Adhering to Utility Interconnection Standards May Not Guarantee DG Security

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ADHERING TO UTILITY INTERCONNECTION STANDARDS MAY NOT GUARANTEE DG SECURITY Wayne G. Hartmann Beckwith Electric Co., Inc.  Product Manager, Protect ion Introduction  DG Interconnection St andards are created and maintained by power comp anies to assure pro tection for the utility. They are written primarily to guarantee prot ection reliability for the utility, and not necessarily for the security of the DG to remain interconnected. DG interconnection protection must be secure to allow the DG to operate in parallel with utility distribution systems. It also must reliably disconnect the DG from the utility distribution system for various reasons such as: loss of utility supply to the feeder (anti-islanding), shunt faults on the utility system and abnormal operating conditions (including open-series events). Additionally, the protective system should provide restoration elements. Table 1 Protection Objectives and Elements for DG Interconnection Protection Protection Objective Protective Elements Anti-islanding Undervoltage (27), Overvoltage (59), Underfrequency (81-U), Overfrequency (81-O), Instantaneous Overvoltage (59I), Directional Power (32F, 32R-U), Rate of Change of Frequency (81R) Shunt Fault Clearing Ground Overcurrent (51G), Phase Overcurrent (51V-C/R), Ground Under/Over Voltage (27G/59G) Abnormal Operating Conditions  Negative Sequence Overvolt age (47), Negative S equence Overcurrent (46), Loss of Protection Potential (60FL) Restoration Reconnection Timer (79), Sync Check (25) Most protection elements are applied to trip the DG off the distribution system in less than one second, and often much faster (10-30 cycles). These tripping times are mandated in DG interconnection standards, and are generally not open to change. Events can occur on the system and within the DG facility, however, that may lead to undesirable tripping. These trips may occur due to certain protection elements being set with a coordination margin that is too small combined with faults within a DG facility that should be cleared by protection within the facility, and interplay of events that include power surges into the utility from cycling loads within a DG facility. This paper explores these scena rios for unwanted tripping of the DG facility. Specific setting examples are not provided, as they are beyond the scope of this paper, but general concepts and possible solutions are discussed to mitigate undesirable tripping. Scenario 1: Power Surges from Cycling Loads in the DG Facility The use of low import power (32R-U) is an additional method of a nti-islanding protection, supplementing the typical protections applied when the feeder load does not equal generation such as: underfrequency (81-U), overfrequency (81-O), undervoltage (27), and overvoltage (59) (Figure 1). Instantaneous overvoltage (59I) may also be useful to detect ferroresonance that may result due to self-excitation of induction machines from capacitor banks that can occur after utility disconnection.

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DGLoad = 1,500 kW

Utility Source

180 kW

¾ Load draws too much real power 

¾ Manifests as Underfrequency (81-U)

Circuit breaker opened, feeder islanded

 

DGLoad = 800 kW

Utility Source

1,200 kW

¾ Load draws too little real power 

¾ Manifests as Overfrequency (81-O)

Circuit breaker opened, feeder islanded

 

DG

Load = 500 kVAr 

Utility Source

150 kVAr 

¾ Load draws too much reactive power 

¾ Manifests as Undervoltage (27)

Circuit breaker opened, feeder islanded

 

DG

Load = 150 kVAr 

Utility Source

500 kVAr 

¾ Load draws too little reactive power 

¾ Manifests as Overvoltage (59)

Circuit breaker opened, feeder islanded

 Figure 1 Typical Islanded Scenario when load does not equal generation

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In most cases, the typical protection applied when the load does not equal generation can

determine if the utility has disconnected the distribution feeder. But in the unlikely occurrence of the islanded DG(s) on the feeder exactly equaling the feeder load plus losses, an island may be

formed (Figure 2).

DG

Load + Losses = 800 kVA

Utility Source

¾ Load + Losses = Generation

¾ Over/Under Voltage and Frequency will not detect

Circuit breaker opened, feeder 

islanded

DG

500 kVA 300 kVA

 

Figure 2 Feeder Islanded, Load + Losses = Generation

A tactic to mitigate this scenario is the use of low import power to assure that the DG facility (or facilities) on a given feeder is importing a small amount of power. This would be the case in

 peak-shaving applications, and in applications where, by contract, the DG is not allowed to

export (Figure 3). A low setting of export power (32F) has also been used for this purpose, butlow import power is more reliable. This is because operational situations could occur after utility

disconnection from the distribution feeder where the export of even a small amount of power by

a few DGs on a given feeder could “hold up” the load plus losses.

DG

Utility Source

¾ Local Load exceeds generation

¾ Facility should always import some power 

from utility

Circuit breaker closed

150 kVA

Feeder Loads

Local

Load

300 kVA

Low Import Power (32R-U)

Power Import

 Figure 3 Low Import Power Application

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The use of low import power, however, is not without security risks. In a peak-shaving or 

contractually-imposed, no-power-export situation, it may make economic sense to essentially“float the interchange”—that is, attempt to provide all power used by the DG facility by the on-

site DG. This is typically accomplished by precise measurement of facility load, DG supply, and

 power across the point of common coupling, and control of the DG output (Figure 4).

DG

Utility Source

¾Generation adjusted to match localload with small bias

¾ Requires metering and governor 

control

Circuit breaker closed

395 kVA

Feeder Loads

Local

Load

400 kVA

Low Import Power (32R-U)

Power Import

5 kVA

Gen = Load - Bias

395 = 400 - 5

 

Figure 4 “Floating the Interchange”

In steady-state applications, this “floating” strategy functions well. Caution should be exercised

if the DG facility contains a large switched load, such a large block of motors (Figure 5).

DG

Utility Source

¾ Generation adjusted to

match local load with

small bias

¾ Part of load is 40 kVA of 

motors

Circuit breaker closed

395 kVA

Feeder Loads

Local

Load

360 kVA

Low Import Power (32R-U)

Power Import

5 kVA

Gen = Load - Bias

395 = 400 - 5

40 kVA

 All circuit breakers closed

M

 Figure 5 DG Employing Low Import Power Protection with Motor Loads

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When these loads are switched off, the rapid change in the load/generation changes, and the

change may be too great for the DG’s governor system to respond, and a power outflow into theutility may result (Figure 6). If this power outflow lasts longer than the setting of the low import

 power element (32R-U), a trip will ensue.

DG

Utility Source

¾ Sudden loss of 40 kVA

¾ Momentary power outflow develops at PCC

Circuit breaker closed

395 kVA

Feeder Loads

Local

Load

360 kVA

Low Import Power (32R-U)

Momentary

export<= 40 kVA

Gen = Load - Bias

395 = 365 - 5

0 kVA

Motor breaker tripped,

others remain closed

M

 Figure 6 Momentary Power Export After Motors Switched Off 

Countermeasures to this possible miscoordination problem are:

1. Increase the bias on the DG governor so that it produces less power, and a wider margin is

maintained to account for the load fluctuations (Figure 7). Although the bias can beeventually widened enough so nuisance trips do not occur, it may not be in the economic best

interest of the DG facility to import power when the DG is in operation.

DG

Utility Source

¾ Generation adjusted to

match local load with bias

equal to large switched

motor load

¾ Import power is higher,

but application secure

Circuit breaker closed

360 kVA

Feeder Loads

LocalLoad

360 kVA

Low Import Power (32R-U)

Power Import

40 kVA

Gen = Load - Bias

360 = 400 - 40

40 kVA

 All circuit breakers closed

M

Figure 7 Increasing the Import Bias at the Interconnection for Security

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2. Change the operational philosophy of the motor shutdowns within the facility. If a batch process line is to be shut down, then sequentially stop the motors from the feedstock source

to the end of the process (Figure 8) if possible. In energy management applications, sequence

HVAC and other motor loads in small blocks so that the incremental change occurring at one

time is reduced (Figure 9). Additionally, the use of variable speed motor equipment will provide a ramping of the shutdown process that should be within the control capabilities of 

the DG’s governor system.

Another concern of properly applying the low import power element is the ability to block it

when the facility disconnects from the utility. At the instant of disconnection, and for the time

interval following while it is disconnected, the power import is zero, which violates the lowimport power element’s setting, so it calls for a perpetual trip. The position of the

interconnection protection circuit breaker should be used to selectively disable (block) the low

import power element when the interconnection breaker is open.

BATCH PROCESS

M M M M M M

1 2 3 4 5 6

Order of Sequential Shutdown

Feedstock Finished 

Product 

 Figure 8 Sequentially Stopping Motors in a Batch Process Operation

Conditioned

Space

Outdoor 

Air 

#1

#2

#1

#2

Intake Fans

Exhaust Fans

Switch off #1 Intake Fan and Exhaust Fan,

then #2 Intake Fan and #2 Exhaust Fan 

Figure 9 Staged Fan Shutdown in HVAC Systems

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Scenario 2: Faults in the DG Facility

Ground overcurrent fault protection (51G), and sometimes phase fault overcurrent protection

(51VC or 51VR), may be mandated for DG installation over 100-300 kVA aggregate (Figure

10). Ground overcurrent protection is applied in cases where the interconnection transformer 

 primary (utility side) is a ground source, such as a wye-delta or wye-wye installation. Theintention of the protection is to mitigate damage to the utility’s infrastructure, including the

interconnection transformer, line reclosers and substation breakers and transformers.

   E  n   t  e  r  g  y

   C  o  m    E

   d

10kW 50kW 500kW 1,000kW 2,000kW 2,500kW 10,000kW

27, 59, 81U/O, 25

59N/27N, 51,

51N, 32, 21

27, 59, 81U/O, 25 -- Gen. < 50% of minimum load

27, 59, 81U/O, 25

59N or 51N, 32 32 81U TT

Gen. > 50% of minimum loadSpecial Constraints, add 50BF, 21-2, TT 

   T  e  x  a  s

   R  u   l  e   2   1

   P  -   1   5   4   7

27, 59, 81U/O, 25

27, 59, 81U/O, 25

59N or 51N, 32 32 81U TT

27, 59, 81U/O, 2532

Sensitive (Xfmr Mag.)

Low Underpower 

27, 59, 81U/O, 25, 32

3

1

 

Figure 10 Comparison of Sample Utility Interconnection Guidelines

Ground and phase faults within a DG facility should be cleared by protective devices within thefacility that are set and coordinated to provide the optimum selectivity and speed. With radial

distribution sourced from the utility—which is typical for a facility prior to the introduction of DG—coordination is typically performed from the source transformer with a three-phase fault

and the ground fault is calculated using transformer impedance and assumed source impedance

 behind the source transformer (Figure 11).

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X

X

XX

LOADS

C

B

 A

   T   i  m  e

Current

C B A

 

Figure 11 Radial Overcurrent Protection Coordination without DG

When DG is added (depending on the location of the DG interconnection protection CTs andVTs, and the setting and coordination applied), the DG may trip for faults that should be cleared

 by other facility devices. This may be especially true if the DG is connected to the bus that is fed

from the point of common coupling (PCC) (Figure 12).

X

X

XX

LOADS

C

B

 A

   T   i  m  e

Current

C B A

XD

G

G

G

 

Figure 12 Miscoordination Example with DG

The coordination employed when the facility was operated from the radial utility source may no

longer be secure due to the relatively long time that was allowed to clear nearby faults, ascoordination to plant loads deeper in the facility had to be maintained. DGs located off of lower 

voltage buses are being coordinated with other protective devices at those levels, which typically

trip faster than the protection near the point of common coupling as they are at, or near, the endof the radial distribution system (Figure 13).

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X

X

XX

LOADS

C

B

 A

   T   i  m  e

Current

C B A

G

XD

G

G

 

Figure 13 Coordination with DG at Remote Bus from PCC

Countermeasures to these possible miscoordination problems include:

1. Revise coordination of installed facility protection to speed up tripping if possible. This may

 be the least expensive option, as it may not require a protection device change-out, but rather a simple setting change. However, there are limits to the coordination time intervals

(typically 0.3 seconds) that should be maintained, and therefore this option may not be

 possible (Figure 14).

   T   i  m  e

Current

C B A

G

>0.3 second from C-B

>0.3 second from B-A

Cannot move A and Bto the left of G, wouldresult in

misccordination

 

Figure 14 Coordination Problem to Speed Up Tripping with G to B & A

2. Directionalize the DG’s overcurrent protection. This will permit high-speed tripping only if 

the fault is determined to be from the utility, versus within the facility. This strategy will

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work if the DG protection is sourced from CTs and VTs at the point of common coupling as

any fault in the utility’s direction must be in the utility (Figure 15). If the DG has its CTs andVTs sourced from deeper within the DG facility, an overcurrent event that is determined to

 be toward the utility does not necessarily mean it is in the utility’s system, but rather it may

 be in the DG facility’s system closer to the point of common coupling (Figure 16).

X

X

XX

LOADS

D

X

D G

Protection

Phase & Ground

Overcurrent

Directionalized

 Figure 15 Employing Directional Elements at the PCC

X

X

X

LOADSX

D G

Protection

Phase & Ground

Ov ercurrentDirectionalized

Faults in the

Facility 

Fault in the

Utility system

 Figure 16 Employing Directional Elements with DG at Remote Bus from PCC

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Conclusions

1. Utility DG interconnection guidelines are written in the utility’s interest to assure rapid

disconnection of DG from distribution systems for various reasons. The protection settings

are typically derived for maximum reliability and speed, and not to maximize the security of 

the DG. Strict adherence to the interconnection guidelines does not necessarily guaranteesecure protection for the DG facility.

2. The utility, project consultant, DG packager and facility owner/operator can all provide input

to make a DG facility’s interconnection protection more secure.3. This paper has outlined two scenarios for consideration. Undoubtedly, more exist and will be

“discovered” as DG continues to proliferate the distribution system.

4. It is hoped that this article has illuminated some considerations regarding DG interconnection protection security, and opens the door for continued learning and sharing of experiences to

make DG interconnection protection more secure.

References:[1] ANSI/IEEE Std. 1001-1988, “Guide for Interfacing Dispersed Storage and Generation

Facilities with Electric Utility Systems”

[2] Mozina, C.J., “Interconnection Protection of Dispersed Generators in the New Millennium”,

Texas A&M University Conference for Protective Relay Engineers, College Station, Texas,April 11-13, 2000

[3] Standard Handbook of Power Plant Engineering, 2nd Edition, 1998, McGraw Hill, NewYork, NY, Chapter 4.3, W. Hartmann

[4] M-3410 Intertie/Generator Relay Instruction Manual, Beckwith Electric, 2001

[5] M-3520 Intertie Relay Instruction Manual, Beckwith Electric, 1997

[6] IEEE P1547, Draft (9) Standard for Distributed Resources Interconnected with Electric

Power Systems

[7] Rule 21, Generating Facility Interconnections, Southern California Edison, November 17,

2000

[8] Chapter 25, Electric, Public Utilities Commission of Texas, 2000

[9] Parallel Operations of Non-Utility Generation on the Distribution System, Entergy, July 1,2000

[10] Guidelines for the Interconnection of Generation to the ComEd System (“The Blue Book”),Commonwealth Edison, 2001.

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About the Author

Wayne Hartmann is Product Manager, Protection, and Marketing Manager for Beckwith

Electric. He is responsible for application and marketing of Beckwith products and systems used

in generator, transformer and DG interconnection protection, as well as synchronizing and bus

transfer schemes.

Before joining Beckwith, he performed various assignments in applications engineering, project

engineering and marketing with Siemens Power T&D, Alstom T&D, INCON, Siemens Energy& Automation, and Combustion Engineering. For more than 17 years in the industry, Wayne’s

focus has been on the application of protection and automation systems for power production,

transmission, distribution and utilization.

Wayne is an active member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Power 

System Relay Committee, where he serves as a Main Committee Member, Vice Chair of theRotating Machinery Subcommittee, and a contributing member of many Working Groups. He

has authored and delivered numerous technical papers for the Georgia Tech Relay, WesternProtective Relay, American Power, Western Power Delivery Automation, IEEE T&D and other 

conferences. Wayne has contributed to numerous IEEE Transactions, Tutorials, and Guides, andis a contributing author/editor for McGraw-Hill’s Standard Handbook of Power Plant 

 Engineering, 2nd Edition. He is a graduate of the State University of New York at Farmingdale,

where he obtained an Associate in Applied Science Degree in 1980.