Water scarcity and violent conflict in international relations: how

process tracing contributes to demystify this alleged causal

relationship

The Rio Grande River Case

DOUGLAS DE CASTRO

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1 – INTRODUCTION

It is well established that due to the uneven water distribution around the world will cause to be under stress in the near future due to population growth, pressure over the economic output (mostly due to food production) and increasing sources of pollution (Water: a shared responsibility – The United National World Water Development Report 2). Considering 1) the fact that there are 263 international basins around the world and an unprecedented increasing number of water-related treaties and non-binding agreements; 2) pressure over water resources; and 3) the high, constant and unavoidable interaction between the countries that share the water resources, it became a matter to pose the question: wouldn´t be expected to observe a more acute number of conflicts even wars?

Drawing its conclusions over the economic rational (scarce resources increase competition and thus potential for conflicts), in the last decades, a body of research agendas and political rhetoric calls the attention to the possibility of water wars or at least to the possibility of the conflict escalating to violent ones due to water scarcity. The problem is that these research agendas fail to provide empirical evidences of the existence of a causal relationship between water scarcity and violent conflict.1

Au contraire of such research agendas, it is observable a tendency that states under pressure over water resources tend to engage in cooperative behavior instead of engaging in violent conflicts. First, there is a large body of international law (hard and soft law) related to water governance that brings to multilateral and regional discussions the most sophisticated principles. Second, the data available that accounts for wars around the world shows that water hasn´t been the trigger or main cause for them.2 Nevertheless, why and how this happen?

The answers to the questions that the subject raises cannot be responded using quantitative methods as what is at stake regards to the process in which such outcome is produced and not the co-variation between conditions (or variables). In addition, in international relations the occurrence of some phenomena are rare, leaving not enough data material to run statistical tests for that matter.

The main objective of this article is to present a new theoretical framework capable of analyzing the conditions in which states are engaging in cooperative behavior instead of violent conflicts under water scarcity scenarios. For that matter, based on the existing literature about transboundary water the work proposes an inference about the existence and operation of an underlying causal mechanism. The causal mechanism proposed is based on the interdependence theory, which traditionally is applied to the economic domain but in this case is applied to the physical settings in an international river basin.

Although the study could not exclude the possibility of war or violent conflict, it will show that there are strong empirical evidences of the presence of sensitivity and vulnerability effects in the Rio Grande river basin. By testing the causal mechanism in this case is expected to generalize the argument to another cases in order to increase confidence, finding additional 1 The most notorious research agenda in this regard has been conducted by Thomas Homer-Dixon and the so-called Toronto School, which will be discussed in detail further on this work (see in http://www.homerdixon.com/research/, last access on June 23, 2015). See also: BERNAUER,BOHMELT and KOUBI (2011) whom presented other agendas: “Hauge and Ellingsen (2001) and Gleick (1993)provide some evidence that water scarcity can lead to armed conflict. In addition, systematic empirical analyses suggest that transboundary waters are associated with low-level conflicts, but not with full-scale ‘water wars’ (e.g. Gleditsch and Hegre 2000, Toset et al 2000, Gleditsch et al 2006, Hensel et al 2006, Brochmann and Hensel 2009, Dinar 2009, Dinar et al 2011). In contrast to these studies, Kalbhenn (2012), Dinar et al (2007), Wolf (2002), and Yoffe et al (2003) report that states tend to cooperate rather than fight over their shared water resources, and most international water conflicts are not full-scale wars, but rather diplomatic tensions.” 2 In http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/, last access on June 23, 2015.

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implications of the theory, and other important micro-causes to advance the research agenda debating social, economic and political implication of water scarcity. 2 – THEORETHICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

There is little room for discussion that water around the world is under stress much of that because of the competing uses and the uneven distribution3. As a non-linear and complex system any changes produces unexpected and/or undesired economic and social effects in the international basin (Byrne, 1998).

As such, serious environmental threats with political, social and economic implications have become important sources of potential conflicts among states because targets the necessary resources for survival of its population such as water resources, agriculture, oil, the spread of diseases, and so on.4 This trend lead to the debate of securitization of environmental issues having water as a sensitive element due the uneven distribution and increasing demand as population grows and economic output need to follow such growing (Villa, 1999). Buzan and Graeger (1997, p. 111) point to a political link between environment and security that “[...] describes a way of handling environmental issues where threats to the environment are seen as urgent and immediate, requiring a quick response at top political level”.

2.1 – Water Scarcity

It is from this perspective of securitization of water that water scarcity becomes a political phenomenon and a hot topic for discussion. In the last few decades the debates have become more acute, as new concepts and rhetoric emerges based on an allegedly relationship between water scarcity to violent conflicts (Brown, 2006 and Caubet, 2006)5 or even the occurrence of water wars (Shiva,2002 and Trottier,2001).

In the academia, the most representative research agenda is the Toronto School. In general, this agenda seeks to provide empirical evidences that environmental scarcity6 (having water as one dimension) has enough causal force to produce violent conflicts, which the basic causal mechanism according to it runs as follows:

Population growth→ High consumption per capta→ Deterioration of the environmental conditions→ Increasing scarcity7

→ Increasing competition→ Higher risk of violence (Homer-Dixon, 2001)

3 See Water: a shared responsibility – The United National World Water Development Report (2006). UNESCO. 4 ULLMAN, Richard H., Redefining Security, International Security, Vol.8, No 1 (summer 1983), p.129-153. 5 As an example of such rhetoric, Ricardo Petrella urges that :”On aeu dês guerres du pétrole comme, actuellement, les Etats-Unis en Irak. Dans certaines régions Du Moyen Orient, um litre d’eau vaut aussi cherqu’ un litre de pétrole. Maintenant au marche noir, l’eau coûte même plus cher que le pétrole. Alor son dit que l’eau va bientôt être la source principale de guerre inter-Etat. Mais qui a dit ça? A croire que c’est inévitable. Tout cela parce qu’on ne veut pas reconnaître quel’ eau est un bien commun. Il ne suffit pas de faire un traité mondial pour que les Etat affirment un et elle chose. Car on sait très bien que les traités ne sont jamais respectés. Il faut institutionnaliser le concept politique de l’existence de l’humanité. L’humanité a la responsabilité de l’eau. et non lês Etats, qui continue dans une logique géostratégique et financière. Il faut reconnaître Le caractère local et globale de l’eau. Donnons-nous lês instruments politiques, institutionnels, financiers et techniques, qui existent, pour résoudre le problème de manière efficace. Donnons-nous, au niveau mondial, l’institution politique de l’humanité.” 6 In http://www.homerdixon.com/research. Last access July 31, 2015. 7 For him the sources of environmental scarcity are: structural, supply-induced, and demand-induced.

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In the next step of the research, Homer-Dixon tests the causal mechanism in the cases of Chiapas; Gaza; Pakistan; Rwanda and South Africa. However, reading the findings makes clear that he misses the proposed methodology and systematization in conducting the studies that gives to the reader the sensation of a mere historical reports of the cases, thus bringing no analytical gains for that matter (Bernauer, Bohmelt e Koubi, 2011).8

The proposed model by Homer-Dixon becomes impossible to test in the real world, as environmental issues play roles in different dimensions as multi-causal phenomena. For that matter, any research agenda needs to consider into its design the separation of the environmental dimensions such as water, pollution, climate change, etc. to develop new theories and empirical tests to acquire analytical gains.

Therefore, our research choice in terms of environmental scarcity dimension to work with is water in an international transboundary context. In order to advance to methodological considerations, it is necessary to establish the concept of water scarcity (based on Goertz, 2006 and Adcock and Collier, 2001). Thus, for the purposes of our study water scarcity is conceptualized as the reduction in quantity (below 1.700m³ per person/year)9, acceptable quality (UN Water Quality Index)10, and the realization of any water development project that prevents people to continue enjoying historical uses of water.

2.2- Research Hypothesis and Cooperative Behavior

Pushed by the puzzle posed in the introductory part of this work, data and literature review, and inferences made, the hypothesis in this work is that contrary to specialized literature and research agendas, the systematic case study evidences points out to a cooperative behavior of the states in the presence of water scarcity. Once operationalized water scarcity in the previous section, which in the neo-positivist jargon would be the independent variable of study, it is time to operationalize the dependent variable that is cooperation as the hypothesis tells us.

For the strict terms of this work the term cooperation is defined as a set of relations based not in coercion and legitimated by mutual consent by the parties (Axelrod, 2006), thus leading to cooperation “[…] when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others […]” (Baldwin, 1993, p.85).

Achieving cooperation under this circumstances means that actors might have two independent but complimentary sets of motivation according to Allan (2002): reaching the welfare of the community (Mccaffrey, 2007) or because of a self-interest perception (Lapid, 1997). These two dimensions play an important role in an international basin as the physical interdependence existing basin states puts them and their people in a face-to-face relationship with common challenges regarding water, which makes no sense to engage in games that will bring relative gains (Lebow, 2006). Thus, in this scenario the tit-for-tat approach provides analytical power to explain why interdependence is important and how states reach cooperative behavior (Mccarty and Meirowitz, 2013 and Ostrom, 1990). Corroborating this view Brochmann and Hensel (2009, p. 393) puts that “[...] states are much more likely to negotiate

8 Gleditsch (1999) pin points the flaws in the research: the lack of scientific approach in conceptualizing; provides discussions and not analysis; important variables are neglected; the model is so complex and broad that it is impossible to test; future events are postulated as evidences; lack of providing boundaries to external and internal aspects of the conflict; there is no consensus over the appropriate level of analysis. 9 See http://www.unep.org/dewa/vitalwater/article69.html, last access in July 31, 2015. 10 See http://www.unep.org/gemswater/Portals/24154/publications/pdfs/gwqi.pdf, July 31, 2015.

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in the most dangerous situations, and institutionalization of river resources can make an important contribution to negotiations over any disagreements that do emerge.”

Therefore, cooperation is a conscientious political coordination necessary to obtain mutual benefits that decreases the effects of scarcity and risks of violent conflict. The indicators of such level of cooperative behavior or physical manifestations are: 1) conferences and meetings to address the issue; 2) diplomatic or judicial solutions to solve the conflict; 3) number of enforceable treaties; and 4) joint water management commission.

2.3 – Qualitative Method and Process tracing

Without making an extensive methodology discussion in this paper, the goal was to make causal process observations thru the application of process tracing technique, which is according to Beach and Pedersen (2013, p.85) “[...] a logical reasoning we formulate a plausible causal mechanism whereby X produces Y along with context within which we expect it to operate.” It is exactly what Elster (2007) called of “opening the black box of causality”.

A causal mechanism as state by Waldner (2011, p.18) is "[...] an agent or entity that has the capacity to alter its environment because it possesses an invariant property that, in specific contexts, transmits either a physical force or information that influences the behavior of other agents or entities [...] " that is to say is built on parts (agents or entities) and forces that are transmitted to each part of it (such as a transmission belt) forming a causal chain that leads to an outcome.11 It operates in an analytical level below of a more general theory, increasing credibility and making the new theory more rigorous scientifically (Checkel, 2008).

According to Brady e Collier (2010) process tracing is the basic form of social

investigation as evidences provided by this methodological tool are valuable for “[...] refuting conventional ideas if they are wrong, developing new ideas that are better, and testing the new ideas as well as the old ones [...]”. In addition, considering the research design, on the theoretical level process tracing allows the analysis of the subjacent causal mechanism to capture the interactions between agents/entities with enough power to impact reality, and on the empirical level process tracing detects the dynamics or specific actions that reverberates in the external world.

The variant of process tracing that is adopted here is the theory-testing one (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). This variant allows the researcher based on the existing literature and debates to infer the existence of a causal mechanism, and how its parts interact to each other by testing empirically in the selected cases. According to Beach and Pedersen (2013, p.87-88) theorization of the causal mechanism should be made previously to testing based on prior knowledge of the subject and its implications, as we see from the excerpt:

[A good starting point for conceptualizing a plausible causal mechanism for a given theorized causal relationship is to start with a thorough reading of the existing theorization on the phenomenon. Review articles are often particularly useful, as are

11 Also according to Hedstrom e Ylikoski (2010, p. 54): “Mechanisms help in causal inference in two ways. The knowledge that there is a mechanism through which X influences Y supports the inference that X is a cause of Y. In addition, the absence of a plausible mechanism linking X to Y gives us a good reason to be suspicious of the relation being a causal one. Although it may be too strong to say that the specification of mechanisms is always necessary for causal inference, a fully satisfactory social scientific explanation requires that the causal mechanisms be specified.”

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descriptions of the state of the art in peer-reviewed journal articles and books. It is important to note that this reading should be as encompassing as possible. The next step is to game through the different steps of a hypothesized mechanism, filling in the dots between X and Y to detail the nuts, bolts, wheels and cogs between them. One way to start this is to draw a mind-map of plausible links between X (or a set of X’s) and Y, using boxes to illustrate each part of the mechanism. It is important to remember that each of the parts are insufficient but necessary to produce the outcome in and of themselves. Focus in particular on conceptualizing the entities and their activities. In practice, we cannot always do this, especially as regards macro-level mechanisms, where the activities of structural entities are not always self-evident.]

2.4 – Causal Mechanism, Empirical Tests and Case Selection

The theory used as base to the construction of the causal mechanism is the complex interdependence (Keohane, 2005). Usually the theory is applied to the economic domain but given the characteristics of the international basins it is suitable to apply (most the literature uses the term dependency among basin states, but fail to expand the application of such concept if meaning interdependence). According to him, the basic characteristics of the complex interdependence are 1) multiple channels that connect societies; 2) absence of hierarchy among political issues; and 3) low risk to resource to military capabilities to resolve issues. As the states find themselves in an interdependent relationship, which is the case of states in an international basin, actions promoted in one will provoke negative effects in the other, resulting in the effects of sensitivity and vulnerability.

Taking into consideration the arguments made along the paper, the inferred causal mechanism runs as follow:

N1 N2 N3

ACTION Tension among states due to

negative effects in

downstream state

(sensitivity)

Tension escalate – alternatives

to solve or to adapt to negative

effects are unavailable or high

costs to downstream state

(vulnerability)

Pay-offs are recalculated based

on physical interdependence

and reciprocity to find common

interests

AGENTS State Civil society and State State

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Based on the causal mechanism as inferred above, the empirical tests should follow the

model:

X N1 N2 N3 Y

Execution of projects

by upstream state in

the international

basin that changes

quantity or quality of

water, which brings

or increases water

stress and causing

harm to downstream

state.

Test water scarcity

as minimal

condition to

generate sensitivity

Environmental

impact

assessments are

made to find

social, economic

and

environmental

impacts resulting

the water project

implemented by

upstream state

Test sensitivity

in the basin

Debates and

conferences reports

that show impossibility

for the downstream

state to adapt to

negative effects

Test vulnerability in

the basin

Downstream state

seeks peaceful

solution to conflict

thru direct

negotiations or via

international/regional

court

Test reciprocity in a

tit-for-tat context

Cooperation is achieved

thru political

coordination of formal

and informal agreements

that adjusts behavior of

states

Test cooperation as an

expected outcome

resulting from scarcity

In regards to case selection, George and Bennett (2004, p.19) inform that it should be part of the researcher´s strategy according to his/her goals and satisfy two basic requirements:

[…] primary criterion for case selection should be the relevance to the research objective of the study, whether it includes theory development, theory testing or heuristic purposes, and cases should be selected to provide the kind of control and variation required by the research problem. This requires that the universe or subclass of events be clearly defined so that appropriate cases can be selected.

Considering that the purpose is to “to open up the black box” of causality by examining causal process, the case selection criteria is typical case, in which the goal is to find representative cases of the theory, meaning that cases in which study variable are found. To Seawright and Gerring (2008, p.299):

The typical case study focuses on a case that exemplifies a stable, cross-case relationship. By construction, the typical case may also be considered a representative case, according to the terms of whatever cross-case model is

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employed. Indeed, the latter term is often employed in the psychological literature (e.g. Hersen and Barlow 1976, 24). Because the typical case is well explained by an existing model, the puzzle of interest to the researcher lies within that case. Specifically, the researcher wants to find a typical case of some phenomenon so that he or she can better explore the causal mechanisms at work in a general cross case relationship

Due to time and space constraints, only one case is subject to test in this opportunity, which is the Rio Grande River basin case. To increase in analytical gains case studies should performed in at least two cases (Yin, 2009). For that matter by the end the author will report the test of the same causal mechanism in the Jordan River basin as means to compare results.

3-CASE STUDY AND EMPIRICAL TESTING

3.1 -Introduction

"In the case of international boundary waters, that is, waters that define at least for part of their course the boundary between two countries, the parties have a more immediate and compelling incentive to come to an understanding because both would likely suffer the consequences of . . . deterioration of water quality or quantity by the unregulated activities of either or both parties. This self-interest is mutual to the extent that the resource itself is knowingly shared. For river systems, the connection is visible and the mutuality is obvious." (Hall, 2004, p. 873). This is the situation in the case of the waters of the rivers Colorado, Tijuana and Rio Grande that runs through a greater part of the boundary between the countries: the United States and Mexico.

In the year 2012, the United States and Mexico signed a new pact that included fresh rules on the Colorado water sharing that was mediated by the International Boundary Waters Commission (IBWC), known as the Comisión Internacional de Límites y Agua (CILA) in Mexico, formed in 1944 to facilitate the resolution of issues regarding the borders between the two countries, as well as the sharing of the waters of the rivers Colorado, Rio Grande and Tijuana that flow between the two nations. This new pact only adds on to the already existing comprehensive agreement and supplements the urgent water storage capacity increases for Mexico from the Lake Mead in the states of Nevada and Arizona. On this occasion the U S Interior Secretary Ken Salazar quipped, “We have chosen collaboration over conflict, we have chosen cooperation and consensus over discord,” (Spagat, 2012).This region, the countries involved as well as the agreements enacted between them form prime examples of the success of cooperation that has eliminated all conflict that could arise from the sharing of the water resources from the three main rivers: Rio Grande, Tijuana and the Colorado.

As seen from this introductory note, a comprehensive net of formal agreements are already in place between US and Mexico, which makes it a typical case for our study. In terms of temporal limitation of the case study and thinking about the water scarcity benchmark, the salinity crisis between the two countries seems to fit the criteria (1961-73).

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3.2 –Background conditions

As is evident from the map provided below in Figure 1, the borders between the countries of the United States of America and Mexico extends to more than 1954 miles in total length and runs through an area that covers four states in the US and six states in Mexico starting from the Pacific Ocean on one end and the Gulf of Mexico at the other (Witte, Eden, Dos Santos, & Esqueda, 2012). The border spans San Diego, California and Tijuana, Baja California, in the west, to Tamaulipas, Mexico and Brownsville, Texas in the east. While the border runs 24 miles down through the center line of the Colorado River, the Rio Grande river outlines the easternmost1,255 miles of the international boundary, traveling south and east until it reaches the Gulf of Mexico. Together, these tworiverscover about two thirds of the international boundary between the two countries. (Umoff, 2008). Although the two countries have a lot in common it has to be acknowledged that there are also a wide range of differences in the resources, regulatory frameworks, development, politics, culture, and language among the large population (Witte, Eden, Dos Santos, & Esqueda, 2012) living in the thirty-six cities (Weston, 1986) and eighty municipalities (Witte, Eden, Dos Santos, & Esqueda, 2012) in the region.

From the above data, it can be seen that both the population as well as the area covered by these rivers is quite large and situated as they are in a vitally important and sensitive area, the issues that arose from the sharing of the waters of the Colorado, Tijuana and Rio Grande are also of the utmost importance, especially as regards the quality and quantity of the waters of these rivers as well as environment and development factors such as water, air and soil pollution and solid waste disposal issues (Weston, 1986).

Figure 1The borders and the river basins between US and Mexico from (Witte, Eden, Dos Santos, & Esqueda, 2012)

As far as the water pollution is concerned, it is seen mainly in the three rivers and the air pollution occurs in the urban settlements in both the countries that are situated on either sides of the border (Busch, 1979). The main causes for the water soil and air pollution stem from the industrial units, agriculture as well as transportation that are connected with these rivers. While the industrial units that responsible for the pollution are mostly concentrated on the US side of the border, Mexico contributes a major portion to the pollution caused by

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agriculture and transportation (Weston, 1986).So both countries share equal blame in creating the problems connected to these rivers.

The settlements in this border region started getting thicker from the year 1965 with the introduction of the maquiladora program that offered foreign assembly plants to be set up in this region. This was added on to by the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that still increased the industrialization of the area. The Mexican industrial development was concentrated in the border region leading adding on to the already large-scale developments in mining and agriculture all of which needed great amounts of water from the rivers here. Not only has the population of the region steadily increased, it is estimated that the 14 million people living there now would jump another 9.3 million level in the next 20 years or so. This brought in more infrastructure development, economic growth and job creation and at the same time increasing the pollution causing problems to the environment as well as the public health in the US as well as in the Mexican side of the border (Witte, Eden, Dos Santos, & Esqueda, 2012).

The waters of the rivers as well as the ground water are affected from the industrial, agricultural and mining runoffs that include toxic substances such as heavy metals, arsenic, lead, pesticides, uranium and organic chemicals (Witte, Eden, Dos Santos, & Esqueda, 2012). Although both countries have laws to protect the environment against such contamination, the soil and water along the borders remain polluted. The reasons for this are two-fold. First of all, the oversight and enforcement of these laws is not as rigorous in the Mexican side of the border as it is in the US side,although the Mexican water quality standards are much higher than that of the US (Witte, Eden, Dos Santos, & Esqueda, 2012) Secondly, there is a large disproportion in the income levels of the people living on either side of the border and this leads to more problems in trying to decrease the pollution levels. This is compounded by the fact that there is also discrepancy in the amount of available funds for pollution containment programs such as water supply and treatment plants (Frisvold & Caswell, 2000). Nevertheless, there is an evident increase in the interest shown by the Mexican government in the recent years towards the improvement of the environment in the border areas (Witte, Eden, Dos Santos, & Esqueda, 2012).

3.3 – Crisis among countries

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, there was uproar among the border state river water users that Mexicans were constructing ditches to divert the Rio Grande waters to their lands. This produced an immediate retaliation from the Mexican government it was in fact the United States’ lavish use of the river’s waters that was actually the cause of the water shortage in these states (Ingram & White, 1993). The international water law in existence at that time could not offer a satisfactory solution to these issues because these laws were appropriative in nature and awarded the rights of water to those who used them. For instance, the Harmon Doctrine that was formatted with particular reference to the water issues of the Rio Grande in the borders of United States and Mexico that "a nation has general and absolutesovereignty over those resources within its territory” (Ingram & White, 1993), although this law has never been given complete validity in the present international law and the United States modified it to the Doctrine of Limited Territorial Sovereignty (Kliot, Shmueli, & Shamir, 2001).

Nevertheless, such a situation was also present in the Colorado River region and both countries needed a proper solution to address the water sharing issues (Umoff, 2008). However, such self-seeking ideologies could not serve a mutually beneficial allocation in an effective manner. For this, a new agreement had to be developed that would effectively address all the issues in this regard and be satisfactory for both the parties concerned (Hall, 2004).

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As the populations on both the sides increased through increased settlement areas, the competition for the waters of these rivers also increased proportionately. The upstream and downstream developments, water usage and allotment, the quality of the water were all points of conflict. There were also problems that included those that were initiated through the changes in the environment and climate. For instance, "Questions arose as to the location of the boundary and the jurisdiction of lands when the boundary rivers changed their course and transferred land from one side of the river to the other." (IBWC). When people realized that the amount of water in the rivers was determinate but the users had increased, the competition for sharing the water became more intense and led to tense situations on both sides of the border (Umoff, 2008).

The water sharing issues were further compounded by the pollution problems that were caused mainly due to the increases in the population and settlements. More than ninety percent of the twelve million people in the region live in the fourteen pairs of Transboundary sister cities that stride either side of the border between these countries. Moreover, the disparity in the income levels of the people of the two countries along with the disproportion in the funding that was available for dealing with pollution by water treatment plants also complicated the matters as they stood between the two countries (Frisvold & Caswell, 2000).

A similar situation persists in the exploitation of the groundwater resources. The expanding population and its increasing demands on groundwater extraction have not only led to the depletion of these resources and the falling of the water table level, there has also been complaints about the increased levels of salinity in the groundwater (Mumme, 1993; Bernal & Solis, 2000; Johnson, 2000). An example of this is the water scarcity found in the areas around Nogales in Sonora (Ingram & White, 1993). The high levels of dissolved salts have even led to the water being found unsuitable for human consumption in some areas of El Paso/Ciudad Juarez situated on the Mexican side of the border (Hayes, 1996; Bernal & Solis, 2000).

In order to conserve the ground water, the United States and Mexico came to an agreement in 1972 to regulate the pumping of ground water in the area within five miles of the border abutting the Yuma/San Luis Rio Colorado where the water was being over exploited for agricultural purposes (Kishel, 2000; Marty, 2001). This is the only agreement made between these two countries regarding the conservation of ground water (Mumme, 1993).

Another conflict that arose concerned the All-American Canal. This referred to the canal that was constructed to carry 3.5 million acre feet of the Colorado water to farming lands in the Imperial Valley in the state of California. However, the construction and maintenance of this canal led to further problems: the canal runs through the arid regions and the sandy soil causes a large amount of water to seep through into the ground. In order to alleviate this problem, the United States made plans to line part of the canal. The Mexicans allege that this lining would not reduce the recharging of the ground water levels, but also lead to the increase in the salinity levels of the aquifer, known as Mesa San Luis. This would cause a lot of problems to the agricultural farms situated in the Mexicali valley (Frisvold & Caswell, 2000).

Sharing of the rivers on the borders between Mexico and United States is long standing issue and has increased in complexity through the years (Umoff, 2008). The Rio Grande issue, for instance, is a model case to illustrate the solving of water sharing issues as a consequence of improved international relations and established to improve such relations (Mostert, 2003).

To recall the problems that arose in the latter part of the nineteenth century, widespread protests erupted in the border states of the United States regarding the digging of ditches on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande in order to exploit more water for their agriculture. The Mexican contention was that the water shortage in the region was actually due to the extravagant water usage on the American (Ingram, 2004). In the same manner conflicts regarding water sharing in the Colorado River region also added to the issue on Rio Grande.

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These protests encouraged the stakeholders in Mexico and the United States to urge and advocate an agreement regarding the sharing of the waters of these rivers and prevent similar instances from arising in the future (Umoff, 2008).

Although the water Treaty signed in 1944 ensured a fair share of the Colorado River water to Mexico (1.5 Million Acre-Feet or MAF), the agreement did not however specify the quality of the water to be supplied, including its salinity levels. This led to further increases in the salinity levels by the early 1960s to almost double the level in a couple of years and was considered totally unfit to be used for agricultural purposes as the salinity had topped 1500 parts-per-million (ppm) where even 1000 ppm was unsuitable. Because of this, the salinity issues added to and even became more controversial than the increasing water scarcity (Kishel, 2000; Mumme, 1993; Frisvold & Caswell, 2000).

The IBWC through its Minute 242 in the year 1973 formed what was named as the Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River. This agreement ensured that the salinity level that is delivered to Mexico would be controlled to be less than 115 parts per million of the total dissolved solids (TDS) in the water at the Imperial Dam reservoir located in the United States. However, Mumme (1993) expresses certain reservations about the agreement, contending that it was only the relative salinity of the water being used by these countries that has been agreed upon and not its absolute value increases that is observed throughout the basin.

This region has a strong contingent of community forums who make sure that the decisions regarding the problems faced by the people of these countries is not only heard, but also given due opportunities for active participation in the decision making process. It is as a consequence of these efforts that bi-national cooperation and collaborative considerations of all available options for solving the issues regarding the water sharing of these rivers have fructified and both countries are reaping the mutual benefits from the programs and institutions that have evolved over the last two decades.

3.4 – Awareness of interdependence based on sensitivity and vulnerability to water scarcity

As mentioned earlier, the disparity in the economic situation of these countries, illegal immigration and other cross-border issues continue to plague the complete success of the planned processes. Changes in the climate, resource management difficulties due to the increasing population that demands more water from the already depleting sources make it imperative that collaboration is the only solution to the issues of this region (Witte, Eden, Dos Santos, & Esqueda, 2012).

At the local government level also, there are unequal and conflicting developmental barriers that prevent the smooth implementation of the decisions regarding the administration of resources and the environment management. For instance, the local governments in Mexico have less autonomy than their US counterparts in initiating and implementing programs. The state and national governments have the final say in all activities that concern major political, social and cultural issues and the local governments have to be regulated by these decisions. Because of this, the developmental activities in the region lack consistency and parity (Busch, 1979).

Peaceful resolution to the problems of the equitable distribution and allocation of the boundary waters in this region through bilateral agreements and institutional methods that have been utilized by all the stakeholders involved can be illustrated by three examples: the United States’ proposal to reinforce the All-American Canal, and the satisfactory implementation of the agreement by Mexico to provide water from the Rio Grande to Texas, and the Hermosillo basin aquifer in the Mexican state of Sonora, which although an intra-national program, brings

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to the fore the effect of international agreements such as the NAFTA on water sources that are not actually trans-boundary (Neir & Campana, 2007).

The involvement of international and regional level non-governmental institutions in the peaceful resolution of water related issues are successful in the region owing mainly to the highly efficient network of environmental NGOs that consider water as the most susceptible issue in their agenda. For instance, after the 1983 La Paz Agreement or the Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area was signed with a view to institutionalizing cooperation between the two countries regarding environmental issues that occurred within a hundred kilometer radius of the border region. In a further addition to the NAFTA agreement, two new institutions were established in 1994: the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADBank). While the function of the BECC is to certify projects involving water, waste-water, and municipal solid waste as satisfying the environmental, technical and financial standards set by them, the NADBank arranges for the funding of these projects. This is to ease the financial crunch felt especially in the Mexican states to undertake such projects. (Frisvold & Caswell, 2000).

International relations depend on the compliance to international law and it is found to be so in the case of the international water issues too, especially as illustrated by the Rio Grande case (Mostert, 2003). States are bounded by international environmental law to the duty to exchange scientific and technological information; provide information, consultation and notification; assist; public access to administrative procedures; and monitoring to all related matters involving environmental impacts (for instance UN Chart, article 1; Rio Declaration, principle 7; Helsinki Convention 1992; Genève Convention 1992, Montego Bay Convention 1982; Antarctic Treaty 1959, etc.).

In this regard, the United Nations Conference on Human Environment that was held in 1972 in Stockholm is significant in this case study. This conference not only turned out to be a landmark in the development of international law but also led to the recognition of the ‘neighborly principle’ that was ratified by both the United States as well as Mexico. This conference framed the Declaration of the Human Environment, which stipulated the international law that ‘no country may engage in an activity which might be injurious to the environment of its neighbors’. The strengthening of attitude of cooperation between these two countries signing in recognition of this principle is made more evident by the observation that recognition of this law technically is not mandatory to following it. Nevertheless, this principle has made a new path to cooperation between the two countries in matters regarding the environment on a permanent basis and to constantly be aware of and deter any adverse effects on the environment by the activities proposed or already implemented, Earlier, such movements towards solving environmental problems only occurred when precipitated by some crisis (Weston, 1986).

There was another problem that put more pressure, especially to US: the communist threat in the border. The salinity brought bad consequences to agriculture and freshwater in the Mexicalli Velley, which according to estimates published by the Manhattan Mercury costs reached US$ 53 million in 1973 and would reach US$ 124 million annually in 2010.12

These condition lead the rural workers (campesinos) to strong protests in front of the US Consulate in Mexicali that according to BERNAL (1968, p.243) reached around 15.000 campesinos, who were organized by the Campesina Central Independiente (CCI) and the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN), two entities that the ideology were clearly Marxist exalting the Mexican Revolution and speeches anti-imperialism.

12Manhattan Mercury (Kansas), July 24, 1974, p.15.

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This fact was very problematic to the US because it was at the same time that the country was facing the Cuban Missile crises, thus the idea of having another front to battle with communist forces, especially along the land border, was very unpleasant to the US (White, 2007). The theat was felt in Washington and ended up reflecting in society as news in the Los Angeles Times:

MEXICALI – The Colorado – which means reddish – River has brought a flow of left-wing extremists and Communists to Baja California in recent months. The river has brought this flow of Reds because it has supplied two things essential for Marxist propaganda: unrest among the lower working classes and anti-Americanism.13

In communication loaded with ideology and invoking human rights the Comité de la Iniciativa Privada de Mexicalli declared:

Su gobierno inhumana e indebidamente está reteniendo agua utilizable del Río Colorado para consume exclusivo de su país sustituyéndola con aguas de drenaje contaminadas para entrega a México. Consideramos que la actitud de su gobierno constituye acto de privación de derechos y de agresión contra el pueblo de este valle.14

In Sonora a protest of 1.200 campesinos become source of attention as it was preparatory to the national one in July 12 of that same year according to the Yuma Daily Sun 15

13 Ruben Salazar, “River Row Makes Reds Flood Baja California”, Los Angeles Times, p.10. 14 In NACP, RG 59, DF, 1960-63, 611.12322/11-2961, Nov 29, 1961. 15The Yuma Daily Sun(Arizona), Jun, 8, 1964, p.1.

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3.5 – The initiation of talks and discussions for the setting up of cooperative structures

International and regional intergovernmental agencies (including international courts) possess strong influence in pushing parties to keep peaceful relationship (for instance UN, UNEP, OEA, EU, and Mercosul). The countries of United States and Mexico have an entrenched framework for managing water issues that have their foundations in international Treaties, Minutes and Agreements. To name a few important such treaties: Treaty of 2 February 1848; the Convention of 29 July 1882; the Convention of 12 November 1884; the Convention of 1 March 1889; the Convention of 21 May 1906;the Convention of 1 February 1933; the Treaty for Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande in 1944 (1944 Water Treaty); the Chamizal Convention of 29 August 1963; and the Treaty of November 1970.

The gathering awareness that the water sharing and its attendant issues needed a solution that was both international and binding as well as framed in a cooperative and collaborative manner led to the formalization of the agreements between the United States and Mexico and to the signing of the first water distribution treaty known as the Convention of March 1, 1906.

This treaty hinged on the allocation of the waters of the Rio Grande, from El Paso to Fort Quitman, through 89 miles of the shared international boundary. This agreement was later

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followed by the Convention of February 1, 1933 that served in two ways: the water allocation from the rivers bordering the two countries, as well as the demarcation of the border between the two countries and these were to be administered by the body formed for the purpose, the International Boundary Commission, on behalf of both the countries. This agreement facilitated the construction, operation and maintenance of the Rio Grande Rectification Project. This project led to the straightening and stabilization of the Rio Grande river boundary on its one hundred and fifty-five miles course through the El Paso/Juarez Valley. This agreement also specified the exact amounts of water from the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers that was to be allocated to each of the two countries concerned (Treaty, 1963). With the addition of the responsibilities in water allocation the IBC was re-named as the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) and known as the Comisión Internacional de Límites y Agua (CILA) in Mexico, and authorized that institution with the powers of enforcing and implementing the Treaty (IBWC).

The International Boundary Commission had been created in 1889 for looking into solving problems that arose at the border regions between the United States and Mexico. It was later changed into the International Boundary and Water Commission, IBWC, in 1944to tackle both the boundary as well as the issues concerning the shared waters of the Colorado, Tijuana and Rio Grande (Neir & Campana, 2007).This august institution, along with the other organizations such as the BECC, has illustrated yet another proof to the theory of public participation in solving trans-border environmental problems.

Conflicts that resulted from disputes on the water allocation resulted in the conclusion of the 1906 and the 1944 treaties. The IBWC/CILA, being also a forum for resolving conflicts regarding border and water sharing issues, is unique in that it also has added functionalities in the region of environment protection, pollution control and ground water management. The later additions and modifications of the original 1944 Treaty is done through the special mechanism of the Minutes which are reviewed and carried out from time to time (Kliot, Shmueli, & Shamir, 2001).

3.6 – The signing of treaties and/or setting up of Joint Commissions for water sharing among

the nations

The 1944 Treaty is considered to be an outstanding example of agreements for joint management of internationally shared waters of the Colorado and Rio Grande (Kliot, Shmueli, & Shamir, 2001). The signing of the historic 1944 Treaty for the Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and the Rio Grande by the United States and Mexico led to its ratification in 1945 and the came into force in November of that year and included the allocation of the waters of these rivers as well as the granting of authority to the IBWC to oversee these activities (IBWC).

The purposes and powers of the IBWC: the institution has a basin-wide comprehensive development responsibility and accountability and comprises of the management of all projects, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of agreements and also in the resolution of all conflicts that arise on these subjects (Kliot, Shmueli, & Shamir, 2001).The 1944 Treaty has identified four priorities for the utilization of the waters shared by the two countries: water used for domestic and municipal activities; water used for agricultural and the raising of stock; water used for the generation of electricity; and water used for other purposes such as water used by industries, navigation, fishing and hunting and other constructive consumptions (Housen-Couriel, 1994).

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As a conflict resolution forum, the IBWC/CILA is obligated to apply the principles and regulations of the Treaty and implement the rights and obligations of both governments under the Treaty, and also resolve all disputes that arise under the Treaty Disputes that arise under the Treaty are settled through the Minute process. (Umoff, 2008). From the time of the signing of the treaty to the present, the IBWC/CILA has successfully addressed many issues in water sharing that include improvements and maintenance in the infrastructure relating to water, routine as well as emergency trans-border water supply, and national responsibilities during the periods of drought and flood. The body has also the added responsibility of the running and maintenance of the bi-national infrastructures such as wastewater treatment plants in Arizona and San Diego, the Morelos Dam on the Colorado River and dams along the Rio Grande River(Witte, Eden, Dos Santos, & Esqueda, 2012), the San Diego and the Calexico-Mexicali sanitation projects (Kliot, Shmueli, & Shamir, 2001) and so on. The agency has not only resolved numerous issues regarding national ownership of water, sanitation, water quality, and flood control, but has also continued to develop as when new issues arise over time(Witte, Eden, Dos Santos, & Esqueda, 2012)including the data exchange and monitoring of the bi-national projects(Kliot, Shmueli, & Shamir, 2001).

Article 2 of the Treaty stipulates that the IBWC "shall in all respects have the status of an international body, which consists of a United States Section and a Mexico Section." (Treaty, 1963). Each section is headed by a Commissioner, assisted by two principal engineers, a legal advisor and a secretary all of whom are accorded diplomatic privileges and immunities when working in the territory of the other country. While each government is responsible for the expenditure incurred in the maintenance of its section, those that are incurred in joint exercises are shared equally between the two governments. The jurisdiction and control of all constructions, acquirements and utilization of works that concern the execution of the treaty are placed with the section of the treaty that relate to the country where such projects are situated.

However, when either section has to deal with a project located in the other country, it can do so with the specific consent of the government of that country. The Department of State of the United States and the Department of Foreign Relations of Mexico are authorized to deal with other matters that involve joint actions or agreements between the two countries (Treaty, 1963).

The Minutes have been welcomed as a method of clarifications, modification and additions to the original Treaty, especially in the areas that were ambiguous or vague. Moreover, the Minutes offer more flexibility at the short-term that would ensure the compliance of its specifications at the long-term (Umoff, 2008). The Minute process involves the recording of all decisions made under the rule-making powers of the Treaty. These records have to be maintained in a bi-lingual format that include both English and Spanish, signed by each Commissioner and forwarded to the respective governments within three days. The Minutes would come into force thirty days later unless otherwise specified by the governments (IBWC).

For instance, the Minute 242 that was prepared to address the issue of salinity in the Colorado river, stipulates that desalination be rectified by three projects to be undertaken by the United States at an estimated cost of $280,000,000 for: the desalination of the Wellton-Mohawk Drainage Project; the extension of a lined bypass drain for transporting the Wellton-Mohawk drainage and brine from the desalination plant to the Santa Clara slough on the Gulf of California; and the financing of Mexico's developments and rehabilitation in the Mexicali Valley that was affected by the salinity problem (Ferguson, 1999). These provisions include the setting up of the Yuma Desalination plant; an 85 kilometer extension of the Wellton-Mohawk drain, construction or the lining of a new Coachella canal in California; reducing the district acreage and enhancing the irrigation proficiency of the Wellton-Mohawk region; constructing a balance well-field on the US side to offset those on the Mexican side of the border (Murakami, 1995).

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The NAFTA 1993 established the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission to not only protect local interests but also to help sustain such activities both environmentally as well as financially (Milich & Varady, 1999). The success of the BECC has been attributed to its design and adaptations that have made it a model institution that has fulfilled its potential of openness, transparency, and bi-nationality, and deduce that these qualities can be emulated by of such trans-boundary institutions to create sincerity, transparency, capacity building, bottom-up design, and sustainability (Milich & Varady, 1999).

In order to help the development efforts of the bi-national projects concerning the water sharing and environment and resource management of the border areas, the NAFTA side agreements established the BECC and the subsequent NADBank in 1994. As the funding situation in the countries involved is not at parity, with the Mexican players being perennially affected by shortages, the NADBank arranges the finance of projects such as the border water and municipal solid waste management after these are duly certified by the BECC. This central funding scheme alleviates the problems that arise from market failures that beset these projects.

Both the countries make use of the bank’s resources as the rates offered by it at a much lower level than those tendered by the commercial lending institutions and thus make these projects economically viable. The NADBank also arranges for loans and grants from private funding agencies that are not directly available to the local bodies. Although the NADBank does not directly grant the loans but only helps in administering the Environment Protection Agency‘s (EPA) grants programs. The bank also stipulates that the loans have to be repaid through the collection of fees and other duties by the local bodies (NADBank, 1998). Thus, the activities turn into one of community participation in the sustainable development of the region.

The BECC also offers technical assistance to the local bodies for the development of projects concerning the environment and resource management. Analysis of the project proposals with due consideration on the effects of these on the environment and also the financial viabilities are made by the BECC and the EPA (EPA, 1998). Earlier there had been some protests regarding the sustainable development standards prescribed by the BECC and the NADBank refused to offer assistance to projects that were certified by the BECC (Varady, Colnic, Merideth, & Sprouse, 1996) because of constraints in meeting the bank’s criteria: lack of adequate resources in the local bodies for such expensive projects, absence of proper master plans proposals; limitations in the capabilities of the local bodies with regard to the financial, administrative and commercial aspects of the projects; opposition to raising the present fees structure to meet the future costs; and the paucity of private sector involvement in the projects.

However, with the establishment of the Border Environmental Infrastructure Bank, by the EPA some of these problems have been alleviated (NADBank, 1998). This funding also obtains and manages grants as well as loan guarantees for projects such as infrastructure development in municipal areas, drinking water treatment plant and also distributions system to supply treated water. The payback of the loans is done over time with the levy of user fees by the local bodies (NADBank, 1998).

Frisvold and Caswell (2000) point out certain criticisms aimed at the IBWC for its functioning and implementing methods. One of the criticisms is regarding the hesitation and tardiness shown by the commission in including the water quality standards to the ground water management issues. Another point of dispute is regarding the vagueness in the mandate of the commission with reference to the water quality that has led to the impeded the environmental agencies at the state and federal level from regulating the water pollution adequately. The commission is also blamed for ignoring the basic causes for the crises and only trying to alleviate those by using short-term structural and engineering solutions. Segregated from public participation and comment, the commission’s decision making process is not community friendly.

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Mumme (1993) also raises the issue of the ambiguity of commission’s mandate over the water quality and the subsequent foiling of the environmental agencies’ efforts at prevention. For instance, the lack of clarity regarding the hazardous waste water falls in the category of both sanitation and sewage issues. Thus, the question of whether the state environmental agencies and the EPA or the Commission that is competent to handle the issue. Moreover, because of the structure and decision making process of the IBWC is different from that of other resource management agencies in the United States, and the commission is exempt from holding public meetings or hearing public comments, as well as the diplomatic accord given to its members and functioning, the commission is considered to be reticent and secretive in its functioning (Mumme, 1993) instead of open and forthcoming as is expected in an international body.

Moreover, the bi-national nature of the IBWC also includes Mexico that has to be given its due as a sovereign country. Because of this, Frisvold and Caswell (2000) argue that the solutions to the environmental problems are more in the nature of a Coasian bargaining (where the market sets the price for the pollution and thus solves the problem), than those offered by regulations and international laws.

4 – CONCLUSION

The salinity crisis offers a very clear view of how political issues (national and international), scientific, economic, social and environmental are interconnected in such a way that the adoption of a holistic approach becomes increasingly necessary. It highlighted the trend that, at a certain point of the conflict installed between riparian countries, whether violent or not, recognition of the physical interdependence becomes the key point that leads countries to cooperation processes.

What is observed in recent decades is considerable progress in bi-national and multilateral collaboration that results in great advances for the processing of problems inherent in the sharing and use of water and the recognition of environmental protection need as a whole deserved great attention and concrete actions on the part of nations, which alone are powerless to solve the problems and meet the demands (Mostert, 2003).

The analysis of the Rio Grande basin shows sufficient evidence of the recognition of the physical interdependence and the presence of aspects of vulnerability and sensitivity, which moved the United States and Mexico to complex processes of interaction and negotiation when they could benefit for both and prevented the escalation of the crisis to a more serious conflict. Ecological, social, economic and ideological aspects of the salinity in the river basin interacted in such a way that an issue restricted to a region became international thanks to the activism of civil society sectors.

The period selected for analysis is between the salinity crisis and the issue of the Minute 242 proved highly relevant to prove the theory in a context of great economic and structural disparity between the two countries, the geographical position of superiority the United States with regard to Mexico in the relevant watercourses and the issue of water quality to be the key-issue between them. The context of the case also shows an interesting point, which is the prior existence of a treaty that has regulated the distribution of water between the two countries, which indicates the willingness of the United States in order to allocate the necessary water for its neighbor despite the principles of prior appropriation and historical use or to use first developed by the US law and the Harmon doctrine.

The salinity crisis as the starting point of the examination period is marked by the proliferation in the United States of unilateral projects for irrigation to meet the needs of

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American farmers on the west coast, where the climate is semiarid for the most part . The uptake of water by these projects did not harm the amount of water that came to Mexico, which was within the minimum terms set out in the 1944 treaty between the two countries. However, the water that came caused significant damage to agriculture and its population in the Mexicalli valley, which depended on agriculture for subsistence. Thus, it is noted that the sticking point raised by the crisis is centered on water quality rather than quantity, for, as seen, there was enough water coming to Mexico, but the water was unfit for use, which confirms scarcity as operationalized previously as having the power to induce states to conflicts should include aspects related to quality and in context with water uses within the unit of analysis proposed for study. As said before, at the conclusion of this study the author presents a summary of the case and its comparison to the Jordan River basin case, which has been tested in other opportunity.

water scarcity sensitivity Vulnerability cooperation

Jordan River High demand of water after Israel State creation

Unilateral water plans: Seven Year Plan (Israel) and Murdoch MacDonald Plan (Jordan)

Inefficiency of plans. Increasing refugees and high costs to send water out of basin.

Oslo Agreements (I and II) and multilateral and bilateral tracks.

Rio Grande River

High demand on water for irrigation-Colorado

Salinity crisis Tension on the border – Campesinos protests (communist threat in the border and Cuban Missile Crisis)

Water Treaty 1944 and Minute 242 that creates the International Boundary Water Commision

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