The Janus Face of the Demographic Transition in the Arab World:

The Decisive Role of Nuptiality

Paul Puschmann¹ & Koen Matthijs² Family and Population Studies

Centre for Sociological Research KU Leuven, Belgium

¹ PhD fellow at Research Foundation Flanders² Full Professor in Sociology

Prepared for the Academic Workshop Population Change and Europe

Antwerp (Belgium), 9-11 May 2012

The First Demographic Transition in a Nutshell

• French Scholars like Dumont (1890), Leroy-Beaulieu (1896) & Landry (1909; 1933; 1934) – Observe a demographic revolution: voluntary limitation in marital fertility.– Focus on France, but Landry included first a European and later even a global perspective.

• Thompson (1929), Notestein (1944;1945) & Davis (1945) – Replaced the term ‘revolution’ by ‘transition’.– Fertility decline interpreted as a reaction to mortality decline.– Modernization and industrialization are driving forces.– Demographic transition was perceived as a universal process.– Transition from one demographic equilibrium to a new.

The First Demographic Transition in a Nutshell

• “… societies that experience modernization progress from a pre-modern regime of high fertility and high mortality to a post-modern one in which both are low.” (Kirk 1996: 361).

• Decline in mortality is followed by a decline fertility.• Transitional period is characterized by high speed population growth.• At a certain moment in time a new equilibrium is reached. • Demographic transition is often related to processes of modernization, technological

progress and industrialization.• In the course of the fertility transition, nuptiality increases, as demographically

speaking, the introduction of birth control, makes postponement of marriage redundant.

Source: http://globalsoc.files.wordpress.com/2008/04/demographic-transition-theory.png

The First Demographic Transition in a Nutshell

• When it comes to the causes of mortality decline, Omran’s epidemiological transition has been very influential. – Three phases: 1 Age of pestilence and famine

2 Age of receding pandemics 3 Age of degenerative and man-made diseases

• Empircial tests of the fertility transition (e.g. Lesthaeghe & Wilson 1982; Coale & Watkins 1986), show that underlying causes of new demographic behavior is many times more complicated than the classical theory suggests. – Differences in timing and pace of the transition between regions are not fully explainable in

terms of urbanization, industrialization & economic growth. – Cultural factors (e.g. religion, secularization; language), which are harder to quantify seem

to be important.– Intergenerational aspects, like wealth flows between parents and children, are also

substantial (Caldwell 1966– Recent focus on diffusion patterns

A Second Demographic Transition

• Lesthaeghe & Van de Kaa (1986): Industrialized countries have entered a new demographic development

– Concept of a Second Demographic Transition is launched.– Fertility declines further then ever imagined (below replacement level).– Increasing disequilibrium between fertility and mortality.– Migration as compensation for declining fertility.– Institution of marriage is under pressure:

– Decline in total first marriage rate; increase in mean age at first marriage.– Strong increase in divorce. – Strong increase in cohabitation.– Rise in births out of wedlock.

Second Demographic Transition

• Fertility declines below replacement level: no new equilibrium between mortality and fertility; compensation by migration.

• Decline in total first marriage rate; increase in mean age at first marriage. • Strong increase in divorce.• Strong increase in cohabitation.• Rise in births out of wedlock.• Old, less effective contraceptive methods are replaced by more effective

methods.

Source: Van de Kaa 1999

Demographic Transition in the Arab World

Demographic Transition in the Arab World

• In the Arab World mortality started only to decline under European occupation (end of 19th / beginning of 20th century).

• Fertility decline started during independence.

• The demographic transition evolved faster than in Western countries, since more effective techniques to decrease mortality and fertility were already available for adoption.

• Fertility decline went faster as there was less religious opposition against birth control / family planning programs.

• In the Arab world, fertility decline is not only driven by birth control, but also by a sharp rise in the ages at marriage. Rising ages at marriage play even a larger role in fertility decline than modern family planning (Rashad & Kadr 2002).

Demographic Transition in Algeria and Egypt

1907-

1911

1912-

1921

1922-

1931

1930-

1939

1940-

1949

1950-

1959

1960-

1969

1970-

1979

1980-

1989

1990-

1999

2000-

2010

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

crude birth ratecrude death rate

1876-1878

1879-1890

1891-1900

1901-1910

1911-1920

1921-1930

1931-1940

1941-1950

1951-1960

1961-1969

1970-1979

1980-1989

1990-1999

2000-20100

10

20

30

40

50

60

crude birth ratecrude death rate

Algeria

Egypt

Mortality Decline in the Arab World

1950-1955

1955-1960

1960-1965

1965-1970

1970-1975

1975-1980

1980-1985

1985-1990

1990-1995

1995-2000

2000-2005

2005-2010

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

AlgeriaMauretaniaMoroccoTunisiaLibyaEgyptSaudi ArabiaLebanonBahrainDjiboutiIraqYemenJordanKuwaitOmanPalestineQatarSudanSyriaUnited Arab EmiratesSomaliaOman

The Decline in TFR in the Arab Countries

1950-1955

1955-1960

1960-1965

1965-1970

1970-1975

1975-1980

1980-1985

1985-1990

1990-1995

1995-2000

2000-2005

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 Algeria

Mauretania

Morocco

Tunisia

Libya

Egypt

Saudi Arabia

Lebanon

Bahrain

Djibouti

Iraq

Yemen

Jordan

Kuwait

Oman

Palestine

Qatar

Sudan

Syria

United Arab Emirates

A Second Demographic Transition in the Arab World?

• Only in a limited number of countries (Lebanon, Tunisia & United Arab Emirates) fertility is below the replacement level

• Marriage in itself has not become less popular in the Arab World: 1 Marriage Rates have not declined 2 Proportions of life-time singles stay very small.

• Divorce is not clearly on the rise; some Arab countries experience even an opposite trend.

• Cohabitation and births out of wedlock are still illegal in most Arab countries and although data is very scarce, there are no indications that there is sharp increase.

• Traditional attitudes toward sexuality and family formation, e.g. that females should preserve virginity till marriage, are still very much alive.

Crude Divorce Rates 1970 - today

Source: World Marriage Data 2008

Country Around 1970 Around 1985 Around 1990  Second Latest Latest

Egypt 2 1,6 1,1 0,9 0,9Lebanon 0,6 1 1,1 1,2 1,1

Iraq 0,4 0,1 1,5 .. ..Libya 2 0,9 0,3 0,3 0,3

Palestine .. .. 1,3 1,1 1Qatar 1,6 0,8 0,9 0,8 1Syria 0,6 0,6 0,8 0,9 1

United Arab Emirates .. .. 0,9 0,9 0,9

Belgium 0,7 1,9 3,5 2,9 2,8Germany 1,3 2,3 2,1 2,4 2,3

Switzerland 1 1,8 2,2 2,9 2,6

United Kingdom 1,1 3,1 2,9 2,6 2,4

The rise in the SMAM among males in the Arab World, 1960-today

1960

1963

1966

1969

1972

1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

Algeria

Mauretania

Morocco

Tunisia

Libya

Egypt

Saudi Arabia

Lebanon

Bahrain

Djibouti

Iraq

Yemen

Jordan

Kuwait

Oman

Palestine

Qatar

Sudan

Syria

Source: World Marriage Data 2008

The rise in the SMAM among Females in the Arab world, 1960-today

1960

1963

1966

1969

1972

1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30Algeria

Mauretania

Morocco

Tunisia

Libya

Egypt

Saudi Arabia

Lebanon

Bahrain

Djibouti

Iraq

Yemen

Jordan

Kuwait

Oman

Palestine

Qatar

Sudan

Syria

Source: World Marriage Data 2008

Marriage in the Arab World stays Popular

Around 1970 Around 1985 Around 19952000 or later

2nd latest latest

Algeria 4,7 5,6 5,5 8,5 9,6Iraq 4,1 8,0 5,6 6,8 9,6Qatar 3,1 3,0 2,8 3,4 3,7Lebanon 7,9 8,8 7,4 7,2Libya 7,3 4,9 4,8 5,3 6,0Saudi Arabia 3,4 4,6 5,2Syria 9,9 8,9 8,5 10,7 10,6

Crude Marriage Rates, 1970 - today

Males FemalesAlgeria 2,3 3,8Mauretania 0,9 2Morocco 6,1 6,8Tunisia 3 2,3Libya 1,5 1,4Egypt 1,4 1,4Saudi Arabia 1,7 1,5Lebanon 5,9 9,5Bahrain 8,3 8,8Djibouti 2,4 2,9Iraq 3 6Yemen 1,4 0,5Jordan 2,2 5,4Kuwait 6,5 10,4Oman 3 1,6Palestine 1,3 7,9Qatar 2,2 3Sudan 3,8 1,6Syria 4,6 1,5United Arab Emirates 1,2 0,9

Percentage life-time singles around 2000Source: World Marriage Data 2008

Source: World Marriage Data 2008

The Janus Face of the Demographic transition in the Arab World• The Demographic transition in the Arab Countries has a double face as fertility

decline is not only driven by birth control but also by rising ages at marriage

• This is a blessing as it helps countries struggling with a demographic explosion to restore balance between population and economic growth: Demographic divide between the West and the Arab World grows smaller

• Rising ages at marriage are also a challenge as they reflect the growing unaffordability of marriage and form a source of tension and frustration.

– The Arab Spring spring is amongst other things a result of a growing disparity between aspirations and realities among young people

• Parental authority is under pressure as period of single life extends:– Double duty of children to contribute to the family budget and to save money for married life.– Delay of main property transfer between parents and children.– Controlling the sexuality of daughters has become more complicated: Disturbing reports on illegal

abortions and surgery’s to ‘restore’ virginity.

• High-speed fertlity decline will accelerate the ageing process of the Arab population

• In short, The demographic transition in the Arab world opens new opportunities, but creates at the same time new challenges.