Backdoor Affirmative - DDI 2015 CT.docx

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    Encryption A

    DDI Backdoors - Gaurav

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    NotesEncryption Back Doors

    Encryption cracking refers to literally guring out the codes being used to conduct theexchange in order to intercept the exchanged communication.

    Another way to access the communication is to have a back door! security code thatwould enable a third party to access the communication. At least in the past" at leastthe providers of the keys have been able to access the communication by retaining aback door.

    Stanford #omputer Science $ro%ect" no date" &he Ethics 'or not( of governmentsurveillance"! http)**cs.stanford.edu*people*eroberts*cs+,-*pro%ects*ethicsofsurveillance*tech/encryptionbackdoors.html 01A) 2++-3

    A 4backdoor4 in computing is a method of bypassing the normal method ofauthentication. Backdoors are usually inserted into a program or algorithmbefore it is distributed widely. &hey are often hidden in part of the design of theprogram or algorithm. 5n cryptography specically" a backdoor would allow anintruder to access the encrypted information without having the correctcredentials. &he backdoor would either a( allow the intruder to guess the accesskey based on the context of the message or b( allow the intruder to present askeleton key that will always grant him access.

    6ow the companies that provide the communications services" such as 7ahoo andApple" do not even have access to these back doors" making it impossible for them toprovide it to anyone" including the government.

    $hilip Swart8" 9ashington &imes 1ctober -:" +,-;"

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    that encryption technology prominently featured in the latestgenerations of smart phones will leave the user&s information

    inaccessible to outside parties even law enforcement personnel with alegitimate search warrant.

    Caurav Darma

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    Background'rivate companies are making their encryption systems more

    accessible

    &he 1bserver 'England(" une " +,-;" ohn 6aughton) Even a password on steroidswon=t keep the spies out" &he 1bserver 'England(" une " +,-;" ohn 6aughton) Evena password on steroids won=t keep the spies out" http)**www.;traders.com*C11CFE56##->--,-2*news*C11CFE#ohn6aughtonEvenapasswordonsteroidswontkeepthespiesout-33G++2* 01A) 2++-3

    &he technology that Coogle will use is public key encryption" and it=s been around for along time and publicly available ever since -GG-" when $hil Himmermann created $C$ 'which stands for pretty good privacy(.

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    4surpasses anything else4 they had ever seen. Being able to compromise rmwaregives an attacker total control of the system in a way that is stealthy and lasting " eventhrough software updates. 9hich means that the unsuspecting victim can never getrid of it. 5f you think this has nothing to do with you" the compromised drives were manufactured

    by most of the leading companies in the diskdrive business" including 9estern 0igital"Seagate" &oshiba" 5B" icron and Samsung. #heck your laptop specications to see which one ofthese companies made the drive.&he second revelation" last month" came from aC#MN presentationprovided by Snowden and reported in online publication the 5ntercept. 0ocumentsshowed that a %oint 6SA*C#MN team had hacked into the internal computer network ofCemalto " the world=s largest manufacturer of sim cards" stealing ,in the process"encryption keys used to protect the privacy of mobile communications internationally.

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    Development&his a eliminates backdoor reOuirements but should also eliminate encryptioncracking by the 6SA solves for circumvention cases

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    Encryption A

    *+,,ase

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    *+, InherencyThe N"+ is permitted to crack encryption in the status 3uo

    0avid "anger" April -+" +,*2" 1bama lets 6.S.A. exploit online security Jaws"

    oIcials say" http)**www.nytimes.com*+,-;*,;*-2*us*politics*obamaletsnsaexploitsomeinternetJawsoIcialssay.html01A) 2+--3

    Stepping into a heated debate within the Qnited States intelligence agencies" $resident 1bamahas decided thatwhen the 6ational Security Agency discovers ma%or Jaws in 5nternet security " it should inmost circumstances reveal themto assure that they will be xed" rather than keep mum so that the Jawscan be used in espionage or cyberattacks" senior administration oIcials said over the weekend. But r. 1bamacarved a broad exception for ==a clear national security or law enforcement need "== theoIcials said on Saturday" a loophole that is likely to allow the 6.S.A. to continue toexploit security Jaws both to crack encryption on the 5nternet and to designcyberweapons . &he 9hite Mouse has never publicly detailed r. 1bama=s decision" which he made in anuary ashe began a threemonth review of recommendations by a presidential advisory committee on what to do in response to

    recent disclosures about the 6ational Security Agency. But elements of the decision became evident on

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    hacked into the internal computer network of Cemalto" the world=s largestmanufacturer of sim cards" stealing, in the process" encryption keys used to protectthe privacy of mobile communications internationally.

    N"+ has been working on the Bullrun program to crack

    encryptionDavid "anger# +pril *6# 67*2# 1bama lets 6.S.A. exploit online security Jaws"oIcials say" http)**www.nytimes.com*+,-;*,;*-2*us*politics*obamaletsnsaexploitsomeinternetJawsoIcialssay.html01A) 2+--3

    At the center of that technology are the kinds of hidden gaps in the 5nternet almost always created by mistake or oversight thatMeartbleed created. &here is no evidence that the 6.S.A. had any role in creating Meartbleed" or even that it made use of it. 9hen the9hite Mouse denied prior knowledge of Meartbleed on

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    and foreign 5& industries to covertly inJuence and*or overtly leverage their commercialproducts= designs.= &he companies involved in this program are unknown. $reviously"tech giants issued cleverly worded denials when confronted with the reports on the$P5S program. A -,yearold 6SA program aimed at breaking encryption technologies

    had a ma%or breakthrough in +,-, when =vast amounts= of data collected throughdragnet taps on the world=s beroptic cables became newly =exploitable.= An internalmemo noted that when British analysts were made aware of the 6SA=s program"=&hose not already briefed were gobsmackedU= &he 6SA=s capability to breakencryption is kept under a thick veil of secrecy. =0o not ask about or speculate onsources or methods"= stated one document aimed at analysts. Strong decryptionprograms are described by the 6SA as =price of admission for the QS to maintainunrestricted access to and use of cyberspace.= Some of these programs involve bruteforce cracking" others involve direct collaboration with technology companies andinternet service providers. &he 1Ice of the 0irector of 6ational 5ntelligenceresponded on

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    -+ years in covertly inserting highly sophisticated spyware into the hard drives of over,",,, computer systems around the world" although this number could be muchhigher.X&he 6SA=s reliance on these elite hackers explains why the agency makesregular appearancesat hacking conferences like 0ef#on and BlackMat.X&here is simply

    no substitute for exploiting a target=s computer in order to intercept allcommunications prior to those communications leaving the computer and becomingencrypted.X 5t=s the cyber eOuivalent of the -G>,s police tactic of bugging a suspect=srotary phone Y they get the info right at the source.X Aid reports that the 6SA alsooften pays outside services Y what we=ve taken to referring to as 4hackermercenaries4 Y to provide these software exploits 'known as 4Hero 0ay Exploits"4since no one knows they exist yet(.X Since the Snowden disclosures" Aid notes" many of

    &A1=s targets have updated their software" so the 6SA=s listening capability is goingdark.X 6onetheless" every software has an exploit waiting to be found" and &A1 hasproven incredibly capable of nding them.

    1ired# /-*5" -2" http)**www.wired.com*threatlevel*+,-+*,2*/nsadatacenter*

    But this is more than %ust a data center"! says one senior intelligence oIcial who untilrecently was involved with the program. &he mammoth Bludale center will haveanother important and far more secret role that until now has gone unrevealed. 5t isalso critical" he says" for breaking codes. And codebreaking is crucial" because muchof the data that the center will handleYnancial information" stock transactions"business deals" foreign military and diplomatic secrets" legal documents" condentialpersonal communicationsYwill be heavily encrypted. According to another top oIcialalso involved with the program" the 6SA made an enormous breakthrough several

    years ago in its ability to cryptanaly8e" or break" unfathomably complex encryptionsystems employed by not only governments around the world but also many averagecomputer users in the QS. &he upshot" according to this oIcial) EverybodyRs a targetKeverybody with communication is a target.!X

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    N"+ cracks most encryptionArab 6ews" September :" +,-2 6SA cracked most online encryption"http)**news.yahoo.com*reportnsacrackedmostonlineencryption,:3;3:33Gpolitics.html(**CD

    &he 6ational Security Agency" working with the British government" has secretly beenunraveling encryption technology that billions of 5nternet users rely upon to keep theirelectronic messages and condential data safe from prying eyes" according topublished reports based on internal QS government documents. &he 6SA hasbypassed or cracked much of the digital encryption used by businesses and everyday9eb users" according to reports &hursday in &he 6ew 7ork &imes" Britain=s Cuardiannewspaper and the nonprot news website $ro$ublica. &he reports describe how the6SA invested billions of dollars since +,,, to make nearly everyone=s secrets availablefor government consumption. 5n doing so" the 6SA built powerful supercomputers tobreak encryption codes and partnered with unnamed technology companies to insert4back doors4 into their software" the reports said. Such a practice would give thegovernment access to users= digital information before it was encrypted and sent overthe 5nternet.

    N"+ cracking encryption&he 5nternational Merald &ribune" September :" +,-2" 6.S.A. foils encryption protectionaround globeK Experts say the Q.S. hunt for =back doors= may have seriousconseOuences" p. ;(**CD

    &he Qnited States faced new pressure on

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    not identify which companies have participated. &he 6.S.A. hacked into targetcomputers to snare messages before they were encrypted. And the agency used itsinJuence as the world=s most experienced code maker to covertly introduceweaknesses into the encryption standards followed by hardware and software

    developers around the world. ==

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    Coogle=s systems" according to the document. ==&he risk is that when you build a backdoor into systems" you=re not the only one to exploit it"== said atthew 0. Creen" acryptography researcher at ohns Mopkins Qniversity. ==&hose back doors could workagainst Q.S. communications" too.== $aul Locher" a leading cryptographer who helped

    design the SSF protocol" recalled how the 6.S.A. lost the heated national debate in the-GG,s about inserting into all encryption a government back door called the #lipper#hip. ==And they went and did it anyway" without telling anyone"== r. Locher said. Mesaid he understood the agency=s mission but was concerned about the danger ofallowing it unbridled access to private information. ==&he intelligence community hasworried about =going dark= forever" but today they are conducting instant" totalinvasion of privacy with limited eort"== he said. ==&his is the golden age of spying.== &hedocuments are among more than 3,",,, shared by &he Cuardian with &he 6ew 7ork

    &imes and $ro$ublica" the nonprot news organi8ation. &hey focus primarily on C#MNbut include thousands either from or about the 6.S.A. 5ntelligence oIcials asked &he

    &imes and $ro$ublica not to publish this article" saying that it might prompt foreign

    targets to switch to new forms of encryptionor communications that would be harderto collect or read. &he news organi8ations removed some specic facts but decided topublish the article because of the value of a public debate about government actionsthat weaken the most powerful tools for protecting the privacy of Americans andothers. &he full extent of the 6.S.A.=s decoding capabilities is known only to a limitedgroup of top analysts. &he les show that the agency is still stymied by someencryption" as r. Snowden suggested in a Ouestionandanswer session on &heCuardian=s 9eb site in une. ==$roperly implemented strong crypto systems are one ofthe few things that you can rely on"== he said" though cautioning that the 6.S.A. oftenbypasses the encryption altogether by targeting the computers at one end or theotherand grabbing text before it is encrypted or after it is decrypted. &he agency=ssuccess depends on working with 5nternet companies by getting their voluntarycollaboration" forcing their cooperation with court orders or surreptitiously stealingtheir encryption keys or altering their software or hardware. According to anintelligence budget document leaked by r. Snowden" the 6.S.A. spends more thanT+3, million a year on its Sigint Enabling $ro%ect" which ==actively engages the Q.S. andforeign 5& industries to covertly inJuence and*or overtly leverage their commercialproducts= designs== to make them ==exploitable.== Sigint is the abbreviation for signalsintelligence" the technical term for electronic eavesdropping. By this year" the SigintEnabling $ro%ect had found ways inside some of the encryption chips that scrambleinformation for businesses and governments" either by working with chipmakers toinsert back doors or by surreptitiously exploiting existing security Jaws" according tothe documents. &he +,-2 6.S.A. budget reOuest highlights ==partnerships with ma%ortelecommunications carriers to shape the global network to benet other collectionaccesses== that is" to allow more eavesdropping. Since r. Snowden=s disclosuresignited criticism of overreach and privacy infringements by the 6.S.A." Q.S. technologycompanies have faced scrutiny from customers and the public over what some see astoo co8y a relationship with the government. 5n response" some companies havebegun to push back against what they describe as government bullying. Coogle" 7ahooand

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    down rather than comply with the agency=s demands for what it consideredcondential customer informationK another" Silent #ircle" ended its email servicerather than face similar demands. 5n eect" facing the 6.S.A.=s relentless advance" thecompanies surrendered.

    N"+ continues to e.ploit software vulnerabilities for spying

    purposesoseph enn" Peuters" ay ->" +,-;" 1bamaRs spying reforms fail to satisfy experts"!http)**www.reuters.com*article*+,-;*,3*->*uscybersummitreformsidQSBPEA;

    'Peuters( 1bama administration actions to change some of the 6ational SecurityAgency=s surveillance practices after the leaks of classied documents by contractorEdward Snowden are falling short of what many private cyber experts want. &op

    government experts told the Peuters #ybersecurity Summit this week they would bemore transparent about spying activity. 6ongovernment guests" however" said theadministration was not doing enough to advance 5nternet security. -.html01A) -++-;

    http://www.reuters.com/sectors/industries/overview?industryCode=174&lc=int_mb_1001http://www.reuters.com/sectors/industries/overview?industryCode=174&lc=int_mb_1001http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.htmlhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/sectors/industries/overview?industryCode=174&lc=int_mb_1001http://www.reuters.com/sectors/industries/overview?industryCode=174&lc=int_mb_1001http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.htmlhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html
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    5t=s a suggestion unlikely to please some intelligence agencies. After all" the -.html01A) -++-;

    But how do the

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    decrypted traIc. 5f all else fails" the 6SA and its allies resort to brute force) &hey hacktheir target=s computers or 5nternet routers to get to the secret encryption or theyintercept computers on the way to their targets" open them and insert spy gear beforethey even reach their destination" a process they call interdiction.

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    *+, Economy +dvantage+dvantage 88 is the economy888 internal links

    [side noteinternal link 3 is crappy

    *st is consumer distrust

    N"+ backdoors create consumer distrust with international

    businesses--- It undercuts global connectivity and spills over

    internationally

    &revor Timm *5" &revor &imm is a Cuardian QS columnist and executive director ofthe

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    ::"http)**law.emory.edu*el%*/documents*volumes*>;*2*articles*chanderle.pdf(Economic 0evelopment any governments believe that by forcing companies to locali8e data within national borders" they will

    increase investment at home. &hus" data locali8ation measures are often motivated" whether explicitly or not" by desires topromote local economic development. 5n fact" however" data locali8ation raises costs for localbusinesses" reduces access to global services for consumers " hampers local startups" and interferes with the use of the latest tech nological advances. 5n an 5nformationAge" the global Aow of data has become the lifeblood of economies acrossthe world. 9hile some in Europe have raised concerns about the transfer of data abroad" the European #ommission hasrecogni8ed the critical importance of data Jows notably for the transatlantic economy.!+,G &he #ommissionobserves that international data transfers form an integral part of commercialexchanges across the Atlanticincluding for new growing digital businesses" such associal media or cloud computing" with large amounts of data going from the EQ tothe QS.!+-, 9orried about the eect of constraints on data Jows on both global information sharing and economicdevelopment" the 1rganisation for Economic #ooperation and 0evelopment '1E#0( has urged nations to avoid barriers to thelocation" access and use of crossborder data facilities and functions! when consistent with other fundamental rights" in order to

    ensure cost eectiveness and other eIciencies.!+-- &he worry about the impact of data locali8ation is widely shared in thebusiness community as well. &he value of the 5nternet to national economies has been widely noted.+-+ Pegarding Bra8ilRsattempt to reOuire data locali8ation" the 5nformation &echnology 5ndustry #ouncil" an industry association representing more thanforty ma%or 5nternet companies" had argued that incountry data storage reOuirements would detrimentally impact all economicactivity that depends on data Jows.!+-2 &he Swedish government agency" the 6ational Board of &rade" recently interviewed

    fteen local companies of various si8es across sectors and concluded succinctly that trade cannot happenwithout data being moved from one location to another.!+-; 0ata locali8ation " likemost protectionist measures " leads only to small gains for a few local enterprisesand workers" while causing signicant harms spread across the entire economy. &hedomestic benets of data locali8ation go to the few owners and employees of data centers and the few companies servicing thesecenters locally. eanwhile" the harms of data locali8ation are widespread" felt by small" medium" and large businesses that aredenied access to global services that might improve productivity. 5n response to PussiaRs recently passed locali8ation law" the 6C1Pussian Association for Electronic #ommunications stressed the potential economic conseOuences" pointing to the withdrawal ofglobal services and substantial economic losses caused by the passing of similar laws in other countries.+-3 #ritics worried" at the time" that the Bra8ilian data locali8ation

    reOuirement would denyVW Bra8ilian users access to great services that are provided by QS and other internationalcompanies.!+-: arilia arciel" a digital policy expert at 6ot only are there signicant economic costs to data locali8ation" thepotential gains are more limited than governments imagine . 0ata server farms are hardlysignicant generators of employment" populated instead by thousands of computers and few human beings. &he signicant initialoutlay they reOuire is largely in capital goods" the bulk of which is often imported into a country. &he diesel generators" cooling

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    systems" servers" and power supply devices tend to be imported from global suppliers.++: 5ronically" it is often American suppliersof servers and other hardware that stand to be the beneciaries of data locali8ation mandates.++ 1ne study notes" Bra8iliansuppliers of components did not benet from this Vdata locali8ation reOuirementW" since the imported products dominate the

    market.!++G By increasing capital purchases from abroad" data locali8ation reOuirements can in factincrease merchandise trade d ecits.

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    Government mandated backdoors cause cyber-espionage#

    attacks# and intellectual property theft

    Davis et al *2'&erry" icroSystems Automation Croup" and $eha" on . #arnegieellon Qniversity" and Burger" Eric" Ceorgetown Qniversity" and #amp" F. ean" 5ndiana

    Qniversity Bloomington School of 5nformatics and #omputing and Fubar" 0an"PelayServices Pisking it All) Qnlocking the Backdoor to the 6ation=s #ybersecurity!Social Science Pesearch 6etwork" http)**papers.ssrn.com*sol2*papers.cfm?abstract/id@+;>>,;(

    M19 A C1DEP6E6& 5CM& 9EALE6 SE#QP5&7 Covernment policies can aect greatly the security ofcommercial products" either positively or negatively. &here are a number of methods by which a governmentmight aect security negatively as a means of facilitating legal government surveillance. 1ne inexpensive method is to exploit preexisting weaknesses that are already present in commercial software" while keeping these weaknesses a secret. Another method is tomotivate the designer of a computer or communications system to make those systems easier for government agencies to access.otivation may come from direct mandate or nancial incentives. &here are many ways that a designer can facilitate government

    access once so motivated. X9EAL SE#QP5&7 5S 0A6CEP1QS 5mproving the ability of law enforcement and

    intelligence agencies to conduct electronic surveillance is part of a strategy to limit threats from criminals" foreign powers and terrorists.At the same time" strengthening the cybersecurity of systems that private citi8ens and corporate entities use and engage also limits

    threats from criminals" foreign powers" and terrorists. 9eak cybersecurity creates opportunities forsophisticated criminal organi8ation s" hostile nation states" and wellfunded" nonstateactors . 9ellfunded criminal organi8ations will turn to cybercrime for the same reasonsthey turn to illegal drugs) money and greed. &he costs imposed on the rest of us aresubstantial.&he conseOuences of malicious cyber activities take many formsYincluding direct nancial losses'e.g." fraudulent use of credit cards(K intellectual property theftKtheftof sensitive business informationK opportunity costs" such as lost productivity when a

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    computer system is taken down K and the damage to a companyRs reputation whenothers learn its systems have been breached or are vulnerable to compromise. 1nerecent study estimates these costs range from T+; billion to T-+, billion per year inthe Qnited States.: 6ot only are individuals and enterprises attacked Y but also federal" state and local governments.9eakened security can only increase the high cost of defending against cybercrime. 1f course" some technically sophisticated

    organi8ations are challenging the security of American computer and communications systems for reasons other than mere nancial

    gain.

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    represents a subsidy to foreign suppliers that do not have to bear the costs ofdeveloping or licensing it.5n #hina" where many overseas supply chains extend" even ethical multinationalcompanies freOuently procure counterfeit items or items whose manufacture benets from stolen 5$" includingproprietary business processes" counterfeited machine tools" pirated software" etc.5nternational 5$ &heft 5s 6ot ust a

    $roblem in #hina. Pussia" 5ndia" and other countries constitute important actors in a

    worldwide challenge. any issues are the same) poor legal environments for 5$P"protectionist industrial policies" and a sense that 5$ theft is %ustied by a playing eldthat benets developed countries.&he Pole of #hinaBetween 3, and , of the problem.&hema%or studies range in their estimates of #hinaRs share of international 5$ theftK many are roughly :," but in specicindustries we see a broader range. &he evidence. Evidence comes from disparate sources) the portion of court cases inwhich #hina is the destination for stolen 5$" reports by the Q.S. &rade Pepresentative" studies from speciali8ed rms and

    industry groups" and studies sponsored by the Q.S. government. 9hy does #hina stand out? A corecomponent of #hinaRs successful growth strategy is acOuiring science and technology .5t does this in part by legal meansYimports" foreign domestic investment" licensing"and %oint venturesYbut also by means that are illegal. 6ational industrial policy goalsin #hina encourage 5$ theft " and an extraordinary number of #hinese in business andgovernment entities are engaged in this practice . &here are also weaknesses and

    biases in the legal and patent systems that lessen the protection of foreign 5$. 5naddition" other policies weaken 5$P" from mandating technology standards that favordomestic suppliers to leveraging access to the #hinese market for foreign companiesRtechnologies.

    2this vulnerability

    ,yber-attacks and conse3uences cost billions of dollars to 0"

    companies

    'Peport to #ongress of the

    0%"%-,hina Economic and "ecurity eview,ommission" --2th #ong." +nd sess." 6ovember 67*2#>GK>http)**origin.www.uscc.gov*sites*default*les*annual/reports*#omplete+,Peport.$0

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    e;orts has been thrown into 3uestion since the N"+ disclosures began. &rusthas been the principal casualty in this unfortunate aair"! wrote Ben

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    addresses would enable it to regulate 5nternet services and devices with abandon. 5$ addresses are a fundamental and essentialcomponent to the inner workings of the 6et. &aking their administration away from the bottomup" nongovernmental" multistakeholdermodel and placing it into the hands of international bureaucrats would be a grave mistake. 1ther eorts to expand the 5&QRs reach intothe 5nternet are seemingly small but are tectonic in scope. &ake for example the Arab StatesR submission from :" at 2 '+,-+("http)**www.itu.int*md*&,G#9C.9#5&-+#,,>:*en 'last visited ay +G" +,-+(. 3 And 5ran argues that the current denition alreadyincludes the 5nternet. #ontribution from 5ran" &he 5slamic Pepublic of 5ran" #9C9#5&-+ #ontribution ;" Attachment + '+,--("http)**www.itu.int*md*&,G#9C.9#5&-+#,,;*en 'last visited ay +G" +,-+(. 2 accomplish the same goal and it is camouJagedsubterfuge that proponents of 5nternet freedom should watch for most vigilantly. 1ther examples come from #hina. #hina would like tosee the creation of a system whereby 5nternet users are registered using their 5$ addresses. 5n fact" last year" #hina teamed up withPussia" &a%ikistan and Q8bekistan to propose to the Q6 Ceneral Assembly that it create an 5nternational #ode of #onduct for 5nformationSecurity! to mandate international norms and rules standardi8ing the behavior of countries concerning information and cyberspace.!>0oes anyone here today believe that these countriesR proposals would encourage the continued proliferation of an open and freedomenhancing 5nternet? 1r would such constructs make it easier for authoritarian regimes to identify and silence political dissidents? &heseproposals may not technically be part of the 9#5& negotiations" but they give a sense of where some of the 5&QRs ember States wouldlike to go. Still other proposals that have been made personally to me by foreign government oIcials include the creation of aninternational universal service fund of sorts whereby foreign \ usually stateowned \ telecom companies would use international

    mandates to charge certain 9eb destinations on a perclick! basis to fund the buildout of broadband infrastructure across the globe.Coogle" i&unes" th Session of the Qnited 6ations Ceneral Assembly" Annex 'Sep. -;"+,--(" http)**www.cs.brown.edu*courses*csci-,,*sources*+,-+/Q6/Pussia/and/#hina/#ode/o/#onduct.pdf 'last visited ay +G" +,-+(.

    even in the smallest of ways. As my supplemental statement and analysis explains in more detail below" such a scenario

    would be devastating to global economic activity# but it would hurt the

    developing world the most% &hank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and 5 look forward to yourOuestions. &hank you" #hairman 9alden and Panking ember Eshoo" for holding this hearing. 5ts topic is among the most importantpublic policy issues aecting global commerce and political freedom) namely" whether the 5nternational &elecommunication Qnion '5&Q("or any other intergovernmental body" should be allowed to expand its %urisdiction into the operational and economic aairs of the

    5nternet. As we head toward the treaty negotiations at the 9orld #onference on 5nternational &elecommunications '9#5&( in 0ubai in0ecember" 5 urge governments around the world to avoid the temptation to tamper with the 5nternet. Since its privati8ation in the early

    -GG,s" the 5nternet has Jourished across the world under the current deregulatoryframework. 5n fact" the longstanding international consensus has been to keepgovernments from regulating core functions of the 5nternetRs ecosystem. 7et" somenations" such as #hina" Pussia" 5ndia" 5ran and Saudi Arabia" have been pushing to reverse this course bygiving the 5&Qor the Qnited 6ations itself" regulatory %urisdiction over 5nternet governance.&he 5&Q isa treatybased organi8ation under the auspices of the Qnited 6ations.- 0onRt take my word for it" however. As Pussian $rime inisterDladimir $utin said almost one year ago" the goal of this wellorgani8ed and energetic eort is to establish international control over the5nternet using the monitoring and supervisory capabilities of the V5&QW.!+ otivations of some 5&Q ember states vary. Some of thearguments in support of such actions may stem from frustrations with the operations of 5nternet #orporation for Assigned 6ames and6umbers '5#A66(. Any concerns regarding 5#A66" however" should not be used as a pretext to end the multistakeholder model that hasserved all nations \ especially the developing world \ so well. Any reforms to 5#A66 should take place through the bottomup multistakeholder process and should not arise through the 9#5&Rs examination of the 5nternational &elecommunication Pegulations '5&P(s.#onstructive reform of the 5&Ps may be needed. 5f so" the scope of any review should be limited to traditional telecommunications

    services and not expanded to include information services or any form of 5nternet services. odication of the current multistakeholder5nternet governance model may be necessary as well" but we should all work together to ensure no intergovernmental regulatoryoverlays are placed into this sphere. 6ot only would nations surrender some of their national sovereignty in such a pursuit" but theywould suocate their own economies as well" while politically paraly8ing engineering and business decisions within a global regulatorybody. - Mistory" 5&http)**www.itu.int*en*about*$ages*history.aspx4Q" http)**www.itu.int*en*about*$ages*history.aspx 'last visited ay -;"+,-+(. + Dladimir $utin" $rime inister of the Pussian

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    "lowdown in growth causes e.tinction

    Pichard 6. aass */" $resident of the #ouncil on

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    and thriving businesses who are being forced to shut down because of this climate weRre operating in.! 5ronically" Albrecht takes that position as someone whostands to gain a competitive edge from the demise of Q.S.based cloud services. Startail is owned by Surfboard Molding BD" a privately held company basedin the 6etherlands" and Albrecht has long touted its overseas location as a selling point for privacyconscious consumers. Fong before Edward Snowdenbecame a household name" she and her Startail colleagues set out to develop an encrypted email service that would be truly safe. But they understood thatit needed to be safe not %ust from the prying eyes of datacollecting behemoths like Coogle 5nc. '6ASA0AN)C11C( and 7ahoo 5nc. '6AS0AN)7M11(" but fromthe Q.S. government" which" under the $atriot Act" can force American companies to hand over data. &hat said" it should come as no surprise that FevisonRsdecision to shutter Favabit rather than compromise its usersR privacy has garnered praise from its marketplace competitors. 5 was truly grateful to him fortaking that position"! Albrecht said" likening Fevison to Snowden. Mere is the second person now who has fallen on his sword" sacricing himself for the rest of

    us.! And Fevison and Snowden are not alone with their swords.

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    Ceoscience observations and model simulations are generating vast amounts of multidimensional data. Eectively analy8ing these data are essential for geoscience studies.Mowever" the tasks are challengingfor geoscientists because processingthe massive amount of datais both computing and data intensivein that data analytics reOuires complex procedures and multiple

    tools.&o tackle these challenges" a scientic workJow framework is proposed for big geoscience dataanalytics. 5n this framework techniOues are proposed byleveraging cloud computing"apPeduce" and Service 1riented Architecture 'S1A(. Specically" MBase is adopted for storing and managing biggeoscience data across distributed computers. apPeducebased algorithm framework is developed to support parallelprocessing of geoscience data. And serviceoriented workJow architecture is built for supporting ondemand complexdata analytics in the cloud environment. A proofofconcept prototype tests the performance of the framework. Pesults

    show that this innovative frameworksigniFcantly improvesthe eIciency of biggeoscience data analytics by reducing the data processing time as well as simplifyingdata analytical procedures for geoscientists. Co to) 5ntroduction Ceoscience data are a core componentdriving geoscience advancement V-W. Qnderstanding the Earth as a system reOuires acombination of observational datarecorded by sensors and simulation dataproduced by numericalmodels V+W. 1ver the past half century humanRs capability to explore the Earth system has been enhanced with theemergence of new computing" sensor and information technologies V2W. 9hile the technological advancements

    accelerate collecting" simulating and sharing geoscience data" they also produce Big 0ata for geosciences from at leasttwo aspects.

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    issues all involve assumptions about human" national and religious behaviour and are thus beyond the remit of scientic bodies like the5$##" which can only hint at what they truly think will happen. So you are not getting the full picture from them. Mowever in a classiccase of improvident human behaviour" a global energy stampede is taking place as oil" gas" coal" tar sands and other miners 'who" beingtechnical folk" understand Ouite clearly what they are doing to the planet( rush to release as much carbon as possible as protably aspossible before society takes the inevitable decision to ban it altogether. &hanks to them" humanity isnRt sleepwalking to disaster so

    much as racing headlong to embrace it. 0o the rest of us have the foresight" and the guts" to stop them? 1ur ultimate

    survival will be predicated entirely on our behaviour \ not only onhow well we adapt tounavoidable change" but also how Ouickly we apply the brakes .

    Tech leadership is key to 0" primacyBaru 'Disiting $rofessor at the Fee Luan 7ew School of $ublic $olicy in Singapore('San%aya" 7ear of the power shift?"! http)**www.indiaseminar.com*+,,G*3G2*3G2/san%aya/baru.htm(There is no doubt that economics alone will not determine the balance of globalpower" but there is no doubt either that economics has come to matter formore.&he management of the economy" and of the treasury" has been a vitalaspect of statecraft from time immemorial. LautilyaRsArthashastrasays" `

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    were not restoredafter this amount of time" the results could be disastrous.

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    *+, Internet $reedom +dvantageDomestic surveillance decks 0" credibility regarding Internet

    freedom and governance J no alt causes

    Cehl *2'0anielle Lehl et al" uly +,-;. $olicy Analyst at 6ew AmericaRs 1pen&echnology 5nstitute '1&5(K Levin Bankston is the $olicy 0irector at 1&5K Pobyn Creeneis a $olicy #ounsel at 1&5K and Pobert orgus is a Pesearch Associate at 1&5.Surveillance #osts) &he 6SARs 5mpact on the Economy" 5nternet

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    Expression and 1pinion said in +,-2) &he right to privacy is often understood as anessential reOuirement for the reali8ation of the right to freedom of expression. Qndueinterference with individualsR privacy can both directly and indirectly limit the freedevelopment and exchange of ideas . An infringement upon one right can be both the cause and conseOuence of

    an infringement upon the other.&echnology has improved communication across the world rapidlyand enabled new levels of interactions between people who could never havecommunicated before. 7ou can argue that such platforms encourage and even helpterrorists organi8e activities" but that is the exception" not the rule. +:;+:2:*&extDiew 01A) 2+--3

    &hose concerns were heightened in anuary" after 1bama" alongside Q.L. $rime inister 0avid #ameron" said lawenforcement and intelligence agencies should not be locked out of encrypted messages. &he president=s remarks cameafter Apple" Coogle and other tech giants stung by criticism of their cooperation with the +:;+:2:*&extDiew 01A) 2+--3

    &hose concerns were heightened in anuary" after 1bama" alongside Q.L. $rime inister 0avid #ameron" said law enforcement andintelligence agencies should not be locked out of encrypted messages. &he president=s remarks came after Apple" Coogle and other techgiants stung by criticism of their cooperation with the

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    surveillance is that they weaken encryption technology. 4Any attempt to weakenencryption via a backdoor will make it easier for bad actors to get in"4 says 0avid #ampbell" chiefsecurity oIcer of SendCrid" a Boulder" #olo.based security software startup. 45t=s a huge mistake.4 5t also sets a badprecedent for other governments.41ur government has asked companies to give them

    a backdoor"4

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    dollars of losses overseas because of consumer distrust over theirrelationships with the N"+ - would lose all credibility with users around the world ifthe

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    digital scrambling" that guards global commerce and banking systems" protectssensitive data like trade secrets and medical records" and automatically secures the emails" 9eb searches" 5nternet chats and phone calls of Americans and others aroundthe world" the documents show. But don=t worry" your electronic medical records are

    secure" and will 6EDEP be used for political purposes by your adversaries... Beginningin +,,," as encryption tools were gradually blanketing the 9eb" the 6.S.A. investedbillions of dollars in a clandestine campaign to preserve its ability to eavesdrop.Maving lost a public battle in the -GG,s to insert its own =back door= in all encryption" itset out to accomplish the same goal by stealth. &he agency" according to thedocuments and interviews with industry oIcials" deployed custombuilt" superfastcomputers to break codes" and began collaborating with technology companies in theQnited States and abroad to build entry points into their products. &he documents donot identify which companies have participated. At least we may have gotten faster$#=s as a side result of the research that supported these eorts. ... the agency usedits inJuence as the world=s most experienced code maker to covertly introduce

    weaknesses into the encryption standards followed by hardware and softwaredevelopers around the world. Some of the agency=s most intensive eorts havefocused on the encryption in universal use in the Qnited States" including SecureSockets FayerV;W" or SSFK virtual private networksV3W" or D$6sK and the protection usedon fourthgeneration" or ;C" smartphones. any Americans" often without reali8ing it"rely on such protection every time they send an email" buy something online" consultwith colleagues via their company=s computer network" or use a phone or a tablet on a;C network. ight as well %ust send them a copy of all your communications to sparethem the eort... ... Fadar Fevison" the founder of Favabit" wrote a public letterV>W tohis disappointed customers" oering an ominous warning. =9ithout #ongressionalaction or a strong %udicial precedent"= he wrote" =5 would strongly recommend againstanyone trusting their private data to a company with physical ties to the QnitedStates.= Mey" how about let=s AFF have our medical records stored by health 5&companies providing AS$ 'Application service provider"http)**en.wikipedia.org*wiki*Application/service/providerV:W( osite EMP hostingservices to hospitals and clinics...

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    information on their customers with government agencies. &hat pushback has prompted 4vituperative4 comments by government andlaw enforcement that he said are 4usually reserved for %ournalists and activists"4 implying that those companies are 4friends of theterrorists4 or are 4aiders and abetters of terrorists.4 0emoni8ing them" he said" is an attempt to push them back into the morecollaborative relationship technology companies have had with government in the past. any companies actively worked with the 6SA"oering 4what the law reOuired them to do but also beyond4 those reOuirements. Earlier relationships with the 6SA were benecial" or atleast came at no cost" to those companies. But now that kind of cooperation can cost them in terms of reputation and business.

    N"+ back door encryption hacking violates privacy6ew 7ork &imes Editorial Board" September +-" +,-2" #lose the 6SARs Back 0oors"!http)**www.nytimes.com*+,-2*,G*++*opinion*sunday*closethensasbackdoors.html?

    /r@-

    5n +,,>" a federal agency" the 6ational 5nstitute of Standards and &echnology" helped build an international encryption system to helpcountries and industries fend o computer hacking and theft. Qnbeknown to themany usersof the system" a dierent government arm"the 6ational Security Agency"secretly inserted a back door! into the systemthat allowed federal spies to crack open any data that was

    encoded using its technology. 0ocuments leaked by Edward Snowden" the former 6.S.A. contractor" make clearthat the agency has never met an encryption system that it has not tried to penetrate. And it freOuently tries to take the easy way out. Because modern cryptography can be so hard to break" even using the brute force of

    the agencyRs powerful supercomputers" the agency prefers to collaborate with big software companies and cipher authors" gettinghidden access built right into their systems.&he 6ew 7ork &imes" &he Cuardian and $ro$ublica recentlyreportedthat the agency now has access to the codes that protect commerce andbanking systems" trade secrets and medical records" and everyoneRs email and5nternet chat messages" including virtual private networks. 5n some cases" the agencypressured companies to give it accessKas &he Cuardian reported earlier this year"icrosoft provided access toMotmail"1utlook.com" Sky0rive and Skype. According to some of the Snowden documents given to 0er Spiegel"the 6.S.A. also has

    access to the encryption protecting data on i$hones" Android and BlackBerry phones.&hese back doors and specialaccess routes are a terrible idea " another example of the intelligence communityRs overreach. #ompanies andindividuals are increasingly putting their most condential data on cloud storageservices" and need to rely on assurances their data will be secure . Lnowing that encryption hasbeen deliberately weakened will undermine condence in these systems and interfere with commerce.&he back doors also

    strip away the expectations of privacy that individuals" businesses and governmentshave in ordinary communications. 5f back doors are built into systems by the 6.S.A."who is to say that other countriesR spy agencies Y or hackers" pirates and terrorists YwonRt discover and exploit them? &he government can get a warrant and break into the communications or data ofany individual or company suspected of breaking the law. But crippling everyoneRs ability to use encryptionis going too far" %ust as the 6.S.A. has exceeded its boundaries in collecting everyoneRsphone records rather than limiting its focus to actual suspects.

    http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/drbg/drbgval.htmlhttp://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/drbg/drbgval.htmlhttp://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/government-announces-steps-to-restore-confidence-on-encryption-standards/http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/government-announces-steps-to-restore-confidence-on-encryption-standards/http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html?hp&pagewanted=allhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html?hp&pagewanted=allhttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-datahttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-datahttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-datahttp://outlook.com/http://outlook.com/http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/how-the-nsa-spies-on-smartphones-including-the-blackberry-a-921161.htmlhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/world/how-the-nsa-spies-on-smartphones-including-the-blackberry-a-921161.htmlhttp://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/drbg/drbgval.htmlhttp://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/government-announces-steps-to-restore-confidence-on-encryption-standards/http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html?hp&pagewanted=allhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html?hp&pagewanted=allhttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-datahttp://outlook.com/http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/how-the-nsa-spies-on-smartphones-including-the-blackberry-a-921161.html
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    the world will not be discovered by someone else? 7ou can hide a formula" but youcan=t prevent others from nding it. 1ne might only need a pencil and a piece of paperto do that. And once the secret is out in the open" itRs not %ust Big Brother that will bewatching usYother brothers! will be spying on us" intercepting our messages" and

    hacking our bank accounts. 9e live in a new era in which mathematics has become apowerful weapon. 5t can be used for goodYwe all benet from technological advancesbased on mathYbut also for ill. 9hen the nuclear bomb was built" theoreticalphysicists who had inadvertently contributed to creating something monstrous wereforced to confront deep ethical Ouestions. 9hat is happening now with mathematicsmay have similarly grave implications. embers of my community must initiate aserious discussion about our role in this brave new world. 9e need to nd mechanismsto protect the freedom of mathematical knowledge that we love and cherish. And wehave to help the public understand both the awesome power of math and the seriousconseOuences that await all of us if that power is misused.

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    such vulnerability mandates is necessary to restore international trust in Q.S.companies and technologies.

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    6+,,ase

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    6+,+dd-ons

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    -+ billion sometime in the twentyrst century" possibly as early as +,:3.&he key is economics. Clobalcommunications" from television to movies to the 5nternet" have brought an image of the comfortablelife of the developed world into the homes of the poorest people" ring their ownaspirations for a better Ouality of life " either through economic developmentin their own country

    or through emigration to other countries. 5f wein the developed world can make thebasic tools of prosperityinfrastructure" health care" education" and lawmore accessible and aordable" recent history suggests that thecultural drivers for producing large families will be tempered " relatively Ouicklyand withoutcoercion. But the task is enormous. &he physical prereOuisites for prosperity in the global economy are electricity and communications.

    &oday" there are more than + billion people living without electricity" or commercial energy in any form" in the very countries wheresome 3 billion people will be added in the next 3, years. 5f for no other reason than our enlightened selfinterest" we should strive foruniversal access to electricity" communications" and educational opportunity. 9e have little choice" because the fate of the developed

    world is inextricably bound up in the economic and demographic fate of the developing world. A third" related opportunity fortechnology is in decoupling population growth from land use and " more broadly"decouplingeconomic growth from natural resource consumption through recycling" enduseeIciency" and industrial ecology. 0ecoupling population from land use is well under way. According to Crubler" from-:,, to -3, nearly + hectares of land '3 acres( were needed to support every child born in 6orth America" while in the more crowdedand cultivated regions of Europe and Asia only ,.3 hectare '-.+ acres( and ,.+ hectare ',.3 acre( were needed" respectively. 0uring the

    past century" the amount of land needed per additional child has been dropping in all areas of the world" withEurope and6orth Americaexperiencing the fastest decreases. Both crossed the 48ero threshold4 in the past few decades"meaning that no additional land is needed to support additional children and that landreOuirements will continue to decreasein the future. 1ne can postulate that the pattern of returningland to nature will continue to spread throughout the world" eventually stemming andthen reversing the current onslaught on the great rain forests . &ime is critical if vasttracts are to be savedfrom being laid bare" and success willlargely depend on how rapidlyeconomic opportunities expand for those now trapped in subsistence and frontierfarming. 5n concept" the potential for returning land to nature is enormous.

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    circumvented by the use of chemicals that enabled a billion or so railroad ties to last for decades instead of years. &he great 4manurecrisis4 of the same era was solved by the automobile" which in a few decades replaced some +3 million horses and freed up ;, millionhectares '-,, million acres( of farmland" not to mention improving the sanitation and smell of inner cities. 1il discoveries in &exas andthen in the iddle East pushed the pending oil crisis of the -G+,s into the future. And the energy crisis of the -G:,s stimulated thedevelopment of new sensing and dril ling technology" sparked the advance of nonfossil fuel alternatives" and deepened the penetrationof electricity with its fuel Jexibility into the global economy &hanks to underground imaging technology" today=s known gas resourcesare an order of magnitude greater than the resources known +, years ago" and new reserves continue to be discovered. &echnology has

    also greatly extended human limits. 5t has given each of us a productive capability greater than that of -3, workers in -,," forexample" and has conveniently put the power of hundreds of horses in our garages. 5n recent decades" it has extended our voice and our

    reach" allowing us to easily send our words" ideas" images" and money around the world at the speed of light. But globalsustainability is not inevitable. 5n spite of the tremendous promise that technology holds for a sustainable future"there is the potential for all of this to backre before the %ob can be done. &here are disturbingindications that people sometimes turn in fearand anger on technologies" industries" and institutions thatopenly foster an everfaster pace of change . &he current opposition to nuclear power genetically altered food"the globali8ation of the economy and the spread of American culture should give us pause. &echnology has always presented a twoedged sword" serving as both cause and eect" solving one problem while creating another that was unintended and often unforeseen.9e solved the manure crisis" but automotive smog" congestion" and urban sprawl took its place. 9e cleaned and transformed the citieswith allelectric buildings rising thousands of feet into the sky. But while urban pollution was thereby dramatically reduced" a portion ofthe pollution was shifted to someone else=s sky. Breaking limits 4Fimits to growth4 was a popular theme in the -G:,s" and a bestsellingbook of that name predicted dire conseOuences for the human race by the end of the century. 5n fact" we have done much better thanthose predictions" largely because of a factor the book missedthe potential of new technology to break limits. Pepeatedly" humansocieties have approached seemingly insurmountable barriers only to nd the means and tools to break through. &his ability has now

    become a source of optimism" an article of faith" in many parts of the world.&oday=s perceived limits" however" look andfeel dierent. &hey are global in nature" multicultural" and larger in scale and complexity than everbefore. 6early + billion people in the world are without adeOuate sanitation" and nearlyas many are without access to clean drinking water. A50S is spreading rapidly in the regionsof the world least able to ght it. Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases aremore than 2,greater than preindustrial levels and are climbing steadily . $etroleum reserves " expected to be tapped by over abillion automobiles worldwide by +,-3" may last only another 3,-,, years. And without careful preservation eorts"the biodiversity of the planet could become as threatened in this coming century as itwas at the end of the last ice age" when more than :, of the species of large mammals andother vertebrates in 6orth America disappeared'along with +G in Europe and > in Australia(. All these perceivedlimits reOuire innovation of a scope and intensity surpassing humankind=s currentcommitment . &he list of realworld problems that could thwart global sustainability islong and sobering. 5t includes war" disease" famine" political and religious turmoil" despotism"entrenched poverty " illiteracy" resource depletion" and environmental degradation.

    &echnology can help resolve some of these issuespoverty and disease" resource depletion" and environmental impact" for examplebutit oers little recourse for the passions and politics that divide the world. &he likelihood is that we will not catch up and overtake themoving target of global sustainability in the coming century" but given the prospects for technology" which have never been brighter" we

    may come surprisingly close. 9e should put our technology to work" striving to lift more than 3billion people out of poverty while preventing irreversible damage to the biosphereand irreversible loss of the earth=s natural resources.

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    Stefan Bauschard

    Encryption A

    @eadership prevents locali=ationI@ add-on() leadership is *e+ to prevent localization re'uirements

    Business ,oundtable 1(grou% of chief eecuti!e officers of +a7or .S. cor%orations for+ed to %ro+ote %ro:

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    Encryption A

    +6L Backdoors don:t undermine 0" companiesBackdoors undermines 0" Internet companies internationally

    0avid "anger" April -+" +,*2# 1bama lets 6.S.A. exploit online security Jaws"

    oIcials say" http)**www.nytimes.com*+,-;*,;*-2*us*politics*obamaletsnsaexploitsomeinternetJawsoIcialssay.html01A) 2+--3

    1ne recommendation urged the 6.S.A. to get out of the business of weakeningcommercial encryption systems or trying to build in ==back doors== that would make itfar easier for the agency to crack the communications of America=s adversaries . &emptingas it was to create easy ways to break codes the reason the 6.S.A. was established by $resident Marry S. &ruman >+ years ago the

    committee concluded that the practice would undercut trust in American software andhardware products. 5n recent months" Silicon Dalley companies have urged the Qnited Statesto abandon such practices " while Cermany and Bra8il" among other nations" have said theyare considering shun ning Americanmade eOuipment and software .

    Businesses can:t sell products that have a back door to the N"+

    ,enter for Democracy M Technology" 6ovember -," +,*2" 5ssue Brief) aBackdoor to Encryption for Covernment Surveillance"! https)**cdt.org*insight*issuebriefabackdoortoencryptionforgovernmentsurveillance*01AK 2-3-3

    #onsumers outside of the QS may be much less inclined to purchase American techproducts that facilitate government surveillance. #onsider" for example" the diIcultyQS companies would have selling smartphones or network servers in the EQ that arebuilt to enable easy access for the 6SA. As a technical matter" it is diIcult andexpensive to both build a backdoor security vulnerability and then defend that

    vulnerability against unauthori8ed use.&his burden would be heaviest on smallbusinesses and innovators of new communications services" which may create adisincentive to encrypt their products and reduce the overall security of users.

    Government backdoors damage 0" business credibility and hurts

    our economy

    (IT ,"+I@ T >-? #omputer Science and Articial 5ntelligence Faboratory&echnical Peport!" uly >" +,-3 Marold Abelson" Poss Anderson" Steven . Bellovin" oshBenaloh" att Bla8e" 9hiteld 0iIe" ohn Cilmore" atthew Creen" Susan Fandau"

    $eter C. 6eumann" Ponald F. Pivest" erey 5. Schiller" Bruce Schneier" ichael Specter"0aniel . 9eit8ner " http)**dspace.mit.edu*bitstream*handle*-:+-.-*G:>G,*5SA5F&P+,-3,+>.pdf?seOuence@(**CD

    6ext" there are the broader costs to the economy . Economic growth comes largely frominnovation in science" technology" and business processes. At present" technologicalprogress is largely about embedding intelligence Y software and communications Yeverywhere. $roducts and services that used to be standalone now come with a mobile phone app" an online web service" and businessmodels that involve either ads or a subscription. 5ncreasingly these are also social!" so you can chat to your friends and draw them into

    the vendorRs marketing web. #ountries that reOuire these new apps and web services to have

    http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/13/us/politics/obama-lets-nsa-exploit-some-internet-flaws-officials-say.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/13/us/politics/obama-lets-nsa-exploit-some-internet-flaws-officials-say.htmlhttps://cdt.org/insight/issue-brief-a-backdoor-to-encryption-for-government-surveillance/https://cdt.org/insight/issue-brief-a-backdoor-to-encryption-for-government-surveillance/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/13/us/politics/obama-lets-nsa-exploit-some-internet-flaws-officials-say.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/13/us/politics/obama-lets-nsa-exploit-some-internet-flaws-officials-say.htmlhttps://cdt.org/insight/issue-brief-a-backdoor-to-encryption-for-government-surveillance/https://cdt.org/insight/issue-brief-a-backdoor-to-encryption-for-government-surveillance/
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    Stefan Bauschard

    Encryption A

    their usertouser communications functions authori8ed by the government will be at asignicant disadvantage. At present" the world largely uses QS apps and services" rather than the governmentapprovedones from Pussia and #hina. &his provides enormous leverage to QS businesses.

    International businesses shy away and crush 0" overseas

    businesses

    #laire #ain (iller" 2+-67*2" 4Pevelations of 6.S.A. Spying #ost Q.S. &ech#ompanies"4 6ew 7ork &imes" http)**www.nytimes.com*+,-;*,2*++*business*falloutfromsnowdenhurtingbottomlineoftechcompanies.html(**CD

    SA6

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    Stefan Bauschard

    Encryption A

    6+,,loud ,omputing +dvantage

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    Encryption A

    developed the argument that" against the backdrop of terrible defeat" domestic power struggles succeeded in reorienting apan=sconception of security in favor 1f economic rather than military strength. &hus the apanese state practices a form of 4technologicalnational security4 in order to ensure against its resource dependence and reduce its exposure to international supply disruptions'Lat8enstein -GG>" +,,3K also Samuels -GG;(.

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    Encryption A

    6+, verview,yber-attacks on critical infrastructure crush military

    e;ectiveness and cause e.tinction J that:s +ndres

    (ilitary operations solve all conAict so there:s only a risk of the

    D+

    Cagan and :anlon >

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    Stefan Bauschard

    Encryption A

    +6L Encryption ,an:t Be ,rackedN"+ can crack encryption codes faster than +pple reali=es

    0avid "anger MBrian ,hen" September +>" +,*2" 6ew 7ork &imes 6ew i$hone

    blocks surveillance with uniOue user codeK Encryption can stymie law enforcementand intelligence agencies" http)**www.nytimes.com*+,-;*,G*+:*technology*iphonelocksoutthensasignalingapostsnowdenera.html?/r@,01A) 2+--3

    Breaking the code" according to an Apple technical guide" could take ==more than 3Wyears to try all combinations of a sixcharacter alphanumeric passcode with lowercaseletters and numbers.== '#omputer security experts Ouestion that gure" because Appledoes not fully reali8e how Ouickly the 6.S.A. supercomputers can crack codes.(

    http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/technology/iphone-locks-out-the-nsa-signaling-a-post-snowden-era-.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/technology/iphone-locks-out-the-nsa-signaling-a-post-snowden-era-.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/technology/iphone-locks-out-the-nsa-signaling-a-post-snowden-era-.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/technology/iphone-locks-out-the-nsa-signaling-a-post-snowden-era-.html?_r=0
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    Stefan Bauschard

    Encryption A

    +6L No ,ascade

    Interconnectivity means small disruptions cascade

    1ilhusen and Trimble *6'Statement of Cregory #. 9ilshusen" 0irector 5nformation Security 5ssues 0avid #. &rimble" 0irector 6atural Pesourcesand Environment" #hallenges in Securing the oderni8ed Electricity Crid!

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    Stefan Bauschard

    Encryption A

    +6L No collapse military

    Grid failure shuts down 0" military operations

    $aul Stockton --" assistant secretary of defense for Momeland 0efense and AmericasR Security Aairs" &en 7earsAfter G*--) #hallenges for the 0ecade to #ome!"http)**www.hsa%.org*?fullarticle@:.+.--

    &he cyber threatto the 05B is only part of a much larger challenge to 0o0 . $otentialadversaries are seeking asymmetric means to cripple our force pro%ection" warghting"and sustainment capabilities" by targeting the critical civilian and defense supportingassets'within the Qnited States and abroad( on which our forces depend.&his challenge is notlimited to manmade threatsK 0o0 must also execute its missionessential functions inthe face of disruptions caused by naturally occurring ha8ards.+,&hreats and ha8ards to0o0 mission execution include incidents such as earthOuakes " naturally occurringpandemics" solar weather events" and industrial accidents " as well as kinetic or virtualattacks by state or nonstate actors. &hreats can also emanate from insiders with tiesto foreign counterintelligence organi8ations" homegrown terrorists" or individuals witha malicious agenda.

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    Stefan Bauschard

    Encryption A

    consumer of energy in the Qnited States" 0o0 is dependent on commercial electricitysources outside its ownership and control for secure" uninterrupted power to supportcritical missions. 5n fact" approximately GG percent of the electricity consumed by 0o0facilities originates osite " while approximately 3 percent of critical electricity

    infrastructure itself is commercially owned. &his situation only underscores the importance of ourpartnership with 0MS and its work to protect the nationRs critical infrastructure \ a mission that serves not only thenational defense but also the larger national purpose of sustaining our economic health and competitiveness. 0o0 hastraditionally assumed that the commercial grid will be sub%ect only to infreOuent" weatherrelated" and shorttermdisruptions" and that available backup power is suIcient to meet critical mission needs. As noted in the

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    Stefan Bauschard

    Encryption A

    +6L edundant ,ommunications

    Empirically awful

    Sater --0aniel Sater" Pesearch

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    Stefan Bauschard

    Encryption A

    +6L Backup Generators

    Generators are too short"term

    +ndres **

    Pichard B. Andres" Energy Security #hair" 5nstitute for 6ational Strategic Studies$rofessor of 6ational Security Strategy" 6ational 9ar #ollege" 6ational 0efenseQniversity" 1ctober ;" +,--" 4SE#QPE CP50 `--4"http)**www.ndu.edu*inss*docuploaded*Secure+,Crid+,=--+,AfterAction+,Peport.pdf

    &he ilitary \ According to QS61P&M#1" its bases at the installation level are not normally provided real timeadvance warning of an impending C0. #ertain missions directly impacted by space weather do currently receiveforecasts and warnings. Mowever" notice to installations to ensure readiness of the support infrastructure may be

    necessary as well. 5t is essential that bases hosting critical missions have suIcient electrical power to sustain

    independent continuous operations even if the surrounding commercial power grid is lost.&hough manyinstallations possess dieseljpowered electrical generators" they have limited diesel fuelstorage. 5n the event of a widespread grid outage " fuel supplies could dwindle rapidly"thereby impacting the abilityof installations to conduct primary missions.

    They don:t last J empirics

    Annie "nider *6" EE reporter" $entagon still can=t dene =energy security"= much less achieve it!" anuary ->"http)**www.eenews.net*public*Creenwire*+,-+*,-*->*-

    Murricane Latrina humbled Q.S. military bases in +,,3" cutting power at air towers"training facilities and command centers%ust as it did everywhere else along the Culf #oast.&he6aval #onstruction Battalion #enterin Culfport" iss." for example" a staging ground for regional reliefoperations after the storm" needed reliefitself after running for two weeks on backup powersystems. And Leesler Air

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    Encryption A

    Topicality

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