In the last three issues of YANKEE SCOUT, as Pvt. Drew recorded in his ALL TRUE Memoir, he was captured

by a Rebel scouting party on – he believed – about December 18th

, 1863. Thereafter, he was transported under guard

on a rail flatcar to Richmond, Seat of the Confederacy, and examined by the Confederate Army Provost Guard there!

He was declared a prisoner of war, and was sentenced to dig sand

on Belle Island, “until the end of the war or exchanged.”

But an exchange of Pvt. Drew for a Confederate prisoner of war of his rank – or any exchange for any prisoner of

any rank -- was going to be unlikely: for by this point in the war – December, 1863 -- prisoner exchanges had been

suspended!! No prisoners were being exchanged, of any rank…. and these men on Belle Island had in fact no hope

at all of exchange. What they could hope for, was release – either by death, or at the end of the war. The reason

for this additional torment, was a dispute over the status of the black man – in particular, of the Negro soldier.

The Union Army had begun forming “colored brigades” of African-Americans,

for combat, following a Congressional Act of February 2, 1863; and by this

December, many such black Union soldiers had served courageously in battle

and of those, some were now prisoners of war. But in retaliation, the Confederate

Congress threatened these new forces, promising to punish severely white officers

commanding black troops, and to enslave black soldiers captured on the

battlefield. President Lincoln issued his General Order 233, threatening reprisal

on Confederate prisoners of war for any mistreatment of black troops, and then

issued his General Orders 252, effective July 30, 1863, -- suspending prisoner

exchanges altogether. So Pvt. Drew would never have been exchanged …..

However, although the Union Army soldiers regularly read the papers (see

below, p. 8), Pvt. Drew may not have been fully abreast of all these details.

What he did know was that his sentence to dig sand on Belle Island was an

effective death sentence – and he had nothing to lose by attempting escape:

and thus, while being marched by the Provost Guard to Belle Island, Pvt.

Drew, under cover of darkness, in a rainstorm, SLIPPED THE LINE !!

To become a …..

YES: A PRISONER AT LARGE at the foot of Mayo’s bridge. Pvt. Drew escaped undetected by the Provost Guard,

thence making his way along the docks and among the tobacco warehouses of Richmond’s Shockoe District, near

the Shockoe Tobacco Warehouse. See YANKEE SCOUT – Stranger in Richmond: Confederate Christmas !!

There, he was lucky to meet a young African-American slave named George, and

the two men together formed themselves into a musical duo, playing fiddle and

banjo for a Coloreds-only Friday night dance!

Immersed in practicing their music, the young men had hit it off, and George –

probably suspecting that Drew was not a Confederate – disclosed that he, George,

was “a Lincoln man,” and wanted to escape to the North!! Which, upon hearing,

Pvt. Drew advised that he, too, was not what he seemed: that he was really a

Stranger in Richmond -- an escaped Yankee prisoner “at large” who needed to

return to his regiment. Young Pvt. Drew was in need of a Stranger’s Guide, for

sure – and if he didn’t get his hands on the latest issue, then George was his man.

So, in the he ensuing week in Richmond, Drew and his new acquaintance,

George the Richmond slave, hatched a plan to escape the Confederacy. They

executed the plan after playing tunes all night at a Christmas Eve ball; and they

did so by launching out of the Shockoe dist. docks in a small skiff, and floating

down the James River “to fish for the Richmond market” !! So, at any rate,

George had told his “Massa.” A nasty little fib there, George … !!

Col. Emory Upton

After a long cold voyage drifting down the James, in

their “freedom skiff’ finally the pair were picked up

by a Yankee tugboat near the Williamsburg landing,

and then taken to Fort Monroe, where Drew was

dropped off. There the two men parted company.

Finally, after a second week making his way through

Army channels, Pvt. Drew now finds himself at last

back with his comrades of Co. K, 6th

Maine Infantry,

in the Grand Army of the Potomac, in Winter

Quarters at Brandy Station –TOTAL TIME LOST –

TWO WEEKS ! Almost exactly …

Just two weeks … but this was precious time to Col.

Emory Upton, who was responsible for keeping the

men alert and exercised: disciplined and drilled to the

nines, thus ready for relentless, conditioned action

under orders, after a very long Winter -- whenever the

Spring offensive should finally arrive.

Thus, as we saw in YANKEE SCOUT – Mine Run !! before Denbo and Drew had reconnoitered Lee’s

Winter Quarters at Mine Run in late November, 1863,

the troops had been getting regular drilling by Col.

Upton according to the systems of tactics of Casey and

Hardee, Drew had said. Meanwhile, Col. Upton had

evidently been actively revising the Army’s infantry

tactics, and when Denbo & Drew had returned to

Brandy Station, in Culpeper County, Virginia, there

was a new drill “on a new tactics introduced by our

Upton.”

“When we got back to the regiment we found a new tactics had been introduced by our [Col. Emory ] Upton.” Pvt. Drew is stating here, that as early as November of 1863, Col. Emory Upton was making changes to the infantry

tactical drill routine, enough that it constituted a ”new tactics.” But this seems unsupported: there is no other record

of Upton working on his tactics during the war – not even in his own letters and papers. And Upton’s New System of Infantry Tactics was only published well after the war – indeed, as late as August or September, 1867.

Hardee had turned Confederate, that much was certain: and so the brass had decided that his Tactics could only be

used – for a time -- in an anonymous printing. As Pvt. Drew had said, “The Army must have a Union tactics.” But

if so, then what was the problem with continuing use of Gen. Silas J. Casey’s Infantry Tactics? Earlier in his Memoir, Pvt. Drew observed that in his initial infantry training – that is, in the late summer months of 1861, following the

Battle of Bull Run -- the Army was drilling the new recruits according to Casey’s Infantry Tactics…

“We were drilling at Casey's Manual, the regular Army drill.

Each Co. had a drill master. We all were anxious to become perfect.”

-- YANKEE SCOUT – Bull Run!!

Later, however, after the battle of Mine Run, Pvt. Drew mistakenly reports that Gen, Casey too had gone over to the

Rebels!!! And so, Drew writes on the presumption that both these officers’ tactical manuals were being “tossed” by

the Federal Army, and during the 1863-64 layover in Winter Quarters at Brandy Station:

“When we [Denbo and Drew, out on a scout – Ed.] got back to the regiment

we found a new tactics had been introduced by our [Col. Emory ] Upton.

Casis [ Casey ] and Hardee were boath rebels, so we must have a Union tactics,

we drilled at it morning, noon and night, it’s no improvement on the old one,

only a little harder on the line officers. ”

-- YANKEE SCOUT – Mine Run!!

But Pvt. Drew was wrong !! In fact Brig-Gen. Silas J. Casey was no

Confederate, and the Army had recently

approved a brand-new tactical drill

manual in his work, Infantry Tactics for the Direction, Exercise and

Manuevers of the Soldier …”

which had been published by

the Secretary of War Edwin

Stanton, effective August 11,

1862. It is shown here in a

printing from 1863 – which

was, let’s face it, about as hot off

the presses as could be obtained

before the advent of

downloadable .pdf texts. There

were only two modest changes made

to this text when it was issued ….

So why then was Col. Upton modifying Casey’s tactical drills at all?

And under what or whose authority?

Brig-Gen Silas J. Casey

Despite the fact that Casey’s Infantry Tactics was published in August 1863, just after the Peninsular Campaign had

concluded in a humiliating retreat and defeat, it does not demonstrate any canniness of Virginia topography that the

Army would have been acquired during that Campaign. In fact, as Casey says in his introduction, he was only editing

Scott’s Tactics, by updating the translation of Scott’s source, and based entirely on this thoroughly established mutual

experience of campaigning in Mexico. Thus, the tactics being used by the U.S. Army were Casey’s revisions of Scott’s

revision of …. well, some French thing: good enough for the Revolutionary War, so successful because of French

military expertise. But these tactical manuals had been developed for conventional battlefield warfare on the model

of the Europeans – formations of serried ranks, deployed generally over expansive fields and open spaces. And

indeed, such tactics was naturally well-suited for use in battle on the great deserts and high plains of Mexico.

But the 1862 experience -- that is, the Peninsular Campaign -- proved this old tactics to be cumbersome and very

inefficient for the wilds of Virginia. And of course, in the heat of battle, “cumbersome and inefficient” will soon

translate into fateful and deadly. Indeed, this is precisely what some of the Union command had learned the

preceding year, where the troops were placed in jeopardy due to tactical limitations realized… during …

But only one author gives us the answer: E. Burd Grubb, Notes of a Staff Officer of our First New Jersey Brigade on the Seven Days

Battles on the Peninsula (1910), writes (pp. 19-20):

“Now it will be seen that our brigade being I column of four right

in front under the old tactics, to have formed a line of battle the

order would have been given front, and all the men would have

turned to the left, which would have brought their backs to the

enemy, as the enemy was on our right or west side. To have

formed the line of battle we would have had to have faced by

the rear rank, and while that did not make much difference in

merely forming the line, only so far as the file closers were

concerned, any [p. 20] subsequent manoeuvers from that

formation would become exceedingly complicated; and I

doubt whether any of the regiments of the First Brigade at that

time could have successfully performed those manoeuvers.

These were some of the difficulties which the Upton’s tactics

subsequently adopted, aimed to obviate, and did so.”

The impetus for Upton’s development of a new tactics was the Union Army’s experience of a new battlefield terrain

– particularly the Virginia topography. Col. Emory Upton had his New System of Infantry Tactics published “by

authority” after the war, with the approval of a full Army panel headed by both Generals Grant and Meade. The

panel convened at West Point on July 9, 1867, and unanimously recommended approval to Secretary of War

Stanton, who ordered it adopted as of August 1, 1867. Upton’s Tactics was approved “with flying colors,” because it

had been tested for months at BRANDY STATION and thereafter had been proven in battle –and shown to be

masterfully adapted to American topography…”

John Singleton Mosby

New Years Jan 1st, 1864

“I went went [sic] to regimental headquarters with Percival Knowles 1st Lieut

of Co. K. to pay my respects to Capt. Theo Lincoln of Co. F. who had been

promoted and was in command of the Reg’t.

“Then I took a walk to the hospital to see Dr. Buck, my he was pleased he

almost kiss me, he opened a new box of cigars and chatted for an hour.1

Then, taking his hat, he says, “Let’s go over to the band tent,” where he

called to Henry Bowles, “Pay me that $20 here is my boy Drew!” He had

made a wager with Bowles that I would be back with the regiment when it

moved on the Spring campaign. Denbo was on three days’ picket, when he

came in and found me we had a real Indian pow-wow, he said if I hadent got

home before the end of the month he was agoing to hunt me up and capture

me himself. On the 4th

we got paid two months pay, we are getting $16 per

month now.

“Drill six hours per day or more for the new recruits by some of the old

hands; guard mount at 9o’cl A.M. Dress parade at sunset, three meals with

fresh warm bread (butter if you furnish it yourself) + Coffee [ P. 137 ] Target

practice for the new members and any of the old that wants to, there was no

pains or trouble spared to make them come up to our standard. The old

members was allowed no more privileges than the recruits.”

“Tis True the 6th

Corps [ was ] fighting men. Our prize fight coming off about every two of three weeks for purses

of from $300- to $500. The Corps artillery division took charge of and conducted all such afairs. The Vermonters

and the Pennsylvania coal miners gave us several exhibitions of the manly art, sometimes quite large amounts of

money changed hands.”

“Guerilliers was always hanging around watching for a chance to capture

something or kill a union solder. A number of plans was laid to capture

one Mr. Mosby and his gang – we never got Mr. Mosby, we got four of

his gang with three horses one day. They were not soldiers at all had

never been enrolled in the rebel army never been enrolled in the rebel

army, were citizens and farmers living handy by, we turned them over to

the provose marshall.

“I understood they were given a drum-head court-marshall and sentenced

to be hung and president Lincoln pardoned them ( I don’t know this as a

fact).”

1

Dr. Buck was Drew’s high school teacher back in Machias, Maine. See YANKEE SCOUT – Fort Sumpter!!

Winter Quarters2

“As the month wore away the army grew. The rebels on picket on their side of the [Rapidan] river was very

pleasant, we visited and traded coffee for tobacco, paper, there was one northern papers that they would not

[accept] in exchange for any of their papers, it was the New York Tribune.”

As early as the 1830’s, Horace Greeley’s editorial policy at the

New York Tribune, as concerning slavery, was not just anti-

expansionist, but forcefully abolitionist: and this helps account for

the Confederate soldiers’ collective ban on trading Southern

newspapers for the Tribune, as noted by Drew. Greeley was not

just a journalist, however, but also a founder of the anti-slavery

Republican party, and an early supporter of a little-known up-and-

comer for the 1860 Republican party nomination for President,

Abraham Lincoln.

Greeley was committed to the International Labor movement,

and maintained as a stringer, a scruffy European correspondent

named Karl Marx3

– who carefully watched and applauded the

work of American President Abraham Lincoln. 4

In fact, the

whole world, and European intelligentsia in particular, watched

the American Civil War as a manifestation of the International

Labor Movement. Lincoln’s defense of the Union during the

Civil War was thoroughly informed by world intellectual

movements for social justice, and in particular for the rights of

labor.

2

Union Army Winter Quarters, at Brandy Station, Virginia. See p. 10, below. Drew has been here before – a few

times in fact! See, e.g., YANKEE SCOUT – Gettysburg & Brandy Station!! and YANKEE SCOUT –Mine Run!! 3 Karl Marx contributed essays on European politics from 1854 to 1862. A collection of his dispatches is here:

https://libcom.org/files/Marx%20-%20Dispatches%20for%20the%20New%20York%20Tribune.pdf 4 There are a number of good treatments of the ideological relationship between Lincoln and Karl Marx. The

editor believes, that one of the best, is here: http://isreview.org/issue/79/reading-karl-marx-abraham-lincoln

“We received daily papers from Washington, New York, Chicago, every morning, so we kept pretty well posted;

“So when orders was read on dress parade one evening early in March, stating that Gen’l U.S. Grant had been put

in command of all the armeys [ P. 138 ] of the United States and was a Lieut Gen’l we was not surprised….

The news of his promotion was received with much rejoicing by the 6th

Me and many speculations. We was tired

of Hallock siting in Washington and calling our army back when and if he found his pet generals found out he had

a job two time to big for him.”

By Act of Congress dated February 29, 1864, the office of Lieutenant-General was revived, and Grant was

commissioned Lieutenant General of the Union Army: the first man since George Washington to hold this title.

The prestige is entirely intentional. Thanks to availability of the telegraph, Grant will make his Head Quarters in the

field, where the Army of the Potomac is currently encamped at Brandy Station, in Culpeper County. See below ….

Lincoln did his homework on Grant …. as he had

hardly done with many other troubled top military

appointments. It wasn’t Grant’s competence that

Lincoln was investigating: his battlefield record was

impeccable. Nor was it his penchant for whiskey:

that was also well understood. What concerned

Lincoln, was the possibility that Grant entertained

political aspirations: in particular, to run for the

Presidency in 1864, in opposition to Lincoln– who

was ambitious for a second term. Lincoln already

had a problem of precisely this nature, from Gen.

George B. McClellan who in January, 1863, had

proclaimed his candidacy for the Democratic

nomination, running on a peace platform. 5

As it turned out, Grant reported that he had no

political ambitions whatever – no immediate ones

that is; and this satisfied Lincoln. Of course, long

after the war, Grant would go on to run as the

Republican Party candidate in 1868 – winning

easily – and again in 1872. While to treat of Grant’s

Presidential administration would be to get far

afield from the matters Drew reports in this issue of

YANKEE SCOUT, he does mention a few things

about the Grant Administration a little later on…

See YANKEE SCOUT – Cold Harbor!!

5 The complexity of the political situation and

Lincoln’s careful attention to intelligence-gathering

on Grant, in the weeks before this decision to

appoint him to command of the entire Union

Army, is covered in an excellent speech by Prof.

Brooks Simpson of Arizona State, here:

http://www.c-span.org/video/?305846-3/lincoln-

congress-grant-lieutenant-general-act

“Beats ran high when the Army advanced and crossed the Rappadan and struck Lee’s lines of rifle pitts and Forts

extending all the ways to Richmond – that if we could not go over them we would go around them. [See below –

Ed. ] “Wagers was laid ten to one that Grant’s headquarters would not be in Washington. It was past the middle of

March before we got a sight of him. He reminded me very much of Colonel Burnham, but so good-looking and

[yet in] some way he did not have as good a gate when walking. He had established his Headquarters with the

Army of the Potomac. But Gen’l Mead was still commander of the army.”

“General Meade and Grant in Consultation During the Battle of the Wilderness”,

from Leslie’s Illustrated The Soldier in Our Civil War, p. 257.

Grant arrived at Brandy Station on March 10, 1864, to take over command from Meade, and continue the planning

for the Spring campaign, in Winter Quarters camp with the Army of the Potomac. All in all, these preparations

would consume fully two months – and the resulting offensive starting in Culpeper County, Virginia, and continuing

through Orange and Spottsylvania Counties, and so forth, will become known as the Overland Campaign.

Although upon Grant’s arrival, Meade immediately offered to step aside and hand the reigns over to Grant, Grant

would leave Meade in tactical command of the Army, and in full command of the Army of the Potomac. Indeed,

part of Lincoln’s enius in reviving the rank of Lt. General for Grant’s prestige, is that no other generals, and esp.

not Meade, will have to be demoted to accommodate his arrival. But even as Grant’s ‘second,” Meade certainly had

his work cut out for him. Take a look: this links to the Order of Battle for the Army of the Potomac, as organized

by Meade: http://www.civilwarhome.com/wildernessbattleorderunion.html Meade of course had staff to assist with

this Herculean task: the planning of the troop movements for the coming Overland Campaign were mapped out by

Meade’s Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Andrew Humphreys, engineer and topographer. See, e.g., Roy Morris, Jr., An Account of the Battle of the Wilderness, http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-the-wilderness But this is the same

engineer whose cartography was derided as “useless” by Babcock …… See YANKEE SCOUT – Williamsburg !!

Grant’s surprise “adoption” of Meade generated good will throughout the Army. And with such matters of

“command structure” settled early, and with tactical planning handled by Meade, Grant could focus on strategic

planning. Pvt. Drew reports that the troops did not see Grant until past the middle of March – and here he is correct:

Grant left for Washington the next day, March 11, and did not return to Brandy Station till the 26th, at which time

he pitched his own tent five miles south of Meade’s tent, and ordered all communications to be routed to himself.

As we have seen, Col. Emory Upton’s tactical reform was already in process as early as November of the preceding

year, 1863. The Editor of YANKEE SCOUT feels comfortable supporting Pvt. Drew’s observations regarding Upton

– see pp. 5-6 above -- namely, that Upton must have been encouraged within the chain of command, to continue in

his work to reform the tactical drill manual of Brig. Gen. Casey – as also to drill the troops on it aggressively. With

the object of correcting the “convolutions” encountered at White Oak Swamp, under Meade’s oversight Upton

would thus pursue his tactical reform throughout the winter at Brandy Station. Even after Grant’s arrival, with tactical

planning delegated to Meade, continuity of this project would have been assured, and as planning progressed, the

two officers could demonstrate the changes to Grant. Grant would thus have been carefully apprised of all essential

details: it is virtually inevitable that Grant was briefed by Col. Upton on his tactical work – probably in the company

of Gen. Meade and other Army brass. He must have been advised of the problems with the “convolution of the

infantry column” encountered at White Oak Swamp, as noted by Grubb.

Finally, Grant certainly must have observed his whole Army incessantly drilling at “Upton’s new tactics” as mentioned

by Pvt. Drew. So Grant knew Upton’s work well. And, for young Col.. Upton – who literally obsessed over his

chances of a promotion – delivery on this tactical reform was his one great opportunity in the war, to distinguish

himself from the crowd. Upton “maxed out” that opportunity in his reform -- and later proved that, while an

innovative tactician, he also had the makings of a good general. For more, see YANKEE SCOUT – Spottsylvania !! This is why both Grant and Meade were on the panel that gave final approval to Upton’s Tactics, when it was finally

authorized for publication in August, 1867. Thus, the published Committee endorsements introducing the book

recite— at p. iv -- that Upton’s new Union Army Tactics had indeed been adapted to American topography:

“That it provides for all column movements required in an open country and by the column of fours, for the Movements necessary in narrow roads, wooded or obstructed countries, without the extension incident

to Ordinary movements by the flank.” https://archive.org/details/newsystemofinfan00upto

There is some debate over where precisely Grant made his headquarters during his preparation. For my money,

perhaps the most meticulous and insightful historian of this period of the Overland Campaign, as well as for

numerous other Civil War events taking place in Culpepper County, Virginia, is Clark “Bud” Hall, founder of the

Civil War Trust, http://www.civilwar.org/ and other Civil War battlefield preservation organizations. Hall is a

crackerjack historian in his own right. Hall argues for the Barbour house in Culpeper, as Grant’s headquarters, based

on a variety of sources, especially Henry Brainerd McClellan, writing in The Battle of the Wilderness, at p. 46. This

house is now gone, but the site is on the grounds of the Culpeper County Courthouse. No plaque marks the site.

See, Hall, Grant’s Headquarters, Culpeper Court House, Virginia, March 26-May 4, 1864 (unpublished speech).

“I think -- with the exception of some of the recruits that have not had a ??? surfierners ???? drill some of them

has had none – that the Army was never so good as at present. Not so strong in old troops as when Burnside had it

at Fredericksburg, or when Hooker had it at Chancellorsville, but with more Unionship among the generals.

“Hooker and Burnside boath has been sent west, each given a good force. And Hooker had gained great renown

by his battle above the clouds. He is all right give him something of his size.”

General Joseph Hooker enjoyed one of his greatest victories in “The Battle Above the Clouds” at Lookout Mountain,

outside of Chattanooga. Tennessee, back on November 24, 1863. True to the principle that a cat can look at a king,

Pvt. Drew is not shy to offer Hooker a back-handed compliment on this occasion, while probably remembering, e.g.,

Hooker’s failure to make any progress before Williamsburg.

General John Sedgwick

[ P. 139 ] The 6th

Me had about 700 officers and men. “The 5th

Wis.

Had about the same but was looking for a few more recruits. The 49th

and 119th

Pennsylvania each was near full, they had never been put to

the hard work the 5th

[Wisc] and 6th

[Maine] had.

[ Corps Chain of Command ]

“The Brigade was commanded by Gen’l David Russell a West Point

graduate.

“The Division by Gen’l H.C. Wright a West Point graduate.

The Corps by Gen’l John Sedgwick another West Pointer.

“One day there was a review of the 6th

corps by General Grant and his staff and some military officers from France

and Russia. As our Brigade was marching in review with lines as straight as men ever formed, I saw Sedgwick nod

his head in our direction and Grant smiled, I wondered if he was smiling at so many read and green Greek crosses,

or if he thought our bunch to small to accomplish much.”6

“Inspections, reviews, skirmish drill, target practice, bayonet exercise was the order of the day. “Then we got

orders to turn in our extra blankets, overcoats and anything else we did not need on the coming campaign.

“Then the 1st

and 3rd

Corps was broken up and the troops distributed among the 2nd

under Hancock, the 5th

under

G. K. Warren, 6th

under Sedgwick redusing the army to three Corps. The 9th

and 11th

Corps and some more was

gone west or long the coast. Orders came in bunches every evening.

6

NOT LIKELY: In fact, there is reason to wonder if there wasn’t in fact a legend

building around these regiments. In the Editor’s opinion, it’s a fair bet that if Drew

did see Sedgwick gesturing to Grant, that Sedgwick was pointing out the caps of the

soldiers of General Hancock’s former First Brigade: those who later comprised most

of the Light Brigade, and who still sported the “Green Greek Cross” of the Light

Brigade, which Drew is careful to mention again. In particular, the 6th Maine and

5th Wisconsin volunteers, had led Hancock’s Charge at the Battle of Williamsburg

on May 5, 1862; and had mowed down the Stonewall Brigade at White Oak Swamp,

on June 30, 1862. Assigned to the Light Brigade, these same regiments led the assault

on Marye’s Heights at the second battle of Fredericksburg, May 3, 1863, and, still

later, under Russell, were the first to go “over the top” in the successful Battle of

Rappahannock Station, November 7, 1863 …. Just across the river from the Brandy

Station encampment… The Green Greek Cross of the Light Brigade – for details on

Gen. Hooker’s earlier Army reorganization of January 1863, and the creation of the

“special forces” Light Brigade, see YANKEE SCOUT – Mud Campaign !!

““The last of April there came 100 rounds of ammunition extra inspection of rifles some of the boys got new guns.

On the 2nd

May Gen’l Orders read on parade for a grand advance of the army to begin at 4 o’cl A.M. of the 4th

with

six days rations fresh meet was to be driven on foot and butchered as needed – our load was not very light under

Grant.

[P. 140] Ditto

A man’s load was

3 days rations in the haversack

3 days rations in the knapsack,

40 rounds of cartridges in cart/ box

100 rounds of cartridges in the knapsack,

A army blanket, a rubber blanket,

A section of pup tent, a suit of undercloths,

Extra socks, 1 or 2 pairs,

A canteen of water, a cap box full of gun caps,

Our rifles with bayonets, and equipment.

“Many of the men who had been barefooted on former campaigns took extra shoes. I had a frying pan with a

hinged handle so it would lay down on the inside. I got a battery blacksmith to rivet loops on opposite sides so I

could strap it to the back of my knapsack.

Union frying pan with hinged handle – but without Drew’s custom rivet-loops provided

by the battery blacksmith !!

“Many had paper, enevelops, pens and ink ( it was before the days of the fountain pen).

About each six men had a light short-handled axe and carried [?] we took a day about

packing it, tobacco, pipe, matches, a housewife [ sic: this was Army lingo for a sewing kit

– Ed.] a few keepsakes.

“We discarded the uniform dress coat, and took the Army blouse, we put the whole, 6

days rations of hard tack in the haversack it filled it so full the cover or flap would not

buckle without putting in a loop.

“Generally the third evening found them [hard-tack] well pulverized if the weather was dry or redy to rebake if

there was a rain. Neither knapsack or haversack would turn water, we depended on the rubber blanket to keep

things dry.

“2 quarts of coffee ½ a qt of sugar we put in sacks we made from an old draws leg or pants leg as the case might be.

The meat we rolled up in the same kind of wraping to march all day in the heat or rain then not allowed any fire to

cook was common on a campaign.”

Advance “On the morning of the 4

th

of May, 1864, before the stars grew dim the 6th

Corps [ P. 139 ] was on the move to the

Germanna Ford7

of the Rappadan river Va., where the 5th

& 6th

Corps was to cross. The advance of the cavalry and

leading troops had driven the rebel pickets off and had laid the pontoones bridges, boath corps was all across

before dark. This crossing was some 8 or 9 miles below the Right of Lee’s rebel army.

Edwin Forbes, “General Meade Crossing the Rapidan May 9th

, [sic] 1864”

from Leslie’s Illustrated The Soldier in Our Civil War, p. 261

7 GERMANNA FORD, in Culpeper County, Virginia, was so-named by Virginia Governor John Spotswood, who

in 1714 settled a group of skilled German immigrants at this location along the Rapidan, in order to bring their

critical ironworking and metalworking skills to Virginia, to advance the economic prospects of the country.

“Spotswood wrote to Baron de Graffenreid… requesting him to recruit German miners for a project to develop a

Virginia iron industry. In the spring of 1714, twelve families, totaling 42 persons, arrived from the towns of Siegen

and Meusen in Nassau-Siegen. Spotswood … led them to the frontier site he had selected for the new mining

settlement. * * * He named it Germanna, honoring both the new colonists’ origins, and Queen Anne… The site

was along a horseshoe bend of the Rappahannock’s south fork, which Spotswood named the Rapidanna, about

thirty miles above what is now Fredericksburg.” In May of 1714, Spotswood wrote of Germanna, “I have placed

there a number of Protestant German, built them a fort [and] and furnished it with two pieces of cannon and some

ammunition.” H. Graham Lowry, How the Nation Was Won: America’s Untold Story, pp. 212-13 (EIR, 1987),

available at http://www.amazon.com/Nation-Americas-Untold-Story-1630-1754/dp/0943235219

“The 2nd

corps crossed some some 5 or 6 miles lower down.

“As soon as we got across skirmishers was put out a ¼ of a mile along the line of march to keep the rebs from

sniping the line. After seeing the Bridges up and moved off we took our place in line and went in camp, it was a

good days march and no fighting. No fires and no noise was the order, we chawed our hard-tack eat the meat raw,

washed it down with cold water then laid down to sleep in the wilderness.”

“Our army had moved to the attack once more and Gen’l U. S. Grant who had come to us thinking and even

saying that the Army of the Potomac didn’t know what real fighting was, would soon see how we could fight.”

Grant -- The Wilderness

“Was a tangled wild woods of many kind of trees, the undergroath of thick brush, creeping and clinging vines,

thorn brush, creeks, hills and hollows, had been mined for iron ore laying just below the surface leaving many

pitfalls, the trees shut out the sunlight.8

8 As Pvt. Drew notes, the land throughout this region is seamed with iron ore .... or, at least, it once was: for by the

time of the Civil War, the German emigrants resettled here by Spotswood (see note, preceding page) have, for

nearly a century and a half, worked open-pit mines to extract the metal ore– leaving dangerous pitfalls throughout

the Wilderness. For an introduction into the wild terrain in Culpeper County, Virginia, in 1863-4, review YANKEE

SCOUT – Winter Quarters – the Battle of Mine Run!! -- But for an unsurpassed narrative that makes this landscape

come alive, read the books by B. K. Benson referenced therein – esp. A Friend with the Countersign (1901)

Available here: https://archive.org/details/cu31924022256436

‘The foe knew every cowpath, hogtrail and wallow. All bridges was destroyed, such roads as there were was worn

below the surface and the foe used them for rifle pitts. Some of the cowpaths was closed by fallen timber behind

which the rebels would lay and pick off our men. They stood behind brush and trees until we were close up then

opened on us – we were eternally running into ambush, many times we was within 40 feet of them when they

opened fire [ P. 142 ] then when the rebels set the woods afire to drive us out it was all that Denbo said on the

evening of the 6th

“One hell of a hole with thousands of Devills turned loose,” with death in every direction, where

many a man lay and rotted where he fell.”

“The next morning, May the 5th

, before 3 o’cl. A.M. we was up before the sun and eaten our cold breakfast, waiting

orders, and soon the sounds of battle reached us out on our left. A double line of skirmishers was put out. Soon

the 1st

Division was ordered forward on quick time as Warren the 5th

Corps was up aginst something hard. We

soon got in line on the right of the 5th

Corps our two left companyes [Including Drew – Ed.] put out as skirmishers.

The rest of us went to work building rifle pitts and breast works.

The Battle of the Wilderness was on.

“A rought and tumble, every man on his own hook, the rest of the 6th

Corps was up inline and the foe is attacking its

seemed along the [side] on our left. Our skirmishers was attacked awhile after noon.9

And the rest of the regiment

put out as a reinforcement.”

9

Drew implies that he was among the 6th Maine men deployed by Sedgwick as skirmishers on May 5th, as he was

on the 6th – see following page.

“We soon put the foe to rout and did not follow them up. About sunset, Lee’s men got around the end of the 6th

Corps and was working to the rear, when unkle John [Sedgwick] took two regiments form the left of the 3rd

division

and flanked the flankers and captured two or three lines as many of them than they had taken from us. Darkness

had settled down and the firing ceased.”10

“We got word that Burnside with the 9th

Corps was on the way to join the army. We slept soundly all night and was

ready as soon as any one else in the morning for the days’ work.

10

Sedgwick is much better known for having “flanked the flankers” in movements against Gen Ewell, occurring late

on the following day, May 6, 1864. See next pages. But Pvt. Drew is unambiguous in presenting this engagement -

- in which Sedgwick’s uses two regiments of his “new” Third Division to turn the Rebel flanking maneuver - as taking

place on May 5th

. (Darius N. Couch's Division of the IV Corps, had become the 3rd Division of Sedgwick’s VI

Corps.) Drew affirms this by his later reference to Gen. Burnside arriving with reinforcements – as Burnside did

on the evening of May 5th

. Stevens, Three Years with Sixth Corps, p. 305 (1866), confirms a Confederate effort to

flank Sedgwick on the 5th

: “The enemy now charged upon our lines making a desperate attempt to turn our right

flank but without avail. Again and again the rebels in columns rushed with the greatest fury upon the two brigades

in front, without being able to move them from their position.” Robert E. Lee Russell, in a series of 15 sketch maps,

shows just such an engagement of two brigades of Sedgwick’s Corps, occurring late in the day on May 5:

https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3884wm.gcw0668000/?sp=7

“And the ball opened with a vengeance -- about sunrise the rebels struck with the force of a battering ram. This was

the 6th of May. [ P. 143 ] Only two days since the crossing the River and not a hot morsel gone down my throat.

The regiment was relieved from the skirmish at daybreak and went to the rear of the line under a hill and cooked

and eat a meal, rolled up in our blankets to take a nap. Some way the 5th

Corps moving or closing up on the left,

let a gap get open between their right and the Left of the 6th

Crops – then some regulars gave way and some others

and the Johnneys was in the gap and trying to make it bigger, had capture 2 or 300 of our men.

“Then Sedgwick and Warren got to work and our regiment came in action on the flank of them Johnneys and

captured 4 or 500 prisoners – their fun was done, they had lost more than they had won, but the fighting was fine

for a few minutes.”

This official Army carto, Map of the Battle Fields of the Wilderness, by Bvt. Col. J.C. Duane intrigues, as it

not only correctly places the Army of the Potomac under the command of Meade, but omits all reference to

Grant. It is undated. https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3884w.cw0665000/

“I was told that a mounted officer galloped up to Gen’l Grant and shouted, “The 6th

Corps is flanked and the foe is

in its rear, you have to retreat!” – he [ the courier – Ed.] had more likely been with Howard when the 11th

had been

flanked. All day the musket firing was as heavy as any I had ever heard. The Artillery could not be used and

had not fired a shot in the two days fighting,

“Our Corps was the rear of the Army and two or three times the foe tried to flank us but Sedgwick was always

found redy. The destruction of life was heavy on each side. I think they must have lost the most.”

At the opening of the Battle of the Wilderness, Gen. John Sedgwick’s VI Corps was

on the far right of the Union line, faced off against Lt. Gen. Richard Ewell’s Second

Corps, when Ewell tried to flank the line and come up behind the VI Corps – a

movement which Sedgwick detected and successfully countered. While Drew’s

narrative indicates a Confederate flanking maneuver was made around sunset on May

5th

(see p. 18, above) Gen. Ewell re-initiated this effort the next afternoon. A series

of 26 very fine maps of the Battel of the Wilderness, made by Judge Robert E. Lee

Russell, are available from to view or download at the Library of Congress website

here: https://www.loc.gov/item/2007627341/ Ewell’s effort against Sedgwick’s flank -

- but NOT Sedgwick’s successful turning of Ewell’s effort -- is depicted in a few of

these maps. See, No. 21 https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3884wm.gcw0667000/?sp=22

CSA Lt. Gen. John B. Gordon, in his Reminiscences of the Civil War, pp. 257-8 (1902) writes of the Confederate

leadership’s battlefield deliberations over whether to move against Sedgwick on that afternoon of May 6. Gordon’s

scouts indicated that Sedgwick was vulnerable – but Gen. Early reported key intel that Gen. Burnsides backed him:

“General Grant during that day was full of apprehension that Ewell would attempt some offensive tactics

against Sedgwick, while Lee was wondering why it was not done. Lee knew that it ought to be done, as will

appear later, if for no other object than to divert Grant's attention from his prime purpose and thus bring

incidental relief to Longstreet and the other heavily pressed Confederates far off to our right. General

Horace Porter, in his "Campaigning with Grant," more than once refers to General Grant's uneasiness about

Sedgwick. He says: "The general-in-chief was devoting a good deal of thought to our right, which had been

weakened." Well might General Grant be apprehensive. Had he been fully apprised of that strangely

exposed flank of his army, he would have been impelled to send troops to protect Sedgwick's right. On the

other hand, had Lee been advised, as he should have been, of the reports of my scouts and of myself, he

would not have delayed the proposed movement against Sedgwick's flank a moment longer than was

necessary to give an order for its execution. * *

“Both General Early and I were at Ewell's headquarters when, at about 5:30 in the afternoon, General Lee

rode up and asked: "Cannot something be done on this flank to relieve the pressure upon our right ?" After

listening for some time to the conference which followed this pointed inquiry, I felt it my duty to acquaint

General Lee with the facts as to Sedgwick's exposed flank, and with the plan of battle which had been

submitted and urged in the early hours of the morning and during the day. General Early again promptly

and vigorously protested as he had previously done. He still steadfastly maintained that Burnside's corps

was in the woods behind Sedgwick's right; that the movement was too hazardous and must result in disaster

to us. With as much earnestness as was consistent with the position of junior officer, I recounted the facts

to General Lee, and assured him that General Early was mistaken; that I had ridden for several miles in

Sedgwick's rear, and that neither Burnside's corps nor any other Union troops were concealed in those

woods. The details of the whole plan were laid before him. There was no doubt with him as to its feasibility.

“His words were few, but his silence and grim looks while the reasons for that long delay were being given,

and his prompt order to me to move at once to the attack, revealed his thoughts almost as plainly as words

could have done. Late as it was, he agreed in the opinion that we could bring havoc to as much of the

Union line as we could reach before darkness should check us. It was near sunset, and too late [for Ewell]

to reap more than a pittance of the harvest which had so long been inviting the Confederate sickle.”

“No mortal man has ever described the battle of the Wilderness or ever will.

Like Sherman, I’ll say it was Hell.”

The next morning May 7th, 1864

“We was ready at 3 o’Cl A.M. to begin the days work, just after sunrise the skirmishers reported the foe had left

our front. Then we started to hunt them up – about [P. 144] noon we located them back in their fortified lines,

redy to entertain with the best they had if we would only call.

“Our army moved to the left and by dark

we was out of the Wilderness and we think

Lee had got as much of it as we had.

“We left the dead and fatally wounded.

Many from each side was cremated in the

fire.

“No fighting to day unot {?] in or ever

[even?] among the skirmishers. We are

close up to Lee’s lines and the rebs are

making their works stronger.

“When we haulted for the night we had

the first good wash-up since leaveing

Winter Quarters and we also had a good

nights sleep.

“On the morning of the 8th

while cooking

breakfast we began to sing

“O ain’t I glad I am out of the Wilderness, “Out of! We are out of the Wilderness ….

“Orders came from Gen’l Russel to stop

that noise but Gen’l Sedgwick who was

riding with Russell told him to let the men

sing all they wanted to.

“We gave Unkle John three cheers. We

knew we had crossed the Rappadan and

Rappahannock for the last time…

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6JO4784QvSI

“Gen’ls Grant and Mead passed our Brigade and we gave them three cheers that made the forest ring and brought

a couple of shells from the rebs as a protest to our hilariousness – they are moving in the same direction we are,

but they are behind earthworks, and some of the boys thinks they must be packing them along…

“The Wilderness Battle was the last time Lee’s Army ever left their Breastworks to attack us while I was in the

army.

“We was on the road to Richmond again.”

Gen. Grant has brought with him to the battlefield something which Lee – operating a strictly defensive campaign –

can at first hardly comprehend: namely, a grand strategy for victory by which he will seize the initiative from Lee.

Grant’s strategic plan is not simply to advance toward Richmond in a “capture-the flag” sequence of pitched battles

and retreats, hoping to take the Confederate Seat, but rather to engage Lee’s Army wherever possible, for the sake

of inflicting maximum casualties, and wearing that army away. In other words, in his Brandy Station strategizing,

Grant had shifted the strategic objective of the Army, from a raw territorial one, of taking Richmond, to one of

engaging the Rebel Army itself, simply to reduce its numbers and effectiveness. With this in mind, Grant will

undertake to make repeated moves as if to approach Richmond, with the strategic objective of drawing Lee out to

defend it -- and to fight. Since Lee is operating a defensive campaign, Grant is effectively turning Lee’s strength to

his own purposes. For Grant, attaining Spottsylvania was only preliminary to drawing Lee out into further battles ….

In that particular, then, Grant had planned to march the Army of the Potomac to Spotsylvania Court House – a

crossroads which would give the Army of the Potomac an obvious inside track to Richmond. Again, Grant’s objective

of securing the Spotsylvania crossroads is not to attack Richmond “per se” – as in every other Union Army campaign

-- but only to force Lee to defend it. But by attacking Grant and engaging the Union Army in the Wilderness, Lee

had apparently “thwarted” Grant’s drive to Spottsylvania. Indeed, considered as if in isolation, much as earlier battles

in the war must be considered, the Battle of the Wilderness is often reckoned by historians to be a tactical victory for

Lee, or at worst, a “tactical draw” between the two Armies. But was it? YANKEE SCOUT sees it this way:

1. Pvt. Drew remembers with satisfaction the exuberance of the Union Army forces emerging after three days

fighting in the Wilderness, and underlines the sense of accomplishment with the comment “The Wilderness

battle was the last time Lee’s Army ever left their breastworks to attack us, while I was in the army.” For the

infantry soldier like Drew, this change means that Grant, in his first engagement with Lee, has already seized

the upper-hand and given a tactical advantage to his Army. This awareness was “bi-lateral” -- simply put, if

the Yankees knew that the Rebs were not leaving their breastworks to fight, the Rebs themselves knew it all

the more: Drew emphasizes this by relating the crack, that “some of the boys thinks they must be packing

[their earthworks ] along.” Thus, Grant in the Wilderness has forced the Army of Northern Virginia to adopt

a change in movement tactics, with increased defenses. This is a setback for Lee, and is instantly recognized

by the Union soldiers as a change in the battlefield initiative.

2. Drew also remarks that the Army knew it had crossed the Rappahannock and Rapidan for the last time.

According to one historian of Culpeper County, Clark B. Hall, the Rappahannock River was actually a

Confederate defensive “front” or “line” of great but unacknowledged significance: it marked the front of what

was accepted as Lee’s “home-turf.” Throughout the course of the war, the Rappahannock River has served

as a key barrier to Union advance. See, Hall, Upper Rappahannock River Front: the Dare Mark Line,” and

Hall, Chronology of Major Military Actions on the Rappahannock River Line, Fauquier and Culpeper Counties (2011), online at: http://www.brandystationfoundation.com/places/Rappahannock%20Front.pdf

For the Union Army to have crossed the Rappahannock River now, and successfully engaged Lee’s forces in

the Wilderness, and yet thereafter effectively “dis-engaged’ to continue the advance -- moving south out

toward Spottsylvania Court House – represents the effectiveness of Grant’s strategy.

3. In addition, while it is unrelated to Grant’s strategy, on May 6th

, during the second day

of fighting in the Wilderness, Lee’s second-in-command, Gen. James Longstreet was

badly wounded, by “friendly fire” rifle shot to the throat, which removed him from

the battlefield for the duration of the summer – until October, 1864.

So, Lee’s Army emerged from the Wilderness almost in a different “phase” …..

“The country more open the roads better and it seems good to get out in the sunlight even if it is some warmer.

[P. 145] At the end of the day’s march, after we had eaten a bite, the Regiment was advanced about ¼ of a mile or

more, and haulted in a thick groath of Oak timber and formed line of battle in a road and told to lay down and

hold that position until daylight and then take the skirmish for the day.

“I had never see the officer before who placed us there it was dark before we got in the place. Colonel Lincoln

ordered scouts out in front and on each flank.

“We always took such precaution unless we was shore there was pickets in front. The grown was levell no

underbrush. On the right the scout reported all clear for a half a mile – no pickets. On the left the scouts found a

rebel fort with guns mounted less than 200 spaces, the foes lines making a bend and was nigher to us than in front –

so we put our pickets on front and left and the [men] was ordered to be on the watch also.

“No taking, no smoaking, no noise, no blanket – the men laid with their [weapons] in or close at hand. How still it

was, not even a treetoad was chippering. It was warm… I think the men in line was all asleep.”

Winslow Homer – Army of the Potomac – Sleeping on Their Arms, from Harper’s Weekly, (May 21, 1864). Homer illustrates the impact that Grant’s hard-driving strategy is already having on the Union troops – who cannot

take time even to pitch a tent, but must bed down in the open without fire -- and without cooked food.

Inset Detail: A sleeping infantryman with the Greek Cross of Sedgwick’s VI Corps. See p. 12 above.

“ I got up and took a look at the pickets.

“Denbo’s signal reached me and I went to him ...

“He had been up to the fort and heard the Rebs inside takking, couldn’t make out what they said, but they had

loaded cannon in the fort.”

“It must have been past midnight. I started intending to get the men out of that road and had got close enough to

see them… When this strange thing took place… --- ”

SPECIAL THANKS TO LYNDON H. LaROUCHE (JR.) and STAFF

for LEADING MANKIND SUCCESSFULLY through the WILDERNESS !!