Venezuela Debt Relief Affirmative - DDI 2013 SS
Transcript of Venezuela Debt Relief Affirmative - DDI 2013 SS
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Venezuela Debt Relief
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Plan Text
The United States federal government should substantially increase its debt
relief efforts toward Venezuela.
The United States federal government should substantially increase its debt
relief efforts toward Venezuela through bilateral or multilateral channels.
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Cooperation Advantage
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1AC Advantage
Plan Solves
A. Economic engagement with Venezuela reverses current foreign policy-
bolsters declining US diplomacy- and it spills over
Griffin 4/3 [John, freshman analyst for the Harvard Crimson--
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/ -2013-SR] Diplomatically , positive engagement with Venezuela would be a major step toward building
American credibility in the world at large, especially in Latin America. Chávez (along with his friends the
Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support for his regime by pointing out the United
States’ attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics. Soon, a number of populist
governments in Latin America had rallied around Chávez and his anti-American policies . In 2004,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our
America, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed (but never realized) by the Bush administration.
Chávez galvanized these nations—many of whom have experienced American interventionist tactics—by vilifying
America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategyregarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chávez’s position . Every time Washington chastises Venezuela for
opposing American interests or attempts to bring sanctions against the Latin American country, the leader in Caracas (whether it be Chávez or Maduro)
simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler. This weakens the United States’
diplomatic position, while simultaneously strengthening Venezuela’s. If Washington wants Latin America to
stop its current trend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less
astringent tone in dealing with Venezuela. Caracas will be unable to paint Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in
turn gain a better image in Latin America.¶ Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin
American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be economically advisable. With the
world’s largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources, and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists, Venezuela has quite a bit to
offer economically. Even now, America can see the possible benefits of economic engagement with
Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation: Each year, thousands of needy
Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a Boston-area oil company.¶ Engagement
with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin
America. It was mostly through Venezuela’s efforts that the United States was unable to create a “Free Trade Area of the Americas,” an endeavor
that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade. In a world where the
United States and Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would
benefit from such agreements.¶ For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the best course of action
for the United States. As it stands, the negative relationship between the countries has created an
atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic
cooperation nearly impossible. While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticized—authoritarian
rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly policies—nothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is having any effect.
The United States should stop playing “tough guy” with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and work toward
stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere. We aren’t catching any flies with our vinegar—it’s high time we
started trying to catch them with honey.
B. Now is the critical time to resolve diplomatic relations-Maduro’s remarks
Reuters 5/19 [http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/20/us-venezuela-usa-
idUSBRE94J01R20130520 –2013—SR] (Reuters) - Venezuela's recent designation of an acting head of its diplomatic mission in the
United States shows the OPEC nation's desire to restore full diplomatic relations , the foreign
minister said in an interview broadcast on Sunday.¶ Disputes between Caracas and Washington were
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common during the 14-year-rule of late socialist leader Hugo Chavez, leaving both nations without
ambassadors in each other's capitals.¶ Foreign Minister Elias Jaua suggested in a televised interview that the move to name
government ally Calixto Ortega as charge d'affaires in Washington could be a prelude to restoring ambassadors.¶ "This is a
message for U.S. politicians so they understand Venezuela's desire to normalize relations ...
via the designation of the highest diplomatic authorities," he said. "Why? Because the United States
remains our top trade partner."¶ Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has in recent months said he
wants better ties with Washington as long as the relationship is respectful.
Venezuelan debt is the critical issue-foreign exchange is key
Sanders 7/14 [Sir Ronald—senior reporter for the Barbados Advocate-
http://www.barbadosadvocate.com/newsitem.asp?more=columnists&NewsID=31512 -SR] The Economist Intelligence Unit reports that “Venezuela is currently struggling with a lack of foreign
exchange, which has put significant pressure on the overvalued official exchange rate of BsF6.3 to
US$1”. Additionally, inflation is in the high 30s, (while the Latin American average is 7 per cent ), the national debt is rising,
and the fiscal deficit is growing; it is said to have tripled to 11 per cent of gross national
product. There is also growing concern within Venezuela about money being spent on, or
given-away to, foreign countries while sections of the Venezuelan population are facing
hardships – a justifiable concern and one that Maduro cannot ignore .¶ All this puts Maduro in a very
difficult position, worsened by the fact that a now rampant opposition is whipping up as much popular resentment of him as it can.
US Diplomacy solves warming, water scarcity, and proliferation
Hague 2k10 [William Hague, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and
Member of Parliament for Richmond, United Kingdom, “The Diplomacy of Climate Change,”
9/27/10]
But I particularly wanted to make the point to this audience and to circulate to a wider audience certain points about climate
change this morning, which is perhaps the 21st century's biggest foreign- policy challenge, along with
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. I believe those two threats over the longer term are
the biggest threats to the peace and security of the world.¶ A world that is failing to respond to climatechange is one in which the values embodied in the United Nations will not be met, and it's a world in which competition and conflict
would win out over collaboration.¶ We're at a very crucial point in the global debate on this subject.
Many people are questioning, in the wake of Copenhagen, whether we should continue to seek a
response to climate change through the U.N. and whether we can ever hope to deal with this
enormous challenge.¶ And I will first argue today that an effective response to climate change underpins
our security and prosperity; second, that our response should be to strive for a binding global
deal, whatever the setbacks; and third, I will set out why effective deployment of foreign policy assets
is crucial to mobilizing the political will needed if we're going to shape an effective response.¶
Now, Ban Ki-moon is right to have made climate change his top priority. Two weeks ago, I was talking about Britain's values in a
networked world. I said then that a successful response to climate change must be a central objective of
British foreign policy. And I said this not only because I believe action against climate change is in line
with a values-based foreign policy, but because it underpins our prosperity and security.¶ Youcan't have food, water or energy security without climate security; they are interconnected and
inseparable. They form four resource pillars on which global security, prosperity and equity stand. Each depends on the other.
Plentiful, affordable food requires reliable and affordable access to water and energy.
Increasing dependence on coal, oil and gas threatens climate security, increasing the severity
of floods and droughts, damaging food production, exacerbating the loss of biodiversity, and
in countries that rely on hydropower, undermining energy security through the impact on the
availability of water.¶ As the world becomes more networked, the impact of climate change in one country or region
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will affect the prosperity and security of others around the world.¶ No one can have failed to be appalled
by the devastating floods in Pakistan. They overwhelmed the capacity of government to respond and opened political space for
extremists. While Pakistan has borne the brunt of the human impact, China too has been hit on a vast scale by a seemingly endless
sequence of droughts, floods and deadly mudslides. The Russian drought last month damaged the wheat harvest, leading to an
export ban. World prices surged, hitting the poorest hardest, and sparking riots over bread prices in far away Mozambique.¶ While
no one weather event can ever be linked with certainty to climate change, the broad patterns of abnormality seen this year are
consistent with climate-change models. They provide an illustration of the events we will be encountering increasingly in the
future.¶
So the clock is ticking, and the time to act is now. We must all take responsibility for this threat and take robust action. Butwe must also be clear-headed about the difficulties of reaching agreement and not lose heart when the going gets tough.¶ The post-
war leaders set up the United Nations in the aftermath of conflagration. They saw the pressing need for global
solutions to global problems: cooperation not conflict, through frameworks and institutions
embedded in the rule of law, and an international system that is fair and offers everyone a
realistic prospect of security and prosperity.¶ Failure to respond to climate change is inimical to all these values,
undermining trust between nations, intensifying competition for resources, and shrinking the political space available for
cooperation. It is an affront to fairness, since it puts the greatest burden on those who have done least to cause the problem and are
least able to deal with its consequences.¶ It is incompatible with the values and aspirations that the U.N. embodies. And it's
incompatible with the values and aspirations of British foreign policy.¶ For more than 20 years, we've been striving to
build an effective international response to climate change. But we have lacked the collective
ambition required. We need to shift investment urgently from high-carbon "business as usual" to the low-carbon economy.
This means building an essentially decarbonized global economy by mid- century.¶ At the same time, we must ensure development
is climate resilient; otherwise, the changes in climate that are already unavoidable will block the path for hundreds of millions ofpeople from poverty to prosperity. These changes also threaten to sweep away the investments in
development we have made, and just as the bridges and schools in Pakistan were swept away.¶ To drive that shift in
investment from low to high carbon, we need a global climate change deal under the United Nations.¶ Now, some have argued that
we should abandon hope of doing so. They say Copenhagen proved it's all too difficult; we should focus instead on less inclusive and
less demanding responses, such as coalitions of the willing. But we believe this would be a strategic error. It
mistakes the nature of the task, which is to expand the realm of the possible, not to lower our ambition by accepting its current
limits.¶ And we must recognize this at Cancun. One thing Copenhagen did give us was a set of political commitments, captured in the
Copenhagen Accord, on which we can build. More than 120 countries have now associated themselves with that accord, and that
represents a broad and growing consensus. We now need to ensure that we live up to the commitments we made to each other in
the accord, and reach out even more widely.¶ Copenhagen, despite those accords, was a strategic setback, but it was not by any
means the end of the road. We need to be clear why it failed to live up to high expectations and why it did not deliver a legally
binding deal.¶ Many people say that it failed because of process: The diplomats and the politicians had created a negotiation that
was too difficult and too complex. But this misses the point. International treaties are an outcome, not an input, of political bargains.
If you've made the political commitment to deliver, you can make the process work to deliver.¶ The real reason
Copenhagen did not deliver on high expectations was a lack of political will . Many in developing
countries saw a gap between the words and the deeds of the industrialized economies. They questioned whether we really believed
our own rhetoric. And to answer those questions, we each need to start at home.¶ That is why the coalition government to which I
belong has committed itself to being the greenest government ever in the United Kingdom, and why, with others in Europe, we are
calling on the European Union to commit to a 30-percent cut in emissions by 2020 without waiting for the rest of the world to act.¶
The UK is already the world leader in offshore wind, with more projects installed, in planning and in construction than any other
country in the world. We're undertaking the most radical transformation of our electricity sector ever. We aim to provide over 30
percent of our domestic electricity from renewables by 2020. We have committed to build no new coal-fired power stations without
carbon capture and storage technology, and we've announced our intention to continue the demonstration projects of that.¶ And
because it's imperative that foreign and domestic policies are mutually reinforcing, we must ensure that our approach is coherent.
Now, that's one reason we have established the new British National Security Council: to ensure this happens across the full range of
issues, including climate change.¶ And that's why I work hand in glove with Chris Huhne, the British Energy and Climate Change
secretary, and Andrew Mitchell, the International Development secretary, to ensure that our domestic action reflects our level of
international ambition.¶ But we won't succeed, of course, if we act alone. We must aim for a
framework that is global and binding. It needs to be global because climate change affectseveryone. Only a response that allows everyone a voice will generate a sense of common purpose and legitimacy. Only a
response that is binding will convince investors that we intend to keep the promises we make to each other. Businesses need c lear
political signals, so let's show them an unequivocal green light.¶ We are now a few weeks away from the 16th Conference of Parties
on Climate Change in Cancun. And I commend the consultative and collaborative approach Mexico has taken ahead of
this meeting. Thanks to their determination and foresight, we have a chance in Cancun to
regain momentum and make progress on key issues such as forests, technology, finance and
transparency of commitments. Cancun will -- may not get us all the way to a full agreement, but it can put us back on
track to one.¶ That said, the negotiations can't succeed inside a bubble. The negotiators in the U.N. process can't themselves build
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political will. They have to operate on the basis of current political realities in the countries they represent. And it's those realities
that limit the ambition that we can set in the -- in such negotiations, and it's those realities that we now need to shift.¶ There is
no global consensus on what climate change puts at risk, geopolitically and for the global
economy, and thus on the scale and urgency of the response we need. We must build a g lobal
consensus if we are to guarantee our citizens security and prosperity. That is a job for foreign policy.¶ A fundamental purpose here
for foreign policy is to shift the political debate, to create the political space for leaders and negotiators to reach agreement. We
didn't get that right before Copenhagen, and we must get it right now.¶ So we urgently need to mobilize foreign ministers and the
diplomats they lead, as well as institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations, to put climate change at the heart of foreign-
policy thinking.¶ When I became foreign secretary in May, I said the core goals of our foreign policy were to guarantee Britain's
security and prosperity. Robust global action on climate change is essential to that agenda. That is why the British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, under my leadership, is a vocal advocate for climate diplomacy. All British ambassadors carry the argument
for a global low-carbon transition in their breast pocket or in their handbag. Climate change is part of their daily vocabulary,
alongside the traditional themes of foreign policy. And they're supported by our unique network of climate attaches throughout the
world.¶ The core assets of foreign policy are its networks and its convening power. Foreign policy can build political impulses to
overcome barriers between sectors and cultures. In a networked world, diplomacy builds partnerships beyond
government. And nowhere are those partnerships more vital than on climate .¶ So we must mobilize
all our networks, not just across government but between governments, using organizations such as the Commonwealth as well. We
must reach out, beyond, to NGOs, faith groups and businesses. And of all these, perhaps business engagement is the key to making a
difference. It's business that will lead low-carbon transition. It's business that best understands the incentives needed to help us all
prosper.¶ We must also harness scientific expertise in cutting-edge low- carbon technologies. The scientific community will develop
the goods which will power the low-carbon economy and drive global ambition on climate change. And that's why the British
government has a science and innovation network, which fosters collaborative research in the U.K. and other countries.¶ Now, whatcan the U.K. and the European Union do to make that fundamental shift and shape a global consensus on climate change? The most
serious problem at Copenhagen, and the strongest brake on political will, was and is a lack of confidence in the low-carbon
economy. Too few people in too few countries are yet convinced that a rapid move to low carbon is compatible with economic
recovery and growth. They see the short-term economic and domestic stability risks before the opportunities and the longer-term
risks of inaction.¶ There should be only one European response to that confidence gap. The EU, in my view, must accelerate its own
progress and demonstrate that a low-carbon growth path makes us more competitive. I am convinced this is in the long-term
interests of Europe's economy. We have learned painful lessons from the oil price shocks. We must modernize our infrastructure.
The opportunities are out there. The g lobal industry in low-carbon and environmental goods and services is already estimated to be
worth up to 3.2 trillion pounds a year. Nearly a million British people are now employed in this sector, and that's why we are
creating a green investment bank to ensure that we can properly support and develop low-carbon industry.¶ But we need to
redouble our efforts, both in the EU (itself ?) and in our engagement with partners. Each of us as member states will
be better able to accelerate if we're doing so together as the world's largest single market. And
by opening up this effort through partnership with others, we can make it easier for them to accelerate, too.¶ So we'll be at the
forefront of pushing for low-carbon modernization of Europe's infrastructure and energy policy. The European Union's budget until
2013 is set out in the current "financial perspective".¶ We will argue -- we will need to agree the financial perspective for the sevenyears after that, the period including our 2020 climate goals. And it's -- as ever, it's right that the EU budget should reflect the
prevailing economic circumstances. It's also right that we direct the budget to today's challenges, not those of yesterday. And that
means one that supports the transition to a low-carbon economy.¶ Action in Europe alone will not be enough. We need both the
developed and developing world to take action. And this week Guido Westerwelle, the German foreign minister, and I have tasked
our teams to come together to shape a coordinated, diplomacy-led effort on climate change, combining
the strengths of our respective foreign services.¶ I've just put the case for bringing a new urgency for low-carbon
transition within the EU. But together we should carry that urgency in external dialogues, whether they are with the United States,
China or India.¶ The transition to low carbon will happen faster and maximize the benefit for all if the United States -- historically the
world's largest emitter -- is at the leading edge. I recognize the political challenges that the U.S. administration faces and welcome
President Obama's commitment to combat climate change. As he said in his State of the Union speech, "the nation that leads the
clean-energy economy will be the nation that leads the global economy."¶ Whatever the outcome of the upcoming midterm
elections in the U.S., there is scope for political unity around an economic agenda that targets new energy opportunities and new
jobs. American business understands this new market and should want to lead it. But to make these new clean-energy investments
at the required pace and on a sufficient scale, they need the right incentives.¶ On climate, as in so many areas, the world looks to the
US for leadership, because it has the economic clout and diplomatic leverage to shift the global debate.¶ And I look forward toworking with the U.S. administration and indeed with the Council on Foreign Relations to raise global ambitions and put us back on
the path to sustainable growth.¶ A key challenge for Europe is to build an economic partnership with China that reinforces the steps
China is taking towards a low- carbon economy. These steps include its recent announcement of the five provinces and eight cities
that have been designated as China's low-carbon pilots. Together these pilots cover 350 million people, so an ambitious approach to
these schemes, tenaciously implemented, could provide a critical boost to global confidence in the concept of low- carbon
development and help put China on the path to sustainable prosperity.¶ It could also produce huge two-way investment and
partnership opportunities. Europe should place itself at the heart of these, working with China to maximize the ambition and the
opportunities and to build the shared technology standards that will shape a global low- carbon market.¶ In China's case, low-carbon
opportunity is matched by urgent low- carbon need. The pace of growth in China means average Chinese per- capita emissions could
soon eclipse those of Europe. So while China has taken some very welcome steps, without a commitment from China to further
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decisive action, the efforts of others will be in vain.¶ The emerging economies face a dilemma. Often they are the most vulnerable to
the direct effects of climate change. But they are concerned that action against climate change will adversely affect their
development. The challenge to all countries is to have a high- growth, low-carbon economy. Some, like Brazil, which derives nearly
half its energy from clean and renewable resources, are rising to that challenge.¶ India is another, embodying in microcosm the
challenge that climate change poses to us all. Threatened by food, water and energy insecurity, India has responded with ambitious
plans to generate 20 gigawatts of solar power by 2022.¶ South Africa, a coal-dependent economy, the success of which is so
important to growth and prosperity within the continent, has made a significant offer to deviate their emissions from the business-
as- usual pathway.¶ The opportunity is for the emerging economies -- for the emerging economies is to make a direct leap to low
carbon, avoiding the high- carbon lock-in that we see in the developed world: a new, sustainable pathway for prosperity andsecurity. A global low-carbon economy is not an idealist's pipe dream but a 21st-century realist's imperative. Countries that adapt
quickly to a carbon-constrained world will be better able to deliver lasting prosperity for their citizens. As a Permanent Security
Council member, I'm determined that the U.K. will play its full part in that, not least by supporting climate finance for the poorest.¶
Collectively, we share a responsibility to those most vulnerable to the impact of c limate change. Bangladesh, with its densely
populated coastal region, is particularly susceptible to rising sea levels. Glacial melt, sea-level rises and El Nino-type events threaten
the lives of millions across South America. And the very existence of many small island states is under threat.¶ We have a shared
vision to meet the Millennium Development Goals. But in a world without action on climate change, that
vision will remain a dream, and the efforts of the last 10 years would¶ So climate change is one
of the gravest threats to our security and prosperity. Unless we take robust and timely action
to deal with it, no country will be immune to its effects. However difficult it might seem now, a global deal
under the U.N. is the only response to this threat which will create the necessary confidence to drive a low- carbon transition.¶ We
must be undaunted by the scale of the challenge.¶ We must continue to strive for agreement. We must not accept that because
there is no consensus on a way forward now, that there never will be one. And to change the debate, we must imaginatively deploy
all of the foreign policy assets in our armory until we've shaped that global consensus.¶ A successful response toclimate change will not only stabilize the climate, but open the way to a future in which we
can meet our needs through cooperation, in accordance with the ideals of the United Nations. Failure to do so will
enhance competitive tendencies and make the world more dangerous, so this is not actually a hard choice.¶ We have to get
this right. If we do, we can still shape our world. And if we don't, the world will determine our
destiny for us.
Warming is real and causes extinction
Mazo 10 – PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLAJeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, “Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,”
pg. 122
The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above pre-industrial levels, depending on
the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual'
projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1°C. Even keeping
emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still be expected to reach
1.2°C (O'9""1.5°C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." Without early and severe reductions in
emissions, the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first century are likely to be
catastrophic for the stability and security of countries in the developing world - not to mention the associated human
tragedy. Climate change could even undermine the strength and stability of emerging and advanced economies,
beyond the knock-on effects on security of widespread state failure and collapse in developing
countries.' And although they have been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that
unmitigated climate change beyond the end of the century could pose an existential threat to civilisation ."
What is certain is that there is no precedent in human experience for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best
case adaptation to these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political changes.
Water Scarcity causes extinction-draws in major powers
Reilly ‘2(Kristie, Editor for In These Times, a nonprofit, independent, national magazine published in Chicago. We’ve been around since 1976,
fighting for corporate accountability and progressive government. In other words, a better world, “NOT A DROP TO DRINK,”
http://www.inthesetimes.com/issue/26/25/culture1.shtml)
*Cites environmental thinker and activist Vandana Shiva Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke—probably North America’s foremost water
experts
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The two books provide a chilling, in-depth examination of a rapidly emerging global crisis. “Quite simply,” Barlow and Clarke write, “unless we
dramatically change our ways, between one-half and two-thirds of humanity will be living with severe fresh water shortages within the next quarter-
century. … The hard news is this: Humanity is depleting, diverting and polluting the planet’s fresh water
resources so quickly and relentlessly that every species on earth—including our own—is in
mortal danger.” The crisis is so great, the three authors agree, that the world’s next great wars will be
over water. The Middle East, parts of Africa, China, Russia, parts of the United States and
several other areas are already struggling to equitably share water resources. Many conflictsover water are not even recognized as such: Shiva blames the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in part on the severe scarcity of
water in settlement areas. As available fresh water on the planet decreases, today’s low-level conflicts
can only increase in intensity.
Post-Chavez US-Venezuela ties vital to prevent Iran proliferation
Jones, 13 – (Steve Jones, US Foreign Policy on About News. “Does Chavez' Death Mean Better
Relations Between U.S. and Venezuela?”
http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/alliesenemies/a/Does-Chavez-Death-Mean-Better-
Relations-Between-U-s-And-Venezuela.htm)//SDL
While the U.S. State Department isn't holding its collective breath, it would like to see better relations
between the two countries in the post-Chavez era. That would enable the U nited S tates to leverage
Venezuela against Iran as it continues attempts to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear
weapons .¶ Venezuela and Iran became allies during the Chavez' tenure, and Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Venezuela in 2012. The two countries signed various trade and financial agreements.¶ The U.S.
has deployed an array of sanctions against Iran. Venezuela's help could help strangle
resources that support Iran's nuclear program . According the the State Department, the United States
sanctioned Venezuela in 2011 for "delivering at least three cargoes of reformate, a blending
component for gasoline, to Iran between December 2010 and March 2011."
Iran prolif leads to Middle East arms race and ensures nuclear war
Allison 2k6 --- (Graham Tillett Allison Jr. is an American political scientist and professor at the
John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, Fall 2006, “The Will to Prevent,” Harvard
International Law Review, lexis nexis)Meanwhile, Iran is testing the line in the Middle East. On its current trajectory, the Islamic Republic will become a nuclear weapons
state before the end of the decade. According to the leadership in Tehran, Iran is exercising its “inalienable right” to build Iranian
enrichment plants and make fuel for its peaceful civilian nuclear power generators. These same facilities, however, can
continue enriching uranium to 90 percent U-235, which is the ideal core of a nuclear bomb. No one in the
international community doubts that Iran’s hidden objective in building enrichment facilities is to build nuclear bombs. If Iran
crosses its nuclear finish line, a Middle Eastern cascade of new nuclear weapons states could
trigger the first multi-party nuclear arms race, far more volatile than the Cold War competition
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Given Egypt’s historic role as the leader of the Arab Middle East, theprospects of it living unarmed alongside a nuclear Persia are very low. The IAEA’s reports of clandestine
nuclear experiments hint that Cairo may have considered this possibility. Were Saudi Arabia to buy a
dozen nuclear warheads that could be mated to the Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles it purchased
secretly in the 1980s, few in the US intelligence community would be surprised. Given Saudi Arabia’s role as the major
financier of Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear program in the 1980s, it is not out of the question that Riyadh and
Islamabad have made secret arrangements for this contingency. Such a multi-party nuclear arms race in
the Middle East would be like playing Russian roulette—dramatically increasing the likelihood of a
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regional nuclear war. Other nightmare scenarios for the region include an accidental or unauthorized
nuclear launch from Iran, theft of nuclear warheads from an unstable regime in Tehran, and possible
Israeli preemption against Iran’s nuclear facilities, which Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has implied, threatening, “Under
no circumstances, and at no point, can Israel allow anyone with these kinds of malicious designs against us to have control of
weapons of destruction that can threaten our existence.”
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Uniqueness
Now is key to resolve relations-Maduro’s remarks
Reuters 5/19 [http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/20/us-venezuela-usa-
idUSBRE94J01R20130520 –2013—SR] (Reuters) - Venezuela's recent designation of an acting head of its diplomatic mission in the
United States shows the OPEC nation's desire to restore full diplomatic relations , the foreign
minister said in an interview broadcast on Sunday.¶ Disputes between Caracas and Washington were
common during the 14-year-rule of late socialist leader Hugo Chavez, leaving both nations without
ambassadors in each other's capitals.¶ Foreign Minister Elias Jaua suggested in a televised interview that the move to name
government ally Calixto Ortega as charge d'affaires in Washington could be a prelude to restoring ambassadors.¶ "This is a
message for U.S. politicians so they understand Venezuela's desire to normalize relations ...
via the designation of the highest diplomatic authorities," he said. "Why? Because the United States
remains our top trade partner."¶ Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has in recent months said he
wants better ties with Washington as long as the relationship is respectful.
Chavez’s death makes now key Newton-Smalls 3/7 [Jay, reporter for Time-- http://swampland.time.com/2013/03/07/u-s-
hopes-chavezs-passing-could-smooth-relations-with-venezuela/ --2013—SR] U.S. officials are cautiously optimistic that the death of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez could improve
relations between the two countries, but they aren’t holding their breath.¶ “One of the things that happens
over 14 years in a government like Venezuela is it really did revolve around one man. So while I’m
hesitant to say that the change in an individual, or the passing of an individual, completely changes a relationship,” a State Department official told
reporters Wednesday, “he played an outsized role in that government and therefore his absence can
have outsized implications.”¶ That said, Venezuela is now facing elections, as mandated by its constitution. “And all of us know
electoral campaigns are not times to break new ground on foreign policy,” the official said.¶ (PHOTOS: Rise of Chávez: The Late Venezuelan President’s
Path to Power)¶ Not to mention that hours before Chávez’s death was announced, Venezuelan Vice President Nicolás Maduro, Chávez’s anointed
successor, accused the U.S. of working to destabilize Venezuela and of causing Chávez’s illness in a rambling 90-minute press conference. Two U.S.
State Department officials were expelled from Venezuela following the allegations. Chávez died Tuesday of cancer.
American influence is declining
Maher 10[Richard Maher, Ph.D Political Science Brown University with a focus on foreign policy disagreements between Britain, France, and
Germany since the end of the Cold War, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-
Unipolar World”, Science Direct, 11/12/2010+
And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its political and strategic
influence diminishing around the world. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq
and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has
adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency
convertibility, and America’s growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America’s closest
strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy
resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence.Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs.
Brazil’s growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and
investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And relations with Japan, following the
election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in
decades. To many observers, it seems that America’s vast power is not translating into America’s
preferred outcomes. As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate
into the realization of one’s preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one’s predominant position in world
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politics. There are many costs that come with predominance – material, political, and
reputational . Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in others, in one’s friends
just as much as in one’s rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily American predominance that produces unease but rather American
predominance. Predominance also makes one a tempting target, and a scapegoat for other
countries’ own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country’s
economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to
America’s own interests. Predominant power likewise breeds envy, resentment, and alienation. How is it
possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy—the
perception that one’s role and purpose is acceptable and one’s power is used justly—is indispensable for maintaining
power and influence in world politics. As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence)of great powers
in other parts of the world, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is
inevitable that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future,
and that the United States will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the United
States naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American
predominance, it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international
history with dread or foreboding. It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting
unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of
maintaining its predominance, America’s position in the world—both at home and internationally—could very
well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to
start thinking about how best to position itself in the ‘‘post-unipolar’’ world.
u.s. influence in latin America is low
Suver, research associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2012(Roman, “Looking back on the Cuba distraction at Cartagena and the Failure of the US Latin
America Policy,” COHA, April 24, Online: www.coha.org/looking-back-on-the-cuba-distraction-
at-cartagena-and-the-failure-of-the-u-s-latin-america-policy/)
The increasingly vocal and adamant calls for Cuba’s inclusion by Latin America, and the
growing number of provocative comments being made by Latin American leaders aboutending North American hegemony in the region, are ominous signs for the abiding strength of
the U.S.’ influence in the region. With the prospect of the majority of the next Summit’s attendees boycotting the event
under the current status quo, the future of the OAS and North American participation in Latin American affairs appears noticeably
bleak. There are already a number of regional organizations which exclude the U.S. and Canada,
CELAC and UNASUR among them, and their increasing relevance to international cooperation in the
Americas does not bode well for North America. If the U.S. continues to persistently adhere to
its current stance on Cuba through to the 2015 Seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama, there is a distinct
possibility that the OAS could lose all legitimacy as well as its influence as exasperated Latin
American countries refuse to participate. This could lead to both a rethinking of U.S. policy towards Cuba, and
greater cooperation and concessions by the U.S., pursuant to a more unified and egalitarian Western Hemisphere dynamic.
Conversely, if the U.S. continues its archaic and neo-imperialistic stance, bodies like CELAC would
stand to gain considerable influence, and could perhaps even replace the OAS as the hemisphere’sprimary pan-American body and standard-bearer for regional cooperation.
Relations are tense but still fixable
US DoS 1/17(United States Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Venezuela”, 1/17/13, Fact sheet,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm, KJ)
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Following Venezuela’s withdrawal in 1830 from its federation with Colombia, the United States established diplomatic relations with
Venezuela in 1835. The U.S.-Venezuelan relationship has been tense in recent years, although the
two nations agreed at the 2009 Summit of the Americas to seek a relationship based on
mutual interest. Venezuela's president has defined himself in opposition to the United States,
criticizing the U.S. government and U.S. relations with Latin America. He has been in office since 1999
and was re-elected for a third term on October 7, 2012, and his vision of "21st Century Socialism" for Venezuela has included periods
of rule by decree on a broad range of issues. The Venezuelan ambassador to the United States had his visa revoked in December 27,2010, after the Venezuelan president withdrew his approval of the diplomat nominated to be the U.S. ambassador to Venezuela,
and both countries are represented by a Charge d’ Affaires. Despite tensions in the relationship, both countries have had limited
bilateral counternarcotics cooperation, and the U.S. government continues to seek constructive engagement with the Venezuelan
government, focusing on areas of mutual interest. Examples of such overlapping interests include counternarcotics,
counterterrorism, commerce, and energy.
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Plan Spills Over
Economic relations spill over to diplomatic issues
BBC 13(BBC “Viewpoint: New era for US-Venezuela relations?”, 3/6/13, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21680885, KJ)
But in the longer term, trade, commercial relations and personal ties could shift US-Venezuelan
relations for the better.¶ First and foremost are the economic ties between the two nations.
Despite the rhetorical animosity of the last decade, trade continued.¶ The US remains the largest
recipient of Venezuelan oil - some 40% percent of Venezuelan oil exports (and oil makes up over
90% of the country's total exports).¶ In turn, the US has continued to send machinery and cars,
and even increased exports of natural gas and petroleum products to the South American
nation.¶ The hard currency and goods are vital to the functioning of Venezuela's economy,
government and society, and may become even more so through the anticipated tough
economic times ahead.¶ Man holds a protest sign with Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama made
to look like demons Venezuelans protested American officials on the ninth anniversary of the
failed coup against Chavez¶ Despite the increased government management of the economythrough price controls and the nationalisation of hundreds of private companies over the last
decade, many well- and lesser-known US companies still work in Venezuela, providing not just
goods but ongoing links with the United States.¶ In addition to these commercial links, the more
than 200,000 Venezuelans living in the US and the hundreds of thousands more that have ties
through family, friends and colleagues, could also bring the two countries together.¶ Finally, as
subsequent Venezuelan governments look to adjust their economic policies in the coming
months and years, the experience of their neighbours provide incentives to forge a more
amicable bilateral relationship.
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Venezuela Key
Economic engagement with Venezuela bolsters US credibility-it spills over
Griffin 4/3 [John, freshman analyst for the Harvard Crimson--
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/ -2013-SR] Diplomatically , positive engagement with Venezuela would be a major step toward building
American credibility in the world at large, especially in Latin America. Chávez (along with his friends the
Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support for his regime by pointing out the United
States’ attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics. Soon, a number of populist
governments in Latin America had rallied around Chávez and his anti-American policies . In 2004,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our
America, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed (but never realized) by the Bush administration.
Chávez galvanized these nations—many of whom have experienced American interventionist tactics—by vilifying
America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategy
regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chávez’s position. Every time Washington chastises Venezuela for
opposing American interests or attempts to bring sanctions against the Latin American country, the leader in Caracas (whether it be Chávez or Maduro)
simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler. This weakens the United States’
diplomatic position, while simultaneously strengthening Venezuela’s. If Washington wants Latin America to stop
its current trend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less
astringent tone in dealing with Venezuela. Caracas will be unable to paint Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in
turn gain a better image in Latin America.¶ Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin
American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be economically advisable. With the
world’s largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources, and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists, Venezuela has quite a bit to
offer economically. Even now, America can see the possible benefits of economic engagement with
Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation: Each year, thousands of needy
Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a Boston-area oil company.¶ Engagement
with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin
America. It was mostly through Venezuela’s efforts that the United States was unable to create a “Free Trade Area of the Americas,” an endeavor
that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade. In a world where the
United States and Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would
benefit from such agreements.¶ For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the best course of action
for the United States. As it stands, the negative relationship between the countries has created an
atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic
cooperation nearly impossible. While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticized—authoritarian
rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly policies—nothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is having any effect.
The United States should stop playing “tough guy” with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and work toward
stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere. We aren’t catching any flies with our vinegar—it’s high time we
started trying to catch them with honey.
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Debt is Key
Venezuelan debt is the critical issue-foreign exchange is key
Sanders 7/14 [Sir Ronald—reporter for the Barbados Advocate-
http://www.barbadosadvocate.com/newsitem.asp?more=columnists&NewsID=31512 -SR] The Economist Intelligence Unit reports that “Venezuela is currently struggling with a lack of foreign
exchange, which has put significant pressure on the overvalued official exchange rate of BsF6.3 to
US$1”. Additionally, inflation is in the high 30s, (while the Latin American average is 7 per cent ), the national debt is rising,
and the fiscal deficit is growing; it is said to have tripled to 11 per cent of gross national
product. There is also growing concern within Venezuela about money being spent on, or
given-away to, foreign countries while sections of the Venezuelan population are facing
hardships – a justifiable concern and one that Maduro cannot ignore .¶ All this puts Maduro in a very
difficult position, worsened by the fact that a now rampant opposition is whipping up as much popular resentment of him as it can.
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Diplomacy Solves Warming
US Diplomacy solves warming and proliferation
Hague 2k10 [William Hague, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and
Member of Parliament for Richmond, United Kingdom, “The Diplomacy of Climate Change,”9/27/10]
But I particularly wanted to make the point to this audience and to circulate to a wider audience certain points about climate
change this morning, which is perhaps the 21st century's biggest foreign- policy challenge, along with
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. I believe those two threats over the longer term are
the biggest threats to the peace and security of the world.¶ A world that is failing to respond to climate
change is one in which the values embodied in the United Nations will not be met, and it's a world in which competition and conflict
would win out over collaboration.¶ We're at a very crucial point in the global debate on this subject.
Many people are questioning, in the wake of Copenhagen, whether we should continue to seek a
response to climate change through the U.N. and whether we can ever hope to deal with this
enormous challenge.¶ And I will first argue today that an effective response to climate change underpins
our security and prosperity; second, that our response should be to strive for a binding globaldeal, whatever the setbacks; and third, I will set out why effective deployment of foreign policy assets
is crucial to mobilizing the political will needed if we're going to shape an effective response .¶
Now, Ban Ki-moon is right to have made climate change his top priority. Two weeks ago, I was talking about Britain's values in a
networked world. I said then that a successful response to climate change must be a central objective of
British foreign policy. And I said this not only because I believe action against climate change is in line
with a values-based foreign policy, but because it underpins our prosperity and security.¶ You
can't have food, water or energy security without climate security; they are interconnected and
inseparable. They form four resource pillars on which global security, prosperity and equity stand. Each depends on the other.
Plentiful, affordable food requires reliable and affordable access to water and energy .
Increasing dependence on coal, oil and gas threatens climate security, increasing the severity
of floods and droughts, damaging food production, exacerbating the loss of biodiversity, and
in countries that rely on hydropower, undermining energy security through the impact on the
availability of water.¶ As the world becomes more networked, the impact of climate change in one country or region
will affect the prosperity and security of others around the world.¶ No one can have failed to be appalled
by the devastating floods in Pakistan. They overwhelmed the capacity of government to respond and opened political space for
extremists. While Pakistan has borne the brunt of the human impact, China too has been hit on a vast scale by a seemingly endless
sequence of droughts, floods and deadly mudslides. The Russian drought last month damaged the wheat harvest, leading to an
export ban. World prices surged, hitting the poorest hardest, and sparking riots over bread prices in far away Mozambique.¶ While
no one weather event can ever be linked with certainty to climate change, the broad patterns of abnormality seen this year are
consistent with climate-change models. They provide an illustration of the events we will be encountering increasingly in the
future.¶ So the clock is ticking, and the time to act is now. We must all take responsibility for this threat and take robust action. But
we must also be clear-headed about the difficulties of reaching agreement and not lose heart when the going gets tough.¶ The post-
war leaders set up the United Nations in the aftermath of conflagration. They saw the pressing need for global
solutions to global problems: cooperation not conflict, through frameworks and institutions
embedded in the rule of law, and an international system that is fair and offers everyone arealistic prospect of security and prosperity.¶ Failure to respond to climate change is inimical to all these values,
undermining trust between nations, intensifying competition for resources, and shrinking the political space available for
cooperation. It is an affront to fairness, since it puts the greatest burden on those who have done least to cause the problem and are
least able to deal with its consequences.¶ It is incompatible with the values and aspirations that the U.N. embodies. And it's
incompatible with the values and aspirations of British foreign policy.¶ For more than 20 years, we've been striving to
build an effective international response to climate change. But we have lacked the collective
ambition required. We need to shift investment urgently from high-carbon "business as usual" to the low-carbon economy.
This means building an essentially decarbonized global economy by mid- century.¶ At the same time, we must ensure development
is climate resilient; otherwise, the changes in climate that are already unavoidable will block the path for hundreds of millions of
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people from poverty to prosperity. These changes also threaten to sweep away the investments in
development we have made, and just as the bridges and schools in Pakistan were swept away.¶ To drive that shift in
investment from low to high carbon, we need a global climate change deal under the United Nations.¶ Now, some have argued that
we should abandon hope of doing so. They say Copenhagen proved it's all too difficult; we should focus instead on less inclusive and
less demanding responses, such as coalitions of the willing. But we believe this would be a strategic error. It
mistakes the nature of the task, which is to expand the realm of the possible, not to lower our ambition by accepting its current
limits.¶ And we must recognize this at Cancun. One thing Copenhagen did give us was a set of political commitments, captured in the
Copenhagen Accord, on which we can build. More than 120 countries have now associated themselves with that accord, and that
represents a broad and growing consensus. We now need to ensure that we live up to the commitments we made to each other in
the accord, and reach out even more widely.¶ Copenhagen, despite those accords, was a strategic setback, but it was not by any
means the end of the road. We need to be clear why it failed to live up to high expectations and why it did not deliver a legally
binding deal.¶ Many people say that it failed because of process: The diplomats and the politicians had created a negotiation that
was too difficult and too complex. But this misses the point. International treaties are an outcome, not an input, of political bargains.
If you've made the political commitment to deliver, you can make the process work to deliver.¶ The real reason
Copenhagen did not deliver on high expectations was a lack of political will . Many in developing
countries saw a gap between the words and the deeds of the industrialized economies. They questioned whether we really believed
our own rhetoric. And to answer those questions, we each need to start at home.¶ That is why the coalition government to which I
belong has committed itself to being the greenest government ever in the United Kingdom, and why, with others in Europe, we are
calling on the European Union to commit to a 30-percent cut in emissions by 2020 without waiting for the rest of the world to act.¶
The UK is already the world leader in offshore wind, with more projects installed, in planning and in construction than any other
country in the world. We're undertaking the most radical transformation of our electricity sector ever. We aim to provide over 30
percent of our domestic electricity from renewables by 2020. We have committed to build no new coal-fired power stations without
carbon capture and storage technology, and we've announced our intention to continue the demonstration projects of that.¶ And
because it's imperative that foreign and domestic policies are mutually reinforcing, we must ensure that our approach is coherent.
Now, that's one reason we have established the new British National Security Council: to ensure this happens across the full range of
issues, including climate change.¶ And that's why I work hand in glove with Chris Huhne, the British Energy and Climate Change
secretary, and Andrew Mitchell, the International Development secretary, to ensure that our domestic action reflects our level of
international ambition.¶ But we won't succeed, of course, if we act alone. We must aim for a
framework that is global and binding. It needs to be global because climate change affects
everyone. Only a response that allows everyone a voice will generate a sense of common purpose and legitimacy. Only a
response that is binding will convince investors that we intend to keep the promises we make to each other. Businesses need c lear
political signals, so let's show them an unequivocal green light.¶ We are now a few weeks away from the 16th Conference of Parties
on Climate Change in Cancun. And I commend the consultative and collaborative approach Mexico has taken ahead of
this meeting. Thanks to their determination and foresight, we have a chance in Cancun to
regain momentum and make progress on key issues such as forests, technology, finance and
transparency of commitments. Cancun will -- may not get us all the way to a full agreement, but it can put us back on
track to one.¶ That said, the negotiations can't succeed inside a bubble. The negotiators in the U.N. process can't themselves build
political will. They have to operate on the basis of current political realities in the countries they represent. And it's those realities
that limit the ambition that we can set in the -- in such negotiations, and it's those realities that we now need to shift.¶ There is
no global consensus on what climate change puts at risk, geopolitically and for the global
economy, and thus on the scale and urgency of the response we need. We must build a g lobal
consensus if we are to guarantee our citizens security and prosperity. That is a job for foreign policy.¶ A fundamental purpose here
for foreign policy is to shift the political debate, to create the political space for leaders and negotiators to reach agreement. We
didn't get that right before Copenhagen, and we must get it right now.¶ So we urgently need to mobilize foreign ministers and the
diplomats they lead, as well as institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations, to put climate change at the heart of foreign-
policy thinking.¶ When I became foreign secretary in May, I said the core goals of our foreign policy were to guarantee Britain's
security and prosperity. Robust global action on climate change is essential to that agenda. That is why the British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, under my leadership, is a vocal advocate for climate diplomacy. All British ambassadors carry the argument
for a global low-carbon transition in their breast pocket or in their handbag. Climate change is part of their daily vocabulary,
alongside the traditional themes of foreign policy. And they're supported by our unique network of climate attaches throughout theworld.¶ The core assets of foreign policy are its networks and its convening power. Foreign policy can build political impulses to
overcome barriers between sectors and cultures. In a networked world, diplomacy builds partnerships beyond
government. And nowhere are those partnerships more vital than on climate .¶ So we must mobilize
all our networks, not just across government but between governments, using organizations such as the Commonwealth as well. We
must reach out, beyond, to NGOs, faith groups and businesses. And of all these, perhaps business engagement is the key to making a
difference. It's business that will lead low-carbon transition. It's business that best understands the incentives needed to help us all
prosper.¶ We must also harness scientific expertise in cutting-edge low- carbon technologies. The scientific community will develop
the goods which will power the low-carbon economy and drive global ambition on climate change. And that's why the British
government has a science and innovation network, which fosters collaborative research in the U.K. and other countries.¶ Now, what
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can the U.K. and the European Union do to make that fundamental shift and shape a global consensus on climate change? The most
serious problem at Copenhagen, and the strongest brake on political will, was and is a lack of confidence in the low-carbon
economy. Too few people in too few countries are yet convinced that a rapid move to low carbon is compatible with economic
recovery and growth. They see the short-term economic and domestic stability risks before the opportunities and the longer-term
risks of inaction.¶ There should be only one European response to that confidence gap. The EU, in my view, must accelerate its own
progress and demonstrate that a low-carbon growth path makes us more competitive. I am convinced this is in the long-term
interests of Europe's economy. We have learned painful lessons from the oil price shocks. We must modernize our infrastructure.
The opportunities are out there. The g lobal industry in low-carbon and environmental goods and services is already estimated to be
worth up to 3.2 trillion pounds a year. Nearly a million British people are now employed in this sector, and that's why we arecreating a green investment bank to ensure that we can properly support and develop low-carbon industry.¶ But we need to
redouble our efforts, both in the EU (itself ?) and in our engagement with partners. Each of us as member states will
be better able to accelerate if we're doing so together as the world's largest single market. And
by opening up this effort through partnership with others, we can make it easier for them to accelerate, too.¶ So we'll be at the
forefront of pushing for low-carbon modernization of Europe's infrastructure and energy policy. The European Union's budget until
2013 is set out in the current "financial perspective".¶ We will argue -- we will need to agree the financial perspective for the seven
years after that, the period including our 2020 climate goals. And it's -- as ever, it's right that the EU budget should reflect the
prevailing economic circumstances. It's also right that we direct the budget to today's challenges, not those of yesterday. And that
means one that supports the transition to a low-carbon economy.¶ Action in Europe alone will not be enough. We need both the
developed and developing world to take action. And this week Guido Westerwelle, the German foreign minister, and I have tasked
our teams to come together to shape a coordinated, diplomacy-led effort on climate change, combining
the strengths of our respective foreign services.¶ I've just put the case for bringing a new urgency for low-carbon
transition within the EU. But together we should carry that urgency in external dialogues, whether they are with the United States,
China or India.¶ The transition to low carbon will happen faster and maximize the benefit for all if the United States -- historically theworld's largest emitter -- is at the leading edge. I recognize the political challenges that the U.S. administration faces and welcome
President Obama's commitment to combat climate change. As he said in his State of the Union speech, "the nation that leads the
clean-energy economy will be the nation that leads the global economy."¶ Whatever the outcome of the upcoming midterm
elections in the U.S., there is scope for political unity around an economic agenda that targets new energy opportunities and new
jobs. American business understands this new market and should want to lead it. But to make these new clean-energy investments
at the required pace and on a sufficient scale, they need the right incentives.¶ On climate, as in so many areas, the world looks to the
US for leadership, because it has the economic clout and diplomatic leverage to shift the global debate.¶ And I look forward to
working with the U.S. administration and indeed with the Council on Foreign Relations to raise global ambitions and put us back on
the path to sustainable growth.¶ A key challenge for Europe is to build an economic partnership with China that reinforces the steps
China is taking towards a low- carbon economy. These steps include its recent announcement of the five provinces and eight cities
that have been designated as China's low-carbon pilots. Together these pilots cover 350 million people, so an ambitious approach to
these schemes, tenaciously implemented, could provide a critical boost to global confidence in the concept of low- carbon
development and help put China on the path to sustainable prosperity.¶ It could also produce huge two-way investment and
partnership opportunities. Europe should place itself at the heart of these, working with China to maximize the ambition and the
opportunities and to build the shared technology standards that will shape a global low- carbon market.¶ In China's case, low-carbon
opportunity is matched by urgent low- carbon need. The pace of growth in China means average Chinese per- capita emissions could
soon eclipse those of Europe. So while China has taken some very welcome steps, without a commitment from China to further
decisive action, the efforts of others will be in vain.¶ The emerging economies face a dilemma. Often they are the most vulnerable to
the direct effects of climate change. But they are concerned that action against climate change will adversely affect their
development. The challenge to all countries is to have a high- growth, low-carbon economy. Some, like Brazil, which derives nearly
half its energy from clean and renewable resources, are rising to that challenge.¶ India is another, embodying in microcosm the
challenge that climate change poses to us all. Threatened by food, water and energy insecurity, India has responded with ambitious
plans to generate 20 gigawatts of solar power by 2022.¶ South Africa, a coal-dependent economy, the success of which is so
important to growth and prosperity within the continent, has made a significant offer to deviate their emissions from the business-
as- usual pathway.¶ The opportunity is for the emerging economies -- for the emerging economies is to make a direct leap to low
carbon, avoiding the high- carbon lock-in that we see in the developed world: a new, sustainable pathway for prosperity and
security. A global low-carbon economy is not an idealist's pipe dream but a 21st-century realist's imperative. Countries that adapt
quickly to a carbon-constrained world will be better able to deliver lasting prosperity for their citizens. As a Permanent Security
Council member, I'm determined that the U.K. will play its full part in that, not least by supporting climate finance for the poorest.¶
Collectively, we share a responsibility to those most vulnerable to the impact of c limate change. Bangladesh, with its densely
populated coastal region, is particularly susceptible to rising sea levels. Glacial melt, sea-level rises and El Nino-type events threatenthe lives of millions across South America. And the very existence of many small island states is under threat.¶ We have a shared
vision to meet the Millennium Development Goals. But in a world without action on climate change, that
vision will remain a dream, and the efforts of the last 10 years would¶ So climate change is one
of the gravest threats to our security and prosperity. Unless we take robust and timely action
to deal with it, no country will be immune to its effects. However difficult it might seem now, a global deal
under the U.N. is the only response to this threat which will create the necessary confidence to drive a low- carbon transition.¶ We
must be undaunted by the scale of the challenge.¶ We must continue to strive for agreement. We must not accept that because
there is no consensus on a way forward now, that there never will be one. And to change the debate, we must imaginatively deploy
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all of the foreign policy assets in our armory until we've shaped that global consensus.¶ A successful response to
climate change will not only stabilize the climate, but open the way to a future in which we
can meet our needs through cooperation, in accordance with the ideals of the United Nations. Failure to do so will
enhance competitive tendencies and make the world more dangerous, so this is not actually a hard choice.¶ We have to get
this right. If we do, we can still shape our world. And if we don't, the world will determine our
destiny for us.
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Oil Advantage
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1AC Advantage
Petro Caribe collapse coming now-Venezuelan debt is the reason-it spills over
Sanders 7/14 [Sir Ronald—reporter for the Barbados Advocate-
http://www.barbadosadvocate.com/newsitem.asp?more=columnists&NewsID=31512 -SR] Professor Anthony Bryant, a senior fellow at the Institute of International Relations of the University of the West Indies, explains the
problem as follows: “The impact of Petro Caribe has been very dramatic. Since its inception, the financing
mechanism is estimated to have saved members more than US$1bn in financing energy costs. In essence, the programme
saved several regional economies from certain collapse . But while the programme has
provided short-term relief, it has also become an addiction for its beneficiaries . Venezuela is
today the largest creditor for Petro Caribe members”. And, he adds: “The programme has also
contributed to the unsustainable debt accumulation in some of the countries”.¶ Professor Bryant’s
analysis is not unique. The Economist Intelligence Unit and other commentators agree that the debt to Venezuela has
become “unsustainable” for many of the Caribbean countries.¶ In reality, the debt has also
become unsustainable for PDVSA, the Venezuelan oil company that has been the source of the
credit to the many Caribbean countries. It is now clear that several of the Caribbean countries havenot been repaying the debt and are not in a position to do so. In the circumstances, PDVSA and the
Venezuelan government may be left with a huge debt. This would adversely affect the
capacity of PDVSA to raise money from international lenders . Last month, Poor's Ratings Services lowered
its long-term corporate credit and senior unsecured debt ratings on PDVSA to 'B' from 'B+'.
Oil is key to Venezuelan stability-debt relief is key
Metzker 6/18 [Jared- reporter for the International--¶
http://www.international.to/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8681:analysts-say-oil-could-help-mend-us-
venezuela-relations&catid=268:inter-press-service&Itemid=377--SR] Over half of Venezuela's federal budget revenues come from its oil industry, which also accounts for
95 percent of the country's exports. Estimated at 77 billion barrels, its proven reserves of black gold are the largest of any nation in
the world.¶ Despite a troubled political relationship, its principal customer is the United States,which imports nearly a million barrels a day from Venezuela.¶ Venezuela's oil industry has been officially
nationalised since the 1970s, and, as president, Chavez further tightened government control over its production. His
government took a greater chunk of revenues and imposed quotas that ensured a certain
percentage would always go directly towards aiding Venezuelans via social spending and fuel
subsidies.¶ While these measures may be popular with Venezuelans, who pay the lowest price for gasoline in the world, critics
argue such policies hampered growth and led to mismanagement of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the main state-run oil
company.¶ The same critics also point to increasing debt levels, slowdowns in productions and accidents stemming from faulty
infrastructure.¶ In order to boost production, PdVSA agreed in May to accept a number of major
loans. This includes one from Chevron, one of the largest U.S. oil companies, which will work with Venezuelans to develop new
extraction sites.[related_articles]¶ "The oil sector is in deep trouble in Venezuela – production is down
and the economic situation is deteriorating," explained Shifter. "They know they need foreign
investment to increase production, and this is in part what has motivated Maduro to reachout."
Venezuelan oil is key to global oil stability
EIA 2k12 [Energy Information Administration—US studies and analysis--
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=VE ---October 12—SR] Venezuela is one of the world's largest exporters of crude oil and the largest in the Western
Hemisphere. The oil sector is of central importance to the Venezuelan economy. As a founding member of the Organization of
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the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Venezuela is an important player in the global oil market.¶ In
2010, Venezuela consumed 3.2 quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) of total energy. Oil represents the bulk of total
energy consumption in Venezuela. Hydroelectricity and natural gas each account for over 20 percent, while coal
accounts for the remainder of energy use. Over the last decade the share of oil consumption in the
country's total energy mix has risen from 36 percent to 47 percent, largely because the
Venezuelan government subsidizes liquid fuels.
Scenario 1: Oil Shocks
Even a 10% disruption in oil would lead to economic collapse of unprecedented
magnitude—no available safeguards
Black 12 (Edwin Black, American syndicated columnist, and journalist specializing in the
historical interplay between economics and politics in the Middle East, “When the Pump Runs
Dry, February 27)< http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-02-27/news/bs-ed-oil-interruption-
20120227_1_crude-abqaiq-international-energy-agency
The crude realities: America uses approximately 19 million to 20 million barrels of oil per day,
almost half of which is imported. If we lose just 1 million barrels per day, or suffer the type of damage sustained from
Hurricane Katrina, the government will open the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which offers a mere six- to eight-week supply of
unrefined crude oil. If we lose 1.5 million barrels per day, or approximately 7.5 percent, we will ask our allies in the 28-member
International Energy Agency to open their SPRs and otherwise assist. If we lose 2 million barrels per day, or 10
percent, for a protracted period, government crisis monitors say the chaos will be so catastrophic,
they cannot even model it. One government oil crisis source told me: "We cannot put a price tag on it. If it
happens, just cash in your 401(k)." Exactly how could America be subjected to a protracted oil interruption — that is, a
10 percent shortfall lasting longer than several weeks? It will not come from hurricane action in the Gulf of Mexico, or even major
refinery accidents or other oil infrastructure damage. Such damage would be repaired within days and the temporary losses
absorbed by the small, half-million-barrel-per-day global cushion available. But a disruption of the vital Persian Gulf
chokepoints — the Abqaiq processing plant in eastern Saudi Arabia, the Ras Tanura terminal on the Saudi Arabian coast, or the two-
mile-wide sea lane of the Strait of Hormuz — would be devastating. If one, two or three of them is hit by terrorists flying
hijacked jumbo jets or shut down by Iranian military action, as much as 40 percent of all seaborne oil will be stopped, as much as 18
percent of all global supply will be interrupted, and more than 10 percent of the U.S. supply will be cut off. Estimates on the U.S.shortfall suggest the percentage lost could be far higher. Repeat attacks, and the difficulty of anti-mine operations in a hostile
environment, could prolong the crisis for many months — which is exactly what al-Qaeda and the Iranian regime have promised.
Yet, apparently, there is no government plan. The best experts predict that if we suffer as much as a 10
percent shortfall for any period of time, let alone 20 percent, it will be a neighbor-against-neighbor,
"Mad Max" scenario as food shortages swell and a storm of economic collapse surges across the
country. Indeed, experts have been warning about this looming calamity for years. But the government and
presidential candidates refuse to even consider the possibility or develop a contingency plan.
Even if a secret plan exists, who would execute such a monumental undertaking? Yet American allies have developed oil contingency
legislation and other administrative plans that will permit their nations to survive a stoppage. These measures include
severe vehicle traffic reductions, enabling fast alternative fuel production and mass vehicle fuel retrofitting, as well as
rush public transit enhancement and mandated changes in driving habits. Unquestionably, for America to survive such a
catastrophe would require a very painful, multi-layered program of immediate-term, short-term, mid-term and long-term fixes that would change our society and transform it off of
dependency on oil. Currently, the nation has no real alternative fuel delivery or retrofitting
infrastructure. Lawmakers, mayors, governors and candidates have not developed such a plan during the half decade the
interruption has been looming. The notion that Saudi Arabia can make up the shortfall from an Iranian disruption is impossible.
Saudi oil too must pass through the narrow sea lanes of the Strait. The trans-Arabian Petroline that terminates at Yanbu can carry
only a few million barrels per day, and a rush project to double its capacity would require an estimated $600 million and some two
years of construction and chemical changes; this presupposes I ran would not simply attack the line with a barrage of medium range
missiles from its Red Sea forward ports. For America to have prepared intelligently for a Persian Gulf oil interruption would have
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required a decade of planning. To absorb the hit from a sudden oil stoppage, as is now once again
threatened, will be very painful indeed.
Econ collapse causes numerous scenarios for nuclear war
Harris & Burrows 9 – Professors of History @ Cambridge
PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) & member of the
NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit Mathew, and Jennifer “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the
Financial Crisis” 2009 http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdfOf course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of
intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the
Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more
instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated,
the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and
multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral
institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not
be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century . For that reason, the ways in
which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a
constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those
risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move
up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the
Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025,
however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities
within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established
groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct
sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized,
particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an
economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown
of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear
weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop
new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and
consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship
that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran.
Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an
unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well
established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance
capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable
indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short
warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on
preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world
continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and
there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive
countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in
interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for
example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of
war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval
buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal
stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding
targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased
tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational
cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes.With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East,
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cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly
difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
Scenario 2: Cuban Economy
Cuba’s is uniquely fragile-Venezuelan oil collapse devastates economyOsava 5/13 [Mario- correspondent for Inter-Press Service--
http://www.ipsnews.net/author/mario-osava/ -- 2013—SR] RIO DE JANEIRO, Mar 18 2013 (IPS) - Venezuela’s economic challenges, more than the uncertainty over who will
succeed late president Hugo Chávez, could threaten the oil diplomacy he practiced in the region.¶ Cuba is
the most obvious example. Oil imports from Venezuela cover half of the country’s energy
needs, and have made Venezuela the Caribbean island nation’s top trading partner.¶ Cuba’s foreign trade grew
fourfold between 2005 and 2011, to 8.3 billion dollars. And Venezuela’s share of the total increased from 23
percent in 2006 to 42 percent in 2011, according to an online article by Cuban economist Carmelo Mesa, who lives in the United
States.¶ Cuba’s growing dependence on Venezuela has raised fears of a repeat of the severe
shortage of essential goods, as well as frequent, lengthy blackouts, that Cuba suffered during the economic crisis of the
1990s triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union and East European socialist bloc. Cuban economist Pável Vidal, a professor at theJaveriana Pontifical University in Cali, Colombia, said “Venezuela today represents around 20 percent of
Cuba’s total trade in goods and services, while the Soviet Union represented 30 percent, and dependence was even
stronger.”¶ This means the actual risk is lower, although “a decline, even a gradual one, in the links with
Venezuela would spark a recession,” he told IPS in an email exchange.¶ He said an econometric projection indicates
that a decline in Venezuela’s trade with Cuba could lead to a contraction of up to 10 percent of
GDP and a two to three year recession as a result of a drop in foreign revenue and investment,
external financial restrictions, and more costly imports, ,without payment facilities for oil.¶ A
crisis of this kind would require “a complex and painful adjustment process,” Vidal said.¶ But
technological dependence is not as marked as it was with the Soviet Union, Cuba’s foreign
trade has diversified, and Cuba now has a strong tourism industry , which did not previously exist, as well
as new instruments of macroeconomic regulation, he added.¶ However, the country is not in a position to
weather a new crisis, he stressed. “Public wage earners and pensioners paid for the adjustments
made to survive the crisis of the 1990s, but they could not do so today, because their buying
power is just 27 percent of what is was in 1989,” Vidal said.
Cuban instability collapse causes Latin American instability and terror attacks
Gorrell, Lieutenant Colonel, 2005 (Tim, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED
STRATEGIC CRISIS?” March 18, Online: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074) Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro
transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile
who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within
Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order willcreate the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the
current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current
policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba
finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see”
approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast . In the midst of
this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were
criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S.,
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creating a refugee crisis.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its
next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the
U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions
have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995,
8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug
trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least
resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could begreatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an
unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region
increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the
hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase
direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the
region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to
Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could
very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can
mitigate these potential future problems.
Scenario 3: Brazil
Venezuelan instability spills over to Brazil
Duddy 2k12 [Patrick, lecturer @ Duke University-- http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-
unrest-venezuela/p28936 -September 2012-SR] Regional/Bilateral:The United States could urge Brazil, Colombia, and other countries in the region
to press for transparency and compliance with the highest possible standard of election
administration and to press Venezuela to permit exit polling, quick counts, and other mechanisms for independent
validation of the electoral results. Brazil, in particular, has influence with the Chavez government and seeks
to play more of a leadership role globally and in the hemisphere. Instability, violence, or an
interruption of democracy in Venezuela would hurt Brazil's geopolitical ambitions as well as
its extensive business interests. It would also be problematic for the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), which
recently made Venezuela a full member. (Mercosur requires members to be fully functioning democracies and recently suspended
Paraguay after the Senate there removed the sitting president under circumstances that other members considered questionable.)
That causes Brazilian nuclear re-arm
Schulz 2k [Donald E., Ph.D., Chair of Political Science at Cleveland State U., fmr. Research
Professor of National Security at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army College, March
200, “The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future”, Strategic Studies
Institute]
Until recently, the primary U.S. concern about Brazil¶ has been that it might acquire nuclear
weapons and¶ delivery systems. In the 1970s, the Brazilian military¶ embarked on a secret program
to develop an atom bomb. By¶ the late 1980s, both Brazil and Argentina were aggressively¶ pursuing nuclear development programs
that had clear¶ military spin-offs.¶ 54¶ There were powerful military and¶ civilian advocates of developing
nuclear weapons and¶ ballistic missiles within both countries. Today, however, the¶ situation has changed. As a
result of political leadership¶ transitions in both countries, Brazil and Argentina now¶ appear firmly committed to
restricting their nuclear¶ programs to peaceful purposes. They have entered into¶ various nuclear-related
agreements with each other—most¶ notably the quadripartite comprehensive safeguards¶ agreement (1991), which permits the inspection of all
their¶ nuclear installations by the International Atomic Energy¶ 2626gency—and have joined the Missile Technology Control¶ Regime. ¶ Even so, no
one can be certain about the future. As Scott¶ Tollefson has observed:¶ . . . the military application of Brazil’s
nuclear and space¶ programs depends less on technological considerations than¶ on political
will. While technological constraints present a¶ formidable barrier to achieving nuclear bombs
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and ballistic¶ missiles, that barrier is not insurmountable. The critical¶ element, therefore, in determining the
applications of Brazil’s¶ nuclear and space technologies will be primarily political.¶ 55¶ Put simply, if changes in political leadership
were¶ instrumental in redirecting Brazil’s nuclear program¶ towards peaceful purposes, future
political upheavals could¶ still produce a reversion to previous orientations. Civilian¶ supremacy is not so
strong that it could not be swept a way¶ by a coup, especially if the legitimacy of the current¶ democratic
experiment were to be undermined by economic¶ crisis and growing poverty/inequality. Nor are
civilian¶ leaders necessarily less militaristic or more committed to ¶ democracy than the military. The example of Peru’s¶ Fujimori comes immediately
to mind.¶ How serious a threat might Brazil potentially be? It has¶ been estimated that if the nuclear plant at Angra
dos Reis¶ (Angra I) were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it¶ could produce five 20-kiloton
weapons a year. If production¶ from other plants were included, Brazil would have a¶
capability three times greater than India or Pakistan.¶ Furthermore, its defense industry already has a substantial¶
missile producing capability. On the other hand, the¶ country has a very limited capacity to project its military¶
power via air and sealift or to sustain its forces over long¶ distances. And though a 1983 law authorizes
significant¶ military manpower increases (which could place Brazil at a¶ numerical level slightly higher than France, Iran and¶ Pakistan), such growth
will be restricted by a lack of ¶ economic resources. Indeed, the development of all these¶ military potentials has
been, and will continue to be,¶ 2727everely constrained by a lack of money. (Which is one¶ reason Brazil
decided to engage in arms control with¶ Argentina in the first place.)¶ 56¶ In short, a restoration of Brazilian militarism,
imbued¶ with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, is not¶ unthinkable, and such a
regime could present some fairly¶ serious problems. That government would probably need¶
foreign as well as domestic enemies to help justify its¶ existence. One obvious candidate
would be the United¶ States, which would presumably be critical of any return to¶ dictatorial
rule. Beyond this, moreover, the spectre of a¶ predatory international community, covetous of the riches¶ of the Amazon, could help rally political
support to the¶ regime. For years, some Brazilian military officers have¶ been warning of “foreign
intervention.” Indeed, as far back¶ as 1991 General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, then chief of ¶ the Military Command of the Amazon,
threatened to¶ transform the region into a “new Vietnam” if developed¶ countries tried to “internationalize” the Amazon.¶ Subsequently, in 1993,
U.S.-Guyanese combined military¶ exercises near the Brazilian border provoked an angry¶ response from many high-ranking Brazilian officers.¶ 5
Causes South American arms race
GSI 2k12 [Global Security Institute--http://gsinstitute.org/dpe/countries/argentina_brazil- May
22, 2012-SR] Brazil and Argentinas actions to reverse their nuclear programs are generally cited as a success story for
nonproliferation. However, some doubts remain. Both nations, particularly Brazil, remain nuclear
capable, and some analysts have questioned whether Brazil has entirely renounced its
weapons program. For the time being, however, most indications are that the two countries are sincere in
their efforts to prevent a nuclear arms race in South America. In fact, Brazil is part of the New Agenda group
pushing the Nuclear Weapons States to uphold their NPT commitments to nuclear disarmament.
That causes global nuclear war
Watson 2k10 [Connie, senior reporter for CBS--
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2009/10/02/f-rfa-watson.html -January 25th, 2010- SR] In Washington, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told reporters that the Obama administration is worried about thespectre of an arms race in South America. "We hope that we can see a change in behaviour and attitude on the part of the
Venezuelan government," she said.¶ But it is not just Venezuela who is bulking up. In addition to Brazil and Colombia, Chile,
Ecuador, Peru and even Bolivia are also buying new military gear.¶ After South America's
infamous dictatorships of the 1980s, most of the ensuing civilian governments actively
neglected their armed forces for political reasons.¶ Today, only Argentina continues that policy and many regional
analysts believe the investment in modern weaponry is long overdue.¶ Defence spending in the region is among the
lowest in the world, on average 2 per cent of a country's gross domestic product , notes Rosendo Fraga,
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a historian and political analyst who's an expert on Latin America's armed forces. Still, he cautions that the most important
countries in the region are buying weapons at a moment of tension and that this could be
risky.¶ "Nobody wants a war in South America. It's clear," says Fraga. "But the situation involving
Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador is very tense at this moment. And there's a historical conflict involving Peru,
Chile and Bolivia.
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Debt is Increasing
Debt is increasing
Sanders 7/14 [Sir Ronald—reporter for the Barbados Advocate-
http://www.barbadosadvocate.com/newsitem.asp?more=columnists&NewsID=31512 -SR]The Economist Intelligence Unit reports that “Venezuela is currently struggling with a lack of foreign
exchange, which has put significant pressure on the overvalued official exchange rate of BsF6.3 to
US$1”. Additionally, inflation is in the high 30s, (while the Latin American average is 7 per cent ), the national debt is rising,
and the fiscal deficit is growing; it is said to have tripled to 11 per cent of gross national
product. There is also growing concern within Venezuela about money being spent on, or
given-away to, foreign countries while sections of the Venezuelan population are facing
hardships – a justifiable concern and one that Maduro cannot ignore .¶ All this puts Maduro in a very
difficult position, worsened by the fact that a now rampant opposition is whipping up as much popular resentment of him as it can.
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Now is Key
Venezuelan economy is collapsing-current oil atmosphere proves-debt is key
Edghill 6/15 [http://www.caribjournal.com/2013/07/15/the-future-of-
petrocaribe/]At the end of June, leaders from around the Caribbean region met in Nicaragua for the 8th
PetroCaribe Summit.¶ Created with the largesse of Hugo Chavez, the cornerstone of PetroCaribe
has been the discounted prices on oil sales granted by Venezuela to the Caribbean member-
states along with favorable terms for repayment.¶ Surprising to some was the fact that the terms
of the PetroCaribe agreement were not addressed at this meeting, despite many rumors and
suggestions that changes will have to made following the death of Chavez and the economic
problems Venezuela finds itself facing.¶ Instead, the talks focused on economic integration and
steps to be taken to fight poverty and hunger throughout the region. ¶ The omission of any
details concerning the future of PetroCaribe should serve as a warning sign to those that have
benefited from it that changes will be coming in the future.¶ Caribbean nations who have come
to rely on this special agreement to support their economies need to begin preparing for thefinancial reality of a moderation of the PetroCaribe agreement.¶ The economic problems of
increasing debt and rising inflation that Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro faces in
Venezuela can most directly be affected by making adjustments to the largest component of the
Venezuelan economy.
Venezuelan debt is unstable-Petro Caribe proves
Sanders 7/14 [Sir Ronald—reporter for the Barbados Advocate-
http://www.barbadosadvocate.com/newsitem.asp?more=columnists&NewsID=3
1512 -SR]Professor Anthony Bryant, a senior fellow at the Institute of International Relations of the University of the West Indies, explains the
problem as follows: “The impact of Petro Caribe has been very dramatic. Since its inception, the financing
mechanism is estimated to have saved members more than US$1bn in financing energy costs. In essence, the programme
saved several regional economies from certain collapse . But while the programme has
provided short-term relief, it has also become an addiction for its beneficiaries . Venezuela is
today the largest creditor for Petro Caribe members”. And, he adds: “The programme has also
contributed to the unsustainable debt accumulation in some of the countries”.¶ Professor Bryant’s
analysis is not unique. The Economist Intelligence Unit and other commentators agree that the debt to Venezuela has
become “unsustainable” for many of the Caribbean countries.¶ In reality, the debt has also
become unsustainable for PDVSA, the Venezuelan oil company that has been the source of the
credit to the many Caribbean countries. It is now clear that several of the Caribbean countries have
not been repaying the debt and are not in a position to do so. In the circumstances, PDVSA and theVenezuelan government may be left with a huge debt. This would adversely affect the
capacity of PDVSA to raise money from international lenders. Last month, Poor's Ratings Services lowered
its long-term corporate credit and senior unsecured debt ratings on PDVSA to 'B' from 'B+'.
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Venezuelan Oil is KeyMaduro, a former bus driver, has vowed to preserve PDVSA intact as part of Chavez's populist
legacy of having funneled most of its earnings to social programs instead of reinvesting in the
company.¶ Capriles again attacked what he calls the oil elite in a campaign appearance April 7. ¶
"This is a country that has the most important oil reserves of the planet. As much misery asthere is in Venezuela, and the 'plugged-in' ones talking about how PDVSA is now part of the
people, PDVSA is theirs. The richest man in Venezuela is called Rafael Ramirez," he said during a
Caracas event, referring to the oil minister and president of PDVSA. ¶ Maduro responded in
another electoral event April 8 in Maturin, in the oil-producing state of Monages.¶ He insisted
that Ramirez is an honest man, and said that he will create a "secret force" to ferret out
corruption.¶ Ramirez, speaking at the same event, said that "now this man has an obsession with
me" and that Capriles is aiming to take control of PDVSA "to take it apart in pieces."¶ Capriles in
early April said instead that he would work to increase output at PDVSA. ¶ "You know that our oil
industry could be much better, you know that PDVSA could produce much more," he said at
another campaign event. "You know that we could use PDVSA to turn it into the engine of
development of Venezuela."
Petro Caribe is key to Latin America
Xinhua News 6/28 [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-
06/29/c_132496210.htm –2013—SR] MANAGUA, June 28 (Xinhua) -- The energy ministers of 18 Petrocaribe member countries
proposed during their meeting here Friday to create a "Special Economic Zone" (SEZ) for the oil
alliance.¶ The proposal for the SEZ will be presented by the ministers to the heads of State or
Government of Petrocaribe member countries at their eighth summit here on Saturday, where
the leaders will analyze the proposal, Nicaragua's government spokeswoman Rosario Murillo
said in her daily message through the official press.¶ Murillo said the ministers at Friday s
meeting sought the conditions to create the SEZ.¶ Petrocaribe is an oil alliance founded on June29, 2005, with its goal to sell Venezuela's oil at preferential prices to the member countries.¶ The
Petrocaribe member countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Dominica,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Saint
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname and Venezuela.
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A2: Brazil Can’t Get Nukes
Legal restrictions don’t matter
Ruhle 2k10 [Hans, analyst for Speigal Online International--
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nuclear-proliferation-in-latin-america-is-brazil-developing-the-bomb-a-693336.html -May 7th, 2010-SR]
How exactly could Brazil go about building nuclear weapons? The answer, unfortunately, is that it would
be relatively easy. A precondition for the legal construction of small reactors for submarine engines is that nuclear material
regulated by the IAEA is approved. But because Brazil designates its production facilities for nuclear
submarine construction as restricted military areas, the IAEA inspectors are no longer given
access. In other words, once the legally supplied enriched uranium has passed through the gate of
the plant where nuclear submarines are being built, it can be used for any purpose, including
the production of nuclear weapons. And because almost all nuclear submarines are operated with highly enriched
uranium, which also happens to be weapons grade uranium, Brazil can easily justify producing highly enriched nuclear fuel.
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Hegemony Advantage
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Uniqueness
China is rising now and Latin America is fueling it. US – LA relations are key to
hegemony
Wan 7/17(Wan is a China correspondent, based in Shanghai and Beijing. He previously servedas diplomatic correspondent focusing on U.S.-Asia policy. He was part of the Post’s 2010 Pulitzer
finalist team that covered the Fort Hood shootings and has won multiple awards his coverage of
religion. He has worked as a metro reporter for Los Angeles Times, a rewrite man for The
Baltimore Sun and a staff writer for The Washington Post since 2005..
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/global-attitudes-reflect-shifting-us-china-
power-balance-survey-concludes/2013/07/17/7f51a94c-eeed-11e2-bed3-
b9b6fe264871_story.html “Global attitudes reflect shifting U.S.-China power balance, survey
concludes”)
People around the globe believe that China will inevitably replace the United States as the
world’s leading superpower, but that doesn’t mean they like the prospect, according to a new
study on global attitudes. The survey that the Pew Research Center conducted in 39 countriesconfirms much of the conventional wisdom in Washington about the shifting balance of
power between the United States and China. Mutual tensions are rising, with Americans’
favorable opinions of China dropping from 51 percent two years ago to 37 percent now and a
similar drop among Chinese — from 58 percent to 40 percent — with respect to the United
States. China’s economic might is perceived as rising and the United States’ as declining, and
although many countries still see the United States as the top economic power, many believe
that it is only a matter of time before China supplants it. Despite the shifting attitudes,
however, the United States generally enjoys a better image abroad. On the question of which
country they view as a partner, more nations had a majority naming the United States rather
than China. The survey on global attitudes was the largest that Pew has conducted since 2007.
China was widely admired by respondents — especially in Africa and Latin America — for its
scientific and technological advances, according to the survey, but Chinese ideas and popularculture were less well-received. The positive views of China in Latin America and sub-Saharan
Africa reflect heavy Chinese investment in those regions in recent decades.
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Latin America is Key
Latin America is key piece for the symbolism of American power
Valencia 7/10(Robert Valencia, World Policy Institute, 10 July 2013, “US and China: The Fight
for Latin America” http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=166209)
During the first weekend of June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi
Jinping met in California to discuss cyber espionage and territorial claims in the Pacific Rim.
While tension on these topics has hogged the headlines, the fight for influence in another area
could be even more important—Latin America. Other emerging markets in Africa, where China
has an overwhelming influence due to foreign direct investment in mining and oil, also offer
economic opportunities, but Latin America has an abundance of natural resources, greater
purchasing power, and geographic proximity to the United States, which has long considered
Latin America as its “backyard.” The key question now is will Latin American countries lean
more toward China or the United States, or will it find a way to balance the two against each
other? Right now, Latin American countries are increasingly confident thanks to burgeoning
economic and political integration by way of trading blocs , and they're demanding to be
treated as an equal player. As a sign of its growing importance, China and the United States
have courted Latin America more than usual. In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico
and Costa Rica while Vice President Joe Biden visited Colombia, Brazil, and Trinidad and
Tobago. Shortly after these trips, President Xi went to Mexico and Costa Rica to foster
economic cooperation. China’s active involvement in Latin American geopolitics can be traced
back to 2009. Chinalco, China’s largest mining company, signed a $2.2 billion deal with Peru to
build the Toromocho mine and a $70 million wharf in the Callao port. Since then, Peru has sent
18.3 percent of its exports to China, making China Peru’s largest trading partner. China’s imports
to Peru, however, rank second with 13.7 percent of the market while the United States holds
first place with 24.5 percent. China has the upper hand with the Latin American leftist
countries in terms of infrastructure and technology. In 2009, Chinese telephone manufacturerZTE played an instrumental role in assembling the first mobile phone in Venezuela known as
“El Vergatario” (Venezuela slang for optimal). Former President Hugo Chávez introduced this
new phone to low-income families making it the world’s cheapest phone ($6.99 for a handset).
Additionally, China landed rail construction projects in Argentina and Venezuela and has
become a major buyer of farm products and metal in South America. Between 2011 and 2012,
China purchased nearly 58.02 million tons of soy from Argentina, up from 52 million in 2011 and
2010. China has also maintained an active market with Brazil. Chinese oil company Sinopec
and China Development Bank offered Brazilian oil company Petrobras a $10 billion loan in
2009 in return for hundreds of thousands of barrels per day. In 2011, three Chinese metal
companies purchased Brazilian mining company Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e
Mineracao. China’s boldest move in the region is the possible construction of a massive canalin Nicaragua. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega pushed the National Assembly to approve
the multi-billion dollar plan in June. The Nicaraguan canal would have a larger draft, length, and
depth than the Panama and Suez canals, and the enactment granted a Hong Kong-based
company permission to build and control the canal for nearly 100 years. The approval of this
plan, however, raised the ire of environmentalists and neighboring Colombia, which recently
lost 70,000 square kilometers of its Caribbean maritime territory to Nicaragua before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). Last May, Colombian diplomat Noemi Sanin claimed that
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China had influenced ICJ’s decision. According to Sanin, Chinese justice Xue Hanqin knew
beforehand about Nicaragua’s intention to grant the canal construction to China since Xue was a
colleague of Carlos Arguello, a role-player in the maritime case. There is no evidence for this, but
it shows Colombia’s anxiety of China’s growing clout in the region and how it can upset balances
of power.
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Neoliberalism Advantage
U.S. should cancel debt that disproportionately punishes the citizens for the
faults of regimes taking out loans to serve western interestsJubilee 12’ (Jubilee U.S.A. Network, an alliance working for the definitive cancellation of
crushing debt to fight poverty and injustice in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. March 2012, The
Responsible Lending and Borrowing Imperative: Addressing the Root Causes of Poverty)MN
The U.S. Secretary to the Treasury should investigate the U.S. and IFIs debt portfolios in order
to determine if portions of a given LIC’s loan portfolio should be declared illegitimate and
odious. Odious or illegitimate debt stemming from situations in which corrupt regimes
received loans from IFIs, bilateral lenders, and multilateral lenders in order to support the
West’s geopolitical objectives rather than satisfying the financial, social or economic needs of
the citizens should be forgiven as they violate international law. Since representatives of
borrowing governments will not be personally held responsible for paying back loans, they oftenengage in reckless borrowing. Similarly, creditors take advantage of systemic vulnerability and
make inappropriate loan commitments. Rather than unfairly burdening developing nations
with debt that should never have existed in the first place, odious or illegitimate debt should,
lawfully and morally, be nullified. Cancelling illegal debt would alleviate economic pressure on
developing nations, allowing them to better fund social service programs and infrastructure
projects as well as service legitimate debt to responsible lenders.373737373737
Cancellation of Venezuela’s debt is a key step to breaking down the global
neoliberal system
Jagger 02’ (Allison M. Jagger, Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at the
University of Colorado at Boulder, A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt, Hypatia17.4 Fall 2002.) MN
The damage that neoliberal globalization has done to human lives and to the non-human
environment raises profound questions about the rationality of this system. The inequalities in
way that this damage has been distributed raise further questions about the system’s justice.
Although these questions are among the most urgent currently faced by feminist philosophers, I
do not address them directly here. Instead, I undertake the more modest project of challenging
the debt that many poor nations in the global South supposedly owe to international lending
institutions and to a few rich nations in the global North. This debt is one of the chief
mechanisms maintaining global neoliberalism, because it binds together Southern debtors
and Northern creditors in a system disproportionately advantageous to the global North . I
shall argue that many of the South’s supposed debt obligations are not morally binding.
Restricting my focus to this question allows me to stay within a broadly liberal framework,
accepting assumptions that a deeper investigation would bring into question. Relying only on
intuitively plausible liberal assumptions, I shall briefly question, first, the democratic
legitimacy of much Southern debt, and second, the fairness of the accounting system used to
calculate it.
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The cancellation debt is critical to end the anti-democratic demands placed by
developed counties. Debts owed were coerced upon an un-informed public,
and the funds were used anti-democratically by the social elite.
Jagger 02’ (Allison M. Jagger, Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at the
University of Colorado at Boulder, A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt,Hypatia 17.4 Fall 2002.)MN
Liberal democratic theory holds that all citizens are collectively responsible for decisions made bytheir democratically elected governments. Even citizens who disagree with particular government policies are said to have consented to
them indirectly if not dir ectly because they agreed to the rules of the electoral game.17 Most (non-Hobbesian) liberal political philosophers hold that consent is bindingonly if it is informed, rational, and uncoerced. However, since in practice people’s rationality is always imperfect, their information incomplete, and their available
options restricted, the validity of any apparent consent is always a matter of judgment. I shall argue that, when many Southern countriesundertook their supposed debts, their citizenry was largely uninformed and/or their options werevirtually nonexistent. a) Consent to the Debt as Coerced: Many Southern Countries Were Forced toBorrow Because Their Resources Were Stolen. One reason why citizens in the global South cannot besaid to have undertaken their supposed debts voluntarily is that neoliberalism was not introducedinto a global state of nature, comprised of nation states that were politically sovereign andeconomically independent. Instead, it was introduced into a world previously made unequal by
colonialism—which also often exacerbated inequalities among and between men and women.Despite the lip service paid by the European Enlightenment to the ideals of universal freedom andequality, European expansion was characterized by violence, slavery, and genocide.18 Thesedestroyed many non-European societies and drastically weakened many others, forcibly convertingthem into sources of cheap raw materials, food, and labor, as well as markets for the manufacturedproducts of the colonizing countries. The import of manufactured goods from Europe and the United States undermined production by local
artisans and suppressed local manufacturing potential. Thus, colonization made formerly self-suffi cient communities economically dependent, while it created localelites whose interests were linked to maintaining an open economy. At the same time, much of the population was severely impoverished and the seeds were planted of
land misuse and environmental degradation.19 In short , colonialism drained massive resources and wealth away from thecolonies and destroyed their economic self-sufficiency. Even after they had achieved politicalindependence, the erstwhile colonies were left dependent on the metropolis for manufactured goodsand also for training indigenous professional and skilled workers. Seeking to end their economicallydisadvantageous position as suppliers of raw materials, many Southern countries wished to developtheir own industries, but so much wealth had been siphoned off from their nations during the
colonial period that they lacked suffi cient capital to invest in new plants or infrastructure. They weretherefore virtually forced to borrow abroad. These countries can hardly be said to have undertakentheir debts voluntarily, because they had been impoverished by previous centuries of Westerncolonialism. Even if they consented formally to accept the loans, their request was made incircumstances of economic duress. To add insult to injury, not only are many formerly colonizedcountries compelled to pay interest in order to borrow back wealth that was stolen from them, butthey must also pay it to (the descendants of) the robbers. b) Consent to Southern Debt as Uninformedor Nonexistent. The people who bear the overwhelming burden of paying the Southern debt are thepoorest citizens of the poorest countries in the world—especially Southern women. These citizensare held economically responsible for debts undertaken by their governments, often before theywere born. Every baby born in the developing world today owes about $482 at birth ( Jubilee 2000UK). In most heavily indebted countries, however, electorates were uninformed about the meaningor even existence of foreign loans.20 Debts were often assumed by local elites who spent the money
on unproductive prestige projects or siphoned it into personal foreign bank accounts. Many debtorcountries were run by autocratic rulers supported by wealthy First World countries as a bulwarkagainst popular insurgencies regarded as “communist,” and they often used borrowed funds on themilitary repression of their own populations.21 Thus, much of the money lent to Third World rulersin the 1970s and 1980s by wealthy First World states not only did not support economicdevelopment but in fact undermined it by subverting democracy. Given this history, it is plausible toargue that poor people in the global South have no responsibility to pay back money that they did notask to borrow, from which they enjoyed no benefi ts, and through which they were even repressed. Itis especially unreasonable to expect Southern women to be responsible for the debts, because even if
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they had the formal equality of the vote, they had even less input than men into taking on the loansand benefi ted even less from them. Southern women as a group receive even less food, health careand education than Southern men; for instance, 64 per cent of the world’s the 840 million illiterate
people are women (United Nations Development Programme 2001).
SAP’S force governments to cut back on programs to help its citizens and force
it to conform to western standards of economic prosperities- furthering the
poverty inside the indebted countries
Jubilee No date (Jubilee U.S.A. Network, , an alliance working for the definitive cancellation
of crushing debt to fight poverty and injustice in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. How it All
Began: Causes of the debt crisis.) MN
But their loans add to the debt burden and come with conditions. Governments have toagree to impose very strict economic programs on their countries in order to reschedule their debts
or borrow more money. These programs are known as Structural Adjustment Programs
(SAPs). SAPs have particularly affected the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, whose economies are
already the poorest in the world.SAPping the Poor SAPs consist of measures designed to
help a country repay its debts by earning more hard currency - increasing exports and
decreasing imports. In a few countries SAPs appear to have had some good effect; in
most they have worsened the economic situation. In all countries applying SAPs, the
poor have been hit the hardest. In order to obtain more foreign currency,
governments implementing SAPs usually have to: spend less on health, education and
social services - people pay for them or go without Devalue the national currency, loweringexport earnings and increasing import costs Cut back on food subsidies - so prices of essentials can
soar in a matter of days Cut jobs and wages for workers in government industries and
services Encourage privatization of public industries, including sale to foreign
investors Take over small subsistence farms for large-scale export crop farming instead of staplefoods. So farmers are left with no land to grow their own food and few are employed on the largefarms.
Previous SAP’s in Venezuela are the cause of the governmental problems that
have played out throughout venezuela’s history
Adouharb Cingranelli 06’ (M. RODWAN ABOUHARB, DAVID L. CINGRANELLI, International
Relations department of the University College London, Professor of Political Science at
Binghamton University, 2006, International Studies Quarterly (2006) 50 p.233-262)
The case of Venezuela provides an illustration of the role of structural adjustment in
producing increased domestic conflict , a weakened democratic system and repression. As Di
John (2005:114) writes: A few weeks after the announcement of [structural adjustment]
reforms, Venezuela experienced the bloodiest urban riots since the urban guerrilla
warfare of the 1960s. The riots, known as the ‘‘Caracazo,’’ occurred in late February 1989. Adoubling of gasoline prices, which were passed on by private bus companies, induced the outburst. . .
. The riots that ensued were contained by a relatively undisciplined military response that left more
than 350 dead in two days. Although Venezuela’s democratic system has been
maintained, over the period of this study, dissatisfaction with economic policies has
played a part in three attempted coups, multiple general strikes, two presidential
assassination attempts, and has led to several states of emergency being imposed.
Even today, debate over structural adjustment policies in Venezuela remains heated. President Hugo
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Chavez sustains his popularity largely based on his opposition to the kind of
unregulated economic liberalization advocated by the IMF and the Bank (Banks, Muller,
and Overstreet 2003) The findings presented here have important policy implications. There is
mounting evidence that national economies grow fastest when basic human rights
are respected (Sen 1999; Kaufmann 2004; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005). SAAs place too
much emphasis on instituting a freer market and too little emphasis on allowing the other humanfreedoms necessary for rapid economic growth to take root and grow. By undermining the human
rights conditions necessary for economic development, the Bank is damaging its own mission404040
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Solvency
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US Key
The dollar is key
Salmeron 6/8 [http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/130708/venezuelan-govt-likely-get-
into-debt-to-supply-sicad-with-us-dollars—Victor-senior reporter for El Universal-SR]Taking on further debts is likely to be one of Venezuela's mechanisms to feed the Ancillary Foreign
Currency Administration System (Sicad) with US dollars.¶ The State, its decentralized bodies, or any other institution
will be able to issue bonds in US dollars. Such bonds will be paid by companies or individuals
in bolivars and then be sold abroad to obtain foreign currencies.¶ In addition to indebtedness, Sicad is
expected to be fed with US dollars provided by the National Development Fund, which receives petrodollars; the Central Bank
of Venezuela (BVV); and private companies interested in doing the same.¶ The lack of US
dollars in the country has led to basic staple shortage. It all seems that unlike its predecessor –the Transaction
System for Foreign Currency Denominated Securities (Sitme) –, Sicad will turn, in the middle run, into another system constantly
bringing foreign debt up.¶ In the meantime, Venezuela's gold reserves, which comprise 70% of the country's international reserves,
fell in the first quarter 25% or some USD 5.29 billion based on the value of gold up to July 5th.
Current economic trends make the US uniquely keyRWD 6/10 [http://www.riskwatchdog.com/2013/07/10/venezuela-rising-risks-of-a-bolivar-
devaluation-in-2014/]
-Cites Global researchIndeed, given Venezuela’s weak export outlook, as its oil sector (which accounts for 95% of total outbound shipments) continues to
slip, the government relies heavily on the issuance of dollar-denominated debt to inject foreign currency into the economy.
However, because of ongoing capital outflows from emerging markets, a trend that our Global Research team
expects to continue as the US recovery gains momentum, Venezuela’s cost of issuing debt
will increase further . Therefore, while we currently forecast that the next devaluation of the
bolívar will not occur until 2015, we now acknowledge that it could happen as early as 2014 , as
the Maduro administration seeks to increase the amount of local currency it receives from each dollar-denominated oil export sale
to continue financing its politically crucial social agenda.
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Venezuela Will Say Yes
Venezuela will say yes: want better relations
Democracy Digest 13 *no author; Venezuela: in Maduro’s pyrrhic poll victory, ̀ official winner’ is ‘biggest loser’?; 7-2-
13—4-15-13--- SR]
Maduro ”will be tested quickly,” according to the WSJ’s Kejal Vyas and Ezequiel Minaya: ¶ He inherits a country
with the world’s largest oil reserves but with growing financial strains despite almost a decade
of high oil prices. Inflation is expected to reach more than 30% this year. The government’s
budget deficit ended last year at roughly 15% of annual economic output—far higher than
crisis-hit European nations. And a lack of dollars has led to shortages of everything from milk
to corn flour, the staple of the Venezuelan diet. Making matters worse, rates of violent crime are among the
worst in the world, power outages regularly plunge parts of the country into darkness, the state oil industry is suffering
from a lack of investment and corruption is widely seen as worsening.¶ “I don’t know why anyone would want the
job because the challenges are so many; all the problems are tightly bound around the mismanagement that took course over the 14
years of Chávez,” said Christopher Sabatini, senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas. “There’s
going to be contraction in the economy, and Venezuelans are going to wake up and realize that the party is over.Ӧ Should his appeal
prove successful, Capriles’ “task is not much easier,” says The Economist:¶ Although he has consolidated his status as the undisputed
leader of the Venezuelan opposition, he will now be under pressure to prove his claim that he was cheated of victory. With noindependent institutions to turn to, his battle will be a political rather than a legal one.¶ “Meanwhile, there were also
signs that the strident, Chávez-style anti-American message that Maduro used during the
campaign would now be set aside to improve Venezuela’s strained relations with the United
States,” The New York Times reports:¶ Chávez…. built his political career on flaying the United States and its traditional allies in
the Venezuelan establishment, and Mr. Maduro followed his mentor’s script throughout the campaign with an acolyte’s zeal.¶ He
accused former American diplomats of plotting to kill him, suggested that the United States had caused Mr. Chávez’s illness, and had
his foreign minister shut the door on informal talks with the United States that began late last year. …But over the weekend, with his
election victory looking likely, Mr. Maduro sent a private signal to Washington that he was ready to
turn the page. Bill Richardson, the former governor of New Mexico, who was in Caracas as a representative of the Organization
of American States, said in an interview that Mr. Maduro called him aside after a meeting of election observers on Saturday and
asked him to carry a message.¶ “He said, ‘We want to improve the relationship with the U.S., regularize
the relationship,’ ” Mr. Richardson said.¶ Maduro not only lacks Chávez’s charisma, but also the Teflon factor that allowed himto evade responsibility for the country’s glaring problems, says another analyst.¶ “As one of those bumbling and corrupt
nomenklaturi under Chávez, will not enjoy a similar impunity,” writes Jon Perdue, the director of Latin America programs at the Fund
for American Studies:¶ Nor is he likely to enjoy an unprecedented windfall of inflated oil proceeds to fulfill the similarly inflated
expectations of Chávez supporters for subsidies and giveaways in exchange for their votes and deflected blame…………….¶ As the
fragile ground of Chavismo without Chávez begins to crumble under the feet of Maduro’s unsure steps, those once willing to
tolerate the rabid clownery and the imperialist scapegoating of Hugo Chávez may begin to seek more solid ground. The rule of the
diplomatically uncouth, though it makes for a good sideshow for the politically unserious, may finally be nearing its expiration date.¶
“With Chávez gone, Venezuela is on the cusp of a new era,” says The Economist:¶ But it remains bitterly
divided, into two almost equal and apparently irreconcilable political camps. The government has no mandate for imposing the
radical socialism to which it is wedded. But nor can it retreat without triggering a bitter squabble over Chávez’s legacy. Mr Maduro’s
difficult election marks the beginning of an even trickier presidency.
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US Controls the IMF
US controls the IMF
Herald 2k10 [The Herald News--
http://raceandhistory.com/selfnews/viewnews.cgi?newsid1292867839,44248,.shtml --December 20—SR] THE West's claim that its sanctions are targeted at the Zanu-PF leadership in Zimbabwe have been exposed for the sham they are by
a WikiLeaks cable released yesterday that shows that the US government directed the IMF not to restore Zimbabwe's voting rights
and lines of credit.¶ The IMF has over the years masqueraded as a multilateral institution that
operates independently of the whims and caprices of its host, the US government.¶ One of the
cables, dated September 2005, from New Zealand, titled "New Zealand: Response to demarche on Zimbabwe Vote
in IMF," and directed to the New Zealand Agency for International Development, which
handles issues related to the IMF, shows that the US controls the IMF and played a lead role in
blocking the IMF from reinstating Zimbabwe's voting and borrowing rights.¶ "On September 2 (2005),
a representative of New Zealand's Treasury noted Zimbabwe's decision to pay back US$120 million of the US $290 million it owes
the Fund. The representative asked whether the US government would now consider Zimbabwe
to be in compliance with its IMF obligations, or whether the United States still believesZimbabwe should be expelled from the Fund.¶ "Post seeks Department guidance on how it should respond to
these questions. Post also notes that the Treasury representative is due to deliver a recommendation on the issue to New Zealand's
Finance Minister on September 5 (2005) and that a response by COB September 2 (Washington) would be very helpful," reads the
cable signed by one Burnett¶ Analysts say the cable is disturbing given that Finance Minister Tendai Biti has received many
"technical experts" from the IMF and only recently wanted Zimbabwe declared a "Highly Indebted Poor Country" at the behest of
the IMF, a development that would have seen the IMF, and consequently the US by proxy, take over and direct not only the
country's economic affairs but also the exploitation of its natural resources.
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A2 Irresponsible
Attempts to reform countries in the past to pay off debt has led to the
worsening of their conditions- the negs authors are biased from the perspective
of the global NorthJagger 02’ (Allison M. Jagger, Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at the University
of Colorado at Boulder, A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt, Hypatia 17.4 Fall
2002.) MN
Any local economy that is integrated into the global economy is exposed to the vicissitudes of world trade; for example, SAPs ’
promotion of cash crop agriculture has made many countries in the global South vulnerable to drops in world prices or their crops.
At the same time, the shift to cash crop agriculture has encouraged these countries to become
permanently dependent on Northern machines and fertilizers.2 Thus, SAPs have ensured a “captive” supply
of cheap labor, cheap raw materials and agricultural products for Northern industries, and have simultaneously created
guaranteed markets for Northern manufactured products, technologies, and consumer goods.
In a world where the terms of trade for raw materials and agricultural products have tended
historically to worsen (with a few conspicuous, nonrenewable exceptions, such as oil), theSouth’s need for Northern products and capital has inevitably made the North richer and the
South poorer. Although SAPs are advertised as promoting economic development in the global South, they have harmed rather
than helped development in many debtor nations. World Bank theory predicted that imposing these loan
conditions would stimulate a virtuous economic circle of growth, rising employment, and
rising investment. In fact, however, the growth rates of most debtor countries have been
significantly reduced, living standards in many have declined, and some have become trapped
in a vicious cycle of stagnation and decline caused by the interaction of low investment,
increased unemployment, reduced social spending, reduced consumption, and low output. It is signifi cant that some of the
countries that are worst off are the most integrated into the global economy; for instance, exports account for close to 30 percent of
the gross domestic product of impoverished sub-Saharan Africa, compared to less than 20 percent for industrialized nations. Many
Southern countries are now in a state of economic collapse and their debt burdens have multiplied. By 1997, the total debt stock
owed by the developing world to the developed world was $217 TRILLION, up from $1.4 trillion in 1990. Although SAPshave been largely counterproductive from the point of view of the global South, they have
been highly successful from the point of view of the global North, because they have ensured
that an increasing proportion of the debtor countries’ resources have gone to paying off
foreign debts. Even by the mid-1980s, what was then called the Third World was paying out annually about three times as
much in debt repayments as it received in aid from all developed-country governments and international aid agencies combined,
and this continued in the 1990s. Ten years later, the developing countries are paying the rich nations $717 million a day in debt
service; $12 billion annually flows north out of Africa alone.3 Over a decade ago, a former executive director of World Bank stated:
“Not since the conquistadores plundered Latin America has the world experienced a flow in
the direction we see today” (Miller 1991, 62). The world has never experienced anything like
the current flow. Southern debt functions not only as a drain through which the resources of
impoverished countries are siphoned abroad, but also as a shackle, because it keeps highly
indebted countries trapped in a global trading system that they cannot abandon if they are to
earn the foreign exchange necessary to service their debts. The present global trading system is regulated by
neoliberal principles that have been especially harmful to poor women in both the global North and the global South.
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Current systems of conditions only perpetuate the problem- because
bureaucrats are divorced from the grass root issues their policies only work to
recreate systems of dependence- Previous attempts in Africa prove
Ochonu 2005 (Moses Ochonu, Ph. D. Assistant Professor Department of History at
Vanderbilt University, http://acas.prairienet.org/bulletin/bull71-05-ochonu.html)MN
It sounds good to call for a complete reforming of African states and institutions as a prelude to increased aid and debt cancellation.
Without discounting the need for transparency, is this complete cleansing feasible or possible—not only in Africa but anywhere in
the world? Is this insistence on cleansing as a condition for aid in the interest of the suffering (and
innocent) mass of Africans, some of whom depend solely on foreign aid handouts for survival?
Is this not tantamount to withholding food and medicine from a child until its parents “clean
up their acts” and start being financially responsible? It is a good thing that the critics of increased aid and
debt relief offer some alternatives. The most bandied-around of such alternatives is what the New York Times calls smart aid.
Smart aid, it is argued, would bypass the predatory African state and deliver help directly to the Africans in the traditional and
informal sectors through civil society organizations. This is a sensible alternative, one which does not punish innocent Africans for
the sins of their leaders and does not insist on elusive governmental cleansing as a condition for helping Africa’s needy populations.
But this alternative makes a naïve and crucial assumption: it fetishizes civil society and ignores theorganic connections and appendages which unite the governmental sector and the so-called
informal sector. The idea that civil society organizations and the informal sector are corruption-free and could thus serve
as an accountable, efficient, and effective channel for aid distribution and implementation reveals a mindset that is
hopelessly out of touch with realities on the ground. It is a fiction of self-congratulatory
Western development experts symbiotically linked to careerist Western NGO personnel,
whose organizations mentor local NGO’s and need to justify their relevance in order to have
access to a steady flow of funds. The redundant bureaucracies, inefficiencies, and wastage that have
resulted from this bureaucratic detachment from African grassroots problems and from the
veneration of civil society for its own sake, are now part of the problem of the failure of aid to
improve situations in Africa. Moreover, since the African state is quite ubiquitous in terms of power, the smart aid
proposal may not work as state officials will resist and/or undermine this usurpation of what theyconsider their jurisdictional prerogative. It is illusory to expect that state bureaucrats will not
invade or interfere with the implementation of such a smart aid package.
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A2 Off-Case
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China CP
China doesn’t solve http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-chavez-us-venezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-
4790Given its precarious economic situation, Venezuela will need outside assistance in the near
future. And while some would say that China is best suited to step up and bail out Caracas, there
are a few reasons to question whether this will actually come to pass. First of all, The Chinese
Development Bank has already provided a huge amount of money to the Chavez government,
about $40 billion between 2008 and 2012 alone. Thus, if Venezuela were to be faced with a
default, it would be Chinese investors with their money on the line. Any debt renegotiations
would surely include provisions that didn’t sit well with the Venezuelan public. After all, there
have already been agreements reached between Venezuela and the Chinese state-owned
company Citic Group that have raised populist alarm bells regarding the signing of mineral rights
over to foreign companies.
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Venezuela Debt Relief Updates
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Oil Advantage
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Uniqueness
PVDSA is unsustainable—Venezuela cant keep up
Ross 7/21 [Clifton, senior reporter for CounterPunch--
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/07/19/building-a-critical-left-solidarity-movement/ -7/21/13—SR]
Feliciano Guzmán, of the Worker’s Federation of Bolivar State (Fetrabolivar), says that “Under previous governments
these productive businesses took five percent from their profits and paid into the CVG, to pay
for the electricity, the roads, the sporting areas. And now nothing comes to CVG because the companies aren’t
producing anything. Everything relies on subsidies from PDVSA, the state oil company.Ӧ But PDVSA
isn’t much more sustainable since its production is also dropping 3-4% per year and nearly a
third of its earnings are spent buying gas, according to the May 6, 2013 issue of El Comercio. Yes, in one of the great
ironies of “endogenous development” Venezuela is even forced to import millions of barrels of refined
gas to keep up with internal consumption. Currently, Venezuela imports about one quarter of the
gas it uses internally and it is estimated the price of gas in Venezuela (which now costs a few pennies per
gallon) would have to be increased 900% just to cover the costs of production.
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Debt Relief Solves
Lower debt allows Venezuela to stabilize oil prices
Weisbrot & Johnston 2k12 [Mark and Jake—senior analysts @ Center for Economic and
Policy Research-- http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/venezuela-2012-09.pdf -September 2012-- SR]
Venezuela’s economy went into recession in the first quarter of 2009, which lasted for five quarters, ¶
until the second quarter of 2010. International oil prices had dropped precipitously in the fourth ¶
quarter of 2008, falling by 50 percent (from $118 to $58 a barrel). Although at first glance the ¶ recession appears as
though it was part of an inevitable “oil boom and bust,” this was not the case. ¶ Although most of
the countries in the Western Hemisphere experienced recessions during the 2008-¶ 2009 world economic
crisis and recession, many did not, and it was possible to mitigate the ¶ recession or even avoid it
altogether with counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy. Venezuela was in ¶ a position to do so, since it had a
low public debt (and most importantly, low foreign public debt) ¶ when oil prices began to fall, and could
have borrowed and spent as much as necessary in order to ¶ keep the economy growing.
Accumulated debt is devastating the PVDSA—causing oil companies to pull out
Tovar 2k13 [Ernesto J, senior reporter for El Universal--
http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/130322/venezuelan-oil-firm-pdvsas-debt-to-suppliers-
jumps-41-in-a-year -March 22, 2013-- SR]
Since the Venezuelan Executive Office has forced state-run oil company Pdvsa to fund a large
number of government programs and projects while providing 95% of petrodollars to the Treasury, the
petroleum firm faces significant liabilities because of poor fiscal policies. ¶ According to the annual
report for fiscal year 2012 presented by the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining, Pdvsa's accounts payable to suppliers
soared 41% last year.¶ The oil company's consolidated financial statements show that
obligations with suppliers amounted to USD 14.66 billion, USD 4.23 billion above the amountrecorded a year earlier (USD 10.41 billion).¶ Similarly, accounts receivable swelled 24% in the same period, climbing from
USD 31.57 billion in 2011 to USD 38.99 billion in 2012. Receivables related to oil operations with Cuba and
Petrocaribe member states are included. These operations exceed 200,000 oil barrels per
day.¶ The financial report indicates that Pdvsa's assets in cash or cash equivalents fell by 51% in 2012 ,
slipping from USD 8.61 billion in 2011 to USD 4.18 billion in 2012. This shows the various difficulties the
Venezuelan oil company is facing to meet expenses and reduce accumulated debts to
suppliers, which have been on for some years now.¶ Pdvsa's oil revenues in 2012 stood at USD 121.02
billion, down 3% (USD 3.72 billion) with respect to a year earlier. Meanwhile, overall earnings rebounded 2.81% and hit USD
4.71 billion.¶ Pdvsa's liabilities include debts to drilling services providers, which are involved in
exploration and production activities. Such liabilities may translate into a drop in oil output.
Early this week, US oil company Schlumberger, the world's largest oil service supplier, announced areduction in its operations in Venezuela due to Pdvsa's accumulated debts.
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Foreign Debt is Key
Your defense doesn’t apply—domestic debt is distinct from foreign debt
Weisbrot & Johnston 2k12 [Mark and Jake—senior analysts @ Center for Economic and
Policy Research-- http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/venezuela-2012-09.pdf -September 2012-- SR]Venezuela still has a relatively low debt burden. The most common measure of debt is the ratio of ¶ debt to GDP.3 By this measure,
the IMF reports Venezuela’s public debt for 2011 as 45.5 percent ¶ of GDP.4 Central government debt is just
25.1 percent of GDP; the IMF number includes other ¶ public entities, most importantly PDVSA, the
national oil company. This is still a relatively low level ¶ of public debt – the European Union, for example, has a debt of about 82.5
percent of GDP. ¶ But for most purposes the interest burden of the debt is a more important
measure, since countries ¶ that pay lower interest rates can obviously afford a bigger debt
stock.5¶ It is also important to ¶ distinguish between external and internal debt. Debt owed in domestic currency
can always be paid; ¶ but the same is not true for foreign debt.¶ Also, Venezuela’s exports are
about 95 percent oil, and the oil sector is publicly owned. So the ¶ Venezuelan government receives this
income in dollars. Given this situation, it is best to look at the ¶ external and domestic debt separately,
and measure the burden of each debt by the appropriate ¶ yardstick.
PVDSA’s debt is external and foreign
Weisbrot & Johnston 2k12 [Mark and Jake—senior analysts @ Center for Economic and
Policy Research-- http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/venezuela-2012-09.pdf -
September 2012-- SR]
For 2011, interest payments on the central government external debt are 3.4 percent of export ¶
earnings; they are projected to rise to 4.1 percent by 2012 , decreasing thereafter. This is not a large ¶
percentage of public sector export earnings going to debt service, so there is no obvious problem ¶ regarding debt sustainability for
the external debt. If the government decides to increase its ¶ spending, and borrows to do so, it will borrow mostly domestically, and
so should not need to add much to the foreign public debt. Also, these projections are based on the assumption
that revenues ¶ are the same as in 2011, so they are conservative; most likely revenues willincrease and the interest ¶ burden will be lower. ¶ The state oil company also borrows on its
own, and its debt is almost all external ; its interest ¶ payments in 2011 were 1.5 percent of export earnings, and are
projected to peak at 3.1 percent in ¶ 2012.
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PVDSA K2 Venezuelan Stability
Empirics prove PVDSA k2 Venezuelan stability
Weisbrot & Johnston 2k12 [Mark and Jake—senior analysts @ Center for Economic and
Policy Research-- http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/venezuela-2012-09.pdf -September 2012-- SR]For most of the past 13 years, much of the discussion of Venezuela’s economy has either assumed ¶ or concluded that it was headed
for some type of collapse. During the first four years of the Chavez ¶ administration, when the
government did not control the national oil company (PDVSA), there was ¶ indeed a great deal of
economic instability. This culminated in the military coup of April 2002, and ¶ then an economically
crippling oil strike (December 2002-February 2003). The oil strike caused an ¶ extremely severe
recession, with a loss of 29 percent of GDP. However, even after the strike was ¶ over, analysts predicted a
dire future and a slow, difficult recovery. IMF forecasts repeatedly ¶ underestimated GDP growth by a gigantic 10.6,
6.8, and 5.8 percentage points for the years 2004-¶ 2006.¶ 6¶ Instead, the recovery was very rapid and the economy grew at a
record pace over the next ¶ five years, with real GDP nearly doubling from the end of the oil strike (first quarter 2003) through ¶ the
fourth quarter of 2008.
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K2 Solve OPEC
Venezuelan debt is dragging OPEC down
Parranga 2k12 [Marianna, senior reporter @ Reuters--
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/03/02/venezuela-oil-pdvsa-idUKL2E8E19OZ20120302 -March 2, 2012-- SR]
CARACAS, March 2 (Reuters) - The increasingly heavy debts of Venezuela's state oil company PDVSA are
hindering the OPEC nation's efforts to meet ambitious goals to boost its crude production this year.¶ President Hugo
Chavez's government aims to increase output to 3.5 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2012, from 3 million bpd last year. It would be
the biggest annual rise during the socialist leader's 13 years in power.¶ Much of the new production is slated to
come from the vast Orinoco belt. But several executives at companies working with PDVSA
said delays by PDVSA in paying its partners were creating severe bottle-necks.
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US Key
US is the critical actor—direct investments are key
Negroponte 2k13 [Diana Villiers, senior analyst @ Brookings Institute--
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/03/05-chavez-venezuela-negroponte --3/5/2013-- SR] The death of Hugo Chavez presents an opportunity for the new Venezuelan leadership to tone
down the rhetoric of anti-Americanism and put our bilateral relations on a pragmatic basis .¶
The U.S. remains the principal purchaser of Venezuelan oil which is refined in Gulf Coast refineries for later
export to China and other markets. Food and pharmaceutical products, cosmetics, spare parts and
electrical equipment are bought from the U.S. although payment for these goods is delayed and consumers must
wait 4 to 5 months for the new inventory to arrive at Venezuelan ports.¶ Venezuela is in the midst of an economic
crisis with shortages of U.S. dollars, a devaluation of 32 percent and the prospect of searing
inflation. Furthermore, Venezuela needs foreign direct investment, technical expertise and spare parts from
the U.S. ¶ Rather than demonizing Washington, an opportunity exists for Caracas to reframe the
relationship to a realistic mode.
US is key—largest and most sophisticated
Metzker 2k13 [Jared, senior reporter for IPS News--
http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/analysts-say-oil-could-help-mend-u-s-venezuela-relations/ --
6/17/13] “The oil sector is in deep trouble in Venezuela – production is down and the economic
situation is deteriorating,” explained Shifter. “They know they need foreign investment to
increase production, and this is in part what has motivated Maduro to reach out.Ӧ If
its economy continues to falter, Venezuela may be further tempted to embrace the
United States, which has the largest, most sophisticated fossil fuel industry in the
world . Kerry’s recent words suggest that the administration of President Barack Obama would be waiting with open arms.¶
“ Venezuela cannot confront its economic crisis and the United States at the same time ,” Diana
Villiers Negroponte, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, a Washington think tank, told IPS, “and we are a pragmatic country
which will deal with Maduro if it is in our interests.”¶ Indeed, Negroponte said she was “optimistic” about the possibility of
rapprochement between the two countries within the next six months. She notes a “troika” of issues on which the United States is
looking for Venezuelan cooperation: counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and assistance in ridding Colombia of its FARC rebels.¶
Nonetheless, major actions remain to be taken if normalisation is to even begin, such as the exchange of ambassadors and official
U.S. recognition of the Maduro government. Shifter (who regards the Kerry-Jaua meeting as “a small step”) was not optimistic that
these larger requirements will be completed in the short term.¶ “I don’t think Washington is going to push hard to send an
ambassador to Caracas,” he said. “It will probably take more time to observe the new government and see where it is going.”
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Solvency
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A2 Bad Business Model/Won’t Cooperate
Maduro will cooperate change the business model—oil is a critical issue
Neuman & Thompson ‘13 ["A Leader Cries, 'I Am Chavez', as U.S. Seeks Policy Clues",
March 6, William and Ginger, www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/world/americas/a-leaders-cry-in-venezuela-i-am-chavez.html?pagewanted=all --3/7/13—SR]
Among oil executives and analysts, there was cautious optimism that Mr. Chávez’s death could soften
the hostility his government had toward foreign investment in exploration and refining. “It
makes sense that Maduro will be more pragmatic to get the country going,” said Jorge R. Piñon,
former president of Amoco Oil Latin America. He said he had talked with several oil executives and come away
surprised by their optimism.¶ “Industry executives believe that there is a high probability that a
Maduro administration will be a bit more realistic on what is needed to increase the country’s oil
production,” Mr. Piñon added, “and change the investment model to attract more foreign
investment.”
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A2 Counter Plans
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A2 IMF Counter-Plan
Perm do both-shields the net benefit
Poverty DA- IMF policies result in impoverished and disenfranchisement of
many citizens
Pine 2k10 [Adrienne, Professor of Anthropology at American University and a Senior Research
Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs-Summer 2k10] In both countries, families of Arab descent are particularly heavily invested in the maquiladora
industry, which has benefited more from IMF and World Bank liberalization policies tied to
debt relief than any other industry. Free Trade Zones set up with the aim of attracting foreign
investment capital to exploit the countries’ cheap labor without paying taxes also attracted
these local elites (adding to a sense among locals of non-Arab descent that the oligarchy is a foreign enemy among them). If these industries were taxed even
minimally, that income could have been used to strengthen infrastructure and thus provide equitable access to resources, and popular access to allegedly democratic
governments. Such access could have resulted in death tolls from both Hurricane Mitch and Haiti’s earthquake closer to those from events of similar magnitude in countries with
an infrastructure equipped to deal with them, just as the deaths of thousands of people during Hurricane Katrina can be blamed on poor infrastructure and lack of democratic
process in the implementation of policies benefiting powerful business interests. But instead of holding maquiladoras democratically accountable, regressive
taxation policies imposed from the outside in combination with other neoliberal policiesmandated as a condition of debt relief, have resulted in an increased concentration of wealth,
the privatization of public infrastructure, and the impoverishment and disenfranchisement of
ever larger numbers of citizens in Honduras and Haiti.
US is the critical actor—direct investments are key
Negroponte 2k13 [Diana Villiers, senior analyst @ Brookings Institute--
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/03/05-chavez-venezuela-negroponte --
3/5/2013-- SR] The death of Hugo Chavez presents an opportunity for the new Venezuelan leadership to tone
down the rhetoric of anti-Americanism and put our bilateral relations on a pragmatic basis .¶
The U.S. remains the principal purchaser of Venezuelan oil which is refined in Gulf Coast refineries for later
export to China and other markets. Food and pharmaceutical products, cosmetics, spare parts and
electrical equipment are bought from the U.S. although payment for these goods is delayed and consumers must
wait 4 to 5 months for the new inventory to arrive at Venezuelan ports.¶ Venezuela is in the midst of an economic
crisis with shortages of U.S. dollars, a devaluation of 32 percent and the prospect of searing
inflation. Furthermore, Venezuela needs foreign direct investment, technical expertise and spare parts from
the U.S. ¶ Rather than demonizing Washington, an opportunity exists for Caracas to reframe the
relationship to a realistic mode.
Perm do the plan then the counter-plan—not intrinsic
The plan is a prerequisite-US leadership is keyBrainard 13(Lael Brainard, Treasury Under Secretary for International Affairs, Written Testimony before the House
Financial Services Sub – Committee on Monetary Policy and Trade, “Embargoed Until Delivery”, 4/24/13,
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ba19-wstate-lbrainard-20130424.pdf, KJ)
Our interest in a strong and effective IMF has only grown as our economic fortune shave
become ever more closely linked to our partners around the world. The President’s budget
request for the IMF is vital to preserve U.S. leadership in the IMF so we can continue to shape
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the norms and practices that ensure an open, resilient global economy . This budget proposal
will expand the core quota resources of the IMF — with no net new U.S. financial commitment
to the IMF — while preserving the U.S. veto and enhancing the legitimacy of the institution. At
the height of the financial crisis in 2009,Congress provided critical leadership by approving the
Administration’s request for a permanent increase in U.S. participation in the New Arrangements to
Borrow, or NAB—a standing IMF backstop to safeguard the stability of the international
monetary system. This strategy worked : it arrested a steep fall in trade and a sharp reversal
of capital flows in many emerging markets. As global financial conditions eased, we worked
with our international partners in 2010 to secure an agreement on quota and governance
reforms that would expand core quota resources and enhance IMF legitimac y, while requiring no
new resources from the United States and preserving our unique veto. Congressional approval of these reforms
will maintain the U.S. leadership in the IMF, and restore the primacy of the IMF’s quota-based
capital structure. The proposal will reduce U.S. participation in the NAB by Special Drawing Rights
40,871,800,000(approximately $63 billion) and simultaneously increase the size of the U.S. quota in the IMF by an equal amount. It
will also allow the United States to accept an amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement facilitating changes in the composition of
the IMF Executive Board while preserving the U.S. board seat and veto. The President’s Budget Request includes this commitment in
a way that is fully offset and does not change the net U.S. financial participation in the IMF. We are open to working with
Congress on any viable option to get this enacted quickly. I look forward to working with you and your
colleagues on this important legislation. Our participation in the IMF is an exchange of equivalent assets
and our claims on the IMF are fully secure . The IMF has a uniquely strong balance shee t: the
value of the IMF’s reserves and gold holdings exceed total credit outstanding. Moreover, the
IMF is treated by all of its members as the world’s preferred creditor. The IMF has an excellent
repayment record with no history of default. And, finally, the IMF has the unique ability to leverage strong
economic reform conditions as a condition for extending credit. As the world’s largest
economy, we are the only country with a veto to shape major IMF governance and resource
decisions. We should carefully steward this privilege to shape the rules of the global
economy, especially as emerging economies, like China, seek greater influence in the coming
years. U.S. leadership in the IMF promotes American core interests in three ways: as the first
responder when financial crises abroad threaten jobs and growth at home, strengthening ournational security, and designing rules for an open global trade and financial system.
Cooperation Adv is a DA to the counterplan—only direct engagement sends the
proper signal
Links to politics—
IMF politically unpopular—congress sees no reason to support international
finance policies that don’t get them reelected
Henning 9 (C Randall Henning, Peterson Institute for International Economics, “US Interests
and the International Monetary Fund, June 2009, http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb09-12.pdf TSD)
Members of Congress are similarly unlikely to give the IMF ¶ top priority on their legislative
agenda. Unlike domestic financial institutions, the IMF cannot lend to or manage the assets ¶ 19. As conceptualized by the
institutionalist approach to international relations. See, for example, Keohane (1984).¶ A s the largest contributor to the IMF, ¶ the
United S tates wields more votes ¶ than any other single member.616161616161616161616161616161N u m b e r P b 0 9 - 1 2 J u N
e 2 0 0 9¶ ¶ of their constituents. Unlike federal agencies, the IMF does not ¶ serve the constituents in
their states or districts directly. Within ¶ Congress, moreover, responsibility for legislation and oversight ¶ is
fragmented, with the banking, international relations, and ¶ appropriations committees of both houses involved. So, as in ¶ the
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case of other international institutions, few members of ¶ Congress are willing to champion
the IMF; it is “orphaned.” ¶ Finally, Congress is wary of letting the authority that it jealously ¶
guards in disputes with the executive branch over domestic ¶ matters slip away under the
guise of international cooperation.20¶ Outright opposition to the IMF in Congress tends not to be ¶ broad and intense,
but neither is support a high priority for ¶ most members.
Bureaucracy DA—IMF policies must go through an approval of several different
agencies/countries—which means there is a t/f differential
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A2 Politics DA
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Plan Popular
Debt relief is bipartisan
Reuters 2k12 *“Congress approves 3rd world debt relief”-October 26]
WASHINGTON (Reuters) -- The U.S. Congress on Wednesday approved a foreign aid bill that includes the full $435million pledged by President Clinton (news - web sites) to forgive or alleviate the crippling debt burdens of
some of the world`s poorest nations.¶ The Senate gave final approval to the $14.9 billion foreign
assistance bill in a comfortable bipartisan vote of 65 to 27 after it easily passed in the House of Representatives by a
307-101 vote.¶ The debt-relief measure, championed by the White House, charity groups and religious and cultural figures from
Pope John Paul (news - web sites) II to singer Bono of the rock band U2, allows the United States to pay its share under the global
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative to forgive the debts of some 30 Third World countries. ¶ ``This enables
America to do something that is good and just and manifestly in our interests ,`` Clinton said of a debt
pact struck by Congressional negotiators before the votes.
Past policies prove debt relief is popular
Palmer 2k12 [Doug, senior reporter for Reuters--
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/07/us-usa-egypt-debt-idUSBRE8860T220120907 -
September 7] "My hope would be is that we would go to the Congress very shortly with a framework of how we
recommend that this money be allocated," U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides told reporters during a
conference call to discuss goals for a U.S. business delegation headed to Egypt this weekend.¶ President Barack Obama
promised in May 2011 to relieve Egypt of up to $1 billion of the $3.2 billion debt it owes the
United States, and to guarantee another $1 billion in loans for infrastructure and job creation programs.¶ Following Egypt's first
free elections, which brought Islamist president Mohamed Mursi to power in June, the United States has started detailed discussions
with Egyptian officials on how the money would be used.¶ "We're still in those discussions. I think we're getting close to finalizing it.
Obviously the Congress has to approve what we're doing and we're consulting with both
Republicans and Democrats and there's really, quite frankly, bipartisan support for this," Nides said.
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COC Lobby Turn
The Chamber of Commerce likes the plan
Horwitz 2k12 [Daniel, senior reporter for Madison Project-
http://madisonproject.com/2012/02/chamber-of-commerce-lobbies-for-egypt-debt-forgiveness/ -February 10, 2012] When the Chamber of big-government commerce is not pimping the massive federal highway
bill, they are lobbying the State Department to forgive Egypt’s $2 billion debt to the U.S.¶ This, from CQ:¶
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is launching an effort to revive negotiations on debt relief for
Egypt, a high priority for Cairo, but the request could hardly have come at a tougher time.¶ The six-week standoff over Egypt’s raids
on more than a dozen Western democracy-promotion organizations — including several American groups — has profoundly soured
relations, and lawmakers are in no mood to help Cairo’s new leaders at the moment.¶ But Chamber officials insist that
the United States needs to look at the country’s long-term prospects, and consider the risks
that an economic collapse in Egypt would create for both the region and the international community. And the business
group is pointing to a new study it commissioned from the Peter G. Peterson Institute, released Friday, that demonstrates how
multilateral debt relief efforts could help put Cairo on firmer economic ground.
The Chamber of Commerce is the biggest and most powerful lobbying group inthe nation, especially in regards to Republicans
The Economist ’12 Independent Economic Think Tank, “The Chamber Of Commerce Has Been Transformed Into One
Of The Most Powerful Political Forces In Washington” April 23, 2012 (http://articles.businessinsider.com/2012-04-
23/politics/31385442_1_political-spending-chamber-labour) AMERICA’S first chamber of commerce was founded in Charleston in 1773, but it was not until April 22nd 1912 that business found a
national voice. At the urging of President William Howard Taft, the Chamber of Commerce of the USA was established by a
gathering of 700 delegates from 44 states, representing 324 voluntary organizations, in a Washington hotel. Taft turned the meeting
over to his commerce secretary, Charles Nagel, suggesting he keep it brief "in order that the inventive genius and the power of
original thought in this representative body… may not be restricted." For much of the Chamber’s first 85 years it sought to settle
disputes by consensus, much like its small-town namesakes.That began to change in 1997 when the wiry Thomas Donohue
(pictured) was appointed chief executive after a stint reinvigorating America’s trucking association. The organization he inherited
was cash-strapped and lacked punch. His goal, he wrote at the time, "is simple--to build the biggest gorilla in this town--the most
aggressive and vigorous business advocate our nation has ever seen." He has succeeded on many measures. Today theChamberis by far the most muscular business lobby group in Washington. From its historic headquarters opposite the White
House it wields huge political influence, spending heavily to sway congressional contests. In doing so it
has become more controversial and, say critics, more pro-Republican. This has done its coffers no harm: in 2010 it took in
$189m in contributions and grants, roughly five times its pre-Donohue inflows. Today’s Chamber is not shy about staking
out strong (some would say extreme) positions on hot-button issues: it has led the running on supporting tort and
entitlement reform and greater domestic energy production, and in opposing "excessive" regulation, government-run health care
and cap-and-trade schemes. Its leaders seem to love locking horns with the left, not least the Labour unions that spend hundreds of
millions promoting their views in each election cycle. "Our adversaries will never leave the field, so neither can we," says Bruce
Josten, the Chamber’s chief lobbyist. Labour groups have been so spooked by its surging testosterone that they have set up US
Chamber Watch, an outfit dedicated to undermining it. The Chamber’s spending on lobbying has jumped under Mr Donohue (see
chart 1), though it fell sharply last year as an unprecedented lobbying blitz on health and financial reform subsided. It is expected to
rebound after November’s elections. The Chamber uses both its team of in-house lobbyists and outsiders. Last year it paid a team
led by Michael Mukasey, a former United States attorney-general, $180,000 to call for amendments to declaw the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. Its electioneering activities are equally impressive.Its political spending exceeded that of all othergroups bar the two parties in the 2010 mid-terms, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, a campaign-finance
watchdog. Much of the money goes on "issue advocacy" ads, which do not explicitly back or attack candidates but discuss their
stance on business issues. Business associations naturally lean right. But critics say the Chamber has become more
brazenly pro-Republican under Mr Donohue.. Its ranks of lobbyists, strategists and flacks bristle with former
Republican congressional attack dogs Its people are said to meet periodically with Republican-
supporting groups to share intelligence, such as polling data, and to co-ordinate ad spending. It has ties to Karl Rove’s
American Crossroads political action committee, whose president is the Chamber’s former chief lawyer.
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A2 Topicality
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Economic Engagement
Economic engagement includes developmental assistance, debt relief, and
opening markets—prefer our evidence-its from the state department and is in
the context of Latin AmericaSullivan 2k8 [Daniel, Assistant Secretary for Economic, Energy and Business Affairs@ State Department-- http://2001-
2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/rm/2008/106426.htm-6/11/2008-- SR]
Over the last seven years, we have worked steadily to implement this vision using a variety of tools. We refer to this as our Total
Economic Engagement, or TEE strategy, using in a coordinated manner all elements of our economic policy and
development tools to foster economic growth with key countries and regions of the world. This strategy has had a positive impact in
many areas of the world. I want to highlight three broad initiatives of our TEE strategy that have had a positive impact in
our Hemisphere.¶ First, we have revolutionized our approach to development assistance. In 2002 world leaders
gathered at Monterrey, Mexico and agreed to significantly increase development assistance, while
developing countries would focus on implementing more responsible economic policies.¶ To
implement this “new compact” for development, the Bush Administration–with bipartisan support in Congress –has dramatically
increased U.S. official development assistance (ODA). In fact, the Bush Administration has launched the largest ODA increase since
the Marshall Plan, and we met our Monterrey Commitment to increase ODA by 50% three years early.¶ The numbers speak for
themselves. In the last year of the Clinton Administration, U.S. ODA averaged about $10 billion. Between 2001 and 2006, it hasaveraged about $22 billion. This historic increase has manifested itself in different ways. For example, the Bush Administration has
quadrupled our development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa.¶ U.S. funding to combat HIV/AIDS under the President’s
PEPFAR initiative will exceed $18 billion over the initiative’s first five years. This amount is as much as the rest of the world’s
governments combined. And for the next five years, the President has requested an additional $30 billion. Already, PEPFAR is saving
lives and bringing hope to millions afflicted with HIV/AIDS.¶ We also have launched a five-year, $1.2 billion program to combat
malaria and we continue to provide more than half of all global food aid.¶ Under our Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
initiative, we have further implemented the Monterrey Consensus by working in partnership with recipient governments to establish
assistance compacts that focus on their key priorities. At the same time, the MCC supports only governments that rule justly, invest
in people, and promote economic freedom. In this way, we have generated an “MCC effect” that spurs MCC and even non-MCC
recipients to undertake responsible and effective economic policies.¶ This record of revolutionizing development assistance has
been a key part of our engagement with Latin America. For example, with strong bipartisan support, U.S. foreign assistance to the
region has nearly doubled since the start of this Administration from $862 million in fiscal 2001 to over $1.5 billion in fiscal 2008.¶
The United States has committed nearly $1 billion in aid to El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Guyana and Peru’s MCC
Compacts and threshold programs. This MCC engagement focuses on working with these countries to eliminate corruption, promote
transparency, improve health care and education, and build infrastructure to connect people, businessmen and farmers to nationaland international markets.¶ A second element of this strategy that I would like to highlight is debt relief. The Bush
Administration has provided strong global leadership on debt relief by supporting two major initiatives -- the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) –that are expected to provide over $110 billion in debt
relief over time to 33 heavily-indebted poor countries.¶ Latin America has been an important part of this debt
relief strategy. Since the beginning of the Bush Administration, we have led efforts through international financial institutions
to provide more than $17 billion in debt relief to the poorest countries in the region.¶ A third element of our TEE strategy that I
would like to highlight has been to open markets –bilaterally, regionally and globally. The President’s
intense focus on promoting open markets and free trade has taken many forms.¶ For example, in 2002, the Administration was able
to secure Trade Promotion Authority that allows for Congress to consider trade legislation under streamlined procedures. We also
played a leading role in launching the Doha Development Round in 2001, and remain committed from the President on down to an
ambitious conclusion to the Doha Round by year’s end. In fact, just yesterday this was a significant topic of discussion at the U.S.-EU
Summit.