PERANCANGAN STRATEGIK STRIDE 2004 - 2014

STRIDE IntroductionIntroduction

Increasing use for PNT applications:

PositioningNavigationTiming

STRIDE GNSS Vulnerabilities GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delayTropospheric delaySatellite clock errorEphemeris errorSignal error

LOS blockageReceiver noiseDilution of precisionJammingSpoofing

STRIDE GNSS SpoofingGNSS Spoofing

Forging and transmission of navigation messages in order to manipulate the navigation solutions of GNSS receivers

Even if a spoofer is not fully successful, he/she can still create significant errors and jam GNSS signals over large areas


GPS spoofing used to trick a British vessel into Chinese waters


A number of GNSS simulators have been designed for legal purposes

In the wrong hands, can be used for spoofing


GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment


The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE GNSS SpoofingGNSS SpoofingMeaconing

GNSS record and playback systems record real GNSS signals and retransmit the signals to evaluated GNSS receivers.

While spoofing using this method cannot be used to impose user-defined scenarios on a receiver, it can still cause the receiver to compute false location fixes using the transmitted real GNSS signals.

Furthermore, this form of attack can be used for spoofing military GNSS signals

STRIDE ObjectivesObjectives This study is aimed at evaluating GPS

performance during simplistic GPS spoofing attacks.

Spoofing is conducted using a standalone GPS simulator, which at present poses the greatest near-term threat.

In this type of spoofing attack, the spoofing signal is not synchronised (in terms of power level, phase, Doppler shift and data content) with the genuine signals received by the target GPS receiver.

This could cause the target GPS receiver to temporarily lose position fix lock first, before being taken over by the spoofing signal.

STRIDE MethodologyMethodology

Test Setup

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE MethodologyMethodologyTest Scenario

• Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m• The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,

while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE Results & DiscussionResults & DiscussionThe effect of GPS spoofing attacks

Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE Results & DiscussionResults & Discussion

Reading 1 Reading 2 Reading 3

Evaluated GPS receiver

The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy


STRIDE Results & DiscussionResults & Discussion


Reference GPS receiver

The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy


STRIDE GPS SpoofingGPS SpoofingThe effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy

Evaluated GPS receiver Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE ConclusionConclusion Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between

position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are observed for different dates and times.

This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time dependent.

Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites tracked by the receiver.

For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.

This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large, resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE Scope for Future WorkScope for Future Work On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field

GNSS evaluations. Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is

difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.

This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.

This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable user-controlled conditions.

STRIDE GNSS Receiver EvaluationGNSS Receiver Evaluation

Employs live GNSS signals. Should be conducted in open area with

clear view of the sky. Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by

users and not repeatable.

Field Evaluation

Employs simulated GNSS signals. Should be conducted in a RF enclosure

(e.g. anechoic chamber). Test scenarios are user controllable

and repeatable.

GNSS Simulation

STRIDE GPS JammingGPS JammingField Evaluation GPS Simulation

STRIDE GPS Functional TestsGPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments GPS-12R

Topcon Hiper GA

Magellan Z-Max

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer 6000 GeoXH, Nomad

900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

STRIDE Research CollaborationsResearch Collaborations

Effect of Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) on Global Positioning System (GPS) Static Observations

Collaboration with Faculty of Architecture, Planning and Surveying (FSPU), Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM)

Project Co-Leaders: Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman

Mohd Suldi Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris

PERANCANGAN STRATEGIK STRIDE 2004 - 2014

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