Latham Hist of Respons

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ThePolitics andHistoryofResponsibilityAcrossBoundaries

Summer/Fall 2000 VolumeVII,Issue2 173

ROBERTLATHAMProgramDirectorforInternationalPeaceandSecurity

SocialScienceResearchCouncil

ThePoli

t

icsandH

ist

oryof

ResponsibilityAcrossBoundaries

Timeandagainwearetoldthatinthisageofglobalization, oldwallsare

crumbling. Money, products, ideas, images, andsometimespeopleare

flowingfreelyacrossnational bordersatanincreasingrate.Thereissome

truthtothisscenario. Butitleavesoutsomethingtheconstructionofnewwalls

that, paradoxically, arewhatmakestheseflowspossibleinthefirstplace.Moving

acommodityorideaacrossoldwallsfromonepersonshandsdirectlytoanotherskeepsitoutofthehandsofuninitiatedthirdparties.Thisiswhatthesenetworks

allow:movementalongnarrowchannelsofpeopleandplacesdirectlyconnected

tooneanother, leavingoutthosewhoarenotconnected. Evenwhennetworks

formmarkets, forexample, forcurrencyorcomputerequipment, theyremain

moreor lessexclusiveclubsofmemberswithtechnologicalaccessorexpertise

buyingandsellingacrossnationalspacesandtimezones.

Asnetworksofexchangeexpandaroundtheworld, allsortsofnewwalls

springup betweentheeducatedanduneducated, theprosperousandpoor, the

mobileandimmobile. Thesewallsmaynot beasvisibleasthosethatthestate

maintainsthrough, forinstance, customsofficials. Buttheycan berestrictiveand

confining, especiallytothosegroupsandindividualsthataredisenfranchised.

Thatwehave boththeendofoldwallsandthemakingofnewones

reflectsa basicfact. Socialandpoliticallifehas beenshaped bytwocountervailing

tendencies. Ononehand, statesandmarketscanextendthemselvesintoanex-

pandingrangeofplacesandentermoredeeplyintothelivesofindividualsand


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acrosstwooceanstotradeandproselytize.ThusTheodoreRooseveltcouldcom-

fortablyexclaim, Thehistoryofthenationisin largepartthehistoryofthe

nationsexpansion.1

InEuropeaswell, expansionhasarobustlegacythatisnotmerelyafunc-

tionofthedriveforoverseasempire, worldmarkets, orlargernationalterritory.T.H.Marshall, forinstance, arguedthatthescopeofcitizenshiprightsinEurope

keptexpandingacrossthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturies.Whereonceitwas

limitedtocivilrights, citizenshipalsocametoincorporatepoliticalandsocial

rights.2TheproportionofaEuropeancountryspopulationthatwasgrantedfull

citizenshipalsoexpanded.Morerecently, socialtheoristsfromJurgenHabermas

toMichelFoucaulthavedrawnattentiontotheexpandingrangeofactivitiesin

whichtwentieth-centurystateshave becomedirectlyinvolved, suchashealthcare

andsocialsecurity, takingoverfromchurch, family, andneighborhood.Themir-

rorreflectionofthisprocessintheeconomicrealmistheexpansionofmarket

relationsintonewsocialfro

ntiersasmoresocialservicesareofferedforsale, s

u

ch

aschildcareandeducation.3

Whetherone believesstates, markets, empires, societies, orpoweritself

exhibitsagrowth ... towhichthereisnolimit,4confinementnotjustexpan-

sionalsohashadapowerfulholdourpoliticalimaginations. Oftenconfine-

mentdevelopsasareactiontoexpansion. Inthisageofeconomicglobalization,

theattempttolimittheeffectsofinternationalmarketsonlocalandnationallife

isfamiliartomostpeople.Thepracticeandtheoryofthestatehaveincorporated

avarietyofconfinements. ConsiderthatAmericanconstitutionalismreallywas

anethicofconfinement. Checksand balances, theseparationofpowers, andthe

ruleoflawareallexamplesofconfinementsinternaltotheoperationofthestate.

Butsoistheattempttoconcentratepoweratonelevelofgovernment, suchasthepresidency, attheexpenseofanother, suchaslocaljurisdictions.

Overthelasttwodecadestheconfinementofstatepowerandauthority

has beencloselyassociatedwithwhatcameto belabeledneoliberalism.Mecha-

nismsofprivatizationcurtailedstatefunctions, leavingittotheprivatesectorto

provideservicesormanageindustries. Itmay benocoincidencethattheriseof

neoliberalismoccurredintheaftermathofthe 1970s, whenmanycommentators

arguedthatstateactivities becameoverloadedastheyexpandedintotoomany

areasofpeopleslives. Astatethathadexpanded beyonditslimits, theargument

went, couldsatisfynooneandriskedinstabilityin boththedevelopedanddevel-

opingworlds.5

Neoliberalismisanattempttoputalimitonwhatthestatecandoin

society. Suchlimitsarenothingnew. Sometimesactorsinthestateitselfexplicitly

layoutalogicofconfinementastheSupremeCourtdidin 1935 whenitem-

phaticallyclaimedthatthepresidenthad beengivenpowerthatwasunconfined

andvagrant ... notcanalizedwithin bankstokeepitfromoverflowing.6Con-


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RobertLatham

TheBrownJournal ofWorldAffairs176

sideralsothatcivilrightsmarknotjustentitlements butalsothelimitsofinter-

ferenceofthestateinitscitizenslives. Fromtheoppositedirection, someorigi-

naldraftersoftheU.S. Constitutionvigorouslysoughttoconfinetheinfluence

thatprivateinterestscouldhaveovergovernmentalaffairs.

Additionalsociety-centeredformsofconfinement besidesthenetworksmentionedaboveincludetheenclavesofeliteswhoconfinethemselvesinsecure,

gatedcommunitiessymbolicandrealaswellasthetragicethnicenclavesthat

arescatteredacrosstheBalkans. Onecouldalsoincludezonesofinternational

governance, suchasrefugeecampsthatare fencedofffromtheirpoliticaland

socialenvirons.

Indevelopedtypicallydemocraticcountries, groupsandindividuals

canconfinethemselvesinenclaves, clubs, orassociations, becausetheyhavethe

rights todo such things. In thesecases, publicauthority functions toprovide

groupswiththelegalframeworkto

wallthemselvesofforformexcl

u

sivenetworks. Indeveloping societies,

local communities can also avoid

participationin, orinteractionwith,

publicauthorityattimes.8Inthese

cases, somethingiswrongwiththe

publicauthorityofthestate:itmight

notonly becorrupt but beabsent

fromplacesorareasof life, leaving

communitieswith few choices re-

gardingtheirrelationshiptoit. The

state inthisinstanceisconfined, perhapstosmall islandsofpresenceacrossaterritoryortothecapitalcity, notasamatterofideologicalchoiceorprogram but

outofnecessityandduetoalackofpower.

Likeexpansion, confinement isnotarecentphenomenon. Wenaturally

emphasizetheexpansionisttendenciesofimperialism, butempireshaveinvolved

someseriousconfinements, aswell. Indirectrulethroughlocalpoliticalfigures

oftenwasaretreatfrommoreambitiousplansfordirectrule.9Colonies, par-

ticularlyearlyon, were bytheirnatureconfinedaspointsofentryforsettlersin

moreexpansive, andperhapshostile, places, suchasthecoastlinesofAfricaand

NorthAmerica.

Ingeneral, mostsocialandpoliticalphenomenahave bothconfiningand

expansionarydimensions. Whatisimportanttothequestionofresponsibilityis

themixofthetwotendencies, asinthecaseofexpansionaryempiresthatmade

claimsonlargemassesoflandandpeoples, butwhichwererelativelyconfinedin

theirabilitytogovernthemorinthecaseofnetworksthatmayreachexten-

sivelyacrossspaces butwhichdosothrougharelativelynarrowrangeofpartici-

Like expansion, confinementis not a recent phenomenon.

We naturally emphasize theexpansionist tendencies ofimperialism, but empires

have involved some serious

confinements, as well.


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pants.Thepointisthatthesemixescreatetensionsthatshapeinternationalpoli-

ticsandtheproblemofresponsibilityacross boundaries.

LogicsofConfinement

Howdoesconfinementwork?Theaboveexamplesonlyindirectlyrevealthean-

swer.Togetthereweshouldstartwithsome basicdistinctions. Socialforcessuch

asstatesormarketscan beconfinedregardinghowmanypeopleandplacesthey

reachbreadthorhowdeeply theypenetrate intoparticularareasof life in

thoseplacesdepth. Overthelastdecade, forexample, leadersintheEuropeanUnionarguedoverwhetherexpansionshouldoccur byincorporatingnewmem-

bersbreadthorgettingmoredeeplyinvolvedinthegovernanceofsociallife

withintheUniondepth.

Onealsocandistinguishformsofconfinement basedonwhoisdoingthe

confining. O

nonehand, somegro

u

porpoliticalmoveme

ntcan

targe

t some-

thing besides itself for confinement aswhenU.S. conservatives advocate

privatization.Ontheother, agroupororganizationcanseekitsownconfinement

aswhensomeorganizationorgrouplimitsitsactionsinordertopreventharmto

others, theclassicexample beingenvironmentalpollution.

Thelatterwemaylabelself-confinementandhasalottodowiththe

notionthatactorscanconfinetheiractivitiesaspartofastrategytoachievetheir

largeraims. Theycanchoosetoengageordisengage. Strategy isthechoiceof

pointsforceshould beappliedto, asLeninhasfamouslyclaimed. Alongthese

lines, Europeanempire-buildersoftenwouldtargetzonesoftheirempiresthat

they believedwereworthdevelopmentand investment, ignoring, as best they

could, therest.Self-confinementandstrategicengagementaretwosidesofthesamecoin.

Theymakepossiblewhatmany believeisthekeymodeofactionacross bound-

ariestoday, flexibility,thatis, thecapacitytomoveacrosssocialspaces, tochange

commitments, andtoshiftinvestmentsquickly basedonchangingconditions.

Flexibilitymeritssomeofourattention becauseitraisesimportantissues bearing

ontransboundaryresponsibility.

Flexibilitywasfirstassociatedwithnewinvestmentandcorporatestrate-

giesstressingtheabilitytodecentralizeactivitiesandmovefreelyaroundthe

globe. Itrecentlyalsohas begunto beassociatedwithstates.10Typically, astate

thatisflexibleisthoughtto beonethatcanrespondrapidlytochangesinthe

international, especiallyeconomic, realm, alteringitsdomesticandforeignpoli-

ciesaccordingly.11Whatisinterestingaboutconsideringstatesasflexibleisthat,

incontrasttocorporations, theyareexpectedto beotherwise. Thatis, theyare

expectedaspublicauthoritiestoestablishlong-lastingcommitments, whichcan

changeonlythroughcomplicatedpoliticalprocesses.Oneroadto becomingflex-


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RobertLatham


ibleistoprivatizeandhollowoutastate byreducingthe breadthofactivities

andresponsibilitiesthat itundertakes. Thisgivesastateoptionsregardingthe

areasitworksin, forexample, education, health, andtheeconomy;howitdoes

so;andwithwhomitworks, forexample, partnershipswiththeprivatesector.

Notethatactingstrategicallyinthiswayimpliesneitherthatstatessimplyaresimplyretreatingordisempoweringthemselvesnorthattheyare becoming

minimalorpurelylaissez-faire. Astrategicstatecanmoveoutofand backinto

activities, alliances, orinvolvementsinspecificlocaleswithinitsterritory. Are-

cent example is the relationshipof theUnitedStates to the Internet. From a

crucialstartingpointofnurturingthedevelopmentoftheInternet, thestatepulled

back. Butnowitseemsto bere-enteringthisdomaintoregulatesubstanceandto

providesecurity. HeretheUnitedStatesisastrategicpower, makingchoicesand

controllingdeploymentsandengagements to somedegree, although from the

outsideitappearssimplyinconsistentandconfused. Strategicstatescansome-

timesprod

u

cealargeapparatu

sofdisengageme

nt, aswesee

todayi

ntheattemp

t

todismantlethewelfarestatethroughratherextensiveprogramsofwelfare-to-

work.

Itneednotonly beWesternstatesthatcanenjoythissortofpower. A

shifthas beenobserved, forexample, inGuatemala, whichnowcan beseenstra-

tegicallypickingthesocialproblemsandconflictsittakesonaswellasthelocales

inwhichitintervenes, whereasinthepastitconfrontedconflictsacrossitsterri-

tory.12OnestudentofAfricanstatesnotesthatoutsourcingstatefunctionslike

securitytoprivateactorssuchasmercenaryfirmsleavesrulersunconstrained by

popularor bureaucraticopinion,able tomakedecisionsquicklyandreverse

coursewithrelativelylittleencumbrance.13

Thekeyingredientstostrategicengagementandthevariousdimensionsofconfinementdiscussedabovearespaceandtime. Anorganizationlikeastate

canmakechoicesaboutwhichgeographicalspaces, aparticulartownordistrict,

orwhichsocialspaces, adomainlikeeducation, tooperateinrecognizingthat

therearepressuresfromcreditorsorlobbyists. Itisexactly becausenormsofsov-

ereignty, sanctified bytheUN, makethe boundariesofnationalterritoriesrela-

tivelystablethatstatesnolongerfearasmuchasinthepastthatstrategicretreats

insidetheirown boundarieswillcreatevacuumsto befilled byoutsideinvaders.

Timematters, fortohavesuchrelativechoicesistosettemporallimitstocom-

mitments, optingfortemporaryengagementsoverpermanentones.

Strategicengagementandflexiblepoliciesseemto beinconsistentwith

theestablishmentoflongstandingmoralcommitmentstowell beingthatweas-

sociatewithnationalandinternationalprogramsofeducation, healthcare, and

incomeredistribution. Butthisdoesnotmeanthatethicsandresponsibilityare

editedoutofthepicture. Onthecontrary, asIargueinthenextsection, many

decisionsorchoiceshaveethicaldimensionsthatareoftenforgotten.Thus, ethi-


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calproblemsandquestionsofresponsibilitycanmultiplyinthefaceofthechoices

associatedwithstrategicengagement inwaysthatareoftenconvenientlyover-

looked. Indeed, ifitistruethat, asonetheoriststates, nomatterwhatitsform

powerisalwaysanexerciseinappliedmorals,14thenthemanystrategicdeci-

sionsthatanorganizationmakesundertheguiseofflexibilityforceittoconfront,manytimesover, questionsofresponsibility.

ConfinementandResponsibilityAcrossBoundaries

Onitsface, confinementmayseemto betheperfectwaytocontainresponsibility

across boundaries. Anorganizationcancutitselfofffromforcesthatmightother-

wisemakeethicalorpoliticalclaimsonitsactions. Atransnationalcorporation

canworkthroughlocaljointventurespartnerswhoshieldthatcorporationfrom

directexpos

u

retotheclaimsoflocalcomm

unitiesorgover

nment

sabout

pollu

-tion, payscales, oraccesstoresources. Astateis, ofcourse, inprincipleasuperb

confinersinceits bordersarenotonlysupposedtopreventoutsideforcesfrom

intervening inside, butalso to limit state responsibility for socialorder to the

peopleandplaceswithinitsnationalspace.

Butconfinementisonething, andeliminationisanother. Everyconfine-

ment beginswithanethicaldecisionaboutwhat iskeptoutorwhat isto be

confined.Thisis, ofcourse, anegativeexercise, referringtowhatonewillnotdo

ordealwith.Nonethelessitismoralchoice.Thatanorganizationwillinsertitself

insomelocaleforcesitrightofftofaceethicalquestionsaboutthenatureofits

presenceinthatplace. Howmuchwillitconformtolocallawsortakeintocon-

siderationitsimpactonlocalpoliticallife?Silenceonalltheseissuesisnoescape,fornotonlydotheissuesremain, butsilenceitselfisamoralchoicetoconfine

ethicaldiscourse. Organizationsarealwaysmakingmoralargumentsabouttheir

missionsacross borders:forcorporationsitisthepursuitofprofitandtheeffi-

cientuseofresourcesthatareusedtolegitimatetransboundaryactivities. States

usevaluessuchassecuritytodothesame.

Thereisanassumptionthatpowerfultransnationalactorstodaycanchoose

to bestrategicaccordingtotheirowninterestsandself-definedmissions, aslong

astheyappeartoabide bydomesticandinternationallawanddonotegregiously

violate internationalnormsof sovereignty. Thechoice toengageordisengage

basedononesownself-definedinterestshasnotalways beenasreadilyavailable

topowerfulactorsintheinternationalrealmasitseemsto benow. Inthepast,

empiredrewpeopleandplacesintocommontransboundarypoliticalframeworks

organizedaroundasystemofauthorityanchoredatametropole. Inprinciple,

thatauthorityisaresponsibilitytomaintainorderwithintheempire. While, as

mentionedabove, agentsofempireexplorers, armies, consuls, andgovernors


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RobertLatham


sibleandconscientiousactors, partnerswiththecommunitiestheyoperate in.

Theysometimesundertakesocialprogramstoprove it. Theyalsomountlegal

defensesagainst lawsuitsandtrytodefuse boycotts. InplaceslikeAfricaand

CentralAsiatheymight buyoffgovernmentofficialsorhiretheirownprivate

securityfirmstodefendagainstlocalsabotageoractsofviolentresistance.Allofthismay beviewedmerelyasthecostofdoinginternational business.

But thenotion that such tacticscan succeed inconfining claims restson the

assumptionthatclaimsaboutcorporateresponsibilitywillmoreorless bethe

sameinthefutureastheyhave beeninthepast. Inotherwords, furtherexpan-

sionsofclaimsaboutaccountabilityandresponsibilityareto bediscounted, and

thepossibility thatactivists learn fromoneanotherscampaignsand findnew

waystosupportoneanotherisignored. Ifitisthecasethatweareonlyatthe

beginningofanerawithinwhichresponsibilityacross boundariesiscontested,

thencorporationswillhavetothinkhardaboutwhethertheattempttoconfine

claimsthrou

gh

avoidanceis

the bes

toveralls

trategy. Aswe

havesee

n, co

nfine-mentrequiresthemaintenanceofboundaries. Ifthesystemofboundarymainte-

nancedependsondefensiveandevasivetactics, thenthatleavesroomforclaim-

antslikeactivists, governments, andcommunityorganizationstodefine, articu-

late, anddisseminatenewconceptsoftransboundaryresponsibilitywithoutthe

participationofcorporationsthemselves.

Thesesortsofexpansionarypressuresincreaseincentivesforcorporations

tofashioninternationalregimesincooperationwithstatesandmultilateralorga-

nizationsliketheWTOandtheUN.Theseregimescanoperateovertheheadsof

activistsandlocalcommunities, regulatingthingslikeintellectualpropertyrights

andenvironmentalpractices. Regimescandefineandlimit, thatis, confine, re-

sponsibilityaccordingtotheinterestsofpowerfulstatesandcorporations.WhiletheUNefforttoforgeanewglobalcompact between business, NGOs, states,

andlaborisworthwhile, itisatop-downapproachmoreorlessworkingoutof

NewYork, Paris, andGeneva. Although some internationalNGOsmight be

broughttothetable, especiallyinareasliketheenvironment, thevastmajorityof

grassrootsorganizationsareexcludedfortheirsheernumbers.17

Thistacticofconfinementatthegloballevelisafundamentalmistakefor

allinvolved. Itcanprovokeevenmoreambitiousformsofactivistorganization

globally, regionally, and locallyalong the lineswehavealready seen from the

NigerDeltatoSeattle.

Thealternativeisforpowerfulstatesandtransnationalcorporationsto

makeapoliticalandsocialinvestmentinthe buildingofinfrastructuresofre-

sponsibilitythatincluderatherthanexcludeandwhichareanchoredandforged

inthespecificplacestheyoperateinratherthaninfinancecapitalslikeNewYork.

Aninfrastructure isanunderlyingfoundation, liketransportandcommunica-

tionsystems, thatmakesasetofactivitiespossible, like industrialproduction.


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RobertLatham


tionsofresponsibilityandaccountabilitywithlocalcommunities. Corporations

mayfindthattheirfreedomofmovementisexpandedinwaysthatflexibility

nevermadepossible. Ratherthanhavingtofearslipperyslopesanddartelusively

inandoutofengagements, corporationswill beableto becomemoretransparent

andopenabouttheirneedsandconcerns, theywillchooseengagement basedontheformationofnewrelationshipsandopportunitiesguidedandconfined by

powerfulinfrastructuresofresponsibilityratherthansimply byfearanddistrust.

Itisintheirinterest becausetheywillrecognizethatcooperation, ultimately, is

alwayscheaperthanconflict.

Notes

1.QuotedinRichardDrinnon, FacingWest:TheMetaphysicsofIndianHating&EmpireBuilding

(NewYork:SchockenBooks 1980): 312.

2. T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship, andSocialDevelopment. Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress, 1964.

3.MichaelWalzer, SpheresofJustice(NewYork:BasicBooks, 1983): 101-3, arguessomethings

likemarriagearenotmarketized.

4. BetranddeJouvenel, OnPower(Boston:BeaconPress, 1948): 119.

5.TheargumentalongtheselinesforthedevelopingworldisinSamuelHuntington, Political

Order inChangingSocieties(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress, 1968).Thedevelopedworldver-

sionisinMichaelCrozier, SamuelHuntington, andJojiWatanuki, TheCrisisofDemocracy(New

York:NewYorkUniversityPress), 1975.

6. CitedinTheodoreLowi, TheEndofLiberalism. (NewYork:Norton, 1969): 126.

7. GabrielMoran, AGrammerofResponsibility(NewYork:CrossroadPublishing, 1996): 80.

IsaiahBerlin, FourEssaysonLiberty. (NewYork:Oxford, 1969), showedhowtheserightscould

takeanegativeforminadonttreadonmelogicaswellasapositiveforminaIamthe

self-determiningmasterofmylifeform.

8. See, forexample,NaomiChazan, AnAnatomyofGhanaianPolitics:ManagingPoliticalReces-

sion, 1969-1982. (Boulder:WestviewPress): 334-35.

9. FrederickCooper, Decolonization andAfricanSociety. (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity

Press, 1996): 11.

10. AihwaOng, FlexibleCitizenship:TheCulturalLogicsofTransnationality(Durham:Duke

UniversityPress, 1999), goesasfartoarguethatevencitizenshipcannow beflexible.

11. On this sortof flexibility seePhilipCerny, Globalization and theChangingLogicof

CollectiveAction,InternationalOrganization(Autumn 1995): 595-625.

12. IowethisobservationonGuatemalatoanthropologistCharlesHale.

13.WilliamReno, WarlordPolitics andAfricanStates(Boulder:LynneRienner, 1998): 226.

14. JohnLonsdale, PoliticalAccountabilityinAfricanHistory, inP. Chabal, ed., Political

Domina

tion in

Africa(

Cambridge:

CambridgeU

niversi

tyPress, 1986): 128.

15. Cooper, Decolonization: 387.

16. QuotedinReedKramer, Liberia:CasualtyoftheColdWarsEnd:SpecialReportofthe

AfricaNewsService, 1995.

17.Thatthisabsenceisaproblemisindicated bytherecentmovesoftheCouncilonEconomic

PrioritiestoincorporateNGOs, localandotherwise, intotheirnetworkfortheauditingofcorpo-

ratelaborpracticesundertheguidelineslabeledSA8000. See(http://www.cepaa.org).

WA

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