Def Tfn an Apprisal

8/9/2019 Def Tfn an Apprisal

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5 AIR POWER Jounal Vol. 3 No. 4 wiNter 2008 (Oco-Dc)

DeFeNCe trANSFOrmAtiON:AN APPrAiSAL

P. K. maLLiCK

As we prepare for the future, we must think differently and develop the kinds

of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to

unexpected circumstances. We must transform not only the capabilities at our

disposal but also the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise

and the way we ght. We must transform not only our armed forces, but

also the Department that serves them by encouraging a culture of creativity

and prudent risk-taking. We must promote an entrepreneurial approach to

developing military capabilities, one that encourages people to be proactive, not

reactive and anticipates threats before they emerge.

Dold h. Rusfld,

ex US Scrry of Dfc

tansfoaon, fo, odnsaonhav on calls chan

s no a n phnonon n h ad focs. tansfoaon, nas

ncasd coa po y nokn snsos, dcson-aks and

shoos o achv shad aanss, ncasd spd of coand, hh

po of opaons, a lhaly, ncasd suvvaly and a d of

slf-synchonsaon.

* bad P. K. mllck, indan Ay, s cunly h HQ inad Dfnc Saff of hChfs of Saff Co.

Cn fo A Po Suds, N Dlh


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AIR POWER Jounal Vol. 3 No. 4 wiNter 2008 (Oco-Dc) 52

Chan s ssnal, u ffcn chan s no asy.

ths has n consd y sno lads of adfocs houhou hsoy. Dfnc ansfoaon has

poccupd h US Dfnc Dpan (DoD) fo

ov a dcad and holds h pos of a paad

shf n h chaac and conduc of afa. A h sa , s o

han sply ovlayn n chnolos and n hada on xsn foc

sucus; qus fundanal chans n lay docn, opaons

and oansaon.

whl sval couns ncludn inda a closly sudyn and assssnh plcaons of h n voluon n lay affas (rmA),

hy hav, fo a vay of asons, ad ll poss so fa n acually

ansfon h ad focs alon s lns. in fac, os couns a

unlkly, dsp h s ffos, o ov yond odnsaon-plus, a

las no n h na fuu.

th concp, docn, oansaon, ha pcpon, ladshp,

ud, culu and lvl of chnoloy usd y us n inda a a d

vaanc h h USA. Hov, us kp ouslvs aas h all

ansfoaonal acvs happnn acoss h lo, da h coc

lssons, and chan h indan ad focs as p ou condons ha

pval n h suconnn, hl kpn a clos ach on h gloal wa

On tos (gwOt).

in hs ssay, a dald analyss of dfnc ansfoaon psnly n poss

in the USA will be carried out. The signicance of technology, jointmanship,

ladshp, loscs, ann, culu, ud and laons of ansfoaon

and s plcaons fo h indan ad focs ll cad ou

inFORmatiOn aGe

What we are seeing, in moving from the Industrial Age to the Information

Age, is what amounts to a new theory of war: power comes from a different

place, it is used in different ways, it achieves different effects than it did before.

During the Industrial Age, power came from mass. Now power tends to come

DeFeNCe trANSFOrmAtiON: AN APPrAiSAL

Cg s

ssl, buffcg cg

s o sy.


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from information, access and speed. We have come to call that new theory of

war network-centric warfare. It is not only about networks, but also about howwars are foughthow power is developed.

vie Aial (ret) Athu K. cebwski,

diet, ofe f Fe Tansfatin,

ieee Spcru

Primary Characteristics of the Emerging Way of War

Alhouh h concp of ha h fuu foc ll look lk and ho ll

conduc lay opaons s sll volvn, o saln chaacscs so sand ou. i ll a jon, nok-cnc foc and ll capal

of xcun ffcs-asd opaons (ebO), nald y nok-cnc

afa (NCw). Alady, h conaon of odn chnoloy and n

opaonal concps has nald nokd uns and ndvdual plafos o

opa oh n ays no consdd possl jus a f yas ao. NCw s

chaacsd y h aly of oaphcally dspsd focs o aan a hh

lvl of shad alspac aanss ha s xplod o achv sac,

opaonal and accal ojcvs n accodanc h h coands

nn. ths lnkn of popl, plafos, apons, snsos and dcson ads

no a snl nok cas a hol ha s claly a han h su of

s pas. th sul s nokd focs ha opa h ncasd spd

and synchonsaon and a capal of achvn assd ffcs, n any

suaons hou h physcal assn of focs qud n h pas.

What iS tRanSFORmatiOn

It is not the strongest of the species that survives nor the most intelligent that

survives. It is the one that is the most adaptable to change.

Crls Drw

The US DoD has dened transformation in one document as a process that

shaps h chann nau of lay copon and coopaon houh

n conaons of concps, capals, popl and oansaons ha

P. K. mALLiCK


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xplo h naons advanas and poc aans asyc vulnals

o susan h sac poson, hch hlps undpn pac and saly n hold. tansfoaon ancpas and cas h fuu and dals h h co-

voluon of concps, pocsss, oansaons and chnoloy. Pofound chan

in any one of these areas necessitates change in all. Transformation also identies

and lvas n soucs of po. mlay

ansfoaon s aou chann h culu of

h ad focs. thfo, ansfoaonal

acvy us facla a culu of chan and

nnovaon n od o anan copvadvana n h nfoaon a. tha

culu us fos ladshp, ducaon,

pocsss, oansaons, valus and auds

ha ncoua and ad annful

nnovaon.

Ofce of Force Transformation

To help implement transformation, the US DoD created the Ofce of Force

Transformation (OFT), which resides within the Ofce of the Secretary of

Defence (OSD). OFT is a small ofce with a staff of fewer than 30 people and

an annual ud of ouhly $30 llon. i pos dcly o h scay

of dfnc. Aon oh hns, OFt ssus udanc o h s of DoD on

ansfoaon; vs and appovs ansfoaon plans sud y

h lay svcs and DoD ancs; acs as a nao, poo and

clan hous of das fo ansfoaon; and nally vanlss n

suppo of ansfoaon.

As llusad n F. ,lay ansfoaon ns a h sac lvl.

gudd y dfnc say, h lay ansfoaon say and h

joint vision, joint war-ghting concepts are developed. The joint war-ghting

concepts will focus on the development and acquisition of joint war-ghting

capals acoss docn, oansaon, ann, aal, ladshp and

ducaon, psonnl and facls.


trsforo s

procss sps

cgg ur of

lry copo dcoopro roug w

cobos of cocps,

cpbls, popl d

orgsos xplo

os dvgs.


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Scope of Defence Transformation

Ovall, h scop of dfnc ansfoaon ncopasss h ajo

aas: ho usnss s don nsd h dpan, ho ok s don h

interagency and multinational partners, and how we ght.

Military Transformation Process

th lay ansfoaon pocss dpcd n F. 2ns h an analyss

of h say, ha and chnoloy dvs fo ansfon h foc and

h sx ccal opaonal oals, hch povd h focus fo h dpans

ansfoaon ffos. tansfoaonal capals ll aand hn

h suls of concp dvlopn and xpnaon a plnd n

slcd lns of h US ad focs.

P. K. mALLiCK

NaonalScuySay

USDfncSay

mlaytansfoaon

SayJon Vson

Nok-Cnc wafa

effcs-basd Concps

effcs-basd Capals

Coand and conoliSrmanouvFsLoscsFoc Pocon

DOtmLPe

Assu Alls and FndsDssuad Fuu mlayCopon. D thasand Cocon vs. US inssf Dnc Fals Dfas

Any Advsay

JonOpaonsConcps

JonOpan

Concps

JonCapals

expnaon

}

Fg. 1. mlry trsforo Srgy o Cocps o Cpbls


6/29


Military Transformation Strategy

th dpans ovall say fo ansfon consss of h pas:ansfon culu; ansfon pocsss; and ansfon

capals houh foc o lay ansfoaon. th fou pllas ha

consu ssnal lns of h dpans foc ansfoaon

say a:

Snhnn jon opaons.

explon nllnc advanas.

Concp dvlopn and xpnaon.

Dvlopn ansfoaonal capals.

Succssful plnaon of h dpans foc ansfoaon say

ll accla h onon shf fo an ndusal a o an nfoaon a

lay. ths s a a of dvlopn copncy fo h n a. Fuu

lay opaons ll conducd usn o nok-cnc focs. th

accal and opaonal ffcvnss of dly dspsd focs ll nhancd


Fg. 2. mlry trsforo Procss

Strategy Threat Technology

Operational Goals

Protecting Critical Bases

Projecting and

Sustaining Forces

Leveraging Information

Technology

Assuring Information

Systems

Enhancing Space

Capabilities

Compelling Need

Transformation Strategy

Joint Concepts

Capabilities

Processes PeopleTechnology Organisation


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y ncasn nfoaon shan va a scu nok ha povds aconal

nfoaon a all lvls of coand. ths n un ll ca condons foncasd spd of coand and oppouns fo slf-synchonsaon acoss

the battlespace. The rst step towards the development of a network-centric

jon foc s o nvs o no n h fou lay ansfoaon pllas.

jOint tRanSFORmatiOn

Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be

involved in war, we will ght in all elements, with all Services, as one single

concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organisational activities mustconform to this fact.

Prsd Dwg D. esowr

A s x, jonnssans h full naon of h dffn Svc

dvsons,.., h capals a on jon. Jonnss ould fa o

pvaln and ould pna fuh no ach Svc han has n h pas.

ths concp of jonnss ss conssn h h Svcs ach ann h

responsibility and authority to create and sustain specic defence capabilities

u nan jonly n plannn h capals ndd, allocan h

capals acoss h Svcs, dcdn on al plans and alon h

oduls o dployd.

manhl, ach of h lay Svcs has n dvlopn n opaonal

concps o pln Jon Vson2020. th navy has focussd on NCw, usn

n nfoaon chnolos o lnk h focs oh dally. th a foc

has concnad on ebOs, hch assss ho s o dsoy h ny, h

nal collaal daa. th ay has focussd on apd dcsv opaons

(RDOs), that is, reaching the conict quickly and acting before the enemy can

ac. elns of hs h sas a n oh.

teChnOLOGY

It is not that Generals and Admirals are incompetent, but the task has

passed beyond their competence. Their limitations are due not to a congenital

P. K. mALLiCK


8/29


stupidityas a disillusioned public is so apt to assumebut the growth of

science, which has upset the foundations of their technique. The only way ofsalvation would be to survey the problems in complete detachment and from

the widest point of view.

B. h. Lddl hr

From Thoughts of War

What Weapons and Systems are Transformational?

Alhouh ansfoaon nvolvs chans n oansaon and concps ofopaons, uch of h da ov ansfoaon has cnd on hch

lay apons and syss should dd ansfoaonal o no.

exps dsa on hs quson, vn hn okn fo a coon

denition of transformation. As a result, lists of weapons and systems that

qualfy as ansfoaonal dff fo on souc o h nx. wapons and

systems that have frequently been identied as closely associated with the

Adnsaons ansfoaon vson nclud u a no ncssaly ld

o h follon:

Coand, conol, councaon, copus, nllnc, suvllanc,

connassanc (C4iSr) syss ha lnk lay uns no hhly

nad noks fo conducn NCw.

Focs fo counn oss and apons of ass dsucon.

Spac syss.

mssl dfnc.

Unannd vhcls.

Spcal opaons focs.

Pcson-udd a-dlvd apons.

Lh and o ol ay ound focs.

Sall and fas navy sufac shps.

A f chnolos sand ou as spcally ndd fo odays n

ssons:



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Unannd aal vhcls (UAVs) and spac-asd ada fo pssn

suvllanc.infoaon opaons, oh offnc and dfnc.

Soa and val of nfoaondaa nn.

Tagging for tracking, identication and forensics.

Spac conol.

bochcal dfnc.

Ccs say ha ansn accua nfoaon n al- o syss

and units that can act on it immediately is the challenge. Because battleeldinformation and intelligence ows through and across multiple organisational

oundas and nfacs, ll nvaly dlayd, ald, o ohs

dsod. Saffs ll ak o analys and np n nfoaon

and propose courses of action rather than immediately pass it unltered to

suodna and adjacn foaons

Spaan h poan fo h unpoan has alays daund

coands and saffs. t ushs on as coands and saffs sl

h h hony pols of al coand. wha s h s sys o

na an n a? Ho can su ho s ally h? is hs

poan nouh o pospon oh nans? wha aou collaal

daa and nnocn cvlans? Ho uch nfoaon should pushd

don o sall uns and ho uch can hy ds? who ls nds o kno?

who us appov h sk?

ths and oh facos affc h chncal

pol of daa anssson. thy a no val

concns, no a hy paculaly suscpl

o chncal soluons. in fac, h xploson of

auoaon and copu syss n hadquas

has brought an increase, not a decrease, in the size

of hadquas saffs. So lon as popl ak

battleeld decisions, they will stop and think. So

lon as las a hachcal, coands

P. K. mALLiCK

t xploso of

uoo d

copur syss

dqurrs s

broug crs,

o dcrs,

sz of dqurrs

sffs.


10/29


ll us h dscon. whnv nfoaon cosss an oansaonal

ounday, ll ald, hov suly.Advancd coand and conol (C2) s a o-dd sod: can lad o

lss cnalsd opaons o o coanan fo fa. th aly

is that satellite communication has allowed decisions on the battleeld in

iaq o Afhansan o ad a Hadquas (HQ) Cnal Coand

n tapa, Floda. Sos nvolvn a h hhs HQ s ncssay

as we have seen in the case of the siege of the Hazratbal shrine by terrorists

hn, n h la of h da, opaons a cad ou lv and h s no

o o houh all h nda foaons. Of cous, ndafoaon HQs ll fl lf ou.

expnc n h ss of moadshu, n h a ov Kosovo and n

Afhansan and iaq suss ha sv ah, a dfnc, coplx

terrain and urban environments still make combat a very close ght. Critics

say ha h os ccal ansfoaonal apon oday s h povsd

xplosv dvc (ieD) usd y nsuns and oss. tchnoloy has s

laons n clos coa.

CULtURe anD innOVatiOn

Transformed Culture and Processes

th say fo achvn ansfoaon n h Dpan of Dfnc us

n h an ffo o ansfo h ovall culu no on h nnovaon

and nfod sk akn a ncouad and add a culu ha s

chaacsd y h nfoaon a. ths us don houh ladshp

dvlopn and ducaon, an ncasd phass on concp dvlopn

and xpnaon and chans n h psonnl sys and ncnv

sucu. Sno ladshp us s h xapl y fosn nnovaon and

adopn nfoaon a chnolos and concps.

Innovation = Creativity x Implementation

innovaon, so val o h ansfoaon pocss, s dpndn upon

cavy, h dvlopn of n oansaonal and opaonal



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concps, pocsss and chnolos. Fo annful nnovaon o

occu, hov, cavy alon ll no suffcn; plnaon squally poan. whou nsd cusos o conduc xpns,

donsaons, ss and valuaons and ulaly, adop n concps,

pocsss and chnolos fo h conduc of al-old opaons,

nnovaon ll no occu.

toh, cavy and plnaon ll hav a ulplyn ffc n

povdn on focs h nnovav n capals. w us ncoua

nnovaon and h shan of knold and opaonal xpnaon

aon h Svcs. ths ll nal o dscoua and ulaly dfa ofh dvlopn of n capals and ffcv asycal sas

y advsas.

LeaDeRShiP

If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the

unforeseen [in war], two qualities are indispensable: rst, an intellect that,

even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which

leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it

may lead.

Crl vo Cluswz

th ladshp dvlopn pocss us

sul n lads ho a copn, hav

h h ducaon and xpnc houh

schooln and assnn pocsss, a

of sound chaac and ny, chsh

dny, hav h slf-dscpln o alays

do has h and undsand huan

nature and how they can inuence human

nau a any vn pon o accoplsh h

mission. The leader must also be condent in

hs on als o opa ndpndnly f

P. K. mALLiCK

t ldr us

als be nent in

s ow bls o

opr dpdly

f cssry d o

opros w drc

vsbly o gs

lvls of govr

d ry ldrsp.


12/29


ncssay and on opaons h dc vsly o h hhs lvls of

government and army leadership. The leader must have the condence inh capals of suodnas h us aon all s scond nau and

nv qusond.

i don nd soon hos only ood a h klln and akn, i nd

soody ho has h adh of ducaon xpnc and nllc o ak

on all h s of hs ssons ha h o sh s on o saddld h

hn h shoon sops o hn susds o so lvl. thy h ons

ha a on o coun on h ound ou h, o han anyhn ls. And

i hnk has h ssu n any dscusson as o ha happns o ou layfo h on ou.(Souc: gn Anhony Znn, Addss a h man Cops

Assocaon and Naval insu: Fou 2003: Ho Do w Ovhaul h

Naons Dfns o wn h Nx wa?, Cysal gaay mao, Alnon,

VA, Sp 4, 2003).

rd US Ay Chf of Saff godon Sullvan ans aou hs vy

sa pon hn h cauons, th old aps, h old ays of don usnss

ll no ok n odays n os. Sply povn an xsn

pocss ll no solv a pol Don h sa hn you hav alays

donno a ho uch you pov ll you only ha you had

fo(Sullvan & Hap, Hope is not a Method, N Yok : ts busnss

1997, p.152). Military thinker Trevor Dupuy in his book Understanding War

(1987) advanced an important idea about the actual importance of technology

n afa. in h chap tchnoloy and Huan bhavo n Coa, h

assd ha hsocal daa aou a ndcas, No chnoloy, no apon,

hov a s acual o ponal lhaly, has n o poan fo

h nnn of als o as as h n ho conolld h apons

h ssnal nau of a has no chand. was a fouh y n and

h has n no dscnl dffnc n h fundanal nau of an

over the past ve thousand years of recorded history. Because the nature of

an has no chand, nh has hs asc ojcv hn h uns o a:

h ployn of lhal nsuns o foc hs ll upon oh n h

opposn pons of v.



13/29


Innovative Change Agents Discouraged

On dly consd ndn fo succssful ansfoaon has n a

vsonay oup of vsonas h lavly pssn nus, hada o

concv of old n ays of conducn afa.Adal wlla Ons

askd fo h d. wh s h voluonay ho ll lad h rmA?

th as no on h could pon o. No blly mchlls, no Alfd mahans,

no go Paons, no go mashalls. wha s dffn aou h ay

no vsus s n h pas s ha h a cunly no ads fo sk

taking and even the smallest mistakes are punished. As an ofcer in the US

Ay Coand and gnal Saff Coll Suvy sad, rsk avson has

co a lay culual hn; coands a no lln o ak sks

(and suodnas kno ).

P. K. mALLiCK

how Wll W Kow W Ldrs hv Sklls

For Succss i t Uppr-Rg hd Qudr?

infoaon A

whn h beHAViOUr donsas:

Aly o LiSteN

Collaoaon acoss oansaons

muual undsandn and spc h pans

Culu of nnovaon

Undsandn of h conx

Connuous lann

enps sklls

Dvlopn lann oansaons

Undsandn h culu of h opaon

Us of ffcv cs fo succss

gloalsaon ii Ldrs dvlopg ldrs

indusal A gloalsaon iii


14/29


F ncnvs xs fo coands o poc

h avcks n odays ay. Snc on ad omerely neutral ofcer evaluation report (OER),

can un a ca, a hhly sk avs sno a

can dal an nnovav chan an asly.

Suppon vdnc cos fo h suvy: op-

don loyaly dos no xs. Sno lads ll

ho suodnas und h us n a haa o

poc o advanc h cas. ths nd s no

only found in the US Army. In 1996, terrorists blew up a US apartment buildingn Saud Aaa af h coand had aud fo ncasd scuy

conssnly fo onhs. H as lad fo h aack dsp hs ffos o

avod hs ouco. th chf of saff of h US A Foc apd o sav

this ofcers career by preemptively resigning as the responsible commander,

u h local coand as focd o anyay. ths pan sonly

suss ha hh lvls of sk avson a n nsuonally nfocd

n US lay oansaons.

th US Ay has 3,700 colonls u only 33 anouv ads: h navy

has 3,500 captains but only 359 ships. Most wind up on staff duty, whether

hy a ndd o no. mos ffcv as houhou hsoy hav had

only 3 to 8 percent of their numerical strength in the ofcer corps; the US has

4.3 pcn. th load hadquas only ca unpoducv pap ok

for already hard pressed units who are short of ofcers. This dichotomy has

o solvd.

LimitatiOnS

When I was a young ofcer, I was taught that if you have air superiority,

land superiority and sea superiority, you win. Well, in Vietnam, we had air

superiority, land superiority and sea superiority, but we lost. So I realised

there is something more to it.

Colol jo Boyd


mos ffcv

rs rougousory v d

oly 3 o 8 prc

of r urcl

srg

fe ps; the US

s 14.3 prc.


15/29


As h US Ays foc dployn challns n Afhansan and iaq

hav donsad, h Und Sas lay s no oansd, and, oquppd o conduc poacd coun-nsuncy and coun-o

opaons on a la scal. in pacula, h anpo quns o

susan hs coun-nsuncy capans a consdaly a han

hos ha can suppod y h cun foc sucu. indd, cn US

history nds US forces conducting a remarkably high number of regime

chan opaons (.., Panaa, Ha, h balkans, Afhansan and iaq).

ths aly ncass h dand fo focs capal of conducn saly

opaons unl a n ovnn can fod and ndnous focsand o assu sponsly fo h counys nnal scuy. As h

balkans, Afhansan and iaq hav shon, hs opaons can poacd

n nau, spcally n cass h a ous nsun ovn dvlops.

th faus of nsuncylndn no cvl populaon, supo huan

nllnc, nlan s oansaon n , unconsand n choosn

h , locaon and yp of aacks, n f fo lal consans, us

of da o s advanaak a foc h s on nokn and

suaonal aanss.

ths nd ay ll connu, hh o no h US lay conducs

chan opaons. ths s caus advsas confonn sas

h ovhln advanas n convnonal capals (.., h

Und Sas) hav ofn adopd unconvnonal hods of an

a o offs hs advanas. Alhouh h US lays cod n such

opaons s xd, nsuonally h ad focs hav shd aay

from elding forces structured for irregular warfare, for several reasons.

Fs, ula afa opaons a ypcally

anpo nnsv, hl h US lay has

co ncasnly capal nnsv.

tchnolocal soucs of nllnc of ll

valu n Soala. Coands ld on huan

nllnc as h pay souc of nfoaon.

As gn Anhony Znn, hn dco of opaons

P. K. mALLiCK

t furs of

surgcy k

forc w s

ow workg

d suol

wrss.


16/29


a h Und Naons task Foc Soala calld,

h had accss o vy ood chncal nllnc, u snsos could no pna h facon

lads and uly undsand ha hy up

o. O ay undsand h culu, h clan

association afliation, the power of the faction

lads and ay undsandn so of h

nfasucu oo. bcaus of aus n

target selection and identication, many targets

h unnnonally. msaks occud nobecause of a lack of information; the sheer volume of data and the difculty

in separating good from bad information presented difculties. As Secretary

of Dfnc wlla Cohn asd af h a, Ou vas nllnc

system can create such a haystack of data that nding the one needle that will

pinpoint a target in the right time-frame is difcult, indeed.

th s-knon

nllnc falu as h on of h Chns eassy n blad.

Strategic and operational uncertainties were amplied at the tactical level.

Solds and ans opad n a populous, consd uan aa n hch

almost everyone was armed; it was difcult to distinguish between friendly

focs, nuals and hos opposd o h huanaan ffo. Fo ans and

solds, h coplx socal, polcal and oaphcal nvonn lud

dsncons n pac-kpn opaons and coa opaons. maj

gn to monoy akd, if hs sn coa, hn i su havn

a hlluva nha.

maj gn (rd) ro H. Scals hl spakn on Chan Dun wa:

Conplan h Fuu whl Fhn n h Psn a a sna on An

Army at War: Change in the Midst of Conicthld a h Coa Suds

insu Fon Confnc Cn, Fo Lavnoh, Kansas, on Auus

2-4, 2005, ad so vy nsn osvaons:

Technologies dictating conceptsnd an enemy and a method worthy of our

apons. ths s a vy sous pol h us. w hav h chnoloy


Our vs

llgc sysc cr suc

ysck of d

that ning the ne

dl wll

ppo rg

rg -fr

is ifult, inee.


17/29


ncnc afa so ls co up h a lay hoy ha suppos .

whas ood fo ibm has o o ood fo h ayuld a nok andh ny ll collaps. buld a n and h ny ll co. wll,

lann aou ha, an ? th ny adaps. H says, You an a n? ill

build a net and Ill build it with tribal afliations and execute with notes passed

n h ddl of h nh and houh ackyad dals. And you can uld all h

ns you an, u ill a you a you on a. i hnk h ll on ncnc

warfare is something around a trillion dollars. Ive been to the Ofce of Force

tansfoaon. is ncdl ha popl a sll lvn n a al of fanasy.

ty o alk o hs uys aou h ny and aou a n a o-sdd affa

and hy look a you as f you hav a oo on ou of you had. b

caful of h onk and h up sck caful of n hs and n ha.

i o a pc a f onhs ao calld, Culu-Cnc wafa. i old y

do, Look, f i don pu centric on sohn, you uys on pulsh .

gv an ny ohy of y apons...plas. Do you v noc ha

only decide to ght China during the Quadrennial Defense Review? Do you ever

noc ha? gv a p! who can ak a ca? Chna. Okay, hy h

ny. is hs hol da of chnoloy dvn docn nsad of docn

dvn chnoloy

This problem is made particularly difcult today because of our obsession with

jonnss. Jonnss s, y s vy nau, a souc of fcon n foad hnkn,

caus vyody has o hav a pc of h acon. why do pu a J n fon

of all of ou hadquas? wll, caus hav o jon. Acually, don.

Theres very little joint about IRAQI FREEDOM, its 95 percent Army and

man Cops. is o vyhn o do h nnn h a on h ound. th

ny has cdd us h loal coons. w on spac, h a and h sa.

You nd a caalys fo fo. Noally, s a pson. You nd a Donn Say.

You nd soon ho has h unqu sklls, no so uch as a vsonay, Donn

Say ll ll you ha h as no a vsonay; ha h as, as an ndvdual

P. K. mALLiCK


18/29


ho kn ho o ov an nsuon foad. H kn ho o anpula h

lns of chan n od o h os fo h pocss.

Youv o o xpn. expn n nu ncns. expn ov

and ov and ov aan. You h hav a and vn, u nds o chap,

nds o pv, nds o dsud and nds o un y

capans and ajos and ay lunan colonlsno y nals and hads-

of-sa. thas ho chan occus.

w us kll h dacy and dscon. idacy sll oo slo n

ho kll and sll lavly ndscna. w nd o al o kll

soon on h oh sd of h all, ah han doppn a uldn n Fallujah

and nd o do hn sconds and no nus. th A Foc s vy poud

of h fac ha h acon fo clos a suppo has on fo an hou and

5 nus n Koa, don o aou 20 o 25 nus nohas sll oo lon. i

should o nus, no 20 o 25 nus, n hs yp of a.

What happened after 9/11, I would argue, is that it shifted to the other way

no lvn n a old has dvn y rd. Osaa n Ladn dosn ca

aou jon docn. H conols h clock, hs dvn chan, hs adapd vy

quckly and h ally dosn ca aou any of ou sucus, aou ckn

anyhn ha do hasov. So ha dos ha anfo you? wha

ans s h onus fo adapaonfo ncasn h pac of adapaons on

you, no on h. Unl al o do ha, unl al o cas foad and

aay fo h paccal psn and hnk of h hocal fuu, ll

nv al o clos ha ap.

imPeDimentS tO DeFenCe tRanSFORmatiOn in thiRD WORLD

COUntRieS

Several factors currently inhibit defence transformation. The rst comprises

coss and souc consans. tansfoaon dosn co chap, dsp

assons ad aly on y so poponns ha h xploaon of



19/29


cocal off-h-shlf (COtS) chnolos ould aly duc coss.

rah, vn o ak a sa qus h acquson of any n andxpnsv yps of lay-unqu syss. evn any dual-us COtS

nfoaon and councaons chnolos a no asly adapd

to military use, as they often require substantial modication, such as

udsaon o addonal capals

A h sa , fundn fo ansfoaonal syss us nally

compete with large and expensive legacy programmessuch as ghter

acaf, anks and la ashps, as ll as hu anpo coss usually

associated with sizeable ground forces.Also, h US conoy can only suppos lay fo xpnsv ansfoaon ffos.

th oansaonal and nsuonal culus found n os las

pd ansfoaon. mlas n h thd wold a ofn xly

consvav, sk-avs and hhly uaucac oansaons. Of cous,

la oansaons anyh, canly las and Dfnc mnss, a

ypcally ssan o chan, spcally dsupv chan, snc can han

h saly of noal day-o-day opaons, sandad opan pocdus,

a plans and vn ca pahs. Ad focs a spcally hachcal,

h havly op-don coand-and-conol sucus.

Anoh plcaon of h dcddly consvav nau of onal

dfnc salshns s a chaacsc pfnc fo adonal syss.

Militaries often prize large and conspicuous weapon platformssuch as main

battle tanks, modern ghter aircraft and aircraft

caso han lss vsually skn u

ansfoaonal syss, such as unannd

aal vhcls (UAVs), coand, conol,

councaon, copus, nllnc (C4i)

noks and pcson-udd unons.

In addition, high-ranking military ofcials

have tended to prefer immediate, high-prole

hada acqusons ov lon-

software xes.

P. K. mALLiCK

trsforo dos

co cp, dsp

ssros d rly

o by so propos

xploo

of corcl off-

-slf (COtS)

cologs would

grly rduc coss.


20/29


many las also lack any adon of jon

opaons and nsad possss son snlSvc culus and sv n-Svc vals.

In such a state of affairs, it is doubly difcult to

noduc das of jonnss, nopaly and

combined-arms operations as basic war-ghting

concps, o o ca coon C4iSr and loscal

suppo syss.

mos dfnc chnoloy and ndusal ass a ll quppd o

conu uch o dfnc ansfoaon. mos onal dfnc sach,dvlopn and ndusal ass lack h dsn sklls, chnolocal

xps, o lnks o advancd cocal chnoloy scos ndd

o dvlop and anufacu ansfoaonal syss. in pacula, h

defence industries do not possess sufciently advanced systems-integration

capals o lnk oh hhly coplx syss of syss such as

C4iSr noks. in addon, havy phass n os of hs couns on

slf-lanc n as poducon ans ha soucs a ofn asd on

duplcan h dvlopn and anufacu of apon syss alady

dly avalal on h loal as ak.

mlas and dfnc nduss hav f son lnkas o nnovav local

nduss, such as h nfoaon chnoloy sco, ln h ponal fo

spn-onha s, fo cocal o lay. mos onal as nduss

a sa ond and nsulad fo oh ak focs and h pva sco.

This demarcation, however, makes it more difcult for the defence sector to

benet from cross-fertilisation with commercial technologies, as well as making

had and lss aacv fo cvlan nduss o pacpa n lay

sach, dvlopn and anufacun.A h sa , local las n

nal an dsusful of cocal off-h-shlf chnolos and pf

l-spcd qupn. Hov, f h taas can anufacu Huv

vhcls fo h US Ay, hy can suly ou quns. th pon s:

ha ll happn o h lphans lk Odnanc Facoy boad (OFb) uns

lk h Vhcl Facoy? th ad focs suff slnly.


my lrs lso

lck y rdoof o opros

d sd possss

srog sgl Srvc

culurs d svr

r-Srvc rvlrs.


21/29


Fo h las 50 yas, inda has n yn

o s up a dfnc ndusal as, y are not far down the road. In the early 1980s,

a push as vn o h pocss h h

xpcaons ha h 2000+ cycl ll s h

indan ad focs quppd h inda-

made tanks, light ghter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). In 1997,

h ovnn announcd ha a 0-ya plan had n ad o ncas h

ao of xpndu on pocun fo dosc soucs fo 30 pcn

o 70 pcn y 2005. w a noh na achvn .Consqunly, xploaon of dual-us chnolos fo dfnc

ansfoaon s unlkly o occu o any la d. whl naly all

couns s h a pos of advancd cocal chnolos fo

lay uss, paculaly nfoaon chnolos, o spac, f hav

ad acual, dla and concd ffos o na n such spn-on. mos

xploaon of dual-us chnolos n h on has so fa n odula,

ha s, sply pyackn on xsn o n cocal syss

(such as nationwide bre-optic telecommunications networks) rather than

adapn cocal chnolos o lay puposs. ga ok has

n don o pu nfoaon chnoloy (it) and councaon noks

n plac a las up o bad Hadquas lvl. bu ha s h us of

hs nfasucus f don us h o ou advana. wh a h

applcaon sofas fo us? maxu us of hs fanasc councaon

nok n ou ay s o s mS banch posns and pooons. Ou

young ofcers and men are good, smart and technology savvy. It is not

possl o sop h usn nn, cllphons, SmS, al, lon. Y

h dan s ha h o on uss nokd chnoloy, h o s

the security vulnerability. Our ofcers and men will talk to their parents

or wives from battleeld, they will use blogs to exchange their views on

onon opaons h popl all ov h old. wha s ou spons as

an nsuon? As a ypcal hachcal and d oansaon, alays

fall hnd n h ac and a acv n foulan polcs.

P. K. mALLiCK

exploo of dul-

us cologs fordfc rsforo

s ulkly o occur o

y lrg dgr.


22/29


mos couns n h indan suconnn on,

dsp h s ffos, a unlkly o ansfoh las o h xn ad possl y h

nfoaon voluon and h n voluon

n lay affas, a las no n h na fuu.

th a sply oo any facos o ov yond

odnsaon plus. ths facos paculaly nclud

uday consans; culual, oansaonal and uaucac ssanc;

aknsss n naonal dfnc chnoloy and ndusal ass; and und-

appcaon of h coplxy of adapn cocal dual-us chnoloso lay puposs. Ovall, dfnc ansfoaon ay sply oo

dsupv and oo hann o lay and cvlan ls, oo xpnsv

and chnolocally oo dandn.

inDian SCenaRiOThe Indian Ministry of Defence is one of the largest spenders, employers,

industrial complexes and scientic experts in the world. .Somehow

paradoxically, although the number and rank of the people involved have

also expanded, there has not been really innovative or even signicant

change in the way, that problems are analysed or handled and the concept

of tradition has been used to circumvent the obvious need for change.

Aun Singh, Fe ministe f

S for Dfc

in inda, ansfoaon can ncssy dvn, psonaly dvn,

backed by the government or media driven. After the 1962 debacle, massive

xpanson ook plac, mounan Dvsons salshd. th suls

started showing immediately in the 1965 War, and even more in the 1971

opaons. ths can an xapl of ncssy dvn ansfoaon.

Thereafter, in the 1980s, a major modernisation and reorganisation took

plac und h udanc of gn K. Sundj. th chans ncopoad

n h follon sas:


t dgr s

or ouss workd

cology,

or s scury

vulrbly.


23/29


(a) Spculo. ths as don h h pulcaon of concp paps, jounal

acls, suds, foaon of oups o sudy lssons of cn as, c.gn K. Sundaj, as coandan, Coll of Coa, nad hs and

himself wrote an inuential series of papers laying out theoretical doctrine

and deployment plans for Indian nuclear weapons in 198081. He had a

and vson of chan.

() expro. esalshn of xpnal oansaons and

testing grounds, eld training exercises to explore new warfare concepts

and war-gaming at eld formations and Category A establishments were

cad ou.(c) iplo. esalshn of n uns, vson of concps,

salshn of n anchs and chans n cuculu of pofssonal

lay ducaonal nsuons cad ou. As a sul of hch

hav h mchansd nfany. La scal odnsaon ook plac n

h Aoud Cops, Ally, enn, Snals and AD Ally. Ay

Aviation came into being. Gen Sundarji had the vision and inuence both

hn h ay and h nsy, and uaucacy and ladshp o

cay ou h chans. H had a copaavly lon nu, and h could

culva h suodna ladshp and follod up h chans.

Hov, h chan pocss as

ochsad uch al. gn K.V. Kshna

rao n hs o (In the Service of the Nation,

Reminiscences, Vkn, 200) has aculad

ho as chaan of h exp Co

h s lk nn solds such as

L gn m L Ch and gn K. Sundj, h

had sad h pocss al and cafully

nuud h poa as dpuy chf

of Ay Saff, vc chf of Ay Saff and

ulaly as chf of Ay Saff. Connuy

as anand. A unch of shap, nlln,

progressive ofcers, not afraid to think out of

P. K. mALLiCK

mos cours

id subco

rgo dsp r bs

ffors, r ulkly

o rsfor r

lrs o x

d possbl by

foro rvoluo

d rgg

rvoluo lry

ffrs, ls o

r fuur.


24/29


the box, were identied and carefully nurtured under the mentorship of Gen

Sundj o cay foad h chan pocss. Aov all, P mns rajvGandhi rmly backed the effort of major changes in the armed forces. This

as a cas of ansfoaon of h indan Ay, on can au. ths can

an xapl of psonaly dvn ansfoaon. Hov, h os fo

of transformation may be media driven. If in the next ve or six years, we

do no chan, h ll ndous pssu fo h da o chan.

Ou da s y o acqu h knold and vson on dfnc lad

as o dv such a chan. th ouco ay dsasous. Claly,

s unnn ou. bu h a h nllcual lads h vson o dv hnx ansfoaon ffos of h indan ad focs?

Bureaucracy

indas laynhn uaucacy offs addonal as o nnovaon

and chan. th cvlan sd has alays donad cvl-lay laons

n inda. th mnsy of Dfnc and mnsy of Fnanc, coposd laly

of ca uaucas, hav donad pocun and ud dcsons.

th ol of h lay n dnn polcy and pocun has n

dlaly nsd. whou fundanal chans n h indan

defence bureaucracy, any rapid change in the armed forces is difcult to

co houh.

The example of non-nalisation of the Tenth Defence Plan yet can be an

xapl of ho h uaucacy oks. th plan as fo h pod 2002-07.

w a no n 2008! th thd rpo of h Sandn Co on Dfnc

(2004-05) (Founh Lok Saha) psnd o h Lok Saha on Apl 25,

2005, has n scahn n s ccs. i sas:

th Co xpss h sous concn ha dsp h son

recommendation for an immediate nalisation of the Tenth Defence Plan with

committed allocation, there has been little progress, with no rm indication

of annual oulays fo h ann 2 yas of h tnh Dfnc Plan y h

mnsy of Fnanc. th Co no h sous concn ha h mnsy



25/29


has slf add ha so coposs a nval n h asnc of a

foally appovd plan. ..th Co a no convncd h h skchyasons advancd y h mnsy fo dlays and fl ha h mnsy had

nh shon any uncy no follod up h h mnsy of Fnanc o

the rm commitment of funds to nalise the Plan. th Co a unhappy

o no ha nsad of appoachn h mnsy of Fnanc fo supplnay

allocaon, h mnsy of Dfnc has fl conn o ank on dlays on h

pa of suppls o so slppa akn plac n alady concludd conacs

so ha h mnsy could poss n pojcs ou of avalal allocaon.

ths shos a casual appoach on h pa of h mnsy o pusu fo hh

allocaon h h mnsy of Fnanc and os conay o govnn

solv o lna all dlays n Dfnc modnsaon. th Co fl

ha anaouns o coposn h scuy concns of h naon. th

Committee, therefore, desire that the Government should immediately nalise

the Tenth Plan with rm indications of funds for the remaining years of the

tnh Plan hou any dlay so ha h odnsaon pocss can pocd

soohly.

Budgetary Support

Fo knold s po, ony s al po.th os poan

pa s h avalaly of funds o cay ou ajo ansfoaonal ffos.

Even a country like the USA is nding it tough to carry out modernisation

plans. thy a unal o acqu cosly n apons and qupn as ll

as ncas h snh of h ay o an cops hn any sold ho

has fouh coun-nsuncy opaon ll vouch

fo h qun of o oos on h ound.

th sa pol ould co up f and hn h

Indian Army tries to transform. During the 1980s,

h roansd Ay Plans Dvson (rAPiD)

as cad y ducn a ad fo h dvson

sucu on h assupon ha anpo hus

ducd ould placd y foc ulpls and

P. K. mALLiCK

t os

por pr s

vlbly

of fuds o

crry ou or

rsforol

ffors.


26/29


surveillance efforts. However, the nancial resources were never allotted for

h chnolocal hhal.th has n a donad nd n h pcna sha of oss dosc

poduc (gDP) spn on dfnc. th thd rpo of h Sandn Co

on Dfnc (2004-05) (Founh Lok Saha) as fohh n san:

th Co a dply concnd o no ha h mnsy of Dfnc as

compelled to surrender funds to the tune of Rs. 5,000 crore, Rs. 9,000 crore and

rs. 5,000 co a h rvsd esas sa of 200-02, 2002-03 and 2003-

04 respectively, to meet the decits. The budgetary ceilings imposed by the

Ministry of Finance in the year 2005-06 have led to the downsizing of the

oal pojcd capal quns of h Dfnc Svcs fo adqualy

rs. 44,23.86 co o rs. 34,375.4 co hch fals o addss h scuy

concns of h naon. th aay caps on ud ulsaon ov a pod

of hav akn a oll of alos all scos of dfnc lk anpo n h

Navy, h onon odnsaon, nfasucu dvlopn, pocun of

qupn/ acqusons, ndnsaon and r&D navs. th acoss h

oad cu appld y h mnsy of Fnanc on dfnc xpndu hou

undertaking any exercise to check the ramications of their decision on defence

ppadnss, calls fo an da v. th Co fl ha h

should no any cu o ducon n h dfnc ud y h mnsy of

Fnanc a any sa. Hov, consdn h psn dfnc xpndu of

so of ou nhous and h psn scuy scnao, h Co fl

that there is a need to x a minimum percentage of our GDP which should be

ad avalal o h dfnc focs a all coss vy ya.

Joint, Combined or Integrated Warfare

evn af fou as and nnual css, hav fald o volv

jon docn and concps. w a n h pocss of san h jouny.

tansfoaon of h lay us asd on a n jon docn

hch follos a op-don and no a oo-up appoach. gn Shanka

roychodhuy (rd) sas, th indan Ay ndvdually as ll as



27/29


h dfnc focs, us no lon allod o funcon as ndpndn

dsconncd ns, hou h qud n-Svc syny fofulls xploaon of h spcv capals. in so snss,

povson of an naln nvonn of jonanshp and sapn h

on h ndvdual hos and culu of ach Svc ay ll h os

challnn ask, hch should accodd an ovall poy, hh

han any oh ssus.

Future

Poaly s ood ha no ajo ansfoaon ffo s on h anvl n inda.No s h fo a voous, halhy da o ncoua ccaly and

pacpaon a all lvls, odfy h concps and docn kpn n v

h fuu as ll as lssons lan n cn opaons and su-convnonal

afa, po popl, counca o all aou ou vson and

ansfoaon plans, dnfy nllcual lads n h ad focs, cay ou

xpnaons n hoy as ll as n ann xcss, and nsuonals

h chan pocss. tann Coands lk ArtrAC and all h Caoy

A salshns hav a ajo ol o play n vn h nllcual sulus.

w should hav ssv plannn hch ans dcons a vn fo

hhs sac ody o h lo chlons of coand. Ou polcal

ladshp shs aay fo vn n dcons o h Svc chfs.

w us hav a Naonal Scuy Say follod y a Naonal mlay

Strategy, followed by ve-year Defence Plans like the 11th or 12th Plan and

a Lon-t Pspcv Plan. basd on h Jon Vson san ssud

y h CiSC, h spcv Svcs should ssu

h ndvdual Svc Vson sans. w

us hnk aou capaly-asd plannn

n plac of h xsn ha-asd plannn.

No ansfoaon can ak plac hou

acv suppo and ud allon y h

ovnn. th ad focs should o ack o

h ovnn h ou psn capaly and

P. K. mALLiCK

trsforo of

lry us

b bsd o w

o docr wc

follows op-dow

d o boo-up

pproc.


28/29


ask h ha hy an us o do. A cla-cu ssa

should vn, f a pacula capaly nds o acqud, aou ha should h uday ffc.

Hopfully, y h all hs ssus a solvd,

vsonay lads, oh n unfo and ousd ll

o cay h ansfoaon foad. Phaps

Capan Alfd thay mahans a nalsaon

ha no lay Svc should o can undak o

fo slf s vald. Chan us dcd fo ousd, h lay n

od o ansfo and achv u jonnss. Phaps, soody hknold, vson and coandn spc hn h sac couny

lk Aun Snh ould h qun.

w hav o kp h Svc culu alays n nd. All h das,

sysac sudy and analyss hav o cad ou no. As Col Doulas

maco, sfyn fo h Hous Ad Svcs Co on July

5, 2004, on Ay tansfoaon: iplcaons fo h Fuu, sas,

whnv an Ay Chf of Saff aks a ponouncn, adlss of

hh h ponouncn s asd on sound analyss and accua daa,

every ofcer knows that in order to be promoted, he or she must sign on

uncondonally fo h pay ln. in hs culual sn, h s no

aun, no da and no xpnaon.

COnCLUSiOn

Let noble thoughts come to us from every side.

rig vea

th US lay ansfoaon s a pojc andad y say, ha,

chnoloy, sk pavs udd and shapd y opaonal oals and

h lay ojcvs of h US dfnc auhos. i s unqu o h USA.

Applcaon of hs odl s no fasl fo any lay, l alon indas.

Hov, US lay ansfoaon povds poan lssons hch

can lan.


Cg us b

drcd froousd

lry ordr

o rsfor

d cv ru

oss.


29/29

Achvn ansfoaon s y no ans can. Fs, h pocss s

coplx caus affcs any dffn and fundanal aspcs of hjoint war-ghting system. Second, change is always resisted in favour of the

saus quo. thd, ansfoaon cops fo oh anon and soucs

h oh poan, da dands on h nsy, noaly coun-

os, coun-nsuncy opaons and nnal scuy. Fouh,

h s an ncasn dand on soucs fo cun opaons vs-a-

vs nvsns n h fuu. Fnally, ansfoaon s a jouny, no a

dsnaon. Dcson-akn ll nd o alod o hs aly, .., o

phass on h anan of chan vsus adonal anan ofajo n poas.

Of cous, s asy o ccs. Chan,

spcally adcal chan, nhn n h rmA, s

alays had and s huan nau o suspcous

of, and hosl oad, h unknon. i should

no supsn o s so uch oansaonal,

nsuonal and culual ssanc o h da of

ansfoaon. moov, ansfoaon as a

concp suffs fo h fac ha s ascally an

opn-ndd, connuous pocss snc h ll

alays as n chnolocal nnovaons ha

can affc h chaac and conduc of afa

and, hfo, lay docn and oansaon. whn dos a lay dcd

that it has nally and successfully transformed itself?

A h sa , hov, ansfoaon alon h lns of h US odl

ay no ncssay o h jo don. A odnsaon plus say ha

is evolutionary and sustaining innovation alone may be sufcient to meet our

dfnc quns, paculaly h spc o h sac conx (ha s,

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Def Tfn an Apprisal

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