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Some Observations on the "Seventeenth-Century Crisis" in China and JapanAuthor(s): William S. AtwellSource: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Feb., 1986), pp. 223-244

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VOL.

XLV, No. 2

JOURNAL OF

ASIAN

STUDIES

FEBRUARY

1986

Some

Observationson

the

Seventeenth-Century

risis

in

China

and

Japan

WILLIAM

S. ATWELL

Fernand

Braudel ssues this

caution n his widely

acclaimed

workon the

Mediter-

raneanworld

n the

late sixteenth

century, When

discussing he rise

and

fall

of

empires,

t is well to

[avoid)

he temptation

o-. . . discover oo

early igns

of greatness

in

a

state which

we know will one

day be great, or

to predict

oo earlythe

collapse

of an

empire

which we

know will one day

ceaseto be (1975,

vol. 2:661).

Although

Braudel s

primarily

oncernedwith the

Spanishand Ottoman

empires,

he

probably

would not be

surprised o learnthat

studentsof late

Ming

history(c.

1580-1644)

have ended o

keep one

eye firmly ixedon

1644, the year he

Ming dynasty ell

and

Manchu ule

began n China.For

some, at

least, the originsof the

Ming collapse

may

be clearly een in the irresponsible ehavior f the Wan-liemperorr. 1573-1620),

in the enormous

osts incurred

ighting the Japanese

n Korea

during the 1590s,

in

the

crushingdefeatof

Ming forces

n Liaotungby the Manchus n

1619,

or in the

reign

of terror

onductedby the

eunuchWei

Chung-hsien

1568-1627)

in

1625-

1626.

However,Weidied

nearly

eventeen earsbefore he first

Manchu

roopsappeared

on the

streets of

Peking,

and therefore

here

must be some doubt

as

to

whether

his

activities,or

these other

factors,had much

to do with the final

demise of the

Ming

dynasty.

In

marked

ontrast o the

gloomy pictureusually

painted

of

seventeenth-century

China, studies of

Japanat this

time often celebrate

uch positive

developments s

theestablishment f the Tokugawahogunate n 1603, thegreatconstruction rojects

of

the

Keicho 1596-1614)

and Genna

(1615-1623)

periods,

the

completion

f To-

kugawa

nstitutions duringthe

1630sand 1640s, and the

flowering

f urban ulture

during

the

Genroku ra

(1688-1703).

It

is

possible

hereforeo

gain

the

impression

that

the

first centuryof

Tokugawa

ule in Japanwas a time

of peace,

stability,

and

virtually

uninterrupted conomic

and

demographic rowth. Recent

scholarshipYa-

William

S. Atwell is Associate Professorof His-

tory, Hobart and William Smith Colleges.

Some of the research on which this article is

based was made possible by awards

from the School

of Oriental and African Studies, University of Lon-

don, and from the Japan Society for the Promotion

of Science as part of its exchange agreement

with

the British Academy.The author takes this oppor-

tunity to thank them for

their

generous

assistance.

None

of these

organizations, however,

assumes

any

responsibility for the author's conclusions.

An

earlier version of this article

was presented

at

the 31st International Congress

of Human Sci-

ences

in

Asia

and North

Africa, held

in Tokyo

and

Kyoto, August 31-September

7, 1983,

and the au-

thor expresses

gratitude

to the

participants

in

Sec-

tion 8,

Precious

Metals

in

the

Entrepot

Trade

in

East, South, and Southeast Asia, and, especially,

to its

convenor,

Kobata

Atsushi,

for many

helpful

comments.

The author

is also

grateful

to Hayami

Akira,

Henry D. Smith

ll,

Ramon H. Myers,

and

Sarah

Metzger-Court

for

additional

comments

and

suggestions.

Of

course,

the author

is solely

re-

sponsible

for any errors

and

shortcomings

that re-

main.

223






224

WILLIAM

S. ATWELL

maguchi

and Sasaki 1971;

Asao

1975; Nagakura

1982),

however,

has demonstrated

that such an impression

is misleading

and in need

of revision and

qualification.

Indeed,

the

sharply contrasting

political

fortunes

of the

Ming dynasty

and the

Tokugawa hogunatemayhaveobscuredthe extent to which the historiesof seventeenth-

century China

and Japan are

mutually intelligible.

For example,

after rapid

economic

growth in

the late-sixteenth

and early-seventeenth

centuries,

during the

mid-seven-

teenth century

both countries

experienced

severe

economic problems

that

were at once

interrelated

and

strikingly similar

to

those that were

occurring

in other

parts of the

world at about

the same

time. l The

difference, for

East Asian

history

at least, is

that

although Tokugawa

officials were

able

to cope with

those problems

their

Ming coun-

terparts

were not. And

that, as

PierreVilar,

a distinguished

student

of early-modern

Europe

reminds

us, is

of great importance:

In every

general

conjuncture,

different

countries

react differently,

whence

the inequalities

of development

which,

in

the end,

make history (quoted

in Wallerstein

1980:19).

Climatic

Change and

the Famines

of

the 1630s and

1640s

I

argue

in two earlier

articles

(1977, 1982)

that many

aspects of late

Ming

history

may

be fully understood

only

in light

of the vast

amount of silver

that flowed

into

China

from

abroad

during

the late-sixteenth

and early-seventeenth

enturies.2 My

con-

tention is

that,

by facilitating

rapid monetary

growth,

enhancing

the

efficiency of

exchange,

and enabling

Chinese

officials to carryout long

overdue

tax reforms,Japanese

and Spanish-Americansilver played a crucial role in the vigorous economic expansion

for which the late Ming

period in

China is justly

famous.

That

expansion

affected

many regions

of the country,but

it

was particularly

noticeable

in

the

south

and south-

east,

where the urban population

increased dramatically,

agriculture

became

more

commercialized, and

trade

and industry

flourished.

Despite Japan's

differentpattern

of development,

a very similar

statement

may be

made

about

its

economically

advanced regions

(the

Kinai,

the

Kanto,

and

the

Sanyo)

about

this same time. Indeed,

such

a

statement

was

made

in

1620

or 1621 by

Father

Joao

Rodrigues (1561-1634),

the

gifted

translator-priest

who lived

and worked

in

Japan

from

1577 to 1610:

The laws, administration,

ustoms,

culture, trade,

wealth,

and

magnificence

were

restored hroughout

he kingdom,

andpopulous

ities

and

other

buildings

were

raised

everywhere

s

a

result

of tradeand

peace.

Manypeople

became

rich,

although

the

ordinary

olk

andpeasants

were mpoverished

y

the taxes

they

were

obliged

to

pay.

T

hc lords

of the landbecamevery

wealthy,

toringup

much

gold

andsilver.

Through-

out

the

kingdom

here

was a

great

abundance

f

money,

new mines were

opened

and

the

kingdom

was

well

supplied

with

everything.

Rodrigues

1973:78)3

As in

China,

an important

ingredient

in Japanese

economic

growth

during

the

late-sixteenth

and

early-seventeenth

centuries

was

the

rapid

monetization

of

the econ-

omy

that

accompanied

and helped to support political unification, which took place

'

For surveys

and summaries

of the

seven-

teenth-century

crisis

in Europe,

see

Aston

1967;

Rabb

1975;

de Vries

1976;

Parker

and Smith

1978;

Parker

1979.

For the Near

and

Middle East,

see

Lewis

1958;

Barkan 1975.

For

Latin America,

see

Israel 1974;

TePaske

and

Klein 1981.

For

China,

see

Adshead

1973;

Will 1984; Skinner

1985.

2

I

expressed

my

views

on

late

Ming

economic

history

at some

length

in Atwell 1977,

1982, and

I repeat

them

here only

insofar as

is necessary

to

make

the

present

article intelligible.

3

See also Elison 1981:55;

Berry

1982:183-

205.






THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY

CRISIS

IN CHINA AND JAPAN 225

underOda Nobunaga

(1534-

1582), Toyotomi

Hideyoshi

(1536-1598),

and

Tokugawa

leyasu (1542-1616).

As Ito

Tasabur6

and Enomoto S6ji

have pointed out,

many of

the

things

for which the

Azuchi-Momoyama

(1576-

1603)

and early

Tokugawa

(c.

1603-

1635) erasare best known-the marketingand distributionof vast quantitiesof grain,

the organization

and deployment

of large

military

forces, the construction

of

great

castles

and castle

towns,

the separation

of the

military

and

agrarianclasses,

and

the

implementation

of

the alternate

attendance

(sankin-kotai)

ystem-were

all

depen-

dent on the relatively

sophisticated

money economy

that had developed

in

Japan

during

the late-sixteenth

century (Ito

1966:141-44;

Enomoto

1980).

It is hardly

surprising

therefore

hat

the majority

of domains

madefrantic

efforts at

amassing

gold

and silver

during

the

initial stages

of

[Tokugawa

rulel

(Enomoto

1980:45).

As

is

well

known,

some

of these domains

(and the

house

of

Tokugawa

tself)

invested

substantial

portions

of their

wealth

in foreign

trade.

One result

of this was

that

Japanese

silver exports

soared

during the

late-sixteenth

and

early-seventeenth

enturies.

In some

years

following the

establishment

of the Tokugawa

shogunate

in 1603,

for example,

the

exports

probably

approached

200,000

kilograms

(Kobata

1970:8; Iwao

1958:328-

30;

Iwao

1959:63-67).4

Trading

restrictions

imposed

by

the Ming

authorities meant

that much of

this silver had

to go

first to Macao,

Taiwan,

or Southeast

Asia, but

most

of it eventually

reached

China,

where

it was used

to purchase

goods

for the

rapidly

expanding

Japanese

domestic

market.

An impression

of that market's

buoyancy

may

be

gained

from the fact

that between

the late-sixteenth

century and the early

1630s

Japanese

imports

of

raw silk, most

of which

were of

Chinese

origin, rose

from

an

estimated 60,000-90,000 kilograms per year to perhapsas much as 280,000 kilo-

grams

(Kobata

1978b:526;

Yamawaki

1972:9-11;

Kato 1976:44-47;

Caron

and

Schouten 1935:51).

5

Given these

and

other facts

to

be discussed

below,

there is little doubt that

the

dramatic

expansion

in Sino-Japanese

trade

during

the

late-sixteenth

and early-seven-

teenth centuries

had

a significant

impact

on the economies

of

both countries.

Although

Japan

helped

to

supply China

with

large

quantities

of sorely

needed silver,

China

furnished

Japan

with luxurygoods,

raw materials,

and technical

expertise

for

its

bour-

geoning

textile industry (Oishi

et

al. 1980:19-20).

By

the

1630s,

however,

this

mu-

tually

beneficialexchange

was

in

decline, and

by the early

1640s,

both

countries

were

experiencingsevere economic problems. What had happened?

One cause of

the

economic

difficulties

was

the weather.

Few studies of

seventeenth-

century Europe

in recent

yearsfail

to consider

the implications

of the so-called

Little

Ice Age for

economic

and

political

history.

A

fall

of one

degree

centigrade

n

overall

ummer

emperatures

estricts he

growing

season or plantsby

three

or four

weeks

and reduces

he

maximum

altitudeat

which

4Reliable

statistics

on early-modern

East

Asian

trade

are difficult

to

obtain,

and

Kobata

and

Iwao,

therefore,

were

forced

to relyon

a

good

deal

of

im-

pressionistic evidence in compiling their estimates

for Japanese

silver exports during

the

early

decades

of the

seventeenth

century.

These

estimates

recently

have

been

criticized

by

Robert

Innes,

who

believes

not only

that

they

are too high

but

also that

Jap-

anese

foreign

trade

actually peaked

somewhat

later

in the

century (1980:376-432).

For

reasons

that

will

become

apparent

below,

I do not agree

with

Innes on

these

two

points;

however,

his opinions

on

these

and

all other

aspects

of

seventeenth-century

Japanese

economic

history

deserve

serious

consid-

eration.

s Figures

like

these

help

to

explain

the

follow-

ing

statement

by

Father

Rodrigues:

The

use

of

silk

in

olden

days,

and even

up to the

time

we

went

to

Japan

[1577),

was rare

and

because

of its scarcity

and dearth

the

ordinary

people

did not

use it,

nor

indeed

did

the

gentry,

and

the lords

but

seldom.

. ..

But

since

the

time

of

[Hideyoshil

there

has

been

a

general

peace

throughout

the kingdom

and

trade

has

so increased

that the whole

nation

wears

silk

robes;

even

peasants

and their

wives

have

silk

sashes

and

the

better off

among

them have

silken

robes

(1973:133).






226

WILLIAM S.

ATWELL

crops

will ripen by about 500

feet. Eventoday,each

day'sdelay

n the ripeningof

the harvestdiminishes

he present

yieldof cerealcrops

by 63 kilos per hectare,

and

a drop of tone

degree]

n average

ummer emperature

educes he growing

season

in northernEurope y about30 days.Intheseventeenthentury,with moreprimitive

agricultural

methods

and with moremarginal

and undercultivation,

he impactof

[such a fall)

wouldhave been

proportionallyreater till. (Parker

1979:22)

Colder temperatureswere

not

the only-or,

in

many

parts of

the

world,

the

most

important-climatic

factor

in reducing agricultural

yields

during the Little

Ice Age.

Along with the

long-term cooling trend,

to which most

farmers eventually

adapted,

went

significant shifts in global

wind patterns that

led to sharpyear-to-year

luctuations

in precipitation

as well as temperature.

While one area

might experience

abnormally

hot or dry conditions, another

might suffer from

unusual cold or dampness,

or both.

These short-term

changes appear to

have had the

most serious impact

on agricultural

production

in

seventeenth-century

Europe (Schuurmans

1981:253-57;

Rosini

1981:729-36).

These facts are relevant

because the disasters

associated

with the Little Ice Age

did not recognize national

or international boundaries.

In Japan, for example,

a

series

of

unusually

cool summers

in the north and floods

and droughts

elsewheredrastically

reduced grain yields

in

the

late 1630s and early

1640s. This contributed

to the great

famine of the Kan'ei

period (Kan'eikikin),

during which

large numbers

of people and

livestock died from

starvation and disease

(Yamaguchi

and Sasaki 1971:55-59;

Asao

1975:368-76;

Nagakura 1982:75-85;

Okajima 1967:49-50,

561; Endo

1982:58-

64). The Kan'eikikin was the first majorfamine to occur in Japanafter the rapidurban

and demographic

growth of

the late-sixteenthand

early-seventeenth

enturies

had made

many

moreJapanesedependent

on others for

their food

supply

than ever

before.

Moreover, the famine

occurred at

a

time

when the

center of rice

cultivation

in

Japan

was shifting from the

south and west to

the north

and east, greatly

increasing

the

possibility

of

significant

crop damage

from cold (Arakawa1974:19-24,

1982:32-

34;

Tani

1978:201-4).

As climatic

and

agricultural

conditions

worsened

during

the

late

1630s,

the shogunate

was

forced

to grant emergency

relief

to the

poor

and to enact

special

legislation, which

some scholars

have seen as

a

inajor turning point

in

the

policies

of

the

shogunatefor dealing

with the lesserpeasantry

kobyakusho)

nd, thus,

with the organizationand control of Japanesesociety as a whole (Tokugawaikki, vol.

40:159,

164, 213, 258,

269-75,

280-81; Yamaguchi

and

Sasaki

1971:55-62;

Asao

1975

:340-42).6

Be

that

as it may,

and it is a topic

that should be

of

great

interest to

comparative

as well

as

Japanese

historians,7

it is noteworthy

here

that

at

virtually

the

same

time

that grain prices

were rising

to unprecedented evels

in Osaka, Kyoto,

Hiroshima,

and

many

other

cities

(Ky6to

Daigaku 1962:72-74;

Yamazaki

1983:49-57;

Nagakura

1982:79-80),

the

same

thing

was

happening

in

many

parts

of

China

(Nakayama

1978:1-33,

1979a:67-75;

Will

1984).

There, too,

adverse

weather conditions had

been

affecting agricultural

production

for

some time,8 and

by

the late

1630s

some

of

the

richest areas

n

China

were sufferingfrom food shortagesandoutbreaksof epidemic

6

Much of the relevant

legislation

is contained'

in Kodama

and Oishi

1966:21-33.

7 Governments

in

many parts

of the world

dur-

ing the seventeenth

century

had to contend

with

agrarian decline

brought on,

at least

in

part,

by

climatic change.

Some governments,

such as the

Japanese

andthe

Dutch, managed

to cope relatively

successfully;

many

others,

such

as

the

Chinese

and

the

Spanish,

did

not.

8

On

climatic

conditions

in China

at

this time,

seeChu

1973:240-45;Lamb

1982:227-30;Yoshi-

no

1978:335;

Chang 1637:8/21a-22b;

Dunstan

1975;

Will

1984;

Skinner

1985.






THE

SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY

CRISIS IN CHINA

AND JAPAN

227

disease (Imura

1936-1937; Elvin 1973:310-11; Dunstan

1975; Will 1984).

Unlike

their counterparts n Japan, however,

Ming officials proved incapable of coping

with

the situation.9 Food

costs soared, lawlessnessof all kinds

increased, and in April

1644

Peking fell to a rebel army from the

economically devastated northwest. Six

weeks

later

the city fell again, this time to

Manchu invaders, and a new era in

Chinese

political

history began.

Economic Change and Social

Instability

in

Late Ming China

and Early Tokugawa Japan

However

tempting it

may be to ascribe

all

the great events in Chinese

and

Japanese

history during the

mid-seventeenth

century to bad weather and poor harvests,

the

situation

was a

good deal more

complicated than that. Indeed, it can be argued that

the terrible famines

that struck Japanand China in the late

1630s and early 1640s

were

merely the tragic outcome of larger

economic and social problems that had

been

festering for some time. Many of these

problems, in turn, appear to have been

directly

related to the large

amounts of bullion that

had flowed into circulation in East Asia

after

the middle of the sixteenth century.

That bullion

facilitated high levels of public

expenditure, rapid urban growth, and

intense economic competition, all of which

proved to be socially

and politically disruptive.

In

China, the wealth that poured into

government coffersafter 1570 (Ch'uan and

Li 1972:136-39) was more than offset by soaring military costs (including those

incurred fighting the Japanes'e n Korea

in the 1590s), by

expensive public works

projects, and by imperial

extravagancesof

monumental proportion.

It

is

estimated

that

the

weddings and

investiture ceremonies of the five sons of

the

Wan-li

emperorcost

more

than

12,000,000 taels,

a

sum that,

if

converted to

silver

by weight,

would

have

amounted to

approximately 450,000

kilograms (Hucker 1976:334).

O

As

is

often

the

case

in

such

situations,

the

emperor's

extravagance

was

emulated

by others,

with

the

result that

ostentatious

display and conspicuous consumption became

hallmarks

of

late

Ming economic life (Chang 1929; Hou

1957:94-95; Mote

1977:245-52;

Peterson

1979:70-73, 139-45).

Students of Japanese history will note some importantsimilarities between China

and

Japan

at

this time. In addition to the

extraordinarily xpensive

military campaigns

of the three

great

unifiers,

no

fewer

than

twenty-five first-ranking

castles

and

castle

towns were constructed

between 1580 and 1610 (Hall 1968; Rozman

1973:45-51).

The

castles often were

lavishly decorated,

as

were many of

the

shrines, temples,

and

villas

that

were built or

rebuilt about the

same time (Rodrigues 1973:89-90,

101,

122-23;

Elison

1981:61-66; Wheelwright

1981; Berry 1982:189-205).

It

would

be

hard,

writes

John

Hall,

to find

a

parallel

period

of

urban

construction

in

world

history (1968:176).

Nor did

the

period end

in

1610.

Wakita Osamu

estimates

the

costs for

rebuilding

Osaka

Castle

during

the Genna

period

(1615-1624)

at

260,000

koku

approximately 5.1 bushels)of rice per year: If we assumethe annualper-person

rice

requirement

at that

time was

three koku,

hese

expenditures

would

have

supported

9However,

it

should

be

noted that some offi-

cials did

an

admirable

job

of

providing medical and

other relief under

conditions that were often

ap-

palling. See, for example, Ch'en 1803a:

1/30b;

Hu-

choufu-chih

872-1874:62/48a-b;

Yao

1934:146.

LO

One should not overlook the

corruption

of

those associated

with the

imperial court.

When the

eunuch Li

Yung-chen was

executed

in 1628,

for

example, his confiscated

properties

were reported

to

be worth 270,000

taels

of silver (see

Ku 1956,

vol.

4:102; Goodrich and Fang 1976,

vol.

1:951).






228

WILLIAM S. ATWELL

a

population

of

nearly

90,000

persons. When we

take

the

ripple effect

into consid-

eration, we can see that

the construction

expenses

alone could have

supported a pop-

ulation base

of over 100,000

persons (Wakita 1981

244n3).

Under the

circumstances,

it is difficult to disagree with Wakita's conclusion that such projects werea major

factor n creating the

expanding

urban-basedeconomy

of the late-sixteenth

and early-

seventeenth centuries.

However,

that

economy and the

opulent urban-based

ulture it

supported were

ultimately

dependent upon the

agriculturalsector for

food and raw

materials, and,

as

was the case in

China, by the

1630s many of Japan's

towns and villages

were expe-

riencing

severe

economic

problems. Some of the

problems

were related to the deteri-

orating

climatic

conditions discussed above

(Arakawa

1964:250;

Endo 1982:55-59).

11

Nevertheless,

as

Murakami

Tadashi and

others

observe,

the

food

shortages

that

ensued

had human as well as natural causes (Murakami 1982:62; Yamaguchiand Sasaki

1971:55-56; Asao

1975:372-73). Their

point is that the

plight of the peasants

was

made even

worse by the tax and

rent demands of

their

superiors, which were often

totally

unrealistic.

12

These

demands led, among

other things,

to increased tension in

the towns

and villages, to

widespread peasant flight

from the land, and, in

extreme

cases,

to

armed insurrection

(Aoki 1971:26-31;

Asao

1975:370-73; Nagakura

1982:76-79). By far the

most

important

insurrection was the great

Shimabara, or

Christian,

Rebellion in

western

Kyushu, which the bakufu

put down

with

great

difficulty

and

appalling

brutality

in

the

spring

of

1638. Despite

the

government's

attempts

to

portray

the

rebellion as part of

a

RomanCatholic plot

to

enslave

the

Land

of the Gods, however,manyobserversat the time believed that economic and political

factors were far

more

important than

religious

grievances,

at

least

in

the uprising's

initial

stages. Recent

research has

tended to support

that

view

(Irimoto 1980:186-

215).

In

1635,

three

years before the last Christian

rebels were

exterminated

by shogunal

officials,

a

young

Chinese

scholar

wrote about

conditions

in

his native

Yangtze

delta,

an area

only

500 miles southwest of

southern

Kyushu,

which

just

a few

years earlier

had been one of the

most

prosperous

on

earth:

Today

he

distress

of the

people

n

Chiang-nan

s extreme.Thereare those who die

from the pressure f taxes,those whodie becauseof laborserviceobligations, hose

who die

of

starvation,

hosewho die

because

f the

forced

xactions

f

corrupt

fficials,

and

those who

die from the

perverse

nd unreasonable

ctivities

of

powerful

ocal

families.

(Ch'en

1977:1140)

Among

the

perverse

and unreasonable

activities were

usury,

land

encroachment,

and

exorbitant rent

demands,

all

of which

contributed

to

a

rising

tide

of

peasant

unrest

Additional

research

on this subject is

needed,

but

it

seems

possible that

the

droughts

that

struck

southwesternJapanduring

this

period

were

directly

related to those

afflicting

parts of eastern

and south-

eastern China at the

same time

(see the

maps

in

Chung-yang ch'i-hsiang chu

1981:89-91; Yoshino

1978:332-33).

12

It has

long

been

acknowledged that one im-

portant

factor in the

oppressive nature of those

de-

mands

was

the

burden

placed

on the

various

daimyo

by

the

sankin-kotai

ystem and the need

to maintain

face

in

the

status-conscious world

of seventeenth-

century

Edo.

As

an

official of the

Dutch East India

Company

explained

in the mid-

1630s,

Each Lord

lives according to his

Means and Dignity,

rather

profuse than

sparing; so that

[Edo)

swarms

with

Men and

Attendance,

which makes

their

Markets

high and very dear.

Their sumptuous Buildings,

their

gorgeous

Cloathing

of

their

Servants,

...

their Feasts,

their Presents,

and

other Expences

of

that Proud and pompous

Court, do sufficiently keep

under these

Great

Men;

for their Charges

surmount

their

Revenues, and they

are found most commonly

to be much

behinde

hand

(Caron

and Schouten

1935:30).






THE

SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS IN

CHINA AND JAPAN

229

in Chiang-nan, Fukien, Kiangsi, and

other parts of China during the late 1630s

and

early 1640s (Mori 1971:236-45).

13

The Crisis

of

the Early 1640s

Despite different economic,

social, and political systems, China and Japan ex-

perienced

a

number of similar

problems during the late 1630s and early 1640s. More-

over,

in

both cases, the problems were

exacerbatedby monetary

difficulties. As

I

argue

elsewhere (Atwell 1977:8-18),

China's difficulties stemmed

in

part

from

its

almost

total reliance on bullion imports to

increase the money supply at

a

rate sufficient to

maintain

consumer confidence and

prevent economic activity from contracting. How-

ever, beginning in the mid- 1630s the amount of silver flowing into China from Spanish

Americadropped sharply from the 50,000-100,000 kilograms per year that had been

common earlier n the century.

4

A similar situation developed with regard to Japanese

silver; Tokugawa authorities

prohibited Japanese nationals from trading overseas

in

1635, and they expelled the Portuguese from Nagasaki in 1639. Although Dutch and

Chinese merchants continued to export substantial quantities of silver from Japan for

some time to come (Yamawaki

1972:41; Yamawaki 1980:208; Innes 1980:410), the

amounts involved were usually farbelow the estimates of Kobata and Iwao for the first

three decades of the seventeenthcentury.

5

The

Ming government was unable

to replace he bullion lost from domestic sources,

and

soon

it

was confrontedwith an

economic nightmare: hoarding caused huge amounts

of silver to disappear from circulation, counterfeit copper coins flooded the market,

and, not surprisingly, the

silver-copper ratio widened sharply (Yeh 1911:2/6a; Chang

1958:325; Ch'i 1960:147;

Nakayama 1979a:74). In the panic that ensued, credit

became

virtually impossible

to

obtain,

food

prices soared, and,

for a time at

least,

the

marketfor many cash crops and

manufacturedgoods collapsed (Shen 1958:290;

Wiens

1974:525; Nakayama 1979a:74-75).

16

Tax receipts plummeted during the early 1640s,

and the government even considered

reintroducing papercurrency17 to help

finance its

campaigns against domestic rebels and

the

invading

Manchus

(Chi 1969,

vol.

3:337-

38; Yang 1971:67-68; Peterson

1979:74-76).

This

proved politically impossible,

however,and when rebel forces overran

Peking

in

April 1644, they found

the

treasuries

there virtually empty. The Ming dynasty fell, in part, because

it

simply did not

have

the

funds to continue

its

operations.

8

The

existence

of

the

Tokugawa

shogunate

was

not

in

serious

jeopardyduring

the

late

1630s and early 1640s, and one reason for

this

may

have

been

that

Shogun Iemitsu

In Kyoto,

on September 6, 1983, G. Wil-

liam Skinner observed

that much of my data

for

China

comes from

the

economically

advanced

southeast

of the

country,

and he warned

against

the

assumption that

China was a fully integrated eco-

nomic unit at this time.

This point is well taken,

but

I am not aware of any region of China that

escaped severe

economic problems during the

late

1630s

and

early

1640s, with the possible exception

of

the extreme southwest.

14

Although

the

statistical evidence

for

this

con-

tention is less than

satisfactory, the impression-

istic evidence seems to me to be overwhelming.

For

a

fuller

discussion, see Atwell 1977:10-13.

1

The

years 1659-1661

were an

exception

to

this. Exports of silver on Chinese and Dutch

vessels

approached,

and may have

exceeded, 100,000

ki-

lograms

annually. Nevertheless,

this

figure

is sub-

stantially below

the

150,000-200,000

kilograms

per year

that Kobata

and Iwao suggest

for the early-

seventeenth

century (see

Iwao

1953:22;

Yamawaki

1980:208).

16 In an ordinary deflation,

food prices

would

have

declined

along

with other prices. As

I

have

indicated,

however,

with domestic

rebellion, for-

eign

invasion, and climatic

disasters, the late

1630s

and

early 1640s

in

China

were

hardly ordinary.

17

On paper

currency during

the earlyMing dy-

nasty, see P'eng

1965:632-39;

Yang 1971:66-67.

18

This is not to suggest

that

the

dynasty

fell

solely

because of its monetary

difficulties.






230

WILLIAM

S.

ATWELL

(r.

1623-1651) and

his

advisersmoved

much more

swiftly and

efficiently

than their

Chinese

counterparts

in dealing with the problems

that

confronted

them. 19

As

early

as

1633, traveling

inspectors

(junkenshi)

were being

dispatched

from

Edo to inves-

tigate living and other conditions in various parts of the country (Asao 1975:375-

77).

Then, in the

face

of worsening

economic conditions

in the late 1630s

and early

1640s, Iemitsu

issued a

stream

of frugality

and sumptuary

orders ken'yaku-rei)

hat

were designed

to

curb the extravagance

of

the military

and commercial

classes

and

thus to relieve

at least

some of the

pressure on what

the

bakufu referred

to as the

exhausted

peasantry(Tokugawa

ikki,

vol.

40:170, 188,

212, 226).

Despite these

and other

precautions,

Japanese

officials were

unable

to prevent the

great Kan'ei

famine.

As in China,

food prices

rose

to recordlevels

in the early

1640s,

and

many people

were forced

to sell their

farmtools

and animals,

their land,

and even

members of

their family

in

desperate

bids

to stay alive

(Nagakura

1982:75-78).2o

Others simply

abandoned

their holdings and

fled in the

hope

that

conditions

would

be

better elsewhere.2'

Most were

bitterly

disappointed.

The Kan'ei nikki zjho

[An

enlarged

dition of

the Daily Record

f the Kan'ei

period]

describes

the situation in

the

spring of

1642:

From

[the

second)

to the fifth

-month here

was a serious amine throughout

he

country.

The corpsesof

those

who had starved

o death filled

the streets

while the

peasants,

rtisans,

and merchants

who

begged

forfoodwere

numerous.None

of

these

people

had clothes

[and

could

only]

..

wrapstraw

and other

matting around

heir

bodies

br

protection.

They begged

n the marketplace

nd

slept along

the side

of the

road. Quoted

n Asao 1975:368;

ee alsoTokugawa

ikki,

vol. 40:258,

269-70, 272-

75,

and 280)

The reference

to begging

in the marketplace

s significant;

it

suggests

that

in

22

one

of

the

worst

years

of

the

great

Kan'ei

famine food

was

available,

if at a

price.

Moreover,

t indicates that, as

in

China,

the

troubles

of

the

early

1640s

were consid-

erably more complicated

than they

appearedto be.

That possibility

seems

to be con-

firmed by

Dutch

sources dating

from the same

period.

In April

1640, the

chief of

the Dutch factory

at

Hirado

visited Osaka

and was informed

that

contrary

to

ex-

pectations

commodity

prices

in the Kinai

region

had fallen following

the

expulsion

of

the

Portuguese from

Japan

the

previous

summer.

As

a

result,

many previously

wealthy merchants had been ruined, had abandonedtheir wives and children, and,

under intense pressure

from their creditors,

had even

committed

suicide (Dagregisters

1981,

vol. 4:

190_91).23 The situation

in the Kinai

region

remained

depressed

nearly

two years

later, when

another

Dutch official

was told that

many prominent

merchants

in

Kyoto

had gone

bankrupt since

1639 (Murakami

1956:158).

How

had

some

ofJapan's

wealthiest

and

most

experienced

raders

gotten

themselves

into such serious

difficulty? One

likely explanation

is that,

having

been

seriously

af-

fected by

the shogunate's decision

to sever

commercial

links with

the

Portuguese

in

Macao,

those traders

tried to

recoup

their

losses quickly by

assuming

that reduced

'9

With

a

smaller

territory

to

oversee

and with-

out

a

serious external threat,

the

bakufu was

in

a

much better position to respond to the problems

than was the Ming government.

20

For parallels in China

at

this time, see the

poem On

the

Selling

of Children (Mai erh hang)

in Ch'en 1803b:5/22a.

21

On peasant flight from the

land inJapan dur-

ing the Kan'ei period, see Aoki 1971:24-31; Na-

gakura 1982: 76-77.

22

For

parallels

in China's

lower Yangtze

delta

at

almost

precisely

the same time,

see Su-chou

u-

chih

1824:72/20b-21b;

Ch'en

1977, vol.

1:326-

30,

vol. 2:446-51.

23

I

am

grateful

to E. U. Kratz,

School of Ori-

ental and

African

Studies,

for helping

me with

the

original

Dutch. For

a

Japanese

translation

of

this

section

of the

Dagregisters,

ee Nagazumi 1970,

vol.

4:338-39.






THE

SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS IN

CHINA AND JAPAN

231

supplies of goods in Nagasaki

would automatically drive up

prices in the Kinai

and

elsewhere.24 If

so, they were sadlymistaken; silk

and other items

they purchased from

the Dutch and the Chinese in

1639 at what they thought were

good prices had

to

be sold in the face of the great Kan'ei famine and the shogunate'snew frugalityand

sumptuary

orders. Many of the latter dealt

specifically with

extravagant dress (see,

for

example,

Tokugawaikki, vol. 40:170), and it

therefore s not surprising that

mer-

chants involved

in the textile business soon found

themselves in

serious financialtrouble

(Boxer 1935:51;

Yamawaki 1972:15-16).25

As was true

in China at this

time, the financial problem was

made even worse by

unanticipatedmonetary

fluctuations. In March 1641, for example,

representatives

of

the English East

India Company in Surat informed

their colleaguesin Persiathat

three

Dutch

ships had just arrived in

port, having left

Japan four months earlier:

The Dutch factory.. hadbeen expectinga far morevaluable argoby theseships

than

they received.The

400 chests of Japan

silverare reduced o 140.... The vex-

atiousdiscourtesies f the

Japanese uthoritieshad reduced heir

usual profitof

60

percent ..

to 20 percent,norcould they but

with difficultyprocure ilver

n

return

because

Iemitsul

had

commandedhe closure

f

the silver

mines,

andwill

[they

fear]

next

yearprohibitthe exportation f

that

metal

altogether. Pratt

1931,

vol.

2:242;

see also Tashiro1982:293)

The fears

were not realized. The

mines remained

open, and, as

has

been noted,

Dutch

and Chinese

vessels continued to

export substantial quantities of silver from

Nagasaki

for several

decades.

Nevertheless, except for the years

1659- 1661,26 hogunal policies

helped to ensure that far less silver left Japan for foreign destinations than had been

the case at the

height of Japaneseforeign trade

earlier in the

century.

Why were Iemitsu, his

successors,

and

their advisers concerned about bullion

exports

when

they controlled

what

Kobata and others describe as some of

the richest

silver

mines on

earth? One

explanation

is

that

many

of those

mines were no

longer

as

productive

as

they had been

even a

short time

earlier.

7

For

example, during

the

early-

seventeenth

century, no Japanesemines were richer or

more

famous than

the

Omori

mines in

Iwami, the

Ikuno mine

in

Tajima,

the

Aikawa mines

in

Sado,

and

the Innai

mine

in

Akita.

Nevertheless,although detailed statistics

are

not

available, by

the

1630s

24

This,

at

least, is the impression

given in Dag-

registers1981, vol. 4:190-91.

25

The trade

policies of the

shogunate at this

time were somewhat

confusing. As Tashiro Kazui

points out

(1982:292-93), even before the Por-

tuguese were

expelled from Japan in 1639, sho-

gunal

officials

sought assurances from the

Dutch

that they would

be

able to

make up for any resulting

shortfall in raw

silk

imports.

When the

Dutch in-

creased their

shipments of silk

in

1640, however,

they

saw their profit margins drop

dramatically

be-

cause levels of demand in Japan were much lower

than

they had

anticipated.

Those levels

were

lower

in

part because of the shogunate's new

sumptuary

regulations. By encouraging

imports

of

silk and

then restricting its use

domestically,

the

authorities

in

Edo and Nagasaki helped to ensure

that Japanese

and

foreign merchants would both have

difficulties

in

the early 1640s.

26

See fn. 15 above.

27

Of

course,

there are other

explanations.

For

example, there can be little doubt that

the

bakufu

had been deeply worried

by the Shimabara

Rebel-

lion and

by the unrest that

had accompanied the

onset of

the great Kan'ei famine.

Under the cir-

cumstances,

the expulsion of

the Portuguese

from

Nagasaki,

the reduction of silver exports,

and the

establishment of

even stricter

control over foreign

trade must have had

great appeal on political

as

well

as

economic grounds. It

is also true that

even

before this time the

bakufu

had been moving to

consolidate

its position as the

dominant institu-

tional force in many

areas of Japanese life.

Hence

the prohibitions onJapanese nationals trading over-

seas (in 1633, 1634,

and 1635),

the

restrictions

placed

on Chinese commercial

activity (1635),

the

promulgation of statutes

making alternative

at-

tendance

for daimyo at the

shogunal court com-

pulsory

rather

than

voluntary

(1635), and

the

im-

plementation of a

new nationwide coinage

system

(1636). The policies

of the

late 1630s and early

1640s

can be seen as part of

an alreadywell-estab-

lished

process.






232

WILLIAM S. ATWELL

Table

1.

Value of Silver in Japan, 1630-1647

(In number of copper coins

[mon}

per 16.875 grams

of silver)

Year

Mon Year

Mon

1630

236 1635

188

1631

250 1636

188

1632 250

1637

188

1633

243 1638

196

1634 205

1647 300

SOURCE: Kamiki and Yamamura (1977): table 12.

production at most

of the mines mentioned-if not at all of them-had

declined

substantially Murakami

1980:55-56; Kobata 1978a:75; Tanaka1980:134-35;

Sasaki

1983b: 183-85).

Of course, some mines experienced periods of

resurgence, others

reached their peaks

of production somewhat later, and new mines

were occasionally

opened.

It

seems likely, however,

that the

golden age

of

premodern

Japanese

bullion

production came to

an end no later than the

late 1630s.28

The possible

implications of this for Tokugawa economic history

are important.

If,

as

Ito

Tasaburo

and Enomoto

Soji

suggest, the extraordinary xpansion

of the late-

sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries

was dependent to

a

considerable

degree

on

regular and massive injections of gold and silver into the money supply,then a decline

in bullion production

and a slowdown in the rate of growth of the

money supply may

help to explain the

economic slowdown that occurred

in

Japan during

the

late

1630s

and early 1640s.29

The situation was not aided by the bakufu's

decision

to remove

copper

coins from

circulation

during

the

early 1630s

and

then,

beginning

in

1636,

to issue

a

new copper

coin,

the

Kan'ei

szuhj

Nihon

Ginko

1973,

vol.

2:127-31).

One

result

of

this

policy,

whatever

the

government's original

intention,

was to create sub-

stantial

instability

in the

silver-copperexchange

rate

(see

Table

1).

Copper

coins

were

widely

used in

commercial

transactions

at the time and perhaps one-third

of

the taxes

in

Japan were paid in money rather than

in kind

(Hayami 1982);

as

a

consequence

the

fluctuations revealed in table

1

are

likely to

have affected business

and consumer

confidence and to

have

contributed

to

the

economic

uncertainties

of

the

period.

The

above should not be construed to

mean

that the

high taxes,

adverse

weather

conditions,

and

poor

harvests mentioned earlier

were

unimportant.

It

does

suggest

that

these

phenomena should be interpreted

in light of

a

general economic

downturn

that

affected

urban

areas as

well

as rural areas and international

trade

as well

as

domestic

trade.

It

is of more

than

passing

interest that the worst

years

of

the Kan'ei famine

(1641- 1642) occurred

after he collapse

in

commodity prices reported

n the

Dagregisters

of

the Dutch

East India

Company (Dagregisters

1981,

vol.

4:190-91;

Murakami

1956:158). It is unlikely to have been a mere coincidence that in early 1641, a few

months after the Dutch and the Chinese had

made

disappointing

profits

on

their raw

silk

imports

into

Japan,

the

price of

raw silk

fell

sharply

and

unexpectedly

in the

28

This is

not to

suggest

that

production came

to a

halt. It

continued

on

a

steady if

reduced

basis

for

many

years

to come

at

some

mines.

29

A number

of other

factors

help to explain

this,

from

climatic

change

to

the Shimabara

Re-

bellion

to

the bakufu's

ken'yaku-rei.






THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS IN CHINA AND JAPAN

233

Hu-chou region

of the Yangtze

delta (Shen

1958:290).30

As

in Japan, the result

was

widespread famine.

The

Chinese and Japanese

Economies

on Divergent

Paths

It might be helpful

for

those who are

still skeptical about the importance

of

Sino-

Japanesetrade

to the Chinese

economy

during

the mid-seventeenth

century

to quote

from

the June 1647

memorial

written by the new Ch'ing

viceroy of Kwangtung

and

Kwangsi, T'ung

Yang-chia

(d. 1648),

to the Shun-chih

emperor (r.

1644-1661):

During he Chia-ching

eign

[ 1522- 1566)

. . . [the

Portuguese]

radually

enetrated

the

borders f China

as faras Macao,

where hey

built a

permanentettlement.

Every

year hey

paid 500

taels. . . as ground

rent.

.

.

[and]

wereallowed

o

tradeannually

at Canton.... They anchoredhirty1ifrom hecity andcarried n commercial eal-

ings with the Cantonese.

Thus bothdomestic

and foreign

goods circulated reely

n

Kwangtung...

[and]

everyyear

22,000 taels were

paid

in customsduties....

Subsequently,

fficial

corruption

.. increased o

the point

that[the

Portuguese]

were driven to commit

violentacts

.... Afterwards,

heywere no longer

permitted

to go to

Canton. . .

[and]

Chinese

merchants

were obliged to

take their

goods

to

Macao o trade. This occurred

n

[1640).

Since

hen

[Chinese]

merchants

ave

experienced

epeated

ifficulties, oods

have

not

circulated,and

trade in

Kwangtung]

has cometo

a

[virtual]

halt. The people's

livelihoodshavethus been damaged

nd

the customsduties

collected

amount o

just

over 1,000

taels

per

year.

It therefores clear

hat when

the

people

romMacao

ome

to

trade,

Kwangtungprospers;

when

they do

not come,

Kwangtung uffers. Wen-

hsien s'ung-pien,

hi

24:19b)31

Although

Viceroy

T'ung apparently

knew nothing about

the

expulsion

of

the Por-

tuguese

from Nagasaki

in 1639

or thus

about the

primary reason

for

the decline of

Sino-Portuguese

trade,32

he obviously

was concerned

about

the

impact

of

that decline

on

the

region

for which

he was

responsible.

One of

his

purposes

in

submitting

the

memorialwas to

requestthat the

Portuguese once

again

be allowed

to

travel to Canton

in the hope that this

would help

to revive international

and domestic

tradein the

area

(Wen-hsien

s'ung-pien,

hi

24:

19b-20a).

Since

the vast

majority

of

what

the

Portuguese

carriedto Cantonbefore 1640 was Japaneseand Spanish-American ilver, there can be

little

doubt

that one of T'ung's

main worries

was

the

severe

monetary shortage33

hat

had

been plaguing

the region since

the

early 1640s (Boxer

1948:149;

Foster 1913:250).

Although

economic

conditions

in

Kwangtung

and other

parts

of China

gradually

improved

in the 1650s, monetary

problems

persisted.

One

indication of

this was

the

decision of

the

Ch'ing government

in

1650

to

issue new

paper

notes

to

help pay

for

its military operations

against

Ming

rebels.34Very

little is known

about

these

notes,

30

Silk prices

in

Hu-chou were also affected at

this

time

by deteriorating economic conditions

in

China and by a decline in Sino-Spanish trade in

Manila (see Atwell 1977:15-20).

3'

This translation is based

in

part

on one of

the

same passages

in

Fu 1966, vol. 2:7.

32

Commerce

in

the

Macao-Canton region also

was being affected

at

this time by a decline

in

Sino-

Spanish trade and by the temporary refusal of

Ma-

canese merchants to trade in

Manila when they

learned of Portugal's rebellion

against Spain

in

Eu-

rope (see Blair and Robertson

1903-1909, vol.

29:208-58;

Boxer

1974:73-82).

33

By monetary shortage I do not mean to

suggest

that stocksof silver

in

Kwangtung

or in the

rest of China at this time

were low. The

point is

that, because of economic

and political uncertain-

ties, much of that silver

was being

hoarded, thus

removing it from circulation.

34

For

a

meticulously

researched

and

readable

account of the resistance

movement against

the

Ch'ing, see

Struve 1984.






234

WILLIAM

S. ATWELL

but

apparentlythey were

unpopular with the

Chinese

people and were removed

from

circulation in

1661, long

before the government's

military

problems had been

solved

(P'eng

1965:807-8; Yang

1971:68). In the

meantime,

the country's

monetary situ-

ation was deteriorating foranotherreason.During the late 1650s and early 1660s, the

Ch'ing authorities

in Peking

reluctantly

concluded that drastic

action was necessary

to

bring seaborne Ming

loyalists

such as Cheng

Ch'eng-kung (1624-1662)

to their

knees.

Among the policies

decided on was the

forcible

evacuationof thousands

of towns

and villages

along

the

southeastern

coast

in

an

attempt

to

eliminate

the illicit trade

on which

Cheng

had built

an

economically

prosperous and,

for the

Ch'ing

at

least,

militarily

dangerousmaritime

empire that

stretched from

Nagasaki to Southeast Asia

(Kessler

1976:39-46; Wills

1979:223-32).

Although the

coastal evacuation

policy

was

not

always

strictly enforced,

it

and

related

policies remained

in

effect

for more

than

twenty years,

and eventually they

had the desired

result: Chengand his

successors

were denied the resourcesnecessary to maintain their resistance to Manchurule, and

their last remaining

stronghold,

Taiwan, was

taken in 1683.

The

Ch'ing

authorities paid a price

for this military

success,

however, for the trade

that

hadenriched

ChengCh'eng-kung

had also

brought economic

benefits to the coastal

regions of

China.

More specifically, the

contactsof the

Cheng family

in

Japan

enabled

the

family to

exchange

considerable quantities

of Chinese silk

and other goods for

Japanese

silver (Iwao

1953:22). At least

some of that silver

then filtered into Manchu-

controlled

portions of China,

where

it

undoubtedly

helped

to

augment

the

money

supply. 5

Once the

coastal-evacuationpolicy had

been

implemented, however,

he

quan-

tity of

silver (and, as we shall

see,

copper) flowing into China

again dropped

sharply.

This

contributed to

an

economic contraction so

severe

that

one

scholar

has

begun

to

refer

to

the

early

K'ang-hsi reign (c.

1661-1685)

in

China

as a

time

of economic

depression

(Kishimoto-Nakayama

1982, 1984). Depression or

not,

for much

of

this

period grain

prices

in

many

parts of

the

country were

unusually

low,36manufactured

goods sold

poorly,

and large numbers of

people-some of whom

previously

had been

very

wealthy-experienced severe

hardships.37At the

time, one of the most

popular

explanations

for

these

phenomena

was

the

scarcity of

silver,

a

situation

that

many

contemporarywriters

understood to be directly related

to the government's

prohibitions

on

maritime trade

(ibid.).38

Japan'seconomic situation was rather different at this time. After brief but no-

ticeablepauses

during

the

late 1640s and

early 1650s, Japanese

grain

prices resumed

an

upward, though

somewhaterratic,

path (Yamazaki

1983:49-135),39

urban

growth

3 All of the premier silk-producing regions in

China were

in

Manchu hands by the late 1640s.

36

As specialists are aware, grain prices in

China also were low at this time because population

losses that had occurred during the Ming-Ch'ing

transition

had

lowered the overall demand for food-

stuffs and caused marginal lands to be

taken

out

of production. More research on the subject is

needed, but it is also possible that climatic con-

ditions had

improved or

that

farmers had been suc-

cessful in adapting to the climatic changes that had

taken place.

37

Among

the areas

most seriously

affected

was

the lower

Yangtze delta,

a

fact

that

may help

to

explain the famous Chiang-nan Tax Case of the

early 1660s, in which many members of the

Chiang-nan elite were arrested,

and

some

were

ex-

ecuted, for

tax delinquency and for alleged

anti-

government

activity (including

aiding and abetting

Cheng Ch'eng-kung). Additional

research on this

case is needed,

but it is unlikely that thousands

of

people would

have put their lives at risk simply

out

of greed,

obstinacy, or loyalty

to the fallen

Ming.

A more likely explanation

is that many of those

who

were involved found it difficult to pay what was

being

demanded of them. For

general

discussions

of some of these issues,

see Wakeman 1975:9- 13;

Dennerline 1975:110-113;

Kessler 1976:30-39;

Beattie 1979:70-75.

38

The

articles

by Kishimoto-Nakayama

are es-

sential reading

for

anyone

concerned with early

Ch'ing

economic

and

political thought.

39

For

charts on Japanese grain prices

during

the seventeenth century, see

Iwahashi

1981:411.






THE

SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY

CRISIS

IN

CHINA

AND

JAPAN

235

revived

(Rozman

1973:287-88;

Hauser

1974:11-23;

Nakamura

1981:290-91),

and

foreign trade

showed

considerable

vitality (Innes

1980:409-29). How is

this to be

explained,

particularly in

light of

Japan's

previously

close

economic ties

with China?

Thereareseveralpossibleanswers.First, unlike their counterparts n Peking, shogunal

officials

did not

have to

finance

protracted

and

costly

campaigns

against rebel

forces.40

As

Kishimoto-Nakayama

indicates

(1984:233-34), in

early Ch'ing

China

such cam-

paigns drew

sorely needed

funds away

from

some of

the most

dynamic

sectorsof the

economy,helping

to

create the

shortage

of silver.' 4'

Second, the

fact that

Japan

was

generally at

peace

after the

Shimabara

uprising

probably meant that

the famines

and

epidemics that

struck

the

country in the

late

1630s

and early

1640s

were less

damaging

demographically

than

those that

occurred

in

war-torn

China at

the same

time. Carlo

Cipolla

has

noted that

premodern

armies

on the march

usually were far

more

efficient

in

destroyingcrops

and

spreading

diseases

thanthey were in waging war(Cipolla 1976:151). Proportionally peaking,

then, levels

of

demand in

Japan

should have

remained

higher than

those

in

China,

a fact

that

would

help

to explain

why, by the

165Os at

least,

Japanese grain

prices were

rising

while

those

in

Chiang-nan

and in

many other

parts of

China were

beginning to

fall

sharply

(Nakayama

1979b:80; Iwahashi

1981:411;

Kishimoto-Nakayama

1984).42

Third,

the

Japanese appear

to

have been

far

more successful than

the

Chinese

in

managing their

monetary system

during

the second half

of

the

seventeenth

century.

This

was

partially

due to

the

reduction in

silver exports,43

which

freed

more of

the

metal

for domestic

use, but

it

was

also due to the

reintroduction

of

the

copper

coins

known

as the

Kan'ei-tsuhJn

the

mid- 1650s.44

The

government was aided in

the latter

effortby a

steady increase

in

copper

production,45and

by

the

Kambun

period

(1661-

1673),

shogunal

mints

were turning

out excellent

copper coins

in

large

quantities

(Nihon

Ginko

1973,

vol.

2:130- 1).

Meanwhile,

the

Ch'ing government's

prohibitions

on maritime

trade

drastically

reduced

imports

of

Japanese

copper

as

well

as

silver,

thereby

causing several

provincial mints

to be shut

down

in

the

early

1670s (Hall

1949:451-52). The

Ch'ing

monetary

system

was in

serious

disarray

while that

in

Japan

had

achieved

a

temporary but

very welcome

equilibrium.

Finally, it

should

be noted

that,

although Chinese

goods

and

raw materials

were

highly

prized by

Japanese merchants and

consumers,

alternative

sources were available

for most

items.

In the

case

of

raw

silk,

for

example,

it-was

possible

to

find

acceptable,

if

not

ideal,

substitutes in

Japan itself

or,

through the

Dutch

and

the

Cheng

family,

in

SoutheastAsia,

Bengal, or

even Persia

(Glamann

1953-

1954:46-47).46

Moreover,

40

With the

exception of

the

Shimabara cam-

paign of

1637-1638, of

course.

41

Another

factor that

helped to

cause

this

shortage

was the

San-fan,

or

Three

Feudatories,

Rebellion,

which

lasted

from

1673 to

1681.

Not

only was

the

rebellion

expensive

to put

down

but

the

hostilities

made it

difficult

for the

Ch'ing to

obtain

access to Yunnan

and

Kweichow,where

some

of the empire's richest silver mines were located.

42

4

Note that there

were

occasional

sharp

falls

in

Japanese

grain

prices

during

the

second

half of

the

seventeenth

century

as well.

Nevertheless, unlike

China,

the

overall

trend

was

up.

43

In

1668,

the

bakufu

finally

ordered a

total

ban

on

silver

exports.

This did

not stem

the flow

immediately or

entirely, but

by the end

of

the

sev-

enteenth

century

.

.. silver

exports from

Nagasaki

had

dwindled

to

a

mere

trickle

(Tashiro

1982:295).

Tashiro

points

out,

however, that

ad-

ditional

silver was sent to China

via Korea, al-

though the amounts

involved

(less than 6,000 ki-

lograms per year, on

average)

were

quite small when

compared

to those exported from

Japan during the

early- and

the

mid-seventeenth century.

44

Following the unsuccessful

launch

of

the

original

Kan'ei suib

in

the late

1630s,

the

sho-

gunate suspended the

production of the

coins dur-

ing the early 1640s. Faced with a shortage of copper

coins

in

the

1650s,

however, the bakufu resumed

production, this time with

considerable

success

(Nihon Gink6 1973, vol.

2:131).

45

As

gold and

silver

production declined in

mid-seventeenth-century Japan,

copper production

rose sharply.

46

Whenever it

was available,

however, Chinese

silk was

preferred until well into the

eighteenth

century.






236

WILLIAM S.

ATWELL

these substitutes often could be bought

with copper, something that, given

the decline

in the production of gold and silver,

the shogunate became more and more anxious to

use for overseas purchases (Glamann 1953-1954:55-60; Whitmore 1977:18-19;

Innes 1980:586-87). Under the

circumstances, it is hardly surprising

that the Dutch

East

India Company made some of its greatest profits in Japan in the years from 1664

to 1673, at a time when direct trade

with China was particularly difficult (Gaastra

1981:64).

In

part because of the shogunate'strade and monetary policies, and

in

part

because

of greatly increased copper production,

Japan recoveredmore quickly

than China from

its seventeenth-centurycrisis. As Ivo

Schoffer (1978) has suggested with regard to

the Dutch Republic in

seventeenth-centuryEurope, to speak ofJapan'sproblemsduring

the 1640s and early 1650s as a crisis may be exaggerated and misleading. Famine

conditions, the ronin masterless

samurai)conspiraciesof

the

early 1650s,

and the

great

Edo fire of 1657 were dealt with

quickly and relatively efficiently. Meanwhile, daimyo

such as Ikeda Mitsumasa and han

(daimyo domain) officials

such as Kumazawa

Banzan

and Nonaka Kenzan were carrying out local reforms that served to strengthen the

Tokugawa system from the bottom up

(Hall 1966:402-8, 1970; Jansen 1968:122-

28; Sasaki 1981:285-91).

It

is nevertheless interesting and probably significant that the Tokugawaeconomy

does not

appear

to have

resumed

the exuberant

growth

that

characterized

t

during

the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenthcenturies until the Ch'ing authorities lifted

the ban on maritime trade and the

Chinese economy also expanded

with some

vigor.

Given

the

dramatic increase

in

direct

Sino-Japanese

trade

after the

Ch'ing conquest

of

Taiwan in

1683, some figures for

which

appear

in

table 2,

it

seems reasonableto

speculate

that

the remarkableprosperity of

GenrokuJapan (c.

1688-

1703)

was

directly

and intimately related to that of late-seventeenth-century

China.47

This time,

however,

Japanesecopper as well as silver helped to bind the two economies together (Hall 1949;

Yamawaki

1972:216-22;

Innes

1980:526-32).

The renewed surge

in

Sino-Japanese rade was

relatively

short-lived.

The

monetary

needs of both countries expanded at the turn

of

the

eighteenth century,

and

Japanese

mines were

unable to

keep pace

with the

demand for

precious

metals.

The

shogunate

was

forced to impose new export restrictions and, although

trade continued

at

reduced

levels

for many years to come, the two

economies began to drift apart. Resuming large-

scale imports of silver from Europe, South

Asia, and, especially, Spanish America,

China

became ever more

deeply

involved

in the

emerging

world

economy. Japan,

after

more than

a

century of vigorous

international

economic

activity

that was

fueled

by

its

once

spectacular

but now

greatly

reduced

production

of

gold, silver,

and

copper,

settled into the relative self-sufficiencythat was

to deeply color

its

history

for

the next

150 years.

Conclusion

It was the good fortune of the Tokugawa shogunate to be able to close Japan's

borders to

foreign military

threats

in

1639

and to

concentrate,

for

a

time

at

least,

on

the

rehabilitation of the domestic

economy.48

At

the time

many

Chinese

undoubtedly

47

Japanese-Korean trade

and

Sino-Japanese

trade via

Korea flourished

during the late-seven-

teenth

century as well (see Tashiro 1976, 1981).

48

It

should be evident that I

do not mean to

suggest

that

those borders were

hermetically

sealed

or

that

shogunal policies

during

the

1630s and

1640s were determined

on economic grounds alone.

For important

new interpretations of the political

and ideological

aspects of

the seclusion (sakoku)

policy, see Toby 1977, 1984;

Tashiro 1982.






THE

SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY

CRISIS IN CHINA AND

JAPAN

237

Table

2.

Number of Ships from the

Chinese Mainland

Arriving

in

Nagasaki

(1661-1700)

Year

Number of Ships

Year

Number of

Ships

1661

29 (4) 1681 0

1662

17(18)

1682

5

1663

16

1683

2

1664

24 (1)

1684

9

1665

6 (5)

1685 72 (5)

1666

2

1686

87

1667 2 (2) 1687 112(17)

1668

6(12)

1688

171 (3)

1669

4(11)

1689

66

1670

7 (9)

1690 75

1671

6 (1) 1691

75 (1)

1672 4

1692

63

1673

3 (3)

1693

60

(3)

1674

7 1694

49 (4)

1675

7

1695

57 (3)

1676 8

1696

39(24)

1677 7 1697 80 (1)

1678

9

1698

54

(2)

1679

14

1699

61

1680

5 1700

46

SOURCE:

Iwao

(1953:

12- 13). Numbers in

parentheses represent

additional

ships

whose

ports

of

origin

are

unclear;

these ships

may

have been from

the Chinese

mainland.

wished to do

the

same

thing.

Unfortunately

from

their

point

of

view,

the Manchus

were

unwilling to cooperate.

Yet,

whatever their

very different

political fates, Toku-

gawa,

Ming, and, belatedly,

Ch'ing officials

had to

contend

with

a

number

of similar

problemsduring the seventeenth century. At least some of the problems-poor har-

vests, famine

conditions,

outbreaks of epidemic

disease, monetary

fluctuations,

and

price

instability-were interrelated.

It

is

possible

to

study

these

phenomena

in iso-

lation,

to insist that much

more work

needs

to be

done

on

the

national histories

of

China

and

Japan

(or Korea,

Vietnam,

and

the

Philippines)

before

meaningful

com-

parisons are

attempted.

Recent research

has

demonstrated,49

however, that

the

bound-

aries

between national

and international

history

in

early-modern

East

Asia

were

far

from clear-cut.

List of References

Adshead, S. A. M. 1973. The

Seventeenth-CenturyGeneral Crisis in China.

Asian

Profile

1, no. 2:271-80.

Aoki Koji. 1971. Hyakush5 kki sogo

nempyo

A comprehensivechronological

record of

peasant

uprisingsl.

Tokyo:

Sanichi Shobo.

49I

particularly

have in mind the

works

of

more,

and

Wills listed

in

the

bibliography.

Innes, Kishimoto-Nakayama, Tashiro,Toby,

Whit-






238

WILLIAM

S. ATWELL

ArakawaHidetoshi. 1964. Saigai no rekishi

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