FISA Court Affirmative - DDI 2015 SWS

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    FISA Court AFF

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    ACSee separate fle or now

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    CAR!S "# $% #R&ANI'%!

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    FISA Inheren(yNSA la)yers do not prote(t (i*il liberties, but uphold the

    la)+

    S(hlanger -.(Margo Schlanger, Proesor o Law at Michigan

    University specializing in civil rights issues and civil and criminal detentionHarvard National Security Journal, http!""harvardns#$org"wp%content"uploads"&')"'&"Schlanger$pd$ *+-

    .ithina particular organization such as the /S*, the impact o a rights andcompliance rame is to allocate decision%ma0ing to lawyers $ 1 those lawyershave a civil li2ertarian orientation, this could 2e a channel 2y which rightsand compliance serve civil li2erties interests$ 3hat is, one could imagine that agencylawyers might systematically e4ercise a pro%li2erty orientation, which could fll gaps that might otherwise

    e4ist$ 5owever, multiplying accounts o lawyers in the 1ntelligence 6ommunitysuggest otherwise$ * growing shel%ull o articles and 2oo0s document and even cele2rate thelawyers who now populate the military, the 61*, and the 7epartment o 8ustice9s /ational Security 7ivision$

    8ac0 +oldsmith, or e4ample, has la2eled these lawyers a 0ey part o :something new and remar0a2le,;descri2ing :giant distri2uted networ0s o lawyers, investigators, and auditors, 2oth inside and outside thee4ecutive 2ranch, that rendered U$S$ fghting orces and intelligence services more transparent than ever,

    and that enorced legal and political constraints, small and large, against them$; 1 thin0 not$ ?ather, when lawyers(in an o@ce where they areunderstood to 2e practicing law- are given policy roles, those lawyers9legal sign%ore=uently stands in as su@cient #ustifcation to underta0e the policy$ 3o =uote +oldsmith one lasttime, descri2ing the Aush administration9s aggressive stance on a variety o national security topics, therole o lawyers was part o why :B.hat should we do>9 $ $ $ oten collapsed into B.hat can we lawully do>9;

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    3he passage o the frst 2ill since " to curtail government surveillancerepresents a dramatic shit in the politics surrounding terrorism in the US, 2uta much less signifcant change in the way the intelligence communityactually operates $3he US* Hreedom *ct, which has 2een comorta2ly approved 2y 2oth theSenate and the 5ouse, 2ars the government rom collecting the phone records o

    millions o US citizens, a programme which 2ecame the ocus o pu2lic ears a2out over2earingelectronic surveillance$3he surveillance legislation reorm still leaves the USintelligence community with ormida2le legal powers and tools to collect dataand other online inormation or terrorism%related investigations, however$7espite the tidal wave o revelations and pu2lic anger towards the / ationalS ecurity * gencyollowing the &'< lea0s 2y Ddward Snowden, congressional eorts torein in the agency have so ar not curtailed the 2ul0 o its activities $ 3he moresavvy mem2ers o the intelligence community have 2een saying or some time, N1 this is the hit that wehave to ta0e, then so 2e itN, says Mie0e Doyang at the centrist 3hird .ay thin0%tan0 in .ashington,reerring to the 2ul0 telephone data collection programme$ 3he very frst Snowden lea0 was a secret courtorder re=uiring Oerizon to hand over the call records o its customers, in the process revealing an o@cialdragnet that was capturing details a2out tens o millions o *mericans$ *mid the many Snowdendocuments a2out the /S* that ollowed, it was this programme that crystallised pu2lic ears in the US that

    the government was a2using privacy rights in its zeal to monitor terrorist threats $3he Hreedom *ctis designed to tac0le those concerns a2out the 2ul0 collection programme$

    3he legislation calls or telephone companies and not the government tostore the inormation and re=uires a court order 2eore the call data can 2esearched $ Supporters o the reorm cele2rated two urther conditions in the 2ill$ 1t limits the scope ogovernment in=uiries, so that o@cials cannot as0, or instance, or all calls in the && area code$ *nd itre=uires that the secret oreign intelligence court pu2lish legal opinions thatchange the scope o inormation that can 2e collected$Aeyond the specifcs, thepassage o the 2ill represents a landmar0 in the underlying politics o national security$ Aeore theSnowden revelations, the political climate over terrorism would have made it routine to renew the sectionso the post%" Patriot *ct that have now 2een replaced 2y the US* Hreedom *ct$ et the reality is that orthe past months, the administration has 2een ma0ing a tactical retreat rom the call records

    programme$ * panel o e4perts appointed 2y the .hite 5ouse, which includedormer senior intelligence o@cials, saidin 7ecem2er &'< that the programmewas not essential or preventing terrorist attac0s$ 1n early &'E, President Aarac0Q2ama called or many o the changes to the programme contained in the new legislation$ 3his issomething we can live with, says a ormer senior intelligence o@cial o the US* Hreedom *ct$ Moreover,even the 2illNs 2iggest supporters among privacy advocates ac0nowledge that it leaves much o theintelligence collection conducted 2y the US untouched$ .e have now addressed the e4cesses rom thevery frst Snowden story, so or that 1 am liting a glass, says 8ulian Sanchez at the li2ertarian 6ato

    1nstitute in .ashington$ Aut there is a lot let$ 1n terms o the total scope o surveillanceconducted 2y the /S*, this is a tiny corner $ 3he 2ul0 o the electronic data scooped up 2ythe /S* comes rom overseas and is 2ased on separate legal authorities not touched 2y the US* Hreedom*ct %% most nota2ly Section J'& o the H1S* (Horeign 1ntelligence Surveillance- *mendments *ct and the

    ?eagan%era D4ecutive Qrder &

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    333S#45%NC6

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    Publi( Ad*o(atesPubli( ad*o(ate is *ery popular7 Congress needs to

    appoint the ad*o(ates+

    S(hlanger -.(Margo Schlanger, Proesor o Law at MichiganUniversity specializing in civil rights issues and civil and criminal detentionHarvard National Security Journal, http!""harvardns#$org"wp%content"uploads"&')"'&"Schlanger$pd$ *+-

    * reorm proposal endorsed 2y nearly everyone

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    PC4#$ re(ommends a spe(ial ad*o(ate is put into pla(e to

    (urtail sur*eillan(e+

    9edine et+ al, ;.(7avid Medine, ?achel Arand, Dlise2eth 6ollins6oo0, 8ames 7empsey, Patricia .ald Mem2ers o the Privacy and 6ivilLi2erties Qversight Aoard http!""perma$cc"H*U%I?H8$ *+-

    ?ecommendation

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    "he Publi( ad*o(ate )ould ha*e the ability to (urtail

    sur*eillan(e that has already been a((epted and is

    happening in the status 1uo+

    9edine et+ al, ;.(7avid Medine, ?achel Arand, Dlise2eth 6ollins6oo0, 8ames 7empsey, Patricia .ald Mem2ers o the Privacy and 6ivil

    Li2erties Qversight Aoard http!""perma$cc"H*U%I?H8$ *+-

    5owever, the circumstances prescri2ed in H1S6 ?ule are not the onlycircumstances where participation 2y the Special *dvocate might 2eappropriate$ H1S6 #udges should also consider inviting Special *dvocateparticipation or applications to renew already approved programs orimplementations o techni=ues$ 3his may 2e appropriate in matters thatraised issues that were novel or signifcant at the time the original applicationwas fled 2ut were not ully considered at that time matters in whichintervening circumstances have raised issues that did not e4ist at the time othe original application or in other matters where the #udge concludes that it

    would 2e helpul to have a more thorough 2riefng with a diversity o viewspresented$

    Circumvention arguments are wrong

    Prakash and Ramsey 12 (Saikrishna B, David Lurton Massee, Jr. Professor of Lawand Sullivan and Cromwell Professor of Law, University of ir!inia S"hool of Law and Mi"hael D,Professor of Law, University of San Die!o S"hool of Law, review of #he $%e"utive Un&ound, #e%asLaw 'eview ()*+ )-/, htt0-11www.te%aslrev."om1w02"ontent1u0loads1Prakash2'amsey2)2#L'2/.0df+

    3et we dou&t the &ook4s "entral "laim that we live in a 0ost2Madisonian re0u&li". 5irst, the U.S. $%e"utive is verymu"h &ound6&y the Constitution, Con!ress4s laws, and the "ourts. #hou!h we "annot 0eer into the many minds0o0ulatin! the $%e"utive Bran"h, we do not &elieve that e%e"utive offi"ials re!ard themselves as a&ove the law and

    the "ourts, answera&le only to the 0eo0le via ele"tions and 0olls. The Executive Branch does not act thisway, and most of its actions are consistent with its own sense of what the law requires and

    forbids(althou!h, like most a"tors, it often reads the law to ma%imi7e its dis"retion+. #o &e sure, the Executive

    Branch takes advantage of gaps and ambiguities in the law, as well as its speed, decisiveness,

    and access to information, all as #he $%e"utive Un&ound des"ri&es.8 But the Executive does not

    systematically disregard orders from Congres s or the courts nor does it usually exercise core

    powers that the Constitution assigns elsewhere9 the Executive does not impose criminal

    punishments, spend money without authorization, or rule by decree Se"ond, while we a!ree with

    Posner and ermeule that 0u&li" o0inion "olors $%e"utive Bran"h de"ision makin!, we also &elieve that the public

    favors an executive bound by the law!o long as the public expects the law to constrain the

    Executive , the Executive will take into account this expectation and the public"s sense of the

    law, even under Posner and ermeule4s own li!ht. :n other words, the public has a taste for the rule of

    law, a taste that the Executive Branch ignores at its peril ;e think the legal constraints on the

    modern Executive areso manifestthat we wonder whether Posner and ermeule4s real 0ro

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    Executive is bound and that the #adisonian republic lives on

    Adding a publi( ad*o(ate (urtails sur*eillan(e+

    Poorbaugh, .., (ate Poor2augh, 1llinois Law ?eview,

    http!""illinoislawreview$org"wp%content"ilr%content"articles"&')"

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    Publi( ad*o(ates 2all under the 2ederal go*ernment

    4ederman and 5lade(k = (Marty, proessor at the +eorgetownUniversity Law 6enter % 5e was 7eputy *ssistant *ttorney +eneral in the7epartment o 8ustice9s Q@ce o Legal 6ounsel Steve is co%editor%in%chie o

    8ust Security$ Steve is a proessor o law at *merican University .ashington

    6ollege o Law, and is also a senior editor o the 8ournal o /ational SecurityLaw Policy V 3he constitutionality o a H1S* :Special *dvocate; ""?1tt-

    ?eorm o the Horeign 1ntelligence Surveillance 6ourts! 1ntroducing a Pu2lic *dvocate (Mar$ &, &'E- (3hepu2lic advocate can potentially 2e viewed as an agent o the government and may act as a principal or

    inerior o@cer o the United States$3he pu2lic advocate would 2e su2#ect to the *rticle11 *ppointments 6lause mandates$Under *rticle 111, it is =uestiona2le whether such anadvocate has standing to argue the case or controversy2eore the H1S6 due to there=uirement that they have 2een in#ured, are threated to suer in#ury 2yputatively illegal conduct, or are authorized to represent such an in#ured party$ Li0ewise, *rticle 111generally prohi2its the government rom litigating against itsel, and allowing the advocate to see0 relie

    on national security issues could invade core e4ecutive 2ranch powers$ Last, as the advocate would not 2ea party or representative o a party, they may not have standing to appeal H1S6 orders$- see also *ndrew/olan, ?ichard M$ 3hompson 11, Oivian 6hu, 6ong$ ?esearch Serv$, Qct$ &), 1ntroducing a Pu2lic *dvocateinto the Horeign 1ntelligence Surveillance actNs 6ourts! Select Legal 1ssues (&'

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    1$ .ould the Special *dvocate 2e an :Q@cer o the United States; Su2#ect to the *ppointments 6lause>3he 6?S ?eport 2egins with an e4tended analysis o purported *ppointments 6lause issues surrounding

    the special advocate, including whether she would 2e a :principal; o@cer (who could thereore only 2eappointed 2y the President with the advice and consent o the Senate-, or an :inerior; o@cer (who could

    2e appointed 2y the President, 2y the head o a 7epartment or 2y a court-$3he 6?S ?eportappears to assume that the special advocate would not 2e appointed in amanner allowed under the *ppointments 6lause$ 3hat assumption may well 2emista0en, depending on the 2ill in =uestion$ More undamentally, however, the 6?S ?eport9s analysisdepends upon a undamental, mista0en assumption that the special advocate would 2e an o@cer o the

    United States in the frst place$ Aut she would not$ Hor one thing, the advocate would notnecessarily 2e someone appointed to a position o employment within theederal governmentCshe could instead 2e someone assigned on a case%2y%case 2asis to fle 2ries2eore the H1S6, or a ederal contractor, in which case she would not 2e an :o@cer;su2#ect to the *ppointments 6lause$ (See su2sections 11%A%%a and 11%A%%c o this QL6 memo$-1n any event, even i the legislation provided that the advocate were to 2e appointed to a position o

    employment in the ederal government, she would not e4ercise signifcant governmentauthority pursuant to ederal law, and thus would not 2e an o@cer or*ppointments 6lause purposes$(See su2section 1%A%%2 o that I QL6 memo$- 3he role othe advocate would 2e solely to present legal arguments to the H1S6 , as anattorney does when appointed as an amicus 2y the Supreme 6ourt to represent an undeended position ina case 2eore the 6ourt$ (See Marty9s discussion o the 6ourt9s practice$- /othing the advocate would dowould have any 2inding eect upon any entity$ (*nd even i the particular legislation in =uestion providedthat the special counsel was to 2e a :representative; o third parties aected 2y the proposed order (suchas the U$S$ persons whose metadata were collected under section &), or the U$S$ persons whosecommunications are collected in a section J'& surveillance-, that would not give the special advocate thepower to e4ercise signifcant governmental authority$- 3he 6?S ?eport reaches the contrary conclusion 2yreerring to the Supreme 6ourt9s holding in Auc0ley v$ Oaleo that Hederal Dlection 6ommissioners wereo@cers, in part 2ecause they were assigned the authority to 2ring suit against private parties, on 2ehal o

    the ederal government, to compel compliance with ederal election laws$ See E&E U$S$ at

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    re=uirement that they have 2een in#ured, are threated to suer in#ury 2yputatively illegal conduct, or are authorized to represent such an in#ured party$ Li0ewise, *rticle 111generally prohi2its the government rom litigating against itsel, and allowing the advocate to see0 relie

    on national security issues could invade core e4ecutive 2ranch powers$ Last, as the advocatewould not 2e a party or representative o a party, they may not havestanding to appeal H1S6 orders$- see also *ndrew /olan, ?ichard M$ 3hompson 11, Oivian 6hu,6ong$ ?esearch Serv$, Qct$ &), 1ntroducing a Pu2lic *dvocate into the Horeign 1ntelligence Surveillance actNs6ourts! Select Legal 1ssues (&', :7ynamic Surveillance! Dvolving Procedures inMetadata and Horeign 6ontent 6ollection *ter Snowden;, 5*S31/+S L*.

    8QU?/*L Ool$ II! , 8L K 771

    * more institutionalized pu2lic voice at the H1S6 would 2e even more valua2lethan reliance on amici curiae or two reasons$

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    2igger 2lind spot in the current process! the 2arely ade=uate disclosure thatthe government has provided to 6ongress$ 3he :rogue ro2ot; e4planation ornoncompliance urnished 2y the 8ustice 7epartment in its 7ecem2er &'' letter did not supply thecomprehensive sel%appraisal that 6ongress has a right to e4pect$

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    Congressional AuthorityIn(reasing Congressional authority sol*es

    Cetina > (8ohn 6etina, :Aalancing Security and Privacy in &st6entury*merica! * Hramewor0 or H1S* 6ourt ?eorm;, 8ohn Marshall Law ?eview, hW

    ttW p!""rW eW positW orW yW $W#mlW sW $W eW du"lW aW wW rW eW vW ieW w"vW oW lEJ"iW sW sE"),Summer &'E-

    3hesecond proposed remedy re=uires additional scrutiny o #udges selected toserve on the H1S* 6ourt$3he current 6hie 8ustice o the United States, 8ohn?o2erts, selects the other eleven H1S* 6ourt #udges while also sitting at the head o that surreptitious 2ody as its twelth mem2er$ XI * pending 2ill, the H1S* 6ourt *ccounta2ility *ct(:H6**;-, would fmdamentally alter H1S* 6ourt appointment and decisionalprocedures$ X> 3he H6** would strip the 6hie 8ustice o some appointment powerand, instead, ena2le the our main congressional leaders C Senate ma#ority leader andminority leader, 5ouse spea0er and 5ouse minority leader C to ma0e some appointments$ X< 3he

    H6** would also grant congressional authority over certain matters, includingre=uiring a si4tyCpercent superma#ority consensus on H1S* 6ourt rulings $ ' *similar proposal would su2#ect H1S* 6ourt #udges to additional senatorialconfrmation proceedings$ X 3he H6** and the related suggestionlllre=uiring a second round o senatorial confrmation would insert an attractive2alancing element that comports with the spirit o the United States government$& .ith 6ongressplaying a more active role, the H1S* 6ourt would li0ely not ac=uiesce to everyre=uest rom the e4ecutive$ Dnhancing 6ongressNs role would also ma0e theH1S* 6ourt indirectly accounta2le to pu2lic opinionand theconse=uences o intervallicdemocratic elections$

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    "ransparen(yIn(reased transparen(y Sol*es

    $lum -? (Stephanie Alum, :.5*3 ?D*LL 1S *3 S3*D .135 35D H1S*

    *MD/7MD/3S *63 QH &'' */7 17D*S HQ?

    HU3U?D SU?OD1LL*/6D ?DHQ?M,http!""&$J$&I$

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    programs$W )W Hor e4ample, the detailed reports on the use o Section &) were onW ly W availa2le in1ntelligence 6ommittee o@ces or a W :W limited time period,W ;W no W photocopies or notes could 2e ta0en

    out o the room, and only certain W congressional sta mem2ers were allowed to attend$W )&W Similarrules li0ely W apply to the *ttorney +eneralW 9W s rW eports on signifcant H1S*legal W interpretationsW )

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    333%C#N A!5AN"A&%

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    I4

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    Foreign In*estor 4oss!ata PulloutNSA sur*eillan(e kills @S (ompanies2oreign in*estor

    loss, data pullout

    %nderle B.

    (?o2, I"&"), 61Q, :US surveillance programs are 0illing the tech industry,;?o2 is the president and principal analyst o the Dnderle +roup, he haswor0ed or 1AM, 7ell, Microsot, Siemens, and 1ntel, MA* K 6aliornia StateUniversity, Long Aeach, http!""www$cio$com"article"&

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    4aundry list o2 (ompanies lea*ing the @S be(ause o2

    (on(erns about NSA sur*eillan(e

    Sprigman >

    (6hristopher, "&'"E, /U School o Law, :.e 7on9t 5ire 3he /S* or Hederal

    Prosecutors 3o Ma0e U$S$ 1nternet Policy (*nd 3hat9s a +ood 3hing-,;6hristopher Sprigman is a proessor o law K /ew or0 University School oLaw, http!""www$law$nyu$edu"sites"deault"fles"uploadZdocuments"6hristopherY&'Sprigman$pd, J"

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    teams at *l 8azeera Dnglish and *l 8azeera *merica, :/S* Surveillance May 6ost U$S$3ech 6ompanies More than \

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    *merican sot power, 2ut our wallets as well, 131H is urging the /S* to ma0e achange$

    NSA sur*eillan(e kills e(onChina

    Dhittaker . (^ac0 .hitta0er, :1tNs o@cial! /S* spying is hurting the UStech economy;, He2ruary &)th, &'), http!""www$zdnet$com"article"another%reason%to%hate%the%nsa%china%is%2ac0ing%away%rom%us%tech%2rands"-

    6hina is no longer using high%profle US technology 2rands or statepurchases, amid ongoing revelations a2out mass surveillance and hac0ing 2ythe US government$W* new report confrmed 0ey 2rands, including 6isco, *pple, 1ntel, and Mc*ee%% among others %% have 2een dropped rom the 6hinese governmentNs list o authorized 2rands, a ?euters

    report said .ednesday$W3he num2er o approved oreign technology 2rands ell2y athird, 2ased on an analysis o the procurement list$ Less than hal o those companies with security

    products remain on the list$*lthough a num2er o reasons were cited, domesticcompanies were said to oer more product guarantees than overseas rivals

    in the wa0e o the Ddward Snowden lea0s$ Some reports have attempted topin a multi%2illion dollar fgure on the impact o the lea0s$1n reality, the fgurecould 2e incalcula2le3he report confrms what many US technology companies have 2een sayingor the past year! the activities 2y the /S* are harming their 2usinesses in crucialgrowth mar0ets,including 6hina$W3he 6hinese governmentNs procurement list changes coincidedwith a series o high profle lea0s that showed the US government have 2een on an international masssurveillance spree, as well as hac0ing e4peditions into technology companies, governments, and the

    personal cellphones o world leaders$W6oncerned a2out 2ac0doors implanted 2y the/S*, those revelations spar0ed a changein 6hinese policy 2y orcing .esterntechnology companies to hand over their source code or inspection $ 3hat led toan outcry in the capital 2y politicians who in the not%so%distant past accused 6hinese companies o doing

    e4actly the same thing$W3he ear is that as the 6hina%US cy2ersecurity stando

    continues, itNs come too late or Silicon Oalley companies, which are alreadysuering fnancially than0s to the /S*Ns activities$

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    "e(h Competiti*enessNSA kills @S te(h (ompetiti*eness(reates opportunity

    2or 2oreign frms to gain the lead

    %nderle B.

    (?o2, I"&"), 61Q, :US surveillance programs are 0illing the tech industry,;?o2 is the president and principal analyst o the Dnderle +roup, he haswor0ed or 1AM, 7ell, Microsot, Siemens, and 1ntel, MA* K 6aliornia StateUniversity, Long Aeach, http!""www$cio$com"article"& (6arla *nne, ormer editor and reporter or the /ew or0 3imes and.all Street 8ournal, is a clinical proessor o national security studies at Aaruch6ollege and ad#unct senior ellow at the 6ouncil on Horeign ?elations at Aloom2erg2usiness, :5ow to Ae Hriends .ith the /S* *gain,; 8uly E,http!""www$2loom2erg$com"2w"articles"&'E%'J%'

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    data rom the U$S$ government$ *raid o losing overseas mar0ets, tech leaders have2ecome increasingly vocal a2out their rustration and their intention tochallenge .ashington on every issue$ Late last year, Arad Smith, Microsot9s generalcounsel, descri2ed government snooping as an :advanced persistent threat;Ctechspea0 that was once reserved or the most sophisticated 0inds o 6hinese hac0ing$ *ter reports inMarch that the /S* had mas=ueraded as a Hace2oo0 (HA- server to hac0 into an un0nown num2er o

    computers, 6hie D4ecutive Q@cer Mar0 ^uc0er2erg called President Q2ama to protest$ 5e then vented hisanger in a Hace2oo0 post, writing, :.hen our engineers wor0 tirelessly to improve security, weimagine we are protecting you against criminals, not our own government$;

    Absent restri(tions, sur*eillan(e )ill undermine our long

    term te(h (ompetiti*eness+

    Ar(e /.(/icole I"'") #ournalist or the 3ech 3imes, :Dect Q /S* Spying Qn US 3ech 1ndustry!\ /o$ .ay More; http!""www$techtimes$com"articles")

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    2usinesses out o oreign mar0ets, says 131H$ 3his not only hurts U$S$ technologycompanies 2ut costs *merican #o2s and wea0ens the U$S$ trade 2alance $

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    "e(h 4eadershipNSA kills @S te(h leadershiploss o2 te(h industry, tools,

    and )eapons

    %nderle B.

    (?o2, I"&"), 61Q, :US surveillance programs are 0illing the tech industry,;?o2 is the president and principal analyst o the Dnderle +roup, he haswor0ed or 1AM, 7ell, Microsot, Siemens, and 1ntel, MA* K 6aliornia StateUniversity, Long Aeach, http!""www$cio$com"article"&

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    G- $illion 4ostNSA sur*eillan(e e

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    dominated 1nternet inrastructure$ .eNll tal0 with Hrance a2out how we can maintain a highlevel o data protection, Mer0el said in her wee0ly podcast in mid%He2ruary$ *2ove all, weNll tal0 withDuropean providers that oer security or our citizens, so that one shouldnNt have to send e%mails and

    other inormation across the *tlantic$ 3he situation is more com2usti2le at home$ 7isclosures thatthe /S* routinely crac0ed encryption, or data%scram2ling, technology hasheightened the an4iety o industry leaders$ Aut in their pursuit o /S*%proo

    products, theyNve alarmed some intelligence o@cials, who argue that withoutthe a2ility to 2rea0 encryption and create 2ac0 doors to enter computersystems a2road, the US* would 2e disarming at a moment o heightenedcy2erconTict$ 7uring a speech on /S* reorms on 8an$ J, President Q2ama angered tech leaderswhen he did not em2race two recommendations 2y a panel he appointed to review the surveillance thatare o pressing concern to Silicon Oalley and the 2usiness community$ 1t had recommended the /S* not inany way su2vert, undermine, wea0en or ma0e vulnera2le commercial sotware, and that it move away

    rom e4ploiting Taws in sotware to conduct cy2erattac0s or surveillance$ /S*%resistant products Manytech companies eel they have no choice 2ut to try to develop /S*%resistantproducts 2ecause customers rom 6hina to +ermany threaten to 2oycott*merican hardware and cloud services they view as compromised $ 1tNs alreadyhappening, with large corporate deals either lost or in danger o alling 2y the wayside$3he United

    *ra2 Dmirates is threatening to scrap a \&I million intelligent%satellite dealwith two Hrench frms unless they remove U$S$%2uilt components$ 3he U*D earsthe e=uipment would contain digital 2ac0doors that compromise the security o data$ *2out &)Y o

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    "e(h Credibility$a(kdoor te(hnology makes 2oreign (ompanies un)illing

    to )ork )ith the @Skills te(h (redibility

    olmes =

    (*llan, "'"

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    handedly tarnished the reputation o2 the entire @+S+ te(h industry,;said 7aniel 6astro, the report9s author and an analyst with the non%partisanresearch group in .ashington, in an e%mail$ :1 suspect many oreigncustomers are going to 2e shopping elsewhere or their hardware andsotware$;

    "e(h (redibility is not Hero7sumas @S businesses 2ail,2oreign (ompanies report substantial gro)th

    ehl et al >(7anielle ehl is a Policy *nalyst at /ew *merica9s Qpen3echnology 1nstitute (Q31-$ evin Aan0ston is the Policy 7irector at Q31, ?o2yn+reene is a Policy 6ounsel at Q31, and ?o2ert Morgus is a ?esearch *ssociateat Q31, :/ew *merica9s Qpen 3echnology 1nstitute Policy Paper, Surveillance6osts! 3he /S*9s 1mpact on the Dconomy, 1nternet Hreedom 6y2ersecurity,;

    8uly &'E, rc0-

    3rust in *merican 2usinesses has ta0en a signifcant hitsince the initial reports on theP?1SM program suggested that the /S* was directly tapping into the servers o nine U$S$ companies to

    o2tain customer data or national security investigations$& 3he .ashington Post9s original story on theprogram provo0ed an uproar in the media and prompted the 6DQs o several ma#or companies to deny0nowledge o or participation in the program$& 3he e4act nature o the re=uests made through the P?1SMprogram was later clarifed,

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    !ata 4o(aliHationForeign data lo(aliHation and regulations make it harder

    2or @S (ompanies to (ondu(t business abroad

    ehl >

    (7anielle, J"

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    so that one shouldnNt have to send e%mails and other inormation across the*tlantic$

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    Alternati*e Produ(tsNSA kills the @S e(onomy2oreign (ustomers )ill look 2or

    alternati*es to @S produ(ts in emerging markets

    $enner >

    (atie, &""E, Aloom2ergOiew, :Microsot and +oogle in a Post%Snowden.orld,; atie Aenner is a columnist K Aloom2ergOiew reporting oncompanies, culture, and technology,http!""www$2loom2ergview$com"articles"&'E%&%"microsot%and%google%in%a%postsnowden%world, J"

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    International CooperationNSA sur*eillan(e undermines @S (ompaniesdamages

    international (ooperation

    $enner >

    (atie, &""E, Aloom2ergOiew, :Microsot and +oogle in a Post%Snowden.orld,; atie Aenner is a columnist K Aloom2ergOiew reporting oncompanies, culture, and technology,http!""www$2loom2ergview$com"articles"&'E%&%"microsot%and%google%in%a%postsnowden%world, J"

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    !ata(entersNSA sur*eillan(e 2or(es (ompanies to spend billions o2

    dollars on data(enters abroadI$9 pro*es

    ontHer >

    (3ony, "&

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    $a(kdoors"he NSA/s ba(kdoors and sinking (redibility kills @S

    businesses in (ru(ial gro)th marketsChinese

    authoriHation pro*es

    Dhittaker .. (^ach, writer%editor or ^7/et, 2usiness technology newswe2site pu2lished 2y 6AS 1nteractive, along with 3ech?epu2lic and SmartPlanet, andsister sites 6/D3 and 6AS /ews, :1tNs o@cial! /S* spying is hurting the US techeconomy,; http!""www$zdnet$com"article"another%reason%to%hate%the%nsa%china%is%2ac0ing%away%rom%us%tech%2rands"" , rc0-

    6hina is no longer using high%profle US tech nology 2rands or statepurchases, amid ongoing revelations a2out mass surveillance and hac0ing 2ythe US government$ * new report confrmed 0ey 2rands , including 6isco, *pple,1ntel, and Mc*ee %% among others %% have 2een dropped rom the 6hinesegovernmentNs list o authorized 2rands,a ?euters report said .ednesday$ 3he num2er oapproved oreign technology 2rands ell 2y a third , 2ased on an analysis o theprocurement list$ Less than hal o those companies with security products remain on the list$ *lthough anum2er o reasons were cited, domestic companies were said to oer more productguarantees than overseas rivals in the wa0e o the Ddward Snowden lea0s$ Some reports have attempted to pin a multi%2illion dollar fgure on the impact o thelea0s$1n reality, the fgure could 2e incalcula2le$ 3he report confrms what many UStechnology companies have 2een saying or the past year! the a(ti*ities by the NSA are

    harming their businesses in (ru(ial gro)th markets , in(luding China+3he 6hinese governmentNs procurement list changes coincided with a series o high profle lea0s thatshowed the US government have 2een on an international mass surveillance spree, as well as hac0inge4peditions into technology companies, governments, and the personal cellphones o world leaders$

    6oncerned a2out 2ac0doors implanted 2y the /S* , those revelations spar0eda change in 6hinese policy 2y orcing .estern tech nology companies to hand

    over their source code or inspection$ 3hat led to an outcry in the capital 2ypoliticianswho in the not%so%distant past accused 6hinese companies o doing e4actly the same thing$Hrom encrypted instant messengers to secure 2rowsers and operating systems, thees privacy%enhancing

    apps, e4tensions, and services can protect you 2oth online and o_ine$3he ear is that as the6hina%US cy2ersecurity stando continues, itNs come too late or Silicon Oalleycompanies, which are already suering fnancially than0s to the /S* Nsactivities$Microsot said in 8anuary at its fscal ourth%=uarter earnings that 6hina ell short o itse4pectations, which chie e4ecutive Satya /adella descri2ed as a set o geopolitical issues that thecompany was wor0ing through$ 5e did not ela2orate$ Most recently, 5P said on 3uesday at its fscal frst%

    =uarter earnings call that it had e4ecution issues in 6hina than0s to the tough mar0et withincreasing competition rom the local vendors approved 2y the 6hinese government$ Aut one companystands out! 6isco pro2a2ly suered the worst o all$ Darlier this month at its fscal second%=uarter earnings,

    the networ0ing giant said it too0 a percent revenue ding in 6hina, amidclaims the /S* was installing 2ac0doors and implants on its routers in transit$6hina remain s avital core geography or most US technology giants with a glo2al reach$ Aut until somemiddle%ground can 2e reached 2etween the two governments, e4pect Silicon OalleyNs struggles in thecountry to only get worse$

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    NSA sur*eillan(e de(imates Internet produ(ti*ity(reates

    ba(kdoors 2or ha(kers and hurts the e(onomy

    &lobal Resear(h G. (news articles, commentary, 2ac0groundresearch and analysis on a 2road range o issues, ocusing on social, economic,strategic and environmental issues$ 3he +lo2al ?esearch we2site was esta2lished on

    the th o Septem2er &'', two days 2eore the tragic events o Septem2er $Aarely a ew days later, +lo2al ?esearch had 2ecome a ma#or news source on the/ew .orld Qrder and .ashington9s :war on terrorism;$ Since Septem2er &'', wehave esta2lished an e4tensive archive o news articles, in%depth reports and analysison issues which are 2arely covered 2y the mainstream media,http!""www$glo2alresearch$ca")%ways%mass%surveillance%is%destroying%the%us%economy")E

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    and tend to re%la2el :dissidents; as :terrorists; V it9s not unreasona2le toassume that all o us are 2eing adversely eected to one degree or another2y spy agency operations$ Aill Ainney V the high%level /S* e4ecutive whocreated the agency9s mass surveillance program or digital inormation, a Qr, how a2out all the attac0s on systems ingovernment> *re these 2ecause o wea0ened systems>

    $a(kdoors are a maEor threat to the e(onomy

    CSI .(6ounter Surveillance 1ntelligence, / Aan0 ?egulator! 3hird PartyOendors *re a Aac0door to 5ac0ers;, *pril &th, &'),http!""www$cy2ersecurityintelligence$com"2log"%ny%2an0%regulator%third%party%vendors%are%a%2ac0door%to%hac0ers%&E&$html-

    Aen#amin M$ Laws0y, Superintendent o the /ew or0 State 7epartment o HinancialServices(/7HS-, released a report warning 2an0s that insu@cient security atthird%party vendors could provide a 2ac0door or hac0ers to gain access tocritical systemsand piler sensitive fnancial inormation$W:* 2an09s cy2er security is oten only asgood as the cy2er security o its vendors$ Unortunately, those third%party frms can provide a2ac0door entrance to hac0ers who are see0ing to steal sensitive 2an0customer data,; Laws0y said$WHinancial institutions rely on third%party vendors ora 2road%range o services, ranging rom law frms to companies contracted to maintain 5O*6

    systems, and those vendors oten have access to a 2an09s inormationtechnology networ0s, providing a potential point o entry or hac0ers as was seen in the 3arget2reach$W/7HS conducted a survey o E' 2an0s, including many o the largest institutions it regulates,e4amining the security standards those frms have in place in regards to their third%party vendors$ W:*mong other fndings, the /7HS report uncovered that nearly in < 2an0s surveyed do not re=uire their

    third%party vendors to notiy them o cy2er security 2reaches,; /7HS said in a statement$W:1 amdeeply worried that we are soon going to see a ma#or cy2er attac0 aimed atthe fnancial system that is going to ma0e all o us to shudder$ 6y2er hac0ingcould represent a systemic ris0 to our fnancial mar0ets 2y creating a run orpanic that spills over into the 2roader economy , :Laws0y$W:.e are concernedthat within the ne4t decade, or perhaps sooner, we will e4perience an*rmageddon%type cy2er event that causes a signifcant disruption in the

    fnancial system or a period o time$;

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    Spillo*erInternational ba(klash 2rom 2oreign markets hea*ily

    aMe(ts @S (loud (omputing industryspills o*er to other

    se(tors

    ehl et al >(7anielle ehl is a Policy *nalyst at /ew *merica9s Qpen3echnology 1nstitute (Q31-$ evin Aan0ston is the Policy 7irector at Q31, ?o2yn+reene is a Policy 6ounsel at Q31, and ?o2ert Morgus is a ?esearch *ssociateat Q31, :/ew *merica9s Qpen 3echnology 1nstitute Policy Paper, Surveillance6osts! 3he /S*9s 1mpact on the Dconomy, 1nternet Hreedom 6y2ersecurity,;

    8uly &'E, rc0-

    1t appears that little consideration was given over the past decade to the potential economic repercussionsi the /S*9s secret pro% grams were revealed$

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    Inno*ationSurveillance destroys innovationCthat9s 0ey to economic growth&lobal Resear(h G. (news articles, commentary, 2ac0groundresearch and analysis on a 2road range o issues, ocusing on social, economic,strategic and environmental issues$ 3he +lo2al ?esearch we2site was esta2lished onthe th o Septem2er &'', two days 2eore the tragic events o Septem2er $Aarely a ew days later, +lo2al ?esearch had 2ecome a ma#or news source on the/ew .orld Qrder and .ashington9s :war on terrorism;$ Since Septem2er &'', wehave esta2lished an e4tensive archive o news articles, in%depth reports and analysison issues which are 2arely covered 2y the mainstream media,http!""www$glo2alresearch$ca")%ways%mass%surveillance%is%destroying%the%us%economy")E

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    Pri*a(yPlummeting @S (redibility destroys pri*a(ythat/s key to

    the e(onomy

    &lobal Resear(h G. (news articles, commentary, 2ac0ground

    research and analysis on a 2road range o issues, ocusing on social, economic,strategic and environmental issues$ 3he +lo2al ?esearch we2site was esta2lished onthe th o Septem2er &'', two days 2eore the tragic events o Septem2er $Aarely a ew days later, +lo2al ?esearch had 2ecome a ma#or news source on the/ew .orld Qrder and .ashington9s :war on terrorism;$ Since Septem2er &'', wehave esta2lished an e4tensive archive o news articles, in%depth reports and analysison issues which are 2arely covered 2y the mainstream media,http!""www$glo2alresearch$ca")%ways%mass%surveillance%is%destroying%the%us%economy")E

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    elements o #ustice in any society$ *nd a strong rule o law is V in turn V the maindeterminant o +7P growth$

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    Cyber(rimeCyberspyingCyber(rime is hugely (ostly 2or small businesses

    5iuker .(Steve Oiu0er, :6y2ercrime and hac0ing are even 2igger worriesor small 2usiness owners;, 3he +uardian,

    http!""www$theguardian$com"2usiness"&')"#an"&"cy2ersecurity%small%2usiness%thwarting%hac0ers%o2ama%cameron, 8anuary &st, &')-

    6y2ercrime$ 1t was the tal0 o .ashington at President Q2ama9s &') State othe Union, adding one more city to the world tour o technological ear!London, /ew or0, Los *ngeles, Paris$ Dven though the 6harlie 5e2do attac0son the Hrench capital were physical in nature, serious cases o cy2ercrimewere reported soon ater$ 1n an eort to stymie these attac0s, PresidentQ2ama and Aritain9s Prime Minister 6ameron recently announced a #ointcy2ergames war test$W *nd while much o ocus has 2een on attac0s on

    3arget, 8PMorgan 6hase and Sony, small 2usinesses are ar rom immune$W5ac0ers targeted ,''' Hrench we2sites soon ater the terror attac0s$

    *ccording to *r2or /etwor0s, Hrance was the target o ,'J' denial o serviceattac0s$ (1n &', hac0ers 2reached the PlayStation networ0, resulting in ashutdown or several wee0s$ 3he cost to Sony was \J'm$-W * report romMc*ee ound almost 'Y o small% and medium%sized 2usiness in the US donot use data protection or company and customer inormation, and less thanhal secured company email to prevent phishing scams$W3his is an e4pensivemista0e$ 6y2ercrime and cy2erspying cost the US economy \''2n a yearand the glo2al economy a2out \

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    Impa(tGlobal economic collapse cause global war

    Royal -F8edediah ?oyal, 7irector o 6ooperative 3hreat ?eduction at the U$S$ 7epartment o7eense, &'', :Dconomic 1ntegration, Dconomic Signaling and the Pro2lem o Dconomic 6rises,; inDconomics o .ar and Peace! Dconomic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed$ +oldsmith and Arauer, p$ &

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    an increase in the use o orce$ 1n summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economicintegration with an increase in the re=uency o economic crises, whereas politi(al science scholarshiplin0s economic decline with e4ternal conTict at systemic, dyadi( andnational le*els$) 3his implied connection 2etween integration, crises and armed conTict has not eaturedprominently in the economic%security de2ate and deserves more attention$

    %(onomi( (ollapse (auses (ompetition 2or resour(es andinstability that es(alates and goes nu(lear

    arris and $urro)s, ?Fcounselor in the /ational 1ntelligence 6ouncil, the principaldrater o +lo2al 3rends &'&), mem2er o the /169s Long ?ange *nalysis Unit :?evisiting the Huture!+eopolitical Dects o the Hinancial 6risis;, .ashington ]uarterly,http!""www$tw=$com"'april"docs"'aprZ2urrows$pdG

    1ncreased Potential or +lo2al 6onTict

    Q course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed 2elieves the uture is li0ely to 2e the result o anum2er o intersecting and interloc0ing orces$ .ith so many possi2le permutations o outcomes, each with ampleopportunity or unintended conse=uences, there is a growing sense o insecurity$ Dven so, history may 2e more instructive

    than ever$ .hile we continue to 2elievethat the +reat 7epression is not li0ely to 2erepeated, thelessons to 2e drawnrom that period includethe harmul eects on

    Tedgling democracies and multiethnic societies (thin0 6entral Durope in &'s and

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    3ypes o (onKi(t that the world continues to e4perience, such as o*erresour(es, (ould reemerge, particularly i protectionism grows and there isa resort to neo%mercantilist practices$ Perceptions o renewed energy scarcitywill drive countries to ta0e actions to assure their uture access to energysupplies$ 1n the worst case, this could result in interstate conTicts i government leaders deemassured access to energy resources, or e4ample, to 2e essential or maintaining domestic sta2ility and the survival o

    their regime$ Dven actions short o war, however, will have important geopolitical implications$ Maritime securityconcernsare providing a rationale or naval 2uildups and modernization eorts, such as 6hina9s and1ndia9s development o 2lue water naval capa2ilities$ 1 the fscal stimulus ocus or these countries indeed turns inward,one o the most o2vious unding targets may 2e military$ Auildup o regional naval capa2ilities could lead to

    increased tensions, rivalries, andcounter2alancing moves, 2ut it also will create opportunities ormultinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes$ .ith water also 2ecoming scarcer in *sia and the Middle Dast,

    cooperation to manage changing water resources is li0ely to 2e increasingly di@cult 2oth within and 2etween states in amore dog%eat%dog world$

    And, @+S+ te(hnologi(al leadership is on the brink 0 it/s ane

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    May &', and highlighted some o the issues and potential solution paths$ 3hose testiying called or a comprehensive strategy or the US to maintain technologicalleadership well into the &st century$ Many other specifc suggestions were made during that hearing as to ways to support the industrial 2ase and to assist thepartnership o 7o7 and the deense industrial 2ase to utilize technology advances e@ciently$ Huture prospects Many remedies have 2een proposed to ensure continued UStechnology leadership, in the ace o challenges and stresses within the US S3 enterprise$ Some o the typical concerns are overall unding levels, 7o7 unding or S3,the e@ciency o the application o unds to S3, and the emphasis o disciplines within S3$ Qther concerns include regulations and impediments to research in S3,and the production rate o scientists and the career opportunities$ .e have noted many o these issues in our survey o elements o the S3 enterprise$ 3he larger concernis over the respect in which science and technology is held within our society$ Since research is an intermediate product, oten accomplished years 2eore product andsocietal 2enefts, there is oten l ittle appreciation o the role o the researcher and inventor$ *ter .orld .ar 11, there was great respect aorded scientists, particularlyphysicists$ Post%Sputni0, there was a deli2erate eort to elevate the stature o science and technology, and the manned space program certainly contri2uted to societalrespect$ Some argue that it is 2ecause there has 2een a precipitous o%shoring o manuacturing that the generation o new ideas has moved overseas (IJ-$ *ndy +rove o

    1ntel ma0es a complementary argument! 3hat as manu2a(turing mo*es o*erseas, *merican

    companies lose the 0nowledge o how to scale up new ideas to ull%scaleproduction(I-$ Aoth arguments suggestthere are reduced incentives or domestic researchas manuacturing moves elsewhere , and lead to the conclusion that research is 2est perormed 2y those with amiliarity oproduct production$ 3hus, they argue that )e need to rein*igorate manu2a(turing andproduction or economic vitality so that te(hnology de*elopment andleadership )ill 2ollo)$ *nd, indeed, the nation has an *dvanced Manuacturing 1nitiative, and many cite a resurgence o domesticmanuacturing as incentives normalize to less avor o%shoring$ Summing up the landscape 3he US has the 2est universities, the most winners o the /o2el Prize, the 2est

    young scientists, and the largest investment in research and development o any nation on earth$ So how (an it be that the @S is

    apparently losing its lead in s(ien(e and te(hnology "he ans)er

    isn/t that the @S has slo)ed do)n, although according to some the rate o technical progress has, indeed, slowed$ 3he

    act is that the competition has discovered the importance o innovation, and has

    2egun to reap rewards rom speeding up$ .e have seen that 6hina especiallyis mustering its considera2le resources to develop what they call an:innovation economy,; 2ut that other nations, as well as Durope, highly *alues(ien(e and engineering, and impli(itly or ta(itly ha*e begun to

    (hallenge @S te(h nology leadership$ *t the same time, the glo2alization o researchand ease with which international science colla2orations ta0e place meanthat continued US leadership re=uires ull engagement with the internationalscientifc community$ 3hus, impediments to e4change o inormation and 2ureaucracy in the conduct o US research are counter%productive$ *ccording to Aill +ates, you always have to renew your lead$4ii "he @S has the resour(es and

    in2rastru(ture ne(essary to maintain and rene) a lead in te(hnology+

    $ut momentum is not su(ient$ 1n light o concerted eorts in other nations, coasting in scienceand technology will #eopardize national security, and also #eopardize theeconomic and societal 2enefts o 2eing frst to mar0et with technologicalinnovations$ /o single agency or entity within the United States can enact a strategy to renew the technology lead$ 1nstead, continued US technicalleadership will re=uire a dedicated and coordinated eort throughout the society$

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    A"

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    "e(h 4eadership #n the $rink@+S+ te(hnologi(al leadership is on the brink 0 it/s ane

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    rate o scientists and the career opportunities$ .e have noted many o theseissues in our survey o elements o the S3 enterprise$ 3he larger concern isover the respect in which science and technology is held within our society$Since research is an intermediate product, oten accomplished years 2eoreproduct and societal 2enefts, there is oten little appreciation o the role o

    the researcher and inventor$ *ter .orld .ar 11, there was great respectaorded scientists, particularly physicists$ Post%Sputni0, there was adeli2erate eort to elevate the stature o science and technology, and themanned space program certainly contri2uted to societal respect$ Some arguethat it is 2ecause there has 2een a precipitous o%shoring o manuacturingthat the generation o new ideas has moved overseas (IJ-$ *ndy +rove o1ntel ma0es a complementary argument! 3hat as manuacturing movesoverseas, *merican companies lose the 0nowledge o how to scale up newideas to ull%scale production (I-$ Aoth arguments suggest there are reducedincentives or domestic research as manuacturing moves elsewhere, andlead to the conclusion that research is 2est perormed 2y those withamiliarity o product production$ 3hus, they argue that we need toreinvigorate manuacturing and production or economic vitality so thattechnology development and leadership will ollow$ *nd, indeed, the nationhas an *dvanced Manuacturing 1nitiative, and many cite a resurgence odomestic manuacturing as incentives normalize to less avor o%shoring$Summing up the landscape 3he US has the 2est universities, the mostwinners o the /o2el Prize, the 2est young scientists, and the largestinvestment in research and development o any nation on earth$ So how canit 2e that the US is apparently losing its lead in science and technology> 3heanswer isn9t that the US has slowed down, although according to some therate o technical progress has, indeed, slowed$ 3he act isthat the competition has discovered the importance o innovation, and has2egun to reap rewards rom speeding up$ .e have seen that 6hina especiallyis mustering its considera2le resources to develop what they call an:innovation economy,; 2ut that other nations, as well as Durope, highly valuescience and engineering, and implicitly or tacitly have 2egun to challenge UStechnologyleadership$ *t the same time, the glo2alization o research andease with which international science colla2orations ta0e place mean thatcontinued US leadership re=uires ull engagement with the internationalscientifc community$ 3hus, impediments to e4change o inormation and2ureaucracy in the conduct o US research are counter%productive$ *ccordingto Aill +ates, you always have to renew your lead$4ii 3he US has theresources and inrastructure necessary to maintain and renew a lead intechnology$ Aut momentum is not su@cient$ 1n light o concerted eorts inother nations, coasting in science and technology will #eopardize nationalsecurity, and also #eopardize the economic and societal 2enefts o 2eing frstto mar0et with technological innovations$ /o single agency or entity withinthe United States can enact a strategy to renew the technology lead$ 1nstead,continued US technical leadership will re=uire a dedicated and coordinatedeort throughout the society$

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    Cloud Computing Industry eySur*eillan(e )ill hurt the (loud (omputing industry )orst

    be(ause it/s young 0 that )ill under(ut our

    (ompetiti*eness+

    Castro /=(7aniel *ugust Oice President o the 1normation 3echnology and 1nnovationHoundation and 7irector o the 6enter or 7ata 1nnovation, U$S$ Secretary o 6ommerce appointed 6astroto the 6ommerce 7ata *dvisory 6ouncil, ormerly at +*Q, SD6, H716 3he 1normation 3echnology 1nnovation Houndation, :5ow Much .ill P?1SM 6ost the U$S$ 6loud 6omputing 1ndustry>;http!""www&$iti$org"&'

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    data locally to protect domestic data rom the U$S$ government$& ?einhard 6lemens, 6DQ o 7eutsche3ele0om9s 3%systems group, argued in &' that creating a +erman or Duropean cloud computingcertifcation could advantage domestic cloud computing providers$ 5e stated, :3he *mericans say that nomatter what happens 19ll release the data to the government i 19m orced to do so, rom anywhere in theworld$ 6ertain +erman companies don9t want others to access their systems$ 3hat9s why we9re well%positioned i we can say we9re a Duropean provider in a Duropean legal sphere and no *merican can get tothem$;< *nd ater the recent P?1SM lea0s, +erman 1nterior Minister 5ans%Peter Hriedrich declared pu2licly,:whoever ears their communication is 2eing intercepted in any way should use services that donNt gothrough *merican servers$;E Similarly, 8rg%Uwe 5ahn, a +erman 8ustice Minister, called or a 2oycott oU$S$ companies$) *ter P?1SM, the case or national clouds or other protectionist measures is even easierto ma0e$

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    QDAI"IN& F#R &%N%RIC "e(h @S %(on"e(hnology key to the global e(onomy

    Ranis (+ustav 3echnology and 5uman 7evelopment +ustav ?anisD6Q/QM16 +?Q.35 6D/3D? *LD U/1OD?S13 leading development

    economist and the Hran0 *ltschul Proessor Dmeritus o 1nternationalDconomics at ale University$""?itt-

    3here can 2e little dou2t that technology V 2oth in its process and =ualitydimensions V when com2ined with human development V makes a (riti(allyimportant (ontribution to e(onomi( gro)thwhich in turn leads toadvances in human development as a society9s 2ottom line achievement$ 1n aJ S316D?7 article :7evelopment 3hin0ing at the Aeginning o the &st6entury; *martya Sen endeavored to distinguish 2etween human progress2y dint o AL*S3, i$e$, :achieved in Alood, Sweat and 3ears,; also 0nown assavings and investment, and +*L*, human advancement via theenhancement o capa2ilities generated 2y a com2ination o human

    development and technology (Sen, J-$ AL*S3 itsel has, o course,2ecome less tearul over time as the 5arrod%7omar world o constantproportions yielded to Solow9s su2stituta2ility among inputs and the newlyrecognized siza2le une4plained technology residual responsi2le or +7Pgrowth$ 3his e4ogenous technology change was indeed or some time seen asa :measure o our ignorance; and the holy grail to 2e incorporated into evermore sophisticated macroeconomic growth models$ More recently, the advento the :new growth theory; o Lucas (-, ?omer ('- et al$ meant thattechnology change has 2een endogenized and lin0ed up more closely toeducation, health and other such inputs, i$e$, approaching humandevelopment$ Aut the o2#ective remains +7P growth, which, in turn, leads to

    the 2ottom line, i$e$ urther improvements in human development$ .hat 1intend to accomplish in this paper is, in the frst instance, ocus on the role otechnology, in com2ination with human development, in generating thegrowth needed or urther increases in human development$ 3his relationship2etween E technology and human development is an intensive one, runningthrough growth as a critical instrument and to human development as the2ottom line output$ 3here are really two channels to 2e considered here$ 3hefrst runs rom economic growth to human development and is ueled 2yhousehold and government e4penditures, heavily inTuenced 2y the role otechnology in converting household and government allocations o savingsinto advances in education, health and other dimensions o human

    development$ 3his production unction contains a role or technology inconverting AL*S3 inputs into +*L* outputs 2ut it is not yet terri2ly wellunderstood$ * good deal o research has, o course, 2een done on the su2#ecttracing the impact o single investments such as education e4penditurescoming out o economic growth 2y the state and the amily on literacy orcompleted primary schooling$ Aut the #oint impact o interactions amongeducation, health and nutrition inputs, etc$, in generating humandevelopment advances is still ar rom ully understood$ 1t has thus ar proved

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    di@cult to determine e4actly how technology change aects humandevelopment$ .e 0now that per capita income aects lie e4pectancy levelsand nutrition, etc$, and that human development is positively aected 2yhousehold and government e4penditures on health and education$ 5owever,as much research, including that o Aehrman ('-, has pointed out, there

    are many interrelated inputs, including home%schooling, home health inputs,the distri2ution o income as well as the relevance o householdcharacteristics, plus alternative ways in which the pu2lic sector is organized,all o which ma0es it di@cult to get a good f4 on this production unction$ 1treminds one o the pro2lem encountered in earlier years, in determiningagricultural sector productivity change, gi*en multiple 1uantitati*e and1ualitati*e inputs and the some)hat mysterious role o2 te(hnologyin converting e4penditures on agricultural inputs into agricultural productivityachievements$

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    @S Competiti*eness k &lobal %(on@S (ompetiti*eness is key to the global e(onomy

    Porter and Ri*kin (Michael Porter and 8an .$ ?iv0in, :3he Looming6hallenge to U$S$ 6ompetitiveness;, 5arvard Ausiness ?eview,

    https!""h2r$org"&'&"'

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    QDAI"IN& F#R &%N%RIC @S %(on k &lobal

    %(on

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    QDAI"IN& F#R &%N%RIC 6es Dar

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    333"%RR#RIS9 A!5AN"A&%

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    Noteou pro2a2ly shouldn9t read this i you 0now they9re going to read a 3error 7*$

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    AC

    "errorism threat high(yberatta(k, re(ruitment

    $ennett and 5iebe(k .;.

    (6ory, Dlise, )"J"), 3he 5ill, :1sis preps or cy2er war,;http!""thehill$com"policy"cy2ersecurity"&E&&'%isis%preps%or%cy2er%war,;J"'"), SM-

    1slamic terrorists are sto0ing alarm with threats o an all%out cy2er crusadeagainst the United States, and e4perts say the warnings should 2e ta0en seriously$[5ac0ersclaiming a@liation with the 1slamic State in 1ra= and Syria ( 1S1S- released a video Mondayvowing an :electronic war; against the United States and Durope andclaiming access to :*merican leadership; online$[:Praise to *llah, today we e4tend onthe land and in the 1nternet,; a aceless, hooded fgure said in *ra2ic$ :.e send this message to *mericaand Durope! .e are the hac0ers o the 1slamic State and the electronic war has not yet 2egun$; [3he videoreceived ridicule online or its poor phrasing and the group9s apparent ina2ility to ma0e good on its cy2erthreat this wee0$[Aut as hac0ers around the world 2ecome more sophisticated, terrorist groups are li0ely

    to ollow their lead and use the same tools to urther their ends, e4perts said$ [:1t9s only really amatter o time till we start seeing terrorist organizations using cy2erattac0techni=ues in a more e4panded way,; said 8ohn6ohen, a ormercounterterrorism coordinator at the 7epartment o 5omeland Security$[:3heconcern is that, as an organization li0e 1S1S ac=uires more resources fnancially, they will2e a2le to hire the talent they need or outsource to criminal organizations ,;6ohen added$ :1 thin0 they9re pro2a2ly moving in that direction anyway$; [Military o@cials agree$ /S*7irector *dm$ Michael ?ogers this wee0 called the pending shit :a great concern and something that wepay lots o attention to$;[:*t what point do they decide they need to move rom viewing the 1nternet as asource o recruitment ` FtoG viewing it as a potential weapon system>; ?ogers as0ed$ [.hile 1S1S has 2eenwidely recognized or its social media prowess, the growing computer science talent o its recruits has

    mostly gone unnoticed$[:* num2er o individuals that haverecently#oinedthe movemento 1S1Swere ol0s that studied computer sciencein Aritish schools and Duropean universities,;said 3om ellermann, chie cy2ersecurity o@cer at security frm 3rend Micro, who said 1S1S9s cy2ercapa2ilities are :advancing dramatically$;[Dven the man reportedly responsi2le or anum2er o the 2rutal 1S1S 2eheadings, du22ed :8ihadi 8ohn; 2y his captives, has a computer sciencedegree, ellermann said$[3he 2urgeoning online threat posed 2y 1slamic e4tremists was part o themotivation or a new security pact announced 3hursday 2etween the .hite 5ouse and +ul states$[1naddition to securing inrastructure and providing cy2er training, U$S$ o@cials will also wor0 with partner

    states to e4pand #oint e4ercises that involve the potential or cy2er warare$ [Part o the danger othe 1S1S threat is the group9s a2ility to marshal attac0s rom its sympathizers ,generating a diuse and unconnected networ0 that is hard to trac0$ [ellermann said the video threats thiswee0 were :a call to arms more than anything,; meant to incite individuals to act on their own$ [:1t hasactually added a new dimension to the terrorist threat that our counterterrorism approach is not intendedor designed to pic0 up on,; 6ohen said$[So ar, supporters have ocused on distri2uted denial%o%serviceattac0s, spear phishing campaigns and hi#ac0ing legitimate we2sites to push malware, creating what are0nown as :watering holes$;[:Hor e4ample, i you go to an 1S1S we2site and download their videos, you2etter recognize most o those we2sites are watering holes,; ellermann said$ :F3hey areG 2asically tryingto attac0 you while you9re watching that video$; [D4perts thin0 radical hac0ers are li0ely to e4pand thistactic to mainstream we2sites and powerul companies9 we2sites as a way to gather inormation ontargets$[:3hey9re 2eginning to conduct more and more counterintelligence,; ellermann said$ [3he 1S1SNsuse o the 1nternet has 2een descri2ed as unprecedented or a terrorist group, and lawma0ers are growingincreasingly concerned a2out U$S$ attempts to counter its rhetoric online$[Sen$ 6ory Aoo0er (7%/$8$-recently criticized U$S$%led online campaigns against radicalization as :laugha2le,; saying he was:stunned; 2y the eorts9 lac0 o sophistication$[8en .eedon, threat intelligence manager at security

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    researcher HireDye, said these concerns are understanda2le$[:Part o the reason why there9s a 2elie thatthese emissaries are so savvy is 2ecause thereNs a sense o people not eeling that theyNre9 in control o themessage,; she said$[Most o 1S1S9s current online power lies in its messaging, e4perts say, and not in itsa2ility to hac0 real computer networ0s$ Aut a handul o high%profle intrusions point toward its aspirations

    as a hac0ing group$[*lmost every month o &') has 2een punctuated 2y some online attac0 2y 1S1Sa@liates or sympathizers$[3he so%called 6y2er 6aliphate too0 over the 3witter and ou3u2eaccounts or the U$S$ 6entral 6ommand in 8anuary and the 3witter account or/ewswee0magazine in He2ruary$[3hen, the ne4t month, the so%called 1slamic State 5ac0ing 7ivisionposted the personal details o '' U$S$ military personnel supposedly involved inattac0s on 1S1Sin 1ra= and Syria$[:ill them in their own lands, 2ehead them in their own homes, sta2them to death as they wal0 their streets thin0ing they are sae,; the group urged supporters$ [1n *pril, aHrench 3O station was 0noc0ed o_ine in perhaps the 2est e4ample o terrorists9 a2ilities$[:1t seemed to 2eo a 2roader scale than we had seen previously,; .eedon said$ :3here were a num2er o acets to thatattac0, and they also too0 the station o_ine or =uite awhile$ 3hat seemed to me to 2e o a dierentmagnitude$;[Some worry the ne4t step is inevita2le within the year$ [ellermann has noticed an uptic0 in1S1S activity on the :cy2er arms 2azaar,; the massive underground dar0 .e2 mar0et run out o Dastern

    Durope that tra@cs in almost every orm o cy2er sa2otage imagina2le$ [:Ay the end o &'),;ellermann said, :we9re going to hear a2out signifcant attac0s that were pulled o2y sympathizers o 1S1S$;

    NSA sur*eillan(e has not stopped a single terrorist atta(k

    no e*iden(e

    Friedersdor2 .?.

    (6onor, )""), 3he *tlantic, :3he Last 7eenders o the /S*,;http!""www$theatlantic$com"politics"archive"&')"')"the%last%deenders%or%the%phone%dragnet"

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    2om2 the stoc0 e4change$ 1t reported that its e4tent was as ollows! Sa2irhan 5asano, a wanna2e#ihadist, sought to travel overseas and fght alongside 1slamist radicals$[* contact in emen 2egancorrespondence, wanting 5asano9s money more than his presence, saying he could arrange a suicidemission 2ut that 5asano would have to wait to fght a2road$ 5asano didn9t want to die and 0ept gettingstrung along, sending occasional money to his emeni contact, who at one point as0ed or some research$ [:Li0e a student pasting .i0ipedia entries into a term paper, 5asano completely dogged his *ugust &''assignment to study the /ew or0 Stoc0 D4change or a possi2le 2om2ing attac0,; the newspaperreported, adding that when he turned over his fndings, his contact in emen reportedly :tore up thereport, threw it in the street, and never showed it to anyone,; and that :it added nothing to hisunderstanding o the stoc0 e4change$; *nother emeni in contact with the *merican told the HA1 that they:never had a real plan to 2om2 the stoc0 e4change,; and that 5asano was useul only insoar as he 0ept

    sending money$3here9s no cause to thin0 the stoc0 e4change would9ve 2een hit2ut or the phone dragnet$[3he 7anish /ewspaper[3he plot to attac0 the 7anishnewspaper is a particularly a2surd case to cite as #ustifcation or 0eeping the phone dragnet$ 3he terrorist

    in this case is 7avid 6oleman 5eadley$ Dven a cursory loo0 at his story suggests numerous ways that theU$S$ government could9ve stopped him years 2eore they did , and renders a2surdthe suggestion that he could only 2e identifed through 2ul0 collection o metadata$ [*s Pro Pu2licareports![3he convicted drug smuggler radicalized and #oined Lash0ar in Pa0istan in the late 's whilespying on Pa0istani heroin tra@c0ers as a paid inormant or the 7rug Dnorcement *dministration$ 5isassociates frst warned ederal agencies a2out his 1slamic e4tremism days ater the Sept$ attac0s$1nvestigators =uestioned him in ront o his 7D* handlers in /ew or0, and he was cleared$ [U$S$

    prosecutors then made the unusual decision to end 5eadleyNs pro2ation or a drug conviction three yearsearly$ 5e then hurried to Pa0istan and 2egan training in Lash0ar terror camps$ *lthough the 7D* insists hewas deactivated in early &''&, some U$S$, Duropean and 1ndian o@cials suspect that he remained aninormant in some capacity and that the 7D* $$$ sent him to Pa0istan to spy $$$ 3hose o@cials 2elieve hisstatus as an operative or ormer inormant may have deTected su2se=uent HA1 in=uiries$[3he HA1 receivednew tips in &''& and in &'') when 5eadleyNs wie in /ew or0 had him arrested or domestic violence andtold counterterror investigators a2out his radicalism and training in Pa0istan$ 1n=uiries were conducted, 2uthe was not interviewed or placed on a watch list, o@cials have said $$$ [1n late &''J$$$ another wie told U$S$em2assy o@cials in 1slama2ad that 5eadley was a terrorist and a spy, descri2ing his re=uent trips toMum2ai and his stay at the 3a# Mahal Palace 5otel$ 1n act, 5eadley was conducting meticulous surveillanceon the 3a# and other targets or an impending attac0 2y a sea2orne s=uad o gunmen$ Qnce again, U$S$agencies say they did not =uestion or monitor him 2ecause the inormation rom the wie was not specifcenough `[3he fnal tip to authorities a2out 5eadley came rom a amily riend days ater the Mum2aiattac0s ` HA1 agents in Philadelphia =uestioned a cousin o 5eadley9s$ 3he cousin lied, saying 5eadley wasin Pa0istan when he was actually at home in 6hicago ` 3he cousin alerted 5eadley a2out the HA1 in=uiry,2ut 5eadley went to 7enmar0 as planned$ U$S$ agencies did not fnd 5eadley or warn oreign counterpartsa2out him in the frst hal o &'' while he conducted surveillance in 7enmar0 and 1ndia and met ` al%]aida leaders$[*ter all that, the U$S$ only caught up with 5eadley ater a tip rom Aritish intelligence:Supporters o sweeping U$S$ surveillance say itNs needed to 2uild a haystac0 o inormation in which to

    fnd a needle,; Pro Pu2lica would conclude$ :1n 5eadleyNs case, it appears the U$S$ washanded the needleCand then deployed surveillance that led to the arrest and prosecution o5eadley and other plotters$;[3o sum up, Hleitz9s national%security claim is unsu2stantiated while s0epticso Section &) are on solid ground$ *s Peter Aergen put it in his report or the /ew *merica Houndation,

    :Surveillance o *merican phone metadata has had no discerni2le impact onpreventing acts o terrorism and only the most marginal o impacts onpreventing terrorist%related activity, such as undraising or a terrorist group$;[ [3he /ational ?eview article ne4t turns to a terrorist attac0 that preceded the phone dragnet, =uotinga speculative claim 2y ormer deputy 61* director Michael Morell that :5ad the FmetadataG program 2eenin place more than a decade ago, it would li0ely have prevented "$ *nd it has the potential to prevent

    the ne4t "$;[* compelling reason to discount that claim was recently oered 2y 8ulian Sanchez, writingin the atermath o the revelation that the 7rug Dnorcement *dministration was running another

    international phone%metadata program as early as the 's$[5e writes![` the F/S*G program9sdeenders oten suggest that had we only had some 0ind o 2ul0 telephonedata2ase, the perpetrators o the " attac0s could have 2een identifed viatheir calls to a 0nown saehouse in emen$ /ow, o course, we 0now that there was such adata2aseCand indeed, a data2ase that hadalready 2een employed in othercounterterror investigations, including the ) Q0lahoma 6ity 2om2ing$[1t does not

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    appear to have helped$Second, we now 0now that 7D* was a2le to :fnd another solution; tomonitor calls related to suspected narcotics tra@c0ers when the program was ended in &'

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    was dangerous$*nd the li=uid 2om2ers (they9re the reason governments prohi2it passengers rom2ringing large 2ottles o li=uids, creams, and gels on airplanes in their carry%on luggage- were captured in&''I in their London apartment not due to mass surveillance 2ut through traditional investigative police

    wor0$ Dhene*er )e learn about an NSA su((ess, it in*ariably (omes

    2rom targeted sur*eillan(e rather than 2rom mass sur*eillan(e$ Qneanalysis showed that the HA1 identifes potential terrorist plots rom reports o suspicious activity, reports o

    plots, and investigations o other, unrelated, crimes$ 3his is a critical point$ U2i=uitous surveillanceand data mining are not suita2le tools or fnding dedicated criminals orterrorists$.e ta4payers are wasting 2illions on mass%surveillance programs, and not getting thesecurity we9ve 2een promised$ More importantly, the money )e/re )asting on these

    ineMe(ti*e sur*eillan(e programs is not being spent on

    in*estigation, intelligen(e, and emergen(y response :tactics that have 2een

    proven to wor0$ 3he /S*Ns surveillance eorts have actually made us less secure$ Mass surveillanceand data mining are much more suita2le or tas0s o populationdiscrimination! fnding people with certain political 2elies, people who are riends with certainindividuals, people who are mem2ers o secret societies, and people who attend certain meetings and

    rallies$ 3hose are all individuals o interest to a government intent on social control li0e 6hina$3hereason data mining wor0s to fnd them is that, li0e credit card raudsters,political dissidents are li0ely to share a well%defned profle $ *dditionally,under authoritarian rule the inevita2le alse alarms are less o a pro2lemcharging innocent people with sedition instills ear in the populace$

    A s)it(h to human intelligen(e is key to sol*e 2or

    terrorism

    !redge ;.. (Stuart, at the +uardian, editor to +uardian 3echnology,specializing in apps and mo2ile content, :D4perts call or Breturn to humanintelligence9 ater Snowden,;http!""www$theguardian$com"technology"&'E"nov"E"human%intelligence%snowden%surveillance%nsa%gch=, ""rc0-

    Aartlett said Snowden has prompted a :ro2ust response; rom technology companies, and an increase in the availa2ility o

    easy%to%use encryption services or the pu2lic$ Aut terrorists and criminals wouldalso 2e 2enefttingrom encrypted services, ma0ing it harder or agencies to prevent attac0s ,especially perpetrated 2y unpredicta2le individuals with: a low 2arrier to entry;$ 1t could mean, he said, the crisiso confdence in the intelligence agencieswill 2e a2out them ailing to stop terrorism,rather than in overstepping the mar0 on privacy$ Aartlett speculated a2out a return to :old%ashioned humanintelligence;! targeted 2ugs in rooms and infltration o groups, though these actuallypresent a greater moral hazard$ :.e need a new settlement a2out the types ointelligence we9re going to allow % and crucial to that is a ar 2etter system ooversight$; ?ather than securicrats watching other securicrats, :1 want citizens who are security cleared to 2e part othe 1ntelligence and Security 6ommittee Fin parliamentG,; he said$ Machon called or a :proper channel; or whistle2lowers

    that would listen to their concerns, investigate and punish any wrongdoing$ :.hat we haveis a systemwhere iyou as0 =uestions or have ethical concerns you are told to shut up and #ust ollow orders$ *nd you 2ecome mar0edasa trou2lema0er,; she said$ :So those who do have ethical concerns, those who are concerned a2out illegaloperations, usually #ust resign and get on with their lives$; Machon drew on her own e4perience going on the run with herthen%partner 7avid Shayler in I, and noted that intelligence whistle2lowers still ace the punishment o 2eing :de actocriminalised or spea0ing to anyone outside that agency;$ :3hat will 2e the only way to change the culture! thatawareness that they can9t get away with this closed groupthin0 any longer the awareness that they will 2e held to

    account and the awareness that they cannot lie to government any more to cover uptheir crimes and mista0es,; she said$ :.e9re a long way rom it$ .e have the 1ntelligence and Security

    http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/14/human-intelligence-snowden-surveillance-nsa-gchqhttp://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/14/human-intelligence-snowden-surveillance-nsa-gchqhttp://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/14/human-intelligence-snowden-surveillance-nsa-gchqhttp://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/14/human-intelligence-snowden-surveillance-nsa-gchq
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    6ommittee in parliament, which is made up o place%men, appointed 2y the prime minister, and it really has no teeth $ 1tcan9t investigate properly$ 1t never has 2een a2le to investigate properly$ *nd i this was 2eeed up into ameaningul oversight 2ody that whistle2lowers and others could go to, then 1 thin0 that would enorce change$; Aartlettsuggested that 5annigan9s decision to go on the oensive reTected wider rustration within +65] a2out technologycompanies ramping up encryption eatures$ :Qne might say with some weight that they9ve 2rought this on themselves,2ecause it9s as a result o the revelations o Ddward Snowden that more people are using this type o sotware,; he said$:1t is very di@cult indeed or +65] and others to 0eep ta2s on what 1S1S is doing$ 3hey have 2ecome ar moresophisticated and their use o open source encryption has 2een increasing dramatically,; he said adding that there should2e more o a partnership approach rather than 2ullying the sector$ :3hey9re going to have to fnd a more progressive,positive wor0ing relationship$ *nd 1 don9t thin0 the 2est way o doing it is going on the ront oot and slagging them o$;

    3errorism is or the police, not the security services$ Machon said there needs to 2e a de2ate a2outtherole o the intelligence agencies$ :Qur intelligence agencies were put in place to protectBnational security9 % which has never 2een legally defned under Aritish law % and toprotectthe economic well2eing o the state,; she said, citing ..11 and the provisional 1?* campaigns o theJ'9s to '9s as e4amples o threats to national security$ :Aut going ater small, ast%paced terrorist organisations isnot national security$ 3hese terrorist attac0s are horrifc, appalling crimes that traumatise people$ Aut they are not a threatto our national security,; she said$ :3he agencies have mission creep going on$ 3hey have ta0en over wor0 that is not

    really appropriate to an intelligence agency, 2ut is more appropriate or police wor0, where you9re supposed togather evidence and put people on trial in ront o a #ury o their peers$; Machon said there needed to 2e a:wholesale rethin0; o Aritish intelligence agencies and surveillance, starting with the esta2lishment o anentirely new agency that wor0ed within a regulatory ramewor0$ San0ey said it is inappropriate or U ministers to 2e

    signing surveillance and interception warrants when 6anada, /ew ealand and *ustralia all appointed #udges to do so$

    She said Li2erty had calculated that the home secretary signs around seven each day$ :5ow, amongst all theother dutieso the home secretary, are they supposed to have the time and attentionto scrutinise each one, assess whether it9s necessary and proportionate, andas0 the necessary =uestions> 3hey #ust don9t$ 1t9s a ridiculous system$; San0ey claimed thatindependent research on /S* 2ul0 interceptionhas shown it hasn9t prevented a singleattac0$ :3he e@cacy o the policy has not 2een shown to wor0,; she said$ :1 that inormation isn9t 2eing acted upon,what9s the point o ever harvesting more and more o it> 1n the hac0neyed needle and haystac0analogy, you rarely need a 2igger haystac0 $;

    "errorism guarantees e

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    include estimating the ris0 o nuclear terrorism as one component o the overall ris0$ 1 that ris0, theoverall ris0, or 2oth are ound to 2e unaccepta2le, then the proposed remedies would 2e directed toreduce which% ever ris0(s- warrant attention$ Similar remar0s apply to a num2er o other threats (e$g$,nuclear war 2etween the U$S$ and 6hina over 3aiwan-$ his article would 2e incomplete i it only dealt withthe threat o nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat o ull% scale nuclear war$ 1 2oth ris0s areunaccepta2le, an eort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril$ 1nact, society9s almost total neglect o the threat o ull%scale nuclear war ma0es studying that ris0 all the

    more important$ 3he cos3 o .orld .ar iii 3he danger associated with nucleardeterrence depends on 2oth the cost o a ailure and the ailure rate$< 3hissection e4plores the cost o a ailure o nuclear deterrence, and the ne4t section is concerned with the

    ailure rate$ .hile other defnitions are possi2le, this article defnes a ailure o deterrence tomean a ull%scale e4change o all nuclear weapons availa2le to the U$S$ and?ussia , an event that will 2e termed .orld .ar 111$ *ppro4imately &' million peopledied as a result o the frst .orld .ar$ .orld .ar 119s atalities were dou2le or triple that num2erCchaosprevented a more precise deter% mination$ 1n 2oth cases humanity recovered, and the world today 2earsew scars that attest to the horror o those two wars$ Many people thereore implicitly 2elieve that a third.orld .ar would 2e horri2le 2ut surviva2le, an e4trapola% tion o the eects o the frst two glo2al wars$ 1nthat view, .orld .ar 111, while horri2le, is something that humanity may #ust have to ace and rom whichit will then have to recover$ 1n contrast, some o those most =ualifed to assess the situation hold a verydierent view$ 1n a I speech to a #oint session o the Philippine 6on% gress, +eneral 7ouglasMac*rthur, stated, :+lo2al war has 2ecome a Hran0enstein to destroy 2oth sides$ ` 1 you lose, you are

    annihilated$ 1 you win, you stand only to lose$ /o longer does it possess even the chance o the winner oa duel$ 1t contains now only the germs o dou2le suicide$; Hormer Secretary o 7eense ?o2ert Mc/amara

    e4% pressed a similar view! :1 deterrence ails and conTict develops, the presentU$S$ and /*3Q strategy carries with it a high ris0 that .estern civilization will2e destroyed; FMc/amara I, page IG$ More recently, +eorge Shultz, .illiam Perry, 5enryissinger, and Sam /unnE echoed those concerns when they =uoted President ?eagan9s 2elie thatnuclear weapons were :totally irrational, totally inhu% mane, good or nothing 2ut 0illing, possi2lydestructive o lie on earth and civilization$; FShultz &''JG Q@cial studies, while couched in less

    emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that .orld .ar 111 would e4act! :3he resultingdeaths would 2e ar 2eyond any precedent $ D4ecutive 2ranch calculations show a rangeo U$S$ deaths rom

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    A" Ra(ism"hreats are realISIS has made it *ery (lear that they are

    threatening the @nited Statesthey/re posting *ideos o2

    themsel*es beheading Ameri(an (itiHens and ha*e plans

    to unleash bio)eaponsi2 )e )in any risk that the threatis real and is not merely (onstru(ted by the @SF&, you

    ha*e no reason to reEe(t us

    I2 most mani2estations o2 Islamophobia stem 2rom

    domesti( sur*eillan(e, then )e sol*e 2or that)e (urtail

    that sur*eillan(emake them pro*e that @9AN

    intelligen(e and in*estigation are ra(ist

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    333PRI5AC6 A!5AN"A&%FISA (ourt in2ringes on pri*a(y mu(h more than "itle III o2

    Diretap A(t+&rani(k, %

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    stored orever without 2eing inde4ed or logged$ 1n sum, inno(ent Ameri(ans are 2ar more

    likely to be monitored under the FAA than under "itle III 2ecauseunder the H**! *ny num2er o individualsthought to 2e agents o a oreign entity targetmay 2e intentionally monitored as a result o a single H** authorization, andneednot 2e specifcally identifedFMore *mericans li0ely to 2e monitored since an undefned and

    evolving list o individuals are 2elieved to 2e agents o approved targetsG /o wrongdoing re=uiredon the part o the targetF3hus, the people tal0ing to the target are also innocentG *nyacility may 2e monitored, even i there is no connection to the target H1S*minimization operates on a :collect now, minimize later; model H1S*minimization allows the government to 0eep inormation concerning*mericansuntil it :could not 2e; oreign intelligence inormation H1S* minimization doesn9tnecessarily mean the inormation is deleted$ 1t may remain stored, 2ut not inde4ed /o #udicialreview o the #ustifcation or the surveillance /o notifcation to individualsincidentally or mista0enly monitored Oery di@cult to impose conse=uencesor violating the H**, see e$g$ government9s argument in *mnesty v$ 6lapper$ 1n act, H** has lesssaeguards even than traditional H1S*$ 3raditional H1S* at least re=uired agents to! (- identiy theindividuals to 2e monitored and get court approval (&- speciy the acilities to 2e surveilled and show

    pro2a2le cause that those acilities would 2e used 2y the target and (

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    years$ 7espite government o@cialsN claims to the contrary, the /S* is 2uilding a growingdata2ase o *mericansN international telephone calls and emails $ + "hePro(edures allo) the sur*eillan(e o2 Ameri(ans by 2ailing to ensure

    that the NSAs sur*eillan(e targets are in 2a(t 2oreigners outside the

    @nited States$ 3he *ct is predicated on the theory that oreigners a2road have no right to privacyC

    or, at any rate, no right that the United States should respect$ Aecause they have no right toprivacy, the U$S$ government sees no 2ar to the collection o theircommunications, including their communications with *mericans$ Aut even i oneaccepts the governmentNs premise, the Procedures ail to ensure that the /S*Nssurveillance targets are in act oreigners outside the United States$ 3his is 2ecausethe Procedures permit the /S* to presume that prospective surveillance targets are oreigners outside theUnited States a2sent specifc inormation to the contraryCand to presume thereore that they are air

    game or warrantless surveillance$ =+ "he Pro(edures permit the go*ernment to

    (ondu(t sur*eillan(e that has no real (onne(tion to the

    go*ernments 2oreign intelligen(e interests$ Qne o the undamental pro2lems with

    the *ctis that it permits the government to conduct surveillance withoutpro2a2le causeor individualized suspicion$ 1t permits the government to monitor people who arenNt

    even thought to 2e doing anything wrong, and to do so without particularized warrants or meaningulreview 2y impartial #udges$ +overnment o@cials have placed heavy emphasis on the act that the *ctallows the government to conduct surveillance only i one o its purposes is to gather oreign intelligenceinormation$ 3hat term, though, is defned very 2roadly to include not only inormation a2out terrorism 2utalso inormation a2out intelligence activities, the national deense, and even the oreign aairs o theUnited States$ 3he Procedures wea0en the limitation urther$ *mong the things the /S* e4amines todetermine whether a particular email address or phone num2er will 2e used to e4change oreignintelligence inormation is whether it has 2een used in the past to communicate with oreigners$ *nother iswhether it is listed in a oreignerNs address 2oo0$ 1n other words, the /S* seems to e=uate a propensity to

    communicate with oreigners with a propensity to communicate oreign intelligence inormation$ 3heeect is to 2ring virtually every international communication within the reacho the /S*Ns surveillance$ E$ "he Pro(edures permit the NSA to (olle(tinternational communications, including *mericansN international (ommuni(ations, in bulk$ Qnits ace, the *ct permits the /S* to conduct dragnet surveillance, not #ust surveillance o specifc

    individuals$ Q@cials who advocated or the *ct made clear that this was one o its principal purposes, andunsurprisingly, the Procedures give eect to that design$ .hile they re=uire the government to identiy a

    target outside the country, once the target has 2een identifed the Procedures permit the /S*to sweep up the communications o any oreigner who may 2ecommunicating a2out the target$ 3he Procedures contemplate that the /S* will do this 2yemployFingG an 1nternet Protocol flter to ensure that the person rom whom it see0s to o2tain oreignintelligenc