London School of Economics and Political Science

Divide and Rule:

The Effects of Russian Opposition and Incoherence on EU Security Capabilities in the

European Neighbourhood

By

Brittany R Roser

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Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. EU Foreign and Security Policies in the Shared Neighbourhood 2.1 The European Security Strategy 2.2 The European Neighbourhood Policy 3. EU Foreign and Security Policy-Making and Its Vulnerabilities

3.1 Incoherence: The Last Holdout of the ‘Capabilities-Expectations Gap’ 3.2 CFSP and the Vulnerabilities of Intergovernmental Policy-Making: EU Gridlock and National Flexibility 3.3 CFSP and the Vulnerabilities of Intergovernmental Policy-Making: Third Country Influences

4. Russian Foreign Policy Strategies in the Shared Neighbourhood

4.1 The Russian Position on EU Engagement in the Common Neighbourhood 4.2 Russia’s Use of National Bilateralism to Influence the EU: Divide and Rule

5. Case Study: Analysing the European Union’s Role in the Build-Up to the 2008 Russian-Georgian Conflict 5.1 Background 5.2 EU Foreign Policy Mechanisms in Georgia

5.3 Russian Opposition and Analysis of the EU’s Capabilities 6. Conclusion Bibliography

2 5 5 8 11 11 12 15 17 17 17 24 24 26 28 32 34

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1. Introduction

With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, Eastern European and

Central Asian countries were opened up to the West and the rest of the world. With the

opening up of borders, comes vast economic and democratic opportunities, but with open

borders and the advancement of globalisation also comes more open access for transnational

security risks.1 With the 2004 and 2007 enlargements the European Union (EU) now shares

borders with some of these East European countries and therefore, also shares their security

concerns. Thus, the European Union was forced to take an interest in the security of its

neighbours in the interest of pursuing its own.2

One of the most important countries that shares this neighbourhood and a concern

with its security is the Russian Federation. In the past, Russia has been both an ally and

adversary to its European neighbours. More recently, Russia has arisen as one of the most

divisive issues in the European Union in the 21st Century.3 According to Bardakçı, the main

issues constraining the EU in its pursuit of its foreign policy goals in the European

Neighbourhood area are the ‘capacity-expectations gap’, a lack of coherence in foreign

policy-making, and ‘an increasingly self-confident Russia.’4

With each new amending treaty, the Union has tried to increase its capabilities and

resolve coherence issues while setting itself ever-increasing foreign policy ambitions.

However, the Member States have continuously safeguarded their capacity to conduct an

1European Security Strategy (12 Dec 2003), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (Accessed 25 January 2014). 2 Roland Dannreuther, ‘The European Security Strategy’s regional objective: The neighbourhood policy’, The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a global Europe (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 63. 3 Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, ‘A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations, European Council on Foreign Relations’, European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Paper (2007), pp. 63. 4 Mehmet Bardakçı, ‘EU Engagement in Conflict Resolution in Georgia: Towards a More Proactive Role’, Caucasian Review of International Affairs Vol. 4 No. 3 (Summer 2010), pp. 214.

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independent foreign policy.5 With the retention of the intergovernmental framework for EU

foreign policy-making, ‘third countries’, 6 especially those with such divisive potential as

Russia, have great potential to undermine the Union’s common foreign, security and defence

policies7 by pursuing bilateral agreements with individual Member States rather than with the

stronger European Union.

Overall, this essay seeks to demonstrate that the EU is unable to fulfil its security

objectives in the European Neighbourhood in the face of Russian opposition. The essay

argues that the differences in EU Member States’ bilateral relations with the Russian

Federation can cause disunity amongst them, which, in affect, attenuates the EU’s foreign

policy-making process. Due to the intergovernmental foreign policy-making structure of the

EU, Russia is able to take advantage of a ‘divide and rule’ strategy. The resulting division

amongst Member States in turn impedes the EU’s capabilities as a security actor in achieving

its proposed defence and security goals in the shared neighbourhood.8 For example, the lack

of ability to engage in conflict prevention and resolution to peacefully resolve frozen

conflicts can lead to major security crises in the shared neighbourhood. One such example,

the 2008 Russian-Georgian War, provides a great test of the EU’s security capabilities in the

region in the face Russian opposition. Although one must note that there are other aspects of

the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) than just security policies, this essay

5 Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen, ‘The Study of EU Foreign Policy: Between International Relations and European Studies’, Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 1. 6 For the purposes of this essay, the ‘third party countries’ and ‘third countries’ will be understood as non-EU Member States. 7 For the purpose of this essay, the ‘EU’s foreign policy’ refers specifically to the aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union, including those of security and defence dimensions. 8 For the purpose of this essay, the ‘common’ and ‘shared’ neighbourhood region refers to the states in the EU’s Eastern Partnership – Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Southern Caucasus states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – that are also geographically bordering or near to Russia.

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will focus solely on the Union’s abilities, or lack thereof, to achieve their security goals in the

European Neighbourhood.

In order to analyse how Russian opposition affects the EU’s abilities to fulfil its

security goals in the shared neighbourhood, this essay will be separated into four substantive

sections. First, it is necessary to establish and examine the EU’s overall security strategy as

well as the Union’s specific security aims in the European Neighbourhood. In the following

section, the EU’s foreign policy-making framework will be discussed in order to assess how

the aforementioned security goals could potentially be obtained, as well as to point out where

the vulnerabilities in the CFSP’s policy-making capabilities lie. The third section reviews

Russia’s security goals in the shared neighbourhood in regards to its position on the European

Union’s security policies in the region. Furthermore, it examines Russia’s general bilateral

relations with individual Member States and discusses how these bilateral relations might be

used to affect EU foreign policy formulation. Lastly, in order to asses the EU’s abilities to

fulfil its security objectives in the European Neighbourhood in the face of Russian

opposition, the final section will focus on a case study of the EU’s policies in the build-up to

the 2008 Russian-Georgian War.

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2. EU Foreign and Security Policies in the Shared Neighbourhood

This section examines the EU’s general security strategy as well as the more specific

foreign and security goals the Union has prioritised for the countries in the shared

neighbourhood region. This will be accomplished through an examination of the expressed

foreign and security policy goals in the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the European

Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This section provides a basis for which to assess the EU’s

capabilities to achieve these foreign and security policy goals in the shared neighbourhood in

the following case study.

2.1 The European Security Strategy

The Iraq Crisis of 2003 proved a foreign policy nightmare for the EU where divisions

amongst the Member States hindered the EU from developing a clear and coherent policy.

The European countries have been pursuing a path of foreign policy co-operation and co-

ordination since European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970’s, but this crisis

emphasised the problem that there was still no formal European security concept at the

supranational level. The resulting lack of coherence stalled EU policy-makers and hurt the

EU’s credibility as an effective global actor.9 This provided the Union with the motivation to

establish a foundation for a clear EU security strategy. Mutual frustration over such division

prompted a unified call from the foreign ministers of the Member States for the preparation

of a common European Security Strategy. The resulting document, entitled, ‘A Secure

9 Taylan Özgür Kaya, ‘Constituting the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The European Union's Pursuit of Being a Coherent and Effective Foreign and Security Policy Actor in Global Politics’, Akdeniz University Faculty of Economics & Administrative Sciences Faculty Journal / Akdeniz Universitesi Iktisadi ve Idari Bilimler Fakultesi Dergisi Vol. 5 No. 9 (2005), pp. 146.

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Europe in a Better World’, was the EU’s strong attempt at a basis for a more coherent

collective foreign policy.10

The ESS, building upon the pre-existing foreign policy acquis that had been

developing in the sphere of EU foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, corresponded

with the revitalisation of the trend towards comprehensive policies that EU Member States

had been following since EPC. The difference is that it went further by providing a strategic

framework for such and establishing a basis for ‘the consensus on the basic assumptions of

the comprehensive approach.’11 In other words, although the EU Member States had already

been pursuing a more holistic and integrated approach to security amongst themselves, the

ESS provides the codification of a broad, but unified position for the Member States within

the intergovernmental policy-making framework of the CFSP to guide and legally base the

EU’s overall foreign and security policies on.

The ESS is broken down into three main sections – a review of the security

environment and the challenges and threats it presents, the strategic objectives of the EU

within this new security environment, and the policy implications that these objectives have

for Europe.12 Each section builds upon its predecessor in order to point out the issues that the

EU faces, express the EU’s expectations of what it aims to do to address these issues, and

strategize the best way for the EU to maximise its foreign policy capabilities to accomplish

this.

10 Derek Averre, ‘The EU-Russian relationship in the context of European security’, Perspectives on EU-Russian Relations (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 79. 11 Sven Biscop, ‘The European Security Strategy in context: a comprehensive trend,’ The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a global Europe (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 19. 12 European Security Strategy (12 Dec 2003), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (Accessed 27 January 2014).

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As previously mentioned, with the end of the Cold War, the security environment has

greatly changed and, as the ESS points out, has considerably deteriorated.13 The document

illuminates the global scale of the threats and challenges that the European Union faced then

and continues to face today. The resulting opening up of borders and growth of globalisation

has created a new security environment in which countries are much more open and therefore

dependent on one another. This clearly opens up these countries to one another’s

vulnerabilities and security weaknesses as well. In this new environment, ‘no single country

is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own’.14 This not only points out that the

Member States need to work together in order to face security threats, but also that they must

work with others.

One of the most important aspects for this paper is that the EU, for the first time,

explicitly identifies and enumerates threats in the ESS. The five specific security threats are

– (1) terrorism, (2) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), (3) regional

conflicts, (4) state failure, and (5) organised crime.15 The threats are not ranked or prioritised

in any way. They are shown not to be mutually exclusive, but quite interconnected; they all

have the potential to link with or mutually benefit from one another. Thus, the existence of

one of these threats creates a significantly deteriorated security environment more vulnerable

to the others. The Union revisited the ESS in 2008 and edited what it deemed as ‘key threats’

to also include cyber security, energy security, and climate change.16

13 Jean-Yves Haine, ‘The European Security Strategy coping with threats: Is Europe secure?’, The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a global Europe (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 21. 14 European Security Strategy (12 Dec 2003), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (Accessed 26 January 2014). 15 Ibid, (Accessed 12 Aug 2013). 16 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (11 Dec 2008), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf (Accessed 13 Aug 2013).

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Within this security environment, the EU’s proposed strategic objectives are – (1)

addressing the aforementioned threats, (2) building security in the European Neighbourhood,

and (3) promoting effective multilateralism as a foundation of the international order.17 The

ESS points out that former traditional territorial notions of security and defence are obsolete.

Instead it calls for the EU to take a more strategic, more active, and more global role in

international security affairs.18 Haine points out that, ‘By underlining that “the first line of

defence now lies abroad”, it implies a projection of power, soft and hard, that Europe was not

used to exercising in a strategic fashion’.19 It represents a shift in security objectives toward

the development of a European ‘strategic culture’ and even contains the possibility of

employing ‘preventative engagement’.20

All things considered, the European Security Strategy represents an attempt to

establish a basis from which to reference the EU’s basic collective security goals in relation

to a more demanding security environment. In other words, the European Security Strategy,

although quite broad, constitutes an attempt to establish a coherent security strategy in order

to enhance the EU’s foreign policy capabilities in order to deal with the rising expectations

from the challenging security environment. It demonstrates the EU’s discourse on how it

sees itself, its responsibilities, and its goals as an international actor in the international

security environment.

2.2 The European Neighbourhood Policy

Although the European Security Strategy provides a broad strategic framework for

the EU’s overall global security objectives, it also points out that ‘geography is still

17 European Security Strategy (12 Dec 2003), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (Accessed 12 Feb 2014). 18 Haine, pp. 21. 19 Ibid. 20 Averre (2005), pp. 78.

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important.’21 As previously mentioned, ‘building security in our Neighbourhood’ is one of

the explicit security strategy objectives outlined in the document. Furthermore, the ESS

specifically acknowledges the benefits for the European Union of a barrier of secure and

stable countries at its borders and recognises that it has a responsibility to promote stability

within and amongst its neighbours.22

While the motivation for and development of the ENP may not have been in direct

response to the European Security Strategy’s explicit strategic objective, it was undoubtedly

influenced by it.23 The European Neighbourhood Policy similarly sets out five guidelines for

the European Union’s security aims – ‘(1) preventing conflicts in our neighbourhood and acts

of aggression against the EU; (2) settling ongoing disputes and conflicts; (3) establishing

close economic and political partnerships based on shared values, prosperity and security; (4)

controlling migration and all form of illegal trafficking into the EU; and (5) protecting the

security of EU citizens living abroad’.24 The ENP, although more specific in its geographical

spectrum than that of the ESS, as well as benefiting from more bilateral involvement between

the countries with whom the ENP is engaged and the EU, still suffers from internal coherence

issues.25

Many of the threats and security challenges facing the EU that are addressed in the

ESS and ENP can found across several of the countries within the Union’s neighbourhood.

Furthermore, due to its more easily accessible geographical location, theoretically, the EU

has a much more probable prospect of engaging with the countries within its shared

21 European Security Strategy (12 Dec 2003), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (Accessed 12 Feb 2014). 22 Dannreuther, pp. 62. 23 Ibid, pp. 63. 24 Laure Delcour, ‘The European Union, a security provider in the eastern neighbourhood?’, European Security Vol.19 No. 4 (2010), pp. 537; Sven Biscop, The European Security Strategy: a global agenda for positive power. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 40. 25 Delcour, pp. 537.

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neighbourhood in pursuit of its comprehensive security and defence strategies and utilising

more of its diplomatic, political, military, and economic instruments as well. Thus, the

European Neighbourhood provides a testing ground for the EU’s capabilities as a global and

regional security actor as setup by the ESS and ENP.26

However, as pointed out in the discussions of both the ESS and ENP, a lack of

coherence at the foreign policy-making level still poses a threat to the EU foreign and

security capabilities.27 Incoherence amongst Member States’ positions in the foreign policy

framework can hinder any foreign or security policy within the European Neighbourhood

regardless of its geographical proximity. Thus, although the EU has taken steps to increase

its coherence and capabilities in security through establishing a foundation for a clear EU

security strategy and regional policy, internal coherence issues can still hinder EU foreign

policy capabilities.

26 Dannreuther, pp. 63. 27 Biscop (2008); Delcour (2010).

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3. EU Foreign and Security Policy-Making and Its Vulnerabilities

In order to assess the capabilities of the EU to achieve the foreign and security goals

addressed in the ESS and ENP it is necessary to understand the Union’s policy-making

process. This is crucial in order to then point out the potential weaknesses in the process that

could hinder the EU’s foreign policy capacities as an international security actor in the

region. The focus of this section is the demonstration that a lack of coherence amongst

Member States in EU foreign policy due to the intergovernmental structure of the CFSP

decision-making process presents a serious challenge to the security capabilities of the EU.28

3.1 Incoherence: The Last Holdout in the ‘Capabilities-Expectations Gap’

In 1993, Christopher Hill presented the idea of a ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ in the

then European Community’s foreign policy-making potential. He pointed out that a gap had

emerged between the sizable expectations that had been placed on the EC and the foreign

policy capabilities that the Community was realistically able to manage. He claimed that

such expectations ‘pose a serious challenge to the actual capabilities of the EC, in terms of its

ability to agree, its resources, and the instruments at its disposal.’29

However, with each new amending treaty, the Union has tried to increase its

capabilities and competencies and has set itself increasingly ambitious foreign policy goals.

The Union’s foreign policy structure has gone from policy co-operation to coordination and

then to establishing the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and

Defence Policy (CSDP). Asle Toje has argued that this has led to a significant narrowing of

28 This is not necessarily true of other areas of EU foreign policy such as trade, aid, and development that have a more supranational foreign policy procedure, but are not discussed here due to the lack of impact to the overall security and defence goals addressed in this essay. 29 Christopher Hill, ‘The Capability–Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role,’ Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 31 No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 315.

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the ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ in that ‘the European Union today possesses the necessary

capabilities and institutions’, but she claims that the EU, ‘still finds itself unable to deliver

the foreign policies expected owing to a lack of decisionmaking procedures capable of

overcoming dissent’.30

Although the European Union’s foreign policy-making capabilities have greatly

improved, the Member States have continuously defended their capability to conduct

independent foreign policies and thus, the policy-making process remains very

intergovernmental.31 Within the current CFSP policy-making process, disunity amongst the

Member States has the potential to mean no collective EU foreign and security policy and

can therefore weaken the Member States’ foreign policy abilities.

3.2 CFSP and the Vulnerabilities of Intergovernmental Policy-Making: EU Gridlock and National Flexibility

The CFSP is ‘largely an intergovernmental arrangement with limited use of qualified

majority voting, the EP kept at arm’s length, and no right of judicial review’.32 The decision-

making process is dominated by the Member States whose representatives in the European

Council and Council of Ministers act on behalf of the interests of their respective states.33

Although the Foreign Affairs Council is generally able to act by quality majority voting

(QMV), for ‘all-important decisions’, such as those with defence or military implications, the

decision must be taken unanimously.34 With 28 Member States each with their own foreign

and security policy preferences, unanimity is a very challenging feat to accomplish. This

30 Asle Toje, ‘The Consensus–Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe’s Ineffective Foreign Policy’, Security Dialogue Vol. 39 No.1 (2008), pp. 121-122. 31 Tonra and Christiansen, p. 1. 32 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010), pp. 561. 33 Hazel Smith, European Union Foreign Policy: What it is and What it Does (London: Pluto Press, 2002), pp. 122. 34 Dinan, pp. 561.

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means that policy-makers run the risk of gridlock amongst them which can slow the policy-

making process down or even halt it completely. Furthermore, along the lines of

Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist theory, the EU’s foreign policy outputs are largely

dependent on each Member State’s willingness to compromise in light of its relative

bargaining power and intensity of preferences.35 Thus, in order to reach an agreement, the

suggested policy may end up being a watered-down, ‘lowest common denominator’ version

of what policy-makers proposed, potentially limiting the EU’s policy to align more closely

with the least co-operative Member State’s preferences.36

In the prospect of avoiding such cases, a Member State has the ability to abstain from

a decision that is being taken by the others unanimously. In this case, the State is not

required to implement that decision, but must accept that the decision taken obliges the EU as

an entity.37 This allows the abstaining Member State(s)38 some flexibility in pursuing their

own national foreign policies rather than implementing those of the EU. However, this still

undercuts the legitimacy of the EU’s policy because it does not have the full support of the

Union.

Also, if a Member State proclaims an intention to oppose the adoption of a decision to

be taken by QMV due to ‘vital and stated reasons of national policy’, then a vote will not

occur.39 Then, the High Representative is given a chance to persuade the Member State

intending to oppose. In the event that should fail, the Foreign Affairs Council, by a qualified

35 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘ Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach,” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 31 No. 4 (December 1993), pp. 58. 36 Ibid. 37 Smith, pp. 122. 38 Up to, but not surpassing one-third of the Union’s membership and one-third of the EU’s population. 39 Dinan, pp. 562.

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majority, could submit a request for the decision to be taken by the European Council

unanimously.40 This situation seems unlikely to be able to bring a policy to fruition.

Although the Member States are required to ‘support the Union's external and

security policy actively and unreservedly… [and] comply with the Union's action’,41 due to

the intergovernmental framework, such an action is dependent on the Member States being

able to develop a common foreign policy at the EU level at all. Furthermore, the Member

States’ sovereignty over the ‘formulation and conduct of its [national] foreign policy, its

national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and participation in international

organisations’ is not constrained, but rather upheld.42 This allows the Member States to agree

without having to actually adhere to or pursue the EU policy, creating the potential of

undercutting the effectiveness of such a policy.

Overall, the intergovernmental nature of the policy-making process of the CFSP

allows the Member States a lot of freedom in pursuing national foreign policies if they so

choose. This also allows a lot of room for differences in the Member States’ national foreign

policies and those of the other Member States and/or those of the EU. Theoretically, this

intergovernmental framework provides an opportunity for gridlock amongst the Member

States that may not produce an EU level foreign policy at all. In this case, the framework has

the potential to inhibit the Member States from successfully pursuing their individual or

collective foreign, security, and defence goals through the European Union.

40 Ibid. 41 Article 24(3) Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st06/st06655-re07.en08.pdf (Accessed 9 Aug 2013). 42 Kateryna Koehler, ‘European Foreign Policy After Lisbon: Strengthening the EU as an International Actor’, Caucasian Review of International Affairs Vol. 4 No. 1 (Winter 2010), pp. 60.

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3.3 CFSP and the Vulnerabilities of Intergovernmental Policy-Making: Third Country Influences

Although Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist theory presents how the

intergovernmental structure affects the Member States’ pursuit of interests in relation to one

another, Ginsberg’s rationalist concept of ‘politics of scale’ helps to explain that it is in the

EU Member States’ overall best interest to pursue their foreign policy objectives collectively

through the European Union, especially in relations with powerful ‘third party countries’.

This is because when the Union speaks with one voice on the international stage, it carries

the combined weight of the EU’s large population and ‘the world’s richest and most powerful

economic and political bloc’.43 EU Member States’ influence on global issues is much

stronger if they act as one unified body rather than if any of them were to act individually.44

A unified EU policy maximises Member States’ power granting them access to abilities that

they would be unable to achieve separately.

However, with so much freedom to pursue their own national foreign policy agendas

due to the intergovernmental nature of the EU foreign policy-making process, third countries

have the opportunity to exploit such conditions by pursuing bilateral relations with individual

Member States rather than the more powerful collective EU. This jeopardizes the EU’s

strongest lever in international relations: its unity.45 The intergovernmental framework

allows third countries to be in a position with the potential to employ the ‘divide and rule’

strategy by picking out certain individual Member States to work with rather then the whole

Union in order keep them from reaching a common foreign and security policy with more

weight behind it.

43 Roy H. Ginsberg, ‘Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability–Expectations Gap’, Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 37 No. 3 (September 1999), pp. 438. 44 Kaya, pp. 124. 45 Leonard and Popescu, pp. 63.

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With the intergovernmental structure of the EU foreign policy-making process,

disunity amongst the Member States has the potential to mean no collective EU foreign and

security policy. With no collective EU foreign and security policy, the Member States are

not maximising their collective power and resources and therefore diminish their influence

capacity on the international stage. This, in turn, may limit Member State’s individual

abilities to pursue even their own national foreign and security interests.

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4. Russian Foreign Policy Strategies in the Shared Neighbourhood

This section discusses Russia’s position in regards to the EU’s proposed strategy to

increased involvement in security in its ‘former backyard’. Furthermore, this section will

also examine Russia’s use of its bilateral relations with individual Member States and discuss

how these bilateral relations can be used to influence EU foreign policy formulation.

4.1 The Russian Position on EU Engagement in the Common Neighbourhood

One of the most pressing issues for the EU and its ENP is that ‘the current Russian

government tends to view the European Union’s engagement [in the common

neighbourhood] in geopolitical terms and as a zero-sum competition for regional influence’.46

Russia sees the EU and Western influence in the common neighbourhood as competition to

its own interests in what many Russians see as ‘their country’s traditional sphere of

influence’.47 Accordingly, while the European Union has begun to establish and strengthen

its foreign and security policy goals in the shared neighbourhood, it has become ‘increasingly

clear that one of Moscow’s key foreign policy aims is to consolidate Russian influence in the

[Commonwealth of Independent States] CIS and to minimise as far as possible the influence

of other external powers there’.48

4.2 Russia’s Use of National Bilateralism to Influence the EU: Divide and Rule

In light of such opposition to EU involvement in the common neighbourhood, Russia

seems to be one such ‘third country’ that is testing the limits of EU foreign policy capabilities

46 Dannreuther, pp. 78. 47 Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russia, the EU and the common neighbourhood,’ Centre for European Reform (2005), http://leader.viitorul.org/public/620/en/essay_russia_trenin_sept05.pdf (Accessed 22 Feb 2014). 48 Averre (2005), pp. 78; Dmitri Trenin, ‘Moscow’s Realpolitik: Russia Enclosed in the Post-Soviet Space’, Nezavisaia gazeta (9 Feb 2004).

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through exploiting the aforementioned intergovernmental framework and hindering cohesion

amongst the EU Member States in the CFSP.49 Parmentier concludes that, ‘its decentralized

decision-making is generally thought to preclude the EU ability to act efficiently in the

international scene. It is especially true with Russia, which confronts the EU with a series of

challenges in terms of coherence, consistency, capacities and influence.’50

Haukkala argues that, ‘it is the solidarity and truly mutually shared joint vision of the

Member States that is required to make European foreign policy work in general and in the

case of Russia in particular’.51 In line with the aforementioned ‘politics of scale’ concept,

individually, the Member States (especially the Small Member States) do not have the clout

to contend with or influence Russia and need to work together and pool their resources and

power in order to maximise their abilities to pursue their individual and collective interests.

Moreover, if coherency amongst EU Member States benefits the EU, and raises its degree of

power in relation to its counterpart, then it follows logically that, Russia, as the counterpart in

Russian-EU relations, would lose some power in relation to the EU if the Member States

were able to coalesce.52 Thus, it is in Russia’s best interest to thwart such cohesion among

states through dividing them, especially with Russia’s more power politics influenced views

in its foreign policy thinking.53

Russia is only able to employ the ‘divide and rule’ tactic because the

intergovernmental setup of the CFSP and the Member States’ lack of a coherent strategy on

49 Derek Averre, ‘The EU, Russia and the shared neighbourhood: security, governance and energy’, European Security Vol 19 No 4 (2010), pp. 531. 50 Florent Parmentier, ‘Normative Power, EU Preferences and Russia. Lessons from the Russian-Georgian War’, European Political Economy Review No. 9 (Summer 2009), pp. 59; Laure Delcour, ‘The European Union after the Conflict in South Ossetia: A New Impetus to the Common Foreign and Security Policy?’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (2008). 51 Hiski Haukkala, ‘The EU’s Common Strategy on Russia: Four Lessons Learned About Consensus Decision-Making in Foreign Policy’, European Foreign Affairs Review Vol 13 (2008), pp. 330. 52 Ginsberg, pp. 438. 53 Elena Klitsounova, ‘EU-Russian relations: the Russian perspective’, Perspectives on EU-Russian Relations (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 38.

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the EU’s relations with Russia create an environment where Russia is able to exacerbate the

Member States’ divisions to further influence the EU’s policies in the shared neighbourhood.

The national governments tend to be more receptive to Russian demands than the EU

Commission because they emphasise their national interests, especially business interests,

over issues with Russia’s bad human rights record or democratic protections.54 A coherent

EU policy towards Russia has been unattainable mainly due to the competition Russia fosters

among EU Member States who seek a ‘special relationship’ status with Russia. This has

hindered the Union from being able to unite and speak with one voice in regards to Russian

affairs.55 Furthermore, Russia is exploiting its energy relations with individual Member

States in order to coerce them into long-term deals as well as utilising its position in the

United Nations (UN) and potential veto.56 These foreign policy tools all serve as divisive

factors for the EU’s Member States as they tend to disagree on how to engage with Russia on

all of these topics.

As a result, Russia has effectively proven to be one of the most divisive issues

amongst the EU Member States in the Union’s recent history. Currently, the EU Member

States are split between two basic approaches on how best to deal with Russia – those who

favour ‘soft containment’ and those who favour ‘creeping integration’.57

Those who favour the first approach, ‘soft containment’, tend to see Russia as more of

threat and wish to treat it cautiously as such. This approach takes a more neo-realist, Cold

War style, and advocates policies such as supporting anti-Russian regimes in the shared

neighbourhood, excluding Russia from involvement in international institutions such as the

54 Katinka Barysch, ‘EU-Russian relations: the EU perspective’, Perspectives on EU-Russian Relations (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 31-32. 55 Graham Timmins, ‘EU-Russian relations – a member state perspective: Germany and Russia – A special partnership in the New Europe?’ Perspectives on EU-Russian Relations (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 56. 56 Leonard and Popescu, pp. 1. 57 Ibid, pp. 63.

20

G-8 (working in a G-7 capacity), seeking other European energy possibilities, and taking an

overall harder line on EU-Russian relations.58 Some Member States who have traditionally

supported this approach are the United Kingdom (UK), Poland, the Baltics, and the Czech

Republic and others who have already strained bilateral relations with Russia and/or are

simply less wary of speaking out against its human rights infringements, democracy issues,

etc.59

Classified as one of two ‘New Cold Warriors’, Poland has been one of the most

adamant and outspoken critics of Russia.60 On top of an extensive and long history of

unresolved grievances, Russia’s more recent pressures have also motivated Poland’s more

staunchly assertive position on establishing a stronger ENP with an introduction of a key

differentiation between ‘European neighbours’, Eastern European countries who Poland

believes deserve the prospect of eventual membership, and other ‘neighbours of Europe’.61

This in itself is a highly contentious and divisive issue amongst the EU Member States as

many others are wary of any prospects of further enlargement. Moreover, Polish-Russian

relations were especially aggravated in the early 2000s by the Kaliningrad status

negotiations, the involvement of both in the later ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine, and

Poland’s energy concerns over the Nord Stream project62 which allowed Russia to play

Germany against other Members of the EU. Overall, Poland has ‘actively sought to shape a

more critical EU line towards Russia, using means like critical non-papers, diplomatic

footwork and even vetoing negotiations about a new agreement with Russia.’63

58 Ibid, pp. 2. 59 Henrik Boesen and Lindbo Larsen, ‘The Russo-Georgian war and beyond: towards a European great power concert’, European Security Vol 21 No 1 (2012), pp. 103. 60 David Cadier, ‘CFSP and central European strategic cultures: the Visegrad countries and the Georgian crisis’, EU-Consent: Wider Europe, Deeper Integration? Constructing Europe Network, Project-No. 513416 (2009), pp. 14; Leonard and Popescu, pp. 48. 61 Parmentier, pp. 54. 62 Ibid; Cadier, pp. 14. 63 Leonard and Popescu, pp. 48.

21

The United Kingdom (UK), although not considered a ‘New Cold Warrior’ like

Poland, has also tended to prefer the ‘soft containment approach’ when it comes to dealings

with Russia. Though the UK’s relations with Russia tend to be more pragmatic and business

oriented, UK-Russian relations have deteriorated over the past decade as the relationship

evolved to one of ‘diplomatic tension and mistrust’.64 The harassment of the British Council

and later also the British ambassador in Russia, the Litvenienko murder, and the revision of

the Shell and BP contracts have all tarnished the relationship and caused the UK to take a

more assertive position on dealings with Russia.65

The second approach is ‘creeping integration’. Those who favour this approach see

Russia as a potentially powerful political partner and therefore seek to bring Russia in by

treating it as such. This includes involving Russia in international institutions even if it does

not always abide by the rules.66 Some Member States who have traditionally supported this

approach are Germany, France, Italy, Greece and others who seek to socialise Russia and fear

alienating Russia.67 These countries want to use the same ‘bypass animosity through

economic integration’ logic that pacified French and German relations in the post-War

period, in the neighbourhood, including in relations with Russia.68

France has long had strong diplomatic bilateral relations with Russia as it sees these

relations as a means to ‘strengthen its own position in international relations’,69 as well as

seeing Russia as a potential ally to limit or counter US hegemony. Furthermore, as France is

currently opposed to further EU enlargement, it prefers a more cautious EU foreign and

security policy within the shared neighbourhood.70

64 Ibid. 65 Ibid; Parmentier, pp. 54. 66 Leonard and Popescu, pp. 2. 67 Boesen and Larsen, pp. 103. 68 Parmentier, pp. 51. 69 Leonard and Popescu, pp. 31. 70 Ibid; Parmentier, pp. 51.

22

Germany, on the other hand, has even more multifaceted relations with Russia. As

the largest and most important gas market and greatest Western trading partner, the two have

very strong economic links. Furthermore, the abovementioned Polish-opposed Nord Stream

pipeline has also strengthened the countries’ political ties. It is no wonder that some have

called Germany Russia’s ‘gateway to Europe’ with proposed assurances by some German

officials of a continuity in the country’s policies.71

Although Poland and the UK are not the only Member States who favour the ‘soft

containment approach’ and France and Germany are not the only supporters of ‘creeping

integration’, they are important States to study as they constitute the largest States within

these groups and accordingly, carry a lot of weight within the EU on security and defence

matters. With such divisions amongst the Member States, developing a foreign policy in the

face of Russia opposition is very likely to be constrained or even completely inhibited.

The official EU policy on Russia has not changed since the 1990s because each

approach is unacceptable to the other set of EU Member States. This has thereby prevented

the EU from being able to reach an updated common position on Russia itself.72 This

demonstrates the obstructively divisive effects that Russia can have on the Member States’

abilities to even come to an agreement and therefore achieve a coherent collective EU foreign

policy in the face of Russian opposition.

Of course other factors can further accentuate the EU’s policy capability issues in the

shared neighbourhood. However, faced with Russian pressure and adversity, without the

capacity to even create a coherent EU policy amidst such aforementioned divisions, other

factors do not even get the chance to come into play. Therefore, it seems that the reasons for

the EU’s foreign and security policy shortcomings in the common neighbourhood are most

likely to be the fault of European apprehension over Russian reactions to any outside

71 Ibid, pp. 32; Ibid, pp. 52. 72 Leonard and Popescu, pp. 3.

23

intervention within its ‘former backyard’ rather than its lack of military capabilities or an

internal aversion to dealing with ‘hard’ security issues.73

73 Averre (2010), pp. 532.

24

5. Case Study: Analysing the European Union’s Role in the Build-Up to the 2008 Russian-Georgian Conflict

Finally, in order to assess how the presence of Russian opposition and its divisive

effects on EU Member States influences the EU’s foreign policy capabilities in the shared

neighbourhood in practise, the final section will focus on a case study of the EU’s security

policies and their effectiveness in the build-up to the 2008 Russian-Georgian war. First, a

brief historical background will be provided in order to demonstrate the nature of the security

environment in the region before the conflict erupted. This is in order to demonstrate that the

‘frozen conflicts’ in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were in existence during the time that the

EU ratified the ESS and ENP, both of which include the security objective of resolving such

frozen conflicts in the Neighbourhood. Next, the EU’s foreign policy goals as they relate to

the conflicts in Georgia prior to the outbreak of the war will be outlined. The conclusion of

this section will discuss Russian opposition to EU involvement in Georgia and the resulting

constraints on the EU’s foreign policy capabilities with an analysis of the EU’s foreign policy

outputs and capabilities in the presence of Russian adversity.

5.1 Background

The post-Soviet country of Georgia has been the host of two similar and related

‘frozen conflicts’ in the disputed Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia since the

early 1990s. The Russian mediated peace on the South Ossetian dispute in 1992 and the

resulting joint Russian-Ossetian-Georgian peacekeeping troops actually froze the conflict

into a situation where South Ossetia essentially became a de facto separated region from the

rest of Georgia. Although the main city, Tskhinvali, was in the hands of the South Ossetian

separatists, the rest of the towns within the conflict region were divided between Georgian

and Ossetian control. Due to Russia’s prior disputed support of the Ossetians, the

25

impartiality of the Russian peacekeeping troops was never credible. Regardless, from 1992

to 2004, the area was relatively peaceful and the conflict remained frozen.74

After the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the subsequent election of the new

Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, in 2004, the tensions in the region increased. This

happened after President Saakashvili made it a goal of his presidency to regain control over

Georgia’s lost lands. In response, Russian relations with South Ossetia deepened and Russia

even began issuing Russian passports to many South Ossetians. This strengthening and

deepening of the Russian and South Ossetian relationship convinced Georgia to suspect that

Russia might be pursuing a course toward the eventual absorption of South Ossetia to re-join

it with North Ossetia as a part of the Russian Federation.75

Meanwhile, as Russian-South Ossetian relations were tightening, Georgia’s relations

with the United States (US), NATO, and the EU were also deepening. This led to an even

further degradation of the Russian-Georgian relationship. Some of the factors that were

affecting this relationship include:

The Georgian demand for a Russian troop withdrawal and the dismantling of military bases on Georgian territory in accordance with commitments made by Russia at the Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999; Georgian participation in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC); Russian demands for military access to Georgian territory to fight armed Chechen rebels in uncontrolled areas like the Pankisi Gorge; and increased US military support for the modernisation of a hitherto paltry Georgian army.76

Furthermore, by 2006, in response to the Georgian arrest of four military intelligence officers

on counts of espionage, Russia deployed a military force that would be capable of moving

into South Ossetia immediately at the first sign of military hostility in the conflict zone.77

Both sides appeared to be expecting the escalation of the situation into armed conflict.

74 Roy Allison, ‘Russia Resurgent? Moscow’s Campaign to “coerce Georgia to peace”’, International Affairs Vol. 84 No. 6 (2008), pp. 1146. 75 Ibid, pp. 1147. 76 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, Vol II (September 2009), pp. 7. 77 Allison, pp. 1147.

26

Russian frustration with Georgia was mainly based on the ‘westernisation’ of Georgia and its

foreign and security policies. Although Russia had formerly officially acknowledged Soviet

successor states’ sovereignty, it still perceived such states as part of its ‘near abroad’ or

‘former backyard’ and therefore under its influence.78

Finally, in the summer of 2008, the situation in South Ossetia worsened immensely.

The Ossetian separatist militias began targeting Georgian settlements and both Russia and

Georgia began making claims against the other’s actions. On 8 August 2008, the clash

turned into open combat between Georgian and both Russian and Ossetian forces.79 This

resulted in Georgian control of most of Tskhinvali and many ethnically Ossetian towns at

first, but after three more days of combat with Russian forces, Georgian troops were forced to

completely withdraw from the region of South Ossetia.80

5.2 EU Foreign Policy Mechanisms in Georgia

The South Caucasus is an extremely important region for European security for two

main reasons – (1) ‘its position as the transit route for energy originating from the Caspian

Sea’ and (2) ‘because of the risks its disputed territoriality could pose to European

security’.81 For energy security, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC) is extremely

important, however, for the purpose of this essay, we will focus on the region’s more ‘hard’

security risks. In this aspect, the South Caucasus region also poses a ‘hard’ security threat to

European security goals, especially in relation to the ‘frozen conflicts’ in the region.

According to the security threat criteria outlined in the ESS, Georgia’s two separatist

regions, weak-state status after the fall of the fall of the Soviet Union, and issues with

upholding democracy all pose apparent and impending security challenges for the European

78 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, pp. 8. 79 Allison, pp. 1147. 80 Ibid, pp. 1148. 81 Bardakçı, pp. 214.

27

Union’s overall security and stability. Georgia is geographically positioned in an area that is

rife with transnational crime issues such as human trafficking, drug and weapon smuggling,

and money laundering82 and is relatively close in proximity to the Union’s eastern border.

These issues pose a direct security threat to the EU, making the South Caucasus region of the

shared neighbourhood highly important to the European security agenda.

Since 2003, with the initiation of the ESS, the Southern Caucasus region has been an

explicit concern on the EU security agenda.83 Furthermore, as discussed, its ratification

prompted an era of EU foreign policy-making that had many more tools at its disposal for the

promotion of conflict resolution in the South Caucasus region. Even before the 2008

Russian-Georgian war, the EU had already employed such security policies as, ‘It appointed

a special envoy to the region, tried to join the Russia-led conflict-settlement formats in South

Ossetia as an observer and financed the rehabilitation of the conflicts zones around Abkhazia

and South Ossetia’.84

Furthermore, in the political sphere, in July 2003 the EU appointed a EU Special

Representative (EUSR) to the South Caucasus, Finnish diplomat, Heikke Talvitie. At the

beginning the EUSR was assigned the task of ‘developing contracts with local actors,

encouraging regional cooperation, and assisting in conflict resolution’, but in February 2006,

Talvitie was replaced by Peter Semneby, a Swedish diplomat, who received an increased

directive in regards to the EU’s goals toward security in the South Caucasus. Further task

expansions outlined were to help the EU support the UN and OSCE in ‘facilitating of the

EU’s participation in the post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction process and help

82 Ibid, pp. 215. 83 Ibid. 84 Nicu Popescu, ‘The EU’s Conflict Prevention Failure in Georgia’, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst (14 Oct 2009), http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5198 (Accessed 18 Aug 2013).

28

resolve the conflicts in the region’.85 This demonstrates the EU’s awareness of the

importance of the regional conflicts in the South Caucasus and its attempts at becoming a

more involved and influential actor, but only through the lens of the United Nations (UN) and

Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE).

Although the South Caucasian countries still did receive a lot of aid from the ENP,86

even in light of this development and aid, the EU was unable to develop a coherent foreign

policy strategy towards the actual resolution of these conflicts. In the end, the EU basically

poured money into the conflict regions in order to promote some form of resolution to be

fostered between the opposing parties, but had little direct security involvement in the region.

Overall, rather than involve the Union in the conflict resolution process directly, the EU’s

conflict resolution policies towards the frozen conflicts in Georgia in the build-up to the

Russian-Georgian War resulted simply in the provision of economic and development aid

and increased support to the UN and OSCE, the international organisations already presiding

over pre-existing negotiations.87

5.3 Russian Opposition and Analysis of EU Capabilities

The South Caucasus poses a slightly more unique security situation for the EU as its

engagement in conflict resolution is simultaneously sought for by some, while opposed by

others, including Russia, with whom the EU has critical regional and international relations.

In the Southern Caucasus ‘the Russia factor constrains the way the EU engages with the

secessionist conflicts’.88

85 Bardakçı, pp. 224. 86 Bardakçı claims ‘The EU had already spent over €30 million on post-conflict reconstruction projects alone, in and around the South Ossetian and Abkhazian regions prior to 2008’, pp. 215. 87 Ibid, pp. 225. 88 Nicu Popescu, ‘Europe’s Unrecognised Neighbours: The EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia’, CEPS Working Document No. 260 (March 2007), pp. 6.

29

As previously discussed, it has become ‘increasingly clear that one of Moscow’s key

foreign policy aims is to consolidate Russian influence in the [Commonwealth of

Independent States] CIS and to minimise as far as possible the influence of other external

powers there’.89 As a former CIS member, and former member of the Soviet Union whom

Russia still shares a border with, Georgia’s security and alliances definitely pose a foreign

policy concern for Russia. Furthermore, with the Russian peacekeeping troops within

Georgian borders as well as Russia’s membership and veto power in both the UN and OSCE,

the two international organisations which the EU’s policies towards Georgia supported, the

Union’s ability to become more directly involved was already greatly constrained from the

beginning of its attempts to form a security strategy. Thus, the EU and South Caucasian

countries have been slow to develop strong relations due to issues at the EU level through

Member State’s reluctance to Russian opposition within the region, as well as within

international organisations, for example, Russia’s veto of the continuance of the OSCE

border-monitoring mission on the Georgian-Chechen border in 2005.90

As one can see from the various different foreign policy levers that the EU did try to

employ above, there were some attempts by the EU to become more involved in the security

and stability processes in the South Caucasian region, but these were very limited, and clearly

did not stop the conflict from escalating from ‘frozen’ to full-scale warfare between the

separatists and Russia on one side, and Georgia on the other. This is because the EU was

very divided on the degree of engagement in the South Caucasus that it was willing to

participate in at the Member State level. For example, some EU Member States were against

a greater EU role in the South Caucasus. This was because Russia was opposed to the

growth of EU involvement in conflict resolution in the Russian ‘former backyard’ and these

89 Averre (2005), pp. 78; Dmitri Trenin, ‘Moscow’s Realpolitik: Russia Enclosed in the Post-Soviet Space’, Nezavisaia gazeta (9 Feb 2004). 90 Ibid, pp. 215.

30

Member States were afraid that the result would be the deterioration and complication of the

EU’s relations with Russia, which they were highly opposed to.91

In this way, Russian opposition to EU involvement meant that the EU was under both

external (Russian) and internal (those Member States who prioritised good relations with

Russia) resistance to EU foreign policy possibilities that may have lead to any greater role for

the EU in conflict resolution in Georgia. This led to a multitude of EU policy failures.92

The EU’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia

has noted that,

... over the years there was a gradual increase in European involvement in Georgia, which may be called forthcoming in terms of economic aid, politically friendly on the bilateral side, cooperative but cautious on contentious political issues and … mostly distanced [from] sensitive security issues. A good case in point was the European reluctance to take over the Border Monitoring Mission on the Caucasus range facing Russia, after Russia had vetoed the hitherto OSCE engagement in 2004.93

This statement clearly points to an example in the EU’s foreign policies toward Georgia in

the build-up to the Russian-Georgian war in 20008 where the EU’s capability to engage in its

ESS goal of conflict resolution in the face of Russian opposition was thwarted. This example

is the case where, in 2004, Russia used its veto to block the extension of the OSCE border-

monitoring mission on the Georgian-Chechen border. The new Saakashvili government had

requested that the EU should take over the mission, but internal opposition inhibited the EU

from taking such action.94 This was because France, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Germany, to a

certain extent, opposed the EU’s involvement. This, in turn, resulted in a 12 member EU

team being sent as part of the EUSR’s Border Support team rather than the requested number

91 Popescu (2009). 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid; Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia. 94 Stewart, pp. 5.

31

of 150 border monitors of the OSCE team.95 This example clearly demonstrates a EU policy

failure to be able to employ conflict prevention or settlement instruments in Georgia, a

Russian ‘former backyard’ and shared neighbourhood country in the face of Russian

opposition.

Mikhelidze has argued that in the build-up to and aftermath of the 2008 Russian-

Georgian war, ‘European responses to Russia have been firm in rhetoric but compromising in

reality. Russia made it clear that it has it own claims over the South Caucasus ... [and] the

war exposed the inability of the West to prevent Russia from moving aggressively to restore

its primacy over the former Soviet Union’s territory’.96 This specific conflict demonstrates

the potential for escalation and the potential security threats that can arise from the gridlock

that can disable the EU from taking any swift action as a global actor and pursuing its foreign

policies in the face of Russia opposition.

95 Popescu (2009). 96 Nona Mikhelidze, ‘After the 2008 Russia-Georgia War: Implications for the Wider Caucasus and Prospects for Western Involvement in Conflict Resolution’, The Caucasus and Black Sea region: European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and beyond, Background Paper, (Rome, 6-7 February 2009), http://www.iai.it/pdf/dociai/iai0901.pdf, (Accessed 20 Aug 2013).

32

6. Conclusion

Although the EU may not have caused the 2008 Russian-Georgian war or even have

been able to prevent it from happening in the best of circumstances, the main point is that it

was unable to even really attempt to take part in more ambitious conflict prevention and

settlement policies in Georgia due to internal disunity amongst the EU Member States related

to external pressure from Russian opposition. Overall, the EU foreign policy-making process

failed to yield a coherent political tactic towards prevention or settlement of the conflicts in

Georgia. The EU’s inability to act in Georgia in the build-up to the 2008 war, even through

‘soft’ security measures like the border-monitoring team, allowed the situation to escalate

from ‘frozen conflict’ to actual warfare.97 Essentially, not only was the EU unable to

generate foreign policies in order to settle regional conflicts, a goal of the 2003 European

Security Strategy, but the EU was also unable to produce foreign policies which would

‘freeze’ those security threats from becoming even worse and therefore effecting Europe’s

overall security in a negative way.

The retention of the dependence on intergovernmental decision-making in the EU

foreign policy-making process and a third country’s ability to exploit this setup for its own

interests has inhibited EU foreign and security capabilities in the shared neighbourhood. This

is why Russia is able to ‘divide and rule’ the EU Member States and use old-fashioned

rationalist foreign policy methods of seeking to create an asymmetric balance of power in

Russia’s favour.

The EU is unable to fulfil its security objectives in the European Neighbourhood in

the face of Russian opposition. Differences in EU Member States’ bilateral relations with

Russia can cause disunity amongst them that can be exploited by Russia due to the

vulnerabilities of the EU’s intergovernmental-based foreign policy-making process. This in

97 Popescu (2009).

33

turn impedes the EU Member States’ abilities to formulate foreign and security policies at the

EU level. In this case, the EU’s capabilities as a security actor in the shared neighbourhood

diminish and lessen the likelihood of achieving the EU’s defence and security goals in the

region. If the EU is unable to even attempt to pursue its defence and security aims, overall

European security may weaken, as happened in the case of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war.

Some important lessons can be learned from the EU’s foreign policy failures in

Georgia in the years and months leading up to the Russian-Georgian war in 2008. Most

importantly, the EU Member States need to learn to adhere to the fact that they are stronger

in foreign policy together. The Member States themselves are the only ones capable of

strengthening their positions against Russia through uniting.

Secondly, ‘ “not irritating Russia” is not a policy’.98 If the EU is unable to unite in

the face of Russian pressure on conflict prevention policies in situations like the one in

Georgia, then similar security threats in the neighbourhood have the potential and likelihood

to end up becoming worse and escalating into much worse security threats for the Union and

therefore the Member States as well. Furthermore, in this type of worsened situation, EU

relations with both Russia and their shared neighbours may end up deteriorating. The EU

Member States should and must work together and do all they can to pursue foreign policies

that help aid in their coherence and security through policies that aim to strengthen and

stabilise the shared neighbourhood. After all, both Russia and the EU seek a secure and

stable neighbourhood, thus, they should be working together to make this possible.99

98 Ibid. 99 Ibid.

34

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