Biggart ASQ 1977

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The Creative-Destructive Process of Organizational Change: The Case of the Post OfficeAuthor(s): Nicole Woolsey BiggartSource: Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1977), pp. 410-426Published by: Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2392181

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The Creative-DestructiveProcess ofOrganizationalChange:The Case of the PostOfficeNicole WoolseyBiggart

Iwouldlike o thankGaryG. Hamilton,University f California, avis,forhishelp and encouragement.September 1977, volume 22

Studies of organizational change have tended to focus onidentifying the reasons for change while ignoring theprocess of change. Even those that analyze the processof change are concerned with the challenge of creatingnew organizational structures. This paper discusses thedestructive aspects of reorganizing that must take place ifchange is to be successful. The 1970-71 reorganization ofthe U.S. Post Office Department is used as a model.*Studies of organizational hange have most often beenconcerned with the reasons forchange and have taken theprocess for granted. Researchers have attempted to identifythe stimulithat triggeradaptive behaviors and have seenchange as a productof such influences as organizationalstructure(Hummon,Doreianand Teuter, 1975), growth andageing (Labovitz nd Miller,1974), technologicalinnovation(Bell, 1973), environmentalchanges (Sherwood, 1976),con-stituency changes (Mazmanian nd Lee, 1975), leadershipstyle (Meyer, 1975),and the dissatisfactionof the deprived(Benson, 1973).Such studies emphasize the initiating auseand the evolutionarynatureof the process rather han see-ing change as inherentlyproblematic.Even those that doidentify change as problematic reatitas a problemof thecreation of territoriesand structures(Downs, 1967) orofmanagerial"teams" and conducive climates (Golembiewskiand Kiepper,1976).Itis not generally recognizedthat change is an act of de-structionas much as of creation. Because most organiza-tions do change slowly, experimentingwith and selectivelyincorporatingnew forms, the destruction of old forms andmethods is relativelyobscured.Butthe destructiveprocessmust either precede or exist simultaneouslywith the cre-ative. This act of undoingand dismantling s importanttheoretically:reorganization resumes the rejectionorsupercession of old methods in favor of the new and theorganizationmust systematicallydestroy former, competingstructuresbefore it can successfully implant he new.Generally,destructionis an extreme concept but in an or-ganization t rarely inds expression in any dramaticway,principally ecause few organizational hanges are of revo-lutionarydimensionand are often never completed beforeopposing interests can mute the effects. The concept ofdestructionas partof organizational hange is useful be-cause itproperlydescribes the treatment of organizationalaccouterments that have lost their use orare in disfavor.Destruction,as used in this paper,includesany action thatabolishes, discredits, suppresses, orotherwise renders use-less an organizationaltructure.Amongthe features a newregimeoften destroys in the course of conversion are theformer formalstructure, eadership, deology, power al-liances, decision-makingmodel, and technology. Thispro-cess can in some ways be thought of as the resocializationof the organization:an organization annot be isolated fromits former self (althoughsymbolic attempts such as movingthe corporate headquarters nd changing the name arecommon), butpunishments can be meted out for re-establishing old patterns and rewards granted those adopt-410O/Administrativecience Quarterly


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Creative-Destructive Processing new ways. Empirically,his process is importantbe-cause it explainsmanyof the actions prior o and duringgovernment and corporatereorganizations, ctions whichmayotherwise be incomprehensibleor attributed o othercauses.THEMODELThe 1971 reorganization f the U.S. Post Office Department(POD) nto the U.S. PostalService (USPS) s an unusuallydemonstrativemodel of the creative-destructiveprocess forseveral reasons. First, t is an extraordinarilyarge organiza-tion. At the passage of PublicLaw 91-375, the Postal Reor-ganizationAct, the POD had over 700,000 workers, almost1 percent of the U.S. workforce (AnnualReportof thePostmasterGeneral, FY 1971). In the federal government,onlythe militarywas a largeremployerand among privateorganizationsonlyAT&Twas comparable.Such dimensionstend to magnify organizational rocesses.Second, the reorganizationwas close to revolutionarynscope. Inone momentous actionthe President and Con-gress transformedthe POD's formalstructureand legal rela-tionships, forms that had existed virtually nchanged for100 years.Third, he reorganizationwas not evolutionary, hat is, theculminationof internally elt needs or power struggles.Rather, twas a transformation mposed bya coalitionofexternal interests onto a bureaucracyhat neithersoughtnorwelcomed the change. The majority f the employeeshadtaken pride n or at least were comfortablewith theformsthat were repudiatedbythe externalinterestgroups.Finally, he Post Office is a publicorganizationwhose ac-tivities are more available o publicscrutiny han most pri-vate organizations.The structureof the Post Office has features of both indus-tryand government and is, therefore, both similarand un-likeother organizations.Whilethe Post Office is not a typi-cal organization tructurally,he processes of change in thisextreme model demonstrate what can be found generallythroughoutorganizations.Thisstudy distinguishes broadanalyticcategories that appear o have hadimportance nthis case. In some instances the assignment of events to aparticular ategory has been arbitrary ecause few organiza-tional activitiesperforma single functionoract in any uni-taryway.Formal StructureArticle1,Section 8 of the UnitedStates ConstitutiongrantsCongress the right to "regulate commerce . . . to establishpost offices and post roads,"but itwas not until1792 thatthe Post Office had consolidatedits positionas a perma-nent agency (Cullinan: 7). Congress retainedthe exclusiveright o establishand regulate post offices, a rightof con-siderablepower in a growing nationthat depended heavilyon the mails forthe conduct of business and the mainte-nance of communications.The Post Office Departmentwaslocated under the ExecutiveBranchand the President ap-pointedthe Postmaster Generalwho in turn appointed his41 1/ASQ


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IOthermembersof the KappelCommis-sionwere: GeorgeP. Baker,Dean, Har-vardUniversityGraduate choolof Busi-ness Administration; avidE. Bell,VicePresident,The FordFoundation;FredJ.Borch,President,GeneralElectricCom-pany;DavidGinsburg,Partner,GinsburgandFeldman;RalphLazarus,Chairman,Boardof Directors,CumminsEngineCompany;W. BeverlyMurphy,Presi-dent, Campbell oup Company;RudolphA. Peterson,President,Bankof America.

LaurenceO'Brien,President Johnson's campaign managerand Postmaster General,carriedon his duties in muchthesame manneras his predecessors, butduring he 1960s themountingmail volume, outdated equipment, and unrespon-sive management system led to a crisis that could-not beignored.In the autumn of 1966, the Chicago Post Office,the largestmailprocessing facility n the world, ceased tofunction.O'Brien estified before a House Subcommittee,"ten million pieces of mail were logjammed.... Outboundmail sacks formedsmallgrey mountainranges while waitingto be shipped out" (HouseSubcommittee on Departmentsof the Treasuryand Post Office and Executive Office of thePresident,February 7, 1965: 5), and for three weeks the mailwas almost stationary.This situation forced O'Brien o takeemergency hiringmeasures to startprocessing again.The Chicago breakdown ed him to push for an overhaulofthe system; he favoreda corporatestructure hat wouldgive importantpowers to the Postmaster General.Reformwas an acceptable idea to many, but the concept of a cor-poratestructurewas revolutionary nd had few supporters.Publisherswere afraidof losing millionsof dollars n ratesubsidies, the unions had nurtured comfortablerelation-ship with Congress for decades that they were reluctant odismiss, and rural onstituents, knowing how expensiveruralpost offices were to maintain,had nothing to gain by amoreefficient service. Congress held hearings on the mat-ter, however, and O'Brienmade an effective spokesmanfor reform. CongressmanThomas Steed (Democrat,Ok-lahoma)summarizedO'Brien's estimony:Mr.Steed: General .. would this be a fairsummary; hat at the presenttime, as the managerof the Post Office Department, ou have no controloveryourworkload,you have no controlover the pay rates of the em-ployees you employ,you have verylittlecontrolover the conditionsof theservice of these employees, you have virtually o control,bythe natureofit,of yourphysicalfacilities hat you are compelledto use - all of whichadds upto a staggeringamount of "no control" n terms of the dutiesyouhaveto perform ...Mr.O'Brien:Mr.Chairman,wouldhave to generallyagreewith yourpremise. . . that is a staggering istof "no control."I don't know[whether]it has ever been put moresuccinctly o me. If it hadbeen at anappropriateime, perhapsI wouldn'tbe sitting here. (HouseSubcommitteeon Departmentsof the Treasury nd Post Officeand ExecutiveOffice ofthe President,February7, 1967: 27-28).As frequentlyoccurs with disputedpublicproblems,a Presi-dential commission was formed to investigatethe state ofthe Post Office and to recommend solutions.The Chairmanof the Commission,which was formedin the springof1967, was FrederickR. Kappel.Kappelwas formerChairmanof the Boardof AT&T nd had served in numerous gov-ernment advisorypositions. More importantly,he had justcompleted work on the Ash Commission,whose task hadbeen to make recommendations on the modernizationofthe entire federalstructure.Kappelwas joined by eightmembers of the business and educationalworld,1andGeorge Meany, President of the AFL-CIO,o which mostunionized postal employees belonged.The KappelCommissionagreedthat reorganizationwasoverdue and considered five structural lternatives: main-tainingthe post office as a Cabinetdepartmentbut with414/ASQ


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2Meany'sdissension reads,"Iagree withthe goalof modernizinghe postalsys-tem.... However, the status of thePost Officeas a CabinetDepartmenthasa positivevaluethatshould not be dis-carded ightly"KappelCommissionRe-port:2).3Congressheldhearings n 1968 beforethe release of the KappelCommissionfindingson the subjectof removingpoli-tics frompostalappointments; herewassupport orthis independentof postalreorganization.ee hearingsbefore theHouseSubcommitteeon PostalOpera-tions February , 7, 8 andMarch26, 28,1968.

Creative-Destructive Processimprovedmanagement techniques; a sub-cabinetgovern-ment agency insulatedfromsome political nterference; agovernment corporation;a government corporationwithstrong influence fromthe privatesector, called variouslya"mixed"or"conglomerate"corporation;and a regulatedprivatecorporation KappelCommission,Annex 1,1968:181-220). Inits June, 1968 report,TowardPostalExcel-lence, the Commission,with a dissent from Meany,2gaveits supportto a government corporationwith a formalstruc-ture verymuch likea regulatedpublicutilitybutwhollyowned bythe federal government. Of the five alternativesconsidered, the government corporation ave the mostpowerto the PostmasterGeneralwith the least interfer-ence fromexternalagents.RichardNixon, elected Presidentin 1968, appointedwealthybusinessman WintonBlountas PostmasterGeneralandcharged him with guidingthe corporatereformproposalsthroughcongressional hearings.The postalcorporationmovement surviveddespite protest fromlargemailers,postalunions, the postmasters' and supervisors'organiza-tions, and rural itizens. Perhapsthe most important easonforthe corporation's urvival s that Congress hadtiredofthe greatpatronageordealof appointingpostmasters andrural arriers,a chore that many felt was notworththeadvantages.3Too, Congress was pleased to have a popularbipartisanssue like better mailservice during he divisive-ness of the VietnamWar.Withreforma certaintyoppositiongroupsdeveloped theirown legislativeproposals,butthe bill hat passed in thesummerof 1970, and became effective on July 1, 1971,was much likethe originalKappelCommission proposalwith some changes that reflected politicalobbying.Bythenit hadthe supportof the publishersand other largemailerswho were promisedimprovedservice, but the unions werestillreluctant.GeorgeMeanygave his supportonly after theinclusionof a 14-percentpay hike forworkersintothe billand the promiseof the AFL-QCIO'sxclusive rightto repre-sent unionizedmailemployees at the bargainingable(HouseCommitteeon Post Office and CivilService, April22, 1970: 2-4).In addition o-a nine-memberBoardof Governorswhichappointsthe PostmasterGeneral, he billestablishedan in-dependent Postal RateCommission, gave the unions theright o bargain orwages, removedallpostalpositions fromthe patronagesystem and largely rom the controlof theCivilService Commission,authorized he new UnitedStatesPostalService to borrowupto $10 billion or long-termcapi-tal improvementsand removedcontrol over postalfundsfromthe TreasuryDepartment.The PostalService wasgiven until 1984 to breakeven. Inthe interimCongresswouldappropriate nough money to payfor the differencebetween costs and revenues (Title39, U.S. Code, 1970).Inthis reorganization,much of the new formalstructurewas imposed by a lawthat also destroyedthe formerstruc-ture and codifiedthe defeat of oppositiongroups.The de-structionwas incomplete, however, as the internalstructureof the organizationwas not mentioned in the legislation.415/ASQ


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| Postmaster General

Planning Research Consumer Communications General ChiefAdvocate and Public Affairs Counsel Inspector

Deputy Postmaster General

Senior Assistant Senior Assistant Senior AssistantPostmaster General Postmaster General Postmaster GeneralCustomer services Mailprocessing Support

r ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~EmployOpportunity5 Regional Postmasters General

InternationalFinac] Management Personnel Administration PostalInformation AffairsFigure2. U.S. Postal Service, 1971.

Thiswas one of the first tasks that Blountand his staffattackedin the transitionyear before the legislationbecameeffective. Blount'sstrategyreflectedthe model favoredbythe Ash Commission: he retainedwhat policy-making u-thority hadtraditionally xisted at the top and added newoffices to reflect the increasedauthorityof the Postal Ser-vice in areas such as planningand research,and decen-tralizedalloperatingauthorities o the field. The PostmasterGeneralbecame the Chief Executive Officer and the DeputyPostmaster Generalbecame the Chief OperatingOfficer.The regionaloffices were reduced from 15 to 5 and theyreported o the Deputy Postmaster General.The DeputyPostmaster Generalalso hadHeadquarters ffices that re-portedto him but these were largely ieldsupportgroups.The regions became independent subunits and to cope withthe increased span of control they were subdivided ntometro areas and districtswhich were furtherdividedintosectionalcenters. Blount sought support forthe new struc-ture among the still reluctantpostal supervisors by denounc-ing the formerorganizationand appealingto theirpride:There is a need for a basic change inourentireapproach o management.The structurewe have livedwith foryears is a civilservice-stylehierarchi-calorganization.Whata man earns is measuredby how many people hesupervises. People lookto the book to tell them what they aresupposedtobe doing.Andwe spend a lot of time fillingout forms. We need to shift toa new orientation.... It[decentralization] illget away from the strait-jacketof the past,whereby the postal system was runbythe book andthebookwas writteninWashington.We want to give managersa chance tomanage,to innovate and initiate and even to make mistakes....41 6/ASQ


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Creative-Destructive ProcessTreating our service people in the field like messengers guarantees anexperienced, well-trained staff of messengers, but it doesn't breed manag-ers (Postal Leader, June, 1971: 1).The formalstructureof an organization s usuallywhat ismost easily changed in a reorganization nd the act of im-posing a new structureeffectively destroys the former nmost instances. In the case of the Post Office, the destruc-tion was completed by law after considerable struggle; inmost other organizations t is decreed by top managementand reflects management's philosophy.Unwilling ubordi-nates usually have little choice but to accept the change. Inretaliation, hey erode its effects by re-establishing nformalnetworks that approximateold lines of authority.Erosionwas a secondary concern, however, for the new postalstructure.Blountwas quick o recognize that the legislationhad many enemies and the new structurecouldbe de-stroyed by Congress as readilyas Congress had destroyedthe POD should any dissident groups gain power.The mostpotentiallypowerfulenemies were his own employees -the postmasters, supervisors,and postalunionmembers-who had established contacts in Washington, representedagreat many votes, and controlledone of the largestcontri-bution funds in Washington.The fact that postal employeescontact nearlyevery household in the United States sixdays a week gives them a great opportunityo influenceothers as well. Anotherinfluentialgroupof adversarieswere the organizedpostalcustomers, such as publishers,mailorderfirms,the greetingcardindustry,and institutionalmailers.The Post Office's competitors, express companies,package delivery firms,and courierservices, were newlyalert to the aggressive action of a formerlypassive rivalaswell. They lobbiedto raisepostal rates before the PostalRate Commission.Blountwas correctin his estimation of the tenuous positionhis organization aced. Inthe springof 1973, less than twoyears afterthe reorganizationook effect, over 70 billswereentered in Congress to modifythe legislationorto returnpostal management to Congress (Myers,1975: 127).Al-though this case is extreme, otherorganizations ace thesame conditions. "Thesingle most importantdeterminantof whether a bureaucan establish autonomy (and how fastit can do so) is the characterof its power setting. If itssuppliersor beneficiaries are strong and well organized ncomparisonwith its rivalsand sufferers, then it willquicklygain a clearlyautonomous position" (Downs, 1967: 10). Thenew U.S. Postal Service quicklydestroyedthe former deol-ogy, power alliances,and leadership n orderto impose newones favorable o the new structureand neutralizeopposi-tion.IDEOLOGYIdeology s usuallyassociated with politicalparties,socialclasses, and advocacy groups,butrarelywith businesses.Thisseeming oversight is because the profit deology,widelysharedthroughoutcapitalist ndustries,is considereda given by most organizational nalysts. Untilreorganization,the ideology behind the POD was service, service at allcosts. It gave logic to the POD's operatingmethodology,41 7/ASQ


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sustenance to the entwined power relationsamong mailers,postalemployees, and Congress, and even supportto sucheconomicallydebilitatingpolicies as subsidizedrates andruralpost offices.Dependable publicservice is a noble ideology and gives asense of purpose to employees in routine obs in factory-likeconditions. The fact that the PODwas not in businessfor profitelevated the workers'positions in the minds ofmanyemployees. Phrases such as the "sanctityof themails"andthe "mails must go through"reifiedthe postalmission. Callingmailers"patrons"and workers "civilser-vants" emphasized the subservient relationship hat existedbetween the POD andthe generalpopulation.Postmastershadto reside in the town inwhich they worked so thatthey could be accountable to the citizens there (KappelCommission, 1968: 41).The almost exclusive preoccupationwith this concept ofservice was expressed in the absence of financialand costdata, even forprocessingactivities. Inits investigation,theKappelCommission found "postalfinancialmanagementconcentrates on acquisitionand control of the inputside ofpostal operations,"and informationabout costs was "inad-equate or non-existant"(Annex1, 1968: 89). Postmasterswere given "budgets"of man hours, not dollars,and werepaidaccording o the numberof employees they super-vised. Therewas no incentive to be efficient; rather heincentive was to use as many workers as possible andelaborate ustificationproceduresgrew up aroundrequestsformoreworkers. The best justificationwas that servicewouldsuffer.This ideologyof good mailservice uncompromisedby con-siderations such as cost, competition,and even marketde-mand hadconsiderable emotionalappealeven if, objec-tively, service was deterioratingwith increasingvolume andoutdated methods. Such traditional alues were held mosttightly by the senior employees who hadthe greatest per-sonal investment in them. Therewas no doubtthat changewas comingwith the recruitmentof youngeremployees inthe 1960s as volume soared, but the senior employees stillheldpower as supervisors and in the unions where theylargelydeterminedthe postureof employees on issues be-fore Congress.The PODwas what Downs calls a "non-market"organiza-tion where "there is no directrelationshipbetween the ser-vices a bureauprovidesand the income it receives forpro-vidingthem" (1967: 30). The service-at-all-costs deologywas congruentwith this organizationalorm butposed afundamentalthreat to the new "quasi-market"overnmentcorporation.The ideologyof service gave reason to thenon-rational nd justification o the inefficient. Unless chal-lenged and destroyedthe old ideologywould be the founda-tion forthe new business-likestructure.The PostalServicemanagement used a four-foldstrategyto discredit he oldideologyand implanta new one supportiveof the new re-gime: symbolicreorientation,nternalcommunications,ex-ternalcommunications,and trainingand indoctrination.41 8/ASQ


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Creative-Destructive ProcessSymbolic reorientation. Whatever image citizens, em-ployees, and customers had had of the POD it was severelydamaged in the fight over the reform legislation.This hadthe additional ffect of demoralizing mployees and, insome instances, predisposingthem to opposing the newregime. Discrediting he PODwas followed by removing thesigns of its existence.The first and most obvious move was retiring he 200-year-old name of the organization.Only federal cabinetagencies are called departments and the name changesymbolized its removal from a political tatus to that of anindependent agency. It also dissociated the new organiza-tion from the old.Postal management hired he industrial esign firmofLoewy/Snaith o develop new symbols and performa corpo-rate "make-over."They designed a new logo, chose amodern type face for all publications, tationery, and con-tracts, and selected bright new postal colors. Thousands ofolive green postaltrucks and mailboxeswere painteda pa-trioticred, white and blue. Loewy/Snaithalso chose a seriesof color schemes forrepaintingobbies and a new signsystem for post offices to replacethe largelyhand-letteredsigns.The new image was developed during he transitionyearbetween passage of the billand the effective date of July1, 1971. Burnaford nd Company,a promotionfirm,washired o link he new symbols with the occasion of thereorganization.A birthdayparty heme was chosen to sym-bolize the death of the PODand the birthof the USPS;partieswere held in every post office in the United Stateson July 1. The USPS issued a stamp of the new logo onthat dayand gave free commemorative covers to the public.Post offices were open to the publicand tours were givenof the processing facilities.In manyareas there was a sym-bolicremovingof the old PODseal of a colonialriderand itsreplacement by the new USPS eagle poised for flight.Internalcommunications. Internal ommunications,that isthe formalcommunication networkwithinthe postal organi-zation,are forms of symbolic reorientationbutthey are sep-arated n this study because they were directedexclusivelyat employees and includedsubstantiveas well as symboliccontent. The internalcommunicationseffort was aimedatboth preachingthe new ideologyand counteractingoppos-ing efforts by employee unions and supervisoryorganiza-tions. The POD'sOffice of PublicInformationwas reorga-nized intothe Departmentof Communicationsand PublicAffairsand includeda new Office of InternalCommunica-tions whose mission was to formulatepolicyforexplainingcorporatedecisions to employees, create house organs fordisseminatinginformationand act as a clearinghouseforoffices wishing to communicatewith employees throughmass publications.The highlydispersedwork force placedunusual burdens on printedcommunicationsas a mediumof information.Eventually,videotape equipment supple-mented printedpublicationsas a method of communicatingwith middle-levelmanagers.41 9/ASQ


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The POD hadinitiateda fairlyprofessional employee houseorgan, Postal Life, in the mid-1960s that was issuedbimonthlyand sent to the homes of allemployees. It was agenerallyinnocuous compendium of humanintereststoriesand bits of informationabout postal historyand lore. Afterthe reorganization t became an importantmedium for dis-seminatingmanagement's point of view on automation,labornegotiations, workconditions, and other issues of im-portance to management-union relations. Italso served as away of breakingdown the formerways of thinkingof em-ployees used to the previousideology and non-competetiveposture of the POD.Articlespraised post offices that weremeeting new efficiency standards- "WhatMakes Ft. WorthNo. 1," May-June 1971: 8 - encouraged employees to be-come aggressive in theirselling of postalproducts "LittleStamps, Big Business," March-April 972: 17-and evensought to instillsome fear of competition,something postalworkers never considered when Congress appropriatedfunds- "ThatOther PackageService and How It Suc-ceeded," November-December1972: 12.Middle-levelmanagementwas perhaps the most importanttarget of top management: withoutconvincing them tosupport he system there would be no way to control therank a nd file employees. In 1971 the InternalCommunica-tions staff initiateda monthlymanagement newsletter,PostalLeader,that denigrated formerpolicies "SmallP.O.Inspection No LongerNit-Picking," Postmasters Get Free-dom to Move," May 1971 - and praised new ones -"PromotionsOpen to All in Seattle Region," January1971.The PostmasterGeneralheld unprecedentedmanagementbriefings staged by Burnaford nd Companyfor field man-agers allover the countryto makethem feel partof the"team" and managerswere flown to Washington to con-tribute heir ideas for the new organization Meyers, 1975:158).The contrast with the formerlyhighlystructuredandauthoritarianystem was striking.Certainly,much of itwasforeffect, but itaimedat dividingsupervisorsfromanyoppositionto the USPS and neutralizing heir associations inWashington.Externalcommunications. External ommunicationsarehere meant to includethose activities directedat influenc-ing the USPS's supportersand enemies, especiallyCon-gress and customer groups.Largemailers, ust as em-ployees, hadindustrygroupswith lobbyistsin Washingtonrepresentingtheir interests before Congress.The USPSat-tempted to keep these ties brokenby winning their cus-tomers to their side. Unableto grantfavorablerates to mail-ers, the USPSestablisheda nationalsales force and cus-tomerservice representativesto help largemailers mprovethe efficiency of their mailingoperationand to therebysavemoney with in-house mailingsystems. Butthe eventualneed to increase ratesand reduce subsidies made the pub-lishers one of the most active opponents of a self-sufficientPostalService (Meyers, 1975: 132-145).Although ndividualmailers had littleorganized nfluence,disgruntledmailers have always representeda large portionof the complaintscongressmen receive and are a large420/ASQ


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Creative-Destructive Processsource of annoyance to congressional staff. By keepingcongressmen undisturbedby complaints about the mail,USPS management hoped to smooth over relationswithCongress.A consumer advocate was appointed to act as afunnel for complaints (PostalLife, November-December1971: 6). The USPS also established the Office of Advertis-ing and began its first paid advertisingcampaignto putforth its new businesslike image and to win acceptance forits new position in the marketplace.When criticismof theUSPS grew, top level Washington executives were dis-patched around he countryon "media tours" to hold brief-ings with the press and appearon radioand TV alk shows.Training and indoctrination. Faced with a managerial taffthat was selected for its seniority and which embracedtheformerservice-at-all-costs deology, the trainingand indoc-trinationof supervisorsbecame a top priorityo USPSman-agement. Indoctrinations perhaps an extreme concept butit is appropriate o the extent that the trainingoften focusedon unlearningold habits of relating o work, employees, andcustomers, and relearningnew businesslike orientations.The Postal Service Management Institute (PSMI) nBethesda, Maryland,was the center for these efforts.Blount,and especially his successor in 1972, ElmerT. Klas-sen, encouraged the growth of PSMl's staff which becamea 75-member facultyof professional trainers,organizationaldevelopment specialists, and numerous others with techni-caland academic expertise. About 20,000 supervisorsa yearwere sent through PSMI's extensive courses which in-cluded datamanagement, customer services, and cost-benefit analysis (PSMICatalog,1971). During heir oftenintensive training,managerswere housed on campus indormitories or a week or more. Inaddition, he PSMIstaffwent into majorpost offices and conducted lengthyon-sitemanagement trainingcalled the TEAMprogram TeamEf-fectiveness Approach o Management); managerswereforced to play decision-makinggames together to breakdown years of authoritarianism. orrespondence courses, atechnical trainingschool at the Universityof Oklahoma,andregional rainingcenters supplemented the effort. Blountalso took the entiretop staff in Washingtonto the HarvardBusiness School fora week-long management course.Destroyingthe "service-at-all-costs" deologyand replacingitwith a businesslike, efficient service, ideologywas mostcriticalo accomplish among the employees, particularlyhesupervisoryworkers.Ifsupervisorsdid not maketheir deci-sions on the basis of costs, the new organization ould notsurvive. Hence, the heavy reliance on resocialization c-tivities forsupervisors.The organization's deology-changingactivitieswere most successful, as one would expect,among the junior upervisorswho had least commitmenttothe formersystem and the most to gain by expanded pro-motionalopportunities or those that could demonstratenew efficiencies.The superficial mage-changingactivitiescan only be seenas strategies to forestallthe enemies of the reorganization.Byappeari g new and forwa d looking, op managementhoped to convince the public hat substantive changes421/ASQ


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were takingplacewithin that would soon be evident inimprovedservice and new products.Destructionand re-placement of the ideologyand its trappingsenabled Blountand Klassento modernizewith more immediateimpact.LEADERSHIPAlthoughthe younger careersupervisorswere reasonablywillingto change with the new organization, here wererelatively ew of them, especially in the regionaloffices andin Washington. Althoughthe top positions in Washingtonwere occupiedby politicalappointees, almost allof whomwere from industry, he newly important ieldmanagementand technical positions nearthe top were filledprimarilyypeople with enough seniorityto have worked up fromthebottom. InMay, 1971, the PostmasterGeneral, n a sweep-ing move to purgethese olderpostalofficials, gave regionaland headquarters mployees a one-time bonus of sixmonths' payif they would leave immediately."Adramatic,and some say heartless move, to pointupthe reorganiza-tion and cut away senior officials,"a totalof 2,099 "tookthe bait"(Business Week, May13, 1972).About4,000 em-ployees were left in the five regions and Washington. Klas-sen reorganized he remainderand then used 14 profes-sional recruiters o seek people fromindustry.The USPSwas able, in one stroke,to destroy much of the formerleadership, replacesome of it with people alreadyembrac-ingthe new ideology,and serve notice to those who hadnot been purgedthat the USPSdid not operateon thesame basis as the POD.In orderto assure a steady supplyof leaders loyalto theUSPSthe organizationhadto dismantlethe formerman-agement recruitment ystem. It did this in fourways. First,it weakened the senioritysystem by makingclerksand car-riersalmost immediatelyeligible for supervisorypositions(PostalBulletin,August8, 1970: 2) and encouraged moreambitiouspersons to stay in the postal system. Second, itallowedsupervisorsto compete for promotionsoutside theirown post office for the first time, thus promoting oyalty othe largerorganization t the expense of loyalty o theworkersormanagement of any one office (PostalLeader,January1971: 1). Third, t subvertedthe former"up theladder"promotionsystem by establishingmanagementtraineeprograms hat recruitedcollege graduates, especiallythose with an MBA,for middle-managementpositions(PostalLife, November-December1971: 2). The traineeswere relatively ew in number, wo orthree hundred,butthey had substantial mpactbecause they were young, andafter relativelyittletime were allowed to managethe previ-ously sacrosanct operationsactivities.Finally, he formerpostmasterand rural arrierpositionswere removed frompoliticsand filledby disinterested parties.Postmasterswereselected by the recommendationof PostmasterAdvisorySelection Boardswhich were interview committees com-posed of postalmanagersand localbusiness leaders. Fur-thermore,postmasterswere no longerrequired o reside inthe town inwhich they worked (PostalBulletin,April ,1971: 1).422/ASQ


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Creative-Destructive ProcessPower Bases and AlliancesThe internalstruggles for change, difficultas they mighthave been, were more effectively controlled han struggleswith external agents. The legislationdefined new relation-ships between the USPS and Congress andthe USPS andthe employees, but left open to question exactly what thoserelationswould be. In addition, he new position of com-petitors, customers, and other government agencies toCongress and the USPSwere not defined. Allof thesegroups had stakes in the formeralliances and werethreatened by the new situation.The Post Office had tosupporthelpfulalliances and destroyorcripplerelationshipsbetween externalagents that had a stake in the failureofthe USPS.An interesting example of how the USPS attemptedtobreak he long-standingrelationshipbetween unionizedemployees and Congress was the gag rule orderedbyBlount.When, predictably,he unions complainedto Con-gress over drastic ob cutbacksinstitutedby Blountduringthe reorganization,Blount issued an order hat all communi-cation between the post office and Congress would gothroughhis office (Postal Bulletin,January21, 1971).BothCongress and the unions, and many postmasters as well,balkedand charged Blountwith denyingthem basic free-doms.Inan effort to increase its ability o exercise control over itsoperationsthe post office attemptedto cut itself from itssister agencies. A numberof federalagencies performworkforother agencies and, indeed, depend on business fromthem to survive. Because of its size, the post office wasone of the largestconsumers of federal services. Toassertits independence, the USPSdid such things as issue bondson the open market,despite the fact that it could havereceived money interest free from the TreasuryDepartment(Myers,1975: 82), and installa new personnel system notcompatibleorcomparable o the one administeredfor otheragencies bythe CivilService Commission(PostalBulletin,February , 1971: 1).Economic factorsgenerallydetermined how successful theUSPS was in developing new ties. Itwas somewhat suc-cessful with employees at the expense of generous wageincreases and relativelyunsuccessful with customers be-cause of the risingrates needed to paythe new salaries.CONCLUSIONSThe reorganization f the U.S. Postal Service unleashed in-credibleforces both in and out of the organization;heforces were aimed at protectingorconsolidatingthe powerof interestgroups. In the sense that allorganizationsaredistributionsof powerand that these subunits of powercompete orcooperatedepending on theirinterests at thetime, they are political ystems (Harveyand Mills,1970:185).As polities, organizationshave supporters, enemies,and neutralobservers. Politicalparties engage in competi-tion for control of the resources and their allocation n thepolitical tate. In a similar ashion, unions, management,423/ASQ


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and departments compete forthe allocationof organiza-tional resources. As nationsbattle to impose their willandprotecttheir own economic interests in the worldeconomy,so too do competing businesses, opposing agencies, andconsumer groups struggle to protect their own economicinterests. Certainly, he analogyof the organizationas apolitical tate does not extend to all spheres, but it is auseful model for understanding he process of organiza-tional change.Students of organizationswill recognizethat political ys-tems are in a continuous fight for survival,but that thissurvivalprocess is muted in "mature"states which haveestablished alliances and substantial means formaintainingindependence. It is in new states in their earlydays, follow-ing political oups, that control is most vulnerable o upset,and that successful revolutionaries eek to stabilize heirpositions by formingcoalitions and destroyingthe previousregime. Downs recognizes that an organization xpressesthe same needs as a new politicalregime as itattempts toreachan "initial urvival hreshold."Before then "it has notyet generated enough externalsupportto resist severe at-tack"(1967: 9). Hence, it is only in the birthof a neworganizationor in a reorganization f revolutionary ropor-tions that routine survivalprocesses are revealed fully.These processes areclearlyseen in the case of reorganiza-tion of the Post Office, in which the beneficiaries of theformerstatus quo had nothing to riskby declaringa chal-lenge and everythingto gain bysuccessful opposition.The newly restructuredorganization, aced with attackin itsunstableyouth, retaliatedby destructive actions againstwhat it perceivedto be the most debilitatingaspects of theformerorganization:he formalstructure, he ideology,theleadership,and opposing alliances and power bases. De-structiontook placeat the same time the new organizationwas engaged in the constructiveactivities of creating newworkmethods, buildingnew facilities, developing technolog-icalimprovements, and creatingalliances. Destruction s aninherentpartof successful change; without destroyingcompeting formsthe organizationallows its competitiontoflourishunimpeded.To extend the analogyof organizations o political ystems,politicaleaderswho seize powerthrough revolutionarymeans recognizethat they must destroy enough of the op-position's leadership, deology,and organizationo give thenew regime an opportunityo develop supporters.As Maosaid, "Before a brandnew social system can be builton thesite of the old, the site must be swept clean," (1967: 18).Destruction s never total,but must be enough to weakenthe oppositionwithout incurringhe wrath of potentialsup-porters.This process is not analyticallyneat; there are manyrestrictionson the actions an organization an take andrarelywill it be able to act, even in extreme circumstances,in the most effective way possible. Certainlyts enemiescan thwartits efforts and force itto change tactics. Norwillallorganizations eek to destroythe same structures.Targetswill be those that pose the greatest threat to theorganizationand can be partof the formalstructure,424/ASQ


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Creative-Destructive Processdecision-makingmodel, loyaltysystem, technology or lead-ership,or a combinationof such factors.The methods an organizationwillemploy willbe based onthe resources available o it. Forexample, the most effec-tive way to remove formeropposing leaders is by annihila-tion butthis is not usuallyacceptable or necessary in or-ganizational truggles. Removalfrom the organizations theusualrecourse if sufficient power exists. If, as is the case inmanygovernment organizations, his is not possible, re-moval from positions of importance s the next choice. Eachof these "less destructive" alternativesposes some threatto the organization,as with a former leader stillin the or-ganizationcommandingloyaltyamong sympatheticsub-groups.To destroyor replacea competing ideology,the organizationcan move in several directions:remove and replaceem-ployees embracingthe competing ideology;resocialize tsemployees, but this requiressubstantialtime and expense;or changing employee behaviorwithout changing theircommitments. From he organization'spointof view, totalremovalof opposition would be best but since this is notrealistic,most organizations ettle for changingemployeebehavior.This method reduces, butdoes not eliminate,thethreat to the organization.As students of organizationhave recognized, change is acontinualprocess of adaptation o new demands and chang-ing environments. What must be recognized, however, isthat change is not just the reactionof organizations o suchunitaryand abstractphenomena as leadershipstyle andmanagement philosophy,but rathera dynamicpush andpullbetween contradictoryorces that reside within andwithoutthe organizationand constantly strugglefor domina-tion. Change is a complex and multidimensionalprocessthat destroys as it creates. These processes are least evi-dent in organizations hat have developed an equilibriumbetween opposing interests and most apparentwhen thebalance is upset in times of revolutionary irthor reorgani-zationwhen survival s paramount.Nicole Woolsey Biggart is a doctoral student in the De-partment of Sociology, University of California,Berkeley.

REFERENCESPostmaster General1969 AnnualReport.Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrint-ing Office.1972 Washington, D.C.: U.S. PostalService.Bell, Daniel1973 The Comingof Post-industrialSociety. New York:BasicBooks.Benson, James1973 "Theanalysisofbureaucratic-professionalon-flict:functionalversus dialec-ticalapproaches."SociologicalQuarterly, 4: 376-391.

Business Week1972 "PostalService:the talenthunt."New York:McGraw-Hill.May 13: 115.Committee on Post OfficeandCivilService, U.S. House of Rep-resentatives1970 Hearings:PostalReform.Washington,D.C.: U.S. Gov-ernmentPrintingOffice.1971 Hearings:Briefingsby Post-masterGeneraland PostalRate Commissioner.Washington,D.C.: U.S. Gov-ernmentPrintingOffice.

Cullinan,Gerald1968 The Post Office Department.New York:Praeger.Downs, Anthony1967 Inside Bureaucracy. oston:Little,Brown.Fowler, DorothyGanfield1967 The CabinetPolitician.NewYork:AMSPress.Golembiewski,Robert T., andAlan Kiepper1967 "MARTA-towardn open, ef-fective giant."PublicAdmin-istrationReview, 36: 46-60.

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Harver,Edward,and Russell Mills1970 "Patternsof organizationaladaptation: political erspec-tive." InMayerN.Zald ed.),PowerinOrganizations:181-213. Nashville:Vander-biltUniversity.Hummon,Norman P., PatrickDoreian,and KlausTeuter1975 "Astructuralontrolmodeloforganizationalhange."Amer-icanSociologicalReview, 40:813-824.Labovitz,Sanford, and Jon Miller1974 "Implicationsf power,con-flictandchange in an organi-zational etting." PacificSociologicalReview, 17:214-239.MaoTse-Tung1967 StuartR.Schram(ed.),Quota-

tions fromChairmanMaoTse-Tung.New York:BantamBooks.Mazmanian,DanielA., and Mor-decai Lee1975 "Traditione damned! TheArmyCorpsof Engineers schanging."PublicAdministra-tion Review,35: 166-172.

Meyer,MarshallW.1975 "Leadership ndorganiza-tionalstructure."AmericanJournalof Sociology,81:514-542.Myers,Robert J.1975 The ComingCollapseof the

Post Office. New Jersey:Prentice-Hall.PSMICatalog1971 Washington,D.C.:U.S. PostalService.Postal Bulletin1960 Washington,D.C.:U.S. Gov-ernmentPrintingOffice.1971 Washington,D.C.:U.S. PostalService.Postal Leader1971 Washington,D.C.: U.S. PostalService.Postal Life1971 Washington,D.C.:U.S. Gov-ernmentPrintingOffice.1972 Washington,D.C.:U.S. PostalService.

President'sCommission on PostalOrganization(KappelCommis-sion)1968 TowardPostalExcellence,andAnnex I.Washington,D.C.:U.S. GovernmentPrint-ing Office.Sherwood, FrankP.1976 "TheAmericanpublicexecu-tive inthe thirdcentury."PublicAdministrationReview,36: 586-589.Subcommittee on Departments ofthe Treasuryand Post OfficeandExecutiveOfficeof the President,U.S. House of Representatives1967 Hearings:Appropriations,1968. Washington,D.C.:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice.Subcommittee on Postal Opera-tions, U.S. House of Repre-sentatives1968 Hearings:TakingPoliticsOutof PostmasterandOtherAp-pointmentsand Promotionsinthe PostalService.Washington,D.C.:U.S. Gov-ernmentPrintingOffice.U.S. Code, Title391970 Washington,D.C.:U.S. Gov-ernmentPrintingOffice.

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