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Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 3-16-CE-8

The head of Russia's Security Council has identified Islamic State (IS) as the greatest threat to world peace and security, and it seems the danger could be getting closer to home.

• The “caliphate” virus is quite widespread among young people.• The militant Islamist group has proclaimed the establishment of a wilayaat, or

province, in Russia's mainly-Muslim North Caucasus, suggesting it may be gaining the upper hand in a battle for control over radical forces there.

• Meanwhile, analysts say most militants who have publicly switched support to IS are largely unknown figures.

• "I don't think they are planning just to separate off a piece of the North Caucasus for themselves, to create a territory controlled by their jihadists," Grigory Shvedov of the internet news agency Caucasus Knot believes. "I think the plan would be to use the region for terror attacks in Russia, which would show their reach and put them 'on the map'," he adds.

• With more and more former members of the Caucasus Emirate pledging allegiance to the “caliphate” of the Islamic State, the situation in the North Caucasus may destabilize further.

• The head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has dismissed claims of an IS province in the region as "bluff", but also said the threat of the IS "virus" was not being ignored.

• The trend of young people flocking to the ranks of the Islamic State is not limited to the Russian regions populated by Muslims.

Islamic State may threaten Russia's CaucasusBy Sarah Rainsford BBC News, Moscow The head of Russia's Security Council has identified Islamic State (IS) as the greatest threat to world peace and security, and it seems the danger could be getting closer to home. The militant Islamist group has proclaimed the establishment of a wilayaat, or province, in Russia's mainly-Muslim North Caucasus, suggesting it may be gaining the upper hand in a battle for control over radical forces there. The statement follows an anonymous audio message posted online pledging allegiance to IS on behalf of militants in four regions. But it remains unclear how far - and high - that support may reach among militants previously loyal to the banned, al-Qaeda-affiliated group Caucasus Emirate, which has long sought to carve out an Islamist state in the region. Caucasus Emirate's presumed head has made no comment. Meanwhile, analysts say most militants who have publicly switched support to IS are largely unknown figures. Rooted in the Chechen separatist movement of the 1990s, Caucasus Emirate has committed numerous terror attacks against civilians, including the Moscow metro bombing of 2010 that killed dozens. But its insurgency has recently focused on Russia's security forces.

Some fear an upsurge in deadly attacks if the network does indeed affiliate itself with IS. "I don't think they are planning just to separate off a piece of the North Caucasus for themselves,

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to create a territory controlled by their jihadists," Grigory Shvedov of the internet news agency Caucasus Knot believes. "I think the plan would be to use the region for terror attacks in Russia, which would show their reach and put them 'on the map'," he adds. It is perhaps that heightened danger, coupled with renewed IS gains in Syria, which prompted a rare phone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Barack Obama on Thursday. The White House says Islamic State was the top issue for discussion: the leaders' last call in February focused exclusively on the Ukraine crisis. "Of course it is in our mutual interest to co-operate on this with the West, though we disagree on other issues," former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told the BBC. "Modern security threats are international, we can't fight them alone," he added - a theme that Russian officials have begun to stress.

C: Do we remember declared intent based upon previous AQSL statements’ and publications as well as many related books. Part of the Seven Phase plan.

'Frustrated rebels' The head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has dismissed claims of an IS province in the region as "bluff", but also said the threat of the IS "virus" was not being ignored. "We will destroy the devils and bandits without mercy," he pledged. Whilst highly controversial, his tough methods have been relatively successful in suppressing the threat from the Caucasus Emirate in Chechnya - but the usual tactics could backfire badly with IS. "I think a lot of rebels, especially the young, are very frustrated and would support a more radical response," believes Grigory Shvedov, and says that IS would back that. Official estimates of how many Russian citizens have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join IS differ, though the most conservative count is more than 1,000. Just this month, 13 potential recruits were returned to Moscow from the Syrian border, including a teenage female student. On Thursday, Russia's Anti-Terrorism Committee said two people killed in Ingushetia were suspected of trying to recruit fighters for IS.

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Popularity of Islamic Sate Soars in Russia and Post-Soviet Space Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 115 June 19, 2015 By: Mairbek Vatchagaev

With more and more former members of the Caucasus Emirate pledging allegiance to the “caliphate” of the Islamic State, the situation in the North Caucasus may destabilize further. What is happening is not the disbanding of one rebel organization and its replacement with a more radical one. Indeed, both rebel organizations have declared the establishment of an Islamic state as their objective (Onkavkaz.com, June 16). The most important change is that the Islamic State has no place for a distinct North Caucasian Muslim identity. Since 2007, when the armed underground movement rejected the idea of establishing an independent Chechen state of Ichkeria in favor of an Islamic state in the North Caucasus, the Islamic resistance forces have drifted increasingly toward a weakening of their identity. In this sense, the North Caucasian militants’ switch to the project of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s “caliphate” is a logical stage in their evolution, especially given that they are not currently in the best shape. Why did the “caliphate” project become so popular among the North Caucasians only now, and not two or three years ago? The most likely answer is that people who were involved with the “caliphate” in the Middle East began to return to the North Caucasus. Such militants frequently fought under North Caucasian commanders in Iraq and in Syria, such as Umar Shishani (Tarkhan Batirashvili). Shishani’s people may have devised a plan for incorporating the North Caucasian militants into the Islamic State. Those few people who returned from the Middle East to the North Caucasus did not run away from war, but rather joined the region’s militarized underground resistance movement. The returnees could very well be the driving force pushing militant commanders to leave the Caucasus Emirate and join the Islamic State at the end of 2014. The “caliphate” virus is quite widespread among young people. If the information provided by the Russian police is correct, over 400 people have left Chechnya for Syria since the start of the conflict to take part in it. Of those, 104 people have been killed, while 44 have returned. The whereabouts of the remaining 250 people are supposedly unknown to the Ministry of Interior and the Federal Security Service (FSB). According to Deputy Chechen Interior Minister Apti Alaudinov, the ministry has launched 88 criminal cases against participants in the Syrian war (RIA Novosti, June 15). These figures raise concerns about the potential impact that North Caucasians currently fighting in the Middle East are having on the situation in the North Caucasus. It is unclear how radical their views on the Russian state will be when they return to the North Caucasus. In reality, thousands of Chechens have been fighting in Syria and Iraq for some time. If hundreds of Dagestanis and Tatars and dozens of Ingush, Kabardins and Russian converts are added to this, the overall picture becomes even bleaker for Russia (Kavkazsky Uzel, June 15). For example, FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov believes that over 200 residents from the Volga region are taking part in the conflict in the Middle East on the side of the Islamists. Bortnikov provided these figures at a joint meeting of the National Antiterrorist Committee (NAK) and the Federal Emergency Headquarters in the Volga region on June 16 (Interfax, June 16). Given the fact that the interior ministry and the FSB branches in Chechnya give figures that are six to seven times smaller than the real ones, it is plausible that the official figures for the Tatar and Bashkir participation in the Middle Eastern conflict are also significantly

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smaller than the actual ones. It is not surprising that even Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently spoke in favor of a joint international effort to fight terrorism that would involve cooperation between Russian and Western intelligence services. Lavrov thinks the intelligences services of all European countries and the United States should share information concerning the threat from the “caliphate” (Interfax, June 11). The trend of young people flocking to the ranks of the Islamic State is not limited to the Russian regions populated by Muslims. The notorious attempt by Moscow State University (MGU) student Varvara Karaulova to travel to Syria and her subsequent arrest (see EDM, June 12) was just one such case. Mariam Israilova, a student at the prestigious, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), is suspected of having joined the Middle Eastern militants. The authorities have been searching for her since June 12, when she left her home for the university and did not return home in the evening. The student’s parents suspect she may have run away to Syria (Meduza.io, June 16). According to the FSB, the Islamic State has recruited 1,400 people in Russia over the last year (Nsn.fm, June 17). This trend is evident in all of the post-Soviet countries: According to one estimate, more than 3,000 nationals from Uzbekistan alone may have gone to Syria (Ozodi.org, November 4, 2014). Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan also have the same problem. Thus, one may observe an acute reaction by societies that for a long time were under the powerful pressure of militant atheism and government-controlled Muslim clerics. If Russia and other former republics of the Soviet Union do not adjust their policies toward religion, they will likely experience strong shocks from supporters of the “caliphate.” By itself there is no way that Russia can cope with this growing problem.

Islamic State is recruiting volunteers in the Caucasus. Russia may be letting them goJul 4th 2015 IN OCTOBER 1832 Russian soldiers besieged the village of Gimry in the mountains of Dagestan in an effort to capture Gazi-Muhammad, the first imam of the Caucasus Imamate, who had defied their rule. He was killed, but his follower, Imam Shamil, jumped over the line of Russian bayonets and escaped. Ever since then, Gimry has been a symbol of defiance and a stronghold of Islamic rule.In the autumn of 2014 Russian soldiers again besieged the village. They were trying to capture Magomed Suleimanov, a native of Gimry who had been proclaimed emir of the Emirate Caucasus, an al-Qaeda-linked insurgency launched in 2007. The soldiers sacked a neighbouring settlement, forced out its population of 1,000 and looted their houses. Mr Suleimanov escaped, but Gimry remains surrounded by Russian soldiers; only residents are allowed in. Yet the Russian army, it seems, is fighting yesterday’s war. While it is still trying to catch Mr Suleimanov, his insurgency seems to be on its way out. “The Emirate Caucasus is dead,” says

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Abdurakhim Magomedov, an aged leader of the puritanical Salafi movement from the village of Novosasitli. “It has not been effective.”The Emirate Caucasus has been replaced by something even nastier: Islamic State (IS). Up to 2,000 young men from Chechnya and Dagestan may be fighting for IS, according to estimates by Russian security experts. Several commanders from the Emirate Caucasus in Chechnya and Dagestan have switched their allegiance to the IS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.Young men are drawn to IS by its perceived strength and success, says Abas Makhmudov, an ex-member of the shura, or Islamic council, of Chechnya and Dagestan. Others speculate that the risks of fighting in Syria are less awful than at home: a young jihadi may be killed, but his killers will not be able to threaten his family back in Dagestan or Chechnya. Mr Makhmudov opposes IS, yet his own son was recently killed fighting for the group in Syria. “I tried to stop him, but he was enticed by his friends and the images on the internet—particularly the ones of atrocities by the Assad regime,” he says. What baffles Mr Makhmudov is how his son, who had a criminal record, obtained the Russian passport needed to travel abroad—even after he alerted the authorities to his son’s intentions. It is even less clear how Nadir Medetov, a radical preacher who had been under house arrest in Dagestan, made his way to the Middle East, where he swore allegiance to IS. In a recent interview Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of Russia’s Security Council, claimed it would be impossible to stop the flow of recruits to IS. Coming from an official of the security apparatus that sealed off the entire region ahead of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, that sounds disingenuous. Most people interviewed for this article who have had contact with those who have gone to Syria suggest that Russian security services have been complicit. “They are certainly not trying to stop them,” says Magomedrasul Saaduev, the chief imam of the central mosque in Makhachkala, Dagestan’s capital.Formally, Russia supports the regime of Bashar Assad and deems IS illegal. It recently outlawed the participation of Russian citizens in armed conflicts abroad with aims that “contradict the interests of the Russian Federation”. (The caveat is presumably meant to distinguish IS fighters from Russians fighting in eastern Ukraine.) However, Russia may hope that letting jihadists leave the country is good riddance. Insurgent activity in the North Caucasus has certainly gone down. The chances of IS militants returning are slim; Russia does, in fact, tightly control its borders. Yet Akhmet Yarlykapov, a Dagestan expert at the Russian Academy of Sciences, says the tactic is short-sighted. Russia itself is faced with a major threat from IS: it recently claimed the entire territory of Caucasus as one of its provinces (see article).Over the past two years, the regional commanders of the Emirate Caucasus pledged not to target civilians and ruled out the use of female suicide bombers. But switching allegiance to IS may entail employing its methods, says Mr Yarlykapov. As a preventive measure, the authorities are piling pressure on anyone who practises Salafism. Ikramudin Aliev, who was fired as a co-ordinator of the pro-Kremlin youth movement in Dagestan for growing a beard, says the authorities are trying to shut down his Salafi mosque by planting weapons and drugs on its clerics. Ziyautdin Uvaisov, a young Salafi imam who opposes IS, argues that instead of letting people like him do his job and educate Muslims, the authorities are radicalising them and pushing them into the hands of IS or the local insurgency. A recent report by Human Rights Watch found that the use of extra-judicial harassment is widespread. Yet while the state can apply force, it can scarcely supply social services or justice. Magdi Kamalov, the editor of Chernovik, an independent newspaper, says the presence of Russian power in Dagestan is mainly decorative. “We see more and more people coming to us for justice,” says Mr Saaduev, the imam of the main mosque in Makhachkala, who adheres to the state-endorsed Sufi creed. Just a few years ago, Dagestan’s Salafi and Sufi leaders were on the

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verge of religious conflict. Now they are uniting in the face of twin threats: IS recruitment and the Russian government’s lawlessness. The Emirate Caucasus might be losing its grip. So, however, is the Russian state.

Kadyrov Plays Down Threat of Islamic State in Chechnya Eurasia Daily Monitor -- Volume 12, Issue 124 On June 26, one day after the Russian security services killed Magomed-Ali Aliev and his wife Leila in Nazran, Ingushetia (Topwar.ru, June 25; see EDM, July 1), law enforcement agencies in the Chechen capital Grozny killed two suspected terrorists. According to the Chechen government forces, the suspects shot at the police when they tried to arrest them and were killed by return fire. Two police officers were wounded in the shootout. The slain individuals were identified as active members of the so-called Tagilov gang, which operates on Chechen territory (Interfax, June 26). The police discovered the rebels in a house on Krenkel Street, in Grozny’s Staropromyslovsky district, while conducting a special operation. The Chechen Ministry of Interior’s press service stated: “Police killed a resident of Alkhan-Kala village of Grozny district of the republic, 23-year-old Mansur Usmanov, and a resident of Orekhovo village in Achkhoi-Martan district, 38-year-old Bislan Baidulaev. In 2013 both joined illegal armed groups. They were involved in a series of attacks on law enforcement agencies and have been on the federal wanted list for more than a year” (RIA Novosti, June 26). According to the police, the two slain suspects were involved in terror attacks in Grozny (Kavkazsky Uzel, June 27). Because they were charged with terrorism-related crimes on Chechen territory, Mansur Usmanov and Bislan Baidulaev, in accordance with Russian law, will be buried in anonymous graves without notification of their relatives. Their bodies will not be returned to their relatives. Nor is the future of their relatives enviable. The official view in Chechnya is that relatives of slain rebels bear part of the blame for not having prevented them from launching attacks. Usmanov and Baidulaev were identified as active members of the Tagilov group, which is under the command of the leader of Chechen militants, Aslan Byutukaev (Kavpolit.com, June 28). Tagilov’s group was previously based in the Achkhoi-Martan and Urus-Martan districts of Chechnya, but it appears that the group also operates in Grozny. A suspected member of the group was arrested in the Chechen capital in February (Kavkazpress.ru, March 23). Apart from the killing of the two suspects, Chechen police also detained four alleged accomplices in Grozny, Achkhoi-Martan and the Achkhoi-Martan district village of Davydenko. The four had allegedly provided various services to the insurgents since October 2013. In particular, according to the police, they gave money, food, USB flash drives and other items to Baidulaev. The authorities have accused the detained individuals of violating the criminal statute on organizing or participating in illegal armed group (95.mvd.ru, June 27). Both insurgent attacks and the actions of government forces against insurgents always provoke a large response from the local media. The last large-scale attack by rebels took place in Grozny on December 4, 2014. The attack was the most significant action by the insurgency in Chechnya in the past several years (Novayagazeta.ru, December 11, 2014). Special operations against rebels in Chechnya are rare nowadays, which is why the public shows a high level of interest in such news, including the report on New Year’s Day this year that two rebels had been killed (Vesti.ru, January 1). Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov tied the July 26 killing of the two suspected militants to the Islamic State (IS). While officially on vacation, Kadyrov gathered the republic’s imams

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and chief mufti, calling on them to step up their work against the ideas of IS, which he called the State of Iblis (the Devil) (Instagram.com, June 28). Kadyrov’s comments can be regarded as an official response to the Chechen rebels who recently pledged fealty to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Rosbalt, June 26). Kadyrov thinks the Chechen rebels have neither the forces nor the opportunity to launch any significant attacks under the flag of the Islamic State (Newsru.com, June 26). Kadyrov said that there is no outflow of people from the republic to join the Islamic State terrorist organization. “We do not see any outflow from our territory; on the contrary—we return our people,” he said, adding that he was confident he would not allow the emergence either of IS members or even IS supporters in the republic (Vz.ru, June 26). The head of Chechnya also said he realized the rebels would, sooner or later, return home, but that anyone who left the Chechen Republic and joined IS had no way back. Kadyrov said parents and relatives of young people should increase their role in preventing further recruitment of youth to terrorist groups. Civil rights activists have criticized Kadyrov for trying to put the blame for young people joining IS on their relatives. According to North Caucasus expert Alexander Cherkasov, harsh methods against militants and the glorification of those methods provoke the insurgents to take counter-actions (Profi-forex.org, June 28). Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev apparently does not share Kadyrov’s assessment that young Chechens are not joining Islamic State, stating recently that the government has not yet been able to stem the outflow (Rg.ru, June 22). The problem may be bigger than the leadership of the republic imagines. More effective than bans and threats against relatives of IS recruits, might be for the government to seek a common platform with the Islamic world and—through that influence—with young people, thus clarifying the youths’ misconceptions about the Islamic States’ “caliphate.”--Mairbek Vatchagaev

Amid defections, Islamic Caucasus Emirate publicly recognizes new leaderBY THOMAS JOSCELYN | July 6, 2015 |

This image of Abu Usman, the new leader of the Islamic Caucasus Emirate, was posted on Vilayat Dagestan’s Twitter feed on July 1.

Russian forces killed Ali Abu Muhammad al Dagestani, the emir of the al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic Caucasus Emirate (ICE), in April. In the weeks that followed, jihadists on social media spread rumors that a senior ICE sharia official known as Muhammad Abu Usman had been named as his successor. It does not appear, however, that ICE formally

announced Abu Usman’s new role.

Then, on July 1, the official Twitter feed for Vilayat Dagestan, one of ICE’s so-called “provinces,” identified Abu Usman as ICE’s emir. The Twitter feed posted three images of the jihadist. One of the three (shown on the right) trumpeted the

fact that the head of the Vilayat Dagestan, Said Arakanskiy, had sworn allegiance to Abu Usman.

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The new messages were undoubtedly influenced by the Islamic State’s successful recruitment drive in the Caucasus region. Since late last year, a number of ICE defectors have pledged their allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s “caliphate.” One of the most significant defections came in early December 2014 when Rustam Asilderov, the previous head of Vilayat Dagestan, announced his allegiance to Baghdadi. Asilderov released a video in which he claimed that a “majority” of the jihadists in Dagestan shared his desire to join the Islamic State and, therefore, his bayat (oath of allegiance) to Baghdadi was “on behalf of the mujahideen of the Dagestan province.” Asilderov’s video drew a sharp backlash from Ali Abu Muhammad al Dagestani and Abu Usman, both of whom blasted his “treachery.” And Ali Abu Muhammad appointed Arakanskiy as Asilderov’s replacement. [See LWJ report, Dagestani jihadist swears allegiance to Islamic State, invoking backlash.]

But the defections kept coming.

During the first half of 2015, other ICE commanders and fighters joined the Islamic State as well. In mid-June, the Chechen ICE commander Aslan Byutukayev announced that he, too, had become one of Baghdadi’s men. Byutukayev, who is also known as Emir Khamzat, has a compiled a thick dossier of terrorist attacks. He is known as a specialist in directing suicide bombing operations. On June 21, an audio message released online featured an unknown jihadist claiming to speak on behalf of all of his comrades in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia. The jihadist claimed that all of the fighters in these “provinces” were “united” in their decision to swear fealty to Baghdadi. This led Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al Adnani to announce just two days later, on June 23, that the “caliphate” now has a new wilayat (or province) in the Caucasus. Adnani said that Baghdadi had accepted the pledges of allegiance coming from the Caucasus and “has appointed the noble sheikh Abu Muhammad al Qadari as Wali [or governor] over” the region. Adnani called for all the mujahideen in the Caucasus “to join” Qadari’s “caravan and to hear and obey him in everything except sin.” It appears that Qadari is Rustam Asilderov, the same ICE leader in Dagestan who defected last year. One of Asilderov’s known aliases is very similar to “Abu Muhammad al Qadari,” the same name used by Adnani. This dynamic has set up a showdown in the Caucasus between ICE loyalists and the Islamic State’s growing “province.” It is not clear how many fighters are in each camp, but the Islamic State’s surge of support has clearly caused problems for al Qaeda, which has long backed ICE.

In January, sharia officials from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Al Nusrah Front (al Qaeda’s official branch in Syria), as well as other al Qaeda-linked jihadists, issued a joint statement denouncing the Caucasus jihadists who had defected to Baghdadi. The al Qaeda ideologues argued that the Islamic State’s self-declared “caliphate” was illegitimate, because it lacked the proper theological credentials. The statement’s authors also endorsed Ali Abu Muhammad al Dagestani as head of ICE, writing that his appointment to that position was a “blessing.” In early March, AQAP again came to ICE’s aid. The group released a video calling on Muslims to provide financial and other assistance to the Caucasus jihadists. The video featured a review of the history of jihad in the region, as well as footage of al Qaeda leaders. In return, ICE has repeatedly demonstrated its allegiance to al Qaeda. Ali Abu Muhammad was an al Qaeda loyalist and openly praised Ayman al Zawahiri as his “leader.” Under Ali Abu Muhammad’s leadership,

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ICE regularly eulogized fallen al Qaeda bigwigs, including AQAP officials who openly supported ICE against its Islamic State rivals. For instance, Vilayat Dagestan, which is part of ICE, praised AQAP’s Harith bin Ghazi al Nadhari after his death was confirmed earlier this year. (Al Qaeda’s branches also issued eulogies for Ali Abu Muhammad after Russian troops finally tracked him down in April.)

ICE has continued to demonstrate its loyalty to al Qaeda under Abu Usman’s leadership.

On June 16, Vilayat Dagesan’s Twitter feed posted a statement honoring Nasir al Wuhayshi, who served as AQAP’s emir and al Qaeda’s general manager until he was killed in a US drone strike. Vilayat Dagestan’s statement, which was endorsed by Abu Usman, can be seen on the right. It remains to be seen how strong the ICE’s remaining cadre of fighters is. Abu Usman and Arakanskiy clearly have their work cut out for them, as their jihadist rivals have

grown stronger over the past year. If the battlefields elsewhere are any indication, the Islamic State’s followers in the Caucasus will do what they can to undermine the ICE’s leadership even further.

Popular North Caucasian Islamic Preacher Turns Up in the Middle East and Joins Islamic State Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue:

99 May 28, 2015 By: Mairbek VatchagaevNorth Caucasian Islamist Preacher Nadir Abu Khalid (Source: Caucasian Knot)One of the most “fashionable” Islamic preachers in the North Caucasus, Nadir Medetov, has unexpectedly surfaced in the ranks of the Islamic State (IS) in the Middle East after being put under house arrest by the Russian security services for the past 6–7 months. How Medetov “evaded” house arrest and now suddenly appeared in the Middle East pledging allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State is one of several questions about this militant preacher of Islam, who is quickly becoming a fixture of the North Caucasus militants fighting in the Middle East. Better known on the Internet as Nadir Abu Khalid (Jamaatshariat.com, May 23), Medetov studied in the Sharia department of the Islamic University of Medina, in Saudi Arabia. The jihadists dubbed him a sheikh, even though he was not formally one: the only feature of a sheikh Nadir Abu Khalid possessed was that he could perform the davaat (call). He did not write anything that could have put him on a par with fairly ordinary Middle Eastern sheikhs. In a professionally made video, Nadir Abu Khalid is shown in a mosque saying how happy he is to be in the Caliphate and taking an oath of allegiance to Islamic State’s leader, Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Receiving Nadir Abu Khalid’s pledge in the otherwise empty mosque is Abu-Jihad, a.k.a. Islam Seit-Umarovich Atabiev, a 31-year-old native of the village of Ust-Jeguta in Karachaevo-Cherkessia who was well-known during the period when a separate Karachay jamaat still existed. Abu-Jihad is an important figure in the system of the Caliphate since he reports to Umar al-Shishani and is responsible for recruiting North Caucasians. The IS apparently shot this video for propaganda purposes and staged a special reception for the new arrival. Abu-Jihad is Umar al-Shishani’s right hand man who specifically targets the North Caucasians in Syria and Iraq as part of his informational campaign. Nadir Abu Khalid is shown in the video with a Kalashnikov in his lap still wearing his backpack like he just got off a bus from Makhachkala (YouTube, May 23), in an apparent

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attempt to show the resolve of the new arrival to enter the war immediately after taking the oath. The video is a high-quality, professionally made piece. The video says that Nadir Abu Khalid was detained by Russian authorities and forced to choose this path. It is unclear whether he would have joined Islamic State if the authorities had not detained him and put him under house arrest for the past 6–7 months. According to the video, the preacher was detained on October 8, 2014, and spent over half a year under house arrest by the Russian security services. It is quite rare for Islamic preachers to be placed merely under house arrest in Russia, and it is particularly strange in this case given that the police claimed they found arms in his car (although the weapons may have been planted there to provide the pretext for his arrest (Kavkazsky Uzel, October 28, 2014). Nadir Abu Khalid was also known outside of Dagestan. Thanks to his intensive posting of videos on the Internet, he was acknowledged and respected in the North Caucasus, especially among young people. He did not call for jihad or disobedience; instead, Nadir Abu Khalid’s lectures were focused on Islamic lessons, the values of Islam and examples from the personal life of the Prophet (Archive.org, accessed May 28). Ahlu Sunna, a Salafist organization in Dagestan that operates officially and distinguishes itself from the armed underground movement, ardently defended Nadir Abu Khalid after he was arrested. Despite being under constant surveillance by the security services and the police as a consequence of his house arrest, Nadir Abu Khalid still managed to leave not only Dagestan, but also the Russian Federation, and reach territory under the control of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. It is also unclear why a popular preacher from the North Caucasus went so far away from home when he could have joined militant jihadists in Dagestan. At the time of his detainment by police, Nadir Abu Khalid may have disliked the leader of the Caucasus Emirate, Aliaskhab Kebekov, and thus chose not to join the homegrown Islamic organization. However, now that some militants in the North Caucasus have pledged allegiance to the caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the preacher could have joined the Islamic State without leaving his home region. Yet, Nadir Abu Khalid ignored all his friends from the local jamaat and went to the Middle East to die for the caliph there. Does that mean he considered the efforts of the local jihadists in the North Caucasus worthless, not worth of dying for? If so, why did he not criticize them? A reference to the call by al-Baghdadi to travel to the land of Islam (Ia800309.us.archive.org, accessed May 28) is nothing but self-justification: it does not explain the position of Nadir Abu Khalid, who spread Salafist ideas in Dagestan. Nadir Abu Khalid’s arrival in the Middle East may spark an exodus from Russia of young people who trusted him. That was the purpose for shooting the video of him taking an oath of allegiance to al-Baghdadi. Clearly he will replace Abu-Jihad as the preacher to the North Caucasians fighting in Iraq and Syria—unless he is dispatched to the frontlines to die heroically for the caliph. Thus, Nadir Abu Khalid’s flight from Russia to the Middle East may further increase his influence in the minds of young people who have been deceived by preachers and who advance the idea of building the “true” Islamic State in the Middle East.

Islamic State Causes Turmoil and Divisions Among North Caucasus Militant LeadersPublication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 104June 4, 2015 By: Mairbek Vatchagaev (Source: Kavkaz)

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The amir (commander) of the Khasavyurt jamaat, Islam Abu Ibragim (a.k.a. Islam Muradov), recently declared that Muslims in Dagestan should pay a tax to the Islamic State (IS). Ibragim is among those militants who left the Caucasus Emirate and pledged allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and the amir of Khasavyurt has demanded that Muslims on his territory pay zakat (Muslim property tax) exclusively to him (YouTube, May 25). Ibragim’s nervous speech in front of the video recorder evidently suggests he has experienced difficulties securing funds for his jamaat. Citing the famous Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, he demands financial help from businesses and also differentiates between taxes and voluntary donations. Ibragim further states that he will not issue warnings anymore, but will switch to punishing people. For the duration of his 13-minute video, Islam Abu Ibragim repeats two dozen times who the Muslims of Khasavyurt district should pay their tax to. He repeats again and again that the district’s treasury is in his hands and only he will distribute the funds. Such public speeches are rare among the militants, and this one creates a negative impression of the armed Islamic resistance in the North Caucasus. Khasavyurt is one of Dagestan’s largest districts and is second only to Makhachkala in terms of the size of financial flows. The largest marketplace in the North Caucasus is located in Khasavyurt, so the struggle for money is the primary activity of the insurgency in the district. Islam Abu Ibragim is known among the rebels for his strange ability to leave the scene of special operations by the security forces just before they start. Moreover, his jamaat does not seem to have many members. Back in 2014, when he was still an amir within the structures of the Caucasus Emirate, he never was flanked by more than ten people, usually wearing masks (Daily Motion, summer 2014). The fact that they wore masks suggested they were not open militants, but rather people who resided in their homes in the villages and provided support to the jamaat clandestinely. Islam Abu Ibragim has a better known and tougher rival -- amir Suleiman (a.k.a. Suleiman Zaylanabidov) of the Aukhov jamaat. Suleiman was the first North Caucasus militant leader to quit the Caucasus Emirate and pledge allegiance to the Islamic State (kavkaz-uzel.ru, Novеmber 27, 2014). Both the Khasavyurt and the Aukhov jamaats operate in Khasavyurt district and the city of Khasavyurt, but are under the command of two different Velayats. The Aukhov jamaat is part of Nokhchiycho (Chechen) Velayat, while the Khasavyurt jamaat is part of the Dagestani Velayat. The Aukhov jamaat has influence in those areas of Dagestan with predominant Chechen populations. The Khasavyurt jamaat has influence over a large part of the city of Khasavyurt and the adjacent areas, which have a majority non-Chechen population. Ethnic Avars, Kumyks and Russians are reportedly fighting in the ranks of the Aukhov jamaat along with Chechens (Audio recording of the Aukhov jamaat’s address to Islam Abu Ibragim, Kavkazpress.ru, May 26). The amir of the Aukhov jamaat also became famous for his demand that Aliaskhab Alibulatovich Kebekov, a.k.a. Ali Abu Mukhammad, the man who succeeded Doku Umarov as leader of the Caucasus Emirate after Umarov was killed in the fall of 2013, pledge allegiance to the Islamic State. (Kebekov was killed in April of this year.) The rivalry between amir Islam Abu Ibragim and amir Suleiman developed against the backdrop of a dispute over dividing weapons between their groups. Amir Suleiman accused amir Islam Abu Ibragim of illegally seizing his weapons while he was under arrest. The Caucasus Emirate’s websites, meanwhile, claimed amir Suleiman to be an agent of Russia’s FSB (Federal Security Service) (Kavkaz Center, Novеmber 27, 2014). Amir Suleiman’s strange release and his ostracism by Caucasus Emirate militants may have pushed him to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State and launch a campaign to dismantle the Caucasus

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By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

Emirate. Amir Suleiman practically managed to retain all of his jamaat, which apparently accepted his story that he had managed to escape the clutches of the FSB. The two rival amirs, it should be noted, are ethnic Chechens, but Amir Suleiman regards the Aukhov district, which is ethnically Chechen but has been part of Dagestan since 1922, as belonging to the Chechen Velayat, while amir Islam Abu Ibragim regards that district as part of the Dagestani Velayat. Thus, the clash between the amirs has acquired an ethnic dimension. It is unclear who represents the Caucasus Emirate in Khasavyurt district, given that in the wake of the defection of the amirs of the Aukhov and Khasavyurt districts to the Islamic State, it will be hard to find someone in the area aligned with the Caucasus Emirate who will be able to challenge them. The two amirs who switched sides to the Islamic State will also find it difficult to compete for financial support among local businesses if the Caucasus Emirate finds a representative in the district. Local businesses will then pit the militant groups against each other in order to avoid being taxed several times. The situation of the militants who declared support for the Islamic State is quite odd in itself. The leadership of the Islamic State has not reacted to their pledges of allegiance or given any indication that such pledges are desired. This is always the case with Russia: Osama bin Laden also did not bother Russia much and did not accept the Caucasus Emirate as a member of his organization. The current leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, also is in no hurry to proclaim the armed Islamic rebels of the North Caucasus as members of al-Qaeda’s worldwide terrorist network. Thus, the militants who switched sides from the Caucasus Emirate to the Islamic State are divided over whether it was a prudent move. It will become clear in the near future whether the Caucasus Emirate can take advantage of these divisions.

Two North Caucasus Rebel Leaders Face Off in Islamic State–Caucasus Emirate Dispute Eurasia Daily Monitor -- Volume 12, Issue 120 Following multiple pledges of allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) by rebel amirs in Chechnya and Dagestan, a new statement, allegedly on behalf of all of the former amirs of the Caucasus Emirate appeared on the Internet on June 21 (Sitemultimedia.org, June 21). A voice with a Chechen accent reads the text of the oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which declares: “We testify that all Mujahideen of the Caucasus—in the Velayats of Nokhchiycho [Chechnya], Dagestan, Galgaicho [Ingushetia] and KBK [Kabarda, Balkaria and Karachay]—are united in their decision and we do not have differences among ourselves.” Nothing has been heard from the amir of the KBK Velayat, Salim (a. k. a. Zalim Shebzukhov), on this issue; in any case, the Russian security services claim he was killed in April 2015 (Kavkazsky Uzel, April 16). In January 2015, Amir Salim took the side of the then-amir of the Caucasus Emirate, Abu Muhammad (Aliaskhab Kebekov), in his conflict with supporters of IS (Liveleak.com, January 10). The KBK leader may also have switched sides to IS after Chechen Amir Khamzat (Aslan Byutukaev) pledged allegiance this organization. It would be hard for the KBK jamaat to survive without switching to IS after their Chechen fellow insurgents did so. While this latest oath of allegiance claims that all the militants of the North Caucasus are now loyal to IS and ready to fight on the orders of al-Baghdadi, in fact this is not yet the end of the Caucasus Emirate. There is still one well-known amir who is loyal to the Caucasus Emirate—Abu Usman Gimrinsky (Magomed Suleimanov), the Emirate’s qadi (Muslim judge) and amir of the group’s Mountainous Sector of Dagestan. Late last year and in January of this year, he repeatedly harshly criticized all those who pledged allegiance to IS (Alaninform.wordpress.com, December 26).

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By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

At one point there were rumors Abu Usman had been appointed amir of the Caucasus Emirate. But such appointments are not kept secret, and the group’s sources would have announced such a development by now. Not many persons are currently available for the position of Caucasus Emirate leader, so Abu Usman’s appointment as leader of the remaining Caucasus Emirate forces would be logical. He is a 39-year-old native the village of Gimry, the birthplace of Gazi-Muhammad, the first imam of Dagestan, and Shamil, the imam of Dagestan and Chechnya. After graduating from the al-Fatih Islamic Institute in Damascus, Abu Usman preached in Gimry’s mosque. In 2007, the preacher joined the underground movement, but a year later he returned to civilian life. In 2009, Abu Usman joined the militants once again. Since then, the Muslim cleric has led the militants of the Mountainous Sector of Dagestan. In 2010, he became the qadi of all Dagestan (Grani.ru, May 28). The official website of the Caucasus Emirate’s representative abroad—Akhmad Umarov, the brother of the group’s late leader, Doku Umarov—has not been updated for the past two weeks and has not provided any comments about what is going on inside the group (Checheninfo.com, June 24). What happens to the remaining members of the Caucasus Emirate will become clearer in the near future. In any case, they will have to make a choice, and it is unlikely that they will choose an isolated existence. According to Russian experts, the Caucasus Emirate has become obsolete and its members have pledged allegiance to a person they believe has leadership qualities—IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. However, one leading Russian expert on the North Caucasus, Akhmet Yarlykapov, thinks that it is too early to discount the Caucasus Emirate. “I contend that the ‘Emirate’ has been weakened but still is present in the form of cells,” he told the Kavkazsky Uzel website. “I do not know yet to what extent those cells have switched [their allegiance] to IS. It is too early to discount the ‘Emirate,’ but the trend is that it is slowly losing ground” (Kavkazsky Uzel, June 23). Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has supposedly appointed Abu Muhammad Kadarsky (Rustam Asildarov) as the amir of the newly-established Velayat Kavkaz. Murad Attaev, a Russian-speaking representative of IS on Twitter who resides in Germany, reported this via his account (Twitter.com, June 23). Abu Muhammad Kadarsky was the amir and wali (guardian) of Dagestan in the Caucasus Emirate’s system—a position Doku Umarov appointed him to in August 2012. Even though Kadarsky was born in Kalmykia, his family comes from the village of Kadar, in the Kadar zone of Dagestan’s Buinaksk district. Born in 1981, the 38-year-old Kadarsky has been in the ranks of the insurgency nearly for the past ten years. In 2007, he was arrested and sentenced to a prison term. However, Dagestan’s Supreme Court exonerated him, which allowed him to resume his insurgent activities (Kavkazpro.ru, accessed June 26). Kadarsky has been on the federal wanted list since 2011, on charges of manslaughter and arms trafficking (05.mvd.ru, accessed June 26). The authorities suspect him of involvement in attempts on the lives of law enforcement agents, the killing of five hunters in Dagestan’s Karabudakhkent district, the shooting of four men in a forest in Dagestan’s Buinaksk district, the killing of sheikh Said Chirkeisky, and many other crimes. The Islamic States has essentially appointed this odious figure as its representative in the North Caucasus. Thus, two strong figures in the armed underground of the North Caucasus currently are at loggerheads over whether to belong to the Caucasus Emirate or the Islamic State, and both of them are from Dagestan. Their differences are so significant that it is hard to predict what they will do in the near future. --Mairbek Vatchagaev

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By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

Georgia’s Anaklia Port May Alter Balance of Power Near Russian-Occupied Abkhazia On June 9, the Georgian government finally selected two winners, two consortia that are to move to the final stage of the bidding process to design, construct and operate the deep sea port of Anaklia, on Georgia’s Black Sea cost. Both consortia are owned by Georgians. The first one, Anaklia Industrial Eco-Park and Port, was founded by Teimuraz Karchava, a Georgian businessman who owns some enterprises in Russia and also is connected to the thermal power plant project in Armenia. The second winner, Anaklia Development Consortium, was started by Mamuka Khazaradze, the chairman of TBC Bank’s supervisory board. He joined up with the US company Conti Group, which develops and builds capital assets projects. Out of these two consortia, one will be selected to launch the construction of the port in spring 2016 (Ipress.ge, Civil Georgia, June 9). The economic as well as political significance of Anaklia’s planned deep sea port is hard to underestimate. Its cargo capacity should reach 40 million tons annually by the twelfth year of its operation. This will far exceed the cargo capacity of the other two major Georgian ports, Poti and Batumi, which can handle only smaller, “feeder” vessels and are dependent mostly on the port in Istanbul, Turkey. There, Georgian-bound cargo is reloaded from larger panamax-size ships to smaller vessels to be then transported to Georgia (Civil Georgia, June 9). Anaklia port promises to address that problem, promising to turn the facility into a major hub in the Black Sea, particularly along the sea’s eastern basin, rivaling Turkish ports in the region. Moreover, Anaklia is expected to revitalize the struggling Georgian economy in the medium and long term, bringing much needed revenues to the state treasury. Anaklia’s biggest impact, both economic and political, will be on the Russian-occupied Georgian region of Abkhazia, however. Anaklia sits right on the edge of this breakaway territory, where the Enguri River, which separates Abkhazia from the rest of Georgia, merges with the Black Sea. If Anaklia succeeds as a major port, it will certainly become a draw for thousands of impoverished Abkhazians, who are struggling under crushing poverty. Moreover, Anaklia promises to revitalize the surrounding region of Samegrelo. This revitalization may create a success story right on the doorstep of neighboring Abkhazia. If successful, Samegrelo’s development might encourage some groups within the separatist Abkhazian region to question the rationale of continued “independence” under Russian occupation, which has so far been accompanied by little more than economic impoverishment and bleak prospects ahead. In addition, if Anaklia emerges as a major port city on the eastern Black Sea coast, it may facilitate further deterioration in the importance of Abkhazia’s capital of Sukhumi and other coastal cities, which had already gone into decline after the 1992–1993 war and the ensuing expulsion of Georgians from this once sprawling region. Hence, Abkhazians will have more reason to reevaluate their stance on many political issues with regard to their relations with Tbilisi. Because of all these reasons, Anaklia will likely have a major pull factor to attract the estranged Abkhazians closer to Georgians and possibly build bridges between the communities. Certainly, Anaklia cannot and will not be a panacea to the problem of a separatist Abkhazia. Nor will this port bring immediate changes in that regard. This backwater coastal village still has a long way to go to becoming a sprawling port city. Yet, Anaklia certainly has the

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potential to transform itself into a regional hub and gradually alter the economic and political balance of power in northwestern Georgia, near Abkhazia, in the medium and long term. Paradoxically, the Anaklia port project started out as a highly controversial endeavor in Georgia. The project was launched by President Mikhail Saakashvili’s administration. Saakashvili, while building Anaklia port, declared that he, in fact, was building a new city named Lazika, referring to the ancient and powerful Georgian kingdom that existed in this part of Georgia back in the first millennium CE. Many, including today’s ruling Georgian Dream coalition, which was then in the opposition, heavily criticized the idea of building a new Black Sea port city as an unrealistic undertaking, especially against the background of poverty-stricken Georgia’s colossal socio-economic problems (For.ge, October 8, 2012; Tspress.ge, November 2, 2012). Some even blamed Saakashvili for pilfering the idea of building Anaklia port from someone else. The above-mentioned businessman Temur Karchava, now the head of Anaklia Industrial Eco-Park and Port, claimed back in 2012 that the idea belonged to him, not to Saakashvili, and that President Saakashvili simply stole it from him (Geworld.ge, July 11, 2012). After coming to power, the Georgian Dream–led coalition quietly dropped the name Lazika from the project. However, realizing its economic potential, the new government agreed to build a port and soon claimed the entire Anaklia project was Georgian Dream’s brainchild (Frontnews.ge, September 27, 2014). Former president Saakashvili pushed back, reasserting that the project was his idea. Nevertheless, he encouraged the current government to realize his plans (Radiotavisupleba.ge, November 11, 2013). With political quarrels around Anaklia now apparently resolved, the project seems to be steadily moving forward. Although its effects will not be felt immediately, Anaklia port promises to alter the balance of power with regards to Russian-occupied Abkhazia in the medium and long term. With few, if any, mechanisms left to have any impact on the breakaway territory, Georgia views the new port with hope and expectation. --Vasili Rukhadze

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