Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator Part 2014 Part 4-1-AQAP-10From Capt (Ret) C de Waart. Please feel free to share in Confidence.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has promised "total war on all crusaders"AQAP official; “You will not dream of safety until we actually live it in Palestine and all

Muslim countries.”

Cees: In recent weeks, every major terrorist assault has brought with it questions about the possible involvement of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the group known as Isis. The truth is that, in many countries in the Muslim world, Isis may have sympathisers but it does not yet have well-established roots. Well before the attacks, however, al-Qaeda had spent nearly 20 years building up contacts and cells in Sudan1, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The Islamic State, in its fight for supremacy, hopes to put Al Qaeda in the unenviable position of accepting a caliphate led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. However, IS’s attempt to unite the Ummah (Muslim community) by demanding Muslims identify as those who believe in haqq (truth) from those who believe in batil (falsehood), creates a dilemma among jihadists worldwide: join the caliphate or risk their lives opposing it.

The Hidden War between IS and Al Qaeda December 19, 2014 The Islamic State (IS) has recently found itself the center of international media attention, primarily because of its unexpected expansion and recent brutality toward Western journalists2. IS, an organization combining elements of jihadist and Salafist teachings, is often mislabeled as a branch of Al Qaeda. However, the two organizations could not be more different from one another—both in ideology and in their quest for supremacy. Indeed, in its early stages, IS was an offshoot of Al Qaeda. Abû Mus’ab az-Zarqâwî, a Jordanian jihadist, created the movement after the American invasion of Iraq, and in 2004 it became the official branch of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). But AQI began to diverge from its parent organization, and two years later joined the Iraqi Mujahideen Shura Council, a group of disparate jihadi factions, which granted leadership positions to Iraqis jihadists before foreign-born jihadists. Then, on October 15, 2006, the Council was disbanded after integrating another 30 Iraqi tribes and renamed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The founding of ISI marked the official end to the Al Qaeda-affiliation and beginning of a new era, in which the two organizations’ interests would deviate both militarily and politically. IS, which it renamed itself in June 2014, seeks to establish a universal Islamic caliphate. To accomplish this goal, it targets its closest enemies: Shias from Syria to Iran. The movement is also notably homogenous in ideology and messaging. IS believes that once it conquers territory, it must implement sharia law and begin its own rule of governance.

1 Ambassador Bola Dada, Nigeria, Whatever the strategy they made that time, there is a link to what is happening now. When Sudan came under pressure during the US Bill Clinton era, they sent Bin Laden away. Osama Bin Laden had established himself there. In fact, one of his wives was the daughter of the Speaker. So when Sudan was under pressure to send Osama Bin Laden away, he decided to divide his Al-Qaeda army into three; he took the first team to Afghanistan and kept the second team in Sudan; the third group he sent out to be disturbing the whole world, including Magreb which is close to Mali, Chad and Niger. I raised an alarm in 2001 that Al-Qaeda was in Nigeria – that Al-Qaeda had penetrated Nigeria through Chad. Then when I got wind of the distribution of Osama Bin Laden Al-Qaeda groups, I reported. I told them to check our borders between Mali, Niger, and Chad – that Al-Qaeda was on the move. They call it Afikaya, a doctrine that all African states must be governed by Muslims. . I got wind of it in one document. I read it with my eyes that all African countries must be governed by Muslims and any country that is mistakenly being ruled by a Christian, they should make life difficult for him. They said it’s the injunction of the Quran. I read it. [1] http://www.punchng.com/news/i-was-chased-out-of-sudan-when-i-raised-the-alarm-about-boko-haram-ambassador-bola-dada/

2 http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/12/19/hidden-war-between-and-al-qaeda

On the other hand, Al Qaeda’s mission is more global in scope. Since 1998, when Osama Bin Laden issued the infamous statement titled “World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders,” its main target remains the West, and the U.S. in particular. The highly heterogeneous organization has multiple independent branches, including Jabhat Al-Nusra in Syria, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI) in Algeria, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The reason for the stark ideological differences between the two groups may lie in the existing generation gap. Al Qaeda’s fighters came of age and trained in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s, and IS’s fighters rose to prominence after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in the mid-2000s. Given their difference in historical reference points, the two groups are currently employing disparate strategies in the Middle East.An example of these aforementioned differences can be seen in Syria, the site of multiple wars. After the Arab Spring, IS sent a small delegation to Syria, called Jabhat al-Nusra (meaning “Victory Front”). This group soon became extremely powerful and nearly an independent branch of IS. To maintain control of its Syrian branch, Abû Bakr al-Baghdâdî, leader of IS since 2010, announced in April 2013 the merging of the two groups and the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Abû Muhamad al-Jûlânî, leader of the Nusra Front, rejected this decision, though he acknowledged his financial ties with IS. In June 2013, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who succeeded to Bin Laden as leader of Al Qaeda, recognized the Nusra Front as part of Al Qaeda. He also stated that the Islamic State in Iraq needed to leave Syria. al-Baghdâdî protested and his spokeperson, al-‘Adnani, affirmed that IS would not accept geographical limitations on the basis of the Sykes-Picot agreement.

IS seeks to re-establish the Abassid Caliphate (AD 750-1258)This led Al Qaeda’ general command to publicly disown and declare a complete separation from this organization in February 2014. “ISIS is not a branch of the Qaidat al-Jihad [Al Qaeda's official name] group. We have no organizational relationship with it, and the group is not responsible for its actions," read the official statement. Thus, the relations between IS and Al Qaeda are now extremely tense. In the strategic region of Deir Ezzor, the heart of the Nusra Front, IS seized control of many oil wells. And in June 2014, it took over the remaining Syrian cities previously seized by the Nusra rebels. IS has also lured several Nusra Front fighters to their cause after al-Nusra pledged allegiance to al-Zawahiri, weakening Al Qaeda’s presence in Syria. On June 29, 2014, the same day IS adopted its new name, it issued its most provocative statement to date, stating the re-establishment of the caliphate. “The impact of this announcement will be global, as Al Qaeda affiliates and independent jihadist groups must now definitively choose to support and join the Islamic State or to oppose it,” explained Charles Lister, visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center. The Islamic State, in its fight for supremacy, hopes to put Al Qaeda in the unenviable position of accepting a caliphate led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. However, IS’s attempt to unite the Ummah (Muslim community) by demanding Muslims identify as those who believe in haqq (truth) from those who believe in batil (falsehood), creates a dilemma among jihadists worldwide: join the caliphate or risk their lives opposing it.

[20/December/2014] NEW YORK, Dec. 20 (Saba) – The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has strongly condemned the Tuesday bomb attacks in Radaa city in Bayda province, which killed more than 25 people, including at least 15 schoolgirls. "There is absolutely no justification for such cowardly terrorist acts that brutally take the lives of innocent civilians, including children", said a statement read by Spokesman for UN Secretary-General. The statement called for the perpetrators to be brought to justice. In the statement , the UN Secretary-General expressed his sympathies and sincere condolences to the families of the victims of these heinous attacks. The statement referred that the Security Council members have condemned in the strongest terms these terrorist attacks and the violations and abuses committed against children by terrorists in Yemen, as well as the high frequency of the attacks carried out or sponsored by Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The statement recalled that AQAP is included on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List and is thus subject to the asset

freeze and arms embargo in resolution 2161 (2014). The UN Secretary-General reiterated that any individual or entity that provides financial or material support to the terrorists, including the provision of arms or recruits, is eligible to be added to the Al-Qaida Sanctions List and subject to sanctions measures.

20 Dec, Since the seizure of the Yemeni capital of Sana'a by Houthi rebels in late September, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has stepped up its terrorist attacks throughout the country, claiming credit for a total of 149 attacks in 14 provinces. These attacks have targeted AQAP's traditional enemy, the Yemeni government and military, and led to more frequent attacks on the Houthi rebels. At the same time, AQAP has also managed to carry out several attacks against American interests, including the US Embassy in Sana'a and the US Ambassador to Yemen 3.

SANA’A, Dec. 15—Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed responsibility on Sunday for the assassination of leading GPC figure Salim Ghufaina that morning. Ghufaina was chairman of the General People’s Congress (GPC) branch in Marib governorate, and chairman of the Majzar district Local Administrative Council. AQAP claimed on its Twitter account that a group of AQAP fighters planted an explosive

device on Ghufaina’s car, and detonated it at 10:30 a.m., when Ghufaina was driving with his son and bodyguard through the Al-Jawf roundabout in Marib city. SANA’A, Dec. 154—The Houthis allegedly blew-up four homes on Sunday belonging to individuals they claimed to be members of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the town of Hamat Bani Sarar in Rada’a. The Houthis declined to comment on the allegations. SANA’A, Dec. 10—Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed responsibility on Tuesday for an attack on the First Military Command’s headquarters in the city of Seyon in Hadramout governorate.

Dec 11, A new video5 from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula alludes to the Senate Intelligence Committee report released this week on enhanced interrogation techniques, claiming that jihadist brethren need to be rescued from U.S. prisons violating human rights.The video released by AQAP’s media arm, Al-Malahem, is titled “A message for American people about killing American hostage in Yemen.”Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi also spoke in the video threatening the life of American photojournalist Luke Somers unless their demands were met in three days. The Obama administration launched a raid to rescue Somers nearly a week ago, but he and South African hostage Pierre Korkie were killed in the attempt. A charity claimed it had negotiated Korkie’s release just before he was killed. “This message is for American people about killing hostages in Yemen. After our message in which we gave Obama and his government three days to fulfill demands of mujahideen, with it was appeal of American hostage,” al-Ansi said in regard to Somers’ message. “Obama was taking wrong decision which was accounted as a signature of execution order of American citizen. Despite our warning to him not to do any foolish brave things … he didn’t do anything to withhold death of hostage and to keep his life,” he continued. “… Obama and his government know fairness of our demands and they could at least negotiate with us about some clause or be

3 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/12/aqap_attack_map.php4 http://www.yementimes.com/en/1842/news/4697/Houthis-blow-up-homes-of-alleged-AQAP-members.htm5 http://pjmedia.com/tatler/2014/12/11/aqap-hints-at-torture-report-in-new-video-u-s-far-away-from-convention-of-human-rights/

sincere in this matter. But he chose military solution, which failed before and failed once again, thank to grace of Allah.” Al-Ansi boasted that “a few members” of al-Qaeda and “brothers from the tribe” fought off the Americans despite superior U.S. weaponry and air support. He said the battle went on for three hours. “You must know that every Muslim is mujahid and that jihad is worshipping and obligation in our religion,” he warned, referring to Yemeni tribesmen defending AQAP. He acknowledged the appeal that Somers’ family made directly to al-Qaeda for the journalist’s release. “But it was appropriate to appeal to Obama and his government, not to us,” Al-Ansi said. “Obama made decision which caused things to go in a completely different way than we wanted.” The AQAP official accused Obama of trying “to cover his barbaric behavior” while decrying the barbaric murder of Somers. “Obama was careless about other innocent lives,” he added, noting Korkie was soon to be released. “I would like to present a few questions for those reasonable,” al-Ansi continued, arguing that AQAP has a right to try to free Omar Abdulrahman, the “Blind Sheikh” serving a life sentence in North Carolina. “Can they explain the fate of imprisoned Aafia Siddiqui and can they free her after two long years of injustice and torture and arrest?” The U.S.-educated Pakistani neuroscientist dubbed “Lady al-Qaeda” is in prison in Texas; ISIS sought her release in a prisoner exchange before they murdered journalist James Foley.“We have brothers and sisters, who are jailed and put in Guantanamo Bay prison, in prisons of American collaborators in Islamic countries, and in American security prisons which are spread all over the world; they have a right to be free. We try to free them from their tragic situation and barbaric injustice which is far away from convention of human rights,” al-Ansi said. “Is there anything in this and another list of American injustice and tyranny we can negotiate about with America? This American answer and behavior confirm the truth [about] what mujahideen think, that it is impossible to have agreement with American government except in a way of straightforward killing and facing tyranny which puts the lives of all Americans in danger, inside and outside of America, in the air, on the ground and in the sea. Would your people understand the fate which this government and this aggressive policy guides you to?” the AQAP official continued. “You will not dream of safety until we actually live it in Palestine and all Muslim countries.”

Internal instability and backlash against U.S. counterterrorism operations could allow al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to expand its safe haven in Yemen. Additionally, Yemen faces an insurgency led by the Houthi, a Shia rebel group with links to Iran. The Houthi rebellion has been remarkably successful: the insurgents took control of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in September 2014. Following widespread violence and an inability to maintain political and territorial control, Prime Minister Mohammed Salem Bassindwa resigned in September and the Yemeni military fractured as a result of Houthi advancements. While the rebels agreed to a cease-fire and the formation of a new “technocratic national government,” political instability persists in Sanaa. Ongoing political turmoil could weaken the Yemeni government’s ability to counter the growth of terrorist and insurgent groups. The 2011 Arab uprisings in Yemen resulted in a power vacuum that allowed AQAP to seize territory in the south. The National Dialogue Conference was created to identify roots of instability and facilitate state-building and the establishment of good governance, but AQAP was excluded from the process. Still, AQAP, which formed in 2009 when the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda merged, is considered the most dangerous al-Qaeda affiliate to U.S. national security, underscored by the December 2014 murder of an American hostage, Luke Somers, after a failed rescue attempt. The United States is deeply invested in combating terrorism and violent extremism in Yemen. The United States has collaborated with the Yemeni government on counterterrorism since the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, beginning drone strikes there in 2002. In 2012 alone, the United States carried out approximately 44

drone strikes in Yemen. However, the Houthi insurgency not only increases the risks posed by Yemeni terrorism but also draws Yemen into the broader Sunni-Shia conflict overtaking much of the Middle East.

Difference Between Al-Qaeda And ISIS: Senior AQAP Leader Holds 'Press Conference,' Said Beheadings Are 'Big Mistake'

Dec 11, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula commander Nasr Ibn Ali al-Ansi held the group's first "press conference." al-

Malahem Media/ YouTube Al Qaeda’s branch in Yemen is on a mission to distinguish its brand of terrorism from the Islamic State group's. In stark contrast to the Islamic State group’s graphic videos, a senior al Qaeda commander denounced beheadings, calling them “very barbaric,” and said al Qaeda’s strategy for jihad is the only

sustainable way to beat the United States, according to a statement released Monday. "Filming and promoting it [beheadings] among people in the name of Islam and jihad is a big mistake and not acceptable whatever the justifications are," al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) commander Nasr Ibn Ali al-Ansi said. In what could be described as a move to appear the more civilized, and credible, of jihadist groups, AQAP held its “first international press conference," and answered questions from journalists asked via social media6. - 7 - 8 Al-Ansi quoted passages from the Quran and from Osama bin Laden, condemning beheadings, and criticized the group, also known as ISIS or ISIL, for what he called a lack of central focus in fighting the United States. “Sheik Osama bin Laden used to say anyone with sound instincts cannot stand watching scenes of killings,” al-Ansi said. The statement is an obvious criticism of the Islamic State group’s signature practice: beheading hostages. The two groups have the same goal of fighting the United States, he said, but al Qaeda is the one with a sustainable strategy. Last week AQAP released a statement denouncing the ISIS caliphate, stating it was illegitimate and “driving a wedge” among jihadi groups."The general way we preach is different,” al-Ansi said, adding AQAP has achieved a “solid” knot of fighters because commanders are not instructed to rule with fear. Though the group’s strategies differ, al-Ansi maintained AQAP would support ISIS’ “jihad against crusaders” but called on ISIS to end inter-jihadi group fighting. Ironically, al Qaeda was the first terror groups to behead an American journalist, and then release a video of the execution. Al Qaeda member Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheik was accused of luring U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl to his capture by the group in Pakistan. Pearl was then beheaded -- al Qaeda ranking member Khalid Sheik Mohammed has confessed to the killing, and is currently on trial for it -- and a video depicting the gruesome killing, “The Slaughter of the Spy-Journalist, the Jew Daniel Pearl,” appeared in 2002. AQAP is one of the largest branches of the al Qaeda global brand and is considered the most dangerous threat to the United States. The “press conference” was filmed before a recent U.S. raid to rescue several hostages in AQAP custody. The raid was unsuccessful and AQAP shot and killed two hostages.

An image purportedly showing one of the vehicles used in the attack. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) carried out a double suicide bombing early Tuesday morning at the First Military Command base in

6 http://triceratops.brynmawr.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/4675/ZAW20080402.pdf?sequence=57 http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21-jihad/20-zawopeninterview8 http://analyst-network.com/articles/605/AnalysisoftheZawahiriQuestionandAnswerSession.pdf

Seyoun, the capital of Yemen’s eastern Hadramout province. Dec 12, Yemeni security sources reported that two attackers detonated separate vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) at the base, killing at least five soldiers and wounding between four and eight others. A Twitter account affiliated with AQAP promptly claimed credit for the bombings and alleged that “tens” of soldiers were killed in the attacks. Although Yemeni security officials indicated that soldiers had prevented the explosives-laden vehicles from entering the facility, AQAP claimed that one car bomb exploded at the base’s gate and the other detonated inside the compound. AQAP identified the first suicide attacker as Humam al Qarqa al Awlaki, also known as Julaybeeb al Awlaki. According to the group’s statement released this morning, Awlaki detonated a Suzuki Vitara laden with half a ton of explosives at the gate of the base at around 8:40 a.m. About two minutes later, the second suicide attacker, Nasser bin Ganam al Si’ri, also known as Mansour al Si’ri, detonated a Toyota Hilux carrying 1.25 tons of explosive material inside the command headquarters, allegedly killing “tens” of soldiers and disabling a number of military vehicles. AQAP stated that its fighters had been monitoring the base prior to the operation and noted that a military convoy that included high-ranking officials had entered the facility about 30 minutes before the attacks. Yemeni officials told Arabic news outlets that a military truck was also attacked last night in the city of al Shihr, about 150 miles south of Seyoun. Two soldiers were killed and one wounded in the incident, according to officials. An AQAP statement released today alleged that its fighters attacked the military truck with an improvised explosive device (IED) at 8:30 p.m. on Dec. 8 at the western entrance to al Shihr, killing three soldiers and wounding other passengers. The statement also asserted that soldiers from a nearby barracks began firing in the area “randomly” for over an hour after the attack, ostensibly damaging a nearby mosque and several “houses of Muslims in the area.”Bombings in Sana’a; Today’s double suicide attack in Hadramout follows a day of AQAP bombings in Sana’a targeting the residences of Shiite Houthi rebel leaders in the city. The jihadist group said that its fighters carried out three nearly identical twin bombing attacks on the morning of Dec. 8 at the residences of Abd al Ilah al Sharqi, Mohammad Dhayf Allah, and a third unnamed Houthi leader, killing a total of 15 Houthis and wounding 36. Local media outlets reported that five IEDs exploded in several locations in Sana’a on Monday morning, injuring a total of eight people. Two of the IEDs reportedly detonated in the al Sha’ub district of Sana’a at the home of a local carpenter and overt Houthi supporter, Abdul Hamed Dhayf Allah. The first bomb exploded at 6:00 a.m. and the second, attached to a car parked outside the house, went off about 20 minutes later, reportedly injuring eight local residents. An officer from the Criminal Investigation Bureau in Sana’a claimed that a third IED exploded a short time later at the house of local Houthi leader Abdullah al Sharafi in the capital’s Hasaba district. In addition, two IEDs detonated in the al Sayah neighborhood of Sha’ub district yesterday morning, with apparently no injuries. According to a statement released by AQAP today, its fighters staged three identical bombing operations at the residences of Houthi leaders, each comprised of two staggered explosions at each site.In the jihadist group’s account, the first attack took place at 6:00 a.m. at the residence of Houthi politician Abd al Ilah al Sharqi, where AQAP fighters detonated a rigged motorbike parked outside the house, damaging the building’s facade as well as six vehicles. As Houthis gathered at the scene of the initial explosion, AQAP claimed it detonated a second and more lethal IED comprised of 13 kilograms of TNT and 370 pieces of shrapnel. According to the jihadist group’s statement, eight Houthis were killed and 14 others were wounded in the secondary attack. AQAP also stated that it carried out essentially the same operation at the residence of Houthi leader Mohammad Dhayf Allah, remotely detonating the first IED at 6:15 a.m. and the second, a five-kilogram explosive, at 6:30 a.m. The jihadist group also stated that

its fighters reenacted this scenario a third time at the house of an unnamed Houthi leader, claiming that seven Houthis were killed and 22 injured in these two attacks.AQAP has already claimed credit for a total of 25 terrorist attacks throughout Yemen against both Houthi and military targets since Dec. 1, including today’s bombing at the First Military Command base in Hadramout. Eight of these attacks (about 30 percent of all AQAP attacks this month) have been directed at the Yemeni military, mostly in Yemen’s southern and eastern provinces. The remaining operations, with the exception of the Dec. 3 bombing at the residence of the Iranian ambassador to Yemen, have been directed at Houthi military positions and/or individual Houthi leaders or their alleged supporters. The majority of these attacks (7) took place in Sana’a, whereas other operations were conducted in Ibb and Baydah provinces. AQAP has been battling its traditional local enemy, the Yemeni military, and its rising nemesis, the Shiite Houthi rebels, while still managing to threaten the US.

Iran's role in Yemen draws Israel and Saudi Arabia closerDecember 12, 2014 On Dec. 5, Ahmed Barakeh, Palestine Islamic Jihad's representative in Yemen, met with the leader of the country’s Houthi rebels. What do the two have in common? And why should this meeting concern us? The common denominator of these two organizations is that they are both supported, militarily and politically, by the regime in Iran. Their meeting is an expression of this connection. Islamic Jihad, an Iranian creation, remains the Palestinian terror organization with the closest ties to Iran. When Tehran decided to disregard the Oslo Accord in 1994, it was Islamic Jihad that launched the terrorist offensive within Israel, and Hamas joined it later on. To this day, the organization is funded and operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force. The Houthis, a Shiite tribe, control the north of Yemen. Their militia is trained and equipped by Hezbollah, whose strings are also pulled by the Iranians. For several weeks, the Houthis have been expanding their foothold in Yemen after defeating the regime’s army and the Sunni militias supported by al-Qaeda. Their biggest takeover was of the Yemeni port city of Hodeida and the shoreline toward the southwest coast of Saudi Arabia and the Ras Isa marine terminal. This takeover is of great strategic importance. For the first time, Iran has a foothold in the southern gate of the Red Sea, literally on the Bab El-Mandab Strait, which separates Asia from Africa. The western coast of Yemen is also adjacent to the western coast of Saudi Arabia, with all its strategic facilities, posing a double threat: to freedom of movement in the straits and to Saudi security. As we know, the Iranians are believed to be engaged in political and military subversion in Saudi Arabia’s eastern regions — including the coast — through the Shiite minority there. Now they may be jockeying to open a second front on the country’s western side. For Saudi Arabia, a Houthi takeover of western Yemen, while al-Qaeda controls the country’s center and eastern areas, constitute a clear and present danger. Israel also cannot remain indifferent to the new Iranian stronghold on the seaway that connects it to Africa and Asia. What does this development mean from Israel’s point of view? First, the need for security coordination with Saudi Arabia has increased. Even if covert channels exist for this kind of cooperation, the new situation is likely to warrant a more visible and pronounced relationship. But in light of the way Israeli governments have rejected the Arab Peace Initiative so harshly, and of the policies of the current government about the Palestinian issue, the chances for this are negligible. Another Israeli security interest is thus sacrificed on the altar of maintaining the status quo in the West Bank. But there is one thing the United States can do. Opposite Yemen, on the other side of the straits, lies Eritrea. Over the last decade, the United States has espoused a policy designed to isolate and weaken the country. The wisdom of this policy should be reconsidered, given the new regional configuration. Eritrea is not a Jeffersonian democracy, but neither are the vast majority of African states. Now is the time to take Eritrea out of its isolation and allow it to rejoin the

family of nations. We must remember that radical Islam has no foothold in Eritrea, and religious coexistence is a stable force there. With murderous Sudan to its north and the new Yemen to its east, Eritrea can fill a positive role in the Red Sea.

From Obscurity to Dominance: The Continuing Rise of Yemen’s al-Houthi MovementPublication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 23 December 5, 2014 By: James Brandon During the last three years, the Houthi movement has accomplished a remarkable transformation, evolving from an obscure family-led Zaydi Shi’a guerrilla movement in Sa’ada governorate, one of Yemen’s most remote and underdeveloped, to become the country’s dominant military and political force. During the last six months in particular, the Houthi movement’s military wing, Ansar Allah, has seized control of the capital Sana’a and expanded into most of the country’s cultivated, upland region, while foraying even Aden in the south, Mareb in the east and Hodeidah in the west. Meanwhile in Sana’a, the Houthi leadership have displaced the formerly preeminent Sunni al-Ahmar family as country’s leading power brokers. Although predicting the future in a country as volatile as Yemen is arguably best left to the country’s numerous mystics and fortune tellers, this article will attempt to trace the Houthi movement’s remarkable recent trajectory, summarize its recent actions and briefly examine some likely future developments. Clashes ; Although the Houthis’ recent expansion throughout much of the Yemeni highlands passed off relatively peacefully, in recent weeks a spate of low-level clashes have illustrated that the Houthis face a number of challenges as they seek to consolidate their territorial and political gains, particularly from elite groups that have been displaced by the movement. In Sana’a, Houthis have clashed repeatedly with a range of rivals. On November 26, clashes broke out between Houthis and supporters of the al-Ahmar family in the city’s Hasaba area, after an al-Ahmar vehicle refused to stop at a Houthi checkpoint and its occupants instead opened fire. The resulting violence, involving the use of heavy machine guns and RPGs, killed five and left the Houthis occupying the house of Sam al-Ahmar, a leading member of the dynasty (Yemen Times, November 26). Separate clashes have pitted Houthis against Salafists. On November 5, Houthi militants killed one French-Moroccan Salafist student in Sana’a, in an apparently unprovoked attack, and separately stormed the Sunna mosque, the city’s largest Salafist mosque, allegedly looking for weapons (Yemen Times, November 6). Many of the mosque’s students had reportedly previously studied in madrassas in Dammaj in Sa’ada governorate, the scene of numerous clashes between Houthis and Salafists in the past (Yemen Times, November 6). Further clashes took place in mid-November between the Houthis and security staff at the Sana’a airport when the Houthis attempted to assert control over the facility, including forcing the airport to employ 20 Houthis (al-Arabiya, November 11; Yemen Times, November 18). Similar violence has occurred elsewhere. In Dhamar city, fighters from the local Bayt Hanash tribe attacked the Houthis after the latter ordered local merchants of qat (a popular narcotic shrub) to stop paying “taxes” to the tribe (Yemen Times, November 25). In Hodeidah meanwhile, on November 10, Houthis reportedly kidnapped Abdulrahman Mokarram, the leader of the Tihami movement, which represents the people of the Tihama coastal plain (al-Jazeera, November 10). This followed protests by Tihama activists against the Houthis, following the latter’s capture of the coastal city in October (Yemen Times, October 19). As these various incidents indicate, such clashes are typically the result of Houthis using their newfound power to settle old scores, displaced local elites reasserting their influence against the Houthis or else are a result of the group trying to neutralize potential sources of dissent. As such, such incidents are likely to continue both in Sana’a and across the country. Meanwhile, the Houthis have also been in periodic conflict with fighters from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Some of the most significant recent clashes have taken place in

Rada’a, southeast of Dhamar, in a predominantly Sunni and traditionally lawless area on the edge of the desert. Heavy clashes here in early and mid-November killed over 85, in violence involving the use of tanks and artillery (al-Arabiya, November 14). AQAP social media accounts claimed their fighters had helped local tribesmen attack the Houthis; the accusation is credible given the strong Sunni feeling among local tribes and given that AQAP has previously operated in the area (Yemen Times, November 24). Previous apparently coordinated attacks between tribes and AQAP have occurred in other strongly-Sunni areas; for instance, in late September, an AQAP suicide bomber attacked Houthi forces in Mareb, killing around 15 Houthis (Yemen Times, September 30). AQAP also claimed credit for attacks on the Houthis in Hodeidah in November (al-Masdar, November 2) From an overall national political perspective, however, the most significant rivalry is arguably between the Houthis and al-Islah, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Yemeni branch, which is closely linked with the al-Ahmar family. Houthis and al-Islah activists have clashed repeatedly during the last few years, most recently in Ibb in early November when a leading al-Islah politician was assassinated, and their rivalry is given an added bitterness by al-Islah’s former role as a key cheerleader of the army’s assaults on the Houthis’ during Ali Abdullah Saleh’s presidency (Yemen Times, November 4). While it is generally unhelpful to view the Houthi conflict through a “Sunni vs Shi’a” prism, the Houthis’ struggles with al-Islah, which contains both broadly non-sectarian traditional tribal figures and hardline Salafist elements, often fits this category. On November 29, however, it was reported that al-Islah and the Houthi group had reached a ceasefire agreement, brokered by Jamal Benomar, the UN Envoy to Yemen and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 29). The agreement, pointedly negotiated on the Houthis’ home turf in Sa’ada, reportedly included agreements to end fighting, release prisoners and return seized property and included a commitment to maintain open communications. In practice, however, al-Islah is likely to regard any deal with the Houthis solely as a temporary expediency; al-Islah’s tribal figures will ultimately wish to regain their lost political influence and its ideologically-driven Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood elements will continue to resent living under the Houthis’ perceived Shi’a rule. [1] Meanwhile, for the Houthis, the ceasefire deal can be seen as a sign that the group is attempting to resolve some past feuds, perhaps driven by a recognition that the group faces numerous challenges and cannot afford an open-ended conflict with al-Islah. The Houthi Political Agenda ; Any attempt to understand the Houthi movement is invariably hampered by the group’s chronic inability to consistently or coherently articulate its goals. Beginning as a local Zaydi Shi’a family-based religious revivalist movement focused on protesting against heavy handed Sunni-flavored government intervention in Sa’ada, from the beginning it quixotically adopted “Death to America! Death to Israel!” as its universal slogan, despite this having no connection to its actual grievances or goals. Since capturing Sana’a in September, the movement has tried to present itself to Yemenis as a broad non-sectarian “revolutionary” alternative to the discredited status quo and to the international community as a rational and credible partner. Saleh al-Sammad, a senior Houthi recently appointed as a political advisor to the president, personified these contradictions in a recent interview, describing first a sinister “American project... to occupy Yemen,” and then claiming that after the group’s capture of Sana’a, “the Ansar Allah displayed the highest degrees of tolerance. They did not attack the institutions of the state that were part of the six wars against the Ansar Allah. Nor did they attack their political adversaries, whether political parties or others” (al-Ahram, November 19). The group’s other spokesmen, such as Ali Emed of the group’s political office, have also repeatedly said that the group only aspires to create a non-sectarian “democratic civil state that guarantees the rights of everyone and is governed by the law” (Middle East Eye, September 1). The group has also repeatedly publicly renounced any ambitions to recreate the imamate, which the Saleh-era government often accused them of

harboring. Despite undertaking some steps to present itself as a regular, even mainstream, non-sectarian political party, the Houthi movement has nonetheless worked quickly to consolidate its power and embed itself in the country’s key institutions. For instance, the Houthis appear to have succeeded in their demand for some of their forces to be merged into the national army. On November 24, Yemen’s Defense Minister, Mahmoud al-Subaihi, said that this would be done as laid out in the Peace and National Partnership Agreement signed on September 21 between the Houthis and the government. However, he did not say how many Houthi fighters would be integrated or into which units, and he also stressed that “the military and security institution will remain in charge of all military and security forces” (Yemen Times, November 25). The Houthis’ likely aim is to consolidate their political influence, prevent the Yemeni Army from being used against the Houthis and ensure that some of the costs of maintaining the Houthi militia is, in the future, met by the state. In addition, the group has inserted its “advisors” into key government departments, with Saleh al-Sammad, for instance, becoming an advisor to the president, presumably with some sort of veto power over government decisions. Although the level of Iranian influence over the Houthi movement remains unclear, this strategy is strongly reminiscent of Hezbollah’s “state within a state” strategy in Lebanon and would give the Houthis considerable influence from behind the scenes. Outlook; Although the Houthi movement has sought to increase its control over the Yemeni government without taking direct responsibility for running the Yemeni state, it is unclear whether it will be able to achieve this balance. Indeed, the Houthis have inherited the same challenges which led Ali Abdullah Saleh to describe governing Yemen as “dancing on the heads of snakes,” including a bankrupt and dysfunctional state, a fractious tribal environment, a smoldering al-Qaeda insurgency, an active southern separatist movement and regional powers willing to intervene to promote their own interests. Although the Houthi movement can potentially distance itself from some of the government’s failings, it is almost inevitable that any further collapse of law and order, the economy or government services will provoke discontent with the group. It is also all but inevitable that Sunni forces and traditional tribal leaders, although knocked off-balance by the Houthis’ unexpected successes, will gradually reorganize themselves, seek out foreign funding and plan a comeback, regardless of the consequences for the country at large. In particular, al-Islah’s leaders are liable to try to seek Wahhabi or Gulf State funding and to meanwhile stoke domestic anti-Shi’a sectarian feeling for their own political gain. For instance, Tawakkol Karman, a leading al-Islah member (and Nobel Peace Prize winner) recently described the Houthis as being “supported financially and militarily by Iran” in order to “undermine the Yemeni republic” as part of “an Iranian project that is targeting the entire region” (Arabi21.com, September 29). Meanwhile, the General People’s Congress, the former ruling party, although seemingly operating in conjunction with the Houthis at present, may at some point seek to regain its old monopoly on power. Much also depends on what the Houthis themselves do next. At times, the movement seems content to accept its role as one party of many in the government and to focus on attaining formal federalism for its heartlands in northern Yemen. At other times, however, as demonstrated by its recent attempts to reposition itself as a national “revolutionary” movement, or to integrate its fighters into the army, or by its forays to Hodeidah, Mareb and Aden – all far outside the traditional Zaydi or Houthi heartlands – it seems to have grander aspirations. Regardless, the deeper causes of Yemen’s malaise are ultimately economic and given the country’s catastrophic financial situation, compounded by falling oil revenues, a growing water shortage and a booming population, the country is bound to remain unstable for many years to come, regardless of the political machinations of the Houthis, al-Islah and other groups. James Brandon is a political and security risk analyst. Note

1. See for instance, “Interview: Muhammad Qahtan, senior member of Yemen’s al-Islah,” al-Ahram, November 27, 2014, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/116588/World/Region/Interview-Mohammed-Qahtan,-senior-member-of-Yemens.aspx.Files:

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