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Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2014 Part 4-1-Iraq-23

Turkey is attacking Kurdish fighters instead of ISIS against the wishes of the Obama administration.

Previous: What strategy for Tikrit, Mosul and beyond? To bring meaningful progress against ISIL, the 'spring offensive' must serve a broader political strategy. The United States this week began transferring to Iraq and Gulf bases elite units of the US 82nd Airborne Division. US strategy on Iraq 'not yet complete' – Obama, The US does not yet have a "complete strategy" for helping Iraq regain territory from Islamic State (IS), President Barack Obama has said.

Since ISIS stormed onto the world’s stage on June 10, 2014 with its seizure of Mosul, the Institute for the Study of War has been the institution of record for tracking ISIS.The ISW “ISIS Sanctuary Map” quickly became an iconic image of the conflict ranging across Syria and Iraq.It has been used hundreds of times, in several languages, and adapted for such uses as electronic backdrops on CNN, Fox, and other news broadcasts. When developing a 1,200 year history of Iraq in maps, The National Geographic used only one source for its map of the recent conflict: ISW.The ISIS Sanctuary Maps from the last 14 months (and longer—see below) show how ISW has tracked the conflict and become the recognized expert on ISIS’s expansion.

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As we approach the one-year anniversary of US and coalition airstrikes against ISIS, we have collected all our Sanctuary Maps, along with examples of where they have appeared, to help show the role ISW is proud

to have played in tracking ISIS. The original ISIS Sanctuary map, then call Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), published in September 2013:

Islamic State (Isis) is the catastrophic consequence of political illegitimacy in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, the prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, created a governance vacuum. With the unflagging support of Iran, he disenfranchised and alienated Sunni Arabs through narrow, partisan and utterly sectarian policies. In Syria the vacuum’s creator is Bashar al-Assad – with the enthusiastic backing of Iran, he pursues a political survival strategy of collective punishment, featuring mass homicide focused on civilians. Legitimate governance in both places may be a long way off. But keeping Isis from sinking roots in Syria is an urgent priority, which, if unmet, will enable this criminal band to sustain its combat operations in Iraq from a secure rear area where it will also menace Turkey and Jordan. Political legitimacy

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– a condition in which the citizenry agrees on the rules of the political game – is a tall order for the two countries in question. Can Iraq survive as a state, even as a confederation? Is there a future for Syria within borders drawn during the colonial era? Surely a stable, peaceful and confederated Iraq is not right around the corner. And for Syria, reconstruction, reform, and reconciliation may be generational undertakings.No doubt the process of overcoming the conditions that made large swaths of Iraq and Syria safe for Isis will be a long one. The hardships associated with this process will be borne in large measure by Syrians and Iraqis. Yet to admit that the struggle for political legitimacy will be extended is not to say that the battle against Isis must be a multi-year engagement. Indeed, in Syria it must not be, as this deadly combination of al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein loyalists seeks to establish itself in a country where it has no natural constituency.In Iraq Isis has the advantage of local allies: Sunni Arabs disenfranchised by Maliki and his Iranian backers. In Syria Isis lacks a popular base, and its principal enabler has been the Assad regime. Unless Isis sees something it wants that Assad has – an oil field, a weapons-rich military base, or a town filled with priceless antiquities – it and the regime pursue a live-and-let-live arrangement. Each tries instead to eliminate alternatives to itself and the other. Each, for its own reasons, wishes to be one of the two last political entities standing in Syria. For Assad, facing Isis alone could be his ticket back to polite society: an enemy so loathsome as to be able to appear worse than him. For “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, facing Assad alone – especially if the regime and the west make common cause – would be a recruiting bonanza. Assad is the cause of Syria’s legitimacy crisis. Isis, aside from the humanitarian catastrophe spawned by Assad, is the principal effect. Assad’s barrel bombs and starvation sieges are gifts of incalculable value to Isis. And Isis’s subjugation of eastern Syria is essential to sustain the group’s military operations in Iraq.As the anti-Isis coalition struggles to strangle the organisation in Syria, the Assad regime pumps oxygen into its lungsWashington, London and Paris have found sorting this out to be difficult. They know that it is the Assad regime’s malfeasance that has made eastern Syria safe for Isis. And yet the regime has been given a bye. It was Iran’s dual role as the Isis-abetting facilitator of Assad-regime atrocities and as an interlocutor in nuclear talks – a role Tehran handled with ease – that caused the west to freeze. Should it demand that Iran gets its Syrian client out of the business of mass homicide? Throw sand in the gears of the Assad regime’s barrel-bombing campaign? What? Risk tempting Iran’s supreme leader to walk away from the nuclear talks (and hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions relief and investment)? The Assad regime was left free to do its worst. The result has been a recruiting lifeline to Isis, one offset only in part by an anti-Isis air campaign and a Kurdish militia ground-combat component. As the anti-Isis coalition struggles to strangle the organisation in Syria, the Assad regime pumps oxygen into the caliph’s lungs.An agreed strategy for Syria in which western and regional oarsmen all pull in the same direction is long overdue. Key near-term aims could be to introduce regional ground forces into eastern Syria to rout Isis and stand up a new Syrian government, while stopping Assad regime barrel bombs and strikes on residential areas in western Syria. If the desired end in Syria is a negotiated political solution, Isis must be beaten militarily and the regime atrocities stopped. Otherwise there is no basis for talks.Legitimate governance for all of Syria – and for that matter all of Iraq – is a long way off. Defeating Isis in Syria – where its lack of a popular base makes it most vulnerable – is the essential first step. Time is of the essence. The Assad-abetted Isis malignancy makes time the enemy.

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Iraq army chiefs to stand trial over Ramadi withdrawalPrime Minister Haider al-Abbadi refers commanders to a court martial for abandoning their positions when ISIL took city.16 Aug 2015 Iraqi Prime Minister has approved the decision of an investigative council to refer military commanders to a court martial for abandoning their positions in the battle against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) fighters in Ramadi.Haider al-Abbadi confirmed the decision in a statement on his website on Sunday. Al Jazeera's Mohammed Jamjoom, reporting from Baghdad, said the statement says that all military officials with the rank of officer or above, who left their Ramadi posts without permission, will be court-martialled. "What is not clear is when those court martials will happen, or if any of those members of the military have already [faced proceedings]," he said. ISIL seized Anbar province's capital Ramadi in May, extending its control over the Euphrates valley west of Baghdad and dealing a major setback to Abbadi and the US-backed army he entrusted with its defence. The fall of Ramadi was widely considered as the Iraqi army's worst defeat since ISIL swept through north Iraq June 2014. It led US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter to attribute the setbacks around Ramadi to a lack of will on the part of the Iraqi military. The US estimated in July that there are between 1,000 and 2,000 ISIL fighters in Ramadi.

Saturday, 15 August 2015 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) group has destroyed “70 percent of agriculture infrastructure” including silos southwest of Kirkuk province in Iraq, an farming representative told the independent al-Sumaria News on Saturday.Ihsan al-Jubouri, head of the Kirkuk farmers committee also said “most of the agriculture equipment and machines were stolen and transferred to Syria.” He described the pillaging as costing billions in dinars.

What is the strategy to "degrade and defeat ISIL"? Iraqis and Syrians caught in the middle of the conflict are waiting to know what the "complete strategy" will be. 09 Jun 2015 It has been a month since Ramadi - the provincial capital of Iraq's western province of Anbar - fell to the Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). I was in Baghdad at the time and remember clearly how the US administration and Iraqi government officials played down its significance. They described it as a tactical setback. They said there were "good and bad days in any war and that was a bad day". They also promised to recapture the city.

Well, it has been weeks and ISIL is still as defiant as ever. There have been numerous attacks - many of which involved suicide car bombs that have killed many of Iraq's security forces and Shia paramilitary troops in the province. ISIL has also managed to target the Habbaniyah base - the staging ground from which the counteroffensive is being launched. And what is worse, the counter attack is not being lead by Iraq's army. Instead, the government has had to rely on Iranian backed Shia militias simply because the military is unable to wage the fight ISIL didn't just capture Ramadi. A few days later, they captured the central Syrian city of Palmyra and the last border crossing that was manned by Iraqi and Syrian government forces in Anbar. At the time, there was criticism and calls to review the strategy of the US led coalition against the armed group.

Now, President Barack Obama says the US lacks a "complete strategy" and that Iraqis have a role to play. He talked about the need to speed up the training of the Iraqi army and to include Sunnis in the fight - statements he has repeatedly made in the past.What is the strategy to "degrade and defeat ISIL"? In September the White House outlined what it called "a comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIL".- Support an effective governance in Iraq that would address the legitimate grievances of all Iraqis

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- Deny ISIL safe havens with a systematic campaign of airstrikes- Train and support Iraqi forces- Help the government form National Guard units that would be recruited locally and be responsible for protecting their own communities and securing their own areas- Disrupt ISIL's finances and the flow of foreign fighters

What has happened since? ISIL may have lost some territory but more than 4,000 airstrikes have not stopped the group from taking new and strategic ground in Iraq and Syria.Obama himself acknowledged the flow of foreign fighters through the Turkish border has not stopped. Iraq may have a new prime minister who is seen to be less of a divisive figure than the former premier Nouri Al Maliki but Haidar Al Abadi's ability to rule is in question.He needs the military backing of Shia paramilitary groups who hold power on the ground. They have been leading the battles against ISIL because the army has proven to be weak. It did retreat in the face of ISIL's advance in Ramadi. Iraq's Sunnis are still disgruntled and feel the government hasn't addressed their demands.They have been asking for weapons to wage the battle on their own, but opposition from some Shia politicians in Baghdad have prevented that from happening. The planned National Guard has not been approved by parliament. That is the story in Iraq. Across the border in Syria it is even more complicated. The coalition doesn't have a partner on the ground apart from its unofficial partnership with the Kurds in the northeast. To ultimately degrade and defeat ISIL, it must be done on both battlefields. It also requires political reconciliation in both countries. Iraqis and Syrians caught in the middle of the conflict are waiting to know what the "complete strategy" will be. Source: Al Jazeera

Iraqi Shiite militia commander threatens to attack US BY BILL ROGGIO | June 9, 2015 | Akram Abbas al Kabi, the “secretary general” of the Harakat Nujaba, holds hands with Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah. Image from the League of the Righteous’s website. The leader of a powerful Iraqi Shiite militia that is operating against the Islamic State has threatened to attack the US after members of allied militia were killed in a blast in Anbar province over the weekend. Shiite militias have claimed that the US killed the militiamen in an airstrike, but US officials denied that aircraft were operating in the area when the blast took place. Akram Abbas al Kabi, the “secretary general” of the Harakat Nujaba, an Iranian-backed Shiite militia, blamed the US for a an explosion near Abu Ghraib last weekend that purportedly killed 10 members of the League of the Righteous, or Asaib al Haq. Some Iraqis have claimed that the US executed an airstrike that killed the militiamen. Kabi, who is listed by the US as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist for activities in Iraq, said all Shiite militias will get “vengeance” for the purported airstrike, which was carried out by “the treacherous American aircraft.”“All resistance movements will seek revenge in a timely manner,” Kabi stated. Kabi is the second militia commander who has threatened to attack US interests in Iraq so far this year. In early May, radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr threatened to attack US personnel inside Iraq and beyond if the US House of Representatives passed a bill that would have recognized Kurdistan and the Sunnis in western Iraq as their own independent countries. [See LWJ report, Muqtada al Sadr threatens to ‘unfreeze the military wing,’ attack US interests.]

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Animosity towards the US The Harakat Nujaba leader has a long history of hostility to the United States. Before taking command in July 2013 (the group was founded by Hezbollah Brigades and the League of the Righteous to facilitate the movement of Iraqi fighters into Syria to prop up President Bashir al Assad’s government), he was a military commander in Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army.  He then became the military commander of the League of the Righteous, followed by becoming the group’s interim leader after Qais Qazali was captured by US forces in 2007 until he was released at the end of 2009. Kabi was added to the list of global terrorists in September 2008. Also designated with Kabi was Abdul Reza Shahlai, a deputy commander in Iran’s Qods Force who was involved in the planning and execution of the attack on the Karbala Joint Provincial Coordination Center. Five US soldiers were kidnapped and then executed in the Karbala attack. [See LWJ report, US sanctions Iranian general for aiding Iraqi terror groups.] Kabi directed attacks against US and Iraqi forces during the so-called Mahdi cease-fire imposed by Sadr in the spring of 2008. He provided weapons “for large-scale military operations against Coalition Forces” in early 2008, according to the US government. Kabi likely aided the Mahdi Army and other Shiite terror groups in attacking US and Iraqi troops as they built the security barrier around a large segment of Sadr City. More than 1,000 Mahdi Army fighters were killed during the fighting in Baghdad from April until the Mahdi Army quit the battle in June of that year.

Links with Hezbollah Harakat Nujaba has close ties with Lebanese Hezbollah. The two groups coordinated activities as Iraqi militia fighters entered Syria to battle rebels and jihadists. Harakat Nujaba touts its relationsip with Hezbollah. On its website, the group published a picture of Kabi holding hands with Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah. The two met recently to discuss the security situation in Iraq. Cooperation between the two groups and their leaders goes back more than a decade, when Iran’s Qods Force directed Hezbollah to aide in the establishment and training of what US military commanders used to call the “Special Groups.” Qods Force leader Qassem Soliemani, who is frequently seen on Iraq’s battlefields coordinating with Shiite militias, and commanders such as Abdul Reza Shahlai were instrumental in establishing the Mahdi Army, Hezbollah Brigades, and offshoots such as the League of the Righteous. Hezbollah also aided in the formation of the Special Groups. Musa Ali Daqduq, a top Hezbollah operative who served as the chief of Nasrallah’s bodyguards as well as the head of the terror group’s special operations branch, was ordered to help establish Shia groups in Iraq along the lines of Lebanese Hezbollah, according to the US government.

The US captured Daqduq in Basrah, Iraq in March 2007. Daqduq was released to Iraqi custody in December 2011 as the US withdrew from Iraq with the promise that he would be tried for his war crimes. But in 2012, he was freed by the Iraqi government and immediately traveled to Lebanon. After his release, US intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal said that Daqduq was involved with supporting Iraqi militias fighting in Syria. In its designation of Daqduq as a global terrorist in November 2012, the US Treasury Department said that sometime in 2005, “Iran asked Hezbollah to form a group to train Iraqis to fight Coalition Forces in Iraq.” The designation stated: “In response, Hassan Nasrallah established a covert Hezbollah unit to train and advise Iraqi militants in Jaish al Mahdi (JAM) [or Mahdi Army] and JAM Special Groups, now known as Asaib Ahl al Haq [the League of the Righteous],” a Mahdi Army faction. “As of 2006, Daqduq had been ordered by Hezbollah to work with IRGC-QF [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force] to provide training and equipment to JAM Special Groups to augment their ability to inflict damage against US troops,” Treasury noted. Hezbollah continues to train and support the

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deadly Shiite militias as recently as last summer. In July 2014 Hezbollah celebrated the death of Ibrahim al Hajj, who was described as a Hezbollah “commander” and “a technical trainer.” Hajj was killed while “performing his jihadi duties,” while fighting the Islamic State in the northern Iraqi city of Tal Afar. [See LWJ report, Hezbollah ‘trainer’ killed during fighting in northern Iraq.]

US airstrikes aid Shiite militias despite their open hostility The US military, under the aegis of Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve, the coalition created to “degrade and defeat” the Islamic State, continues to launch airstrikes in support of hostile Shiite militias as they battle the jihadist group for control of northern, central,and western Iraq. The militias have taken the lead against the Islamic State as demoralized Iraqi security forces have performed poorly on the battlefield. The militias operate under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Committee, which was formed after the Iraqi military collapsed as the Islamic State took control of vast areas of Iraq in June 2014. The Popular Mobilization Committee itself is directed by Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, a former commander in the Badr Organization who was listed by the US government as a specially designated global terrorist in July 2009 and was described as “an advisor to” Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani.

The largest and most effective militias in the Popular Mobilization Committee are supported by Iran and include Hezbollah Brigades, which has been designated by the US government as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, Saraya Khorasani, the Badr Organization, the League of the Righteous, Kata’ib Imam Ali (Imam Ali Brigade), Sayyed al Shuhada Brigade, and Harakat Nujaba. Top leaders of the last four groups are listed by the US as specially designated global terrorists. US strike aircraft have helped the Iranian-backed militias advance in Amerli, Jurf al Sakhar, and Tikrit, and are currently supporting the counteroffensive in Ramadi. Despite threats from the Shiite militias and their open hostility towards the US, General (retired) John Allen, the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition To Counter ISIL, or the Islamic State, has sought to reassure the US public that the military is not supporting “extremist elements” of the Popular Mobilization Committee. Caleb Weiss contributed to this report and provided the translation of Akram Abbas al Kabi’s threat.

Dohuk, Iraq June 10, - On one side of a small mountain bordering Dohuk and Nineveh provinces in northern Iraq, rows of soldiers march in green fatigues and red berets, rifles slung across their shoulders. On the other side is Mosul, the de facto Iraqi capital for fighters with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), who seized the territory one year ago today. The fighters in Dohuk are preparing to take Mosul back, although there is no timeline for the offensive, which is being coordinated by Iraqi forces and a global anti-ISIL coalition. "We are under major pressure daily from families and relatives inside Mosul to liberate Mosul," said Mahmoud el-Surchi, a spokesperson for the Dohuk training camp, whose soldiers have been dubbed the National Crowd for Liberating Nineveh. The group is primarily Sunni, but also includes fighters and commanders of various religious and ethnic backgrounds. "We believe the cards are stacked against Daesh [ISIL]," Nineveh told Al Jazeera. "Everyone agrees Daesh should be defeated. We are just waiting for the right time." The operation to retake Mosul, which fell into ISIL's hands in June 2014 after Iraqi security forces fled from the group's rapid advance , was initially expected to begin in April or May

The Peshmerga, the West's Best Defense Against the Islamic StatePosted: 06/09/2015 11:11 am EDT Updated: 06/09/2015

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An anti-ISIS conference was held in Paris on June 2. In attendance was the United States, staunch in its refusal to put soldiers on the ground. As well as Saudi Arabia, which was responsible for the working group on the "resources" of the Islamic State. (Am I dreaming, or did the Saudis have a role in its initial financing?) And Turkey, chairing the group on "movements of combatants." You read that right. Turkey, yes, which everyone knows is one of the main gateways for would-be jihadists coming from, or returning to, Europe! Australia because it was good enough to send a handful of instructors to the Emirates. Iraq, whose army had collapsed two weeks previously in Ramadi. Plus, some 15 representatives of countries such as New Zealand and Belgium that had no apparent reason for being there. But, the only armed forces that, so far, have stood up to the beheaders, the only ones capable of holding a front a thousand kilometers long, the only ones that have not yielded an inch of ground (and have even retaken essential strategic positions near Sinjar and above the Mosul dam), the army without whose help the symbolic city of Kobane would have fallen in January into the hands of the barbarians that had gained control of three-fourths of it -- the Kurdish armed forces, the army of the Iraqi Kurds and its heroic Peshmerga -- were not invited. The incident may appear purely anecdotal. Especially since the absurd meeting in Paris obviously came to nothing. But it is indicative of the hold over the coalition of two actors whose war aims are at the very least problematic. First, Iraq, of which Kurdistan is, administratively, only an "autonomous region" and whose leaders preferred to do without the accounts of the only combatants who had something specific, concrete and positive to report rather than yield an iota of their failed sovereignty. Second, Turkey, whose membership in NATO has, so far, not induced it to deviate from its obsessively anti-Kurd line. "I will do anything and make any alliance," Erdogan seems to think: I am ready to play the card of the most radical and criminal Islamic fundamentalism, rather than take the slightest risk of seeing the Turkish Kurds point to the valor of their brothers in Iraq and remind the international community of their own unacknowledged rights.The situation could not be more tragically clear. Since President Obama will, under no circumstances, commit ground troops, two forces and two forces only, are capable of holding back the Islamic State. The Shiite militias, on the one hand. But this is far from a sure thing. To date, the military capacity of the militias has not been clearly demonstrated. And if it were to be, the price to the region would be a dramatic strengthening of Iran and a multiplication of the cortege of war crimes, collective punishments of Sunnis and Christians, kidnappings, and terror already seen in the villages "liberated" by the "brigades of vengeance." There remains the Peshmerga, who, I repeat, are the only force to have inflicted decisive reversals on the enemy and whose political agenda, proven preference for pluralism, conception of Islam (freedom of conscience, freedom to choose one's faith) and recognition of the role of women in society as in the armed forces are unparalleled in the Muslim world and would become, if the Kurds prevailed, a model for the region. So, are we willing to help the Kurds help us? Will we help them help us to promote the values of democracy and law? To do so would be the reasonable and honorable choice. It is the only possible choice for a coalition that seeks to vanquish terrorism while also saving civilization. But it is true that this solution requires the delivery to Erbil of Milan wire-guided missiles, anti-tank weapons, and tanks, all sorely lacking among the Peshmerga and without which the best fighters in the world ultimately are powerless in the face of the intensely motivated and heavily armed barbarians who have just laid claim to the Iraqi army's arsenals in Ramadi. And it is equally true that such massive military aid would presuppose a firm resolve to override Baghdad's veto, to go against Ankara's cynical calculations, and to sidestep the dangerous trap being set by Tehran -- in short, to oppose the grand strategies of the three empires -- Arab, Ottoman and

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Persian -- that are currently reconstituting themselves, and not in a way that would suggest a return solely of the best of their heritage. In welcoming to Paris in April a group of Peshmerga commanders led by cabinet minister Mustafa Said Qadir, French president François Hollande seemed ready. But where are his allies? What are they waiting for? Are they resigned to let history be written without them -- that is, against them (as typically occurs by default) -- in this new hurricane belt that stretches from Baghdad to Damascus and whose ripples are felt in New York, London, Berlin and Paris? We'll know in a few weeks. Despite their admirable courage, the Kurds won't hold out much longer without reinforcements. Translated by Steven B. Kennedy

The Fight To Document The ISIS Massacre Of The YazidisA year after the rampage, the difficult road to justice.Charlotte AlfredWorld Reporter, The Huffington Post←Posted: 08/15/2015 10:43 AM EDT

Every week, The WorldPost asks an expert to shed light on a topic driving headlines around the world. Today, we speak with Christoph Wilcke about the efforts to document crimes against the Yazidis. The remains of 67 people found in mass graves in northern

Iraq were finally laid to rest this week, Kurdish media reported. They were members of Iraq's Yazidi minority, killed by the Islamic State militant group, also known as ISIS, as it rampaged through the community's homelands near Mount Sinjar one year ago, according to Rudaw news agency.The extremist group, which deems Yazidis to be heretics, massacred several thousand Yazidis and took some 5,000 captive, forcing women and children into sex slavery, according to Yazidi leaders and the United Nations. U.N. human rights investigators said earlier this year their evidence shows that Islamic State militants likely committed genocide, intending "to destroy the Yazidi as a group."In the year since the massacre began, Yazidi activists and the Kurdish semi-autonomous government in northern Iraq have tried to facilitate the escape of hundreds of captives and make sure a suspected genocide does not go unrecorded. But it is dangerous and difficult work, in a region that is still fending off Islamic State attacks.The WorldPost spoke to Christoph Wilcke, senior researcher for the Middle East and North Africa at Human Rights Watch, about his work helping to document crimes committed against the Yazidis. What have you found out through your field work about what happened to the Yazidis since the rise of the Islamic State?From early on, we've been documenting the onslaught on the Yazidis and the thousands who fled to Sinjar mountain and then to the Kurdish region. Since then we've put a focus on documenting and publicizing the enslavement, captivity and sexual abuse of Yazidi women by ISIS. You wrote recently about visiting mass graves. What did you find there? I first tried to help Kurdish authorities get in touch with international experts to document the mass grave sites in January, but when I returned in April I was surprised to find that nothing had happened. So I wanted to go myself and see the state of the graves, the bodies and whether the sites were protected. 

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I went to seven mass grave sites with local police and I found there wasn't a single body there. They said the bodies were decomposed and their bones scattered by wild animals, so they had to collect the remains and other evidence and take it to the Forensic Medicine Institute in Dohuk. It's a pity. If they had international experts, they could have done forensic analysis at the site. Now some of that evidence is

potentially lost.The Kurdish side and the Yazidi side both strongly want the bodies identified, buried and to move on. 

Who is responsible for collecting the evidence?The genocide committee in Dohuk [of the Kurdistan Regional Government] is the body taking the statements of the Yazidis who survived enslavement, captivity and sex slavery. A judge records their statements. They are also in charge of protecting the mass graves.This all took place in Nineveh province, which is technically under the control of [the central Iraqi government in] Baghdad. But the Kurds have long exercised control over the area and expanded it since the rise of ISIS. So, the Baghdad government hasn't set foot in the area. People laugh at me if I ask whether anyone from Baghdad human rights ministry has visited the sites. They say, "For them, we don't exist." People in Baghdad say this was very sad but it's not part of our responsibility and the Kurds are taking care of it. What about international assistance?The U.N. called for more protection of the mass grave sites in January, but it's not high on their priority list, which is perhaps understandable given that they are dealing with the current killings. The Yazidis are in a kind of personal and collective shock, and just thankful for those who survived.After my trip in April, I made calls to international organizations to check that no international experts had gone. No one has taken the initiative. And the Kurds haven't prioritized asking for help. On the one hand, there is a clamor that this was genocide. On the other hand, the effort to gather evidence to make that claim is not really being done. How likely do you think it is that anyone will be held accountable for crimes against Yazidis?Should ISIS perpetrators who are foreign nationals end up returning to London, Paris or Washington, that could lead to the start of proceedings. This may be our best bet to capture and try people.In Iraq, so few ISIS fighters have been captured on the battlefield. There are sleeper cells and sympathizers who have been arrested but they're probably not part of the killing machine. It depends on how much territory Iraq is able to recapture from ISIS. Then they can try Iraqis under Iraqi law. This is not an international armed conflict so they are not prisoners of war. The adjudication is a matter for the Iraqi authorities. Iraq is not part of the International Criminal Court -- it said it would consider joining but has not. Iraq could enter a case for temporary jurisdiction, for certain crimes during a certain time period, but it has not. There is also no law against genocide or war crimes in Iraqi law.

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We hope that there will be accountability. Right now there is a strong sense of collective guilt, that all ISIS are genocidal. In order to move forward, it is important to say this specific person committed a crime. Maybe we will find out that some commanders refused orders. Maybe we will learn something more about the organization. We don't want to label all Sunnis or all Shia or all Kurds guilty. There has to be individual accountability. What did Yazidi survivors tell you about their hopes for justice?In my limited interactions, the call for justice was not their first and foremost priority. The Yazidis are in a kind of personal and collective shock, and just thankful for those who survived. Almost every survivor knows a family member or close relative who did not survive or is presumed captured or enslaved. Their highest priority is getting the captives out alive. They want to survive and rebuild. They are waiting for a decisive victory so they can return and resume their lives. This interview has been edited and condensed for clarity.

ISIS Top Brass Is Iraqi Army's Former Best and BrightestThe experience they bring gives ISIS the military prowess it needs to win and the discipline it needs to weld together jihadis from across the globe Hamza Hendawi and Qassim Abdul-Zahra Aug 08, 2015 read more: http://www.haaretz.com/news/features/1.670177AP - While attending the Iraqi army's artillery school nearly 20 years ago, Ali Omran remembers one major well. An Islamic hard-liner, he once chided Omran for wearing an Iraqi flag pin into the bathroom because it included the words "God is great.""It is forbidden by religion to bring the name of the Almighty into a defiled place like this," Omran recalled being told by Maj. Taha Taher al-Ani.Omran didn't see al-Ani again until years later, in 2003. The Americans had invaded Iraq and were storming toward Baghdad. Saddam Hussein's fall was imminent. At a sprawling military base north of the capital, al-Ani was directing the loading of weapons, ammunition and ordnance into trucks to spirit away. He took those weapons with him when he joined Tawhid wa'l-Jihad, a forerunner of Al-Qaida's branch in Iraq.Now al-Ani is a commander in the Islamic State group, said Omran, who rose to become a major general in the Iraqi army and now commands its 5th Division fighting IS. He kept track of his former comrade through Iraq's tribal networks and intelligence gathered by the government's main counterterrorism service, of which he is a member.It's a common trajectory.Image made from a video purporting to show ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi delivering a sermon at a mosque in Iraq. APUnder its leader, Iraqi jihadi Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State group's top command is dominated by former officers from Saddam's military and intelligence agencies, according to senior Iraqi officers on the front lines of the fight against the group, as well as top intelligence officials, including the chief of a key counterterrorism intelligence unit.The experience they bring is a major reason for the group's victories in overrunning large parts of Iraq and Syria. The officers gave IS the organization and discipline it needed to weld together jihadi fighters drawn from across the globe, integrating terror tactics like suicide bombings with military operations. They have been put in charge of intelligence-gathering, spying on the Iraqi forces as well as maintaining and upgrading weapons and trying to develop a chemical weapons program.

'Necessary ingredient' Patrick Skinner, a former CIA case officer who has served in Iraq, said Saddam-era military and intelligence officers were a "necessary ingredient" in the Islamic

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State group's stunning battlefield successes last year, accounting for its transformation from a "terrorist organization to a proto-state.""Their military successes last year were not terror, they were military successes," said Skinner, now director of special projects for The Soufan Group, a private strategic intelligence services firm.

ISIS militantReuters How officers from Saddam's mainly secular regime came to infuse one of the most radical Islamic extremist groups in the world is explained by a confluence of events over the past 20 years — including a Saddam-era program that tolerated Islamic hard-liners in the military in the 1990s, anger among Sunni officers when the U.S. disbanded Saddam's military in 2003, and the evolution of the Sunni insurgency that ensued.The group's second-in-command, al-Baghdadi's deputy, is a former Saddam-era army major, Saud Mohsen Hassan, known by the pseudonyms Abu Mutazz and Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, according to the intelligence chief. Hassan also goes by Fadel al-Hayali, a fake name he used before the fall of Saddam, the intelligence chief told The Associated Press. Like others, he spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the intelligence.During the 2000s, Hassan was imprisoned in the U.S.-run Bucca prison camp, the main detention center for members of the Sunni insurgency, where al-Baghdadi also was held. The prison was a significant incubator for the Islamic State group, bringing militants like al-Baghdadi into contact with former Saddam officers, including members of special forces, the elite Republican Guard and the paramilitary force called Fedayeen.In Bucca's Ward 6, al-Baghdadi gave sermons and Hassan emerged as an effective organizer, leading strikes by the prisoners to gain concessions from their American jailers, the intelligence chief said.Former Bucca prisoners are now throughout the IS leadership. Among them is Abu Alaa al-Afari, a veteran Iraqi militant who was once with Al-Qaida and now serves as the head of IS's "Beit al-Mal," or treasury, according to a chart of what is believed to be the group's hierarchy provided to the AP by the intelligence chief.

Islamic State group top command is dominated by former officers from Saddam Hussein's military.AP

Iraq's 'governors' Al-Baghdadi has drawn these trusted comrades even closer after he was wounded in an airstrike earlier this year, the intelligence chief said. He has appointed a number of them to the group's Military Council, believed to have seven to nine members — at least four of whom are former Saddam officers.He brought other former Bucca inmates into his inner circle and personal security.Saddam-era veterans also serve as "governors" for seven of the 12 "provinces" set up by the Islamic State group in the territory it holds in Iraq, the intelligence chief said.Iraqi officials acknowledge that identifying IS leadership is an uncertain task. Besides al-Baghdadi himself, the group almost never makes public even the pseudonyms of those in its hierarchy. When leaders are killed, it's often not known who takes their place — and several have been reported killed multiple times, only to turn up alive. Figures are believed to take on new pseudonyms, leaving it unclear if a new one has emerged or not.

In Rakka, Syria: Islamic State fighters control much territory in Iraq and Syria - and seek a foothold in the Sinai too. AP"IS's military performance has far exceeded what we expected. The running of battles by the veterans of the Saddam military came as a shock," a brigadier general in military intelligence told the AP, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive topic. "Security-wise,

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we are often left unable to know who replaces who in the leadership. We are unable to infiltrate the group. It is terrifying."Estimates of the number of Saddam-era veterans in IS ranks vary from 100 to 160 in mostly mid- and senior-level positions, according to the officials. Typically, they hail from Sunni-dominated areas, with intelligence officers mostly from western Anbar province, the majority of army officers from the northern city of Mosul and members of security services exclusively from Saddam's clan around his hometown of Tikrit, said Big. Gen. Abdul-Wahhab al-Saadi, a veteran of battles against IS north and west of Baghdad.For example, a former brigadier general from Saddam-era special forces, Assem Mohammed Nasser, also known as Nagahy Barakat, led a bold assault in 2014 on Haditha in Anbar province, killing around 25 policemen and briefly taking over the local government building.

Tribal links, professional skills Many of the Saddam-era officers have close tribal links to or are the sons of tribal leaders in their regions, giving IS a vital support network as well as helping recruitment. These tribal ties are thought to account, at least in part, for the stunning meltdown of Iraqi security forces when IS captured the Anbar capital of Ramadi in May. Several of the officers interviewed by the AP said they believe IS commanders persuaded fellow tribesmen in the security forces to abandon their positions without a fight.ISIS fighters marching through Raqqa, Syria - but they're also working on gaining a foothold in the Sinai Peninsula.APSkinner, the former CIA officer, noted the sophistication of the Saddam-era intelligence officers he met in Iraq and the intelligence capabilities of IS in Ramadi, Mosul and in the group's de facto capital of Raqqa in Syria."They do classic intelligence infiltration. They have stay-behind cells, they actually literally have sleeper cells," Skinner said."And they do classic assassinations, which depends on intelligence," he said, citing a wave of assassinations in 2013 that targeted Iraqi police, army, hostile tribal leaders and members of a government-backed Sunni militia known as Sahwa. Knowing who to assassinate and how to get to them requires good information, Skinner said, and the IS obviously knew how to acquire it.One initiative that eventually fed Saddam veterans into IS came in the mid-1990s when Saddam departed from the stringent secular principles of his ruling Baath party and launched the "Faith Campaign," a state-sponsored drive to Islamize Iraqi society. Saddam's feared security agencies began to tolerate religious piety or even radical views among military personnel, although they kept a close watch on them and saw to it they did not assume command positions.At the time, the move was seen as a cynical bid to shore up political support among the religious establishment after Iraq's humiliating rout from Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf War and the Kurdish and Shiite uprisings that followed."Most of the army and intelligence officers serving with IS are those who showed clear signs of religious militancy during Saddam days," the intelligence chief said. "The Faith Campaign ... encouraged them."

Mujahedeen In the run-up to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, Saddam publicly invited foreign mujahedeen to come to Iraq to resist the invaders. Thousands came and Iraqi officials showed them off to the media as they were trained by Iraqi instructors. Many stayed, eventually joining the insurgency against American troops and their Iraqi allies.After the collapse of the Saddam regime, hundreds of Iraqi army officers, infuriated by the U.S. decision to disband the Iraqi army, found their calling in the Sunni insurgency. In its early stages, many insurgent groups were relatively secular. But Islamic militants grew in

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prominence, particularly with the creation and increasing strength of Al-Qaida in Iraq. Some Sunnis were radicalized by bitterness against the Shiite majority, which rose to power after Saddam's fall and which the Sunnis accuse of discriminating against them.Al-Qaida in Iraq was initially led by a Jordanian militant, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and had a strong foreign presence in its leadership. But after al-Zarqawi's death in a 2006 U.S. airstrike, his Iraqi successor, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, began to bring in more Iraqis, particularly former Saddam officers. That process was accelerated when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over after his predecessor was killed in a 2010 airstrike.Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's first two deputies, who each played a major role in setting up what would become its sweep over Syria and Iraq, were both Saddam-era officers, according to those interviewed by the AP. They were Sameer al-Khalifawy, an air force colonel killed in fighting in Syria in 2014, and Abdullah el-Bilawy, a former intelligence officer who was killed in Mosul by the Iraqi military in May 2014, a month before the city fell to the Islamic State group. He was replaced by the current deputy, Hassan."It's clear that some of these (Saddam-era officers) must have been inside the core of the jihadist movement in the Sunni triangle from the beginning," said Michael W.S. Ryan, a former senior executive at the State Department and Pentagon, referring to the Sunni-dominated area that was the most hostile to American forces in Iraq."Their knowledge is now in the DNA of ISIS," he said, using an alternate acronym for the extremist group."This melding of the Iraqi experience and what we might call the Afghan Arab experience became the unique ISIS brand," said Ryan, now a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, a Washington-based think tank."That brand ultimately became more successful in Iraq than Al-Qaida in Iraq ... and, at least for now, stronger in Syria than Al-Qaida."read more: http://www.haaretz.com/news/features/1.670177

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