Venezuela Democracy Reforms Affirmative - DDI 2013 SS

8/13/2019 Venezuela Democracy Reforms Affirmative - DDI 2013 SS

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/venezuela-democracy-reforms-affirmative-ddi-2013-ss 1/64

Oil Democratic Reforms Aff



***1AC



Plan

The United States federal government should increase its economic

engagement in Venezuelan oil if and only if Venezuela agrees to meet target

democratic reforms.



threaten the opposition will be detrimental to bilateral ties with the United States. The fact is that Washington holds all

the cards. Venezuela's economy is in a free-fall, Maduro's popularity is plummeting, and

various public scandals – especially those related to institutional corruption – could further erode public confidence in the

current government.

A socialist regime means that Bolivarian Revolution is inevitable – Venezuela is

prepared for asymmetrical war against US influence and democracy in LatinAmerica now – the goal is instability

Manwaring 12 (Max G. - Professor of Military Strategy; “Venezuela as an exporter of 4thgeneration warfare instability”; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012;http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1139) IINAlmost no one seems to understand the Marxist-Leninist foundations of Hugo Chavez’s political thought. It becomes evident, however, in his

general vision of the Bolivarian Revolution. The abbreviated concept is to destroy the old foreign-

dominated (U.S.-dominated) political and economic systems in the Americas, to take power,

and to create a socialistic, nationalistic, and “popular” (direct) democracy in Venezuela that

would sooner or later extend throughout the Americas.5 Despite the fact that the possible use of military force is never completely separated

from the Leninist concept of destroying bourgeois opposition, Chavez’s revolutionary vision will not be achieved through a conventional military war of maneuver and attrition, or a traditional insurgency.

According to Vladimir Lenin and Chavez, a “new society” will be created only by a gradual and systematic applicationof agitation and propaganda. That long-term effort is aimed at exporting instability and

generating public opinion in favor of the “revolution” and against the bourgeois system.6 Thus, the

contemporary asymmetric revolutionary warfare challenge is rooted in the concept that the

North American “Empire” and its bourgeois political friends in Latin America are not doing

what is right for the people and that the socialist Bolivarian philosophy and leadership will.¶ In

these terms, regime legitimacy is key to the conflict, and it is public op inion that is the main target of the revolutionary effort. Chavez’s vision comes at a time when, despite general economic pro gress, there aredeep flaws in the democratic political systems throughout the Western Hemisphere. The relative popular dissatisfaction stems from deep-rooted socio-economic inequalities, distrust and lack of confidence in thepolice, national legislatures, and political parties. There are also rising popular expectations along with a popular consciousness of nonexistent rights.7 The apparent waning of U.S. power has opened the possibilityof a new global geopolitical order. At the same time, the worldwide financial crisis and the rise of the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have shaken the conventional wisdom that capitalism and liberal

democracy are superior to the alternatives.8 Latin America now—as in the 1960s and 1970s—appears to be a revolutionary’s dream.¶ Five Enabling Concepts.¶ Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian strategic-level dream

depends on five enabling concepts. It begins with the premise that traditional post-World War II socialist and Marxist-Leninist political-economic models made mistakes, but the theory remains valid. The

idea is that representative democracy and the U.S.-dominated capitalism of the new global

era are total failures. Representative democracy and capitalism serve only elites—not the

common people. These failures must now be replaced by “participatory democracy,” “directdemocracy,” or what some detractors have called “radical” or “neo-populism.” In these terms, Chavez

is: 1) re-elaborating a Rousseauan concept of “direct” or “totalitarian” democracy; and, 2)

promoting a socialist economic system as two parts of a five-part overarching political-

economic model for Latin America.9 The other three parts of the model include: 3) a new security

scheme for Venezuala; 4) social programs to strengthen “direct democracy” and its internal

power base; and, 5) maximum communications support to the regime. That overall system of power is intended to ensure

internal peace and societal harmony in Venezuela that will—in time—provide the foundations for a Hemisphere-wide regional power bloc, and¶ socioeconomic and political integration. 10¶ Direct Democracy and

the Socialist Economic System. The current concept of Venezuelan democracy has its roots firmly in the French Revolution and

subsequent perversions of the Rousseauan notion of “total” (totalitarian) democracy. In this scenario, the individual surrenders his rights

and personal interests to the state in return for the enforcement of social harmony and the General Will. Prior to the French Revolution, kings ruled by “Divine Right” and were sovereign. With the revolution,

however, sovereignty was shifted from the king to the nation-state. Thus, the state enjoys absolute power (de facto sovereignty)—

through the enforcement of Rousseau’s General Will—as an essential right. 11¶ The main tenets of direct democracy

in contemporary Venezuela dictate that: 1) the new authority in the state must be a maximum leader who

communicates directly with the people, interprets their needs, and emphasizes “social

expenditure” to guarantee the legitimate needs and desires of the people; 2) elections,

Congress, and the courts will provide formal democracy and international legitimacy (de jure

sovereignty), but will have no real role in governance or the economy; 3) the state will control

or own the major means of national economic production and distribution; and, 4) the

national and regional political-economic integration function will be performed by the

supreme leader by means of his regional financial, material, informational, and political-



military support of radical populist and 21st-century social movements.12¶ The Security Scheme. Lacking the conventional

power to challenge the United States or most of Venezuela’s immediate neighbors, President Chavez and his followers know that asymmetric conflict is a logical means of expression and self-assertion. It is aconcept as old as war itself, a methodology of the weak against the strong. The primary characteristic of asymmetric conflict is the use of disparity between contending parties to gain advantage. Strategicasymmetry has been defined as “acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weakness es, attain the initiative, or gain greater

freedom of action and movement. It can have both psychological as well as physical dime nsions.”13 Chavez’s concept of asymmetric war makes

explicit the need to generate a mix of unconventional methods that authoritatively integrates

a nation-state’s political, economic, social-moral, informational, and military instruments of

power. This type of conflict is not won by seizing specific territory militarily or destroyingspecific industrial or nuclear capabilities. It is won by altering the political-psychological-

economic-social factors that are most relevant in a targeted culture. But, like all others, this kind of

conflict is intended to resist, oppose, gain control of, or overthrow an existing government or

symbol of power—and bring about radical political change. All this requires a complete unity of effort by the state, using the

multidimensional instruments of national and international (alliances and partnerships) power that it has at its disposal.14 ¶ Thus, the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 provides political and institutional autonomyfor the armed forces, under the absolute control of the President and commander in chief. President Chavez has also created an independent national police force, outside the traditional control of the armedforces, which is directly responsible to the President. At the same time, efforts have gone forward to establish a one million-person military reserve and two additional paramilitary organizations —the FrenteBolivariano de Liberacion (Bolivarian Liberation Front) and the Ejercito del Pueblo en Armas (Army of the People in Arms). The armed forces and the police perform traditional national defense and internal securitymissions within the context of preparing for what President Chavez has called a “4th Generation Asymmetric War of All the People.”15 The military reserve and the paramilitary (militia) organizations are chargedto: 1) protect the country from a U.S. or Colombian invasion with an Iraqi-style insurgency; 2) act internally as armed, anti-opposition militias; and, 3) act internationally as armed anti-bourgeois militias.16 Theinstitutional separation of the various security organizations ensures that no one security institution can control the others, but the centralization of those institutions under the control of the President ensures his

absolute control of security and “social harmony” in Venezuela—and elsewhere.17¶ Social Programs and Communications. To strengthen his personal position and internal power base, President Chavez isspending large amounts of money on an amorphous Plan Bolivar 2000 for the building and renovation of schools, clinics, day nurseries, roads, and housing for the poor. Additionally, the President is developingeducation and literacy outreach programs, agrarian reform programs, and workers’ cooperatives. At the same time, he has estab lished MERCAL, a state company that provides subsidized foodstuffs to the poor.Chavez has also imported 16,000 Cuban doctors to help take care of the medical needs of the Venezuelan underclass. Clearly, these social programs offer tangible benefits to the mass of voting Venezuelans who

were generally ignored or neglected by previous governments.18 ¶ The intent of the communications and informational efforts is to generate strong and favorable public opinion. Thus, Bolivarianismo requires

maximum media (radio, TV, and newspapers/magazines) support to purvey ideas, develop mass consensus, and generate electoral successes. Ample evidence exists that Chavez-controlled

media are using emotional arguments to gain attention, to exploit real and imagined fears ofthe population, to create outside enemies as scapegoats for internal failures, and to inculcate

the notion that opposition to the regime equates to betrayal of the country . President Chavez’s personal involvement

in the communications effort is also clear and strong. Statements, speeches, and interviews are being broadcast throughout Venezuela, the Caribbean Basin, and large parts of Central and South America every day

on the state-owned Television del Sur.¶ Additionally, Iranian TV (Hispan TV) is now broadcasting in Spanish 24 hours a day throughout all of Latin America.19 ¶ Conclusions.¶ All these

programs together provide the President of Venezuela—whoever he might be —with the

architecture to generate a unity of effort among the various political-psychological-

socioeconomic-informational-military instruments of state power. That unifying structure, rather than traditional governmental

hierarchy, allows the President a vastly more effective and efficient means through which to pursue his political-strategic Bolivarian objectives. At a minimum, Hugo Chavez has created the elements that can make

Venezuela a regional power. He or his successor can easily export direct democracy, oil money, socialist

propaganda, and military assets to friendly governments, radical groups, and insurgents all

over the Hemisphere. In these terms, Chavez is also developing the capability to destabilize and force a

radical restructuring of specific bourgeois political-economic systems over large parts of theAmericas.20 But, instability is only a symptom, not the threat. Instability is the starting point from

which to understand the second-, third-, and fourth-level effects that shape the Latin

American security environment now and for the future. Instability also defines the ultimate

security threat for now and the future—that is, the threat that no one likes to talk about—the

export of economic and political instability to foment the state failure process.

4GW is zero sum and the Chavez regime is a master of this Wizard’s Chess

Manwaring 12 (Max G. - Professor of Military Strategy; “Venezuela as an exporter of 4thgeneration warfare instability”; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012;http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1139) IINCombinations. The two Chinese colonels who authored Unrestricted Warfare, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, are adamant. They

unequivocally argue that regardless of whether a war took place 2,500 years ago or last year, the data

indicate that all victories or failures display one common denominator—the winner is the

national power, international alliance (power bloc), or nonstate political actor that is best

organized and has implemented a combination of multidimensional efforts.31 The purpose of

combinations is to organize a system of offensive and defensive power that is a great force

multiplier and facilitator within the global security arena. This system gives new and greater meaning to the

idea of a nation-state or other political actor using all available instruments of power to protect, maintain, and achieve perceived

political and security interests.32 The dominating characteristic of a war of this kind is political-military,



economic-commercial, or cultural-moral. Within the context of these combinations, there is a difference between

the dominant sphere and the whole, although a dynamic relationship exists between a dominant type of general war and the

supporting elements that make up the whole. As an example, Qiao and Wang state that conventional military war must

be strongly supported by media (propaganda/information/moral) warfare and a combination

of other types of war that might include but are not limited to psychological war, financial

war, trade war, cyber war, diplomatic war, proxy war, narco-criminal war, and guerrilla war .33

More specif ic examples of national power combinations include the following: • Conventional military war/cyber war/media war(e.g., Georgia, 2008); • Surrogate or proxy war/intelligence war/ media war (e.g., Lebanon, 2006); • Narco-criminal war/financialwar/psychological/media war (e.g., Mexico, to date); • Guerrilla war/psychological-media war/narco-criminal war (e.g., Colombiaand Peru, to date); and, • Diplomatic war/media war/conventional war (e.g., Algeria, 1954-62). Any one of the above combinations

can be combined with others to form new methods and combinations of conflict. There are no means that cannot be

combined with others. The only limitation is the imagination of the planner and

decisionmaker. As a consequence, politically effective contemporary warfare requires the services

of civilian warriors—as well as professional soldiers and policemen—who can conduct

persuasion-coercion-propaganda war, insurgency war, media war, financial war, trade war,

psychological war, network (virus) war, cyber war, chemical-biological-radiological war, etc .

Professional soldiers no longer have a monopoly on power. Accordingly, civilian warriors must be included in the strategic

architecture for contemporary warfare.34 Time as an Instrument of Statecraft. Hugo Chavez and his disciples

understand that war is no longer limited to using military violence to compel desired radical

political-economic-social change. Rather, all means that can be brought to bear on a given

situation must be used. A 4GW leader will tailor his actions to his adversaries’ vulnerabilities,

and to their psychological precepts.35 In these terms, both Lenin and Mao taught that time (the long-term) becomes

one of the main instruments of contemporary power. Prolonged war includes no place for compromise or other options short ofachieving the ultimate political objective (radical political change). Lenin was straightforward: “Concessions are a new kind ofwar.”36 Thus, time is one more instrument of statecraft. Moreover, because the “new” asymmetric conflict is generally political-psychological, protagonists must understand that it takes time to change peoples’ minds and behavior and prepare them for phased,progressive moves toward short-and mid-term as well as long-term objectives. As examples, Mao and his Chinese communistsfought for 28 years (1921-49); the Vietnamese communists fought for 30 years (1945-75); the Nicaraguan Sandinistas fought for 18years (1961-79); and the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso organization has claimed that it is prepared to fight 75 years (1962-?) toachieve its revolutionary objective.37 As a consequence, in 2005, Chavez claimed that he was planning for a protracted 40-yearstruggle in which he or other Bolivarian leadership must: 1) propagate Latin American nationalism; 2) educate, organize, and prepareseveral thousand professionals for organizational duties, combat, and governance who are prepared to lead the masses through arevolution and into the proverbial halls of power; and, 3) create a popular front not just of a few hundred “true believers,” but a

large number of Christians, Socialists, trade unionists, intellectuals, students, peasants, the “debourgeoised” middle classes, andfriendly nations that will “march together to defeat sepoyan (lackey-like) militarism and U.S. imperialism.”38 Contrary to theteachings of some impatient revolutionaries who still adhere to the teachings of Che Guevara, no shortcut will work.39 Conclusions.

Hugo Chavez and his selected leadership understand that contemporary asymmetric war is not a kind of

appendage (a lesser or limited thing) to the more comfortable conventional military attrition

and maneuver warfare paradigms. It is a great deal more. Again, such war may be military or nonmilitary, lethal or

nonlethal, or a mix of everything within a state or a coalition of states’ (alliance) array of instruments of power. As such, it may

be a zero-sum game in which only one winner emerges; or, in the worst-case scenario, no

winner. It is, thus, total. That is to say, the “battlefield” is extended to everyone, everything,

and everywhere—over time.40 Some important things in contemporary war have changed, but some have stayed the

same. In 2005, we summarized the concept of modern asymmetric warfare by taking a page from a Harry Potter adventure. We

called it “Wizard’s Chess.” As a metaphorical example, we further characterized Hugo Chavez as a

“Master” of this deadly game. The analogy is still instructive and sobering: In that game, protagonists movepieces silently and subtly all over the game board. Under the players’ studied direction, each

piece represents a different type of direct and indirect power and might simultaneously

conduct its lethal and non-lethal attacks from differing directions. Each piece shows no mercy

against its foe and is prepared to sacrifice itself in order to allow another piece the

opportunity to destroy or control an opponent—or to checkmate the king. Over the long-term,

however, this game is not a test of expertise in creating instability, conducting violence, or

achieving some sort of moral satisfaction. Ultimately, it is an exercise in survival. A player’s failure



in Wizard’s Chess is death, and is not an option.41 The reality of this kind of “game” is grand strategic and

epochal in scale, and ultimately witnesses the transition from one dominant political form to

another. Politicized militias, hegemonic nonstate entities, and surrogates for traditional

nation-states will likely move from war with some rules and conventions to new warmaking

entities and into completely unrestricted warfare. Failing and failed states will possibly evolve

into new and undesirable state forms such as rogue states, criminal states, draconian states

(military dictatorships), neo-populist states (civilian dictatorships), or new “People’s

Republics.” Failing or failed states may also dissolve and become parts of other states, or may be configured into entirely new

entities.42 In short, revolution is not an event; it is a process. This takes us back to where we began. Hugo Chavez understands thesophistication and complexity of combinations of national instruments of power and alliances, and war as a whole. He alsounderstands the value of facilitating the processes of state failure to achieve his objectives of establishing 21st-Century Socialismand Latin American grandeza (greatness). Chavez and his supporters understand the importance of dreams about survival and abetter life for much of any given population. These are the bases of power—all else is illusion.

Venezuelan alliances prevent conventional military responses – conflict would

go global involving state and nonstate actors.

Manwaring 12 (Max G. - Professor of Military Strategy; “Venezuela as an exporter of 4thgeneration warfare instability”; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012;

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1139) IINAlliance Enablers for the Exportation of Instability. The operationalization of Chavez’s “New Strategic Map for the

Exportation of the Bolivarian Revolution” appears to be based on three mutually supporting

alliance activities: 1) Combating International Isolation; 2) Increasing Economic Activism; and,

3) Increasing Paramilitary and Conventional Military Presence in the Hemisphere. Chavez and his

disciples expect these 4GW alliance activities to lead to the destabilization of their bourgeois enemies. The

“new” Socialist reasoning is quite realistic. “Adopting alliances is vital for the integration of Latin America

because it is impossible for the United States [or anyone else] to use its vast conventional military

force against them.”54 Combating International Isolation. Alliances provide Venezuela with powerful friends both outside

and inside the Western Hemisphere. The major allies have been noted above. Unofficial extra-hemispheric actors, in

addition to Iran and Russia, would probably include China, Chinese Triads, African gangs and

cartels, the Spanish Basque separatist organization (ETA), the Irish Republican Army (IRA), andvarious Islamic groups sponsored by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States to include al-Qaeda,

Hamas, and Hezbollah.55 A new element in the current configuration of forces in Latin

America is that criminalizing states frequently use TCOs (cartels) as a form of statecraft . They

bring these elements into areas of weak or no state sovereignty, and the TCOs and their enforcer gangs provide

alternative (criminal) governance systems (quasi-states). Strategically, this alters the structure of

global order and makes a lie of de facto or de jure sovereignty. This threat is operationalized

by the illicit movement of goods (e.g., drugs, money, weapons systems, and human beings), and the billions of

dollars that these illicit activities generate. The influence and corruption that this money buys i s rotting fragile

(failing) states.56 Such a relationship between state and nonstate actors provides numerous short- to mid-term benefits to both

parties. As one example, the FARC (Colombia’s major insurgent and drug-trafficking organization) gains access to

Venezuelan territory and routes for exporting cocaine to Africa, Europe, and the United

States. The FARC uses the same territory and routes to import weapons systems,communications equipment, training, and money. In this way, the Venezuelan government exerts

indirect military pressure and related destabilization efforts on its most dangerous neighbor—

Colombia. Additionally, the Venezuelan government enhances its international revolutionary

credentials in the radical axis composed of leftist populists and Islamic fundamentalists. It is

also able to profit from this illicit trade at a time when oil revenues are relatively low and the

national budget is under significant stress. Given the enormous revenue stream that illicit Venezuelan-Colombian

TCO trade represents, it is not likely that this alliance will go away soon.57 Clearly, the Venezuelan state and its



criminal-insurgent-terrorist partners will continue to leverage their relationships to mutual benefit. But a cautionary note is requiredhere. Over the long term, TCOs and criminal-insurgent networks have proven to be resilient and highly adaptable. This gives thesekinds of actors an asymmetric advantage over partner state actors, which are inherently more bureaucratic, slow moving, and lessadaptable than nonstate groups. At the same time, governments have also consistently underestimated the capabilities of moreefficient nonhierarchical organizations. Those organizational advantages can generate a possible national security and sovereigntythreat to the Venezuelan state in that national security and sovereignty are being impinged every day, and the illicit commercial

motives of TCOs and other nonstate actors have been known to become a subtle and ominous political agenda. In short, the

common putative objective of these hybrid horizontally organized nonstate groups is tocontrol people, territory, and government to ensure their own freedom of movement and

action within a given national territory (i.e., effective sovereignty).58

US influence in Latin America k2 deter conflict

Peterson 08 (Robert D. – Colonel US Army; “US STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH HUGO CHAVEZ’S

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITIAS”; U.S. Army War College; March 15, 2008;http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479076) IINChavez has worked to destabilize the region by directly and indirectly backing candidates

sympathetic to his political agenda. Chavez openly supported Evo Morales in Bolivia, Daniel

Ortega in Nicaragua, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, in their election wins; all of which have moved

towards “participatory” democracies and anti- Americanism. However, in Peru Ollanta Humala, a radical

nationalist, was defeated in elections by a moderate anti-Chavez leftist, despite Hugo’s support. In another defeat Venezuela failedto win enough votes at the United Nations for the non-permanent seat at the Security Council.35 His influence has been felt infragile parts of Latin America but his manipulation and destabilization efforts are generally resisted in the nationalist political

cultures of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Chavez’s bilateral agreements and support of Iran are

cause for concern and could destabilize Latin America if nuclear ambitions and Iranian brand

of terrorism are accepted as viable means of warfare by Venezuela.36 The U.S. should continue

to work with regional partners and the international community to hold Chavez’s

unacceptable interventions, those that use force or the threat of force, in check and clearly

communicate what the U.S. will not tolerate. Not only do we have national interests in

Venezuela and Latin America but we also have international and regional obligations. These

obligations derive from our position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security

Council and our role as a leader in the Western Hemisphere. As the worlds only remaining superpower

most countries, especially in the western hemisphere, look towards the United States for leadership,

especially with regards to security. The international community expects us to work with them

towards mutually accept solutions. Our strategy towards Venezuela requires a more holistic,

integrated approach to the regions challenges using combined U.S. interagency, hemispheric

and international partners.

Three Scenarios:

First – Iran shuts down any possibility of democratic transition drug

trafficking, money laundering, war

Manwaring 12 (Max G. - Professor of Military Strategy; “Venezuela as an exporter of 4th

generation warfare instability”; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012;http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1139) IINIncreasing Economic Activity. At base, increasing economic activity is a continuation from the more fundamental alliance activity we

call Combating International Isolation. Economic cooperation, as a result, has emerged as a defining feature of the alliance

between Iran and the Chavez regime in Venezuela, and serves at least three clear purposes.

First, it allows Iran to circumvent financial sanctions imposed by the United States, the

European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN) through access to the Venezuelan financial

system. As a consequence, Iran’s partnership with Venezuela effectively provides an ancillary

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479076





avenue from which it can access the international financial system, despite Western pressures.

Second, this financial access facilitates the funding and support of radical populist and socialist

parties and violent nonstate actors throughout the Hemisphere. Third, Iran has increased its

economic investment in several areas (e.g., industry, mining, transportation, energy, and

technical assistance). Many of Iran’s contracts with various countries in Latin America have not yet come to fruition. The

exception, however, is Venezuela, where substantial Iranian investments have been made. As a matter of fact, Iranian economic

investment in Venezuela has expanded from virtually nothing in 2007 to a not insignificant $40 billion today.59 Even though much ofthe promised Iranian economic investment in the Hemisphere has not materialized, that country is in the process of creating an

extensive regional network of diplomatic, economic, industrial, and commercial activities. Thus, probably the most

dangerous threat to the United States from Venezuela results from its facilitation and

encouragement of the penetration of the Western Hemisphere by Iran and its principal

terrorist proxy, Hezbollah. Hezbollah has established a major regional presence throughout

the Americas and is involved in a range of illicit activities, from drug trafficking, to money

laundering, to training Venezuelan and other paramilitary forces.60 In this connection, coercive state

and violent nonstate actors are serious impediments to growth, and major instruments for

corrupting, distorting, and damaging stability in Latin America. The TCO-enforcer gang-insurgent-state

nexus represents a triple threat to the authority and sovereignty of a host gov ernment as well as an enemy regime. First, murder,kidnapping, intimidation, corruption, and impunity undermine the ability of the state to perform its legitimizing security and public

service functions. Second, by coercive imposition of power over bureaucrats and elected officials of the state, TCOs and theirallies compromise the exercise of legitimate state authority and real democracy. Third, and closely

related, by taking control of portions of a given national territory and performing at least some of the tasks of effective sovereigngovernance, the TCO phenomenon transforms itself de facto into states within the state, and criminal leaders govern as they wish.

Thus, the hybrid TCO-state phenomenon contributes significantly to the erosion of democracy

and to the evolutionary state failure process.61

(Insert Iran War goes nuclear)

Second – Latin American instability leads to state failures

Manwaring 12 (Max G. - Professor of Military Strategy; “Venezuela as an exporter of 4thgeneration warfare instability”; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012;http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1139) IINSome argue that all these agi-prop (agitation-propaganda) efforts aimed at the destabilization of bourgeois enemies and theorganization of alliance activities are merely political theater. They are absolutely right. What they do not understand, however, is

that 4th Generation Asymmetric Warfare is directed at influencing an unconventional center of

gravity—that is, public opinion and leadership. As a consequence, it is important to understand that Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian

Revolution is indeed political theater. It is intended to create political-economic-social disequilibrium,

the weakening of an enemy state, and radical change over the long term. Accordingly, transition is

grand strategic and epochal in scale. It ultimately witnesses change from the supposed misery of liberal democracy and capitalism tothe promised love and harmony of “New Socialism.”71 In The Sling and the Stone, Colonel T. X. Hammes, USMC (Ret.), argues that“Just as the world has evolved from an industrial society to an information-based society, so has warfare.”72 4GW does not attemptto win wars by defeating an enemy’s military forces. Both the epic, decisive Napoleonic battle (2nd Generation War), and the wide-

ranging, high-tech, high-speed maneuver campaign (3rd Generation War—“Shock and Awe”) are irrelevant. 4GW is an evolved formof insurgency rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater militaryand economic power. It uses all available networks—political, economic, social, informational, and military—to convince the enemy

decisionmakers that their goals are either unachievable or too costly to justify the perceived benefits. Using its networks, 4GW

directly attacks the minds of enemy populations, policymakers, and decisionmakers to destroy

their political will.73 These are the principal characteristics of what President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela has called “4th

Generation War,” “Guerra de todo el pueblo (“War of all the People,” “Peoples’ War,” or “War Among Peoples”). He asserts that

this type of conflict has virtually unlimited possibilities for a “Super Insurgency” intended to

bring about fundamental political-economic-social change in the Western Hemisphere.74 The



urgency and importance of the 4GW threat have generated four related themes. First, several countries in Latin America and

the Caribbean are paradigms of the failing state and have enormous implications for the

stability, development, democracy, prosperity, and peace of the entire Western Hemisphere.

Second, the transnational drug and arms trafficking, paramilitary, insurgent, and gang

organizations in Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean Basin are perpetrating

a level of corruption, criminality, human horror, and internal instability that, if left unchecked

at the strategic level, can ultimately threaten the collapse of various states and undermine the

security and sovereignty of neighbors. Third, poverty, social exclusion, environmental

degradation, and political-economic-social expectations—and the conflicts generated by these

indirect and implicit threats to stability and human well-being—lead to further degeneration

of citizen security. Fourth, these threats also constitute a serious challenge of U.S. national

security, well-being, and position in the global community. The primary implication of the complex and

ambiguous situations described above is straightforward. The contemporary, chaotic global strategic environment reflects a generallack of legitimate governance and civil-military cooperation in many parts of the world. Instability thrives under those conditions.

Instability, violence, terrorism, and criminal anarchy are the general consequences of

unreformed political, social, economic, and security institutions and concomitant misguided or

poor governance. Ultimately, this instability, and the human, nonstate, and state destabilizers who exploit it, lead to a

final downward spiral into failing and failed-state status . Again, it must be remembered that, as important as

instability might be, it is only a symptom—not the threat itself. Again, the ultimate threat is the issue nobody

wants to deal with—state failure. The novelist John le Carré succinctly defines a failing or failed state in stark terms: I

would suggest to you that, these days, very roughly, the qualifications for being a civilized state amount to—electoral suffrage . . .protection of life and property . . . justice, health and education for all . . . the maintenance of a sound administrative structure—and

roads, transport, drains, etcetera—and—what else is there?—ah yes, the equitable collection of taxes. If a state fails to

deliver on at least a quorum of the above—then one has to say that the contract between

state and citizen begins to look pretty shaky—and if it fails on all of the above, then it’s a

failed state . . . an unstate . . . an ex-state.”75 The logic of the state failure situation demonstrates that the

conscious choices that the international community and individual nation-states make about

how to deal with this type of unconventional threat will define the processes of national,

regional, and global security and well-being for now and into the future. This cautionary tale reminds

us that protracted asymmetric war (4GW) is the only kind of conflict that a modern power has ever lost .It is surprising and dismaying that the world’s only superpower does not have a unified long-

term strategy and a multidimensional interagency organizational architecture to deal with Chavez’s 21st-

Century Socialism and its associated asymmetric war.76 It would appear that this epochal transitional threat is

being dismissed as too difficult, too ambiguous, and too far into the future to deal with. Nevertheless, prudence dictates that it istime to take the empirical evidence seriously and make substantive political-economic, social, informational, and military changes todeal effectively with the threat that one dare not speak its name.77 The primary challenge, then, is to come to terms with thepressing need to shift from a singular operational-tactical military-police approach to a multidimensional and multinationalparadigm. That, in turn, requires a strategic-level conceptual framework and a supporting organizational structure to promulgateunified civil-military planning and the implementation of transnational responses to transnational threats. These efforts must beorganized as a network rather than in the traditional vertical, top-down bureaucracies of most governments. Accomplishing suchefforts will also require fundamental changes in how government leaders and personnel at all levels are employed, trained,developed, and promoted. Additionally, and most importantly, this interagency and multilateral process must exert its collectiveinfluence for the entire duration of a conflict—from the initial planning to the final achievement (or compulsion) of a sustainable

peace. Remember, it is the last man standing—regardless of how badly beaten he might be—who is the winner in this type ofconflict.

Failed state struggle is zero-sum human rights violations, torture, poverty,

starvation, disease, human trafficking, WMD prolif, genocide, and anarchy.

Manwaring 5 (Max G. - Professor of Military Strategy; “VENEZUELA’S HUGO CHVEZ,

BOLIVARIAN SOCIALISM, AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE”; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. ArmyWar College, October 2005; http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a439743.pdf) IIN



The Issue of State Failure. President Chvez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most

dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today . The argument in general is

that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency,

regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and

major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal

business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as

Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do

not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of

infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights

violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers,

trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons

systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time,

these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization,

and conflict.62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure

“armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities“business incentives.” Chvez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions

necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider

latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’

strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and

capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory

and society. Chvez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on

selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he

understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of

upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the

state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and

other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability

and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real .64 But failing and failed

states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable

situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a

consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states,narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can

rest assured that Chvez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any givenopportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the morethey and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65

Third – Transnational Organized Crime group conflict would draw in Iran,

Russia, China, FARC, ETA, and more

Farah 12 (Douglas - International Assessment and Strategy Center’s (IASC) Senior Fellow,Financial Investigations and Transparency at the U.S. Army War College; “TransnationalOrganized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-OneNational Security Priority”; Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College; August

2012; http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA565540) IINAs discussed at length below, Iran, identified by successive U.S. administrations as a state sponsor of

terrorism, has expanded its political alliances, diplomatic presence, trade initiatives, and

military and intelligence programs in the Bolivarian axis. The U.S. intelligence community has recently

concluded that Iranian leadership is now more willing to launch a terrorist attack inside the U.S.

homeland in response to perceived threats from the United States.9¶ This press for expanded ties comes

despite the almost complete lack of cultural or religious ties to the region, linguistic affinity, or traditional economic logic and

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA565540








rationale in the relationships. This is one of the main focuses of this monograph, but multiple other actors are also becoming more

involved.¶ Russia is a growing force, particularly in Mexico and the Bolivarian states, where it is

building up a regional presence through rapidly rising weapons sales, naval and air force

visits, increasing diplomatic presence, and nuclear cooperation agreements with Ven- ezuela,

Bolivia, and Ecuador. In addition to the growing presence of a state itself, which is increasingly viewed as criminalized,

there has been a significant increase in the presence of Russian nonstate actors in the form of

TOCs, which are widely involved in drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, and money launder- ingactivities.10¶ China is aggressively and successfully acquiring access to many of the region’s

natural resources, and¶ trade between Latin America and China is growing exponentially. Over

the past decade, China’s trade with Latin America has jumped from $10 billion to $179 billion.11 With the increased

presence has come a significantly enhanced Chinese intelligence capacity and access across

Latin America. At the same time, Chinese Triads—modern remnants of ancient Chinese secret

societies that evolved into criminal organizations—are now operating extensive money

laundering services for drug trafficking organizations via Chi- nese banks.¶ China also has

shown a distinct willingness to bail out financially strapped authoritarian governments if the

price is right. For example, China lent Venezu- ela $20 billion, in the form of a joint venture with a company to pump crude oil

that China then locked up for a decade at an average price of about $18 a barrel. The money came as Chvez was facing a financialcri- sis, rolling blackouts, and a severe liquidity shortage across the economy.12 Since then, China has extended several other

significant loans to Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia.¶ The dynamics of the relationship between China and the Bolivarian bloc and itsnonstate proxies will be one of the key determinants of the future of Latin America and the survival of the Bolivarian project.Without significant material support from China, the economic model of the Bolivarian alliance will likely collapse under its ownweight of statist inefficiency and massive corruption, despite being richly endowed with natural resources.¶ However, Chineseleaders likely understand that any real replacement of the Bolivarian structure leadership by truly democratic forces could result ina significant loss of access to the region, and a cancel-¶ lation of existing contracts. This, in turn, gives China an incentive to continueto support some form of the Bolivarian project going forward, even if ailing leaders such as Chvez and Fidel Castro are no longer

on the scene.¶ Nigerian TOC groups have been particularly ac- tive in Ecuador, where they drew

police attention because of the unusual violence of the group, including the beheading of

competitors.13¶ These developments indicate that multiple groups, both terrorist and

criminal, as well as some extra-regional states, are expanding their relationships both in

breadth and scope, leading to the suspicion that the Latin America case is far from unique.While there have been criminalized states in the past (the Garca Meza regime of “cocaine colonels” in Bolivia in 1980, and Desi

Bouterse in Suriname in the 1980s, for example), what is new with the Bolivarian structure is thesimultaneous and mutually supporting merger of state with TOC activities across multiple

state and nonstate platforms. While Garca Meza, Bouterse, and others were generally treated as international pari- ahs

with little outside support, the new criminalized states offer each other economic, diplomatic,

political, and military support that shields them from international isolation and allows for

mutually reinforcing structures to be built.¶ One of the aims of this monograph is to show the connectivity among

these disparate groups operating along different geographic parts of the overall criminal-terrorist pipeline. Rather than operating inisola- tion, these groups have complex but significant inter- action with each other, based primarily on the ability of each actor or set

of actors to provide a critical service while profiting mutually from the transactions.¶ This conceptualization builds on

the hybrid model developed by Louise Shelley et al. to describe the relationship among terrorist groups

and TOC,14 adding the element of the criminalized state appropriating, and sometimes

merging with, those hybrid groups such as the FARC in Colombia and ETA in Spain. There is a

shared overarching political vision that jus- tifies the state support of TOC as another device inthe toolbox of 21st-century revolutionaries.

TOC groups pose a global security threat – conflicts go nuclear

Farah 12 (Douglas - International Assessment and Strategy Center’s (IASC) Senior Fellow,Financial Investigations and Transparency at the U.S. Army War College; “TransnationalOrganized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-OneNational Security Priority”; Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College; August



2012; http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA565540) IINThe Changing Nature of the Threat.¶ The purpose of this monograph is to identify and discuss the role played by transnational

organized crime groups (TOCs) in Latin America, and the interplay of these groups with criminalizing state struc-

tures, “stateless” regions, extra-regional actors, and the multiple networks that exploit them. It particularly focuses on those areas

that pose, or potentially pose, a threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad; and, it can be used as a

model for understanding similar threats in other parts of the world.¶ This threat includes not

only traditional TOC activities such as drug trafficking and human trafficking, but others, including the

potential for weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trafficking. These activities are

carried out with the participation of regional and extra-regional state actors whose leaders

are deeply enmeshed in criminal activities. These same leaders espouse a publicly articulated

doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United States and its allies that explicitly

endorses as legitimate the use of WMD.¶ This emerging combination of threats comprises a hybrid of

criminal-terrorist, and state and nonstate franchises, combining multiple nations acting in con-

¶ cert, and traditional TOCs and terrorist groups acting as proxies for the nation-states that

sponsor them. These hybrid franchises should now be viewed as a tier-one security threat for the United States. Under-

standing and mitigating the threat requires a whole- of-government approach, including collection, analysis, law enforcement,

policy, and programming. No longer is the state/nonstate dichotomy useful in illu- minating these problems, just as theTOC/terrorism divide is increasingly disappearing.¶ These franchises operate in, and control,

specific geographic territories which allow them to function in a relatively safe environment.

These pipelines, or recombinant chains of networks, are highly adaptive and able to move a multiplicity of

illicit products (cocaine, weapons, humans, and bulk cash) that ultimately cross U.S. borders

undetected thousands of times each day. The actors along the pipeline form and dissolve alliances quickly, occupy

both physical and cyber space, and use both highly developed and modern institutions, including the global financial system, aswell as ancient smuggling routes and methods.¶ The profits of global TOC activities, even before factoring in the growing efficienciesderived from state sponsorship and protection, are enormous. The sheer scale of the enterprise, and the impact it has on legaleconomies, argues for sustained national and international attention and resources as a tier-one security threat. These new factorsfurther increase the threat.

Nuclear war causes extinction

PHILLIPS 2000 (Dr. Allen, Peace Activist, Nuclear Winter Revisited, October, http://www.peace.ca/nuclearwinterrevisited.htm)

Those of us who were involved in peace activities in the 80's probably remember a good deal about nuclear winter. Those who h ave become involved

later may have heard little about it. No scientific study has been published since 1990, and very little

appears now in the peace or nuclear abolition literature. *It is still important.* With

thousands of rocket-launched weapons at "launch-on-warning", any day there could be an all-

out nuclear war by accident. The fact that there are only half as many nuclear bombs as there were

in the 80's makes no significant difference. Deaths from world-wide starvation after the war

would be several times the number from direct effects of the bombs, and the surviving

fraction of the human race might then diminish and vanish after a few generations of hunger and

disease, in a radioactive environment.





http://www.peace.ca/nuclearwinterrevisited.htm








Contention 2 is Democracy

Venezuela failing to meet economic demands – flow of oil money extremely

low

O’Neil 6/25/13 (Shannon K.; “Venezuela’s Economy and Future”; Council on ForeignRelations; June 25, 2013; http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/06/25/venezuelas-economy-and-future/) IINMany Venezuela watchers have been waiting for the other proverbial economic shoe to drop

(see here, here, and here), and for the country to fall into serious crisis. Others, such as Mark Weisbrot co-director

of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, question this premise, arguing in his Guardian column that Venezuela has and will

continue to make progress using its own economic model. So where does the nation stand?¶ Those supportive of the

Chvez and now Maduro government point to Venezuela’s 2012 GDP growth, which topped 5 percent

(due largely to government spending). Over the last decade GDP per capita more than doubled and the poverty rate (using theWorld Bank’s national poverty line measurement) fell from over 60 percent of population in 2003 to some 30 percent in 2011.Inequality declined as well, and the United Nations publicly recognized the governments’ efforts in halving the number of cit izenssuffering from malnourishment. Moreover Venezuelans in general seem quite happy—reporting a life satisfaction rating of 7.5 (out

of 10), higher than the global average of 5.5.¶ But the underlying fundamentals question how long this can

last. Oil production and exports have bankrolled most of these social programs, pumpinghundreds of billions of dollars into government coffers over the last twelve years. Having

spent all this money (and even augmented it with billions of dollars of debt), one can question

the efficiency of Venezuela’s social programs. One also should worry about their sustainability,

as the institutions to deliver services—from health care to basic electricity—are weak and in some cases

deteriorating. And the flows of oil money behind all of it are increasingly fragile. Though Venezuela

has almost 300 billion barrels in proven reserves, PDVSA’s own production figures show stagnation.

Independent estimates (such as BP’s) reveal falling production. Whichever is true, there is a real question as to whether the country

can keep supporting the current array of programs.¶ The rest of the economy has been hollowed out over the

last decade. While in the 1990s nearly a quarter of exports were non-oil products—foods, agricultural

materials, and manufactured goods—today it is less than 5 percent. To put this into perspective, oil

makes up 16 percent of Mexico’s total exports, 11 percent of Brazil’s, and some 89 percent of oil giant Saudi Arabia’s—still less

than Venezuela’s 97 percent.¶ For day to day life, inflation—estimated at between 20 and 35 percent

(compared to 3 percent inflation in Colombia, or 6 percent in Brazil)—erodes the purchasing power of average

Venezuelans, and hits the poorest the hardest. Fueling this spiral is Venezuela’s penchant to

print money to fund its social programs and to pay for its imports—according to Reuters, in 2011 new

currency topped $17 billion, more than any other Latin American country.¶ To fight inflation, the government has

imposed price caps, leading to shortages of basic goods—from toilet paper to milk, electricity to communion

wine. In fact, the Venezuelan Central Bank’s scarcity index hit 21 percent, meaning that one out of

five basic goods in Venezuela can be considered in short supply.¶ Added to these economic

woes are broader societal ones, including rising crime rates. The United Nations reports that

there were some 45 homicides per 100,000, making Venezuela one of the most dangerous

countries in the world. In Latin America, Venezuela is only surpassed by the notoriously bloody Honduras and El Salvador.¶

The recent electoral investigations reaffirmed Maduro’s control over the presidency, despite the many questions that linger. What isless ambiguous is how average Venezuelans would vote today if given the chance—and it would not be for Maduro.

http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/06/25/venezuelas-economy-and-future/








the rightist candidate Henrique Capriles, who has continued to charge electoral fraud and condemn Maduro as an illegitimate president. While the Obama

administration has yet to formally recognize Maduro’s close election victory, it has turned a

cold shoulder to demands for OAS sanctions against Venezuela. And Mendoza’s visit to Miraflores indicates that the

billionaire accepts Maduro as legitimate.¶ Clearly, both domestic and foreign capital recognize that behind the left

rhetoric and the limited social reforms of “Bolivarian Socialism,” Maduro’s government

defends capitalism and they can do business with it. More fundamentally, continued agitation by the right wing and a further

weakening of the government under conditions of deepening economic crisis and rising popular discontent poses the danger of provoking a social explosion in the working class.

Democratic reform is k2 US interests in the region – oil is the leverage

Peterson 08 (Robert D. – Colonel US Army; “US STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH HUGO CHAVEZ’SESTABLISHMENT OF MILITIAS”; U.S. Army War College; March 15, 2008;http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479076) IINU.S. Core Interests There are four generally agreed upon core U.S. national interests: physical

security, promotion of values, economic prosperity and stable international order . All

administrations focus on these interests and may emphasize one over another. 19 Chavez’s anti-U.S., Bolivarian

policies threaten all of these interests. By supporting states like Iran that are tied to terrorist

organizations, Venezuela is threatening the physical security of the people of the United

States. This is a vital interest in our National Security Strategy. Throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s the United Stateswas instrumental in assisting the spread of democracy throughout Central and South America. However, these fragile

democracies have not brought sweeping social and economic prosperity to the large lower

class of Latin America. Chavez has used this to promote his anti- democratic socialist reforms

and promises of prosperity to the poor, funded almost exclusively with oil profits.20 The

promotion of democratic values and economic prosperity is an important interest in Latin

America, which if unfulfilled, will eventually affect our ability to help raise most of Latin

American’s out of poverty. Rampant poverty, some 70 percent of Latin America living on $300

a month, fuel the discontent with former political and economical policies spread by the U.S.,

and cause instability and anti-U.S. sentiments within most of the poorer countries.21 Hugo Chavez

has been successful in spreading his ideology through state sponsoring and political support in Bolivia, with the election of his

prodigy Evo Morales, and in Ecuador with Rafael Correa’s election victory in November 2006.22 When these peaceful

ways of Bolivarian Revolution are not successful with other states, Chavez will be required todestabilize countries in the region in order to promote his radical ideology. Militias trained in

asymmetric warfare could be sent into other regional countries to promote Bolivarian

revolutionary ideology, coerce vulnerable masses, disrupt governments, and destabilize

internal security. Once destabilized the state is susceptible to Chavez’s mass appeal, promises

of social programs, and can unite against a common enemy, the United States. National Interests

Why is Venezuela and President Chavez important to the United States? Our interests are

categorized as: continued access to energy, protection of democracy in Venezuela and the

region, economic development, and regional stability and security.23 The White House issued a “vital

national interests” certification allowing the funding of opposition groups due to Venezuela “deterioration of democratic

institutions.”24 Clearly the United States understands the importance of Venezuela and must develop

a policy and strategy that tips the scales of democracy and partnership that favors both

countries. Venezuela is the United State’s fourth-largest supplier of petroleum imports,

roughly 11 percent of our imported oil, behind only Canada (18 percent), Mexico (17.5

percent) and Saudi Arabia (14 percent). U.S. refineries on the gulf coast are dependant on

Venezuelan heavy crude. Most of Venezuela’s oil is heavy grade crude which requires

specialized refining for which these refineries are specially designed.25 Should Chavez cut

crude exports to the U.S., if only for a few days, the impact would surely be detrimental on

the economy. It would require a significant increase in production and imports from

elsewhere in the world which may not be able to sustain indefinitely. Because of proximity






and specialized refining capabilities, the U.S. is the natural market for Venezuelan oil and we

do not want to disrupt this supply with tightening global oil markets.

Making it clear the US is devoted to worldwide rule of law restores our human

rights credibility worldwide – that’s a key check on genocide

Shattuck 8 – CEO of the JFK Library Foundation, Foreign Policy Lecturer at Tufts University,and former US Ambassador to Czech Republic, (John, “Restoring U.S. Credibility on HumanRights,” American Bar Association, Fall 2008,http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol35 _2008/human_rights_fall2008/hr_fall08_shattuck.html ) //JGAmong the many challenges facing you from the time you take office will be how to restore

U.S. credibility in the world. One way to do this will be to change the global perception that

the United States is a human rights violator. International public opinion of the recent U.S. record

on human rights has been devastating. A poll conducted last year in eighteen countries on all continents by the

British Broadcasting Corporation revealed that 67 percent disapproved of U.S. detention practices in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.Another poll in Germany, Great Britain, Poland, and India found that majorities or pluralities condemned the United States for

torture and other violations of international law. A third poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations showed that majorities inthirteen countries, including many traditional allies, believe “the U.S. cannot be trusted to act responsibly in the world.” Less than adecade ago, the situation was quite different. A 1999 survey published by the U.S. State Department’s Office of Research showedthat the United States was viewed favorably by large majorities in France, 62 percent; Germany, 78 percent; Indonesia, 75 percent;and Turkey, 52 percent; among others. This positive climate of opinion helped produce the outpouring of international supportimmediately following the 9/11 attacks that made it possible for this country to quickly assemble a broad coalition with United

Nations (UN) approval to respond to the terrorist attacks by striking al Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan. Seven years later, global

support for U.S. leadership has evaporated. In nearly all the countries that registered strong support for the United

States in 1999, a big downward shift of opinion had occurred by 2006. In France it was down to 39 percent; in Germany, 37 percent;and in Indonesia, 30 percent. A separate survey conducted by the Pew Research Center revealed extremely hostile attitudes towardthe United States throughout the Arab and Muslim world: In Egypt, the United States polled 70 percent negative; in Pakistan, 73percent negative; in Jordan, 85 percent negative; and in Turkey, 88 percent negative. The gap between America’s values and actions

revealed by this polling data has severely eroded U.S. global influence. How can you and your administration gain it

back? First, you should make it clear that one of our country’s bedrock principles is the

international rule of law. Human rights are defined and protected by the Constitution and international treaties ratifiedand incorporated into our domestic law. In flaunting basic rules—such as habeas corpus, the Convention against Torture, and theGeneva Conventions—the previous administration created a series of “law-free zones.” Within these zones, detainees were abused,

thousands were held indefinitely without charges, and human rights were trampled. Second, you should bring U.S. values

and practices back into alignment. The United States in recent years has lost credibility by charging others with the

types of human rights violations that it has committed itself. In recent annual country reports on human rights practices, the StateDepartment has criticized other countries for engaging in torture, detention without trial, warrantless electronic surveillance, and

other abuses, even though the U.S. record in these areas also has been abysmal. Fortunately, history shows that U.S.

credibility on human rights can be restored when our government’s policies reflect our

nation’s values. A series of bipartisan initiatives during five recent presidencies ––three Republican and two Democratic ––

illustrates the point. President Gerald Ford signed the Helsinki Accords, paving the way for international recognition of the cause ofhuman rights inside the Soviet bloc. President Jimmy Carter mobilized democratic governments to press for the release of politicalprisoners by repressive regimes. President Ronald Reagan signed the Convention against Torture and persuaded a Republican-dominated Senate to ratify it. President George H. W. Bush joined with other governments in the Organization for Security and Co-

operation in Europe to nurture new democracies and respect for human rights following the end of the Cold War. And President BillClinton worked with NATO and the UN to implement the Genocide Convention and bring an end to the human rights catastrophe in

the Balkans. Mr. President, you can restore U.S. influence by reconnecting the nation’s values and

policies on human rights and the rule of law. Among the initiatives that you might take are the

following. Human Rights Law Enforcement. You should announce that the United States is bound by the human rights treaties

and conventions that it has ratified and adopted as domestic law, including the Geneva Conventions, the Torture Convention, andthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. You should follow through with your commitment to close the detentioncenter at Guantanamo and transfer detainees to this country for determinations whether to try them in U.S. courts or release them.Fully complying with the Geneva Conventions would not preclude the United States from trying detainees in military commissionsunder constitutional standards of due process, nor would it restrict the government’s authority to conduct lawful interrogations to



obtain intelligence in-formation about terrorist activities. Truth Commission. At times in our recent history, the nation has createdhigh-level commissions to probe national crises and recommend ways to prevent them in the future. In the area of human rights,these bodies have included, most notably, the Kerner Commission on race in the 1960s and the commission in the 1980s on theinternment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. The recent commission on the events of 9/11 had a comparable scope andimpact in addressing a complex and far-reaching national crisis. A similar commission could be established to compile the record ofhuman rights abuses in the War on Terror. U.S. Commission on Human Rights. A permanent institution could be created to monitorthe U.S. government’s compliance with its legal obligations on human rights. I urge you to endorse legislation pending in Congressthat would establish a United States Commission on Human Rights with oversight authority and subpoena power. The legislation

would require the executive branch to provide regular reports to the commission on its implementation of international humanrights treaties such as the Torture Convention and the Geneva Conventions. Counterterrorism Assistance. The United States couldprovide assistance to other countries for counterterrorism operations that comply with basic standards on human rights. “Fightingterror” has become a convenient excuse for repressive regimes around the world to engage in further repression, often leading tomore terrorism in an increasing cycle of violence. To break this cycle, this country could provide assistance and training to foreign

military and law enforcement personnel in methods of fighting terrorism within the rule of law. Democracy and Human

Rights Assistance. The United States should find appropriate ways to support those seeking

to promote the rule of law, democracy, and human rights within their own countries. Democracy

and human rights activists are the shock troops in the struggle against terrorism. But democracy and human rights can never be

delivered from the barrel of a gun. Assistance to those working to build their own democratic societies

must be carefully planned, sustained over time, and based on a thorough understanding of

the unique circumstances and profound differences among cultures, religions, and countries.

The new administration should work within a multilateral framework to assist thosestruggling around the world to bring democracy and human rights to their own societies.

Responsibility to Protect. The United States should join with other countries, alliances, and

international organizations to prevent or stop crimes against humanity and genocide . Mr.

President, you could invoke the Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006, to work withother leaders to develop effective multilateral methods of preventing human rights catastrophes such as Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo,

and Darfur. Diplomatic and economic tools should be employed first to head off impending

genocides , but multilateral military intervention must remain available under international law if other means have been

exhausted. By recommitting the United States to a foreign policy conducted within a framework

of human rights and the rule of law, President Obama, you can restore America’s moral

leadership in the world, and, by doing so, strengthen U.S. national security.

Human Rights violations and structural violence will continue without the

reform – democracy is the only chance for strong US-Venezuela economic

relations

Lehtinen 13 (Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, March 14, 2013, Florida Republican, is chairman of theHouse Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa. “ROS-LEHTINEN:Venezuela after Chavez: What comes next?”http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/14/venezuela-after-chavez-what-comes-next/) Since 1999, the Venezuelan people have suffered under an oppressive, neosocialist

dictatorship that disregarded human rights, the rule of law and freedom of the press. For 14 years, Hugo Chaveztrampled over democratic order, jailed political prisoners and oppressed the Venezuelan people. Chavez reportedly accumulatedvast amounts of wealth estimated in the billions while Venezuelans suffered from high inflation and joblessness, rampant food

shortages and a private sector that is threatened at every turn. Venezuela is a pivotal national security interest

for the United States. It is one of the largest foreign suppliers of crude oil to the United States

and is a strategic foothold that continues to pose a threat to our interests in the region. Chavez

was instrumental in bringing the threat of narcoterrorism, illicit activities by foreign terrorist organizations and the Iranian regime,including elements of Hezbollah, to the Western Hemisphere. Chavez’s cronies have made it abundantly clear that they do not wishto cooperate with U.S. law enforcement officials on terrorism and countering the narcotics trade. This was made clear once again asthe new leadership in Venezuela expelled two U.S. Air Force attaches shortly before Chavez’s death. This unwarranted, provocative

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/14/venezuela-after-chavez-what-comes-next/







action was reciprocated last week when two Venezuelan diplomats were expelled from Washington. Still, there is more to be done.

In a post-Chavez era, much attention is being focused on new elections and a call for democratic order. However, elections

for the sake of elections do not constitute a true democracy. Venezuela's National Electoral Council is extremely

corrupt and colludes with Chavez loyalists, who aim to intimidate the masses in Venezuela by

controlling the media and judicial system. A free, fair and transparent election cannot be conducted if the same

players continue to control the already tainted electoral process. The authoritarian regime cannot be allowed to simply shift control

from one despot to another in an effort to maintain its iron grip over the Venezuelan people. The United States’ role inthe post-Chavez era should be to support democratic order by continuing to promote the

Venezuelan civil society and ensuring that their rights are respected. The freedom-hungry

people of Venezuela fear that the United States is too weak to counter interim President

Nicolas Maduro. Support for pro-democracy leaders cannot be accomplished if the Obama

administration continues to cozy up to their oppressors and refuses to draw a line in the sand

for Mr. Maduro, demanding an end to these undemocratic policies. Last year, it was reported that the Obama administration

was seeking to exchange ambassadors in an attempt to normalize relations between the countries. The U.S. State Department’sapproach was extremely premature, and it, unfortunately, legitimized Mr. Maduro without even questioning whether theVenezuelan Constitution was being upheld. The Obama administration continued to send mixed messages and to undermine theopposition by sending a delegation to attend Chavez’s funeral services last week, alongside enemies of the United States, such asIranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Words matter, but actions matter more, and this decision not only sends mixed signals to

the people of Venezuela, but reiterates the failed policy of attempting to re-establish diplomatic relations. It is in our best

interest if political and economic reforms come to Venezuela, but all signs currently point tothe contrary. As the leader of the Chavista movement, Mr. Maduro could potentially be worse for the Venezuelan people and

for U.S. national security interests. Mr. Maduro still controls all branches of government, stifles free

speech and was indoctrinated with socialist ideology. He has traveled to Tehran and has strong ties with Iran,

supports the Assad regime in Syria and has become a lap dog for Cuba’s Castro brothers. In January, the Castros orchestrated theviolation of the Venezuelan Constitution when Chavez did not take the oath of office. The U.S. State Department responded that it i sup to the Venezuelan people to decide if there was a violation, and that it would not interpret the constitution. However, thosesentiments were nowhere to be found in 2009 when the State Department led the charge against the people of Honduras, helpedexpel Honduras from the Organization of American States, and did not recognize Honduras’ constitutional authorities. Why the

double standard? Democratic rights under the Inter-American Democratic Charter cannot be selective; they must be uniform. The

United States should be telling the leaders of Venezuela that they need to respect the

constitution, abide by the Inter-American Democratic Charter and uphold democratic

principles. These democratic processes can only be enforced if the Venezuelan leadership

thinks that there will be serious repercussions if they do not take responsible actions to fulfill

their obligations. This is an opportunity for the United States and responsible nations to demonstrate a commitment to

restoring true democracy to Venezuela, and I hope the opportunity isn’t missed.

Solving human rights is a d-rule

Gordon & Gordon, 95 (Haim & Rivca, Department of Education, Ben Gurion University, BeerSheva, Israel, Sartre & Evil: Guidelines for a Struggle, Questia)Put differently, this book is also about us, a man and a woman who, often with others, have for years been struggling for freedom,for dialogue, for justice, for human rights in Israel and in the Middle East, and about what we have learned from Sartre that has

helped us to conduct this daily struggle. Yet it should also be clear: We are not standard do-gooders. When we

use the word "struggle," we mean fighting, attacking, pointing at evildoers, demanding that

they be prosecuted. We mean accepting the profound loneliness that often characterizes such

struggles. We mean living with the stupid decisions and the mistakes that we have often

made, and, we hope, learning from them. We mean knowing that we too have done Evil. Like

Sartre we do not need to be identified with a party or an organization or a large group when we attack an evildoer, although we are,

at times, happy when such occurs. For instance, when human rights are blatantly abused in the Gaza Strip, or

when violence against women is ignored by the Israeli police, we are unwilling to compromise such

a destruction of human freedom with the goals of a party or an organization so that the

organization or party can attain its political ends from this Evil. Learning from Sartre, we condemn

the Evil and the oppression and exploitation as loudly and clearly as possible. And like Sartre, our



condemnations often fall on deaf ears. Again and again we have failed, as this book will often indicate. The Israeli

military administration in Gaza, the Israeli press, Israeli politicians, other intellectuals and academics, and even other human rights

organizations have often made us feel frustrated, impotent, stuck, irrelevant. But we continue. It is in this kind of

struggle, we believe, that one can learn much from Sartre's writings. Hence, in what follows, while we shall

discuss in detail and in depth quite a few philosophical themes central to Sartre's writings, we shall always attempt to

suggest how these themes can help in the day-to-day struggle against Evil. To do so, we often add to

our discussion of Sartre's insights on Evil an instance from our personal experiences or from events in the world that these insightshave helped to clarify. We firmly believe that Sartre would have preferred such a book to a strict scholarly study of his relationshipto Evil. He repeatedly pointed out that he was deeply concerned with the relevance of his writings to day-to-day praxis, to day-to-day struggles, to the situation in which persons find themselves. He wanted his writings to make a concrete difference in the world,not only to be a topic of analysis and discussion among scholars and philosophers.

Democracy promotion should be a top priority- recent failures were due to

failure of objectives

Stanley Foundation No Date ( Stanley Foundation,“Promoting Democracy: What roledoes this play in the US global agenda?” http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?id=453) Support for democratic values and human rights have been prominent features of the US

global agenda for decades, and properly so, according to a group of experts who discussed democracy promotion at the recent

Stanley Foundation Strategy for Peace Conference. The following discussion summary is by Tod Lindberg, research fellow and editor,Policy Review, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; David Shorr, program officer, the Stanley Foundation; and Richard Weitz,

senior fellow and director, Program Management, Hudson Institute. Efforts to promote democracy around the

world are yet another element of foreign policy made more difficult by the Iraq war. Bringing

liberal democracy to Iraq was not the main objective of the military intervention in 2003, but

it subsequently became a rationale for the continued US occupation. Now, the ongoing violence

and instability in Iraq and other aspects of the war on terror have tarnished the image of the

United States abroad. And at home, the American people have grown cool to promoting democracy. However,

democracy promotion and military intervention need to be delinked. Placing the focus on military

action to achieve democracy promotion is to argue from the most extreme and unusual case.

Principled Stands Participants recognized democracy promotion must be weighed against high-

priority strategic and security interests, tailoring the approach to suit different countries and situations. However,

they also said that American officials should be able to faithfully adhere to three key precepts when dealing with nondemocraticregimes. The United States should never break faith with its concerns about the undemocratic practices of foreign governmentseven as it engages those governments in pursuit of other objectives. Many concessions can be made to gain the concurrence ofautocratic leaders; whitewashing their record on democracy and human rights is not one of them. The United States should never be

silent about its concerns. Democracy and human rights issues can be raised publicly or quietly,

depending on the severity of the problem and what else is at stake in the relationship, but

they should always be on the bilateral agenda. Bilateral relations should not be conducted exclusively with

national governments. The need for a full range of relationships in another country is one of the

basics of diplomacy, but maintaining communication with democracy advocates and human

rights groups is particularly vital in undemocratic countries. Such people can give insight into the problems

as well as options for trying to improve the situation.

http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?id=453






Contention 3 is Solvency

Now key to US influence in Venezuelan democratic transition – new political

regime and oil dependency mean conditions are k2 to US influence

Christy 3/15/13 (Patrick - senior policy analyst at the Foreign Policy Initiative; “Obama MustStand Up for Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela”; US News; March 15, 2013;http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-must-encourage-democratic-venezuela) IINVenezuela's upcoming election to replace the late Hugo Chavez gives the country an important

opportunity to break away from over a decade's worth of strongman rule—and move towards

better governance, improved internal security and stability, a stronger and more vibrant

economy, and a truly constructive role in regional and global affairs. It's critical that the United States do

what it can to encourage Venezuela to seize that opportunity.¶ ¶ For over a decade, Chavez led ideologically-driven

efforts to erode U.S. standing in Latin America and around the globe. The populist leader

expanded Venezuela's ties with rogue states such as Cuba and Iran, aided and protected

terrorist organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), andactively undermined the rule of law in Venezuela and throughout the Americas. In the Western

Hemisphere alone, Chavez used record petrol prices to prop up anti-American socialist leaders, most notably in Bolivia, Cuba and

Nicaragua.¶ ¶ Chavez leaves behind a broken economy, a deeply divided nation and a

dysfunctional government, all of which will take years—if not decades—to overcome.

Venezuela is plagued with double-digit inflation, mounting budget deficits and rising levels of

violence. While the OPEC nation maintains one of the world's largest geological oil reserves,

crude exports—which account for roughly 45 percent of federal budget revenues—have

declined by nearly half since 1999. The United States imports roughly one million barrels from Venezuela per day.¶ ¶

Chavez's protégé Nicolas Maduro, the former vice president who's now acting as Venezuela's interim president, is running to

succeed the late strongman, but it's not preordained that he'll win. It remains to be seen the extent to which he can properly uniteprior to the election the many competing populist factions that benefited under Chavez for so many years. What is clear is that he

will drape himself in the political ideology of chavismo in the run up to April 14 elections, and

use—and quite possibly abuse—government institutions and petrodollars in attempt to woo

the country's voters.¶ ¶ What's perverse is how the Obama administration's move to "reset"

relations with Maduro is doing more to legitimize him as the rightful heir to Venezuela's

presidency than to resuscitate relations between the two governments. The move showed itself to be

even more naive after Maduro accused the United States of plotting to poison Chavez shortly after the strongman's death.¶ ¶

Washington must realize that a strategy of engagement alone will not ensure a renewed and

improved partnership with Caracas. Failure to realize this will not only undermine whatever

influence America has in the months ahead, but also send a troubling signal to Venezuela's

increasingly united political opposition. The Obama administration should instead pursue a

more principled policy towards a post-Chavez Venezuela. In particular, it should:¶ ¶ Pressure

Caracas to implement key election reforms. Venezuela's opposition faces formidable obstacles. Interim President

Maduro will use the government's near-monopoly control of public airwaves, its established networks of political patronage andlast-minute public spending programs to bolster his populist agenda.¶ ¶ Washington should stress publicly and privately that anyattempts to suppress or intimidate the opposition runs contrary to Venezuela's constitution and the principles defined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which was adopted by Venezuela in 2001. To this point, José Cárdenas, a former USAID actingassistant administrator for Latin America, writes,¶ ¶ The Venezuelan opposition continues to insist that the constitution (which is ofChavez's own writing) be followed and have drawn up a list of simple electoral reforms that would level the playing field and betterallow the Venezuelan people to chart their own future free of chavista and foreign interference.¶ ¶ Demand free, fair and verifiable

elections. Although Venezuela announced that a special election to replace Chavez will be held next month, it is important to

remember that elections alone do not make a democracy. Indeed, Chavez long embraced the

rhetoric of democracy as he, in reality, consolidated executive power, undermined

http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-must-encourage-democratic-venezuela







Venezuela's previously democratic political system and altered the outcomes of election

through corruption, fraud and intimidation.¶ ¶ The Obama administration should make clear that free and fair

elections, properly monitored by respected international election observers, are essential to Venezuela's future standing in thehemisphere and the world. Likewise, Secretary of State John Kerry should work with regional partners—including (but not limited to)

Brazil, Canada, Colombia and Mexico—to firmly encourage Maduro's interim government. A unified regional voice

would send a powerful signal to Chavez's cronies in Caracas and longtime enablers in China,

Iran and Russia.¶ ¶ Condition future diplomatic and economic relations. Corruption andcriminality were widespread under the Chavez regime, as high-level government and military

officials benefited from close ties to corrupt businesses and international drug traffickers. Yet to

date, the Obama administration has done little to hold Venezuela's leaders accountable.¶ ¶ Washington should make

clear that full diplomatic relations with the United States will be contingent upon Venezuela

ending ties to international terrorist groups and rogue regimes like Iran. If Venezuela takes

meaningful steps to end these ties and ensure future elections, the United States should

work with Caracas and the private sector to reform Venezuela's energy industry and identify

key development projects and reforms to improve the country's economic future.¶ ¶ The United

States can play an important role in shaping Venezuela's post-Chavez future. But to do so, the Obama administration

will need to stand with the people of Venezuela by publicly defending democratic principlesand the impartial rule of law in Latin America .

The Chavez model in Venezuela has limited investment, restricted growth and

increased the risk of oil shocks and instability -U.S. investment can reverse the

trend and preserve our influence

Goldwyn 13 --- President, Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC (4/11/2013, David L., “The Impact of the Tight Oil and Gas Boom

on Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities for Cooperation,” House Committee on Foreign Affairs; Subcommittee on theWestern Hemisphere; “Energy Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean”http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-GoldwynD-20130411.pdf, JMP)

The unconventional revolution will also force the resource-endowed nations of the Western

Hemisphere to develop more competitive investment frameworks. North America hasbecome the investment destination of choice, with large markets, attractive fiscal terms,

strong rule of law and respect for contract sanctity in the U.S and Canada. As will be discussed in

greater depth, many Latin American countries are noted for resource nationalism, volatile

investment frameworks, and political extremes rather than stability. In order for Latin

America to compete, investment terms will have to improve and regulatory frameworks must

be enforced with equity and consistency. In short, the southern half of the Hemisphere must

prove that it can adapt to changing markets, resource bases and technologies in order to

compete with the opportunities found in North America. The prospects for this adaptation are mixed,

providing opportunities for U.S. energy diplomacy.¶ II. Energy Trends in the Western Hemisphere¶ The Western

Hemisphere has seen the rise of two trends in energy governance in recent years. One trend is towards rising state control

of energy resources – in Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador in particular. The concern here is that this trend will limit the growth of global supplies of oil and gas by undermining the value of existing

investments, discouraging future investment and leading to political instability resulting from

declining living standards. The economic consequence of this trend is that the hemisphere will

contribute less to the diversification of oil supply, thereby engendering a tighter international

oil market more vulnerable to the negative effects of supply shocks , increasing the

importance of OPEC supply and, over time, undermining economic development in the region.



The political consequences of these trends include the decline of U.S. influence in the region

relative to competing ideologies and the erosion of democratic structures.¶ A second, much more

positive, trend is towards creative fiscal regimes that welcome foreign investment and require state owned companies to competewith international companies, with independent regulators that promote fair and efficient regulation. Countries observing thismodel are increasing production or stalling the decline of existing reserves. Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Peru are keyexamples of this creative model.¶ When I last testified on Latin American energy trends before Congress, Mexico was generallyconsidered to be a part of the first group, making the net trend negative. Today, however, Mexico’s government is actively seekingreforms that include, but are certainly not limited to, the energy sector. A new question mark hangs over Brazil, however. WhilePetrobras had been viewed as an exemplar national oil company in recent years, it has recently seen its production estimatescurtailed, and its market value tumble. The company is no longer second in value only to Exxon Mobil. Perhaps as a sign of changingregional dynamics, Petrobras is now reported to be worth less than Colombia’s national oil company, a development that wouldhave been thought to be nearly unthinkable just a few years ago. 14 While natural gas production is rising, oil production is falling, asPetrobras has faced major challenges fulfill both its newfound responsibilities in the deep and ultra-deepwater subsalt resources,companies face challenges meeting aggressive local content requirements and Petrobras struggles to meet the political expectations

of the government.¶ Venezuela and Mexico are the most important oil exporters in the hemisphere .

While Brazil, Colombia and Argentina are important destinations for foreign investment, and

helpfully produce enough oil to meet their own domestic needs and make some contribution to the global export market, they

are not strategic suppliers to the global market at this time. Only Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela produce

more than a million barrels per day, although Colombian crude oil production rose as high as 944,310 barrels per day in 2012,15 andFederico Renjifo, the Colombian Energy and Mining Minister, has stated that the country expects to produce 1.01 mbd in 2013.16Bolivia has enormous gas reserves, but exports mostly to Brazil and modestly to Argentina. Only Trinidad and Tobago is a key

supplier to the world gas market.¶ A. The Rise in State Control¶ From those countries now committed to increasing state control, theU.S. faces two key challenges: the loss of production growth and diversity of supply from the region if new economic frameworks areunattractive to foreign investors and, most critically, the loss of U.S. influence vis-à-vis competing political visions.¶ The Economic

Impact of Rising State Control¶ The recent wave of changes in contractual terms and dramatic changes

in tax regimes in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and, in recent years, Argentina, threatens to slow new

investment and eventually deepen instability and poverty in these nations, as well as destroy

shareholder value for the companies invested there. The deterioration in the investment

climate for energy in these countries is primarily an economic threat, as it foments an

environment where supply is constrained and prices are high. We are seeing the revision of economic terms

at a time when producers rather than companies hold more market power.¶ Venezuela¶ In 2007, President Hugo Chavez led thenationalization of oil exploration and production in Venezuela, mandating renegotiation of contracts with a minimum 60 percentPdVSA share. While sixteen companies, including Shell and Chevron, complied with the new agreements, ExxonMobil and ENIrefused to cooperate and were forcibly taken over. Both companies have pending complaints before the International Centre for the

Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) at the World Bank that are expected to be decided in late 2013. As a result of thoseclaims, particularly the ExxonMobil claim, Venezuela withdrew from the ICSID in 2012.17 The impact of the nationalizations,

according to expert analysts like Deutsche Bank and Wood Mackenzie, was a massive flight of investment capital

from Venezuela’s heavy oil sector to Canada’s oil sands, effectively freezing development of

the hemisphere’s largest oil reserves during one of the greatest oil booms in history. The net

impact on Venezuela’s credit and credibility are quite negative, again with serious negative

long-term consequences for the global oil market and Venezuela’s own economy. In 2008, ENI and

Total came reached an agreement with PdVSA regarding a 2005 joint venture requirement that they had not previously signed anMOU for. Terms for involvement in natural gas development in Venezuela are slightly more beneficial, although in 2012, the year

before his death, President Chavez expressed some interest in altering those terms. It is generally expected that Venezuela’s

oil production will continue to fluctuate or stagnate without considerable outside

investment . According to the EIA, some analysts estimate that PdVSA must spend at least $3 billion annually in order to keep

production at its current levels.18 Venezuela plays a significant role in the Western Hemisphere, acting

as a proxy for Cuba and providing oil at favorable cost and financing terms to Caribbean

nations through Petrocaribe and the Southern Cone through Petrosur, ventures which add

stress to the country’s fiscal situation. While change is unlikely to happen quickly, pressure stemming from

the recent failed currency devaluation, rising inflation, and vast external subsidies will take a

toll on the economy and are ultimately unsustainable.



***2AC Extension/A2



Say Yes

Potential change of Venezuelan politics with Maduro – leveraging oil is key

Fabian 3/6/13 (Jordan; “Hugo Chávez Death: Fixing the U.S.-Venezuela Relationship Won't Be

Easy”; ABC News; March 6th

, 2013; http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/Politics/hugo-chavez-death-fixing-us-venezuela-relationship-easy/story?id=18668275) IINThe death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez removes one of the United States' foremost geopolitical foes

from Latin America, sparking hope among U.S. officials that the ensuing changes could lead to

improved relations in the region. But it won't be easy.¶ The United States and Venezuela have shared a rancorous relationship since Chávez was first elected in 1998.

Chávez angered multiple U.S. presidents by establishing ties to regimes in countries like Cuba

and Iran that are hostile to the United States, and for fomenting anti-U.S. sentiment in other

nations in the Western Hemisphere. And the Chávez regime repeatedly accused the U.S. of plotting to overthrow his rulership, fueling distrust between the two

countries.¶ Relations have become so frayed that the U.S. and Venezuela have not exchanged

ambassadors since 2010.¶ Those tensions were evident even on Tuesday, the final day of Chávez's life. Venezuela expelled two U.S. embassy officials from the country on allegations

they tried to destabilize the country. Upon their ejection, Venezuelan Vice President Nicolás Maduro even suggested that U.S. interests were behind the cancer that eventually claimed Chávez's life. ¶ But

now that Chávez has passed away, elected officials see an opening to reestablish ties with

Venezuela.¶ "Hugo Chávez ruled Venezuela with an iron hand and his passing has left a politicalvoid that we hope will be filled peacefully and through a constitutional and democratic

process," Senate Foreign Relation Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) said in a statement. "With free and fair elections, Venezuela can

begin to restore its once robust democracy and ensure respect for the human, political and

civil rights of its people."¶ "It is my sincere hope that Venezuela's leaders will seek to rebuild our once strong friendship based on shared democratic and free enterprise principles,"

added Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.¶ The path, however, could be difficult. ¶ Venezuelan officials have said a new election will be called within 30 days. Thatcontest will likely pit Maduro against Henrique Capriles Radonski, an opposition leader who touts free market policies and is perceived as friendlier to the U.S. But it's not clear that Capriles will fare better than he

did in October, when he was defeated by Chávez.¶ The former president sparked a passionate and loyal following among Venezuela's poor and lower-classes that's morphed into a strong social movement, known

as chavismo. Maduro, who will lead the country on an interim basis and is considered the front

runner, has pledged to continue Chávez's work. But experts are divided on whether chavismo

can outlive its charismatic namesake.¶ Some foreign policy observers believe that, even if Maduro wins, ties could

improve between the U.S. and Venezuela.¶ "I think it is an opportunity for us to step into a new relationship with Venezuela," Former U.N. ambassador Bill

Richardson, who met with Chávez in 2008, said on MSNBC. "The opposition candidate Capriles is pro-U.S. The vice president Maduro is not pro-U.S., but

is, I think, going to be more pragmatic than Chávez."¶ Still, the U.S. will have to work to improveits image and standing in Venezuela following nearly a decade-and-a-half of anti-U.S.

sentiment being imbued into the country's government and political culture.¶ Dan Restrepo, a former senior Latin American affairs advisor in the Obama administration, told Univision that Maduro's

decision to expel U.S. embassy officials on the day of Chávez's death "doesn't bode particularly well that the current Venezuelan government is particularly interested in a different relationship with the United

States."¶ "Now you're going to have a different political dynamic in Venezuela. The system without Chávez is going to be different .

Nobody knows exactly how different and what direction that's going to go," he added. " There is a

change coming and it could take a bunch of different forms ."¶ Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas and

Americas Society, said that it's in Maduro's political self-interest to maintain Venezuela's current tack against the United States. ¶ "My strong belief is that Maduro is going to keep relations with the U.S. in thedeep freeze because he has to establish his own legitimacy," he said in an interview with ABC/Univision. "He doesn't have his own base of support. He's got to keep tensions high with the United States." Tried and

true tactic."¶ In a statement, President Barack Obama said his administration would seek to build a "constructive

relationship with the Venezuelan government" moving forward, adding that the U.S. supports policies that

"promote democratic principles, the rule of law, and respect for human rights."¶ That's a long road, given how

deep the divide runs. Venezuela has some of the richest oil and natural gas reserves in the world and Chavez spread that wealth to many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean enabling him to curryinfluence. For example, in 2001 the Chávez government helped bail out Argentina, a regional power, from a financial crisis, a move that helped him gain popularity there. He has also built ties with left-wing

governments Bolivia and Ecuador and helped financially backstop the Castro government in Cuba. ¶ During his presidency, Chávez earned the scorn of U.S. officials

for cracking down on his political opposition and hostile media outlets. He also had a knack

for spinning conspiracy theories against the American government. For example, in 2002 he accused

the U.S. of being involved in a failed coup attempt.¶ Chávez also made overtures to Cuba's Fidel Castro and to Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who

lead governments that are also hostile toward the United States. A Univision documentary that aired last year revealed that a Venezuelan consulate official in Miami was involved in plotting cyber attacks on the

U.S. that allegedly involved agents from Iran and Cuba.¶ The U.S. government expelled the Venezuelan official, Livia Acosta Noguera, from the country and Venezuela eventually shuttered its Miami consulate. ¶

But on a key economic front, Venezuela's government has taken a pragmatic approach to the

United States. The South American nation remains one of the top contributors to the U.S.'s oil

http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/Politics/hugo-chavez-death-fixing-us-venezuela-relationship-easy/story?id=18668275








imports, ranking in the top four last year, according to the U.S. Energy Information

Administration .¶ " Oil is their political weapon, but with the U.S., they never used it," Richardson said.¶ Eric

Farnsworth added that the Venezuelan people have not traditionally been anti-American throughout their

history and it may be possible for a leader to eventually bridge the gap between the two

nations.

Venezuela is willing to cooperate with the US – only our evidence assumes the new Maduro

regime

Wasler 6/7 – Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America at the Heritage Foundation (Ray,

“Buyer Beware: Secretary Kerry and Venezuela,” The Heritage Foundation, 6/7/13,http://blog.heritage.org/2013/06/07/buyer-beware-secretary-kerry-and-venezuela/) //JG After the meeting, Kerry told the press: “We agreed today, both of us, Venezuela *read: the Maduro

regime] and the United States, that we would like to see our countries find a new way

forward, establish a more constructive and positive relationship,” Regrettably, Secretary Kerry and his

Department of State colleagues are succumbing to Diplomat’s Syndrome, a form of optical illusion or mental disorientation thatmistakes talk for action and assigns friendly gestures equal weight with actual deeds. That top diplomats of the U.S. and Venezuelatalked is no big deal. President Obama made nice with President Chavez in April 2009 and relations continued to deteriorate.

What really matters is whether Venezuela’s populist authoritarian leadership is genuinely

ready to modify behaviors that clash with important U.S. interests and values. Beginning with the

death of Chavez on March 5, the Maduro regime has engaged in virtually non-stop anti-American diatribes. It arrested U.S. citizenand filmmaker Tim Tracy on farcical charges of espionage. His recent release is a long overdue and little more than a concession toreality. Since March, President Maduro and company have repeatedly blocked efforts to obtain a fair review of voting irregularitiesin the April 14 elections and threatened and assaulted members of the democratic opposition, including a brutal attack onopposition legislators on the floor of the National Assembly. Maduro and company have also spoken of punitive reprisals againstU.S. ally Colombia, because Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos met with defeated opposition candidate Henrique Capriles.Maduro and Jaua clearly hope that Secretary Kerry and the Obama Administration will finally recognize the outcome of the April 14elections and legitimate Maduro’s presidency while openly throwing the democratic opposition under the bus. Kerry’s statement equating Maduro’s mouthpiece Jaua with Venezuela is disconcerting. The offensive of Maduro and Jaua is aimed at undercutting thediplomatic offensive of the opposition. They also hope to keep the systemic failures of their Cuban-inspired socialism and economic

mismanagement out of the discussion and obscure their ties with Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. Therefore, the bar for genuine

improvements in U.S. –Venezuela relations should remain high. It should include a serious

commitment by the Maduro regime to not only respect the rights of the democratic

opposition but to enter into an actual dialogue aimed at reducing tensions and preserving

fundamental political and economic rights. It will also require a major reversal in persistent

anti-Americanism coupled with genuine cooperation to combat illicit drug trafficking and

terrorism and adherence to all Iran and Syria sanctions. Without progress on these keys

themes, Kerry and company will falter when it comes to changing the dynamic with post-

Chavez Venezuela and legitimate authoritarian rule in Venezuela.

Willing to cooperate now - both sides are looking to normalize relations

UPI 6/11 – United Press International (“Venezuela sees normal U.S. relations this year,” United Press

International, 6/11/13, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/06/11/Venezuela-sees-normal-US-relations-this-year/UPI-72141370932200/) //Jg

Venezuela hopes to normalize relations with the United States and exchange ambassadors

this year, the country's foreign minister said. "We have agreed [with the United States] on a meeting point, and also that

our relationship will be one of mutual respect so that we can appoint ambassadors later this year," Elias Jaua told

Spanish newspaper El Pais. The State Department had no immediate comment on Jaua's timetable. U.S. Secretary of State JohnKerry announced talks aimed at improving the two countries' relations Wednesday after meeting with Jaua for about 40 minutes onthe sidelines of an Organization of American States meeting in Antigua, Guatemala. "We agreed ... both of us, Venezuela and the

United States, that we would like to see our countries find a new way forward, establish a more



constructive and positive relationship," Kerry said after the Jaua meeting. U.S.-Venezuelan relations have been

strained for years. Kerry said he hoped the countries would "quickly move to the appointment of

ambassadors." Calixto Ortega, Venezuela's newly named charge d'affaires in Washington, who attended the Guatemala

meeting, told The Wall Street Journal the two countries agreed on a plan to normalize ties and resume cooperation on counter-terrorism, anti-narcotics operations and energy. Despite strained relations, the United States imported more than $50 billion in oilfrom Venezuela last year. The Kerry-Jaua meeting took place at Venezuela's request, U.S. officials said. Jaua told El Pais PresidentHugo Chavez had pushed for the normalization of relations before he died of cancer March 5 and Chavez' successor, Nicolas

Maduro, was carrying out Chavez' wishes. Jaua stressed the relations would be "normalized," not "restored." "We

haven't broken relations," he told the newspaper. Washington has not officially recognized Maduro's April 14 victory in a specialpresidential election. When asked by El Pais if Caracas needed U.S. recognition to normalize relations, Jaua said, "No, it's notnecessary," adding recognition or not, Venezuela has "a legitimate and constitutional government." Jaua's Twitter account,however, posted a message a day after the Kerry meeting saying, "Finally Obama recognizes the legitimate government of Maduro,"with a link to a Venezuelan news website story whose headline said the same words but ended with a question mark. Even after

normalized relations, Washington intends to keep on pressing Caracas to ensure democracy and

individual freedoms, a U.S. official told the Journal.

They’ll say yes - Maduro has “extended an olive branch” to the US – now is key for coop over

democracy

Daly 5/27 – CEO of U.S.-Central Asia Biofuels Ltd. and writer for oilprice.com (John, “VenezuelanPresident Maduro Offers Olive Branch to Washington,” oilprice.com, 5/27/13,http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/South-America/Venezuelan-President-Maduro-Offers-Olive-Branch-to-Washington.html) //JG To say that U.S. relations with Venezuela’s former President Hugo Rafael Chvez grew increasingly strained would be an

understatement. But Chávez succumbed to cancer on 5 March, and the winds of change are

blowing through Caracas . Why was Chvez in Washington’s bad books? His choice of allies, which included the Russian

Federation, Iran and Cuba, but worse still were the social programs that Chávez implemented to benefit his people, which were

socialist in nature, anathema to Washington’s proscriptions. But, tying the U.S. and Venezuela together like

Siamese twins is – oil. According to the U.S. Energy Administration, Venezuela is the fourth largest provider of crude oil

imports to the U.S., averaging 930 thousand barrels per day. In its country report on Venezuela the EIA succinctly noted, “Venezuelacontains some of the largest oil and natural gas reserves in the world. It consistently ranks as one of the top suppliers of oil to the

U.S. Venezuela is one of the world's largest exporters of crude oil and the largest in the Western Hemisphere. The oil sector is ofcentral importance to the Venezuelan economy. As a founding member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

(OPEC), Venezuela is an important player in the global oil market.” Venezuela has the largest conventional oil

reserves and the second-largest natural gas reserves in the Western Hemisphere and two years ago OPEC reported that of theorganization’s 81.33 percent of the g lobe’s known oil reserves Venezuela had 24.8 percent, exceeding Saudi Arabia with 22.2percent. According to state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) figures, Venezuela currently has 77.5 billion barrels ofoil reserves, the largest in the Western Hemisphere. PDVSA has a production capacity, including its strategic associations andoperating agreements, of 4 million barrels per day, the highest production capacity in the Western Hemisphere. To fund his socialprograms, Chvez was determined to bring the country’s oil sector under government control, putting him into direct conflict withWashington’s belief in free markets. Venezuela’s oil industry had been under private control until 1974, when Venezuelanationalized it, setting up PDVSA. Venezuela’s oil production is centered in the Orinoco Oil Belt, which analysts believe contains theworld’s largest reserves of extra-heavy oil, with an estimated 300 billion recoverable barrels. In the 1990s PDVSA began a so-called“oil opening,” where it allowed more and more foreign private companies to extract oil, via majority shares in joint ventures and theoperating agreements. But difficulties began with Washington in February 2007, when Chávez announced a new law to nationalizethe last remaining oil production sites that are under foreign company control, to take effect on 1 May. Under the law, whichallowed foreign companies to negotiate the nationalization terms, earlier joint ventures, involving ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco,

Statoil, ConocoPhillips, and BP, were transformed to give PDVSA a minimum 60 percent stake. The process completed a governmentinitiative begun in 2005, when the Chavez administration transformed earlier “operating agreements” in Venezuela’s older oil fieldsinto joint ventures with a wide variety of foreign companies. Thirty out of 32 such operating agreements were transformed, withmost foreign companies accepting the new arrangements, but ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips refused, instituting lawsuits forcompensation that continue to this day. The policies had repercussions in the diplomatic sphere. On 28 June 2010 President Obamanominated Palmer as U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela but three months later Chávez announced on his weekly TV program that hewould not allow Larry Palmer to take up his post after Palmer told a US senator that morale in the Venezuelan army was low andthat members of Chávez's government had ties to leftist FARC Colombian rebels. On 28 December Chávez flatly refused to acceptPalmer because of his derogatory remarks and the following day the U.S. revoked the accreditation of Venezuelan ambassador,Bernardo Álvarez Herrera. And there relations have remained until now, even as oil sales have continued unabated. But Venezuela's



new President, Nicolás Maduro, is now seeking to break the diplomatic logjam. On 19 May, during an

interview with Venezuela’s Televen television channel, Foreign Minister Elias Jaua said, "We are going to

remain open to normalizing relations with the United States. The first thing would be to

resume diplomatic representation at the highest level," adding that Venezuela is "interested

in further deepening and cultivating a friendship with the U.S. people." To be sure, there are still

many roadblocks in the way – quite aside from the rhetorical sniping, the U.S. has yet to recognize Maduro’s election, and

there remains that pesky issue of compensation. But an olive branch has been extended , and Washington

can lose little by at least listening to the country with the Western Hemisphere’s largest

energy reserves. If they do not, then Caracas always has China, which is interested in trade more than ideological rhetoric.



Conditions Key

US must commit to democratic promotion before any further engagement

Ros-Lehtinen 13 – Member of congress from Florida who was a former an emigrant from Cuba and has

a PhD in education from University of Miami (Ileana, Engagement with the Chavez Regime Is

Counterproductive, “State’s Actions Undermine U.S. Foreign Policy Interests”, 1/4, http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/press-release/engagement-chavez-regime-counterproductive-state%E2%80%99s-actions-undermine-us-foreign-policy)//JH Washington, DC – Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) made the following comment regarding reports of the Department ofState engaging the Venezuelan regime of Hugo Chavez. Statement by Ros-Lehtinen “It is very troubling but not surprising that, once

again, the Department of State looks to cozy up with yet another tyrant in the Western Hemisphere. Chavez and his

cohorts have a long and nefarious track record of supporting illicit activities such as drug

trafficking, aiding the Iranian and Syrian regimes, violent extremist groups, and suppressing

human rights. State’s policy of engaging bad actors while ignoring their abusive power grabs

and oppression of civil society only encourages rogue regimes’ to continue their unlawful and

unconstitutional actions. This approach has failed with regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia,

and Ecuador but the Department of State does not learn from its mistakes. The Obama

Administration’s continued policy of appeasing tyrants who undermine democratic principlesdoes nothing to advance our national interest nor does it benefit the Venezuelan people. The

U.S. must support true democratic reforms in Venezuela and urge the immediate rejection of

transnational illicit networks before any further engagement with the Chavez regime takes

place.”

Unconditional engagement undercuts democracy- escalates

Noriega 2/5 – visiting fellow at the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute, has served as a U.S. diplomat and policy maker, specializing in Western

Hemisphere Affairs. (Roger, “Kerry pledges to press for democracy and anti-drug cooperation from Venezuela”, American Enterprise Institure, February 5 th, 2013,http://www.aei-ideas.org/2013/02/kerry-pledges-to-press-for-democracy-and-anti-drug-cooperation-from-venezuela/)//SQR Secretary of State John Kerry has told the US Senate that the United States will insist that “any

new elections [in Venezuela] should be democratic, constitutional, peaceful, and transparentand must respect the universal human rights of the Venezuelan people.” Kerry made this pledge in

writing in response to a question submitted during consideration of his nomination. It will soon be published by the Senate ForeignRelations Committee. Anticipating the death or incapacitation of Venezuela’s cancer-stricken leader Hugo Chvez, Kerry said, “TheVenezuelan constitution and the Inter-American Democratic Charter should define the way ahead.” The new chief US diplomat alsopledged to “support the strengthening of democratic institutions, respect for freedom of expression, rule of law, and the protection

of human rights.” Kerry has also committed to make counternarcotics and counterterrorism

cooperation a priority in any future bilateral relationship with Venezuela, along with the traditional

issues of commerce and energy. The new secretary of state has his work cut out for him in promoting democracy, human rights, andanti-drug efforts in Venezuela. The State Department’s recent annual human rights report included a blunt critique of Venezuelaunder the Chavista regime: The principal human rights abuses *…+ included government actions to impede freedom of expressionand criminalize dissent. The government harassed and intimidated privately owned television stations, other media outlets, and journalists throughout the year, using threats, fines, property seizures, targeted regulations, and criminal investigations andprosecutions. The government did not respect judicial independence or permit judges to act according to the law without fear ofretaliation. The government used the judiciary to intimidate and selectively prosecute political, union, business, and civil society

leaders who were critical of government policies or actions. There is ample evidence that Venezuela hasbecome a narcostate under Chávez, with the most senior military officers and political leaders

of the regime implicated in narcotrafficking. US officials have fresh, compelling information

implicating Chávez, his head of the National Assembly (Diosdado Cabello Rondón), his former defense minister (Henry de Jesús

Rangel Silva), his army chief (Cliver Alcalá Cordones), and his newly appointed deputy interior minister (Hugo Carvajal), and

dozens of other senior military officials in cocaine trafficking. In addition, Venezuela has provided

weapons, safe haven, and logistical, financial, and political support to Hezbollah and

Colombian terrorist groups. The Chávez regime also continues to violate international



sanctions by providing substantial material assistance to the rogue governments of Iran and

Syria. Secretary of State Kerry assumes his duties just as career US foreign service officers were opening back-channel talks to the

Chvez regime in an effort to “normalize” relations by exchanging ambassadors. Only after the matter was made public did the State

Department mention drug cooperation as one objective of these talks. Any unconditional restoration of bilateral

ties now would wade into the middle of a succession struggle, legitimize a hostile and

despotic regime, interfere with ongoing US law enforcement investigations, and undercut

democratic demands being made by the internal opposition. In light of Secretary Kerry’s forthright

commitments to the US Senate, he will now have to make a c lear and sober assessment of the state of affairs in Venezuela to decidewhether US human rights, anti-drug, and counterterrorism priorities will be truly served by rushing to recognize a Chávez successor.

A US commitment to electoral freedom is key

Wasler and Zuckerman 13 – Senior Policy Analysts on Latin America for the Heritage Foundation (Ray

and Jessica, “Venezuela After Chavez: U.S. Should Rally to Democracy,” The Heritage Foundation, 3/6/13,http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/03/venezuela-after-death-of-chavez-us-should-rally-to-democracy ) //JG A principled U.S. policy toward Venezuela should be guided by continued commitments to

broad-based—not just electoral—democracy enshrined in the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter.

Preservation of the constitutional order in Venezuela requires new elections that are not onlyfree but fair. The interests of the U.S. will be best served with the return of fully functioning

democracy (separation of powers, rule of law, protection of individual rights and liberties) in

Venezuela. To achieve these objectives, the Obama Administration should: Deliver by public diplomacy channels a

comprehensive report on the costs and consequences of the Chavez regime; Insist on maintaining the 30-day

electoral timetable and press for real international electoral observation ; Signal clearly that

anything other than free and fair elections will open the door to possible diplomatic and

economic sanctions; Continue to investigate narco-corruption and collect intelligence on criminal, terrorist, and Iranian

activity in Venezuela; and Refrain from restoring relations at the ambassadorial level without a firm Venezuelan commitment tocooperate in fighting drug trafficking and international terrorism. Too Big to Ignore The weeks and months ahead are a period of

opportunity and peril in Venezuela. The Obama Administration should not be content with leading from

behind or claiming more pressing engagements. From defending democracy to preserving stability, a post-Chavez

Venezuela is too big to ignore.

Democracy is a pre-requisite to engagement

Noriega 12- visiting fellow at the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute, has served as aU.S. diplomat and policy maker, specializing in Western Hemisphere Affairs. (Roger, “After Chvez, theNarcostate”, Foreign Policy, April 11th, 2012,http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/11/after_chavez_the_narcostate?page=0,1) //SQR Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez has tried for 10 months to conceal the fact that he is losing his bout with cancer, determined toappear in command of his revolutionary regime and the nation's future. This past Holy Week, however, television cameras capturedhim pleading for his life before a crucifix in his hometown church, his mother looking on without the slightest glint of hope on herface. Chávez's raw emotion startled his inner circle and led some to question his mental health. As a result, according to my sourcesinside the presidential palace, Minister of Defense Gen. Henry Rangel Silva has developed a plan to impose martial law if Chávez'sdeteriorating condition causes any hint of instability. Pretty dramatic stuff. So why isn't anyone outside Venezuela paying attention?Some cynics in that country still believe Chávez is hyping his illness for political advantage, while his most fervent followers expecthim to make a miraculous recovery. The democratic opposition is cautiously preparing for a competitive presidential election set f orOct. 7 -- against Chávez or a substitute. And policymakers in Washington and most regional capitals are slumbering on the sidelines.In my estimation, the approaching death of the Venezuelan caudillo could put the country on the path toward a political and socialmeltdown. The military cadre installed by Chávez in January already is behaving like a de facto regime determined to hold onto

power at all costs. And Havana, Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing are moving to protect their interests. If U.S. President Barack

Obama were to show some energetic engagement as Chávez fades, he could begin to put the brakes on

Venezuela's slide, reverse Chávismo's destructive agenda, and reclaim a role for the United States in its

own neighborhood. But if he fails to act, there will be hell to pay. Sources close to Chávez's medical team tell me

that for months, his doctors have been doing little more than treating symptoms, trying to stabilize their workaholic patient longenough to administer last-ditch chemo and radiation therapies. In that moment of Chávez's very public prayer for a miracle, he set



aside his obsession with routing his opposition or engineering a succession of power to hardline loyalists. Perhaps he knows that hislieutenants and foreign allies are behaving as if he were already dead -- consolidating power, fashioning a "revolutionary junta," andplotting repressive measures. One of them is longtime Chávista operator and military man Diosdado Cabello, who was installed byChávez to lead the ruling party as well as the National Assembly in January. Cabello's appointment was meant to reassure a powerfulcadre of narcomilitares -- Gen. Rangel Silva, Army Gen. Cliver Alcalá, retired intelligence chief Gen. Hugo Carvajal, and half a dozenother senior officers who have been branded drug "kingpins" by the U.S. government. These ruthless men will never surrenderpower and the impunity that goes with it - - and they have no illusions that elections will confer "legitimacy" on a Venezuelan narco-state, relying instead on billions of dollars in ill-gotten gain and tens of thousands of soldiers under their command. Chavismo's

civilian leadership -- including Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro, Vice President Elías Jaua, and the president's brother, Adán Chávez,the governor of the Chávez family's home state of Barinas - - are eager to vindicate their movement's ideological agenda at the polls

this fall. Maduro is extraordinarily loyal to the president, and is considered by Venezuelan political

observers as the most viable substitute on the ballot. Above all, these men crave political power and

will jockey to make themselves indispensable to the military leaders who are calling the shots today .

Cuba's Fidel and Raúl Castro are desperate to preserve the life-blood of Venezuelan oil that sustains

their bankrupt regime. According to a source who was briefed on conversations in Cuba, Raúl has counseled Chávez to

prepare to pass power to a "revolutionary junta"; Venezuelans who are suspicious of the Castros expect them to pack the junta withmen loyal to Havana. Cabello does not trust the Castros, but with thousands of Cuban intelligence officers and triggermen on theground in Venezuela, the Castro brothers are a force to be reckoned with. The Chinese have provided more than $20 billion inquickie loans to Chávez in the last 18 months, which are to be repaid by oil at well below the market price. Most of these funds werepaid into Chávez's slush funds before the Chinese knew of his terminal condition. Another $4 billion is being negotiated now, but mysources in the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry say the Chinese are demanding new guarantees. Beijing also is angling to ensure that anypost-Chávez government will honor its sweetheart deals. However, these predatory contracts are being scrutinized by leading

opposition members of the National Assembly. Iran is more dependent than ever on its banks and other ventures in Venezuela as ameans to launder billions in funds to evade tightening international financial sanctions. Companies associated with the IranianRevolutionary Guard Corps, the Qods Force, and illicit nuclear and ballistic missile programs have invested millions in infrastructurein shadowy facilities throughout Venezuela. Tehran will struggle to keep its beachhead near U.S. soil, which is vital to its survivalstrategy in the critical months ahead. Russia is considering making $1-2 billion in payments in the weeks ahead to lock in natural gasand oil deals signed with Chávez. Some in Moscow, however, are weary of the Venezuelan shakedown, particularly because theyknow that Chávez's days are numbered. Russian firms are deciding now whether to double down on the Chávez regime, which hasbeen a reliable customer of more than $13 billion in Russian arms, or wait to see if a successor government will honor its

agreements in the oil and gas sector. The Soviet-style succession that corrupt Chavistas and their Cuban

handlers are trying to impose on the Venezuelan people is anything but a done deal. There is room and

time for friends of democracy to play a constructive role. Cabello and company, my sources tell me, are far more likely

to resort to unconstitutional measures and repression if they can count on support from Moscow and Beijing. The Chavistas intend

to promise continued cheap oil and sweetheart contracts to leverage this support. Discreet U.S. diplomacy -- working in

concert with like-minded allies -- can help scuttle these plans. The Chinese and Russians may not be eager to

defend yet another violent pariah regime, and Washington should rally Latin American leaders to draw the line against a Syria

scenario in the Western Hemisphere. At the heart of the Chavista strategy is a narco-state, led by men with

well-documented ties to narco-trafficking. The White House should instruct U.S. law enforcement

agencies to smash the foundations of this regime. One Venezuelan general or corrupt judge in a witness

box in a U.S. federal courthouse will strike the regime at the very top and destroy any illusion of

legitimacy or survivability. U.S. intelligence agencies have been virtually blind to the Iranian presence in

Venezuela. If they were instructed to kick over the rocks to see what is crawling underneath, I am convinced that they would

discover a grave and growing threat against the security of the United States and its allies in the region .

Such evidence will help motivate Venezuela's neighbors to take a stand against an even more

unaccountable regime taking shape in Caracas. Venezuela's military is not a monolith, and Chávez has

undermined his own succession strategy by giving the narco-generals such visible and operational roles.The fact that the narco-generals will be more willing to resort to unconstitutional measures and repression to keep power and carrythe "narco" label sets them apart from the rank-and-file soldiers and institutionalist generals. The United States military still carries alot of weight with these men. A simple admonition to respect their constitution and serve their people may split the bulk of the force

away from the narcos and deny them the means to impose their will. (Institutionalist generals may react in a similar way to newsthat Iran is conducting secret operations on Venezuelan territory that are both unconstitutional and a dangerous provocation.)

There is much the United States and the international community can do without interfering in

Venezuela's internal politics. Although the leaders of the democratic opposition are determined to keep

their distance from Washington, they must at least show the flag in the United States and other key

countries to elicit the solidarity they deserve. Moreover, anyone who thinks the opposition can take on Cuba, China, Russia, Iran,

drug traffickers, and Hezbollah without international backing is just not thinking straight. Unfortunately, the career U.S.

diplomats in Washington responsible for Venezuela have spent the last two years downplaying the

mess there and the three years before that neglecting it altogether. So if there is any hope for U.S.



leadership, it will require the attention of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton or President Obama. Alas, in

our own neighborhood, "leading from behind" is not an option.

Human rights violations rampant now – conditioning economic engagement is

key to solve

Clark no date - Juan Clark is a professor of Sociology at Miami Dade Community College (Juan,

“CUBA: EXODUS, LIVING CONDITIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS”,http://www2.fiu.edu/~fcf/juanclark.cuba/clark97.humrtscond.html)//JHThe repressive situation described above leads us to the conclusion that the most basic human

rights are being violated to the Cuban people, all the time. Undoubtly conditions will worsen as

malnutrition and even hunger reach the highest levels and epidemics continue to develop. Efforts to escape the island

will persist in spite of restrictions imposed by the U.S., which since 1995 has been delivering into

Castro's hands those who have tried to flee that totalitarian hell . The rafters realize they can do nothing

to change the destiny of their homeland and to them it seems preferable to die trying to escape than to continue living under that

system. The number of suicides can be expected to rise even further. It is imperative that international

support be given to an emerging civil society separate from the state, embracing human rights organizations,

independent journalists, political organizations, churches, and fraternal associations that are trying to survive outside state control.

Amid such chaos, Castro, who once confiscated foreign investments now seeks them eagerly. He wants to sell the island tointernational capitalists, while foreigners benefit at the expense of Cubans who are still denied the right to productive private

property. That is whygovernments and companies that trade or may consider trading with Havana must be

informed of the violations of the human rights of the Cuban people. Those who would do business

with Cuba are urged to make any such transaction contingent upon the respect of human rights

in that country . Castro's immense economic need should enable these governments and

businesses to exercise great influence upon his government . They have the enormous

responsibility to promote the inevitable transition to democracy ‹whose main protagonists

should be the Cuban people‹ so that it may take place as soon as possible and without a

bloodbath.



Oil Key

This will collapse the Venezuelan government

Tulchin 13 - Visiting Fellow at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University, Latin American

scholar, member of the task force on Hemispheric Security Issues at the Center for Hemispheric Policy of the University of Miami (Dr.Joseph S. “Oil price is key to success for Venezuela’s President Maduro” World Review April 24 2013<http://www.worldreview.info/content/oil-price-key-success-venezuelas-president-maduro> 6/27/13)//AH

Mr Maduro now has to follow in some large footsteps . Charismatic Mr Chavez was a regional leader who created the

Latin American Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) within which populist and progressive regimes could express their aspirations as we ll as their anger with theUS. Mr Chavez was also instrumental in creating the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin Ameri can and Caribbean

States (CELAC). UNASUR has a modest infrastructure which might become a significant international forum for South America. Mr Chavez and

his charisma created something between a political movement and a personality cult in

Venezuela, establishing an emotional link with the people, especially the underclass. Mr Maduro will have difficulty

maintaining this. The Chavez governments increased social spending to three per cent of gross

domestic product (GDP). Inequality, measured by the Gini Index, declined by 10 index points. Extreme

poverty was reduced. The Chavista movement - the followers of Mr Chavez - was a politically effective, well-oiled machine. But Mr

Chavez’s legacy also includes the failure to establish the participatory democracy that he called part of Socialism of the 21st Century. Political freedoms

have declined, the space for debate has been reduced, and the rule of law has deteriorated

.Mr Chavez carries the blame for the terrible

macroeconomic policies his government imposed which have brought Venezuela to the ver ge of dysfunction. Public administration has become a bad

joke. The state simply does not work. The net judgment on the legacy of Hugo Chavez is that his regime represents a lost opportunity. Mr Maduro

has to deal with three problems from the moment he assumes power. First is the petroleum industry. The

social model built by Mr Chavez will collapse very quickly without increased production. No

Venezuelan government can survive long with the price of oil below US$90 per barrel or if

production continues to decline even at higher prices. Second is inflation. The economy is seriously dysfunctional,

largely because of Mr Chavez’s wild spending spree in the year prior to last October’s elections and his

dependence on oil revenue. Third is the crime rate which makes Venezuela one of the most v iolent countries in the world. This is itself

symbolic of a more general problem of social cohesion. Today, Venezuelan society is deeply divided. Civil discourse has disappeared, personal freedomshave been severely curtailed, the rule of law is uncertain. It will be a challenge for the new government t o avoid civic discord and violence and deal with

widespread crime. A rising proportion of this is connected to international traffic in drugs. But it is petroleum which has

dominated Venezuela’s economy for nearly a century. Petroleum revenue equals 82 per centof Venezuela’s GDP. PDVSA was turned into Venezuela’s largest social benefits ministry using

virtually all its petroleum sales revenue to pay for the ambitious government social

programmes carried out by Mr Chavez when he was president. The variables that will determine the future

capacity of the Venezuelan government to pay its debts, control inflation, and pay for its

social welfare programmes are the international price of oil; the level of oil production; and

the level of investment in Venezuela’s petroleum industry. The interplay between these

determines the scenarios for Venezuela’s future.

U.S. resources and expertise are key to revive the oil sector

Farnsworth 13 - vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society

(4/11/2013, Eric, “ENERGY SECURITY OPPORTUNITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, HEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRSSUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-FarnsworthE-20130411.pdf, JMP)

More broadly, the U nited S tates has a strategic interest in working with willing nations in the

hemisphere to develop their own energy resources effectively, while promoting models that



reduce the negative if unintended consequences of regional energy development, including a

lack of transparency and official corruption, the distorting impact of consumption subsidies,

an over-reliance on a single commodity or sector, environmental concerns, and a

concentration of wealth and political power around the sector. In order to develop their respective

industries, nations need U.S. technology , management expertise, and investment dollars. They

need our education system to develop their engineers and seismologists, they need help to

understand regulatory, tax, and policy models that work, they need to be exposed to best

practices in environmental mitigation, and they need our technical assistance to improve the

investment climate and the rule of law.

Large-scale rapprochement not likely now but oil investment could catalyze

stronger relations

Metzker 13 (6/17/2013, Jared, “Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend U.S.-Venezuela

Relations ,” http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/analysts-say-oil-could-help-mend-u-s-venezuela-

relations/, JMP)WASHINGTON, Jun 17 2013 (IPS) - A shift in U.S. foreign policy towards Venezuela may be pending as a bilateralrapprochement suddenly appears more possible than it has in years. On the sidelines of talks held earlier

this month in Guatemala by the Organisation of American States (OAS), U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with VenezuelanForeign Minister Elias Jaua, with Kerry’s subsequent statements indicating that relations could be heading in a friendlier direction.¶ “We agreed today – both of us, Venezuela and the United States – that we would like to see our countries find a new way forward,establish a more constructive and positive relationship and find the ways to do that,” Kerry said following the meeting with Jaua,which was reportedly requested by the Venezuelans.¶ The meeting happened on the heels of the release of Timothy Tracy, a U.S.filmmaker whom Venezuela had been holding on accusations of espionage. His release was interpreted by many as an “olive branch”being offered by the new Venezuelan government of Nicholas Maduro, whose presidency Washington still has not formallyrecognised.¶ Only months ago, before the death of Venezuela’s long-time socialist leader Hugo Chavez, any normalisation ofrelations between Venezuela and the United States seemed highly unlikely.¶ In 2002, Chavez was briefly removed from power by amilitary coup d’état that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had known was imminent. Chavez immediately accused theUnited States of having played a part in the event. After his suspicions were confirmed partly valid, his rhetoric grew more scathing.¶ In 2006, he famously told the United Nations General Assembly that then-U.S. President George W. Bush was “the devil himself”.¶ Following Chavez’s death from cancer in March, however, his hand-picked successor, Maduro, the former vice-president, has not

been as vitriolic in his posturing vis-à-vis the United States.¶ According to Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue,a Washington-based think tank, Maduro has offered “conflicting signals”.¶ “Maduro has so far shifted in his position toward the U.S.between a moderate approach and a more hard-line one,” Shifter told IPS.¶ The new president’s waffling may be a reflection of histenuous grip on power. By many accounts, Maduro lacks the political prowess and rabble-rousing charm of Chavez, who enjoyedmilitary backing as well as fervent support from the lower classes.¶ In addition to a strong anti-Chavista opposition that openlychallenges the legitimacy of his narrowly won election, Maduro has had to deal with a split within Chavez’s own former politicalbase.¶ Shifter pointed out that among the military, which was once a source of significant strength for Chavez, more support is givento Diosdado Cabello, currently head of Venezuela’s parliament and whose supporters believe he was the rightful heir to the

presidency.¶ Maduro’s legitimacy stems largely from his perceived ideological fidelity, the reason for

his selection by Chavez to lead in the first place. Shifter said this leads him to “emulate” his predecessor and

makes rapprochement with the U nited S tates less probable.¶ Still, ideological concerns may not

ultimately decide the issue . Venezuela has inherited from Chavez an economy in difficult

straits, which continues to suffer from notorious shortages and high inflation.¶ Oil economy¶ Over half of Venezuela’s

federal budget revenues come from its oil industry, which also accounts for 95 percent of the country’s exports.

Estimated at 77 billion barrels, its proven reserves of black gold are the largest of any nation in the world.¶ Despite a troubledpolitical relationship, its principal customer is the United States, which imports nearly a million barrels a day from Venezuela.¶ Venezuela’s oil industry has been officially nationalised since the 1970s, and, as president, Chavez further tightened governmentcontrol over its production. His government took a greater chunk of revenues and imposed quotas that ensured a certain percentagewould always go directly towards aiding Venezuelans via social spending and fuel subsidies.¶ While these measures may be popularwith Venezuelans, who pay the lowest price for gasoline in the world, critics argue such policies hampered growth and led tomismanagement of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the main state-run oil company.¶ The same critics also point to increasingdebt levels, slowdowns in productions and accidents stemming from faulty infrastructure.¶ In order to boost production, PdVSAagreed in May to accept a number of major loans. This includes one from Chevron, one of the largest U.S. oil companies, which will



work with Venezuelans to develop new extraction sites.¶ “The oil sector is in deep trouble in Venezuela –

production is down and the economic situation is deteriorating,” explained Shifter. “They know

they need foreign investment to increase production, and this is in part what has motivated

Maduro to reach out.”¶ If its economy continues to falter, Venezuela may be further tempted

to embrace the U nited S tates, which has the largest, most sophisticated fossil fuel industry in

the world . Kerry’s recent words suggest that the administration of President Barack Obama would be waiting with open arms.¶

“Venezuela cannot confront its economic crisis and the United States at the same time,” Diana Villiers Negroponte, a senior f ellow atthe Brookings Institute, a Washington think tank, told IPS, “and we are a pragmatic country which will deal with Maduro if it is in ourinterests.”¶ Indeed, Negroponte said she was “optimistic” about the possibility of rapprochement between the two countries withinthe next six months. She notes a “troika” of issues on which the United States is looking for Venezuelan cooperation: counter-

terrorism, counter-narcotics and assistance in ridding Colombia of its FARC rebels.¶ Nonetheless, major actions remain to

be taken if normalisation is to even begin, such as the exchange of ambassadors and official U.S. recognition of the

Maduro government. Shifter (who regards the Kerry-Jaua meeting as “a small step”) was not

optimistic that these larger requirements will be completed in the short term.¶ “I don’t think

Washington is going to push hard to send an ambassador to Caracas,” he said. “It will probably take

more time to observe the new government and see where it is going.”

This is critical to boost U.S. influence and mold the regional economic

framework

Goldwyn 13 --- President, Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC (4/11/2013, David L., “The Impact ofthe Tight Oil and Gas Boom on Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities forCooperation,” House Committee on Foreign Affairs; Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere;“Energy Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean”http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-GoldwynD-20130411.pdf, JMP)III. The Impact of Hemispheric Energy Trends on U.S. Foreign Policy¶ The tight oil boom will produce competitive

pressure on the region’s oil and gas producers. If global oil prices soften, revenues could fall s ignificantly and put

major fiscal pressure on governments highly dependent on resource revenues for their budgets. The market will impact these

economies far more than any U.S. policy can. But there will be a debate over economic frameworks in the

hemisphere, and the U.S. should be a part of it . While U.S. influence in the hemisphere has

waned in key areas in recent years, our ability to help these economies revive through energy

investment , and to grow through more competitive energy feed stocks can help change this

pattern if we take advantage of it. We have key strategic partners in the region including Brazil, Mexico, Chile,

Argentina, and Colombia.We can effectively use trade as a tool for good, as witnessed by the US-Colombia Free

Trade Agreement. We need to appreciate the salience of legitimate regional issues like poverty and

advocate how our economic and political models can alleviate them. Examples of this are addressing

trade barriers to agricultural imports, expanding educational opportunities in the U.S. for future leaders, improving the visaapplication process, dealing with migration issues with Mexico in a spirit of respect and fairness, supporting World Bank and InterAmerican Development Bank infrastructure programs in the hemisphere, supporting the development of civil society and thecapacity of democratic institutions, and treating our relations with our hemispheric neighbors as intrinsically important, not aslitmus tests of loyalty to the U.S. on issues external to the region itself. In countries where we face ideological competition, it iscrucial that we do not abandon the field. We need to increase our diplomatic engagement and defend our way of thinking.¶ A.

Uncertainty in Venezuela¶ Venezuela has long been seen as the leader of a regional group of states

seeking to wage an ideological and political competition for regional influence with the U.S.

Yet the death of President Chavez, whose charisma has long been regarded as a key facet of the Bolivarian narrative, and

Venezuela’s growing economic problems, which were recently reflected by the government’s efforts to devalue the

currency by more than 30% against the dollar, have led some observers to believe that the influence of the



Venezuelan model has peaked. Many are now forecasting that the Brazilian economic model, which still provides for a

generous state role in the economy, yet does so in a more market-friendly and democratic context, will gain clout among states inthe region that remain skeptical of liberal economics and the Washington consensus.¶ In the wake of Hugo Chavez’s death, manyquestions remain about whether political change is possible in Venezuela itself. Indeed, the opposition candidate in the April 14election to succeed Chavez, Henrique Capriles, is a vocal adherent of the Brazilian model that many say is gaining regional traction.Yet it is widely assumed that Chavez’ handpicked successor, Vice President Nicolas Maduro, will win the election. Several divergent

prognostications have been made regarding what a Maduro Presidency would entail for the U.S. While some perceive

Maduro as a pragmatist who may be amenable to normalizing bilateral ties , others believe that he will

be eager to prove his Bolivarian credentials to Chavez’s constituency and reject any U.S. entreaties to reengage. Still others

doubt whether he will be able to retain the Presidency at all should the economic situation

deteriorate further. Diosdado Cabello, a fellow Chavez adherent who is President of the National Assembly and is reported

to be a popular figure among the Venezuelan Armed Forces, is commonly cited as an individual capable of seizing the Presidency,potentially through forcible means, should an opportunistic situation present itself.¶ The manner in which the next VenezuelanPresident manages Venezuela’s oil wealth will have significant implications for international oil markets, which remain fairly tightdue to supply disruptions in geopolitical hotspots Iran, South Sudan, Yemen, and Syria. In February 2012, the Economist estimatedthat international markets have lost 1.25 million barrels per day as a result of these and other recent supply disruptions.28Venezuela is an even more significant player in international markets; EIA estimates that it exports around 1.7 million barrels of

crude per day.29 The impacts on Venezuela’s own economy will also be very profound, as Venezuela’s economy is far from

diversified and remains nearly entirely dependent on the oil sector . In recent years, PdVSA’s exploration and

production capital expenditures have not been sufficient to reverse production declines in the country’s mature conventional fields

or to harness the country’s massive oil sands reserves in the Orinoco Belt. These unconventional resources are thought to accountfor around 90% of Venezuela’s remaining proven oil reserves. In order to maintain production at a reasonable

clip, the next Venezuelan President will have to improve the country’s oil and gas investment

regime to attract international firms with expertise in enhanced oil recovery techniques in

conventional fields and in the unique, challenging technical requirements for producing the extra heavy crude oil in the Orinoco Belt,

and that also have the resources to alleviate massive infrastructure bottlenecks that plague

the oil sands production. ¶ It is hard to be optimistic about Venezuela’s near term prospects. Canadian heavy crudes are

likely to fulfill a greater share of the US need for heavy crude. While heavy coking refinery capacity is growing world wide, Venezuelawill face a challenging market for its crudes and lower profit margins as the distance to market will grow.¶ B. The Status of Current

Dialogues¶ The US has had a number of bilateral and multilateral energy policy forums in the

hemisphere over the years. These forums are platforms to understand market dynamics,

share best practices on energy efficiency and conservation, share understanding on ways to

enhance energy production, and exchange views on how a nation’s energy policies may be

enhanced or reformed to promote the nation’s own policy. These policy dialogues are also

essential for building the understanding and relationships that are essential for trade

promotion and conflict resolution .¶ Numerous dialogues and programs have been enacted since 2008, when I wrote that engagement wit h the

Western Hemisphere needed to be renewed. Among those are a number of programs and initiatives aimed at energy relations.¶ The Energy and Climate Partnership of theAmericas (ECPA) was founded at the invitation of President Obama following the April 2009 Summit of the Americas, hosted in Trinidad and Tobago. ECPA was intended to focuson issues including energy efficiency, renewable energy, cleaner and more efficient use of fossil fuels, energy poverty, and infrastructure, and Secretary of State Clinton laterproposed expanding the focus to include sustainable forests and land use a nd climate change adaptation. ECPA brings together governments and public and private sectorpartners to implement initiatives and complete projects, and boasts numerous initiatives in Central and South America and the Caribbean.¶ Among the ECPA Initiatives are theColombia Biomass Initiative, which aims to develop a technological plan for the production of energy from agroindustrial biomass, and the Chile Renewable Energy Center,which is intended to serve as a tool a nd resource for the region as it seeks to increase its use of renewable fuels. Both projects are undertaken in collaboration with the U.S.Department of Energy, which provides technical assistance and opportunities for collaborative work.¶ Numerous dialogues exist today between the U.S. and Brazil. The U.S.-Brazil Strategic Energy Dialogue (SED), a presidential-level partnership aiming to deepen energy cooperation between the two nations, is one of the most significant.Strengthening energy security, the creation of new jobs and industries and reduction of carbon emissions are key goals of the SED. Major topics of the dialogue include biofuels,renewables and the sustainable development of oil and gas resources.¶ The US has a trilateral energy policy dialogue with Canada and Mexico, which has addressed electricpower, energy conservation, harmonization of standards and market outlooks. It has taken many forms, but it functions very well. In May 2012 the U.S., Mexico, Canada Map of

Potential Carbon Dioxide Storage Capacity was released, identifying capacity in North America for at least 500 years worth of carbon dioxide emissions. The “New NorthAmerican Carbon Storage Atlas” was created through the North American Carbon Atlas Partnership, and was developed by DOE, Natural Resources Canada, and the MexicanMinistry of Energy.¶ We have many paths for cooperation. What we need now is a sharper focus on what we should prioritize, so we can maximize our impact and make themost of the limited e ngagement of our senior officials.¶ IV. Energy Security Opportunities for the U.S.¶ The Committee is wise to see the unique period of opportunity that the

massive changes in oil and gas markets have created for U.S. foreign policy. While we will be more self-sufficient at home, our

national security will still depend on a diverse global supply of oil gas, one able to withstand

the inevitable disruptions we will face. If we can take this moment to help the hemisphere increase its own self sufficiency, wean itself from

high carbon fuels, access more cost competitive feed stocks for power and transportation, and reduce dependence on subsidized Venezuelan fuel oil, we will have helped ourown national security interests and helped to foster a freer, more prosperous, and more climate secure hemisphere. Here I offer six steps that the United States can take tomeet its energy security goals in the Hemisphere.¶ 1. Sustain Efforts Aimed at Energy Efficiency and the Adoption of Biofuels and Renewable¶ Technologies¶ Lowering globalcarbon emissions in order to mitigate the impacts of climate change is an important step towards ensuring global energy security. Latin America is highly dependent upon fossilfuels for its energy needs, most notably oil, coal and natural gas. Fuel oil is still a frequently used fuel for power generation, in spite of the fact that it is relatively inefficient and



particularly bad for the environment. Hydropower has long been the favored form of renewable energy in Latin Am erica, but changing weather patterns a nd droughts haveprevented it from being fully reliable. The United States has, as described above, undertaken initiatives aimed at expanding the spread of biofuels and renewables in theWestern Hemisphere, and this should remain a priority. The expiration of the U.S. tariff on imported biofuels was a step in the right direction, and more ca n be done to developbiofuels industries in Latin America. The development of new industries, clean energy research centers and government policies incentivizing the use of renewable technologiesfor power generation will help to build long-term, sustainable industries in the Hemisphere. Regardless of the power source used, energy efficiency is a worthwhile goal for LatinAmerica. The IEA noted in the World Energy Outlook 2012 that while energy intensity is not particularly high in Latin America, it is primarily because high energy intensity inenergy producing nations is offset by low energy use in energy importing nations. Improving energy efficiency, particularly in energy producing nations, will permit moreefficient use of energy resources, allowing them to stretch farther. Existing forums like the ECPA already have energy efficiency as an issue of focus and can aid in connectingcompanies that represent successful and proven efficiency technologies with partners in Latin America. ¶ 2. Propagate Advanced Production Technologies Abroad¶ Latin Americahas significant reserves of oil and gas, including potentially huge unconventional resources. One of the fastest, and perhaps easiest, ways for the U.S. to ensure diversification ofenergy supplies is to help other nations take advantage of the unconventional energy revolution. This will mean sharing technology, building regulatory regimes, improvingenvironmental safety standards and possibly even developing infrastructure in nations with shale gas and tight oil reserves. The U.S. should continue to expand upon the workthat the Department of State and partner agencies are attempting to achieve through UGTEP, offering technical, regulatory, geological and other support to countries that wantto develop their shale oil and gas resources. There are also roles for companies to play, sharing their technology and technical expertise through partnerships, investmentopportunities or service contracts. Helping other nations develop their domestic resources will increase global energy security by increasing and diversifying global supply.Natural gas is also, as far a s fossil fuels go, a relatively low-carbon source of energy, and the expansion of the shale gas boom may offset global coal consumption and carbonemissions, serving as a boon for climate goals as well. By helping other nations, such as Colombia, Brazil and Mexico, adapt to changing energy markets and complex newsources of energy, the U.S. will be simultaneously ensuring its own energy security.¶ 3. Research Ways to Encourage Gas Penetration in the Caribbean¶ With abundant naturalgas supply a short distance from the Caribbean, the US should look for ways to back out fuel oil and gasoline as a feedstock for power and transportation. While these nationsare trying to maximize renewable energy, they still need a non-intermittent source of power generation. But short driving distance makes CNG or other natural gas technologiesa real possibility. The key challenges are m oving gas to small islands, ensuring storage or other means of security of supply, and identifying the right forms of vehicle technology.How to make this transition economically is a question for engineers as well as policymakers. The U.S. should design ways that private foundations, in tandem with our nationallaboratories and perhaps the OAS, can look for near-term, practical ways to increase natural gas utilization. Combined with a permissive policy on natural gas ex ports to theCaribbean, this could be major step forward for climate and national security for the Caribbean.¶ 4. Reconsider the U.S. Policy Regarding Oil and Gas Exports and Swaps¶ In lightof the unconventional revolution, the U.S. will have surpluses of natural gas and even light oil, given that the domestic refining system is primarily configured to process heavyoil. Large price differentials also exist for U.S. resources, largely as a result of infrastructure and policy constraints that keep them trapped in the U.S. Current U.S. policy onlypermits the export of crude oil in highly limited circumstances. A careful reconsideration of U.S. export policy, particularly towards oil, may be warranted. Allowing some ex portsor swaps of light oil produced in the U.S. for the heavy oil needed for refineries would enable us to supply our hemispheric neighbors, increase export earnings, and sustaindomestic job growth. Granting an additional avenue for sale of energy resources, either oil or gas, will a lso ensure that artificial barriers to export don’t lead to decreasedproduction, high domestic prices and lost value to the economy, while simultaneously adding to global energy supply stability and security.¶ The hemisphere can also benefitfrom additional exports of natural gas. Mexico imports costly LNG at oil-linked prices. The Caribbean is dependent on fuel oil for power generation and Brent prices gasoline for

transportation. These exports could present a political advantage as well as an economic one, granting the U.S. with another tool to use in the Western Hemisphere, whereVenezuelan influence is cemented by subsidized sales of crude oil and products.¶ 5. Complete the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Agreement¶ On February 20, 2012, the U.S. andMexico signed a transboundary hydrocarbons agreement that allows for the joint the development of oil and gas reservoirs that cross the international maritime boundarybetween the two countries in the Gulf of Mexico.30 If implemented, the agreement would end the current moratorium on exploration and production in the border area. Whilethe Mexican Senate ratified the agreement on April 12, 2012, the Obama Administration has not formally submitted the agreement to the U.S. Congress for passage. The entryinto force of this agreement would render significant benefits for both the U.S. and Mexico.31 It would provide a means for Pemex to collaborate with private companies in theGulf of Mexico border area, which would give Pemex a crucial opportunity to gain expertise in deepwater activities that could be applied to the firm’s operations throughoutMexico. This would serve U.S. interests by boosting Mexican production and reducing U.S. dependence on imports from more polit ically troublesome regions, which havereplaced lagging Mexican exports in recent years.32 Conversely, U.S. reticence to implement the agreement may send the wrong signal to Mexico and dampen enthusiasm forenergy sector reform at a time when the stage may be set for historic change. Indeed, competent implementation of the agreement could demonstrate to Mexico that itsinterests can be protected in joint production regimes with U.S. companies and bring about an impetus for broader Mexican energy reforms.¶ 6. Revive Energy Diplomacy and

Commercial Engagement¶ Energy diplomacy and commercial advocacy should be vital components of U.S.

energy policy in the coming decades. The global energy system is projected to remain

dependent upon fossil fuels for the foreseeable future, and as a result, having access to

reliable, affordable sources of energy will remain important, as will the stability of energy

markets. Energy diplomacy should center on ensuring that the U.S. has good working

relationships with the countries that produce and consume energy. Successful energydiplomacy can serve a critical role in managing tensions over energy development,

transportation, investment, and other issues. ¶ The Department of State has significantly

increased its capabilities to conduct energy diplomacy through the establishment of the Energy and Natural

Resources Bureau, led by Ambassador Carlos Pascual. Its programs should be robustly funded. We should also deepen the

international energy diplomacy capacity of the Department of Energy . The Department of Energy’s

relationships with civil servants in ministries across the globe provide a bridge across changes in government here and there. Theycan talk when the politics of non-energy issues obstruct dialogue among the foreign ministries. It is easier to get Energy Ministers

together for regular meetings than Secretaries of State. Their staff should be expanded and serious program

budget established to make our cooperation more than rhetorical . For true reform to be

achieved, foreign ministers and heads of government will have to be involved, as this will be

the key to integrating energy security into foreign policy.¶ The three countries that need robust attention at

this time are Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela. Mexico is considering major reforms and we have much we can share at a technical levelon gas markets, unconventional oil and gas technology, safe regulation of the deepwater, and energy efficiency. We should create aquiet bilateral mechanism for sharing this information with Mexican ministries, its nascent regulator and PEMEX. Changing globalmarkets also impact Brazil, and we should ensure that the Strategic Energy Dialogue is reactivated as soon as new officials are on

board at the Department of Energy. Venezuela is trickier because it is in political transition and there is a

great deal of rhetorical hostility. But the US had a technical dialogue with Venezuela that

lasted over 30 years. We need to know the new officials at the Ministry and PdVSA and to



share our view of market realities , even if we may not agree on them. Sometime in 2013,

after the Venezuelan elections, this technical dialogue should be revived , perhaps at the

Assistant Secretary, or Deputy Assistant Secretary level.¶ Conclusion¶ Mr. Chairman, the ties between Latin

America and the Caribbean and the energy security of the United States are numerous. Here I have addressed only a few of thepossible avenues for improving U.S. energy security, and there are undoubtedly more, but the overarching conclusion is that

energy security goals in the Hemisphere can be achieved through improved dialogue andrelations with allies and adversaries alike. As I stated in 2008, it will require new approaches to

energy and foreign policy. It will require fresh policy approaches, money, and creative

diplomacy. But more than anything it will require leadership . As a citizen I thank the committee for its

leadership on this critical issue.



Impacts



---Global War

Externally, conflict in Venezuela goes global involving every major power


generation warfare instability”; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012;http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1139) IINPartnerships, and Coalitions. These are agreements among states or nonstate actors to: 1) coordinate

behavior in the event of political-economic-social-military emergencies; 2) increase empirical

power in the international security arena; 3) counterbalance threats posed by potential

aggressors in the anarchical global security environment; and, 4) support coercive diplomacy.

Thus, alliances, partnerships, and coalitions have operated in the security arena for thousands of years, and really are not “new”

instruments of statecraft. Their primary rule and purpose, forever, has been and is to protect,

maintain, and/or enhance one’s own interests.51 These tenets define a part of Hugo Chavez’s “New Strategic

Map for the Exportation of the Bolivarian Revolution.” That part of his “map” is entitled “Stimulating the New Multipolar

System.” The rationale for this is that “the United States will continue to increase its interventionist,

aggressive, genocidal, and savage policies regarding the Americas. Thus, we must prepare ourselves to

deal with and overcome these hegemonic issues. We must work hard, very hard, to prevail over the United States and extend therevolution to the rest of the Latin American region.”52 Accordingly, Chavez has brought together an unlikely

assortment of state and nonstate actors, and criminal-terrorist organizations for these

purposes. They are: 1) the Bolivarian Alliance led by Venezuala, which includes Bolivia, Cuba,

Ecuador, Nicaragua, and, possibly, Argentina; 2) Iran and Russia; and, 3) at the very least, this

alliance offers material and political support to the insurgent and drug trafficking

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Ira nian surrogate and terrorist Hezbollah

operations in the Western Hemisphere, and other violent nonstate actors such as African and

Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs). Thus, this group of partners (allies) comprises a hybrid

of state, nonstate, and criminal-terrorist franchises that appear to be expanding as this monograph is being written. The one

thing this diverse group of parties has in common is a hatred for the West in general and the United

States in particular.53

Bolivarian state displaces US influence in Western Hemisphere – Latin America,

Russia, and Iran on board for asymmetric war

Manwaring 12 (Max G. - Professor of Military Strategy; “Venezuela as an exporter of 4thgeneration warfare instability”; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012;http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1139) IINSince his election as the President of Venezuela in 1998, Hugo Chavez has encouraged and continues to

encourage his Venezuelan, Latin American, Russian, and Iranian partners to support an

undeclared asymmetric war paradigm designed to put an end to U.S. political and economic

influence in the Western Hemisphere and to transform the whole of Latin America into a

single Bolivarian (Socialist) state. Chavez’s model centers on a three-front asymmetric war that is: 1) psychological-

political; 2) uses combinations of asymmetric ways and means to achieve its ends; and, 3) is deliberately protracted. In addition toAsymmetric War, Chavez calls this type of conflict 4th Generation War (4GW).2 Whether or not Chavez can deliver on his three-front21st-century transition program is really not all that important. This is not because this is the rhetoric of a “nut case,” a “clown,” oreven a “dead man” immersed in “political theater.” This is, importantly, the rhetoric of an astute warrior who understandsasymmetric war and who is performing the traditional and universal Leninist-Maoist function of providing a strategic vision and

operational plan for a successful revolutionary conflict. Most importantly, Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian dream has stirred

the imaginations of many Latin American and other interested observers around the world.

He has provided a seductive Leninist blueprint for a utopian future. Anyone can take it, adapt

it for his own use, and use it anywhere in the world to bring about radical political, economic,



---State Failure

State failure is zero-sum resulting in corrupt state, nonstate, and/or individual

actors victory social violence, criminal anarchy, terrorism, displacement

Manwaring 12 (Max G. - Professor of Military Strategy; “Venezuela as an exporter of 4thgeneration warfare instability”; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012;http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1139) IINOperationalizing a “New” Paramilitary Mission—Facilitating the Processes of State Failure. Like revolution, state failure is a

process, not an outcome. Contemporary 4GW asymmetric destabilization threats to personal and

collective security and well-being are not necessarily direct attacks on a government. They are,

however, proven means for weakening governing regimes. These indirect threats reflect a logical progression

from the problems of institutional and state weaknesses to the partial collapse of the state,

and, finally, to state failure. The process is brought on by poor, irresponsible, and/or

insensitive governance and leads to one other fundamental reason states fail. That is, state

failure can be a process exacerbated either by nonstate groups or nation-states (e.g., insurgents,

transnational criminal organizations and their enforcer gangs, and/or civil or military or paramilitary organizations operating directly

on behalf of a nation-state or indirectly as a proxy (surrogate). The general intent is to depose an established

government or exercise illicit control over a targeted country. Destabilizing actions

perpetrated by nonstate groups (including proxies) or state authorities weaken government and its

institutions, and regimes become progressively less capable of performing the fundamental

security and well-being tasks of responsible governance.49 More specifically, the state failure process

tends to move from personal violence to increased collective violence and social disorder to

kidnappings, bank robberies, violent property takeovers, murders/assassinations, personal

and institutional corruption, criminal anarchy, and internal and external population

displacements. In turn, the momentum of this process of violence tends to evolve into more widespread

social violence, serious degradation of the economy, and diminished governmental capability

to provide personal and collective security and guarantee the rule of law to all citizens. Then,

using complicity, intimidation, corruption, and indifference, an irregular political actor or nonstate group can quietly and subtly co-opt politicians, bureaucrats, and security person nel to gain political control of a given piece of the national territory. The individual

or nonstate group that takes control of a series of networked pieces of such “ungoverned

territory” can then become a dominant political actor (e.g., warlord) and control a quasi-state within a state.50

Somewhere near the end of the destabilization process, the state will be able to control less and less of its

national territory and fewer and fewer of the people in it. The diminishment of responsible

governance and citizen security generates greater poverty, violence, and instability—and a

downward spiral in terms of socioeconomic development and well-being. It is a zero-sum

game in which state, nonstate, or individual actors (e.g., insurgents, transnational criminal organizations,

corrupt public officials, and hegemonic states) are the winners, and the rest of a targeted society are losers.

Unless and until a society perceives that its government deals with issues of personal security,

well-being, and socioeconomic development fairly and effectively, the potential for internal or

external forces to destabilize and subvert a regime is considerable. Regimes that ignore thislesson often find themselves in a “crisis of governance.” They face increasing social violence,

criminal anarchy, terrorism, insurgency, and overthrow. This process has been known to lead to the violent

imposition of a radical political-economic-social restructuring of the state and its governance in accordance with the values—good,bad, or nonexistent—of the best organized and most-disciplined group left standing.



---Venezuela War

Venezuela possesses Russian arms – threat to Latin American security


generation warfare instability”; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012;http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1139) IINMilitary-Paramilitary presence builds on the previous two closely related elements of Hugo Chavez’s “New Strategic Map for theExportation of the Bolivarian Revolution” These actions facilitate serious regional instability through significant military equipmentand arms purchases and training. They support extremists and various “liberation movements” in the Hemisphere and “generateeconomic production, influence, and angst.”62 In a world where public opinion is crucial, economic production, influence, and angst

keep bourgeois enemies off balance and are great facilitators of long-term success (i.e., destabilization).Military,

paramilitary, and intelligence information is always among the murkiest areas of concern in global security politics.

But even if complete and accurate information is not available, these issues cannot be prudently ignored. After all,

governments do not invest long-term resources in pursuit of ephemeral or insubstantial aims. In that connection, Venezuela hassubmitted two reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), one in 1997 and the other in 2002. Both were nil. At thesame time, even though Venezuela ratified the Organization of American States (OAS) Transparency Convention in 2005, it has neversubmitted a report. This was because of military secrecy laws; the 1999 Constitution gives the President of the Republic the right toclassify and control disclosure of matters directly relating to the planning and execution of operations concerning national security.

Additionally, in 2009, the National Assembly approved a law to maintain the confidentiality of military agreements betweenVenezuela and other states.63 As a consequence, Venezuela has provided no information on weapons

transfers from Russia either to UNROCA or the OAS . However, in 2012, Russia reported to the

UNROCA that it had delivered 24 combat aircraft, 44 attack helicopters, and 2,272 missiles and

missile launchers to Venezuela.64 Jane’s Intelligence Weekly and Jane’s International Defense Review report a good

deal more. They state that Venezuela and Russia have signed agreements for arms and training over

the period from 2004 to 2010 that amount to $11 billion. During that time, Venezuela received 24 Su-30MKV

multirole fighters, 92 T-72 tanks, 57 transport and assault Mi-17/26/-35 helicopters, 25 CATIC K-8WB lead-in fighter trainers, four

Damen Stan Lander 5612 transport ships, and two Stan Patrol 2602 coastal patrol craft. Other programs, coming to $4

billion, provide additional patrol vessels, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and BMP-3

infantry fighting vehicles. Additionally, Russia is supplying 24 BM-21 122 mm and 12 Smerch 300 mm multiple

rocket launchers, 48 Sanyi 120 mm self-propelled mortars, 48 MSTA-S 152 mm self-propelled howitzers, and

Buk-M2E mobile air defense systems. Lastly, more arms, long-range mobile radars, air defense systems, and electronic

warfare centers are expected to be delivered in 2012.65 Accordingly, it is being reported that Russia is trying to regain

the influential position it enjoyed in the 1970s and early-1980s in Latin America. At the same time,

Russia is repaying Venezuela for its diplomatic recognition of the independence of Georgia’s

breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.66 Whether or not these assertions can be proved is not as important as the fact

that the reports of Venezuelan acquisition of these arms and weapons systems are destabilizing the

military balance and causing a great deal of “angst” in Colombia, Guyana, and a few other

countries in Latin America and the Caribbean regions.67



four different levels of analysis—each with a regional (Latin American) corollary, orientedtoward countering a possible Venezuelan threat. From that point, contemporary asymmetricconflict and its implications may be examined. The First Level. This is a more or less traditional-legal level of analysis at the nation-state level that involves the potential threat of conventionalinterstate war. For example, President Chvez has defined Colombia as Venezuela’s most criticalexternal threat.49 Addtionally, although remote, an undeniable possibility of interstate war—based on old territorial quarrels—exists between Venezuela and Colombia and betweenVenezuela and Guyana.50 The corollary concerns possible Venezuelan support to ongoinginsurgencies and radical populist movements in various Latin American states—and resultantbilateral and multilateral tensions. The corollary also concerns the traditional principle of“nonintervention.” The question, simply put, is, “How to respond to a country that is helping todestabilize its neighbors?” The implications are enormous. Under the absolutist concept ofnational security and sovereignty, there is no aggression unless it is blatantly obvious, or can beproved legally, that uniformed forces of one country have forcefully moved into the nationalterritory of another. Now we understand that an aggressor may not necessarily be a recognizedmilitary entity. The enemy could become the state itself or a nonstate actor that plans andimplements the kind of direct or indirect, lethal or nonlethal, or military or nonmilitary activity

that subverts stability in other countries. The associated question for the Western Hemisphereis, “How to operationalize a rule-based system and make multilateral security a reality?” TheSecond Level. The second level of analysis is that of subnational threats to stability andsovereignty (effective control over what occurs within a given national territory). Subnationalthreats may be generated by elements operating within a state, but they may also operatebetween states—and be considered transnational threats. Examples include—but are notlimited to—terrorists; insurgents; narco-traffickers; and other organized criminals, populists,warlords, and gangs. The threat, in any case, involves the intent either to control a targetedgovernment politically, or to change radically or destroy a given nation-state. In these terms, anonstate actor can do what has already been done in at least two Mexican states and oneBrazilian state, as follows: If the irregular attacker—terrorists, drug cartels, criminal gangs,

militant religious fundamentalists, or a combination of such nonstate actors— blends crime,terrorism, and war, he can extend his already significant influence. After embracing advancedweaponry, including Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD] (including chemical and biologicalagents), radio frequency weapons, and advanced intelligence gathering technology, along withmore common weapons systems and technology, the attacker can transcend drug running,robbery, kidnapping, and murder and pose a significant challenge to the nation-state and itsinstitutions. Then, using complicity, intimidation, corruption, and indifference, the irregularattacker can quietly and subtly co-opt individual politicians and bureaucrats and gain politicalcontrol of a given geographical or political enclave. Such corruption and distortion canpotentially lead to the emergence of a network of government protection of illicit activities, andthe emergence of a virtual criminal state or political entity. A series of networked enclavescould, then, become a dominant political actor within a state or group of states. Thus, rather

than violently competing with a nation-state, an irregular attacker can criminally co-opt andseize control of the state.51 Additionally, it is important to note that this second level of analysiswould include proxies or surrogates of other countries. Many of the “Wars of NationalLiberation” and “People’s Wars” that were fought all over the world during the so-called ColdWar are good examples of this phenomenon. In this context, it is important to note that, at aForum on Fourth-Generation of Warfare and Asymmetric War, held in Caracas, Venezuela, inearly 2004, President Chvez directed the armed forces to develop a new military doctrine forcontemporary conflict: “I call upon everybody to start an . . . effort to apprehend . . . the ideas,



American security dialogue, the most important implication of the third-level personal securitycomponent of the contemporary conflict spectrum is the issue of achieving a balancedsocioeconomic development with freedom and security. Experience throughout the world andover time clearly indicates that the inability or unwillingness of a government to perform itsfundamental governance and personal security functions leads to failing or failed state status.55Clearly, many of the problems integral to the failing state process have their origins in weak orinadequate institutions that result in poor or thuggish responses to issues ranging from povertyto street gangs to organized crime. Thus, the question here is, “How to strengthen stateinstitutions as they attempt perform their legitimate governance and security functions?” TheFourth Level. Finally, at the fourth global level of analysis, much of the international communityis involved in securing the benefits of global integration. The keys to those benefits are securityand stability. A multipolar world in which one or a hundred state and nonstate actors areexerting differing types and levels of power within a set of cross-cutting alliances is volatile anddangerous. As a consequence, the countries and peoples that expect the benefits of globalstability must understand and cope with the threats imposed by the new global securityenvironment, think outside the proverbial hemispheric “box,” and make a contribution—however small—to world stability. At the same time, President Chvez’s approach to Latin

American security and stability requires a realignment from capitalist and “neo-liberal”economics and politics to his socialism for the 21st century. That realignment will likely generateinstability, conflict, and probably exacerbate the processes of state failure in important parts ofthe hemisphere. Thus, the corollary at this level must address questions associated with“peacekeeping,” “stability operations,” “nation-building,” and “state failure.” The implicationsare straightforward. In the contemporary security environment, international organizations suchas the UN and the OAS, and individual national powers, increasingly are being called on torespond to conflict generated by all kinds of material instabilities and human destabilizers.Likewise, the global community increasingly is being asked to respond to failing and failedstates. In these terms, it is important to remember that state failure is a process, not anoutcome. It is a process by which a state loses the capacity and/or the will to perform its

essential legitimizing governance and security functions. In either case, the associated questionis “How should the processes of state failure be addressed before they run their courses andachieve conflict and/or crisis proportions?” Conclusions from the Four Levels of Analysis. Chvezunderstands that every player in the international community from small powers to the U.S.superpower must cope simultaneously with four separate and potentially grave types ofcontemporary threat. These threats include, first, traditional and lingering boundary andterritorial disputes, as well as balance of power concerns. Second, each protagonist must dealwith the very real possibility that transnational and internal nonstate actors can be used by onenation-state to play serious roles in destabilizing and taking down another. Additionally,destabilizing nontraditional internal public and personal security threats can been seen all overthe hemisphere in ungoverned territories, urban criminal gangs, more conventional terrorism,and insurgency. At the same time, real threats to effective sovereignty exist, stemming from

chronic poverty, disease, and other “root causes” of conflict. Accordingly, all of the above typesof threats are seen as methods of choice—or areas for exploitation—for various commercial(narco-traffickers and organized criminals), ideological (insurgencies such as Peru’s SenderoLuminoso) movements, and caudillos like Chvez who are completely and ruthlessly dedicatedto achieving control or radical change in a given nation-state. Nevertheless, rather thanconsidering each level of conflict as an independent form of warfare, Chvez finds that it is moreuseful to think of them as parts within his concept of total war, a people’s war, or a superinsurgency.56 The questions associated with the corollaries and implications of each of the



above levels of analysis, thus, imply no easy set of tasks. However, if the United States and theother countries of the Americas ignore what is happening in the region, that inaction coulddestroy the democracy, free market economies, and prosperity that has been achieved, andplace the posterity of the hemisphere at serious risk.



---Famine

Famine will continue under Maduro’s rule

Lehtinen 13 (Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen June 14, 2013 Florida Republican, is chairman of the

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa “As VenezuelansStruggle to Find Food, Maduro to Receive UN Award for Food Production” http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/venezuelans-struggle-find-food-maduro-receive-un-award-food-production) For months, What's Next Venezuela and other major news outlets have been reporting on the rampant shortages plaguingVenezuela. In light of this reality, we and many others were stunned to learn this week that President Nicolás Maduro is expected toreceive an award from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) for the "progress" Venezuela has made in

food-related matters. The irony is palpable; shortages in Venezuela are now so severe that Venezuelans

have turned to a mobile app that helps them locate basic goods like milk and toilet paper.Maduro's troubling two months in office and record shortages have caused many, including Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, towonder aloud whether the award is indeed justified. While the FAO argues advances have been made with regards to food

development and consumption in Venezuela, the facts and figures beg to differ. The Venezuelan Central Bank

reported that shortages in May rose to 21.3 percent, its highest level in 64 months. In other

words, two out of 10 products were not in stock in grocery stores and supermarkets. Furthermore,

that same month Venezuelan consumer prices increased at a record pace after a devaluation of the currency pushed up the cost ofimports. Prices climbed 6.1 percent from April, accelerating the annual inflation rate to a record-high 35.2 percent. Price controlsand foreign exchange restrictions in the import-dependent nation have triggered shortages in every sector of the Venezuelan

economy. Basic food products such as chicken, milk, sugar and toilet paper have become an

ordeal to find. Not even the Catholic Church has been exempt of the country's growing scarcities. Wheat flour used for the

sacramental wafers is scarce, while the supply of altar wine used for Holy Communion is threatened, likely forcing the Church to

ration supplies. Maduro's only solution to the problem has been to blame Venezuelans for

"overconsumption." Such a charge stands in utter contrast to the scenes of hungry

Venezuelans swarming a grocery truck when it finally arrived with the food they needed.

Maduro, meanwhile, has responded by telling Venezuelans not to "panic" and to "regularize consumption," accusing the public forthe government's failed policies.

http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/venezuelans-struggle-find-food-maduro-receive-un-award-food-production








America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategy regarding

Venezuela has often strengthened Chvez’s position. Every time Washington chastises Venezuela for opposing American

interests or attempts to bring sanctions against the Latin American country, the leader in Caracas (whether it be Chávez or Maduro)

simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler. This weakens the United

States’ diplomatic position, while simultaneously strengthening Venezuela’s. If Washington wants Latin America to stop

its current trend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less astringent tone in dealing with

Venezuela. Caracas will be unable to paint Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in turn gain a better image in LatinAmerica. Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American

nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be economically advisable. With the world’s

largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources, and stunning natural beauty to attract

scores of tourists, Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically. Even now, America can see the

possible benefits of economic engagement with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation: Each year,thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a Boston-

area oil company. Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation

with the entirety of Latin America. It was mostly through Venezuela’s efforts that the United

States was unable to create a “Free Trade Area of the Americas,” an endeavor that would

have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more

lucrative trade. In a world where the United States and Venezuela were to enjoy normalized

relations, all nations involved would benefit from such agreements. For both diplomatic and economicreasons, then, positive engagement is the best course of action for the United States. As it stands, the negative

relationship between the countries has created an atmosphere of animosity in the

hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic cooperation nearly impossible. While

there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticized—authoritarian

rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly policies—nothing that the United States is doing to

counter those drawbacks is having any effect. The United States should stop playing “tough guy” with Venezuela, bite the bullet, andwork toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere. We aren’t catching any flies with our vinegar—it’s high time westarted trying to catch them with honey



---Venezuelan Econ

Venezuelan economy on the brink of collapsing

El Universal 13(El Universal, March 12, 2013“US fears economic collapse in Venezuela”

http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/130312/us-fears-economic-collapse-in-venezuela) Alert to the situation of Venezuela following the death of President Hugo Chávez, the US intelligence services have

warned against economic collapse in the Latin American country according to a report that

also elaborates on other situations across the region. The next Venezuelan Government will have to

face both the consequences of growing deterioration among businesses and increasing

economic imbalances, the report presented on Tuesday to the US Senate reads. The report indicates that the country's

obligations arising from debts taken on by the Venezuelan Government will consume raising oil revenues regardless of high oil

prices. The report also draws the attention to "the wave of violent crime," which puts the

Venezuelan population in jeopardy.

Low oil prices kill Venezuelan economy

Peterson 08 (Robert D. – Colonel US Army; “US STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH HUGO CHAVEZ’S

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITIAS”; U.S. Army War College; March 15, 2008;http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479076) IINThe United States has long promoted a policy of open, free-market, global liberalization as thebest way to increase long-term economic growth and stability. Chavez has implemented aneconomic model fed with oil dollars based on state intervention and control of business. Hisprograms have been successful largely due to relatively high oil prices. Oil revenues have fedChavez’s social growth.30 The World Bank Group suggested that his economic success is notsustainable over the long term and that a modest fall of oil prices will strain his social budget.31Foreign investment in Venezuela has declined significantly in the last few years due to Chavez’staxing and seizing of company assets. “Without financial transparency, foreign investment, non-oil- sector growth, and publicly accountable and independent institutions, Venezuelan officials

will find it difficult to sustain economic growth and maintain current investments in educationand health care.”32

Venezuela dependent on oil exports to US

Bustamante and Sweig 8 (Michael J. – research associate for Latin America studies at thecouncil on Foreign Relations; Julia E. - the Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow anddirector of the Latin America Studies program at the Council on Foreign Relations; “PUBLICDIPLOMACY IN A CHANGING WORLD: SECTION THREE: NATIONAL CASE STUDIES OF PUBLICDIPLOMACY AND COMMENTARY: Buena Vista Solidarity and the Axis of Aid: Cuban andVenezuelan Public”; March 2008; The Annals of The American Academy of Political and SocialScience; Lexis) IINSuccesses, Failures, and the Search for Soft Power¶ While the Cuban and Venezuelan governments share many of the same ideo-

logical orientations and goals, their public diplomacy strategies differ. At the very least, President Chavez's penchant

toward the dramatic, combined with his ostentatious largesse and reputation as a power

broker, make Venezuela's public diplomacy presence more susceptible to accusations of

grandstanding . Notably, a comparison of these two cases suggests that public diplomacy success is not always directly

correlated with the amount of resources devoted to the effort. In fact, perhaps because Cuba appears more modest in its ambitions,

it seems more genuine--an ironic result in some ways. After all, one would expect global opinion to be far more

suspicious of the international promotional efforts of a one-party state than those of a

government that, for all its difficulties, continues to answer to electoral politics and the free

http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/130312/us-fears-economic-collapse-in-venezuela








market.¶ Of course, as this article also suggests, the real root of the difference may be that Cuba can easily rally support behind

the widely discredited U.S. embargo. Venezuela, on the other hand, depends heavily on sustained oil trade

with the United States as well as other deepening commercial ties to the North. n22 As a

result, the Chavez government's opposition to the United States risks appearing less deeply

rooted, less permanent, and more embedded in rhetoric than true revolutionary sacrifice. History may also be on Cuba's side in that the island's revolution has already acquired a certain mythic status, while for Venezuela,

Chavez's long-term legacy has yet to be written. Havana's aid and other outreach efforts have remained at their core the same fornearly half a century. Consequently, the scope and ambitions of the island's public diplomacy efforts are well understood throughout

the world. Venezuela, on the other hand, is a new, more geopolitically powerful player whose

intentions are viewed with greater suspicion.

Poor oil economic structure hampering Venezuelan economy now

Puntes 7/1/13 (Suhelis Tejero; “Venezuela's economic imbalances prevent achievement ofgoals”; July 1, 2013; El Universal; http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/130701/venezuelas-economic-imbalances-prevent-achievement-of-goals) IINRestoring an economy full of imbalances that no longer matches the plan outlined less than a

year ago is one of the challenges Venezuelan authorities are facing. Based on the results, the model

designed within the framework of socialism appears unfeasible in the long term.¶ The Venezuelan government's economic

goals for 2013 included growth at 6%, inflation at 14-16%, with the oil basket price at USD 55

per barrel and the foreign exchange rate at VEB 4.3 per USD dollar.¶ However, the government first

missed a goal in February, when the Executive Office ordered a devaluation of the Venezuelan bolivar

by 46.5%, to VEB 6.3 per US dollar.¶ Then, after the quarterly economic growth hit some five

percent throughout 2012, the economy stopped and growth stood at 0.7% in January-March

2013.¶ Furthermore, inflation in January-May hit 19.4%, more than three percentage points above

the year's inflation goal.¶ The only goal met thus far is the oil price. Calculated at USD 55 per barrel, last week the oil

basket averaged USD 98.99 per barrel.¶ The real problems¶ Unlike other times, the current situation is not the result

of external factors or specific situations, but of structural issues negatively affecting the

economy.¶ Some of the driving forces behind the country's current situation are lower oil output

(2.3% down in May as against the same month in 2012); sales of oil at 60-70% of market price under the

Petrocaribe agreement; allocation of windfall oil revenues to different funds free ofmonitoring, just like the case of traditional fiscal accounts; and spiraling inflation, with the

annualized rate as of May at 35.2% .¶ Further, the public manufacturing sector has slowed down. According to the

Central Bank of Venezuela, state-owned manufacturing companies recorded a 12.1% drop in the first quarter of 2013.

The United States intervention sends strong signal to other countries key to soft

power and jump starts weak Venezuelan economy

Christy 13 (Patrick Christy, March 15, 2013, Senior Policy Analyst the Foreign Policy Institute,US News “Obama Must Stand Up for Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela”http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-must-encourage-democratic-venezuela) Venezuela's upcoming election to replace the late Hugo Chavez gives the country an important opportunity to break away from over

a decade's worth of strongman rule—and move towards better governance, improved internal security and stability, a stronger and

more vibrant economy, and a truly constructive role in regional and global affairs. It's critical that the United States do

what it can to encourage Venezuela to seize that opportunity. For over a decade, Chavez led ideologically-

driven efforts to erode U.S. standing in Latin America and around the globe. The populist leader expanded Venezuela's ties withrogue states such as Cuba and Iran, aided and protected terrorist organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(FARC), and actively undermined the rule of law in Venezuela and throughout the Americas. In the Western Hemisphere alone,

Chavez used record petrol prices to prop up anti-American socialist leaders, most notably in Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua. Chavez

leaves behind a broken economy, a deeply divided nation and a dysfunctional government, all

of which will take years—if not decades—to overcome. Venezuela is plagued with double-digit

http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/130701/venezuelas-economic-imbalances-prevent-achievement-of-goals













inflation, mounting budget deficits and rising levels of violence. While the OPEC nation maintains one of

the world's largest geological oil reserves, crude exports—which account for roughly 45 percent of federal budget revenues—havedeclined by nearly half since 1999. The United States imports roughly one million barrels from Venezuela per day. [See a collectionof political cartoons on the economy.] Chavez's protégé Nicolas Maduro, the former vice president who's now acting as Venezuela'sinterim president, is running to succeed the late strongman, but it's not preordained that he'll win. It remains to be seen the extentto which he can properly unite prior to the election the many competing populist factions that benefited under Chavez for so manyyears. What is clear is that he will drape himself in the political ideology of chavismo in the run up to April 14 elections, and use—

and quite possibly abuse—government institutions and petrodollars in attempt to woo the country's voters. What's perverse is howthe Obama administration's move to "reset" relations with Maduro is doing more to legitimize him as the rightful heir to Venezuela'spresidency than to resuscitate relations between the two governments. The move showed itself to be even more naive after Maduroaccused the United States of plotting to poison Chavez shortly after the strongman's death. [Check out our editorial cartoons onPresident Obama.] Washington must realize that a strategy of engagement alone will not ensure a renewed and improved

partnership with Caracas. Failure to realize this will not only undermine whatever influence America

has in the months ahead, but also send a troubling signal to Venezuela's increasingly united

political opposition. The Obama administration should instead pursue a more principled policy

towards a post-Chavez Venezuela. In particular, it should: Pressure Caracas to implement key election reforms. Venezuela's

opposition faces formidable obstacles. Interim President Maduro will use the government's near-monopoly

control of public airwaves, its established networks of political patronage and last-minute

public spending programs to bolster his populist agenda. Washington should stress publicly and privately that

any attempts to suppress or intimidate the opposition runs contrary to Venezuela's constitution and the principles defined in theInter-American Democratic Charter, which was adopted by Venezuela in 2001. To this point, José Cárdenas, a former USAID acting

assistant administrator for Latin America, writes, The Venezuelan opposition continues to insist that the constitution (which is ofChavez's own writing) be followed and have drawn up a list of simple electoral reforms that would level the playing field and betterallow the Venezuelan people to chart their own future free of chavista and foreign interference. Demand free, fair and verifiableelections. Although Venezuela announced that a special election to replace Chavez will be held next month, it is important toremember that elections alone do not make a democracy. Indeed, Chavez long embraced the rhetoric of democracy as he, in reality,consolidated executive power, undermined Venezuela's previously democratic political system and altered the outcomes of electionthrough corruption, fraud and intimidation. [Read the U.S. News Debate: Given The Current Deficit Crisis, Should Foreign Aid Be

Cut?] The Obama administration should make clear that free and fair elections, properly

monitored by respected international election observers, are essential to Venezuela's future

standing in the hemisphere and the world. Likewise, Secretary of State John Kerry should work with regional

partners—including (but not limited to) Brazil, Canada, Colombia and Mexico—to firmly encourage Maduro's interim government. A

unified regional voice would send a powerful signal to Chavez's cronies in Caracas and

longtime enablers in China, Iran and Russia. Condition future diplomatic and economic

relations. Corruption and criminality were widespread under the Chavez regime, as high-levelgovernment and military officials benefited from close ties to corrupt businesses and

international drug traffickers. Yet to date, the Obama administration has done little to hold Venezuela's leaders

accountable. [See Photos: The Life of Hugo Chavez] Washington should make clear that full diplomatic relations with the UnitedStates will be contingent upon Venezuela ending ties to international terrorist groups and rogue regimes like Iran. If Venezuela takes

meaningful steps to end these ties and ensure future elections, the United States should work with Caracas and

the private sector to reform Venezuela's energy industry and identify key development

projects and reforms to improve the country's economic future. The United States can play an important

role in shaping Venezuela's post-Chavez future. But to do so, the Obama administration will need to stand with

the people of Venezuela by publicly defending democratic principles and the impartial rule of

law in Latin America.



---4GW

Oil wealth being used for Bolivarian revolution. Fourth generation war is the

only threat to US influence and supremacy – empirics prove.

Peterson 08 (Robert D. – Colonel US Army; “US STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH HUGO CHAVEZ’SESTABLISHMENT OF MILITIAS”; U.S. Army War College; March 15, 2008;http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479076) IINUS STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH HUGO CHAVEZ’S ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITIAS Introduction HugoChavez was democratically elected president of Venezuela in December 1998 and began whathe calls a Bolivarian revolution, named after Simon Bolivar, a nineteenth-century leader of LatinAmerican independence wars.1 He has repeatedly reformed the democratic government into anever increasing socialist state with increased control by the executive branch, development oflarge social programs, and government control of energy companies and the media.2 Chavez isan extremely vocal anti-US., anti-capitalist who wants to be the leader of Latin America and aworld player.3 Overall United States credibility in Central and South America has declined over

the last decade due to the Iraq war and the “perceived failure of the pro-market reforms that itchampioned in the 1990s.”4 Widespread social inequality and poverty are the regions largestproblems with an estimated 40 percent of the citizens of Latin America living in poverty.5 WithVenezuela’s recent increase in oil revenues Hugo Chavez is able to spend millions on anti-poverty, health care, and social development initiatives thereby significantly increasing hisBolivarian ideology and his stature. Problem Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s anti-UScrusade includes: anti-democracy, anti-free market economy, anti-free trade agreements andglobal economies, destabilizing the region, lack of cooperation with drug enforcementoperations, and building alliances with U.S. adversaries including Cuba, Iran and North Korea.6On April 11, 2002 the Venezuelan military conducted a coup and held Chavez in custody at amilitary base for a few days before he was released and again grabbed power.7 The UnitedStates responded suspiciously to the coup with the White House Press Secretary indicating that

“the United States looked forward to working with the transitional government, thereby givingthe impression that the administration had welcomed, even supported, Chavez’s forceddeparture.”8 The perceived U.S. involvement in the coup fueled Chavez’s suspicion and hate forthe American government. Subsequently, Chavez built, funded, and armed militias to defend thecountry from a United States attack and as a means to suppress internal dissent and support hiscontinued Presidency. The principle security threats to the United States today areunconventional in nature and seek to respond to America’s massive conventional forcesuperiority in asymmetric ways. The lesson of the Persian Gulf War, Kosovo, and most recentlyin Afghanistan and Iraq is that no nation-state can afford to oppose the United States in asymmetrical manner with heavy Army divisions or tactical fighter planes.9 Chavez has studiedthe lessons of fighting the U.S. and has built his strategy around asymmetric warfare. He has

“closely followed the Iraq insurgency, and has called on his armed forces to learn how to mimicthe Sunni resistance”10 should the United States invade his country. In a speech by theVenezuelan Minister of Defense, Gustavo Reyes Rangel Briceno, on 18 July 2007, he defines theUnited States as the enemy and states that the U.S. uses 6 phases to gain power in regions.11The first phase is the destabilization of the society through “transculturization, ungovernability,economic war and communicational war” while pretending to be friends and defendingdemocracy, Human rights, etc. The second phase is consolidation of subversive groups with theintent of debilitating the constituted government. The third phase is promotion of regional






conflicts, the fourth – threats of direct intervention, the fifth phase is the invasion, and the finalphase is the imposition of puppet governments and distribution of gains so they become visibleto the “great corporations”. To defend against U.S. aggression brought on by a “clear deficiencyof energy” and a need to attain vital energy using military and economic power, the Minister ofDefense stated that Venezuela would conduct an asymmetric war, a war of resistance, “a longwar of all the town” to answer the “imperialistic aggressions in defense or our Mothercountry.”12 This is not rhetoric from a lunatic dictator’s appointee but a strategy and processthat is engrained into all parts of the government and society. Hugo Chavez is using thecountry’s oil wealth to subsidize his Bolivarian revolution, destabilizing Latin America in order tounify it under his rule. He is following the dream of his idol, the region’s 19th-century liberatorSimon Bolivar, who expelled Spanish rule from South America with the dream of unifying thesubcontinent.13 Chavez is using all elements of national power to achieve his goal, includingtraining his militias as an asymmetric force not only to defend the country from a United Statesinvasion and to protect his internal power, but also to destabilize Latin American states in orderto spread his Bolivarian revolution.14 To accomplish this grandeur strategy he will need apowerful tool, militias that can provide the means by coercion, and possibly force, for spreadingthe revolution throughout the region. Chavez‘s strategy to deal with the United States in the

21st century includes what he calls a “Super Insurgency”, “fourth-generation warfare” (4GW),“Asymmetric War” or “War of all the People”.15 This war among the people has combatantsmore likely deployed in small groups of armed soldiers, not necessarily in uniforms, andinterspersed among ordinary people.16 This type of warfare uses all elements of national power – political, economical, social, and military – “to convince the enemy’s political decision makersthat their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.” Thistheory uses a principle that superior “political will”, over an extended period that could bemeasured in decades, can defeat a greater military and economic power like the U.S.17 ColonelThomas Hammes in his book The Sling and The Stone points out that only fourth-generationwarfare has defeated a superpower and has defeated both the United States and the SovietUnion on multiple occasions.18 The Bolivarian revolution ideology is Chavez’s “will” imposed

over Venezuela and his loftier goal of the region. His strategy could also be used to defeat U.S.’sinterests in the region and an American intervention into his country. Clearly Chavez recognizesthat the U.S. strategic center of gravity is our “political will” and he is building a strategy toengage his enemy to the North. Recent history has shown Hugo Chavez that buildingconventional military forces to impose his revolution by force in neighboring countries will likelyend in their defeat, international condemnation and possibly his fall from power. SaddamHussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 illustrates the vulnerabilities with using conventional forcesto impose “will” on neighbors. The Iraqi dictator was condemned by the United Nations andArab countries, his forces were expelled from Kuwait, and most were destroyed by an immensecoalition of forces led by the United States. In watching the U.S. military in other actions in thelast two decades most notably: the Panama invasion in 1989, Bosnia, Kosovo, OperationEnduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq; Chavez understands that

his conventional forces are no match against the United States. However, lessons of the currentirregular insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq give him hope and a possible “way” to achieve hisobjective of a Bolivarian revolution throughout the southern hemisphere, that the United Stateshas little political resolve and lasting power against.



A2: Reason for anti-Americanism

Venezuelan anti-American sentiment is unwarranted – it’s just state building

Bustamante and Sweig 8 (Michael J. – research associate for Latin America studies at the

council on Foreign Relations; Julia E. - the Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow anddirector of the Latin America Studies program at the Council on Foreign Relations; “PUBLICDIPLOMACY IN A CHANGING WORLD: SECTION THREE: NATIONAL CASE STUDIES OF PUBLICDIPLOMACY AND COMMENTARY: Buena Vista Solidarity and the Axis of Aid: Cuban andVenezuelan Public”; March 2008; The Annals of The American Academy of Political and SocialScience; Lexis) IINOn a more directly political level, Venezuela has attempted to mobilize citizens across the world to

stand in solidarity with the Bolivarian Revolution as it faces what Chavez describes as external

threats and provocations, primarily from the United States. Much like Cuba's OSPAAAL in the 1960s,

Venezuela has organized periodic "World Gatherings in Solidarity with the Bolivarian Revolution" and forged

relationships with international "Bolivarian Circles" as well as the "Hands Off Venezuela"

network (http://www.handsoffvenezuela.org), founded after the United States was widely suspected to

have colluded in the 2002 coup that unseated Chavez for several days. The Chavez government has

also been a direct participant and sponsor of events with a broader goal of promoting

sustainable development in the third world and resisting global neoliberalism. Most notable was

Venezuela's role as host for one of the branches of 2006's "polycentric" World Social Forum--a conference established in 2003 tocounter the yearly World Economic Forum in Davos. Officials took advantage of the occasion to appeal for the support of the morethan sixty thousand conference attendees. On a principal avenue in Caracas, for example, a "festival of revolutionary democracy"highlighted the Chavez government's health, education, and other social programs, while outdoor video screens played pro-Chavezdocumentaries (Frasquet 2006).¶ Yet partly because the Chavez government is relatively new, and partly because Venezuela's

economic fortunes do not seem so desperate (oil prices and revenues have hit all-time highs in recent years), the idea that the

country is somehow drastically threatened and in need of moral support can be a tough sell.

Venezuelan officials have used Washington's suspected collaboration in the 2002 coup to

successfully stoke anti-U.S. sentiment internationally. But particularly since the appointment of Thomas A.

Shannon as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs in 2005, U.S. officials have taken asomewhat more moderate tone toward Caracas. Without something as concrete and consistent as the embargo

to rally around, Bolivarian solidarity groups appear more fragmented and their message less urgent. Moreover, the fact that

Venezuela continues to depend on the United States to purchase more than 50 percent of its

oil exports casts a suspicious shadow over the authenticity of Chavez's anti-American

credentials (Lapper 2006, 21-24).¶ [*234] This is not to say that Chavez himself is not popular as a personal figure in parts of the

world. Among Palestinians, the Venezuelan leader has been treated like a celebrity (Khatib 2006). During President Bush's visits to

Latin America, most recently during the spring of 2007, Chavez has presided at large outdoor assemblies

convened to protest the U.S. president's presence (Cormier 2007). Nonetheless, Chavez also tends to

behave and speak rashly, much more so than his Cuban counterparts, who are generally very

precise in the statements they release to the media. For example, Chavez's melodramatic speech

to the UN General Assembly in September 2006, during which he labeled President Bush "the

devil," was widely deemed a public relations disaster that may have even cost Venezuela itschance at winning a seat on the UN Security Council (Hoge 2006). Likewise, Chavez's open favoritism

for left-leaning electoral candidates in neighboring countries appears to contradict his

demand that the United States cease its support for Venezuelan opposition groups. In fact, in

Peru's 2006 presidential contest, Venezuela's vocal endorsement of leftist candidate Ollanta Humala provoked enough of anationalist reaction to help Alan Garcia reclaim the presidency (Romero 2006).



Chavez spread anti-American sentiment for power – Revolution isn’t

revolutionary

Bustamante and Sweig 8 (Michael J. – research associate for Latin America studies at thecouncil on Foreign Relations; Julia E. - the Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow anddirector of the Latin America Studies program at the Council on Foreign Relations; “PUBLIC

DIPLOMACY IN A CHANGING WORLD: SECTION THREE: NATIONAL CASE STUDIES OF PUBLICDIPLOMACY AND COMMENTARY: Buena Vista Solidarity and the Axis of Aid: Cuban andVenezuelan Public”; March 2008; The Annals of The American Academy of Political and SocialScience; Lexis) IINIn addition to providing subsidized oil for the poor, Venezuela has dramatically expanded both energy and

nonenergy negotiations with a variety of international partners. Since 2005, for example, Brazil and

Venezuela have collaborated on the construction and upgrading of refineries as well as joint oil exploration off the Venezuelan coast

(Wertheim 2005, 28). With Colombia's government, hardly an ally of left-wing chavismo, Venezuelan officials are pursuing the

possible construction of a pipeline linking the two countries to facilitate Venezuelan exports to Asia (Marquez 2004). Venezuela has

also substantially expanded the scope of its energy collaborations with China and Iran, developments that have

provoked concern in the United States . Finally, although the project was put on hold in the summer of 2007, Chavez

has worked closely over the past several years with a number of neighbors on plans for a ten-thousand-kilometer natural gaspipeline that would travel south from Venezuela across the entire continent (Lapper 2006, 14-18). Outside of the energy sector,Chavez has extended his financial reach as well, most notably in Argentina, where the Venezuelan government has purchased morethan $ 5 billion in Argentine bonds (Associated Press 2007; Barrionuevo 2007).¶ Chavez opponents see many of these programs as

unfeasible, fruitless political investments that will bring few long-term benefits to the Venezuelan economy or its citizens. The

Venezuelan government, on the other hand, frames these initiatives as part of a greater struggle to

create a basis for independent regional development and, in a spirit of solidarity, further the

economic and social integration of the hemisphere--rhetoric also used to characterize projects

like Operacion Milagro and PetroCaribe. Yet Venezuela's wide-ranging endeavors also reveal several practical, rather

than strictly ideological, components of Chavez's foreign policy strategy: the desire to diversify the sources of Venezuela's revenue,decrease its dependency on U.S. purchases of its oil, and increase the country's influence as a major economic player in the

hemisphere. Because Venezuela's international trade profile is so large, and because the

government has aggressively sought to leverage its financial resources abroad (Chavez is known to

be a price-hawk in OPEC), Chavez is seen in some quarters as more of a power broker than a thirdworld revolutionary. Controversial diplomatic initiatives with Iran and Syria, deliberately

intended to antagonize the United States, have only furthered this perception . By contrast, with the

help of the U.S. embargo, Cuba has been content to portray itself as the little guy, the perennial David to the U.S. Goliath.¶ In this

context, the size of Venezuela's charitable largesse exposes the country's leadership to

accusations of clientelism and of attempting to simply purchase influence. More worrisome for

Caracas, however, is the risk that those programs with a more straightforward humanitarian focus (where

the potential public diplomacy gains are large) may be perceived as less than altruistic extensions of

chavista global power politics. Cuban aid programs have been subject to similar [*241] accusations. Yet because Cuba

can more easily fall back on well-established and widely accepted narratives of its victimization at the hands of the U.S. empire, andbecause the island's stake in trade, energy, and commercial matters is relatively small, the politicking inherent in its internationaloutreach may appear less threatening, while being no less strategic. While the positive public diplomacy effects of many of Chavez'said programs throughout the world should not be discounted or underestimated, at the very least what this suggests is a point of

vulnerability in Venezuela's public diplomacy strategy. If taken too far, populist generosity can appear openly patronizing, aconundrum the United States has often faced with its own foreign aid programs.¶ Other vulnerabilities are more directly of Chavez's

own making. In addition to publicly supporting candidates in foreign elections, on several occasions the Venezuelan

government has been criticized for using international aid to influence electoral outcomes.

One noteworthy case occurred in Nicaragua where Chavez donated fertilizer and subsidized

oil to Sandinista-controlled districts in the run-up to the 2006 presidential contest. As before, for

a government that constantly warns of U.S. interference in Venezuelan affairs, such clear

favoritism struck many as hypocritical (Wyss 2006). Cuban aid programs, by contrast, have not been so obviously or

publicly linked to domestic electoral politics.



A2: Topicality

Counter Interpretation – democracy and human rights are topical

GAO 13 Feb 7, 2013 “Sub-Saharan Africa:

Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement” http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-199 TITLE: Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement The United States and China

have emphasized different policies and approaches for their engagement with sub-Saharan Africa.

U.S. goals have included strengthening democratic institutions, supporting human rights , using

development assistance to improve health and education, and helping sub-Saharan African countries build global trade. The

Chinese government, in contrast, has stated the goal of establishing closer ties with African countries by seeking mutual benefit forChina and African nations and by following a policy of noninterference in countries' domestic affairs.

Engagement towards a government must be conditionalHaass and O’Sullivan, 2k - *Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at theBrookings Institution AND **a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the BrookingsInstitution (Richard and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies”Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000,

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf Many different types of engagement strategies exist , depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives

employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated

series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes

undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers

modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal

act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government;

unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of

promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.

http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-199



http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf








Maduro Sucks

Maduro has anti-American sentiments who will hinder any possible chance of

sturdy relationsO’Brien Bours 13 (Robinson O'Brien-Bours, World, March 2013 “Venezuela Election: Why Nicolas Maduro Won't Improve RelationsWith the United States” http://www.policymic.com/articles/29758/venezuela-election-why-nicolas-maduro-won-t-improve-

relations-with-the-united-states)Proving himself to be just as paranoid as his former master, the bus

driver-turned-politician has implied that the United States poisoned Chavez with cancer. His

government has subsequently ordered an official investigation into whether or not President Obama ordered Chavez's assassination.The U.S. state department has, understandably, called Maduro's comments as "absurd" and dismissed the accusations. Hugo Chavez

made similar comments in the past, "wondering" if the U.S. was routinely poisoning Latin American leaders. With it not being

enough to accuse the U.S. of murdering Chavez, Maduro has resurrected the all-too-familiar

rants of his socialist mentor. “Sooner rather than later the imperialist elites who govern the United States will

have to learn to live with absolute respect with the insurrectional peoples of America,”

declared Maduro. “We’ve decided to be free, and nothing and no one will take that independence that was re-conquered

with our commander Hugo Chavez at the helm.” Worried by the charisma and support of Henrique Capriles Radonski, the actingpresident has decided on two obvious paths to victory. The first is playing on the public sympathy and mourning for Chavez, buildinga cult around the man's memory to help keep his movement alive. The second is to focus his hatred on the United States, blamingthe Americans for the world's ills and distracting the Venezuelans from the sordid state of affairs that their socialist strongman left

them. As a sign of things to come, Maduro expelled several American diplomats from Venezuela. The

United States has returned the favor, booting two Venezuelan diplomats out of the country.

Maduro has also kowtowed to that particularly sleazy fraternity of world leaders that his predecessor so very much adored,

indicating continuation of Venezuela's disastrous support for human rights abusers and anti-American regimes. If there is to be

any hope of an improvement in relations between Venezuela and the United States, Henrique

Capriles must defeat Nicolas Maduro on the April 14 elections. As the deck is stacked against the opposition, this

seems unlikely.

Currently, Maduro is a human rights violator by sending military officials to the

street while violence still continues

AP News 13 (Associated Press, Fox News, May 18, 2013, “President Maduro Sends

Venezuela's Military To Fight Crime In Violence Torn Neighborhoods”http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/05/18/president-maduro-sends-venezuela-military-to-fight-crime-in-violence-torn/Since Monday, in the socialist government's latest attempt to control Venezuela's pandemic of

violence, President Nicolás Maduro has sent the military into slums to frisk local residents and

man dozens of military checkpoints. Stern-looking soldiers clutching assault rifles wave down the beat-

up Chevy Caprice entering this sprawling slum on the outskirts of Caracas. Flashlights in his face, the driver steps out and

places his hands on the roof while the soldiers frisk him for drugs and weapons. He's clean, and a hand gesture from thecommanding officer sends him off into the maze of ramshackle homes that is Petare, one of the most dangerous parts ofVenezuela's notoriously crime-infested capital. This scene is playing out day and night at dozens of military checkpoints. "Once they

leave, everything changes." - Venezuelan Jorge Torres, 50 Critics dismiss the "Secure Homeland" initiative as a

political charade that risks degenerating into human rights abuses while having no lasting

impact on crime. But to many residents, weary of being terrorized by armed gangs, seeing troops on the streets is a welcome

projection of government power. "You have to act forcefully so that people feel the force of the state," said 47-year-old IrvingGarcia, an unemployed former Army reservist, who like many Caracas residents has firsthand experience of violent crime. Garcia saidhe was shot in the chest when he unknowingly walked into a restaurant robbery. The bullet shattered his sternum, he said, inviting areporter to feel a piece of protruding bone through his shirt. With some 15,000 killings a year, Venezuela's homicide rate is the fifth

highest in the world, according to U.N. statistics. The murder rate doubled during the 14-year-rule of the late

President Hugo Chávez as cheap access to guns and an ineffective justice system fed a culture

of violence in slums like Petare, parts of which have become no-go zones for outsiders,

including police. Chávez banned gun sales, expanded a new national police force and stepped up policing and other programs



in high-crime areas. Now, his hand-picked successor, Maduro, is adding military muscle by

deploying 3,000 troops on the streets. The initiative started in the Caracas area on Monday

and will be expanded to the states of Zulia, Lara and Carabobo next week. Human rights

activists worry that sending soldiers trained for warfare on policing missions will only make

things worse for the residents they are meant to protect.

Venezuela Democracy Reforms Affirmative - DDI 2013 SS

Documents

Transcript of Venezuela Democracy Reforms Affirmative - DDI 2013 SS