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Some Observations on the "Seventeenth-Century Crisis" in China and JapanAuthor(s): William S. AtwellSource: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Feb., 1986), pp. 223-244
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VOL.
XLV, No. 2
JOURNAL OF
ASIAN
STUDIES
FEBRUARY
1986
Some
Observationson
the
Seventeenth-Century
risis
in
China
and
Japan
WILLIAM
S. ATWELL
Fernand
Braudel ssues this
caution n his widely
acclaimed
workon the
Mediter-
raneanworld
n the
late sixteenth
century, When
discussing he rise
and
fall
of
empires,
t is well to
[avoid)
he temptation
o-. . . discover oo
early igns
of greatness
in
a
state which
we know will one
day be great, or
to predict
oo earlythe
collapse
of an
empire
which we
know will one day
ceaseto be (1975,
vol. 2:661).
Although
Braudel s
primarily
oncernedwith the
Spanishand Ottoman
empires,
he
probably
would not be
surprised o learnthat
studentsof late
Ming
history(c.
1580-1644)
have ended o
keep one
eye firmly ixedon
1644, the year he
Ming dynasty ell
and
Manchu ule
began n China.For
some, at
least, the originsof the
Ming collapse
may
be clearly een in the irresponsible ehavior f the Wan-liemperorr. 1573-1620),
in the enormous
osts incurred
ighting the Japanese
n Korea
during the 1590s,
in
the
crushingdefeatof
Ming forces
n Liaotungby the Manchus n
1619,
or in the
reign
of terror
onductedby the
eunuchWei
Chung-hsien
1568-1627)
in
1625-
1626.
However,Weidied
nearly
eventeen earsbefore he first
Manchu
roopsappeared
on the
streets of
Peking,
and therefore
here
must be some doubt
as
to
whether
his
activities,or
these other
factors,had much
to do with the final
demise of the
Ming
dynasty.
In
marked
ontrast o the
gloomy pictureusually
painted
of
seventeenth-century
China, studies of
Japanat this
time often celebrate
uch positive
developments s
theestablishment f the Tokugawahogunate n 1603, thegreatconstruction rojects
of
the
Keicho 1596-1614)
and Genna
(1615-1623)
periods,
the
completion
f To-
kugawa
nstitutions duringthe
1630sand 1640s, and the
flowering
f urban ulture
during
the
Genroku ra
(1688-1703).
It
is
possible
hereforeo
gain
the
impression
that
the
first centuryof
Tokugawa
ule in Japanwas a time
of peace,
stability,
and
virtually
uninterrupted conomic
and
demographic rowth. Recent
scholarshipYa-
William
S. Atwell is Associate Professorof His-
tory, Hobart and William Smith Colleges.
Some of the research on which this article is
based was made possible by awards
from the School
of Oriental and African Studies, University of Lon-
don, and from the Japan Society for the Promotion
of Science as part of its exchange agreement
with
the British Academy.The author takes this oppor-
tunity to thank them for
their
generous
assistance.
None
of these
organizations, however,
assumes
any
responsibility for the author's conclusions.
An
earlier version of this article
was presented
at
the 31st International Congress
of Human Sci-
ences
in
Asia
and North
Africa, held
in Tokyo
and
Kyoto, August 31-September
7, 1983,
and the au-
thor expresses
gratitude
to the
participants
in
Sec-
tion 8,
Precious
Metals
in
the
Entrepot
Trade
in
East, South, and Southeast Asia, and, especially,
to its
convenor,
Kobata
Atsushi,
for many
helpful
comments.
The author
is also
grateful
to Hayami
Akira,
Henry D. Smith
ll,
Ramon H. Myers,
and
Sarah
Metzger-Court
for
additional
comments
and
suggestions.
Of
course,
the author
is solely
re-
sponsible
for any errors
and
shortcomings
that re-
main.
223
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224
WILLIAM
S. ATWELL
maguchi
and Sasaki 1971;
Asao
1975; Nagakura
1982),
however,
has demonstrated
that such an impression
is misleading
and in need
of revision and
qualification.
Indeed,
the
sharply contrasting
political
fortunes
of the
Ming dynasty
and the
Tokugawa hogunatemayhaveobscuredthe extent to which the historiesof seventeenth-
century China
and Japan are
mutually intelligible.
For example,
after rapid
economic
growth in
the late-sixteenth
and early-seventeenth
centuries,
during the
mid-seven-
teenth century
both countries
experienced
severe
economic problems
that
were at once
interrelated
and
strikingly similar
to
those that were
occurring
in other
parts of the
world at about
the same
time. l The
difference, for
East Asian
history
at least, is
that
although Tokugawa
officials were
able
to cope with
those problems
their
Ming coun-
terparts
were not. And
that, as
PierreVilar,
a distinguished
student
of early-modern
Europe
reminds
us, is
of great importance:
In every
general
conjuncture,
different
countries
react differently,
whence
the inequalities
of development
which,
in
the end,
make history (quoted
in Wallerstein
1980:19).
Climatic
Change and
the Famines
of
the 1630s and
1640s
I
argue
in two earlier
articles
(1977, 1982)
that many
aspects of late
Ming
history
may
be fully understood
only
in light
of the vast
amount of silver
that flowed
into
China
from
abroad
during
the late-sixteenth
and early-seventeenth
enturies.2 My
con-
tention is
that,
by facilitating
rapid monetary
growth,
enhancing
the
efficiency of
exchange,
and enabling
Chinese
officials to carryout long
overdue
tax reforms,Japanese
and Spanish-Americansilver played a crucial role in the vigorous economic expansion
for which the late Ming
period in
China is justly
famous.
That
expansion
affected
many regions
of the country,but
it
was particularly
noticeable
in
the
south
and south-
east,
where the urban population
increased dramatically,
agriculture
became
more
commercialized, and
trade
and industry
flourished.
Despite Japan's
differentpattern
of development,
a very similar
statement
may be
made
about
its
economically
advanced regions
(the
Kinai,
the
Kanto,
and
the
Sanyo)
about
this same time. Indeed,
such
a
statement
was
made
in
1620
or 1621 by
Father
Joao
Rodrigues (1561-1634),
the
gifted
translator-priest
who lived
and worked
in
Japan
from
1577 to 1610:
The laws, administration,
ustoms,
culture, trade,
wealth,
and
magnificence
were
restored hroughout
he kingdom,
andpopulous
ities
and
other
buildings
were
raised
everywhere
s
a
result
of tradeand
peace.
Manypeople
became
rich,
although
the
ordinary
olk
andpeasants
were mpoverished
y
the taxes
they
were
obliged
to
pay.
T
hc lords
of the landbecamevery
wealthy,
toringup
much
gold
andsilver.
Through-
out
the
kingdom
here
was a
great
abundance
f
money,
new mines were
opened
and
the
kingdom
was
well
supplied
with
everything.
Rodrigues
1973:78)3
As in
China,
an important
ingredient
in Japanese
economic
growth
during
the
late-sixteenth
and
early-seventeenth
centuries
was
the
rapid
monetization
of
the econ-
omy
that
accompanied
and helped to support political unification, which took place
'
For surveys
and summaries
of the
seven-
teenth-century
crisis
in Europe,
see
Aston
1967;
Rabb
1975;
de Vries
1976;
Parker
and Smith
1978;
Parker
1979.
For the Near
and
Middle East,
see
Lewis
1958;
Barkan 1975.
For
Latin America,
see
Israel 1974;
TePaske
and
Klein 1981.
For
China,
see
Adshead
1973;
Will 1984; Skinner
1985.
2
I
expressed
my
views
on
late
Ming
economic
history
at some
length
in Atwell 1977,
1982, and
I repeat
them
here only
insofar as
is necessary
to
make
the
present
article intelligible.
3
See also Elison 1981:55;
Berry
1982:183-
205.
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THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
CRISIS
IN CHINA AND JAPAN 225
underOda Nobunaga
(1534-
1582), Toyotomi
Hideyoshi
(1536-1598),
and
Tokugawa
leyasu (1542-1616).
As Ito
Tasabur6
and Enomoto S6ji
have pointed out,
many of
the
things
for which the
Azuchi-Momoyama
(1576-
1603)
and early
Tokugawa
(c.
1603-
1635) erasare best known-the marketingand distributionof vast quantitiesof grain,
the organization
and deployment
of large
military
forces, the construction
of
great
castles
and castle
towns,
the separation
of the
military
and
agrarianclasses,
and
the
implementation
of
the alternate
attendance
(sankin-kotai)
ystem-were
all
depen-
dent on the relatively
sophisticated
money economy
that had developed
in
Japan
during
the late-sixteenth
century (Ito
1966:141-44;
Enomoto
1980).
It is hardly
surprising
therefore
hat
the majority
of domains
madefrantic
efforts at
amassing
gold
and silver
during
the
initial stages
of
[Tokugawa
rulel
(Enomoto
1980:45).
As
is
well
known,
some
of these domains
(and the
house
of
Tokugawa
tself)
invested
substantial
portions
of their
wealth
in foreign
trade.
One result
of this was
that
Japanese
silver exports
soared
during the
late-sixteenth
and
early-seventeenth
enturies.
In some
years
following the
establishment
of the Tokugawa
shogunate
in 1603,
for example,
the
exports
probably
approached
200,000
kilograms
(Kobata
1970:8; Iwao
1958:328-
30;
Iwao
1959:63-67).4
Trading
restrictions
imposed
by
the Ming
authorities meant
that much of
this silver had
to go
first to Macao,
Taiwan,
or Southeast
Asia, but
most
of it eventually
reached
China,
where
it was used
to purchase
goods
for the
rapidly
expanding
Japanese
domestic
market.
An impression
of that market's
buoyancy
may
be
gained
from the fact
that between
the late-sixteenth
century and the early
1630s
Japanese
imports
of
raw silk, most
of which
were of
Chinese
origin, rose
from
an
estimated 60,000-90,000 kilograms per year to perhapsas much as 280,000 kilo-
grams
(Kobata
1978b:526;
Yamawaki
1972:9-11;
Kato 1976:44-47;
Caron
and
Schouten 1935:51).
5
Given these
and
other facts
to
be discussed
below,
there is little doubt that
the
dramatic
expansion
in Sino-Japanese
trade
during
the
late-sixteenth
and early-seven-
teenth centuries
had
a significant
impact
on the economies
of
both countries.
Although
Japan
helped
to
supply China
with
large
quantities
of sorely
needed silver,
China
furnished
Japan
with luxurygoods,
raw materials,
and technical
expertise
for
its
bour-
geoning
textile industry (Oishi
et
al. 1980:19-20).
By
the
1630s,
however,
this
mu-
tually
beneficialexchange
was
in
decline, and
by the early
1640s,
both
countries
were
experiencingsevere economic problems. What had happened?
One cause of
the
economic
difficulties
was
the weather.
Few studies of
seventeenth-
century Europe
in recent
yearsfail
to consider
the implications
of the so-called
Little
Ice Age for
economic
and
political
history.
A
fall
of one
degree
centigrade
n
overall
ummer
emperatures
estricts he
growing
season or plantsby
three
or four
weeks
and reduces
he
maximum
altitudeat
which
4Reliable
statistics
on early-modern
East
Asian
trade
are difficult
to
obtain,
and
Kobata
and
Iwao,
therefore,
were
forced
to relyon
a
good
deal
of
im-
pressionistic evidence in compiling their estimates
for Japanese
silver exports during
the
early
decades
of the
seventeenth
century.
These
estimates
recently
have
been
criticized
by
Robert
Innes,
who
believes
not only
that
they
are too high
but
also that
Jap-
anese
foreign
trade
actually peaked
somewhat
later
in the
century (1980:376-432).
For
reasons
that
will
become
apparent
below,
I do not agree
with
Innes on
these
two
points;
however,
his opinions
on
these
and
all other
aspects
of
seventeenth-century
Japanese
economic
history
deserve
serious
consid-
eration.
s Figures
like
these
help
to
explain
the
follow-
ing
statement
by
Father
Rodrigues:
The
use
of
silk
in
olden
days,
and even
up to the
time
we
went
to
Japan
[1577),
was rare
and
because
of its scarcity
and dearth
the
ordinary
people
did not
use it,
nor
indeed
did
the
gentry,
and
the lords
but
seldom.
. ..
But
since
the
time
of
[Hideyoshil
there
has
been
a
general
peace
throughout
the kingdom
and
trade
has
so increased
that the whole
nation
wears
silk
robes;
even
peasants
and their
wives
have
silk
sashes
and
the
better off
among
them have
silken
robes
(1973:133).
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226
WILLIAM S.
ATWELL
crops
will ripen by about 500
feet. Eventoday,each
day'sdelay
n the ripeningof
the harvestdiminishes
he present
yieldof cerealcrops
by 63 kilos per hectare,
and
a drop of tone
degree]
n average
ummer emperature
educes he growing
season
in northernEurope y about30 days.Intheseventeenthentury,with moreprimitive
agricultural
methods
and with moremarginal
and undercultivation,
he impactof
[such a fall)
wouldhave been
proportionallyreater till. (Parker
1979:22)
Colder temperatureswere
not
the only-or,
in
many
parts of
the
world,
the
most
important-climatic
factor
in reducing agricultural
yields
during the Little
Ice Age.
Along with the
long-term cooling trend,
to which most
farmers eventually
adapted,
went
significant shifts in global
wind patterns that
led to sharpyear-to-year
luctuations
in precipitation
as well as temperature.
While one area
might experience
abnormally
hot or dry conditions, another
might suffer from
unusual cold or dampness,
or both.
These short-term
changes appear to
have had the
most serious impact
on agricultural
production
in
seventeenth-century
Europe (Schuurmans
1981:253-57;
Rosini
1981:729-36).
These facts are relevant
because the disasters
associated
with the Little Ice Age
did not recognize national
or international boundaries.
In Japan, for example,
a
series
of
unusually
cool summers
in the north and floods
and droughts
elsewheredrastically
reduced grain yields
in
the
late 1630s and early
1640s. This contributed
to the great
famine of the Kan'ei
period (Kan'eikikin),
during which
large numbers
of people and
livestock died from
starvation and disease
(Yamaguchi
and Sasaki 1971:55-59;
Asao
1975:368-76;
Nagakura 1982:75-85;
Okajima 1967:49-50,
561; Endo
1982:58-
64). The Kan'eikikin was the first majorfamine to occur in Japanafter the rapidurban
and demographic
growth of
the late-sixteenthand
early-seventeenth
enturies
had made
many
moreJapanesedependent
on others for
their food
supply
than ever
before.
Moreover, the famine
occurred at
a
time
when the
center of rice
cultivation
in
Japan
was shifting from the
south and west to
the north
and east, greatly
increasing
the
possibility
of
significant
crop damage
from cold (Arakawa1974:19-24,
1982:32-
34;
Tani
1978:201-4).
As climatic
and
agricultural
conditions
worsened
during
the
late
1630s,
the shogunate
was
forced
to grant emergency
relief
to the
poor
and to enact
special
legislation, which
some scholars
have seen as
a
inajor turning point
in
the
policies
of
the
shogunatefor dealing
with the lesserpeasantry
kobyakusho)
nd, thus,
with the organizationand control of Japanesesociety as a whole (Tokugawaikki, vol.
40:159,
164, 213, 258,
269-75,
280-81; Yamaguchi
and
Sasaki
1971:55-62;
Asao
1975
:340-42).6
Be
that
as it may,
and it is a topic
that should be
of
great
interest to
comparative
as well
as
Japanese
historians,7
it is noteworthy
here
that
at
virtually
the
same
time
that grain prices
were rising
to unprecedented evels
in Osaka, Kyoto,
Hiroshima,
and
many
other
cities
(Ky6to
Daigaku 1962:72-74;
Yamazaki
1983:49-57;
Nagakura
1982:79-80),
the
same
thing
was
happening
in
many
parts
of
China
(Nakayama
1978:1-33,
1979a:67-75;
Will
1984).
There, too,
adverse
weather conditions had
been
affecting agricultural
production
for
some time,8 and
by
the late
1630s
some
of
the
richest areas
n
China
were sufferingfrom food shortagesandoutbreaksof epidemic
6
Much of the relevant
legislation
is contained'
in Kodama
and Oishi
1966:21-33.
7 Governments
in
many parts
of the world
dur-
ing the seventeenth
century
had to contend
with
agrarian decline
brought on,
at least
in
part,
by
climatic change.
Some governments,
such as the
Japanese
andthe
Dutch, managed
to cope relatively
successfully;
many
others,
such
as
the
Chinese
and
the
Spanish,
did
not.
8
On
climatic
conditions
in China
at
this time,
seeChu
1973:240-45;Lamb
1982:227-30;Yoshi-
no
1978:335;
Chang 1637:8/21a-22b;
Dunstan
1975;
Will
1984;
Skinner
1985.
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THE
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
CRISIS IN CHINA
AND JAPAN
227
disease (Imura
1936-1937; Elvin 1973:310-11; Dunstan
1975; Will 1984).
Unlike
their counterparts n Japan, however,
Ming officials proved incapable of coping
with
the situation.9 Food
costs soared, lawlessnessof all kinds
increased, and in April
1644
Peking fell to a rebel army from the
economically devastated northwest. Six
weeks
later
the city fell again, this time to
Manchu invaders, and a new era in
Chinese
political
history began.
Economic Change and Social
Instability
in
Late Ming China
and Early Tokugawa Japan
However
tempting it
may be to ascribe
all
the great events in Chinese
and
Japanese
history during the
mid-seventeenth
century to bad weather and poor harvests,
the
situation
was a
good deal more
complicated than that. Indeed, it can be argued that
the terrible famines
that struck Japanand China in the late
1630s and early 1640s
were
merely the tragic outcome of larger
economic and social problems that had
been
festering for some time. Many of these
problems, in turn, appear to have been
directly
related to the large
amounts of bullion that
had flowed into circulation in East Asia
after
the middle of the sixteenth century.
That bullion
facilitated high levels of public
expenditure, rapid urban growth, and
intense economic competition, all of which
proved to be socially
and politically disruptive.
In
China, the wealth that poured into
government coffersafter 1570 (Ch'uan and
Li 1972:136-39) was more than offset by soaring military costs (including those
incurred fighting the Japanes'e n Korea
in the 1590s), by
expensive public works
projects, and by imperial
extravagancesof
monumental proportion.
It
is
estimated
that
the
weddings and
investiture ceremonies of the five sons of
the
Wan-li
emperorcost
more
than
12,000,000 taels,
a
sum that,
if
converted to
silver
by weight,
would
have
amounted to
approximately 450,000
kilograms (Hucker 1976:334).
O
As
is
often
the
case
in
such
situations,
the
emperor's
extravagance
was
emulated
by others,
with
the
result that
ostentatious
display and conspicuous consumption became
hallmarks
of
late
Ming economic life (Chang 1929; Hou
1957:94-95; Mote
1977:245-52;
Peterson
1979:70-73, 139-45).
Students of Japanese history will note some importantsimilarities between China
and
Japan
at
this time. In addition to the
extraordinarily xpensive
military campaigns
of the three
great
unifiers,
no
fewer
than
twenty-five first-ranking
castles
and
castle
towns were constructed
between 1580 and 1610 (Hall 1968; Rozman
1973:45-51).
The
castles often were
lavishly decorated,
as
were many of
the
shrines, temples,
and
villas
that
were built or
rebuilt about the
same time (Rodrigues 1973:89-90,
101,
122-23;
Elison
1981:61-66; Wheelwright
1981; Berry 1982:189-205).
It
would
be
hard,
writes
John
Hall,
to find
a
parallel
period
of
urban
construction
in
world
history (1968:176).
Nor did
the
period end
in
1610.
Wakita Osamu
estimates
the
costs for
rebuilding
Osaka
Castle
during
the Genna
period
(1615-1624)
at
260,000
koku
approximately 5.1 bushels)of rice per year: If we assumethe annualper-person
rice
requirement
at that
time was
three koku,
hese
expenditures
would
have
supported
9However,
it
should
be
noted that some offi-
cials did
an
admirable
job
of
providing medical and
other relief under
conditions that were often
ap-
palling. See, for example, Ch'en 1803a:
1/30b;
Hu-
choufu-chih
872-1874:62/48a-b;
Yao
1934:146.
LO
One should not overlook the
corruption
of
those associated
with the
imperial court.
When the
eunuch Li
Yung-chen was
executed
in 1628,
for
example, his confiscated
properties
were reported
to
be worth 270,000
taels
of silver (see
Ku 1956,
vol.
4:102; Goodrich and Fang 1976,
vol.
1:951).
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228
WILLIAM S. ATWELL
a
population
of
nearly
90,000
persons. When we
take
the
ripple effect
into consid-
eration, we can see that
the construction
expenses
alone could have
supported a pop-
ulation base
of over 100,000
persons (Wakita 1981
244n3).
Under the
circumstances,
it is difficult to disagree with Wakita's conclusion that such projects werea major
factor n creating the
expanding
urban-basedeconomy
of the late-sixteenth
and early-
seventeenth centuries.
However,
that
economy and the
opulent urban-based
ulture it
supported were
ultimately
dependent upon the
agriculturalsector for
food and raw
materials, and,
as
was the case in
China, by the
1630s many of Japan's
towns and villages
were expe-
riencing
severe
economic
problems. Some of the
problems
were related to the deteri-
orating
climatic
conditions discussed above
(Arakawa
1964:250;
Endo 1982:55-59).
11
Nevertheless,
as
Murakami
Tadashi and
others
observe,
the
food
shortages
that
ensued
had human as well as natural causes (Murakami 1982:62; Yamaguchiand Sasaki
1971:55-56; Asao
1975:372-73). Their
point is that the
plight of the peasants
was
made even
worse by the tax and
rent demands of
their
superiors, which were often
totally
unrealistic.
12
These
demands led, among
other things,
to increased tension in
the towns
and villages, to
widespread peasant flight
from the land, and, in
extreme
cases,
to
armed insurrection
(Aoki 1971:26-31;
Asao
1975:370-73; Nagakura
1982:76-79). By far the
most
important
insurrection was the great
Shimabara, or
Christian,
Rebellion in
western
Kyushu, which the bakufu
put down
with
great
difficulty
and
appalling
brutality
in
the
spring
of
1638. Despite
the
government's
attempts
to
portray
the
rebellion as part of
a
RomanCatholic plot
to
enslave
the
Land
of the Gods, however,manyobserversat the time believed that economic and political
factors were far
more
important than
religious
grievances,
at
least
in
the uprising's
initial
stages. Recent
research has
tended to support
that
view
(Irimoto 1980:186-
215).
In
1635,
three
years before the last Christian
rebels were
exterminated
by shogunal
officials,
a
young
Chinese
scholar
wrote about
conditions
in
his native
Yangtze
delta,
an area
only
500 miles southwest of
southern
Kyushu,
which
just
a few
years earlier
had been one of the
most
prosperous
on
earth:
Today
he
distress
of the
people
n
Chiang-nan
s extreme.Thereare those who die
from the pressure f taxes,those whodie becauseof laborserviceobligations, hose
who die
of
starvation,
hosewho die
because
f the
forced
xactions
f
corrupt
fficials,
and
those who
die from the
perverse
nd unreasonable
ctivities
of
powerful
ocal
families.
(Ch'en
1977:1140)
Among
the
perverse
and unreasonable
activities were
usury,
land
encroachment,
and
exorbitant rent
demands,
all
of which
contributed
to
a
rising
tide
of
peasant
unrest
Additional
research
on this subject is
needed,
but
it
seems
possible that
the
droughts
that
struck
southwesternJapanduring
this
period
were
directly
related to those
afflicting
parts of eastern
and south-
eastern China at the
same time
(see the
maps
in
Chung-yang ch'i-hsiang chu
1981:89-91; Yoshino
1978:332-33).
12
It has
long
been
acknowledged that one im-
portant
factor in the
oppressive nature of those
de-
mands
was
the
burden
placed
on the
various
daimyo
by
the
sankin-kotai
ystem and the need
to maintain
face
in
the
status-conscious world
of seventeenth-
century
Edo.
As
an
official of the
Dutch East India
Company
explained
in the mid-
1630s,
Each Lord
lives according to his
Means and Dignity,
rather
profuse than
sparing; so that
[Edo)
swarms
with
Men and
Attendance,
which makes
their
Markets
high and very dear.
Their sumptuous Buildings,
their
gorgeous
Cloathing
of
their
Servants,
...
their Feasts,
their Presents,
and
other Expences
of
that Proud and pompous
Court, do sufficiently keep
under these
Great
Men;
for their Charges
surmount
their
Revenues, and they
are found most commonly
to be much
behinde
hand
(Caron
and Schouten
1935:30).
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THE
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS IN
CHINA AND JAPAN
229
in Chiang-nan, Fukien, Kiangsi, and
other parts of China during the late 1630s
and
early 1640s (Mori 1971:236-45).
13
The Crisis
of
the Early 1640s
Despite different economic,
social, and political systems, China and Japan ex-
perienced
a
number of similar
problems during the late 1630s and early 1640s. More-
over,
in
both cases, the problems were
exacerbatedby monetary
difficulties. As
I
argue
elsewhere (Atwell 1977:8-18),
China's difficulties stemmed
in
part
from
its
almost
total reliance on bullion imports to
increase the money supply at
a
rate sufficient to
maintain
consumer confidence and
prevent economic activity from contracting. How-
ever, beginning in the mid- 1630s the amount of silver flowing into China from Spanish
Americadropped sharply from the 50,000-100,000 kilograms per year that had been
common earlier n the century.
4
A similar situation developed with regard to Japanese
silver; Tokugawa authorities
prohibited Japanese nationals from trading overseas
in
1635, and they expelled the Portuguese from Nagasaki in 1639. Although Dutch and
Chinese merchants continued to export substantial quantities of silver from Japan for
some time to come (Yamawaki
1972:41; Yamawaki 1980:208; Innes 1980:410), the
amounts involved were usually farbelow the estimates of Kobata and Iwao for the first
three decades of the seventeenthcentury.
5
The
Ming government was unable
to replace he bullion lost from domestic sources,
and
soon
it
was confrontedwith an
economic nightmare: hoarding caused huge amounts
of silver to disappear from circulation, counterfeit copper coins flooded the market,
and, not surprisingly, the
silver-copper ratio widened sharply (Yeh 1911:2/6a; Chang
1958:325; Ch'i 1960:147;
Nakayama 1979a:74). In the panic that ensued, credit
became
virtually impossible
to
obtain,
food
prices soared, and,
for a time at
least,
the
marketfor many cash crops and
manufacturedgoods collapsed (Shen 1958:290;
Wiens
1974:525; Nakayama 1979a:74-75).
16
Tax receipts plummeted during the early 1640s,
and the government even considered
reintroducing papercurrency17 to help
finance its
campaigns against domestic rebels and
the
invading
Manchus
(Chi 1969,
vol.
3:337-
38; Yang 1971:67-68; Peterson
1979:74-76).
This
proved politically impossible,
however,and when rebel forces overran
Peking
in
April 1644, they found
the
treasuries
there virtually empty. The Ming dynasty fell, in part, because
it
simply did not
have
the
funds to continue
its
operations.
8
The
existence
of
the
Tokugawa
shogunate
was
not
in
serious
jeopardyduring
the
late
1630s and early 1640s, and one reason for
this
may
have
been
that
Shogun Iemitsu
In Kyoto,
on September 6, 1983, G. Wil-
liam Skinner observed
that much of my data
for
China
comes from
the
economically
advanced
southeast
of the
country,
and he warned
against
the
assumption that
China was a fully integrated eco-
nomic unit at this time.
This point is well taken,
but
I am not aware of any region of China that
escaped severe
economic problems during the
late
1630s
and
early
1640s, with the possible exception
of
the extreme southwest.
14
Although
the
statistical evidence
for
this
con-
tention is less than
satisfactory, the impression-
istic evidence seems to me to be overwhelming.
For
a
fuller
discussion, see Atwell 1977:10-13.
1
The
years 1659-1661
were an
exception
to
this. Exports of silver on Chinese and Dutch
vessels
approached,
and may have
exceeded, 100,000
ki-
lograms
annually. Nevertheless,
this
figure
is sub-
stantially below
the
150,000-200,000
kilograms
per year
that Kobata
and Iwao suggest
for the early-
seventeenth
century (see
Iwao
1953:22;
Yamawaki
1980:208).
16 In an ordinary deflation,
food prices
would
have
declined
along
with other prices. As
I
have
indicated,
however,
with domestic
rebellion, for-
eign
invasion, and climatic
disasters, the late
1630s
and
early 1640s
in
China
were
hardly ordinary.
17
On paper
currency during
the earlyMing dy-
nasty, see P'eng
1965:632-39;
Yang 1971:66-67.
18
This is not to suggest
that
the
dynasty
fell
solely
because of its monetary
difficulties.
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230
WILLIAM
S.
ATWELL
(r.
1623-1651) and
his
advisersmoved
much more
swiftly and
efficiently
than their
Chinese
counterparts
in dealing with the problems
that
confronted
them. 19
As
early
as
1633, traveling
inspectors
(junkenshi)
were being
dispatched
from
Edo to inves-
tigate living and other conditions in various parts of the country (Asao 1975:375-
77).
Then, in the
face
of worsening
economic conditions
in the late 1630s
and early
1640s, Iemitsu
issued a
stream
of frugality
and sumptuary
orders ken'yaku-rei)
hat
were designed
to
curb the extravagance
of
the military
and commercial
classes
and
thus to relieve
at least
some of the
pressure on what
the
bakufu referred
to as the
exhausted
peasantry(Tokugawa
ikki,
vol.
40:170, 188,
212, 226).
Despite these
and other
precautions,
Japanese
officials were
unable
to prevent the
great Kan'ei
famine.
As in China,
food prices
rose
to recordlevels
in the early
1640s,
and
many people
were forced
to sell their
farmtools
and animals,
their land,
and even
members of
their family
in
desperate
bids
to stay alive
(Nagakura
1982:75-78).2o
Others simply
abandoned
their holdings and
fled in the
hope
that
conditions
would
be
better elsewhere.2'
Most were
bitterly
disappointed.
The Kan'ei nikki zjho
[An
enlarged
dition of
the Daily Record
f the Kan'ei
period]
describes
the situation in
the
spring of
1642:
From
[the
second)
to the fifth
-month here
was a serious amine throughout
he
country.
The corpsesof
those
who had starved
o death filled
the streets
while the
peasants,
rtisans,
and merchants
who
begged
forfoodwere
numerous.None
of
these
people
had clothes
[and
could
only]
..
wrapstraw
and other
matting around
heir
bodies
br
protection.
They begged
n the marketplace
nd
slept along
the side
of the
road. Quoted
n Asao 1975:368;
ee alsoTokugawa
ikki,
vol. 40:258,
269-70, 272-
75,
and 280)
The reference
to begging
in the marketplace
s significant;
it
suggests
that
in
22
one
of
the
worst
years
of
the
great
Kan'ei
famine food
was
available,
if at a
price.
Moreover,
t indicates that, as
in
China,
the
troubles
of
the
early
1640s
were consid-
erably more complicated
than they
appearedto be.
That possibility
seems
to be con-
firmed by
Dutch
sources dating
from the same
period.
In April
1640, the
chief of
the Dutch factory
at
Hirado
visited Osaka
and was informed
that
contrary
to
ex-
pectations
commodity
prices
in the Kinai
region
had fallen following
the
expulsion
of
the
Portuguese from
Japan
the
previous
summer.
As
a
result,
many previously
wealthy merchants had been ruined, had abandonedtheir wives and children, and,
under intense pressure
from their creditors,
had even
committed
suicide (Dagregisters
1981,
vol. 4:
190_91).23 The situation
in the Kinai
region
remained
depressed
nearly
two years
later, when
another
Dutch official
was told that
many prominent
merchants
in
Kyoto
had gone
bankrupt since
1639 (Murakami
1956:158).
How
had
some
ofJapan's
wealthiest
and
most
experienced
raders
gotten
themselves
into such serious
difficulty? One
likely explanation
is that,
having
been
seriously
af-
fected by
the shogunate's decision
to sever
commercial
links with
the
Portuguese
in
Macao,
those traders
tried to
recoup
their
losses quickly by
assuming
that reduced
'9
With
a
smaller
territory
to
oversee
and with-
out
a
serious external threat,
the
bakufu was
in
a
much better position to respond to the problems
than was the Ming government.
20
For parallels in China
at
this time, see the
poem On
the
Selling
of Children (Mai erh hang)
in Ch'en 1803b:5/22a.
21
On peasant flight from the
land inJapan dur-
ing the Kan'ei period, see Aoki 1971:24-31; Na-
gakura 1982: 76-77.
22
For
parallels
in China's
lower Yangtze
delta
at
almost
precisely
the same time,
see Su-chou
u-
chih
1824:72/20b-21b;
Ch'en
1977, vol.
1:326-
30,
vol. 2:446-51.
23
I
am
grateful
to E. U. Kratz,
School of Ori-
ental and
African
Studies,
for helping
me with
the
original
Dutch. For
a
Japanese
translation
of
this
section
of the
Dagregisters,
ee Nagazumi 1970,
vol.
4:338-39.
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THE
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS IN
CHINA AND JAPAN
231
supplies of goods in Nagasaki
would automatically drive up
prices in the Kinai
and
elsewhere.24 If
so, they were sadlymistaken; silk
and other items
they purchased from
the Dutch and the Chinese in
1639 at what they thought were
good prices had
to
be sold in the face of the great Kan'ei famine and the shogunate'snew frugalityand
sumptuary
orders. Many of the latter dealt
specifically with
extravagant dress (see,
for
example,
Tokugawaikki, vol. 40:170), and it
therefore s not surprising that
mer-
chants involved
in the textile business soon found
themselves in
serious financialtrouble
(Boxer 1935:51;
Yamawaki 1972:15-16).25
As was true
in China at this
time, the financial problem was
made even worse by
unanticipatedmonetary
fluctuations. In March 1641, for example,
representatives
of
the English East
India Company in Surat informed
their colleaguesin Persiathat
three
Dutch
ships had just arrived in
port, having left
Japan four months earlier:
The Dutch factory.. hadbeen expectinga far morevaluable argoby theseships
than
they received.The
400 chests of Japan
silverare reduced o 140.... The vex-
atiousdiscourtesies f the
Japanese uthoritieshad reduced heir
usual profitof
60
percent ..
to 20 percent,norcould they but
with difficultyprocure ilver
n
return
because
Iemitsul
had
commandedhe closure
f
the silver
mines,
andwill
[they
fear]
next
yearprohibitthe exportation f
that
metal
altogether. Pratt
1931,
vol.
2:242;
see also Tashiro1982:293)
The fears
were not realized. The
mines remained
open, and, as
has
been noted,
Dutch
and Chinese
vessels continued to
export substantial quantities of silver from
Nagasaki
for several
decades.
Nevertheless, except for the years
1659- 1661,26 hogunal policies
helped to ensure that far less silver left Japan for foreign destinations than had been
the case at the
height of Japaneseforeign trade
earlier in the
century.
Why were Iemitsu, his
successors,
and
their advisers concerned about bullion
exports
when
they controlled
what
Kobata and others describe as some of
the richest
silver
mines on
earth? One
explanation
is
that
many
of those
mines were no
longer
as
productive
as
they had been
even a
short time
earlier.
7
For
example, during
the
early-
seventeenth
century, no Japanesemines were richer or
more
famous than
the
Omori
mines in
Iwami, the
Ikuno mine
in
Tajima,
the
Aikawa mines
in
Sado,
and
the Innai
mine
in
Akita.
Nevertheless,although detailed statistics
are
not
available, by
the
1630s
24
This,
at
least, is the impression
given in Dag-
registers1981, vol. 4:190-91.
25
The trade
policies of the
shogunate at this
time were somewhat
confusing. As Tashiro Kazui
points out
(1982:292-93), even before the Por-
tuguese were
expelled from Japan in 1639, sho-
gunal
officials
sought assurances from the
Dutch
that they would
be
able to
make up for any resulting
shortfall in raw
silk
imports.
When the
Dutch in-
creased their
shipments of silk
in
1640, however,
they
saw their profit margins drop
dramatically
be-
cause levels of demand in Japan were much lower
than
they had
anticipated.
Those levels
were
lower
in
part because of the shogunate's new
sumptuary
regulations. By encouraging
imports
of
silk and
then restricting its use
domestically,
the
authorities
in
Edo and Nagasaki helped to ensure
that Japanese
and
foreign merchants would both have
difficulties
in
the early 1640s.
26
See fn. 15 above.
27
Of
course,
there are other
explanations.
For
example, there can be little doubt that
the
bakufu
had been deeply worried
by the Shimabara
Rebel-
lion and
by the unrest that
had accompanied the
onset of
the great Kan'ei famine.
Under the cir-
cumstances,
the expulsion of
the Portuguese
from
Nagasaki,
the reduction of silver exports,
and the
establishment of
even stricter
control over foreign
trade must have had
great appeal on political
as
well
as
economic grounds. It
is also true that
even
before this time the
bakufu
had been moving to
consolidate
its position as the
dominant institu-
tional force in many
areas of Japanese life.
Hence
the prohibitions onJapanese nationals trading over-
seas (in 1633, 1634,
and 1635),
the
restrictions
placed
on Chinese commercial
activity (1635),
the
promulgation of statutes
making alternative
at-
tendance
for daimyo at the
shogunal court com-
pulsory
rather
than
voluntary
(1635), and
the
im-
plementation of a
new nationwide coinage
system
(1636). The policies
of the
late 1630s and early
1640s
can be seen as part of
an alreadywell-estab-
lished
process.
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232
WILLIAM S. ATWELL
Table
1.
Value of Silver in Japan, 1630-1647
(In number of copper coins
[mon}
per 16.875 grams
of silver)
Year
Mon Year
Mon
1630
236 1635
188
1631
250 1636
188
1632 250
1637
188
1633
243 1638
196
1634 205
1647 300
SOURCE: Kamiki and Yamamura (1977): table 12.
production at most
of the mines mentioned-if not at all of them-had
declined
substantially Murakami
1980:55-56; Kobata 1978a:75; Tanaka1980:134-35;
Sasaki
1983b: 183-85).
Of course, some mines experienced periods of
resurgence, others
reached their peaks
of production somewhat later, and new mines
were occasionally
opened.
It
seems likely, however,
that the
golden age
of
premodern
Japanese
bullion
production came to
an end no later than the
late 1630s.28
The possible
implications of this for Tokugawa economic history
are important.
If,
as
Ito
Tasaburo
and Enomoto
Soji
suggest, the extraordinary xpansion
of the late-
sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries
was dependent to
a
considerable
degree
on
regular and massive injections of gold and silver into the money supply,then a decline
in bullion production
and a slowdown in the rate of growth of the
money supply may
help to explain the
economic slowdown that occurred
in
Japan during
the
late
1630s
and early 1640s.29
The situation was not aided by the bakufu's
decision
to remove
copper
coins from
circulation
during
the
early 1630s
and
then,
beginning
in
1636,
to issue
a
new copper
coin,
the
Kan'ei
szuhj
Nihon
Ginko
1973,
vol.
2:127-31).
One
result
of
this
policy,
whatever
the
government's original
intention,
was to create sub-
stantial
instability
in the
silver-copperexchange
rate
(see
Table
1).
Copper
coins
were
widely
used in
commercial
transactions
at the time and perhaps one-third
of
the taxes
in
Japan were paid in money rather than
in kind
(Hayami 1982);
as
a
consequence
the
fluctuations revealed in table
1
are
likely to
have affected business
and consumer
confidence and to
have
contributed
to
the
economic
uncertainties
of
the
period.
The
above should not be construed to
mean
that the
high taxes,
adverse
weather
conditions,
and
poor
harvests mentioned earlier
were
unimportant.
It
does
suggest
that
these
phenomena should be interpreted
in light of
a
general economic
downturn
that
affected
urban
areas as
well
as rural areas and international
trade
as well
as
domestic
trade.
It
is of more
than
passing
interest that the worst
years
of
the Kan'ei famine
(1641- 1642) occurred
after he collapse
in
commodity prices reported
n the
Dagregisters
of
the Dutch
East India
Company (Dagregisters
1981,
vol.
4:190-91;
Murakami
1956:158). It is unlikely to have been a mere coincidence that in early 1641, a few
months after the Dutch and the Chinese had
made
disappointing
profits
on
their raw
silk
imports
into
Japan,
the
price of
raw silk
fell
sharply
and
unexpectedly
in the
28
This is
not to
suggest
that
production came
to a
halt. It
continued
on
a
steady if
reduced
basis
for
many
years
to come
at
some
mines.
29
A number
of other
factors
help to explain
this,
from
climatic
change
to
the Shimabara
Re-
bellion
to
the bakufu's
ken'yaku-rei.
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THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS IN CHINA AND JAPAN
233
Hu-chou region
of the Yangtze
delta (Shen
1958:290).30
As
in Japan, the result
was
widespread famine.
The
Chinese and Japanese
Economies
on Divergent
Paths
It might be helpful
for
those who are
still skeptical about the importance
of
Sino-
Japanesetrade
to the Chinese
economy
during
the mid-seventeenth
century
to quote
from
the June 1647
memorial
written by the new Ch'ing
viceroy of Kwangtung
and
Kwangsi, T'ung
Yang-chia
(d. 1648),
to the Shun-chih
emperor (r.
1644-1661):
During he Chia-ching
eign
[ 1522- 1566)
. . . [the
Portuguese]
radually
enetrated
the
borders f China
as faras Macao,
where hey
built a
permanentettlement.
Every
year hey
paid 500
taels. . . as ground
rent.
.
.
[and]
wereallowed
o
tradeannually
at Canton.... They anchoredhirty1ifrom hecity andcarried n commercial eal-
ings with the Cantonese.
Thus bothdomestic
and foreign
goods circulated reely
n
Kwangtung...
[and]
everyyear
22,000 taels were
paid
in customsduties....
Subsequently,
fficial
corruption
.. increased o
the point
that[the
Portuguese]
were driven to commit
violentacts
.... Afterwards,
heywere no longer
permitted
to go to
Canton. . .
[and]
Chinese
merchants
were obliged to
take their
goods
to
Macao o trade. This occurred
n
[1640).
Since
hen
[Chinese]
merchants
ave
experienced
epeated
ifficulties, oods
have
not
circulated,and
trade in
Kwangtung]
has cometo
a
[virtual]
halt. The people's
livelihoodshavethus been damaged
nd
the customsduties
collected
amount o
just
over 1,000
taels
per
year.
It therefores clear
hat when
the
people
romMacao
ome
to
trade,
Kwangtungprospers;
when
they do
not come,
Kwangtung uffers. Wen-
hsien s'ung-pien,
hi
24:19b)31
Although
Viceroy
T'ung apparently
knew nothing about
the
expulsion
of
the Por-
tuguese
from Nagasaki
in 1639
or thus
about the
primary reason
for
the decline of
Sino-Portuguese
trade,32
he obviously
was concerned
about
the
impact
of
that decline
on
the
region
for which
he was
responsible.
One of
his
purposes
in
submitting
the
memorialwas to
requestthat the
Portuguese once
again
be allowed
to
travel to Canton
in the hope that this
would help
to revive international
and domestic
tradein the
area
(Wen-hsien
s'ung-pien,
hi
24:
19b-20a).
Since
the vast
majority
of
what
the
Portuguese
carriedto Cantonbefore 1640 was Japaneseand Spanish-American ilver, there can be
little
doubt
that one of T'ung's
main worries
was
the
severe
monetary shortage33
hat
had
been plaguing
the region since
the
early 1640s (Boxer
1948:149;
Foster 1913:250).
Although
economic
conditions
in
Kwangtung
and other
parts
of China
gradually
improved
in the 1650s, monetary
problems
persisted.
One
indication of
this was
the
decision of
the
Ch'ing government
in
1650
to
issue new
paper
notes
to
help pay
for
its military operations
against
Ming
rebels.34Very
little is known
about
these
notes,
30
Silk prices
in
Hu-chou were also affected at
this
time
by deteriorating economic conditions
in
China and by a decline in Sino-Spanish trade in
Manila (see Atwell 1977:15-20).
3'
This translation is based
in
part
on one of
the
same passages
in
Fu 1966, vol. 2:7.
32
Commerce
in
the
Macao-Canton region also
was being affected
at
this time by a decline
in
Sino-
Spanish trade and by the temporary refusal of
Ma-
canese merchants to trade in
Manila when they
learned of Portugal's rebellion
against Spain
in
Eu-
rope (see Blair and Robertson
1903-1909, vol.
29:208-58;
Boxer
1974:73-82).
33
By monetary shortage I do not mean to
suggest
that stocksof silver
in
Kwangtung
or in the
rest of China at this time
were low. The
point is
that, because of economic
and political uncertain-
ties, much of that silver
was being
hoarded, thus
removing it from circulation.
34
For
a
meticulously
researched
and
readable
account of the resistance
movement against
the
Ch'ing, see
Struve 1984.
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234
WILLIAM
S. ATWELL
but
apparentlythey were
unpopular with the
Chinese
people and were removed
from
circulation in
1661, long
before the government's
military
problems had been
solved
(P'eng
1965:807-8; Yang
1971:68). In the
meantime,
the country's
monetary situ-
ation was deteriorating foranotherreason.During the late 1650s and early 1660s, the
Ch'ing authorities
in Peking
reluctantly
concluded that drastic
action was necessary
to
bring seaborne Ming
loyalists
such as Cheng
Ch'eng-kung (1624-1662)
to their
knees.
Among the policies
decided on was the
forcible
evacuationof thousands
of towns
and villages
along
the
southeastern
coast
in
an
attempt
to
eliminate
the illicit trade
on which
Cheng
had built
an
economically
prosperous and,
for the
Ch'ing
at
least,
militarily
dangerousmaritime
empire that
stretched from
Nagasaki to Southeast Asia
(Kessler
1976:39-46; Wills
1979:223-32).
Although the
coastal evacuation
policy
was
not
always
strictly enforced,
it
and
related
policies remained
in
effect
for more
than
twenty years,
and eventually they
had the desired
result: Chengand his
successors
were denied the resourcesnecessary to maintain their resistance to Manchurule, and
their last remaining
stronghold,
Taiwan, was
taken in 1683.
The
Ch'ing
authorities paid a price
for this military
success,
however, for the trade
that
hadenriched
ChengCh'eng-kung
had also
brought economic
benefits to the coastal
regions of
China.
More specifically, the
contactsof the
Cheng family
in
Japan
enabled
the
family to
exchange
considerable quantities
of Chinese silk
and other goods for
Japanese
silver (Iwao
1953:22). At least
some of that silver
then filtered into Manchu-
controlled
portions of China,
where
it
undoubtedly
helped
to
augment
the
money
supply. 5
Once the
coastal-evacuationpolicy had
been
implemented, however,
he
quan-
tity of
silver (and, as we shall
see,
copper) flowing into China
again dropped
sharply.
This
contributed to
an
economic contraction so
severe
that
one
scholar
has
begun
to
refer
to
the
early
K'ang-hsi reign (c.
1661-1685)
in
China
as a
time
of economic
depression
(Kishimoto-Nakayama
1982, 1984). Depression or
not,
for much
of
this
period grain
prices
in
many
parts of
the
country were
unusually
low,36manufactured
goods sold
poorly,
and large numbers of
people-some of whom
previously
had been
very
wealthy-experienced severe
hardships.37At the
time, one of the most
popular
explanations
for
these
phenomena
was
the
scarcity of
silver,
a
situation
that
many
contemporarywriters
understood to be directly related
to the government's
prohibitions
on
maritime trade
(ibid.).38
Japan'seconomic situation was rather different at this time. After brief but no-
ticeablepauses
during
the
late 1640s and
early 1650s, Japanese
grain
prices resumed
an
upward, though
somewhaterratic,
path (Yamazaki
1983:49-135),39
urban
growth
3 All of the premier silk-producing regions in
China were
in
Manchu hands by the late 1640s.
36
As specialists are aware, grain prices in
China also were low at this time because population
losses that had occurred during the Ming-Ch'ing
transition
had
lowered the overall demand for food-
stuffs and caused marginal lands to be
taken
out
of production. More research on the subject is
needed, but it is also possible that climatic con-
ditions had
improved or
that
farmers had been suc-
cessful in adapting to the climatic changes that had
taken place.
37
Among
the areas
most seriously
affected
was
the lower
Yangtze delta,
a
fact
that
may help
to
explain the famous Chiang-nan Tax Case of the
early 1660s, in which many members of the
Chiang-nan elite were arrested,
and
some
were
ex-
ecuted, for
tax delinquency and for alleged
anti-
government
activity (including
aiding and abetting
Cheng Ch'eng-kung). Additional
research on this
case is needed,
but it is unlikely that thousands
of
people would
have put their lives at risk simply
out
of greed,
obstinacy, or loyalty
to the fallen
Ming.
A more likely explanation
is that many of those
who
were involved found it difficult to pay what was
being
demanded of them. For
general
discussions
of some of these issues,
see Wakeman 1975:9- 13;
Dennerline 1975:110-113;
Kessler 1976:30-39;
Beattie 1979:70-75.
38
The
articles
by Kishimoto-Nakayama
are es-
sential reading
for
anyone
concerned with early
Ch'ing
economic
and
political thought.
39
For
charts on Japanese grain prices
during
the seventeenth century, see
Iwahashi
1981:411.
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THE
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
CRISIS
IN
CHINA
AND
JAPAN
235
revived
(Rozman
1973:287-88;
Hauser
1974:11-23;
Nakamura
1981:290-91),
and
foreign trade
showed
considerable
vitality (Innes
1980:409-29). How is
this to be
explained,
particularly in
light of
Japan's
previously
close
economic ties
with China?
Thereareseveralpossibleanswers.First, unlike their counterparts n Peking, shogunal
officials
did not
have to
finance
protracted
and
costly
campaigns
against rebel
forces.40
As
Kishimoto-Nakayama
indicates
(1984:233-34), in
early Ch'ing
China
such cam-
paigns drew
sorely needed
funds away
from
some of
the most
dynamic
sectorsof the
economy,helping
to
create the
shortage
of silver.' 4'
Second, the
fact that
Japan
was
generally at
peace
after the
Shimabara
uprising
probably meant that
the famines
and
epidemics that
struck
the
country in the
late
1630s
and early
1640s
were less
damaging
demographically
than
those that
occurred
in
war-torn
China at
the same
time. Carlo
Cipolla
has
noted that
premodern
armies
on the march
usually were far
more
efficient
in
destroyingcrops
and
spreading
diseases
thanthey were in waging war(Cipolla 1976:151). Proportionally peaking,
then, levels
of
demand in
Japan
should have
remained
higher than
those
in
China,
a fact
that
would
help
to explain
why, by the
165Os at
least,
Japanese grain
prices were
rising
while
those
in
Chiang-nan
and in
many other
parts of
China were
beginning to
fall
sharply
(Nakayama
1979b:80; Iwahashi
1981:411;
Kishimoto-Nakayama
1984).42
Third,
the
Japanese appear
to
have been
far
more successful than
the
Chinese
in
managing their
monetary system
during
the second half
of
the
seventeenth
century.
This
was
partially
due to
the
reduction in
silver exports,43
which
freed
more of
the
metal
for domestic
use, but
it
was
also due to the
reintroduction
of
the
copper
coins
known
as the
Kan'ei-tsuhJn
the
mid- 1650s.44
The
government was aided in
the latter
effortby a
steady increase
in
copper
production,45and
by
the
Kambun
period
(1661-
1673),
shogunal
mints
were turning
out excellent
copper coins
in
large
quantities
(Nihon
Ginko
1973,
vol.
2:130- 1).
Meanwhile,
the
Ch'ing government's
prohibitions
on maritime
trade
drastically
reduced
imports
of
Japanese
copper
as
well
as
silver,
thereby
causing several
provincial mints
to be shut
down
in
the
early
1670s (Hall
1949:451-52). The
Ch'ing
monetary
system
was in
serious
disarray
while that
in
Japan
had
achieved
a
temporary but
very welcome
equilibrium.
Finally, it
should
be noted
that,
although Chinese
goods
and
raw materials
were
highly
prized by
Japanese merchants and
consumers,
alternative
sources were available
for most
items.
In the
case
of
raw
silk,
for
example,
it-was
possible
to
find
acceptable,
if
not
ideal,
substitutes in
Japan itself
or,
through the
Dutch
and
the
Cheng
family,
in
SoutheastAsia,
Bengal, or
even Persia
(Glamann
1953-
1954:46-47).46
Moreover,
40
With the
exception of
the
Shimabara cam-
paign of
1637-1638, of
course.
41
Another
factor that
helped to
cause
this
shortage
was the
San-fan,
or
Three
Feudatories,
Rebellion,
which
lasted
from
1673 to
1681.
Not
only was
the
rebellion
expensive
to put
down
but
the
hostilities
made it
difficult
for the
Ch'ing to
obtain
access to Yunnan
and
Kweichow,where
some
of the empire's richest silver mines were located.
42
4
Note that there
were
occasional
sharp
falls
in
Japanese
grain
prices
during
the
second
half of
the
seventeenth
century
as well.
Nevertheless, unlike
China,
the
overall
trend
was
up.
43
In
1668,
the
bakufu
finally
ordered a
total
ban
on
silver
exports.
This did
not stem
the flow
immediately or
entirely, but
by the end
of
the
sev-
enteenth
century
.
.. silver
exports from
Nagasaki
had
dwindled
to
a
mere
trickle
(Tashiro
1982:295).
Tashiro
points
out,
however, that
ad-
ditional
silver was sent to China
via Korea, al-
though the amounts
involved
(less than 6,000 ki-
lograms per year, on
average)
were
quite small when
compared
to those exported from
Japan during the
early- and
the
mid-seventeenth century.
44
Following the unsuccessful
launch
of
the
original
Kan'ei suib
in
the late
1630s,
the
sho-
gunate suspended the
production of the
coins dur-
ing the early 1640s. Faced with a shortage of copper
coins
in
the
1650s,
however, the bakufu resumed
production, this time with
considerable
success
(Nihon Gink6 1973, vol.
2:131).
45
As
gold and
silver
production declined in
mid-seventeenth-century Japan,
copper production
rose sharply.
46
Whenever it
was available,
however, Chinese
silk was
preferred until well into the
eighteenth
century.
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236
WILLIAM S.
ATWELL
these substitutes often could be bought
with copper, something that, given
the decline
in the production of gold and silver,
the shogunate became more and more anxious to
use for overseas purchases (Glamann 1953-1954:55-60; Whitmore 1977:18-19;
Innes 1980:586-87). Under the
circumstances, it is hardly surprising
that the Dutch
East
India Company made some of its greatest profits in Japan in the years from 1664
to 1673, at a time when direct trade
with China was particularly difficult (Gaastra
1981:64).
In
part because of the shogunate'strade and monetary policies, and
in
part
because
of greatly increased copper production,
Japan recoveredmore quickly
than China from
its seventeenth-centurycrisis. As Ivo
Schoffer (1978) has suggested with regard to
the Dutch Republic in
seventeenth-centuryEurope, to speak ofJapan'sproblemsduring
the 1640s and early 1650s as a crisis may be exaggerated and misleading. Famine
conditions, the ronin masterless
samurai)conspiraciesof
the
early 1650s,
and the
great
Edo fire of 1657 were dealt with
quickly and relatively efficiently. Meanwhile, daimyo
such as Ikeda Mitsumasa and han
(daimyo domain) officials
such as Kumazawa
Banzan
and Nonaka Kenzan were carrying out local reforms that served to strengthen the
Tokugawa system from the bottom up
(Hall 1966:402-8, 1970; Jansen 1968:122-
28; Sasaki 1981:285-91).
It
is nevertheless interesting and probably significant that the Tokugawaeconomy
does not
appear
to have
resumed
the exuberant
growth
that
characterized
t
during
the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenthcenturies until the Ch'ing authorities lifted
the ban on maritime trade and the
Chinese economy also expanded
with some
vigor.
Given
the
dramatic increase
in
direct
Sino-Japanese
trade
after the
Ch'ing conquest
of
Taiwan in
1683, some figures for
which
appear
in
table 2,
it
seems reasonableto
speculate
that
the remarkableprosperity of
GenrokuJapan (c.
1688-
1703)
was
directly
and intimately related to that of late-seventeenth-century
China.47
This time,
however,
Japanesecopper as well as silver helped to bind the two economies together (Hall 1949;
Yamawaki
1972:216-22;
Innes
1980:526-32).
The renewed surge
in
Sino-Japanese rade was
relatively
short-lived.
The
monetary
needs of both countries expanded at the turn
of
the
eighteenth century,
and
Japanese
mines were
unable to
keep pace
with the
demand for
precious
metals.
The
shogunate
was
forced to impose new export restrictions and, although
trade continued
at
reduced
levels
for many years to come, the two
economies began to drift apart. Resuming large-
scale imports of silver from Europe, South
Asia, and, especially, Spanish America,
China
became ever more
deeply
involved
in the
emerging
world
economy. Japan,
after
more than
a
century of vigorous
international
economic
activity
that was
fueled
by
its
once
spectacular
but now
greatly
reduced
production
of
gold, silver,
and
copper,
settled into the relative self-sufficiencythat was
to deeply color
its
history
for
the next
150 years.
Conclusion
It was the good fortune of the Tokugawa shogunate to be able to close Japan's
borders to
foreign military
threats
in
1639
and to
concentrate,
for
a
time
at
least,
on
the
rehabilitation of the domestic
economy.48
At
the time
many
Chinese
undoubtedly
47
Japanese-Korean trade
and
Sino-Japanese
trade via
Korea flourished
during the late-seven-
teenth
century as well (see Tashiro 1976, 1981).
48
It
should be evident that I
do not mean to
suggest
that
those borders were
hermetically
sealed
or
that
shogunal policies
during
the
1630s and
1640s were determined
on economic grounds alone.
For important
new interpretations of the political
and ideological
aspects of
the seclusion (sakoku)
policy, see Toby 1977, 1984;
Tashiro 1982.
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THE
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
CRISIS IN CHINA AND
JAPAN
237
Table
2.
Number of Ships from the
Chinese Mainland
Arriving
in
Nagasaki
(1661-1700)
Year
Number of Ships
Year
Number of
Ships
1661
29 (4) 1681 0
1662
17(18)
1682
5
1663
16
1683
2
1664
24 (1)
1684
9
1665
6 (5)
1685 72 (5)
1666
2
1686
87
1667 2 (2) 1687 112(17)
1668
6(12)
1688
171 (3)
1669
4(11)
1689
66
1670
7 (9)
1690 75
1671
6 (1) 1691
75 (1)
1672 4
1692
63
1673
3 (3)
1693
60
(3)
1674
7 1694
49 (4)
1675
7
1695
57 (3)
1676 8
1696
39(24)
1677 7 1697 80 (1)
1678
9
1698
54
(2)
1679
14
1699
61
1680
5 1700
46
SOURCE:
Iwao
(1953:
12- 13). Numbers in
parentheses represent
additional
ships
whose
ports
of
origin
are
unclear;
these ships
may
have been from
the Chinese
mainland.
wished to do
the
same
thing.
Unfortunately
from
their
point
of
view,
the Manchus
were
unwilling to cooperate.
Yet,
whatever their
very different
political fates, Toku-
gawa,
Ming, and, belatedly,
Ch'ing officials
had to
contend
with
a
number
of similar
problemsduring the seventeenth century. At least some of the problems-poor har-
vests, famine
conditions,
outbreaks of epidemic
disease, monetary
fluctuations,
and
price
instability-were interrelated.
It
is
possible
to
study
these
phenomena
in iso-
lation,
to insist that much
more work
needs
to be
done
on
the
national histories
of
China
and
Japan
(or Korea,
Vietnam,
and
the
Philippines)
before
meaningful
com-
parisons are
attempted.
Recent research
has
demonstrated,49
however, that
the
bound-
aries
between national
and international
history
in
early-modern
East
Asia
were
far
from clear-cut.
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