Backdoors Affirmative - DDI 2015 SWS.docx

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    Backdoors Af

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    1AC

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    PlanPlan: The United States Federal Government should prohibit

    creation o backdoors and use o backdoors rom companies in

    the United States!

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    "conom# Advanta$eBackdoors Crush US "conom# % & 'nternal (inks:

    1! )ills le$itimac# o US Tech *arkets abroad +hich spills over

    to the rest o the econom#,olmes 1-[Allan Holmes is Director of Technology and Telecommunications with Bloomberg Government. Hewas editor of Nextgov a website a!liated with Government "xecutive covering federal technology #olicy andeditor$in$chief of %ederal &om#uter 'ee(. He received his B.A. in )ournalism from the *niversity of North &arolina at&ha#el Hill and a master+s in #ublic #olicy from Du(e *niversity. ,N-A -#ying -een is(ing Billions in *.-.Technology -ales/ htt#011www.bloomberg.com1news1articles12345$36$431nsa$s#ying$seen$ris(ing$billions$in$u$s$technology$sales-e#tember 43th 234511ahul7

    e#orts that the N ational - ecurity A gency #ersuadedsome *.-. technology com#aniesto build so$called bac(doors into security #roducts networ(s and devicesto alloweasier surveillanceare similar to how the House 8ntelligence &ommittee described the threat #osed by&hinathrough Huawei. 9ust as the -hen:hen &hina$based Huawei lost business after the re#ort urged *.-. com#anies not to use its e;ui#ment the

    N-A disclosures may reduce *.-. technology sales overseas by as much as #ercent of information technology services by 234? according to %orrester esearch8nc. a research grou# in &ambridge @assachusetts. ,The National -ecurity Agency will (ill the *.-. technology industry singlehandedly/ ob "nderle a

    technology analyst in -an 9ose &alifornia said in an interview. ,These com#anies may be )ust dealing with thedi!culty in meeting our numbers through the end of the decade./ 8nternetcom#anies networ( e;ui#ment manufacturers and encry#tion tool ma(ers receivesignicant shares of their revenue from overseas com#anies and governments . &isco-ystems 8nc. the world+s biggest networ(ing e;ui#ment ma(er received 2 #ercent of its

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    learned of the N-A+s encry#tion crac(ing in the media. ,'e had no #rior (nowledge about this #rogram/ said Anna Lvagels(aya of #ublic relations rm'eber -handwic( which re#resents -ymantec. ,'e have long held that 8ntel does not #artici#ate in alleged government eKorts to decrease security intechnology/ isa @alloy an 8ntel s#o(eswoman said in an e$mail. &ongress Huawei 'hile foreign rms may be more sus#icious of some *.-.$ made

    technologies the im#act of the disclosures may be limited said &harles olodgy a security analyst with 8D&. , 8t+s a worldwide mar(etand some com#anies may try to benet from not being a *.-.$based com#any butthe real issue is enter#rises are trying to #rotect themselves in most cases fromcyber criminals or malicious insiders or com#etitors/ he said in an interview. ,They+re not so concerned withwhat a nation$state is doing The mar(et$leading gear is often mar(et$leading because it+s the best. 'e+ve gone #ast being able to source everythingwithin a country./ The N-A revelations also may undermine congressional eKorts to bloc( *.-. sales of networ(ing e;ui#ment made by Huawei and LT"&or#. &hina+s second$largest #hone$e;ui#ment ma(er also based in -hen:hen. A House 8ntelligence &ommittee re#ort released in Ictober 2342 said thecom#anies+ close ties to the &hinese government and its ability to build bac(doors into *.-. com#uter networ(s might allow &hina to disru#t #ower gridsnancial networ(s or other critical infrastructure. That sus#icion a##lies to almost every government and technology com#any 'illiam lummer a Huawei

    s#o(esman said in an e$mail. ,Threats to data integrity are not limited to the acts of certaingovernments or the e;ui#ment or services of com#anies with select countries oforigin/ he said. lummer called the *.-. government+s #ursuit of Huawei ,an innuendo$driven #olitical exercise/ and for ,industry and government toleave #olitical games behind and #ursue real solutions to more secure networ(s and data./

    Tech sector (ey to economic recovery and growth M brin( is now*uro et al 1/[@ar( @uro $ a senior fellow and director of #olicy for the @etro#olitan olicy rogram atBroo(ings manages the #rograms #ublic #olicy analysis and leads (ey #olicy research #ro)ects 9ohnathan othwell

    $ fellow at the @etro#olitan olicy rogram at Broo(ings. His research focuses on labor mar(et economics socialmobility access to education and the sources of economic growth -cott Andes enan %i(ri and -iddharth ul(arniall fellows at Broo(ing 8nstitutions. ,Americas Advanced 8ndustries 'hat They Are 'here They Are and 'hy They@atter/. htt#011www.broo(ings.edu1O1media1esearch1%iles1e#orts1234>132135$advanced$industries1nal1Advanced8ndustryP%inal%eb2lores.#dfQlaRen %ebruary 234>11ahul7

    The need for economic renewalin the *nited -tates remains urgent . Fears of disa##ointing)ob growth and stagnant incomes for the ma)ority of wor(ers have left the nationsha(en and frustrated.At the same time astonishing new technologiesSranging from advanced robotics and,5$D #rinting/ to the ,digiti:ation of everything/Sare #rovo(ing genuine excitement even as they ma(e ithard to see where things are going. Hence this #a#er0 At a critical moment this re#ort asserts thes#ecial im#ortance to America+s future of what the #a#er calls America+s ,advancedindustries/ sector. &haracteri:ed by its dee# involvement with technologyresearch and develo#ment UDV and-T"@ science technology engineering and mathV wor(ers the sector encom#asses >3 industries ranging from manufacturing industries such asautoma(ing and aeros#ace to energy industries such as oil and gas extraction to high$tech services such as com#uter software and com#uter system

    design including for health a##lications. These industries encompass the nation0s tech2 sector

    at its broadest and most conse.uential! Their d#namism is $oin$ to be a

    central component o an# uture revitali3ed U!S! econom#. As such theseindustries encom#ass the country+s best shot at su##orting innovative inclusiveand sustainable growth. %or that reason this re#ort #rovides a wide$angle overview of the advanced industry sector that reviews itsrole in American #ros#erity assesses (ey trends and ma#s its metro#olitan and global com#etitive standing before outlining high$level strategies to

    enhance that. The overview nds that0 4. Advanced industries re#resent a si:able economic anchor forthe *.-. economy and have led the #ost$recession em#loyment recovery . @odest in si:e thesector #ac(s a massive economic #unch. As an em#loyer and source of economic activity theadvanced industry sector #lays a ma)or role in the *.-. economy . As of 2345 the nation+s >3advanced industries see nearby box for selection criteriaV em#loyed 42.5 million *.-. wor(ers. That amounts to about 6 #ercent of total *.-. em#loyment.

    And yet even with this modest em#loyment base *.-. advanced industries #roduce #ercent of all *.-. #atentsX and accounts for ?3 #ercent of *.-. ex#orts.Advanced industries also su##ort unusually extensive su##ly chains and other forms of ancillary economic activity. In a #er wor(er basis advanced

    industries #urchase

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    Directly and indirectly then the sector su##orts almost 56 million )obsSnearly one$fourth of all*.-. em#loyment. 8n terms of the sector+s growth and change the total number of )obs in the sector has remained mostly Jat since 46=3but its out#ut has soared. %rom 46=3 to 2345 advanced industries ex#anded at a rate of >. #ercent annuallyS53 #ercent faster than the economy as awhole. -ince the Great ecession moreover both em#loyment and out#ut have risen dramatically. The sector has added nearly one million )obs since2343 with em#loyment and out#ut growth rates 4.6 and 2.5 times higher res#ectively than in the rest of the economy. Advanced services led this #ost$recession surge and created ?> #ercent of the new )obs. &om#uter systems design alone generated 2>3333 new )obs. &ertain advanced manufacturingindustriesSes#ecially those involved in trans#ortation e;ui#mentShave also added thousands of )obs after decades of losses. Advanced industries also#rovide extremely high$;uality economic o##ortunities for wor(ers. 'or(ers in advanced industries are extraordinarily #roductive and generate some

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    threaten the 8nternet itself are misunderstanding thingsY 9onathan -ander strategy U research o!cer of -tealthbits Technologies told the "$&ommerce

    Times. YThe 8nternet #roduces too much wealth for too many #eo#le and organi:ationsfor anyone including the *.-. to threaten it.Y The *.-. economy Yis one of the bestwea#ons we have in the technology war Y -ander continued. The *.-. mar(et Yis too big for foreign governments toignoreY which is why foreign com#anies continue doing business with the *.-. &oncern has been ex#ressed about invasions of #rivacy throughsurveillance but this issue is Ya matter of #olicyY and there are diKerences in how citi:ens of diKerent countries a##roach it -ander #ointed out. Y8n the "*and to a lesser extent [Australia and New Lealand7 #rivacy is an issue at the ballot box so there are laws reJecting that.Y 8n the *.-. however #rivacyYhas yet to seriously brea( through as an issue so there has been less motionY -ander remar(ed. @assive &ost to *.-. Businesses 8n August of last year

    the German government re#ortedly warned that 'indows = could act as a Tro)an when combined with version 2.3 of the Trusted latform @odule T@V as#ecication for a secure cry#to#rocessor. The T@ is included in many la#to#s and tablets and the concern is that T@ 2.3 ma(es trusted com#utingfunctions mandatory rather than o#t$in as before meaning it cant be disabled. %urther it can let @icrosoft establish a bac(door into the device its in.

    @icrosofts res#onse was that I"@s can turn oK the T@ in x=? com#uters.The German government will end itscontract with Ceri:onX Bra:il has decided to re#lace its ghter )ets with ones madeby -wedens -aab instead of BoeingX and 'eb hosting rm -ervint &or#. re#orted a53 #ercent decline in overseas business since the N-A lea(s rst made new s in 9une 2345.YThere is both di#lomatic and economic bac(lash against these tacticsY obyn Greene #olicycounsel at New Americas I#en Technology 8nstitute told the "$&ommerce Times. 8ts di!cult to establish an exact dollaramount but Yex#erts have estimated that losses to the *.-. cloud industry alonecould reach *-V

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    will have to #ay additionally for sourcing domestic data services by rst estimatingthe general eKect of administrative burdens in data #rocessing services on #rices and T% in each sector of theeconomy. Data #rocessing services is an im#ortant in#ut for #roduction M and by using existing indexes from the I"&D measuring administrative barriersin services over time we evaluate the extent to which these administrative barriers in data services aKect other #arts of the economy through the use of

    data services.%or exam#le the telecommunications sector is very data intensive with 54 of its in#uts beingdata$relatedV and should be more heavily aKected by regulationX similarly data #rocessing is > to W of the total

    in#uts used by business18&T and nancial services.5 The index is then raised based on the regulatory barriers as given in Table 4 foreach country. Not all of these measures are e;ually restrictive and their relative im#ortance is therefore weighted according to their relative cost im#act.By benchmar(ing the resulting index against the estimate #rior to the legislationand data #rocessing intensities for all sectors we com#ute the #rice and T%changes for all sectors in each country as a result of data localisation andadministrative barriers. The second methodology com#utes cost diKerences between countries as a result of data localisationre;uirements in each of the countries. Two ty#es of data are #rimarily used M namely the Data &entre is( 8ndex> and an em#iric observation of costdiKerences.? The rst source ran(s countries according to a number of ris( factors that aKect the costs of o#erating a data centre M a ran(ing that closelyfollows the general cost structure across countries of setting u# a centre as a conse;uence of data localisation measures. The observations of actual costs

    are broadly in line and thereby conrm the is( 8ndex.These costs are u#$front trade costs each rm willneed to incur when investing in and ex#orting to one of our selected countries seeAnnex 88V.These trade costs are allocated across all sectors in each economy based onthe intensity with which each sector uses data services. The nal numbers are

    inter#reted as the additional costs a rm will need to #ay for using data serviceswhen entering one of the countries in which data localisation laws are im#lemented .The third shoc( occurs on investment which forms a ma)or driver for economic growth for develo#ing countries in #articular. However as the regulatoryenvironment im#oses more ? mar(et limitations investments made by both domestic and foreign entities will decrease. 8n GTA= this is introduced as achange in rate of return on investments see Annex 88V. %urthermore a nal shoc( occurs as an additional eKect on the return on investment which isderived from research and develo#ment. A survey by \u Lhu Gibbs 233V #rovides the share of rms in develo#ed and develo#ing countriesres#ectively that uses online sales advertising or electronic data interchanges "D8V.W These numbers are also consistent with industry re#orts on theshare of rms that uses &@ customer relationshi# managementV a##lications for data mining of their customers.= The relation between UDex#enditure and return is given by several studies notably Hall %oray @airesse 2336X Irtega Argil]s 2336 ogers 2336V based on em#irical evidence.

    Slo+ $ro+th and economic decline cause multiple scenarios or

    con6ict and hu$e +ars,aass 1-[ichard N. Haass resident of the &ouncil on %oreign elations #reviously served as Director ofolicy lanning for the *- -tate De#artment 2334$2335V and was resident George '. Bushs s#ecial envoy to

    Northern 8reland and &oordinator for the %uture of Afghanistan. ,The 'orld 'ithout America/ htt#s011www.#ro)ect$syndicate.org1commentary1re#airing$the$roots$of$american$#ower$by$richard$n$$haass A#ril 53th 234511ahul7

    et me #osit a radical idea0The most critical threat facing the *nited -tates now and for theforeseeable future is nota rising &hinaa rec(less North orea a nuclear 8ran modern terrorismorclimate change. Although all of these constitute #otential or actual threats the biggest challenges facing the *-are its burgeoning debt crumbling infrastructure second$rate #rimary and secondary schools outdated immigration system and sloweconomic growthM in short the domestic foundations of American #ower. eaders in other countriesmay be tem#ted to react to this )udgment with a dose of schadenfreude nding more than a little satisfaction in America+s di!culties. -uch a res#onse

    should not be sur#rising.The *- and those re#resenting it have been guilty of hubristhe *- may oftenbe the indis#ensable nation but it would be better if others #ointed this outV and exam#les of inconsistency betweenAmerica+s #ractices and its #rinci#les understandably #rovo(e charges of hy#ocrisy. 'hen America does not adhere to the #rinci#les that it #reaches to others it breeds resentment. But li(e most tem#tations the urge to gloat at America+s

    im#erfections and struggles ought to be resisted. eo#le around the globe should be careful what theywish for. America+s failure to deal with its internal challenges would come at a stee##rice. 8ndeed the rest of the world+s sta(e in American success is nearly as large asthat of the *- itself. art of the reason is economic.The *- economy still accounts for about one$;uarter of global out#ut. 8f *- growth accelerates America+s ca#acity to consumeother countries+ goods and services will increase thereby boosting growth aroundthe world. At a time when "uro#e is drifting and Asia is slowing only the *-or more broadly NorthAmericaV has the #otential to drive global economic recovery. The *- remains a uni;ue source of innovation.

    https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/repairing-the-roots-of-american-power-by-richard-n--haasshttps://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/repairing-the-roots-of-american-power-by-richard-n--haasshttps://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/repairing-the-roots-of-american-power-by-richard-n--haasshttps://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/repairing-the-roots-of-american-power-by-richard-n--haass
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    @ost of the world+s citi:ens communicate with mobile devices based on technology develo#ed in -ilicon CalleyX li(ewise the 8nternet was made inAmerica. @ore recently new technologies develo#ed in the *- greatly increase the ability to extract oil and natural gas from underground formations. Thistechnology is now ma(ing its way around the globe allowing other societies to increase their energy #roduction and decrease both their reliance on costlyim#orts and their carbon emissions. The *- is also an invaluable source of ideas. 8ts world$class universities educate a signicant #ercentage of future

    world leaders. @ore fundamentally the *- has long been a leading exam#le of what mar(eteconomies and democratic #olitics can accom#lish. eo#le and governments aroundthe world are far more li(ely to become more o#en if the American model is

    #erceived to be succeeding. %inally the world faces many serious challenges ranging from theneed to halt the s#read of wea#ons of mass destructionght climate change and maintain afunctioning world economic order that #romotes trade and investment to regulating#ractices in cybers#ace im#roving global health and #reventing armed conJicts.

    These #roblems will not sim#ly go away or sort themselves out. 'hile Adam -mith+s ,invisible hand/may ensure the success of free mar(ets it is #owerless in the world of geo#olitics. Irder re;uires the visible hand of leadershi# to formulate and reali:eglobal res#onses to global challenges. Don+t get me wrong0 None of this is meant to suggest that the *- can deal eKectively with the world+s #roblems onits own. *nilateralism rarely wor(s. 8t is not )ust that the *- lac(s the meansX the very nature of contem#orary global #roblems suggests that onlycollective res#onses stand a good chance of succeeding. But multilateralism is much easier to advocate than to design and im#lement. ight now there is

    only one candidate for this role0 the *-. No other country has the necessary combination of ca#abilityand outloo(. This brings me bac( to the argument that the *- must #ut its house in order Meconomically #hysically socially and #olitically M if it is to have the resources needed to #romoteorder in the world."veryone should ho#e that it does0The alternative to a world led by the *-is not a

    world led by &hina "uro#e ussia 9a#an 8ndia or any other country but rather a world that is not led at all. -uch a world would almostcertainly be characteri:ed by chronic crisis and conJict. That would be bad not )ustfor Americans but for the vast ma)ority of the #lanet+s inhabitants.

    Studies prove our impact is true

    7o#al 18[9edediah oyal Director of &oo#erative Threat eduction at the *.-. De#artment of Defense2343 ,"conomic 8ntegration "conomic -ignaling and the roblem of "conomic &rises/ in "conomics of 'ar andeace0 "conomic egal and olitical ers#ectives ed. Goldsmith and Brauer #. 245$247

    ess intuitive is how #eriods of economic decline ma# increase the likelihood o e9ternal

    con6ict.olitical science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the im#act of economic decline and thesecurity and defence behaviour of interde#endent states. esearch in this vein has been considered at systemic dyadic andnational levels. -everal notable contributions follow. %irst on the systemic level ollins 233=V advances @odels(i and Thom#sons

    466?V wor( on leadershi# cycle theory nding that rhythms in the global economy are associated withthe rise and fall of a #re$eminent #ower and the often bloody transition from one#re$eminent leader to the nex t. As such exogenous shoc(s such as economic crisescould usher in a redistribution o relative po+ersee also Gil#in. 46=4V that leads touncertaintyabout #ower balances increasing the ris( of miscalculatio n%eaver 466>V. Alternativelyeven a relatively certain redistribution of #ower could lead to a #ermissiveenvironment for conJictas a rising #ower may see( to challenge a declining #ower'erner. 4666V. -e#arately ollins 466?V also shows that global economic cycles combined with #arallel leadershi# cycles im#actthe li(elihood of conJict among ma)or medium and small #owers although he suggests that the causes and connections betweenglobal economic conditions and security conditions remain un(nown. -econd on a dyadic level &o#elands 466? 2333V theory of

    trade ex#ectations suggests that future ex#ectation of trade is a signicant variable inunderstanding economic conditions and security behaviour o states. He argues that

    interde#endent states are li(ely to gain #acic benets from trade so long as they have an o#timistic view of future trade relations.However i the e9pectations o uture trade declin e #articularly for di!cult to re#lace items such

    as energy resources the li(elihood for conJict increases as states will be inclined to useforce to gain access to those resources. &rises could#otentially be the tri$$erfordecreased trade e9pectationseither on its own or because it triggers #rotectionist moves by interde#endent

    states. Third others have considered the link bet+een economic decline and

    e9ternal armed con6ict at a national level! Blomber$ and ,ess 2332V nd astrong correlation between internal conJict and external conJict #articularly during

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    #eriods of economic downturn. They write0 The lin(ages between internal and external conJict and #ros#erity arestrong and mutually reinforcing. "conomic conJict tends to s#awn internal conJict which in turn returns the favour. @oreover the

    presence o a recession tends to ampli# the e9tent to +hich international

    and e9ternal con6icts sel reinorce each other. Blomberg U Hess 2332. #. =6V

    "conomic decline hasalso been lin(ed with an increase in the li(elihood ofterrorismBlomberg Hess U 'eera#ana 233V which has the ca#acity to s#ill across borders and lead to external tensions.%urthermore crises generally reduce the #o#ularity of a sitting government. ;Diversionary theoryY suggeststhat when facing un#o#ularity arising from economic decline sitting governmentshave increased incentives to fabricate external military conJicts to create a rallyaround the Jag eKect .'ang 466?V Deouen 466>V. and Blomberg Hess and Thac(er 233?V nd su##ortingevidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gel#i 466WV @iller 4666V and isangani

    and ic(ering 2336V suggest that the tendenc# to+ards diversionar# tactics are $reater

    or democratic statesthan autocratic states due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susce#tible

    to being removed from o!ce due to lac( of domestic su##ort. Deouen 2333V has #rovided evidence showing that #eriods ofwea( economic #erformance in the *nited -tates and thus wea( residential#o#ularity are statistically lin(ed to an increase in the use of force. 8n summary recenteconomic scholarshi# #ositively correlates economic integration with an increase in the fre;uency of economic crises whereas

    political science scholarshi# lin(s economic decline with external conJict atsystemic< d#adic and national levels.> This im#lied connection between integration crises and armedconJict has not featured #rominently in the economic$security debate and deserves more attention.

    Localization Leads to global protectionism prevents global business and leads totrade warsChander and Le 15(Director, California International Law Center, Professor of Law and Martin Luther King, Jr. HallResearch Scholar, ni!ersit" of California, Da!is# $ree S%eech and &echnolog" $ellow, California International Law Center# '..,)ale College# J.D., ni!ersit" of California, Da!is School of Law*'nu%a+ Chander and "n P. L, D'&' -'&I-'LISM, /MR) L'0 JR-'L, 1ol. 234255,

    htt%466law.e+or".edu6el768docu+ents6!olu+es623696articles6chander:le.%df*0e lea!e for a later stud" a crucial additional concern;the funda+ental tension

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    se!eral decades in no s+all +easure contri>3 de+onstrated 7ust how seriousl" awr" the Brational self:interestB of nations can

    go, and the Cold 0ar taught us the i+%ossi

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    C#ber Securit# Advanta$eThe risk o c#berterrorism is hi$h>e9perts a$ree that

    adversaries have the technical skills and political motivation to

    carr# out a dan$erous c#berattack

    Bur$ 15 David Global U *.-. &ybersecurity eader w& and a #rinci#al in therms *- Advisory business ,*- cybercrime0 ising ris(s reduced readiness eyndings from the 234 *- -tate of &ybercrime -urvey/ 9une 234www.#wc.com1us1en1increasing$it$eKectiveness1#ublications1assets1234$us$state$of$cybercrime.#dfV

    The risks and repercussions o c#bercrime 8n this 42th survey of cybercrimetrends more than >33 *- executives security ex#erts and others from the #ublicand #rivate sectors oKered a loo( into their cybersecurity #ractices and state of ris(and readiness to combat evolving cyber threats and threat agents. Ine thing is veryclear0 The c#bersecurit# pro$rams o US or$ani3ations do not rival the

    persistence< tactical skills< and technolo$ical pro+ess o their potentialc#ber adversaries!Today common criminals organi:ed crime rings and nation$states leverage so#histicated techni;ues to launch attac(s that are highly targetedand very di!cult to detect. articularly worrisome are attac(s by tremendously s(illed threat actors thatattem#t to steal highly sensitiveSand often very valuableSintellectual #ro#erty #rivate communications and other

    strategic assets and information. 8t is a threat that is nothing short of formidable. 8n fact the *- Director ofNational 8ntelligence has ran(ed cybercrime as the to# national security threathigher than that of terrorism es#ionage and wea#ons of mass destruction .4*nderscoring the threat the %B8 last year notied 5333 *- com#aniesSranging from small ban(s ma)or defense

    contractors and leading retailersSthat they had been victims of cyber intrusions. The U nited S tates

    aces real ?c#bersecurit#@ threats from criminals terrorists s#ies and maliciouscyber actors / said %B8 Director 9ames B. &omeyat a recent security conference.2 ,The

    #layground is a very dangerous #lace right now./ ationstate actors pose a particularl#pernicious threat according to -ean 9oyce a w& #rinci#al and former %B8 de#utydirectorwho fre;uently testied before the *- House and -enate 8ntelligence committees. ,e areseein$ increased activit# rom nationstate actors< +hich could escalate

    due to unrest in S#ria< 'ran< and 7ussia/he said. , These grou#s may targetnancial services and other critical infrastructure entities./8n today+s volatilecybercrime environment nation$states and other criminals continually and ra#idlyu#date their tactics to maintain an advantage against advances in securitysafeguards im#lemented by businesses and government agencies. ecently for instancehac(ers engineered a new round of distributed denial of service DDo-V attac(s that can generate tra!c rated at astaggering 33 gigabits #er second the most #owerful DDo- assaults to date.

    The SA is placin$ backdoors2 into encr#ption standards to$ather intelli$ence< +eakenin$ +idel# used internet net+orks!

    This collapses the c#bersecurit# o our critical inrastructure

    +hile dama$in$ the $overnment0s trust +ith the private sectorW >=7. %oreign cyber s#ies are also a serious concern0*.-. Homeland -ecurity and 8ntelligence o!cials revealed that &hinese and ussian s#ies have ,#enetrated the *.-. electrical grid/and left behind dormant but malicious software [>67. 8n 233W the discovery of what is now (nown as the ,Aurora threat/ revealedthe #ossibility that so#histicated hac(ers could seriously dam age the grid by destroying mechanisms downstream from the initial#oint of attac(. Aurora involves o#ening and ;uic(ly closing a high voltage circuit brea(er which can result in an out$of$synchronism

    condition that can #hysically damage rotating e;ui#ment connected to the #ower grid [?3$?57. At military installationsacross the country a myriad of critical s#stems must be operational &5 hoursa da# 5?> days a year.They receive and analy:e data to (ee# us safe from threatsthey #rovide direction and su##ort to combat troo#s and stay ready to #rovide reliefand recovery services when natural disasters stri(e or when someone attem#ts to

    attac( our homeland.These installations arealmost completel# dependent oncommercial electrical #ower delivered through thenationalelectrical grid. 'hen the D-B studiedthe 2335 blac(out and the condition of the grid they concluded it is ,fragile and vulnerable... #lacingcritical military and homeland defense missions at unacce#table ris( of extendedoutage/. As the resiliency of the grid continues to decline it increases the #otential for an ex#anded and1 or longer durationoutage from natural events as well as deliberate attac(. The D-B noted that the military+s bac(u# #ower is inade;uately si:ed for itsmissions and military bases cannot easily store su!cient fuel su##lies to co#e with a lengthy or wides#read outage. An

    extended outa$e could Heopardi3e on$oin$ missions in far$Jung battle s#acesfor a variety of reasons0 The American military+s logistics chains o#erate a )ust$in$timedelivery system familiar to many global businesses.8f an aircraft brea(s down in 8ra; #arts may beimmediately shi##ed from a su##ly de#ot in the *.-. 8f the de#ot loses #ower #ersonnel there may not ll the order for days

    increasing the ris( to the troo#s in harm+s way. Data collected in combat :ones are often analy:ed at

    data centers in the *.-. 8n many cases the information hel#s battleeld commanders #lantheir next moves.8f the data centers lose #ower thenext militarymove can be delayed or ta(enwithout essential information. The loss of electrical #ower aKects reneries #ortsre#air de#ots andother commercial or military centers that hel# assure the readiness ofAmerican armed forces. 'hen #ower is lostfor lengthy #eriods vulnerability to attac(increases. resident Ibama &ongress and ma)or utilities among others are discussing an u#grade of the national electricalgrid for a variety of reasons. 'e add our voice to this discussion with a singular #ers#ective0 we see that our national

    securit# is directl# linked to the securit# and reliabilit# o our s#stem o

    ener$# production and deliver#!

    7e$ardless o relative po+er< militar# operations solve all

    con6ict)a$an and I0,anlon J%rederic( agan and @ichael I+Hanlon %red+s aresident scholar at A"8 @ichael is a senior fellow in foreign #olicy at Broo(ings ,The&ase for arger Ground %orces/ A#ril 2 233Whtt#011www.aei.org1les1233W13121233W32Pagan233W32.#dfV

    'e live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to eru#t inmany #laces where the current relative calm is tenuous.To view this as a strategic

    http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424_Kagan20070424.pdfhttp://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424_Kagan20070424.pdf
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    military challenge for the *nited -tates is not to es#ouse a s#ecic theory of America+srole in the world or a certain #olitical #hiloso#hy. -uch an assessment Jows directly from the basicbi#artisan view of American foreign #olicy ma(ers since 'orld 'ar 88 that overseas threats must be countered before they candirectly threaten this country+s shores that the basic stability of the international system is essential to American #eace and

    #ros#erity and that no country besides the * nited - tatesis in a #osition to lead the way incountering ma)or challenges to the global order . et us highlight the threats and

    their conse;uences with a few concrete exam#les em#hasi:ing those that involve (ey strategicregions of the world such as the ersian Gulf and "ast Asia or(ey #otential threats to American security such asthe s#read of nuclear wea#ons and the strengthening of the global Al Zaeda 1)ihadistmovement.The 8ranian government has re)ected a series of international demandsto halt its eKorts at enriching uranium and submit to international ins#ections. 'hatwill ha##en if the *-Sor 8sraeliSgovernment becomes convinced that Tehran is onthe verge of elding a nuclear wea#onQ North orea of course has already done soand the ri##le eKects are beginning to s#read .9a#an+srecent electionto su#reme #ower of aleader who has #romisedto rewrite that country+s constitution to su##ort increased armed forcesSand #ossibly even nuclear wea#onsS maywell alter the delicate balance of fear inNortheast Asia fundamentally and ra#idly. Also in the bac(ground at least for now -inoTaiwanese

    tensions continue to Jare as do tensions between 8ndia and a(istan a(istan andAfghanistan Cene:uela and the *nited -tates and so on. @eanwhile the world+snonintervention in Darfurtroubles consciences from "uro#e to America+s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism yetwith no serious international forces on oKer the bloodletting will #robably tragically continue unabated.And as bad as things are in 8ra; today they could get worse. 'hat would ha##en if the (ey -hiite gure Ali al -istani were to dieQ 8fanother ma)or attac( on the scale of the Golden @os;ue bombing hit either side or #erha#s both sides at the same timeVQ -uchdeterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lostSbut the costs of reaching such a conclusion wouldbe enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment although a ma)or Taliban oKensive a##ears to be in the o!ng.

    -ound *- grand strategy must #roceed from the recognition that over the next few years and decades theworld is going to be a very unsettled and ;uite dangerous #lace with Al Zaeda and itsassociated grou#s as a subset of a much larger set of worries.The only serious res#onse to thisinternational environment is to develo# armed forces ca#able of #rotectingAmerica+s vital interests throughout this dangerous time. Doing so re;uires a

    military ca#able of a wide range of missions S including not only deterrence of great#ower conJict in dealing with #otential hots#ots in orea the Taiwan -trait and theersian Gulf but also associated with a variety of -#ecial %orces activities andstabili:ation o#erations. %or today+s *- military which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused onre$learning the lost art of counterinsurgency this is rst and foremost a ;uestion of nding the resources to eld a large$enoughstanding Army and @arine &or#s to handle #ersonnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in 8ra; and Afghanistan.

    C#berattacks +ill destro# US space assets

    4onahue 189ac( *-A% @a)or ,&ATA-TIH" IN TH" HI8LIN0 A -&"NA8I$BA-"D %*T*" "%%"&T I% IB8TA -A&" D"B8-/htt#s011www.afresearch.org1s(ins1rims1;PmodPbe3e66f5$fc>?$ccb$=dfe$?W3c3=22a4>51;PactPdownload#a#er1;Pob)Paf?64=4=$5>6f$666$be2$f==ca4>bd61dis#lay.as#xQrsRengines#ageV

    Another un#redictable driving force that needs to be considered is adversaryex#loitation of s#ace vulnerabilities via the cyber domain. Through cybers#aceenemiesboth state and non$state actorsV will target industry academia government as

    well as the military in the air land maritime and s#ace domains.=? Ine of the

    easiest ways to disru#t deny degrade or destroy the utility of s#ace assets is to

    attac( or sabotage the associated ground segments through cybers#ace!=W The ground

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    segment includes telemetry trac(ing and commanding of s#ace assets and s#ace$launch functions. Ground

    stations are an e9tremel# critical piece of a satellites continued o#eration. However

    many satellite trac(ing and control stations are lightly guarded and many satellite

    communications launch data rece#tion and control facilities are described in

    numerous o#en$source materials ma(ing the ground segment extremely vulnerable

    to cyber attac(.== An attac( on a xed ground facility can sto# data transmissionrender launch facilities unusable and #revent control of satellites.=6 Thus renderingaKected orbiting satellites ino#erative from the communication disru#tion and creating a ris( to other active

    satellites and a #otential for additional orbital debris. A single incident or a small number of incidents could

    signicantly im#act s#ace systems for years .63

    (oss o space assets risks miscalculation uni.ue escalation

    to nuclear +ar

    T#son 8Jhianna Tyson rogram I!cer of the Global -ecurity 8nstitute,Advancing a &oo#erative -ecurity egime in Iuter -#ace/ @ay 233Whtt#011www.worldacademy.org1les1Advancing23a23&oo#erative23-ecurity

    23egime23in23Iuter23-#ace.#dfV

    Beyond the severe economic re#ercussions resulting from disru#ted commercial satellite communications hostileactions in s#ace can result in grave security threatses#ecially in times of war. @ilitaries relyon satellites for monitoring of and communication with troo#s on the ground. 8f a military

    satellite wasdeceived disrupted< denied de$raded or destroyed commanders lose

    their communication ca#abilities resulting in mountin$ tensionsand an escalation

    of conJict. A worst$case scenario could involveinadvertentuse o nuclear +eaponsK

    without satellite$enabled monitoring ca#abilityin a time of tension or if early warning

    systems give a false reading of an attac( governments may resort to usin$

    nuclear +eapons!

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    Solvenc#Prohibitin$ the use and mandate o backdoors b# the US solves

    securit# or the $overnment and privac# or individuals

    #den 1/[on 'yden the senior *nited -tates -enator for Iregon serving since 466? and a member of

    the Democratic arty. He #reviously served in the *nited -tates House of e#resentatives from 46=4 to 466?. ,-to#%B8 Bac(doors for Tech roducts/ htt#011readersu##ortednews.org1o#inion212WW$W>12W=>=$sto#$fbi$bac(doors$for$tech$#roducts9anuary 5rd 234>11ahul7

    Hardly a wee( goes by without a new re#ort of some massive data theft that has #utnancial information trade secrets or government records into the hands of com#uter hac(ers.The bestdefense against these attac(s is clear0 strong data encry#tion and more securetechnology systems. Theleaders of *.-. intelligence agencies hold a diKerent view.@ost#rominently 9ames &omey the %B8director is lobbying &ongress to re;uire that electronicsmanufacturers create intentional security holes S so$called bac( doors S that wouldenable the government to access data on every Americans cell#hone and com#uter even if it is #rotected byencry#tion. *nfortunately there are no magic (eys that can be used only by good guys for legitimate reasons.

    There is only strong security or wea( security. Americans are demanding strong security for their

    #ersonal data. &omey and others are suggesting that security features shouldnt be too strong because this couldinterfere with surveillance conducted for law enforcement or intelligence #ur#oses.The #roblem with thislogic is that building a bac( door into every cell#hone tablet or la#to# meansdeliberately creating wea(nesses that hac(ers and foreign governments can ex#loit .@andating bac( doorsalso removes the incentive for com#anies to develo# moresecure #roductsat the time #eo#le need them mostX if youre building a wall with a hole in it how much areyou going invest in loc(s and barbed wireQ 'hat these o!cials are #ro#osing would be bad for #ersonal datasecurity and bad for business and must be o##osed by &ongress. 8n -ilicon Calley several wee(s ago 8 convened aroundtable of executives from Americas most innovative tech com#anies. They made it clear that wides#readavailability of data encry#tion technology is what consumers are demanding. *nfortunately there are no magic(eys that can be used only by good guys for legitimate reasons. There is only strong security or wea( security. 8t isalso good #ublic #olicy. %or years o!cials of intelligence agencies li(e the N-A as well as the De#artment of9ustice made misleading and outright inaccurate statements to &ongress about data surveillance #rograms S notonce but re#eatedly for over a decade. These agencies s#ied on huge numbers of law$abiding Americans and theirdragnet surveillance of Americans data did not ma(e our country safer. @ost Americans acce#t that there are timestheir government needs to rely on clandestine methods of intelligence gathering to #rotect national security andensure #ublic safety. But they also ex#ect government agencies and o!cials to o#erate within the boundaries of the

    law and they now (now how egregiously intelligence agencies abused their trust.This breach of trust isalso hurting *.-. technology com#anies bottom line #articularly when trying to sell services anddevices in foreign mar(ets.The #residents own surveillance review grou# noted thatconcern about *.-. surveillance #olicies ,can directly reduce the mar(et share of*.-. com#anies./ Ine industry estimate suggests that lost mar(et share will cost )ust the *.-. cloudcom#uting sector for exam#le Greece discovered thatdo:ens of its senior government o!cials #hones had been under surveillance fornearly a year. The eavesdro##er was never identied but the vulnerability was clear0 built$inwireta##ing features intended to be accessible only to government agenciesfollowing a legal #rocess. &hinese hac(ers have #roved how aggressively they will ex#loit any securityvulnerability. A re#ort last year by a leading cyber security com#any identied more than 433 intrusions in *.-.

    networ(s from a single cyber es#ionage unit in -hanghai. As another tech com#any leader told me ,'hy wouldwe leave a bac( door lying aroundQ/'hy indeed.The *.-. House of e#resentatives

    http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/277-75/27858-stop-fbi-backdoors-for-tech-productshttp://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/277-75/27858-stop-fbi-backdoors-for-tech-productshttp://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/277-75/27858-stop-fbi-backdoors-for-tech-productshttp://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/277-75/27858-stop-fbi-backdoors-for-tech-productshttp://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/277-75/27858-stop-fbi-backdoors-for-tech-products
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    recogni:ed how dangerous this idea wasand in 9une a##roved 265$425 a bi#artisan amendmentthat would #rohibit the government from mandating that technology com#aniesbuild security wea(nesses into any of their #roducts. 8 introduced legislation in the -enate toaccom#lish the same goal and will again at the start of the next session. Technology is a tool that can be #ut tolegitimate or illegitimate use. And advances in technology always #ose a new challenge to law enforcementagencies.

    The plan bans backdoors entirel#>that stren$thens c#ber

    securit# and revitali3es tech competitiveness

    *cLuinn< 15 Alan @cZuinn is a research assistant with the 8nformation Technology and 8nnovation%oundation 8T8%V ,The -ecure Data Act could hel# law enforcement #rotect against cybercrime/ 42$46$4htt#011thehill.com1blogs1congress$blog1technology122W>6$the$secure$data$act$could$hel#$law$enforcement$#rotect$againstV

    ast -unday -en. on 'yden D$Ire.V wrote an o#$ed describing the role that *.-. law enforcement should #lay infostering stronger data encry#tion to ma(e information technology 8TV systems more secure. This o#$ed ex#lains

    'yden+sintroduction of the the -ecure Data Act which would #rohibit the government frommandatingthat *.-. com#anies build,bac(doors/ in their #roducts for the #ur#ose ofsurveillance. This legislation res#onds directly to recent comments by *.-. o!cials most notably the %ederal

    Bureau of 8nvestigation %B8V Director 9ames &omey chastising A##le and Google for creating encry#ted devices towhich law enforcement cannot gain access. &omey and others have argued that *.-. tech com#anies should designa way for law enforcement o!cials to access consumer data stored on those devices. 8n this environment the-ecure Data Act is a homerun for security and #rivacy and is a good ste# towards reasserting *.-. com#etitivenessin building secure systems for a global mar(et. ^ By ado#ting its #osition on the issue the %B8 is wor(ing against itsown goal of #reventing cybercrime as well as broader government eKorts to im#rove cybersecurity. 9ust a few years

    ago the Bureau was counseling #eo#le to better encry#t their data to safeguard it from hac(ers. &reatingbac(door access for law enforcement fundamentally wea(ens 8T systems because itcreates a new #athway for malicious hac(ers foreign governments and otherunauthori:ed #arties to gain illicit access. e;uiring bac(doors is a ste# bac(wards for com#aniesactively wor(ing to eliminate security vulnerabilities in their #roducts. 8n this way security is a lot li(e a shi# at sea

    the more holes you #ut in the systemSgovernment mandated or notSthe faster it will sin(.The bettersolution is to #atch u# all the holes in the system and wor( to #revent any new

    ones .ather than decreasing security to suit its a##etite for surveillance the %B8 should recogni:e that bettersecurity is needed to bolster *.-. defenses against online threats. ^ The -ecure Data Act is an im#ortant ste# in that

    direction because it will sto#*.-. law enforcementagencies from re;uiringcom#anies tointroduce vulnerabilitiesin their #roducts. 8f this bill is enacted law enforcement will be forcedto use other means to solve crimes such as by using metadata from cellular #roviders call recordstext messages and even old$fashioned detective wor(.This will also allow *.-. tech com#anies withthe hel# of law enforcement to continue to strengthen their systems better detectintrusions and identify emerging threats. aw enforcement such as the recently announced *.-.De#artment of 9ustice &ybersecurity *nitSa unit designed solely to ,deter investigate and #rosecute cyber

    criminals/ should wor( in coo#eration with the #rivate sector to create a safer environment online. A change ofcourse is also necessary to restore the ability of *.-. tech com#anies to compete$loball#where mistrust has run ram#ant following the revelations of mass government surveillance. ^ 'ith the445th &ongress at an end 'yden has #romised to reintroduce the Data -ecure Act again in the next &ongress.&ongress should move ex#ediently to advance -enator 'yden+s bill to #romote security and #rivacy in *.-. devicesand software. %urthermore as &ongress mar(s u# the legislation and considers amendments it should restrict not)ust government access to devices but also government control of those devices. These eKorts will move the eKortsof our law enforcement agencies away from creating cyber vulnerabilities and allow electronics manufacturers to#roduce the most secure devices imaginable.

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    Iur claims are reverse causal>onl# eliminatin$ $overnment

    backdoor mandates resolve tech innovation< vulnerabilities= Smay aim to #romote national security and law enforcement byensuring that federal agencies have the ability to interce#t 8nternet communications they do so at a huge cost to

    online security overall. Because of the associated security ris(s the *.-. government should notmandate or re;uest the creation of surveillance bac(doors in #rod$ ucts whetherthrough legislation court order or the leveraging industry relationshi#s to convincecom#anies to voluntarily insert vulnerabilities . As Bellovin et al. ex#lain com#lying withthese ty#es of re;uirements would also hinder innovation and im#ose a ,tax/ onsoftware develo#ment in addition to creating a whole new class of vulnerabilities inhardware and software that un$ dermines the overall security of the #roducts. 5>6 Anamendment oKered to the NDAA for %iscal Fear 234>H.. 5>V by e#resentatives Loeofgren D$&AV and ush Holt D$N9V would have #rohibited inserting these (inds of vulnerabilities outright. 5?3

    The ofgren$Holt #ro#osal aimed to #revent ,the funding of any intelligence agencyintelligence #rogram or intelligence related activity that mandates or re;uests that adevice manufacturer software develo#er or standards organi:ation build in a bac(door to circumventthe encry#tion or #rivacy #rotections of its #roducts unless there is statutory authority to ma(esuch a mandate or re;uest./ 5?4 Although that measure was not ado#ted as #art of the NDAA a similaramendment s#onsored by ofgren along with e#resentatives 9im -ensenbrenner D$'8V and Thomas @assie $FVdid ma(e it into the House$a##roved version of the NDAASwith the su##ort of 8nternet com#anies and #rivacy orga$

    ni:ations 5?2 S#assing on an overwhelming vote of 265 to 425. 5?5 i(e e#resentative Grayson+s amendment onN-A+s consultations with N8-T around encry#tion it remains to be seen whether this amendment will end u# in the

    nal a##ro#ri$ ations bill that the resident signs. Nonetheless these legislative eKorts are aheartening sign and are consistent with recommendations from the resident+seview Grou# that the *.-. govern$ ment should not attem#t to deliberately wea(enthe security of commercial encry#tion #roducts. -uch mandated vulnerabilitieswhether re;uired under statute or by court order or inserted sim#ly by re;uestunduly threaten innovation in secure 8nternet technologies while introducing

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    security Jaws that may be ex#loited by a variety of bad actors. A clear #olicyagainst such vulnerability mandates is necessary to restore international trust in*.-. com#anies and technologies.

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    &ac Addons

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    USChina 7elations

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    &ac-to##ing bac(doors (ey to sto# &hinese hac(ersProtalinski 1&["mil rotalins(i is a freelance )ournalist writing for &N"T and LDNet. Iver the years he hascovered the tech industry for multi#le #ublications including Ars Technica Neowin and Tech-#ot. ,%ormer entagonanalyst0 &hina has bac(doors to =3 of telecoms/ htt#011www.:dnet.com1article1former$#entagon$analyst$china$

    has$bac(doors$to$=3$of$telecoms1 9uly 4

    th

    234211ahul7

    The &hinese government re#ortedly has Y#ervasive accessY to some =3 #ercent ofthe worlds communications than(s to bac(doors it has ordered to be installed in devices madeby Huawei and LT" &or#oration. Thats according to sources cited by @ichael @aloof a former senior security #olicyanalyst in the I!ce of the -ecretary of Defense who now writes for 'ND0 8n 2333 Huawei was virtually un(nown

    outside &hina but by 2336 it had grown to be one of the largest second only to "ricsson. As a conse;uencesources say that any information traversing YanyY Huawei e;ui##ed networ( isntsafe unless it has military encry#tion. Ine source warned Yeven then there is no doubt that the&hinese are wor(ing very hard to deci#her anything encry#ted that they interce#t.Y -ources add that mostcor#orate telecommunications networ(s use Y#retty light encry#tionY on their virtual #rivate networ(s or CNs. 8found about @aloofs re#ort via this wee(s edition of The &yber9ungle #odcast. Heres my rough transcri#tion of

    what he says at about 4= minutes and 53 seconds0The &hinese government and the eo#les

    iberation Army are so much into cyberwarfare now that they have loo(ed at not)ust Huawei but also LT" &or#oration as #roviding through the e;ui#mentthat theyinstall in about 4> countries around in the world and in > of the to# >3 telecom centers around the world the#otential for bac(dooring into data. ro#rietary information could be not only s#ied u#on but also could be alteredand in some cases could be sabotaged. Thats coming from technical ex#erts who (now Huawei they (now thecom#any and they (now the &hinese. -ince that story came out 8ve done a subse;uent one in which sources tellme that its giving &hinese access to a##roximately =3 #ercent of the world telecoms and its wor(ing on the other

    23 #ercent now. "ven if you manage to avoid &hinese #roducts good luc(V your rmstill isnt safe. Thats because the electronic intrusions are su##osedly doneremotely through the use of the commercial networ(sset u# by Huawei and LT" that they haveestablished in numerous countries. %or exam#le com#anies communicating using CNs with #artner com#anies incountries where Huawei and LT" have installed networ( e;ui#ment are #otentially com#romised according to@aloofs sources. Not only do Huawei and LT" #ower telecom infrastructure all around the world but theyre stillgrowing. The two rms are the main beneciaries for vtelecommunication #ro)ects ta(ing #lace in @alaysia with

    DiGi Globe in the hili##ines @egafon in ussia "tisalat in the *nited Arab "mirates America @ovil in a number ofcountries Tele Norte in Bra:il and eliance in 8ndia. These deals are being struc( because the e;ui#ment #roducedby Huawei and LT" &or#oration is re#ortedly subsidi:ed by the &hinese government. -tate$bac(ed &hinese ban(ssu##ly national telecommunications infrastructure and dont see( #ayment on any of the e;ui#ment for years

    according to @aloofs sources.This ma(es them very attractive since 'estern com#aniescannot com#ete with their #rices for domestic and international develo#ment#ro)ects. This is a lot to digest and these claims seem a little cra:y to me. Dont get me wrongX it would notsur#rise me in the slightest if the &hinese government had bac(door access via #roductsmade by some of its com#anies.After all this not a new story0

    &ontinued &hinese s#ying will crush *-$-ino relationson$ 1/[&hun Han 'ong writes about #olitics labor and urbani:ation issues in &hina from The 'all -treet9ournals Bei)ing bureau. He #reviously covered #olitics and business in -inga#ore &ambodia and the broader

    -outheast Asian region. &hun Han graduated from the ondon -chool of "conomics ,"conomic "s#ionage &harges&ould %urther Dent &hina$*.-. Ties/ htt#011www.ws).com1articles1economic$es#ionage$charges$could$further$dent$china$u$s$ties$45245>2== @ay 22nd 234>11ahul7

    *.-. allegations thatsix &hinese citi:ens stole trade secrets threatens to deal a fresh(noc( to relations between the world+s two largest economies as the charges #oint to growingAmerican scrutiny of sus#ected economic es#ionage from &hina. "x#erts say the caseannounced by the 9ustice De#artment this wee( signals 'ashington+s stiKer stance over an issuethat has already frayed ties with Bei)ing. 8t mar(s the latest instance that the *.-. has accused

    http://www.zdnet.com/article/former-pentagon-analyst-china-has-backdoors-to-80-of-telecoms/http://www.zdnet.com/article/former-pentagon-analyst-china-has-backdoors-to-80-of-telecoms/http://www.wsj.com/articles/economic-espionage-charges-could-further-dent-china-u-s-ties-1432135288http://www.wsj.com/articles/economic-espionage-charges-could-further-dent-china-u-s-ties-1432135288http://www.zdnet.com/article/former-pentagon-analyst-china-has-backdoors-to-80-of-telecoms/http://www.zdnet.com/article/former-pentagon-analyst-china-has-backdoors-to-80-of-telecoms/http://www.wsj.com/articles/economic-espionage-charges-could-further-dent-china-u-s-ties-1432135288http://www.wsj.com/articles/economic-espionage-charges-could-further-dent-china-u-s-ties-1432135288
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    &hinese nationals with ties to the government of stealing cor#orate secrets. *.-. #rosecutors say the defendantswho include three #rofessors at &hina+s state$controlled Tian)in *niversity stole sensitive wireless technology tobenet their commercial )oint venture with the school. A Tian)in *niversity s#o(eswoman said the school is loo(ing

    into the allegations.The indictment didn+t say university administrators or othergovernment o!cials were involved. -till ,this case sends a strong message to the&hinese government that it should ta(e serious note about such activity/ said Huang

    9ing an ex#ert on *.-.$&hina relations at the ee uan Few -chool of ublic olicy in -inga#ore. ,8f such theft isfound to be state$s#onsored it would do serious damage to the bilateral relationshi#./ A s#o(esman for &hina+s%oreign @inistry said 'ednesday that Bei)ing o##osed theft of intellectual #ro#erty reiterating the government+s

    longstanding #osition but declined to say whether *.-.$&hina relations would be damaged by theindictment. ,&hina is severely concerned/ over this case s#o(esman Hong ei said at a daily brieng. ,The&hinese government will ma(e sure the rights and interests of &hinese citi:ens are guaranteed during theirinteractions with American #ersonnel./ The six defendants couldn+t be reached to comment. Ine year ago the *.-.9ustice De#artment brought charges against ve &hinese military em#loyees on sus#icion of hac(ing into *.-.com#anies to steal trade secrets. 8t was the rst time 'ashington had #ublicly charged em#loyees of a foreign

    #ower with cybercrimes against *.-. com#anies. &hina dis#uted the accusations and saiddisclosures from former National -ecurity Agency contractor "dward -nowdenshowed that the *.-. was a ma)or instigator of s#ying. 8t also said it would sus#end #artici#ationin a *.-.$&hina wor(ing grou# on cybersecurity. The latest charges come amid a heightened 9ustice De#artmentfocus on economic es#ionage following a 2345 re#ort by a *.-. commission on intellectual$#ro#erty theft that

    accused &hina of being res#onsible for as much as =3 of the intellectual$#ro#erty theft against *.-. com#anies.ast year the *.-. won convictions of two engineers who allegedly stole secrets to manufacturing a white #igmentfrom Duont &o. and sold them to a &hinese state$owned com#any. awyers say most violations of intellectual$#ro#erty rights a##ear to be the wor( of individuals sni!ng a ;uic( buc(. ,@any o##ortunistic #eo#le see &hina asthe #lace to ma(e things ha##en and they+re willing to ris( #otential criminal liability/ said Ben)amin Bai a #artnerat Allen U Ivery in -hanghai who s#eciali:es in intellectual #ro#erty rights and trade$secret #rotection cases.,There are tons of money Joating around in &hina see(ing technology ventures./ Among the six defendants namedthis wee( three had studied at the *niversity of -outhern &alifornia where they received graduate degrees inelectrical engineering in 233? before going on to wor( for *.-. technology rms including Avago Technologies and-(ywor(s -olutions 8nc. Avago and -(ywor(s didn+t res#ond to re;uests for comment.V Two of the men later too( u##rofessorshi#s at Tian)in *niversity+s recision 8nstrument "ngineering De#artment. They and their alleged co$cons#irators also led #atents in the *.-. and &hina that #rosecutors say were based on stolen technology and usedto benet I%- @icrosystem a )oint venture they founded with the university. Ine of the #rofessors Lhang Haowas arrested by *.-. authorities on @ay 4? after arriving in os Angeles from &hina. The other ve defendants werebelieved to be in &hina. I%- based in the northeastern city of Tian)in was founded in 2344 has =? million yuan

    about

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    -im#listic agitation regarding the #otential &hinese military threat to America ignoresthe benets that the *- also derives from its very favorable geostrategic location onthe o#en shores of two great oceans as well as from its trans$oceanic allies on all sides. 8n contrast &hina isgeogra#hically encircled by not always friendly states and has very few M if any Mallies. In occasion some of &hina+s neighbors are tem#ted by this circumstance to draw America into su##ort of

    their s#ecic claims or conJicts of interest against &hina. %ortunately there are some signs that aconsensus is emerging that such threats should not be resolved unilaterally ormilitarily but through negotiation.@atters have been not hel#ed by the American media+scharacteri:ation of the Ibama administration+s relative rebalancing of focus toward Asia as a ,#ivot/ M a word neverused by the #resident M with military connotations. 8n fact the new eKort was only meant to be a constructiverea!rmation of the unchanged reality that the *- is both a acic and Atlantic #ower. Ta(ing all these factors into

    account the real threat to a stable *-$&hina relationshi# does not currently arise fromany hostile intentions on the #art of either country but from the disturbing#ossibility that a revitali:ed Asia may slide into the (ind of nationalistic fervor that#reci#itated conJicts in 23th$century "uro#e over resources territoryor #ower. There are#lenty of #otential Jash #oints0 North orea vs. -outh orea &hina vs. 9a#an &hina vs. 8ndiaor 8ndia vs. a(istan. The danger is that if governments incite or allow nationalistic fervor as a (ind of safety

    valve it can s#in out of control. 8n such a #otentially ex#losive context *- #olitical and economicinvolvement in Asia can be a crucially needed stabili:ing factor.8ndeed America+s currentrole in Asia should be analogous to Great Britain+s role in 46th$century "uro#e as a constructive ,oK$shore/balancing inJuence with no entanglements in the region+s rivalries and no attem#t to attain domination over theregion. To be eKective constructive and strategically sensitive engagement in Asia by the *- must not be based

    solely on its existing alliances with democratic 9a#an and -outh orea M which is in &hina+s interestsbecause of its stabili:ing im#act."ngagement must also mean institutionali:ing American and &hinesecoo#eration. Accordingly America and &hina should very deliberatively not let their economic com#etition turn into

    #olitical hostility.@utual engagement bilaterally and multilaterally M and not reci#rocalexclusion M is what is needed. %or exam#le the *- ought not see( a ,trans$acic#artnershi#/ without &hina and &hina should not see( a egional &om#rehensive "conomic act withoutthe *-. History can avoid re#eating the calamitous conJicts of the 23th century if America is #resent in Asia asstabili:er M not a would$be #oliceman M and if &hina becomes the #reeminent but not domineering #ower in the

    region. 8n 9anuary 2344 resident Ibama and now$de#arting &hinese resident Hu 9intao met and issued acommuni;u] boldly detailing )oint underta(ings and #ro#osing to build a historically un#recedented#artnershi# between America and &hina.'ith @r. Ibama now re$elected and &ommunist arty chief\i 9in#ing #re#aring to ta(e over &hina+s #residency in @arch the two leaders should meet to revalidate andre$energi:e the *-$&hina relationshi#. 'hether this relationshi# is vital and robustor wea( and full of sus#icion will aKect the whole world.

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    1arChina ,acks throu$h BackdoorsChina uses backdoor e9ploits to hack into US Companies and

    militar# s#stems*aloo 1&[%. @ichael @aloof contributing writer for national security aKairs for 'ND and G2Bulletin is aformer senior security #olicy analyst ,&H8NA T"&H &I@ANF BAG-0 '" HA&"D *.-. T""&I@-/htt#011www.wnd.com1234213?1china$tech$com#any$admits$hac(ing$u$s$telecoms1 9une 4th 234211ahul7

    The &hinese government through the com#any+s ,electronic bac(doors/oftelecommunications networ(s has the ability to ex#loit networ(s to steal technology andtrade secrets or even to sabotage electronic devices according to various sources. 'ith thisca#ability &hina would be in a #osition to sabotage critical *.-. wea#ons systems andsensitive cyber sites all of which could include intelligence or systems used by defense contractors doing wor( onbehalf of the De#artment of Defense or the *.-. intelligence community. "x#erts say that D8 generally is arestricted technology because it is so #ervasive. 8t o#erates at what ex#erts call ,line s#eeds/ of u# to multi#les of

    43 gigabytes #er second and can ,read/ every #ac(et in a data stream. ,Ince you have access to every#iece of data in a data stream/ the 'ND source said ,you can do literally anythingwith it. Fou can co#y it you can restrict it you can control it M all at line s#eed M without any

    degradation of the signal. ,The challenge really is dealing with the volume of tra!c in high s#eed lin(s but withadvanced software fol(s managing D8 a##liances in networ(s have the ca#ability of using advanced techni;uessuch as #rotocol identication to stri# out the stuK they want/ the source added. ,'hen 8 say Estri# out+ in the&hinese sense 8 mean interce#t and co#y./ Huawei+s D8 #resentation also referred to detecting and controlling,illegal a##lications/ and referred to ,CNs/ as an exam#le. CNs are a traditional way that users can by#asscontent security measures and #rovide secure access to cor#orate and government networ(s. The Huawei D8#resentation also referred to identifying and restricting *s or uniform resource locators in which it can see andcontrol everything that a com#uter user loo(s at online. 'hile the D8 brief referred to ,#orn illegal violent sicVand gambling/ as *s that Huawei can bloc( the source said the com#any was ,very clearly using that ca#ability/for its own activities and once the technology is de#loyed these a##lications can be remotely accessed. ,-o anetwor( that HuaweiV monitors #otentially without the carrier+s (nowledge in -outh America @alaysia 8ndonesia-audi Arabia Botswana or even Cirginia can be remotely and surre#titiously monitored and #otentially controlled/

    the source said. Huawei also referred to the mundane term ,tra!c mirroring/ which thesource said is ,#lain and sim#le data interce#tion./ Because Huawei is involved in mirroring Minterce#ting data M the source added if the &hinese com#any can routinely do such mirroringremotely then any networ( that contains Huawei e;ui#ment by extension would beca#able of this activity. 8n this regard the source said he and his com#any were tas(ed with doing a ma)ornetwor( assessment for a country+s telecommunications system. During that assessment the source said therewas inadvertently discovered ,undocumented administrator accounts/ in all of the Huawei core networ( routers.'hen e;ui#ment is shi##ed the source said it comes with default #asswords and these are usually changed touni;ue com#any standards. As #art of source+s ,assessment #rocedure/ the source chec(ed and ran a non$standard routine to identify all of the user accounts and that was ,how we inadvertently discovered the second and

    undocumented administrator accounts and too( Escreen shots+ to record their existence./ 'hen they wentbac( to loo( at them again ,they all mysteriously disa##eared M with no trace in therouter logs as to how it ha##ened/ referring to going bac( to examine the undocumented administratoraccounts. ather than a ,sim#le networ( security issue/ the source said he and his securityconsultant team began to reali:e that ,this was much more of a national security

    issue./ The source said that the undocumented administrator accounts had been ,mysteriously erased wesus#ected remotely as nothing was showing in the router logs to indicate how it ha##ened or that they everexisted in the rst #lace./ He said that Huawei has s#ecial teams of &hinese engineers who Jy in often in chartered)ets when a networ( ex#eriences ,certain technical #roblems/ but the networ( e;ui#ment never is allowed to beexamined or xed locally. The source said that such technology also could be used to interce#t communications inintercontinental undersea cables de#loyed at 5333 meters 6=5 feetV under the sea. He said that Huawei @arinewhich is rolling out thousands of miles of intercontinental communications cable beneath the seas com#lete withdee#$sea ber o#tic boosters every >3 miles can very easily conduct covert D8 surveillance entirely undetected.,"mbedding these ca#abilities in any networ( meansthatV they can then interce#t and control those networ(s inany way they li(e/ the source said. ,8 am so worried about &hinese cyber warfare threats their abilities to monitorand remotely shut down international communications networ(s including critical infrastructure networ(s in

    http://www.wnd.com/2012/06/china-tech-company-admits-hacking-u-s-telecoms/http://www.wnd.com/2012/06/china-tech-company-admits-hacking-u-s-telecoms/
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    'estern countries./ ,%orget )ust loo(ing for malicious code/ he said. ,They could )ust as easily identifyencry#ted missile launch commands radar and defense communications criticalinfrastructure command and control networ(s and while they may not be able tonecessarily decry#t and control them being able to bloc( them in networ(s isalmost as eKective as a cyber$warfare strategy./The source also was ;uic( to #oint out that manycritical infrastructure networ(s are not encry#ted and o#erate o#enly. As 'ND has #reviously re#orted *.-.

    government agencies seem un#re#ared to confront the cyber war &hina a##arently is #lanning against the *.-.even though *.-. government o!cials and members of &ongress have (nown about this #otential for at least fouryears. ast @arch in a re#ort #re#ared by the *.-. defense aeros#ace com#any Northro# Grumman &or#. for thecongressional *.-.$&hina "conomic and -ecurity eview &ommission it warned that the &hinese military through itslarge &hinese telecommunications rms has created an avenue for state$s#onsored and state$directed #enetrations

    of su##ly chains for electronics su##orting *-. military government and civilian industry. ,-uccessful#enetration of a su##ly chain such as that for the telecommunications industry hasthe #otential to cause the catastro#hic failure of systems and networ(s su##ortingcritical infrastructurefor national security or #ublic safety/ the re#ort said. ,otential eKects include#roviding an adversary with ca#abilities to gain covert access and monitoring of sensitive systems to degrade asystem+s mission eKectiveness or to insert false information or instructions that could cause #remature failure orcom#lete remote control or destruction of the targeted system./ The re#ort titled ,Iccu#ying the 8nformation HighGround0 &hinese &a#abilities for &om#uter Networ( I#erations and &yber "s#ionage/ said that many of the

    ndings actually came from &hinese source materials including authoritative A #ublications. The re#orts#ecically had singled out Huawei and LT" &or#. as exam#les of high technology com#anies the &hinesegovernment could use to enter remotely into telecommunications systems andcom#uters lin(ed to them to gain undetected access to sensitive data . ,&hineseca#abilities in com#uter networ( o#erations have advanced su!ciently to #ose genuine ris( to *.-. militaryo#erations in the event of a conJict/ the congressional re#ort said. ,A analysts consistently identify logistics and&8- infrastructure as *.-. strategic centers of gravity suggesting that A commanders will almost certainlyattem#t to target these systems with both electronic countermeasure wea#ons and networ( attac( and ex#loitationtools li(ely in advance of actual combat to delay *.-. entry or degrade ca#abilities in a conJict./ The &8-infrastructure referred to in the congressional re#ort is command control communications intelligencesurveillance and reconnaissance. -ources re#ort that the giant telecommunications com#anies Huawei and LT"would give the A such access. The #roblem for the *.-. is that the eKects of #reem#tive #enetrations may not be

    readily detectable until after combat has begun. ,"ven if circumstantial evidence #oints to &hinaas the cul#rit/ the re#ort said ,no #olicy currently exists to easily determine

    a##ro#riate res#onse o#tions to a large scale attac( on *.-. military or civilian networ(s inwhich denitive attribution is lac(ing. Bei)ing understanding this may see( to ex#loit this gray area in *.-.#olicyma(ing and legal framewor(s to create delays in *.-. command decision ma(ing./ The re#ort also detailedthe #otential ris(s to the *.-. telecommunications su##ly chain in which hardware is ex#osed to innumerable #ointsof #ossible tam#ering and must rely on rigorous and often ex#ensive testing to ensure that the semiconductorsbeing delivered are trustworthy and will #erform #ro#erly. -uch com#onents obtained from &hina through *.-.defense contractors however often are untested raising the high #ros#ect of com#romising *.-. systems and

    being virtually undetectable as to the origin of the defect.These develo#ments strongly suggestthat no #olicy exists on this growing #roblem of electronic bac(door es#ionage atthe hands #rinci#ally of the &hinesesources say even though the *.-. government has been awareof the issue for some time.

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    1arBackdoors SolveBackdoors ke# to resolve securit# concerns over hackin$

    ConnorSimons 1/ Adam &onnor$-imons &ommunications &oordinator at@assachusetts 8nstitute of Technology @8TV ,&-A8 re#ort0 Giving government

    s#ecial access to data #oses ma)or security ris(s/ 9uly W 234>htt#011newso!ce.mit.edu1234>1csail$re#ort$government$access$data$ma)or$security$ris(s$3W3WV

    That was the im#etus for a re#ort S titled ,eys under doormats0 @andatinginsecurity by re;uiring government access to all data and communications/ S#ublished today by security ex#erts from @8T+s &om#uter -cience and Articial8ntelligence ab &-A8V alongside other leading researchers from the *.-. and the*..

    The re#ort argues that such mechanisms ,#ose far more grave security ris(sim#eril innovation on which the world+s economies de#end and raise more thorny

    #olicy issues than we could have imagined when the 8nternet was in its infancy./The team warns that rushing to create a legislative #ro#osal is dangerous untilsecurity s#ecialists are able to evaluate a com#rehensive technical solution that hasbeen carefully analy:ed for vulnerabilities.

    &-A8 contributors to the re#ort include #rofessors Hal Abelson and on ivest hDstudent @ichael -#ecter 8nformation -ervices and Technology networ( manager 9eK-chiller and #rinci#al research scientist Daniel 'eit:ner who s#earheaded the wor(as director of @8T+s &ybersecurity and 8nternet olicy esearch 8nitiative aninterdisci#linary #rogram funded by a million grant from the Hewlett%oundation.

    The grou# also includes cry#togra#hy ex#ert Bruce -chneier and researchers from-tanford *niversity &olumbia *niversity &ambridge *niversity 9ohns Ho#(ins*niversity @icrosoft esearch -8 8nternational and 'orcester olytechnic8nstitute.

    Not$so$exce#tional access

    8n Ictober %B8 Director 9ames &omey called for what is often described as,exce#tional access/ S namely that com#uter systems should be able to #rovideaccess to the #laintext of encry#ted information in transit or stored on a device atthe re;uest of authori:ed law enforcement agencies.

    The research team outlines three reasons why this a##roach would worsen thealready$sha(y current state of cybersecurity.

    %irst it would re;uire #reserving #rivate (eys that could be com#romised not onlyby law enforcement but by anyone who is able to hac( into them. This re#resents a4=3$degree reversal from state$of$the$art security #ractices li(e ,forward secrecy/in which decry#tion (eys are deleted immediately after use.

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    ,8t would be the e;uivalent of ta(ing already$read highly sensitive messages andrather than #utting them through a shredder leaving them in the le cabinet of anunloc(ed o!ce/ 'eit:ner says. ,ee#ing (eys around ma(es them moresusce#tible to com#romise./

    -econd exce#tional access would ma(e systems much more com#lex introducing

    new features that re;uire inde#endent testing and are sources of #otentialvulnerabilities.

    ,Given that the new mechanisms may have to be used in secret by lawenforcement it would also be di!cult and #erha#s illegal for #rogrammers to eventest how these features o#erate/ 'eit:ner says.

    Third s#ecial access in com#lex systems li(e smart#hones would create vulnerable,single #oints of failure/ that would be #articularly attractive targets for hac(erscybercrime grou#s and other countries. Any attac(er who could brea( into thesystem that stores the security credentials would instantly gain access to all of thedata thereby #utting #otentially millions of users at ris(.

    "arlier this s#ring the head of the National -ecurity Agency #ushed bac( againstassertions that the *.-. government was advocating for a ,bac(door/ insteadsuggesting a ,front$door/ method of unloc(ing a device using a digital (ey that isdivided into multi#le #ieces. But researchers argue in the re#ort that such methods,ma(e an attac(er+s )ob harder [but7 not im#ossible/ and re;uire that mechanismsbe decidedly more com#lex to im#lement.

    'eit:ner says that while he recogni:es the desire to be able to recover relevantinformation to solve crimes he views government eagerness for access as a#erilous exam#le of #utting the cart before the horse.

    ,At a time when we are struggling to ma(e the 8nternet more secure these#ro#osals would ta(e a ste# bac(ward by building wea(ness into our infrastructure/'eit:ner says. ,8t+s li(e leaving your house (eys under the doormat0 -ure it may beconvenient but it creates the o##ortunity for anyone to wal( in the door./

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    1ar'mpactMapan arChina and Mapan +ar dra+s in US $oes nuclear

    9ohn Bla9land 1- -enior %ellow at the -trategic and Defence -tudies &entre theAustralian National *niversity and i((i ersten rofessor of modern 9a#anese

    #olitical history in the -chool of 8nternational olitical and -trategic -tudies at the&ollege of Asia and the acic the Australian National *niversity 2145145,"scalating territorial tension in "ast Asia echoes "uro#e+s descent into world war/htt#011www.eastasiaforum.org123451321451escalating$territorial$tension$in$east$asia$echoes$euro#es$descent$into$world$war1

    The recent activation of &hinese wea#ons radars aimed at 9a#an ese military #latformsaround the -en(a(u1Diaoyu 8slandsis the latest in a series of incident sin which &hina hasasserted its #ower and authority at the ex#ense of its neighbours.The radarscue su#ersonic missile systems

    and givethose on the receiving endonly a s#lit second to res#ond . 'ith 9a#anese law

    em#owering local military commanderswith increased discretion to res#ond than(s to North orea+s

    earlier #rovocationsV such incidents could easily escalate. 8n an era of well$established *N$relatedad)udication bodies li(e the 8nternational &ourt of 9ustice 8&9V how has it come to thisQ These incidents

    disconcertingly echo #ast events. 8n the earlyyears of the 23th century most #unditsconsidered a

    ma)or war between the great #owers a remote #ossibility. -everal incidents #rior to 464 werehandled locally or successfully defused by di#lomats from countries with alliances that a##eared to guarantee the#eace. After all never before had the world been so interconnected S than(s to advanced communications

    technology and burgeoning trade. But alliance ties and #erceived national interests meantthat

    once a ma)or war was triggered there was little ho#e of avoiding the conJict.Germany+s dissatisfaction with the constraints under which it o#erated arguably was a #rinci#al cause of war in464. -imilarly 9a#an+s dissatisfaction hel#ed trigger massive conJict a generation later. A century on many of

    the same observations can be made in "ast Asia . &hina+s rise is cou#led with a disturbing surge in)ingoism across "ast and -outheast Asia. &hina resents the territorial resolution of 'orld 'ar 88 in which the *nited-tates handed res#onsibility for the -en(a(u1Diaoyu islands to 9a#an while large chun(s of the -outh &hina -eawere claimed and occu#ied by countries that emerged in -outheast Asia+s #ost$colonial order. Iil and gas reserves

    are attractive reasons for &hina to assert itself but challenging the *- #lace in "ast Asian waters is the mainob)ective. &hina resents American Ere$balancing Eas an attem#t at Econtainment+ even though *- de#endence on&hinese trade and nance ma(es that notion im#lausible. &hina is #ushing the boundaries of the acce#ted #ost$-econd 'orld 'ar order cham#ioned by the *nited -tates and embodied by the *N. &hina+s ra#id rise and long$

    held grievances mean its #owerbro(ers are reluctant to use institutions li(e the 8&9. But &hina+sassertiveness is driving regional states closer intothe arms of the *nited -tates.8ntimidation and assertive maritime acts have been carried out ostensibly by elements notlin(ed to &hina+s armed forces. &hina+s white$#ainted &hinese @aritime -ervices and %isheries aw "nforcement&ommand vessels o#erating in the -outh &hina -ea and around the -en(a(u1Diaoyu islands have evo(ed strong

    reactions. But9a#an+srecent allegation that &hina used active radarsis a signicant escalation.

    Assuming it ha##ened this latest move could trigger a stronger reaction from 9a#an. &hinaloo(s

    increasingly as if it is not #re#ared to abide by *N$related conventions. 8nternational law hasbeen established mostly by #owers &hina sees as having ex#loited it during its Ecentury of humiliation+. Fetarguably it is in the defence of these international institutions that the #eaceful rise of &hina is most li(ely to be

    assured. &hina+s refusalto submit to such mechanisms as the 8&9 increases the #ros#ect of

    conJict. %or the moment9a#an+sconservative # rime m inister will need to exercisegreat s(ill

    and restraintin managing domestic fear and resentment over &hina+s assertiveness and the military+s hair$

    trigger defence #owers. A near$term escalation cannot be ruled out . After all 9a#an recognises that

    &hina is not yet ready to inJict a ma)or military defeat on 9a#anwithout resorting to

    nuc lear wea#onsandwithout triggering a damaging res#onse from the *nited -tates.And 9a#an does not want to enter into such a conJict without strong *- su##ort at least a(in to the discreet

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    su##ort given to Britain in the %al(lands 'ar in 46=2. &onse;uently 9a#an may see an escalation sooner rather

    than later as being in its interests #articularly if &hina a##ears the aggressor. &hina+s domesticenvironment has nurtured )ingoism. The &hinese state has built u# the #ublic+s a##etite for vengeanceagainst 9a#an by mani#ulating lms and history textboo(s. In the other hand &hinese authorities recognise that

    the #eaceful rise advocated by Deng \iao#ing is not yet com#lete militarily at leastV. 8n the meantime it is

    #rudent toexercisesome restraint to avoid an overwhelming and catastro#hic

    res#onse. 8f the 464M4= war taught us anything it is that the outcome of wars is rarely as#ro#onents conceived at the outset.

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    1ar'mpact)orean ar)orean +ar $oes nuclear % miscalc

    -teven *et3 1- &hairman of the egional -trategy and lanning De#artment andesearch rofessor of National -ecurity AKairs at the -trategic -tudies 8nstitute

    5145145 ,-trategic Hori:ons0 Thin(ing the *nthin(able on a -econd orean 'ar/htt#011www.world#oliticsreview.com1articles142W=?1strategic$hori:ons$thin(ing$the$unthin(able$on$a$second$(orean$war

    Today North orea isthe most dangerous country on earth and the greatest threat to

    *.-. security. %or years the bi:arre regime in yongyang has issued an unending stream of claims that a *.-. and -outhorean invasion is imminent while declaring that it will defeat this oKensive )ust as $$ according to o!cial #ro#aganda $$ it overcame

    the un#rovo(ed American attac( in 46>3. Iften the #ress releases from theo!cial North orean newsagency areabsurdly funny andAmerican #olicyma(erstend toignore themas a result.

    &ontinuing to do so though could be dangerous asevents and rhetoric turn even more

    ominous. `8n res#onse to North oreas %eb. 42 nuclear test the *.N. -ecurity &ouncil recently tightened existing sanctionsagainst yongyang. "ven &hina North oreas long$standing benefactor and #rotector went along. &onvulsed by anger

    yongyangthen threatened a #re$em#tive nuclear stri(e against the *nited -tates and-outh orea abrogated the46>5 armisticethat ended the orean 'ar and cut oK the North$-outh hotlineinstalled in 46W4 to hel# avoid an escalation of tensions between the two neighbors. A s#o(esman for the North orean %oreign@inistry asserted that a second orean 'ar is unavoidable. He might be rightX for the rst time an o!cial statement from the North

    orean government may #rove true. `No American leader wants another war in orea. The #roblem isthat the North oreans ma(e so many threateningand bi:arre o!cial statementsand

    sustain such a high level of military readiness thatAmerican #olicyma(ers might fail

    to recogni:e the signs of im#ending attac( . After all every recent *.-. war began with

    miscalc ulationX American #olicyma(ers misunderstood the intent of their o##onents

    whoin turn underestimated American determination. The conJict with North orea couldre#eat this #attern. `-ince the regime of im 9ong *n has continued its #redecessors+ tradition of res#onding hystericallyto every action and statement it doesnt li(e its hard to assess exactly what might #ush yongyang

    over the edgeand cause it to lash out . 8t could be something that the *nited -tates considers modest andreasonable or it could be some sort of internal #ower struggle within the North orean regime invisible to the outside world.

    'hilewe cannot (nowwhetherthe recentround of threatsfrom yongyang is seriousor sim#ly

    more of the same old lathering it would be #rudent tothin( the unthin(able and reason

    through what a war instigated by a fearful and delusional North orean regime might mean for *.-. security. `The secondorean 'ar could begin withmissile stri(es against -outh orean 9a#anese or *.-.targets or with a combination of missile stri(es and a ma)or conventional invasion of the -outh $$ something North orea has

    #re#ared for many decades. "arly attac(s might include nuclear wea#ons but even if they didnt the

    *nited -tates would #robably move ;uic(ly to destroy any existing North orean nuclear wea#ons and ballistic missiles. `Thewar itself would beextremely costly and#robably long. North orea is the most militari:ed society onearth. 8ts armed forces are bac(ward but huge. 8ts hard to tell whether the North orean #eo#le having been fed a steady diet of#ro#aganda based on adulation of the im regime would resi