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ROBERTLATHAMProgramDirectorforInternationalPeaceandSecurity
SocialScienceResearchCouncil
ThePoli
t
icsandH
ist
oryof
ResponsibilityAcrossBoundaries
Timeandagainwearetoldthatinthisageofglobalization, oldwallsare
crumbling. Money, products, ideas, images, andsometimespeopleare
flowingfreelyacrossnational bordersatanincreasingrate.Thereissome
truthtothisscenario. Butitleavesoutsomethingtheconstructionofnewwalls
that, paradoxically, arewhatmakestheseflowspossibleinthefirstplace.Moving
acommodityorideaacrossoldwallsfromonepersonshandsdirectlytoanotherskeepsitoutofthehandsofuninitiatedthirdparties.Thisiswhatthesenetworks
allow:movementalongnarrowchannelsofpeopleandplacesdirectlyconnected
tooneanother, leavingoutthosewhoarenotconnected. Evenwhennetworks
formmarkets, forexample, forcurrencyorcomputerequipment, theyremain
moreor lessexclusiveclubsofmemberswithtechnologicalaccessorexpertise
buyingandsellingacrossnationalspacesandtimezones.
Asnetworksofexchangeexpandaroundtheworld, allsortsofnewwalls
springup betweentheeducatedanduneducated, theprosperousandpoor, the
mobileandimmobile. Thesewallsmaynot beasvisibleasthosethatthestate
maintainsthrough, forinstance, customsofficials. Buttheycan berestrictiveand
confining, especiallytothosegroupsandindividualsthataredisenfranchised.
Thatwehave boththeendofoldwallsandthemakingofnewones
reflectsa basicfact. Socialandpoliticallifehas beenshaped bytwocountervailing
tendencies. Ononehand, statesandmarketscanextendthemselvesintoanex-
pandingrangeofplacesandentermoredeeplyintothelivesofindividualsand
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acrosstwooceanstotradeandproselytize.ThusTheodoreRooseveltcouldcom-
fortablyexclaim, Thehistoryofthenationisin largepartthehistoryofthe
nationsexpansion.1
InEuropeaswell, expansionhasarobustlegacythatisnotmerelyafunc-
tionofthedriveforoverseasempire, worldmarkets, orlargernationalterritory.T.H.Marshall, forinstance, arguedthatthescopeofcitizenshiprightsinEurope
keptexpandingacrossthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturies.Whereonceitwas
limitedtocivilrights, citizenshipalsocametoincorporatepoliticalandsocial
rights.2TheproportionofaEuropeancountryspopulationthatwasgrantedfull
citizenshipalsoexpanded.Morerecently, socialtheoristsfromJurgenHabermas
toMichelFoucaulthavedrawnattentiontotheexpandingrangeofactivitiesin
whichtwentieth-centurystateshave becomedirectlyinvolved, suchashealthcare
andsocialsecurity, takingoverfromchurch, family, andneighborhood.Themir-
rorreflectionofthisprocessintheeconomicrealmistheexpansionofmarket
relationsintonewsocialfro
ntiersasmoresocialservicesareofferedforsale, s
u
ch
aschildcareandeducation.3
Whetherone believesstates, markets, empires, societies, orpoweritself
exhibitsagrowth ... towhichthereisnolimit,4confinementnotjustexpan-
sionalsohashadapowerfulholdourpoliticalimaginations. Oftenconfine-
mentdevelopsasareactiontoexpansion. Inthisageofeconomicglobalization,
theattempttolimittheeffectsofinternationalmarketsonlocalandnationallife
isfamiliartomostpeople.Thepracticeandtheoryofthestatehaveincorporated
avarietyofconfinements. ConsiderthatAmericanconstitutionalismreallywas
anethicofconfinement. Checksand balances, theseparationofpowers, andthe
ruleoflawareallexamplesofconfinementsinternaltotheoperationofthestate.
Butsoistheattempttoconcentratepoweratonelevelofgovernment, suchasthepresidency, attheexpenseofanother, suchaslocaljurisdictions.
Overthelasttwodecadestheconfinementofstatepowerandauthority
has beencloselyassociatedwithwhatcameto belabeledneoliberalism.Mecha-
nismsofprivatizationcurtailedstatefunctions, leavingittotheprivatesectorto
provideservicesormanageindustries. Itmay benocoincidencethattheriseof
neoliberalismoccurredintheaftermathofthe 1970s, whenmanycommentators
arguedthatstateactivities becameoverloadedastheyexpandedintotoomany
areasofpeopleslives. Astatethathadexpanded beyonditslimits, theargument
went, couldsatisfynooneandriskedinstabilityin boththedevelopedanddevel-
opingworlds.5
Neoliberalismisanattempttoputalimitonwhatthestatecandoin
society. Suchlimitsarenothingnew. Sometimesactorsinthestateitselfexplicitly
layoutalogicofconfinementastheSupremeCourtdidin 1935 whenitem-
phaticallyclaimedthatthepresidenthad beengivenpowerthatwasunconfined
andvagrant ... notcanalizedwithin bankstokeepitfromoverflowing.6Con-
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sideralsothatcivilrightsmarknotjustentitlements butalsothelimitsofinter-
ferenceofthestateinitscitizenslives. Fromtheoppositedirection, someorigi-
naldraftersoftheU.S. Constitutionvigorouslysoughttoconfinetheinfluence
thatprivateinterestscouldhaveovergovernmentalaffairs.
Additionalsociety-centeredformsofconfinement besidesthenetworksmentionedaboveincludetheenclavesofeliteswhoconfinethemselvesinsecure,
gatedcommunitiessymbolicandrealaswellasthetragicethnicenclavesthat
arescatteredacrosstheBalkans. Onecouldalsoincludezonesofinternational
governance, suchasrefugeecampsthatare fencedofffromtheirpoliticaland
socialenvirons.
Indevelopedtypicallydemocraticcountries, groupsandindividuals
canconfinethemselvesinenclaves, clubs, orassociations, becausetheyhavethe
rights todo such things. In thesecases, publicauthority functions toprovide
groupswiththelegalframeworkto
wallthemselvesofforformexcl
u
sivenetworks. Indeveloping societies,
local communities can also avoid
participationin, orinteractionwith,
publicauthorityattimes.8Inthese
cases, somethingiswrongwiththe
publicauthorityofthestate:itmight
notonly becorrupt but beabsent
fromplacesorareasof life, leaving
communitieswith few choices re-
gardingtheirrelationshiptoit. The
state inthisinstanceisconfined, perhapstosmall islandsofpresenceacrossaterritoryortothecapitalcity, notasamatterofideologicalchoiceorprogram but
outofnecessityandduetoalackofpower.
Likeexpansion, confinement isnotarecentphenomenon. Wenaturally
emphasizetheexpansionisttendenciesofimperialism, butempireshaveinvolved
someseriousconfinements, aswell. Indirectrulethroughlocalpoliticalfigures
oftenwasaretreatfrommoreambitiousplansfordirectrule.9Colonies, par-
ticularlyearlyon, were bytheirnatureconfinedaspointsofentryforsettlersin
moreexpansive, andperhapshostile, places, suchasthecoastlinesofAfricaand
NorthAmerica.
Ingeneral, mostsocialandpoliticalphenomenahave bothconfiningand
expansionarydimensions. Whatisimportanttothequestionofresponsibilityis
themixofthetwotendencies, asinthecaseofexpansionaryempiresthatmade
claimsonlargemassesoflandandpeoples, butwhichwererelativelyconfinedin
theirabilitytogovernthemorinthecaseofnetworksthatmayreachexten-
sivelyacrossspaces butwhichdosothrougharelativelynarrowrangeofpartici-
Like expansion, confinementis not a recent phenomenon.
We naturally emphasize theexpansionist tendencies ofimperialism, but empires
have involved some serious
confinements, as well.
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pants.Thepointisthatthesemixescreatetensionsthatshapeinternationalpoli-
ticsandtheproblemofresponsibilityacross boundaries.
LogicsofConfinement
Howdoesconfinementwork?Theaboveexamplesonlyindirectlyrevealthean-
swer.Togetthereweshouldstartwithsome basicdistinctions. Socialforcessuch
asstatesormarketscan beconfinedregardinghowmanypeopleandplacesthey
reachbreadthorhowdeeply theypenetrate intoparticularareasof life in
thoseplacesdepth. Overthelastdecade, forexample, leadersintheEuropeanUnionarguedoverwhetherexpansionshouldoccur byincorporatingnewmem-
bersbreadthorgettingmoredeeplyinvolvedinthegovernanceofsociallife
withintheUniondepth.
Onealsocandistinguishformsofconfinement basedonwhoisdoingthe
confining. O
nonehand, somegro
u
porpoliticalmoveme
ntcan
targe
t some-
thing besides itself for confinement aswhenU.S. conservatives advocate
privatization.Ontheother, agroupororganizationcanseekitsownconfinement
aswhensomeorganizationorgrouplimitsitsactionsinordertopreventharmto
others, theclassicexample beingenvironmentalpollution.
Thelatterwemaylabelself-confinementandhasalottodowiththe
notionthatactorscanconfinetheiractivitiesaspartofastrategytoachievetheir
largeraims. Theycanchoosetoengageordisengage. Strategy isthechoiceof
pointsforceshould beappliedto, asLeninhasfamouslyclaimed. Alongthese
lines, Europeanempire-buildersoftenwouldtargetzonesoftheirempiresthat
they believedwereworthdevelopmentand investment, ignoring, as best they
could, therest.Self-confinementandstrategicengagementaretwosidesofthesamecoin.
Theymakepossiblewhatmany believeisthekeymodeofactionacross bound-
ariestoday, flexibility,thatis, thecapacitytomoveacrosssocialspaces, tochange
commitments, andtoshiftinvestmentsquickly basedonchangingconditions.
Flexibilitymeritssomeofourattention becauseitraisesimportantissues bearing
ontransboundaryresponsibility.
Flexibilitywasfirstassociatedwithnewinvestmentandcorporatestrate-
giesstressingtheabilitytodecentralizeactivitiesandmovefreelyaroundthe
globe. Itrecentlyalsohas begunto beassociatedwithstates.10Typically, astate
thatisflexibleisthoughtto beonethatcanrespondrapidlytochangesinthe
international, especiallyeconomic, realm, alteringitsdomesticandforeignpoli-
ciesaccordingly.11Whatisinterestingaboutconsideringstatesasflexibleisthat,
incontrasttocorporations, theyareexpectedto beotherwise. Thatis, theyare
expectedaspublicauthoritiestoestablishlong-lastingcommitments, whichcan
changeonlythroughcomplicatedpoliticalprocesses.Oneroadto becomingflex-
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ibleistoprivatizeandhollowoutastate byreducingthe breadthofactivities
andresponsibilitiesthat itundertakes. Thisgivesastateoptionsregardingthe
areasitworksin, forexample, education, health, andtheeconomy;howitdoes
so;andwithwhomitworks, forexample, partnershipswiththeprivatesector.
Notethatactingstrategicallyinthiswayimpliesneitherthatstatessimplyaresimplyretreatingordisempoweringthemselvesnorthattheyare becoming
minimalorpurelylaissez-faire. Astrategicstatecanmoveoutofand backinto
activities, alliances, orinvolvementsinspecificlocaleswithinitsterritory. Are-
cent example is the relationshipof theUnitedStates to the Internet. From a
crucialstartingpointofnurturingthedevelopmentoftheInternet, thestatepulled
back. Butnowitseemsto bere-enteringthisdomaintoregulatesubstanceandto
providesecurity. HeretheUnitedStatesisastrategicpower, makingchoicesand
controllingdeploymentsandengagements to somedegree, although from the
outsideitappearssimplyinconsistentandconfused. Strategicstatescansome-
timesprod
u
cealargeapparatu
sofdisengageme
nt, aswesee
todayi
ntheattemp
t
todismantlethewelfarestatethroughratherextensiveprogramsofwelfare-to-
work.
Itneednotonly beWesternstatesthatcanenjoythissortofpower. A
shifthas beenobserved, forexample, inGuatemala, whichnowcan beseenstra-
tegicallypickingthesocialproblemsandconflictsittakesonaswellasthelocales
inwhichitintervenes, whereasinthepastitconfrontedconflictsacrossitsterri-
tory.12OnestudentofAfricanstatesnotesthatoutsourcingstatefunctionslike
securitytoprivateactorssuchasmercenaryfirmsleavesrulersunconstrained by
popularor bureaucraticopinion,able tomakedecisionsquicklyandreverse
coursewithrelativelylittleencumbrance.13
Thekeyingredientstostrategicengagementandthevariousdimensionsofconfinementdiscussedabovearespaceandtime. Anorganizationlikeastate
canmakechoicesaboutwhichgeographicalspaces, aparticulartownordistrict,
orwhichsocialspaces, adomainlikeeducation, tooperateinrecognizingthat
therearepressuresfromcreditorsorlobbyists. Itisexactly becausenormsofsov-
ereignty, sanctified bytheUN, makethe boundariesofnationalterritoriesrela-
tivelystablethatstatesnolongerfearasmuchasinthepastthatstrategicretreats
insidetheirown boundarieswillcreatevacuumsto befilled byoutsideinvaders.
Timematters, fortohavesuchrelativechoicesistosettemporallimitstocom-
mitments, optingfortemporaryengagementsoverpermanentones.
Strategicengagementandflexiblepoliciesseemto beinconsistentwith
theestablishmentoflongstandingmoralcommitmentstowell beingthatweas-
sociatewithnationalandinternationalprogramsofeducation, healthcare, and
incomeredistribution. Butthisdoesnotmeanthatethicsandresponsibilityare
editedoutofthepicture. Onthecontrary, asIargueinthenextsection, many
decisionsorchoiceshaveethicaldimensionsthatareoftenforgotten.Thus, ethi-
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calproblemsandquestionsofresponsibilitycanmultiplyinthefaceofthechoices
associatedwithstrategicengagement inwaysthatareoftenconvenientlyover-
looked. Indeed, ifitistruethat, asonetheoriststates, nomatterwhatitsform
powerisalwaysanexerciseinappliedmorals,14thenthemanystrategicdeci-
sionsthatanorganizationmakesundertheguiseofflexibilityforceittoconfront,manytimesover, questionsofresponsibility.
ConfinementandResponsibilityAcrossBoundaries
Onitsface, confinementmayseemto betheperfectwaytocontainresponsibility
across boundaries. Anorganizationcancutitselfofffromforcesthatmightother-
wisemakeethicalorpoliticalclaimsonitsactions. Atransnationalcorporation
canworkthroughlocaljointventurespartnerswhoshieldthatcorporationfrom
directexpos
u
retotheclaimsoflocalcomm
unitiesorgover
nment
sabout
pollu
-tion, payscales, oraccesstoresources. Astateis, ofcourse, inprincipleasuperb
confinersinceits bordersarenotonlysupposedtopreventoutsideforcesfrom
intervening inside, butalso to limit state responsibility for socialorder to the
peopleandplaceswithinitsnationalspace.
Butconfinementisonething, andeliminationisanother. Everyconfine-
ment beginswithanethicaldecisionaboutwhat iskeptoutorwhat isto be
confined.Thisis, ofcourse, anegativeexercise, referringtowhatonewillnotdo
ordealwith.Nonethelessitismoralchoice.Thatanorganizationwillinsertitself
insomelocaleforcesitrightofftofaceethicalquestionsaboutthenatureofits
presenceinthatplace. Howmuchwillitconformtolocallawsortakeintocon-
siderationitsimpactonlocalpoliticallife?Silenceonalltheseissuesisnoescape,fornotonlydotheissuesremain, butsilenceitselfisamoralchoicetoconfine
ethicaldiscourse. Organizationsarealwaysmakingmoralargumentsabouttheir
missionsacross borders:forcorporationsitisthepursuitofprofitandtheeffi-
cientuseofresourcesthatareusedtolegitimatetransboundaryactivities. States
usevaluessuchassecuritytodothesame.
Thereisanassumptionthatpowerfultransnationalactorstodaycanchoose
to bestrategicaccordingtotheirowninterestsandself-definedmissions, aslong
astheyappeartoabide bydomesticandinternationallawanddonotegregiously
violate internationalnormsof sovereignty. Thechoice toengageordisengage
basedononesownself-definedinterestshasnotalways beenasreadilyavailable
topowerfulactorsintheinternationalrealmasitseemsto benow. Inthepast,
empiredrewpeopleandplacesintocommontransboundarypoliticalframeworks
organizedaroundasystemofauthorityanchoredatametropole. Inprinciple,
thatauthorityisaresponsibilitytomaintainorderwithintheempire. While, as
mentionedabove, agentsofempireexplorers, armies, consuls, andgovernors
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sibleandconscientiousactors, partnerswiththecommunitiestheyoperate in.
Theysometimesundertakesocialprogramstoprove it. Theyalsomountlegal
defensesagainst lawsuitsandtrytodefuse boycotts. InplaceslikeAfricaand
CentralAsiatheymight buyoffgovernmentofficialsorhiretheirownprivate
securityfirmstodefendagainstlocalsabotageoractsofviolentresistance.Allofthismay beviewedmerelyasthecostofdoinginternational business.
But thenotion that such tacticscan succeed inconfining claims restson the
assumptionthatclaimsaboutcorporateresponsibilitywillmoreorless bethe
sameinthefutureastheyhave beeninthepast. Inotherwords, furtherexpan-
sionsofclaimsaboutaccountabilityandresponsibilityareto bediscounted, and
thepossibility thatactivists learn fromoneanotherscampaignsand findnew
waystosupportoneanotherisignored. Ifitisthecasethatweareonlyatthe
beginningofanerawithinwhichresponsibilityacross boundariesiscontested,
thencorporationswillhavetothinkhardaboutwhethertheattempttoconfine
claimsthrou
gh
avoidanceis
the bes
toveralls
trategy. Aswe
havesee
n, co
nfine-mentrequiresthemaintenanceofboundaries. Ifthesystemofboundarymainte-
nancedependsondefensiveandevasivetactics, thenthatleavesroomforclaim-
antslikeactivists, governments, andcommunityorganizationstodefine, articu-
late, anddisseminatenewconceptsoftransboundaryresponsibilitywithoutthe
participationofcorporationsthemselves.
Thesesortsofexpansionarypressuresincreaseincentivesforcorporations
tofashioninternationalregimesincooperationwithstatesandmultilateralorga-
nizationsliketheWTOandtheUN.Theseregimescanoperateovertheheadsof
activistsandlocalcommunities, regulatingthingslikeintellectualpropertyrights
andenvironmentalpractices. Regimescandefineandlimit, thatis, confine, re-
sponsibilityaccordingtotheinterestsofpowerfulstatesandcorporations.WhiletheUNefforttoforgeanewglobalcompact between business, NGOs, states,
andlaborisworthwhile, itisatop-downapproachmoreorlessworkingoutof
NewYork, Paris, andGeneva. Although some internationalNGOsmight be
broughttothetable, especiallyinareasliketheenvironment, thevastmajorityof
grassrootsorganizationsareexcludedfortheirsheernumbers.17
Thistacticofconfinementatthegloballevelisafundamentalmistakefor
allinvolved. Itcanprovokeevenmoreambitiousformsofactivistorganization
globally, regionally, and locallyalong the lineswehavealready seen from the
NigerDeltatoSeattle.
Thealternativeisforpowerfulstatesandtransnationalcorporationsto
makeapoliticalandsocialinvestmentinthe buildingofinfrastructuresofre-
sponsibilitythatincluderatherthanexcludeandwhichareanchoredandforged
inthespecificplacestheyoperateinratherthaninfinancecapitalslikeNewYork.
Aninfrastructure isanunderlyingfoundation, liketransportandcommunica-
tionsystems, thatmakesasetofactivitiespossible, like industrialproduction.
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tionsofresponsibilityandaccountabilitywithlocalcommunities. Corporations
mayfindthattheirfreedomofmovementisexpandedinwaysthatflexibility
nevermadepossible. Ratherthanhavingtofearslipperyslopesanddartelusively
inandoutofengagements, corporationswill beableto becomemoretransparent
andopenabouttheirneedsandconcerns, theywillchooseengagement basedontheformationofnewrelationshipsandopportunitiesguidedandconfined by
powerfulinfrastructuresofresponsibilityratherthansimply byfearanddistrust.
Itisintheirinterest becausetheywillrecognizethatcooperation, ultimately, is
alwayscheaperthanconflict.
Notes
1.QuotedinRichardDrinnon, FacingWest:TheMetaphysicsofIndianHating&EmpireBuilding
(NewYork:SchockenBooks 1980): 312.
2. T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship, andSocialDevelopment. Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress, 1964.
3.MichaelWalzer, SpheresofJustice(NewYork:BasicBooks, 1983): 101-3, arguessomethings
likemarriagearenotmarketized.
4. BetranddeJouvenel, OnPower(Boston:BeaconPress, 1948): 119.
5.TheargumentalongtheselinesforthedevelopingworldisinSamuelHuntington, Political
Order inChangingSocieties(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress, 1968).Thedevelopedworldver-
sionisinMichaelCrozier, SamuelHuntington, andJojiWatanuki, TheCrisisofDemocracy(New
York:NewYorkUniversityPress), 1975.
6. CitedinTheodoreLowi, TheEndofLiberalism. (NewYork:Norton, 1969): 126.
7. GabrielMoran, AGrammerofResponsibility(NewYork:CrossroadPublishing, 1996): 80.
IsaiahBerlin, FourEssaysonLiberty. (NewYork:Oxford, 1969), showedhowtheserightscould
takeanegativeforminadonttreadonmelogicaswellasapositiveforminaIamthe
self-determiningmasterofmylifeform.
8. See, forexample,NaomiChazan, AnAnatomyofGhanaianPolitics:ManagingPoliticalReces-
sion, 1969-1982. (Boulder:WestviewPress): 334-35.
9. FrederickCooper, Decolonization andAfricanSociety. (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1996): 11.
10. AihwaOng, FlexibleCitizenship:TheCulturalLogicsofTransnationality(Durham:Duke
UniversityPress, 1999), goesasfartoarguethatevencitizenshipcannow beflexible.
11. On this sortof flexibility seePhilipCerny, Globalization and theChangingLogicof
CollectiveAction,InternationalOrganization(Autumn 1995): 595-625.
12. IowethisobservationonGuatemalatoanthropologistCharlesHale.
13.WilliamReno, WarlordPolitics andAfricanStates(Boulder:LynneRienner, 1998): 226.
14. JohnLonsdale, PoliticalAccountabilityinAfricanHistory, inP. Chabal, ed., Political
Domina
tion in
Africa(
Cambridge:
CambridgeU
niversi
tyPress, 1986): 128.
15. Cooper, Decolonization: 387.
16. QuotedinReedKramer, Liberia:CasualtyoftheColdWarsEnd:SpecialReportofthe
AfricaNewsService, 1995.
17.Thatthisabsenceisaproblemisindicated bytherecentmovesoftheCouncilonEconomic
PrioritiestoincorporateNGOs, localandotherwise, intotheirnetworkfortheauditingofcorpo-
ratelaborpracticesundertheguidelineslabeledSA8000. See(http://www.cepaa.org).
WA
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