Table of Contents - macmillanihe.com...Table of Contents vii 11.2 The European agricultural fortress...

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Table of Contents

List of Figures viii

List of Abbreviations ix

Foreword xi

Notes on Contributors xii

Introduction: Key Controversies in European Integration 1Andreas Dür and Hubert Zimmermann

1 The European Union: Success or Failure? 10 1.1 Why Europe works 11

John McCormick 1.2 The rise and fall of the EU 19

Jan Zielonka

2 The Political Efficiency of the EU 29 2.1 The EU as efficient polity 30

Desmond Dinan 2.2 The EU: quick to regulate, slow to adapt 37

Mats Persson

3 More Powers for Brussels or Renationalization? 45 3.1 A stronger, more supranational Union 46

Derek Beach 3.2 The new intergovernmentalism – the next phase in

European integration 55Uwe Puetter

4 How Democratic is the EU? 64 4.1 The inevitability of a democratic deficit 65

Richard Bellamy 4.2 A democratic achievement, not just a democratic deficit 73

Christopher Lord

5 Too Much Power for the Judges 80 5.1 Understanding the European Court’s political power 81

Karen J. Alter and R. Daniel Kelemen

Copyrighted material – 9781137529503


vi Table of Contents

5.2 A strange institution 91Jeremy Rabkin

6 Can There Be a Common European Identity? 97 6.1 European identity formation in (the) crisis 98

Ulrike Liebert 6.2 A common European identity is an illusion 107

Jonathan White

7 Lobbying in the EU: How much Power for Big Business? 115 7.1 Business as usual – the EU is (still) driven by

corporate interests 116Laura Horn and Angela Wigger

7.2 The diminishing power of big business 121David Marshall

8 The Future of the Euro: Union or Disintegration? 128 8.1 Why the euro is a functional necessity in the process

of European integration 129Henrik Enderlein

8.2 For a plurality of economic and social models! Against a monolithic euro state! 137Andreas Nölke

9 The Euro: Economic Success or Disaster? 145 9.1 Exit or differentiated monetary integration –

saving the euro by making it more flexible 146Tal Sadeh

9.2 Unity in diversity: the unfulfilled promise of the euro 151Waltraud Schelkle

10 Can the EU Tame Big Finance? 15810.1 The merits of adaptive governance: the regulation of

financial services in the European Union 159Jörn-Carsten Gottwald

10.2 The pitfalls of EU governance in financial markets 167Daniel Mügge

11 The Big Waste? The Common Agricultural Policy 17511.1 Europe’s common values and agricultural policy:

a defence of the CAP 176Ann-Christina L. Knudsen



Table of Contents vii

11.2 The European agricultural fortress under attack 183Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt

12 Does the EU Act as Normative Power? 19112.1 The EU is a normative power in world politics 192

Daniela Sicurelli12.2 Living in a material world: a critique of ‘normative

power Europe’ 198Mark A. Pollack

13 Is EU Enlargement a Success Story or Has It Gone Too Far? 20513.1 The benefits of EU enlargement: defending security,

democracy and prosperity 206Rachel Epstein

13.2 EU enlargement: a critique 212Christopher J. Bickerton

14 Towards a Common European Army? 21914.1 Still flattering to deceive: the Common Security and

Defence Policy 220Anand Menon

14.2 Defence integration in the EU: from vision to business as usual 227Hanna Ojanen

15 A New German Hegemony: Does It Exist? Would It be Dangerous? 23415.1 The failure of German leadership 236

Matthias Matthijs15.2 A benign hegemon: Germany’s European vocation 243

Miguel Otero-Iglesias and Hubert Zimmermann

16 Should It Stay or Should It Go? Britain, EU Membership and the Merits of Selective Integration 25116.1 Brexit – a disaster for Britain and for the European

Union 252Martin Rhodes

16.2 The case for Brexit: why Britain should leave the EU 258Alan Sked

Bibliography 265

Index 294



1

Introduction: Key Controversies In European IntegrationAndreas Dür and Hubert Zimmermann

In mid-2005, French and Dutch voters rejected a proposal for a Euro-pean Constitution that had taken the member states of the European Union (EU) many years to negotiate. The resounding ‘No’ by two of the founding nations of the EU immediately gave rise to a vivid debate on the pros and cons of the European project. Had this visionary and unparalleled achievement in international cooperation, which promised to overcome the pattern of state rivalry characterizing Europe since the Middle Ages, come to an undignified halt? Was this the beginning of the end of an experiment which was presented by European leaders as a shining example to other regions of the world? Or was the vote just a temporary lull in a continuous process of reform? Many detractors have likened the EU to a bicycle which can only work as long as it is in motion.

In fact, while its designation suggested that the Constitution might be the founding document of a true Union, the rather less grandiose real purpose was to reform the governing structures of the EU. By making these both more efficient and democratic, the EU tried to cor-rect its increasingly negative image among many elites and the general public and to get closer to its citizens. Notwithstanding many obituar-ies, the member states quickly resurrected the idea of an institutional reform with a less-charged set-up. Now they framed it as an inter-governmental treaty which would not need to receive the uncertain consent of a fickle populace. The Treaty of Lisbon went into force on 1 December 2009.

By this time, another crisis rocked the foundations of the EU. The consequences of the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 led to a mas-sive rise in the indebtedness of many European governments. Countries such as Greece, Cyprus or Ireland were threatened with bankruptcy. From 2010 onwards, one emergency summit followed the next. In the first half of 2015, a stand-off between a newly elected left-wing govern-ment in Greece and the rest of the eurozone brought the country to the brink of a disorderly exit with unforeseeable consequences. And just when the dust had settled (for the time being) on this issue, Europe was overwhelmed by a sudden influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing war and economic distress in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and many



2 Introduction

other countries in Africa and Asia. The plight of these masses cast grave doubts on the capacity of Europeans to govern their borders and man-age the stream of refugees. Bitter recriminations broke out on quotas and the distribution of the resulting burden, as well as on the future of the European border regime. Looming above all this was the prospect of Britain leaving the Union with a popular referendum promised by the Conservative government of David Cameron to be held in June 2016, and armed conflicts in the Ukraine in 2015 which conjured up a new Cold War between Russia and the West. And then, on 23 June 2016, Britain voted by a slim majority to leave the EU, setting the stage for years of complicated divorce proceedings.

This long state of emergency shows that the Union should not be taken for granted. European integration is a political process which is reversible once its output turns negative and/or the political support for it vanishes. The often-predicted break-up of the EU has not yet hap-pened; but that does not mean that it will never come. Doubts about the future of the EU have never been so pervasive.

All this renders the second edition of this book particularly timely. Like the first edition, it proceeds from the assumption that the European Union is an open-ended and strongly contested project. It is both spectacularly successful and deeply flawed. The politics of the EU are characterized by numerous controversies which not only are pertinent to the EU itself but also illustrate many of the most salient problems of international coop-eration in today’s world. We tackle these controversies head-on in the form of dichotomous debates. Some of the most prominent EU scholars reflect on the current and future state of the EU against the background of its enlargement to 28 members, the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and the many economic and political challenges the EU has faced since then. The aim is to provide readers with an up-to-date account of current issues in EU politics and to enable them to take sides in one of the great debates of European politics: the future of the European Union.

While most of the books that provide information on the EU describe its history, its institutions, its policy areas and its protracted govern-ance procedures (Cini and Perez-Solorzano Borragán, 2013; Dinan, 2010; Hix and Høyland, 2011; Kenealy, Peterson, and Corbett, 2015; McCormick, 2014; McCormick, 2015; Nugent, 2010; Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2010; Yesilada and Wood, 2015), this book is different. It focuses on the profoundly political core of the European Union. The authors represent the whole spectrum of thinking about the EU, from pro-European to openly Eurosceptic perspectives. Thematic chapters address the most important issues in EU politics, with pairs of authors presenting diametrically opposed views on each controversy. Our aim in editing the book is to spark debate, in public and in the classroom.



Introduction 3

Can the EU survive? A community between crisis and revival

The recurrent crises and the intense debates about the EU indicate that fundamental doubts existed since its earliest days whether a project that transcends national borders in an unprecedented way can survive in a world that is still dominated by nation states. The EU is (and has always been) a fundamentally contested political project.

The idea of European integration has sparked the imagination of Europeans since the nineteenth century. It represented a response to the endless conflicts which plagued Europe for centuries and culmi-nated in World War II, a tragedy that cost the life of up to 50 million Europeans. Only six years after the war had ended, however, France and Germany in 1951 set up the first European institution, the Euro-pean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands joined. In 1957, the six original members of the ECSC signed the Rome Treaties, establishing the European Economic Community and Euratom, an organization aimed at fostering coop-eration in the field of nuclear energy. Important economic reasons sustained these organizations, above all the removal of trade barriers. Right up to the present day, however, European politicians also use the argument that integration has contributed to peace in Europe and thus try to bolster the legitimacy of the Union. Jean-Claude Juncker, the current president of the European Commission and one of the leading politicians in EU affairs during the past decades, once stated: ‘Whoever doubts Europe, whoever despairs of Europe, should visit military cem-eteries’ (Juncker, 2008).

Additional motives have pushed the integration process: the rivalry with the Eastern bloc during the Cold War, demands from economic actors for better market access, the hope to catch up with the United States in terms of economic and political power, and the protection of vulnerable sectors of the European population from the vicissitudes of world markets, for instance, through the Common Agricultural Policy. Sustained economic growth and the increasing wealth of European citizens led to an almost unquestioned support of the Community in its early years, and they proved a big attraction for potential mem-ber countries. And yet, already soon after the founding treaties were signed in 1957, pundits predicted a break-up of the Community dur-ing the so-called Empty Chair Crisis in the mid-1960s. The same hap-pened during the global economic turmoil of the early 1970s when exchange-rate chaos undermined economic cooperation among the member states. Later in this decade, a new European malady was diag-nosed, a status of stagnation called ‘eurosclerosis’. Eventually, how-ever, member states agreed on the Single European Act (1986), which



4 Introduction

cleared the way for a genuine common market. The United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain joined during the 1970s and 1980s.

The Single European Act of 1986, the first major revision of the founding treaties, exerted a pull which hardly could have been fore-seen by its proponents. European legislation (the so-called Acquis Com-munautaire) expanded precipitously, and European institutions such as the Commission as the sole initiator of legislation in the EU, and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as interpreter of the treaties took on ever-expanding roles. The need for cohesion within the Community, the challenges posed by the breakdown of the Berlin Wall, and the effects of an increasingly integrated market brought more and more policy areas into the realm of European integration, among them security and defence policy. In 1992, the member states gathered in Maastricht (Netherlands) to decide on a new treaty, which consolidated previous agreements and established a three-pillar structure for the newly named European Union.

Most importantly, the majority of EU members embarked on the path towards a common currency which, against many odds, became a reality on New Year’s Day, 2002. However, as the EU spread its influ-ence over more and more policy areas that had been the exclusive preserve of nation states, contestation grew. In June 1992, the Danish population voted against the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by its government. The EU’s political establishment reacted with shock. The permissive consensus, that is the unquestioned support of the pro-ject by Europeans, which had sustained European integration since the 1950s, had ended. The term ‘democratic deficit’, denoting the increas-ing distance of citizens from EU decision-making processes and the difficulties to hold EU policy-makers accountable, entered the political vocabulary. Decision-makers have responded by progressively increas-ing the powers of the European Parliament, for example in the treaty revisions of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001). Nevertheless, these moves have often looked like a zero-sum game in which increasing layers of democratic legitimacy inevitably impair the EU’s ability for effective decision-making. In 2004 and 2007, the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe joined, together with Cyprus and Malta, prompting predictions that an already convoluted decision-making process would now become completely unwieldy and that the still fresh political and economic stability of these countries contained the seed for major upheavals. The Union of 28, however, has continued to take decisions across all areas of the EU’s competencies, and, as of 2016, several other countries are candidates at various stages of the accession process.



Introduction 5

The scholarly debateThe incessant political debates about the EU since its founding have their reflection in the big scholarly controversies that have character-ized the literature on European integration since the 1950s. The most long-standing of these was fought between intergovernmentalists and supranationalists. In 1958, Ernst Haas in his book The Uniting of Europe, building on the experience of the ECSC, argued that sectoral integration had an inherent expansive logic, which would lead to an ever- increasing integration among European states. Haas’s argument, which has become known as neofunctionalism, was that the creation of a central authority would lead to the emergence of supranational trade associations, labour unions and political parties that would increas-ingly pursue their interests at the European level. This shift in loyalty and resources away from the national state and towards the emerg-ing centre would strengthen the central authority and facilitate further integration. The first crisis of the integration project in the 1960s, how-ever, encouraged advocates of the so-called intergovernmentalist school of thought, most prominently among them Stanley Hoffmann (1966). Intergovernmentalists argued that nation states would remain the key players in international politics, notwithstanding any efforts at regional integration. In fact, according to these scholars, nation states were the main obstacle to further integration; increasing diversity among national states because of varying external and internal changes would make integration even more difficult in the future. The core normative issue behind the neofunctionalism versus intergovernmentalism debate was the question of whether the nation state would and should have a future in the twenty-first century.

Eurosclerosis in the 1970s and early 1980s meant that the schol-arly debates on European integration lost much of their force. It was only the Single Market Programme in the 1980s that shifted scholars’ attention back to the project of European unification. Supranation-alists were quick to stress the role of the European Commission and transnational actors in giving new impetus to European integration (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989). Reflecting the basic neofunctional-ist logic, they suggested that economic integration in Europe increases the demand for rules at the European level. This demand is met by the European Commission. The supranationalist account of the revival of European integration in the 1980s was immediately challenged by a revised intergovernmentalist argument, however. Liberal intergovern-mentalism, as proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (1998), argues that the steps towards further integration in the 1980s and 1990s should best be understood as a result of the convergence of member-state preferences.



6 Introduction

The Commission, according to Moravcsik, was of little help in produc-ing this outcome. At the same time, the multilevel governance approach emerged as a kind of compromise between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. It stresses member states’ partial loss of control over the integration process, but also sees the Commission’s authority cir-cumscribed owing to the need to cooperate with the Council of Minis-ters and the European Parliament (Marks et al., 1996).

The 1990s also saw the emergence of a literature, less concerned with explaining the process of European integration as such, and more with capturing the dynamics of policy-making in the EU. Much recent research has aimed at explaining legislative activity in this entity, the inner workings of the European institutions, the strategies used by inter-est groups in lobbying EU institutions, the adaptation of national politi-cal institutions to the process of European integration, and specific policy outcomes (Egan et al., 2010). The resulting literature offers a complex picture of the EU, in which a multitude of actors try to shape policy out-comes, and their success can vary from case to case. In many respects, the problems faced by the EU and identified in this huge literature are problems which are typical for an increasingly interdependent world. They exemplify the political controversies underlying each attempt of international cooperation, regardless of whether these are the high poli-tics of global conflicts or the supposedly low politics of international standard setting. While eschewing the normatively charged arguments of the early years of European integration, the problems of efficiency and legitimacy identified by this literature are inseparably linked with the overall debate about the future course of the EU.

Structure and scope of this book

The EU is usually depicted as a mind-bogglingly complex political sys-tem. Only a few European citizens can claim to have an at least fair knowledge of how it works and how its major institutions, such as the Council, the Commission, the Parliament, the CJEU (Court of Justice of the European Union), and the European Central Bank, interact. The Treaty of Lisbon has been widely ridiculed for the spectacular failure it represents regarding the attempt to simplify the core texts of the Union. Given the importance of the EU for global political and economic affairs, it is not surprising that numerous textbooks – some of which we list at the end of this introduction – are on the market which attempt to describe in great detail the often cumbersome ways in which the EU works. While it is indispensable to have an understanding of the pol-ity and policies of the EU, the underlying politics are often not spelled out. EU institutions are responses to problems of policy coordination.



Introduction 7

Their specific forms and the pattern of interaction are also shaped by different visions and ideas about what the EU should, and should not, do. Conflict abounds, ranging from seemingly irrelevant quarrels about minuscule details of EU legislation to the grand question on whether the EU is a visionary project offering hope for future world peace or rather a historical dead end. This book takes up these debates, moving from general debates to more specific ones.

The first chapter debates the overall value of the EU. While John McCormick defends the importance and success of the EU, Jan Zielonka offers a sceptical view of its future relevance. The debate about the EU’s success is closely linked to the question of the political efficiency of the EU (Chapter 2). Desmond Dinan argues that the EU is surprisingly effi-cient regarding its policy output, whereas Mats Persson strongly disa-grees by pointing to the EU’s inability to reform even in the face of clear signals showing that some of its policies do not achieve their stated purpose. ‘More Powers for Brussels or Renationalization?’ is the ques-tion taken up in the third chapter. Derek Beach defends the argument that the EU is becoming more supranational over time. By contrast, Uwe Puetter thinks that a new form of intergovernmentalism prevails in the contemporary EU.

The benchmark for judging political systems is the degree of their democratic quality and their efficiency in delivering political solutions. In addition, and on a more fundamental level, they have to evoke in their citizens a certain feeling of belonging to a community united by a shared purpose. Authors are sharply divided about the democratic quality of the EU polity, and the two essays in Chapter 4 present the contend-ing viewpoints. Christopher Lord argues that the Union is a democratic achievement compared to the normal practices of international organi-zations, even if it is in deficit to democratic states. A successful output legitimates the transfer of sovereignty and helps member states to deal with political and economic problems which they are unable to solve alone. Richard Bellamy, by contrast, stresses the EU’s democratic deficit, which is inevitable as soon as political competencies are delegated away from the national level to a supranational level that lacks the prereq-uisites for a truly democratic system. Crucial for an overall evaluation of the EU’s democratic legitimacy is an assessment to the role of law in European integration. Are binding laws promulgated by international courts possible beyond the nation state? In Chapter 5, Karen J. Alter and R. Daniel Kelemen take the stance that by giving member states and individuals the possibility to resort to legal procedures against deci-sions of the EU, the CJEU is a vital part of European democracy. Jeremy Rabkin disagrees. He views the CJEU as an institution that has usurped democratic decision-making in the EU. The issue of a common identity



8 Introduction

is taken up in Chapter 6, with contributions by Ulrike Liebert and Jona-than White. While Liebert sees a common identity emerging, not least because of the constitutional debate, White radically doubts that a Euro-pean identity can ever exist outside a small circle of highly educated and mobile elites. The political power of business interests in the EU is another problem of relevance for an assessment of the EU’s democratic quality. In Chapter 7, Laura Horn, Angela Wigger and David Marshall take up this issue. Horn and Wigger argue that business lobbyists are far too powerful in the EU, whereas David Marshall maintains that accusa-tions that EU policies are dominated by big business are exaggerated.

Perhaps the most critical area in the current EU is European Mon-etary Union. Doubts about this unprecedented experiment in monetary integration are rampant, speculation about a break-up of the Eurozone is frequent and the euro crisis has cast grave doubts on the capacity of some eurozone members to deal with the challenges posed by a common currency. In Chapter 8, Henrik Enderlein and Andreas Nölke debate the political pros and cons of the common currency. Chapter 9 deals with the economic rationale for the euro. Waltraud Schelkle argues that the euro-zone should be understood as a community sharing risks. She maintains that despite some flaws, risk sharing actually works. Tal Sadeh strikes a sceptical note, pointing to the internal contradictions of the common currency. He advocates a reduction in the number of euro members, or a stronger emphasis on selective integration.

Financial markets in the EU remain highly segmented as the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 amply demonstrated. Vigorous efforts have been made in the past couple of years to remedy this situation and to make the EU a global regulatory power in this area. In Chapter 10, Jörn-Carsten Gottwald argues that the EU has reacted with surpris-ing speed and efficiency to the upheaval on the markets, while Daniel Mügge thinks that these efforts have so far been ineffective. Few EU policies have generated as much controversy as the reviled Common Agricultural Policy. In Chapter 11, Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt writes that it is a colossal waste with serious effects on the environment and on developing countries, whereas Ann-Christina L. Knudsen points to its positive features.

Chapter 12 takes up the question of what type of actor the EU is in international affairs. While Daniela Sicurelli conceives of the EU as a so-called normative power that bases foreign policy on a set of values embodied in the treaties, Mark A. Pollack criticizes this characterization and claims that the EU should be seen as a power just like others on the international stage.

Chapter 13 assesses the EU’s experience with enlargement. Rachel Epstein calls enlargement a big success that should be continued. She



Introduction 9

points to the advantages that accrue to acceding states. Christopher J. Bickerton fears that accession to the EU has had many negative side effects for the central and eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the EU has also attempted to develop a military capability to supplement its economic weight. This project has been beset by difficulties: member states are unwilling to surrender sovereignty in this vital area of state activity, prac-tical difficulties complicate the merging of different national military traditions, many member states are doubtful about the whole under-taking, and the capabilities gap vis-à-vis the United States is massive. In Chapter 14, Hanna Ojanen argues that, nonetheless, a common secu-rity and defence policy is a worthwhile project, while Anand Menon thinks that it will never work properly, and it will fail to live up to the grandiose ambitions of European politicians in this field.

Chapter 15 takes up an issue that has a long, long tradition in Euro-pean history and has acquired new salience in the wake of the euro crisis: how does the largest state in Europe, Germany, fit into a com-munity of equals? Matthias Matthijs thinks that Germany has abused its hegemonic power, while Miguel Otero-Iglesias and Hubert Zimmer-mann argue that Germany overall has behaved responsibly and increas-ingly like a benign hegemon throughout the history of the EU.

A core reason for the current malaise of European politics is the atti-tude of the United Kingdom. Since the earliest days of European integra-tion, Britain has kept some distance from the EU. It managed to gain admission only in 1973. Even after its entry, it remained a very reluctant European, exemplified by Prime Minister Margret Thatcher famously slamming her handbag on the table during EU meetings to recoup some of the money Britain had spent on EU policies. The issue of Britain’s membership has come to a head with the June 2016 referendum on its future in the Community. In the final chapter, Alan Sked and Martin Rhodes represent the sharp debate about the pros and cons of Britain leaving the EU.



294

Acquis communitaire 4, 121, 130, 210

Afghanistan 1, 222–224, 237African Union 18, 195, 223Agenda 2000 210Al-Qaeda in the Islamic

Maghreb 225Algeria 83, 258American Administrative Procedure

Act 85Amsterdam, Treaty of (1997) 4, 49,

53, 59Arab spring 44, 195–196, 219, 225,

236Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) 18, 194–196 Australia 170, 181, 186, 188Austria 67, 149

Banking Union 32, 47–52, 136, 159, 165, 172, 248, 251

Barro, Robert 152Barroso, José Manuel 11, 23, 120,

160, 213Beck, Ulrich 260Becker, G. S. 124Belarus 202Belgium 3, 66, 68, 261Bildt, Carl 255Blair, Tony 220, 226, 253Bohman, James 78–79 Bootle, Roger 262 Border Assistance Mission for the

Rafah Crossing Point 230Bosnia 222Brandt, Willy 241Brazil 186, 188, 202Bretton Woods conference/

system 15, 144, 153, 161Brexit 251–253, 256–261Britain 2, 9, 15–19, 95, 177, 203,

219, 223–229, 234, 242

and its future in the EU see BrexitBritish Chambers of Commerce 258Bulgaria 89, 209–211, 216, 246,

260Bundesbank 155BUSINESSEUROPE 115–118Buzek, Jerzy 42

Cameron, David 2, 49, 252–258 Canada 170CARICOM 18Chad 222Charter of Fundamental Rights 67,

87, 101–102, 253China 19, 164, 183, 201–202,

240–248, 261–264Chirac, Jacques 220, 226Christiansen, Thomas 100Churchill, Winston 207Ciolos, Dacian 183citizenship, of the European

Union 94–106civil society 72, 74–77, 105–106,

122, 196, 217Clegg, Nick 39Climate Change 59, 197, 202Co-decision procedure 32–33, 66,

71, 78Cohesion policy 182Cohesion Fund 211, 246, 248Cold War 2–3, 15–18, 99, 106, 191,

207, 212, 219, 234–236, 241, 245

Comitology 39commercial policy see trade policy Committee of European Banking

Regulators 163Committee of European Insurance

and Occupational Pension Regulators 163

Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) 163

Index



Index 295

Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations (COPA) 187, 189

Committee of Wise Men 159, 163Common Agricultural Policy

(CAP) 3, 8, 42, 50, 175–190, 201, 211–212, 245, 260, 262

Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 42, 260

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 191, 219, 256

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 9, 219–223, 226–233, 256

competition policy, in the EU 34, 40, 130

confederation 18, 187Congo, Democratic Republic of 222 Conservative Party (UK) 2,

252–253 Copenhagen Accords 202Copenhagen Criteria 209–210Corporate Europe Observatory 120Council of Europe 83, 163Council of Ministers 17, 39, 46,

52–54, 64–66, 70–76, 81–87, 255

Council of the Federation of European Industries 117

Court of Auditors 179Court of Justice of the European

Union (CJEU) 4–7, 39–41, 47, 49, 53–54, 65, 71, 80–96, 253, 260

see also European Court of JusticeCrawford, Charles 44Crimea 203–206, 241, 249Croatia 210–217 Cuba 44customs union 139, 168, 260Cyprus 1, 4, 104, 146, 151, 247Czechoslovakia 207Czech Republic 209–212, 229, 242

Davignon, Etienne 120 defence policy 4, 9, 45, 56, 58, 101,

219–220, 226–227, 231–235

Defraigne, Pierre 120Delors, Jacques 130democracy promotion 194–195,

197, 236democratic deficit 4, 7, 17, 64–66,

70–77, 97–98, 116, 159, 173Denmark 4, 45, 64, 192, 253development cooperation 195Doha round 176, 186–187Draghi, Mario 134, 146, 171, 248Dür, Andreas 126

eastern Europe 9, 207Economic and Monetary Union

(EMU) 45–62, 99–101, 106, 118, 128, 133–136, 146–153, 157, 170–174, 237

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 18

education policy 17, 59, 69, 167, 210

Empty Chair Crisis 3, 24enlargement, of the European

Union 2, 8, 21, 29–33, 89, 100–105, 175, 180, 184–218, 246

environmental policy 17, 22, 49, 59, 176, 184–189, 194, 197, 200–202

Estonia 208, 216, 224EU Advisory Mission for Civilian

Security Sector Reform in Ukraine 230

EU Battle Groups 228, 231Eurobarometer 13, 66, 97, 111,

143, 176, 183Eurobond 154, 261Eurogroup 22–24, 55–56, 59–61European Arrest Warrant 41European Atomic Energy Community

(Euratom) 3European Banking Authority

(EBA) 159, 165, 253European Central Bank (ECB) 6,

13, 47–58, 87, 128–136, 140–159, 165–166, 171–172, 239, 248, 261



296 Index

European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 3, 5, 10, 13, 83, 117, 208

European Commission 3–11, 22–61, 64–68, 75–97, 105–130, 139–154, 160–189, 195, 201, 213–215, 225–232, 255, 261

European Community (EC) 19, 31, 82–88, 95, 99–103, 118, 153, 175, 180–187, 251

European Convention of Human Rights 67

European Council 17, 24, 28–33, 43–57, 60–63, 75, 221, 224, 229–230

European Council on Foreign Relations (think tank) 224

European Court of Human Rights 83–86, 91, 94, 254

European Court of Justice (ECJ) 4, 49, 80–86, 139–140, 182

Costa v. ENEL ruling of 1964 80, 84

Gauweiler et al. v. Deutscher Bun-destag 87, 90

Van Gend en Loos ruling of 1962 84

Kadi v. European Council ruling of 2008 87, 94

Laval Ruling of 2007 86, 140SIMAP ruling of 2000 41see also Court of Justice of the

European UnionEuropean Defence Agency 223,

224, 227, 229European Defence Community 83,

219European Economic Community

(EEC) 3, 10, 93–95, 252, 259–260

European elections see European Parliament, elections

European External Action Service (EEAS) 16, 61, 198, 227–229, 230–232

European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 32, 171

European Food Safety Agency 179European Insurance and

Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 159, 163, 165

European Medical Association 115European Parliament (EP) 18,

40–47, 79, 119, 124–127, 173, 255

elections 35–36, 55, 67, 77–78, 253

powers of 4, 36–37, 51–54, 64–68, 80, 143, 174, 190–198, 232

and co-decision 6, 32–34, 39, 46, 53, 70, 78

European Political Community 83European Political Cooperation

(EPC) 191, 219European Posted Workers

Directive 86European Roundtable of

Industrialists (ERT) 118, 120European Security and Defence

Policy (ESDP) 199, 219–221 European Securities and Markets

Authority (ESMA) 165European Security Strategy of

2003 192, 219, 227–228, 277 European Stability Initiative (think

tank) 217European Stability Mechanism (ESM)

51–55, 61, 136, 153–157, 171, 248

European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) 159, 165

European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 165

European Systemic Risk Council 159

European Trade Union Confederation 115

European Union 4, 10budget 32, 141, 176–188, 251,

259–260‘constitution’ of 1critique of 3, 13, 19–29, 37, 50,

65–79, 81–83, 143



Index 297

decision making in 4, 18, 33, 47–62, 64–66, 84

efficiency of 30–44identity / role of 15, 98–114,

191–204, 221 interest groups in 116–128policies of see the subject headings

euroscepticism 11, 35, 63, 103, 252–253

Eurozone 1, 23, 29–32, 54, 72, 100, 128, 160–172, 211, 235, 240–254, 258–262

crisis in the 8–13, 43, 50–52, 87, 103–106, 140–145, 167, 206, 211–212

eurosclerosis 3, 5, 45‘Everything but Arms’ 186, 201

Fabbrini, Sergio 62FIDESZ 209–210FinanceWatch 169financial crisis of 2008/09 245financial regulation, in the EU 30,

40, 120–122, 133, 158–174, 191Financial Services Action Plan

(FSAP) 158, 163Financial Stability Board 164, 166Finland 25, 146, 213, 217, 229Fischer, Joschka 240Fischer-Boel, Mariann 182Fischler, Franz 186France 25, 50–53, 83, 148, 153,

203, 219, 223–229, 234–238, 260

and Germany 3, 10, 14–19, 31, 132, 137, 208, 244–247

referendum of 2005 45, 102, 143, 213

Functionalism 5

G 20 164Gaulle, Charles de 24, 29, 34, 83,

213, 251General Confederation of

Agricultural Cooperatives (COGECA) 187–189

George, Stephen 252

Georgia 225Germany 9, 18–25, 43, 82, 87, 100,

104, 128–156, 165, 203–207, 219, 224–235

hegemony of 234–250Constitutional Court of 23,

95and France 3, 10, 14–19, 31, 50,

132, 137, 208, 244–247Goldsmith, Jack 200Greece 1, 4, 13, 18–24, 32, 43, 55,

67, 104, 134, 141, 147–157, 170, 205–208, 212, 237, 240–247, 258–260

Greenland 258

Haas, Ernst 5Habermas, Jürgen 137Habsburg Empire 22Hall, Peter 157Hallstein, Walter 117High Representative of the Union

for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 194, 225, 229

Hitler, Adolf 82Hobsbawm, Eric 237Hoffmann, Stanley 5Hungary 89, 104, 156, 202–203,

207–209, 211–212, 216, 229, 242, 250

Identity 7–8, 14–15, 67, 80, 97–114, 192, 198, 214–217

Immigration 14, 26–27, 48, 53, 86, 149, 253, 259, 263

illegal 16India 19, 194, 202, 263, India FDI Watch interest groups 34, 115–116, 183,

187intergovernmental conferences

(IGCs) 51intergovernmentalism 5–7, 30,

45–46, 51–63deliberative

intergovernmentalism 57–60internal market see single market



298 Index

International Court of Justice (ICJ) 91–92

International Monetary Fund (IMF) 50, 141, 146, 150, 154

Internet 27Iraq 1, 16, 191–192, 237Ireland 1, 4, 35, 50, 133, 149–157,

166, 246–248, 261 Islamic State 256 Israel 15, 197Italy 3, 16–18, 25, 146–148, 153,

182, 192, 217, 236, 249, 260

Japan 118, 153, 181, 262–264 Jefferson, Thomas 38Joint Decision Trap 29Juncker, Jean-Claude 3, 35, 55–56,

119, 225, 261

Kagan, Robert 200, 220Kant, Immanuel 14Kelemen, R. Daniel 7, 81, 88,

200Kindleberger, Charles 238–239,

243–245 Kissinger, Henry 236Kohl, Helmut 132, 235Kosovo 44, 221

Labour Party (UK) 252–253Lamfalussy, Alexandre 160–164,

173Lamy, Pascale 120de Larosière report 159, 165least developing countries

(LDCs) 186Lehman Brothers 158Libya 44, 202–203, 219–225 Lincoln, Abraham 65Lisbon, Treaty of (2009) 1, 2, 6, 29,

35, 43–49, 52–59, 63, 67, 77, 80, 87, 92–105, 116, 126, 194, 220–221, 227, 253

Lisbon agenda 56, 101Luxembourg 3, 25, 34–36, 80–82,

91–95, 102, 261

Maastricht treaty 23, 45, 243, 253content/effects of 53, 58–64,

100–103, 128–133, 146, 151, 158, 191, 219, 236, 239

signature of 4Macedonia 222Macmillan, Harold 259Majone, Giandomenico 39–40,

69–70 Mali 223, 226Malta 4Mann, Thomas 243Marshall Plan 246–248Members of the European Parliament

(MEPs) 36–37, 42, 67Merkel, Angela 23, 31–32, 57, 120,

134–235, 236–249Milward, Alan 26monetary union see economic and

monetary union (EMU) Monnet, Jean 12, 43Moravcsik, Andrew 5–6, 69–70 Mussolini, Benito 82

National Institute of Economic and Social Research 261

neofunctionalism 5, 45, 49neoliberalism 10, 118, 157, 238Netherlands 3–4, 43, 143, 146,

258referendum of 2005 45, 102, 213NGOs (non-governmental

organizations) 25–26, 115–119, 122–126, 169, 186

Nice, Treaty of (2000) 4, 59Niskanen, W. A. 124no bail-out clause 237Nordic Defence Cooperation

(NORDEFCO) 229normative power 8, 161, 191–204,

220North American Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA) 18North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) 203–211, 220–231, 237–242, 256

Norway 181, 254–257, 262



Index 299

Obama, Barack 241, 252Olson, Mancur 123–124open method of coordination 60Optimum Currency Area 131–132,

145, 149Orbán, Victor 89, 202ordinary legislative procedure 32,

53Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development (OECD) 155–157, 181

output legitimacy 138Oxfam 222

people, movement of 14, 48–49, 94, 135, 139, 263

permissive consensus 4, 25, 103, 143

pillars of the EU 4, 52–53, 130, 186, 219

political parties 5, 54–55, 68, 71, 76–78, 98, 143, 175, 194, 215–216, 252

Portugal 4, 18, 67, 133, 149–150, 156–157, 205–208, 212, 246–248

Posner, Eric 200Putin, Vladimir 241–242, 249

qualified majority voting (QMV) 33–34, 66, 72, 232

al-Quaddafi, Muammar 202

Reagan, Ronald 50realism 199referendum 45, 64, 83, 102–103,

141, 213, 215on British membership in the

EU 2, 9, 49, 226, 251–264 regional integration 5, 18–19, 168,

195–196in Africa 18, 195in Asia 18, 194–196

Risse, Thomas 106Roma 216Romania 89, 177, 209–216, 246,

260

Rome, Treaty of (1957) 3, 83–84, 95, 100, 106, 128, 162, 178–180, 184

Russia 2, 16, 19, 44, 56, 201–208, 223–226, 229–231, 235–242, 244–249, 256

Sarkozy, Nicolas 23Scharpf, Fritz 29, 69–70, 138, 173,

185 Schäuble, Wolfgang 238Schengen Agreement 253Schimmelfennig, Frank 100Sedelmeier, Ulrich 100Sikorski, Radek 243single currency 43, 60, 102–103,

117, 129–137, 145–150, 163, 170, 236

Single European Act (SEA) 4, 34, 118, 139

single market 14–17, 21, 28, 34, 40, 44–50, 59, 105–106, 118, 124, 130–137, 147, 162, 165, 185, 206, 246, 254–257, 263–264

Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) 165, 172

Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 165, 172

Slovakia 207, 209, 211–212, 229, 242

Slovenia 212, 216‘Social Europe’ 21, 102South Korea 181sovereignty 7–9, 30, 38, 53, 57,

84–86, 135–139, 196, 227–228, 234–235, 246, 252, 259

Soviet Union 15, 22, 207, 216Spain 4, 16–18, 25, 42, 50, 102,

133, 146, 149, 154–157, 205, 208, 212, 244, 246–249, 260

spillover 17, 123, 168Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 50,

52, 128, 237Stalin, Josef 207St. Malo summit of 1998 219–221,

226, 229



300 Index

structural funds 211, 246–248 subsidiarity 49, 69, 88 Suez crisis 15supranationalism 6, 30 46, 232Sweden 86–87, 104, 213, 217, 253 Switzerland 62, 68, 181, 254–257,

262Syria 1, 203, 225, 237, 244Szabo, Stephen 241

TARGET 155–156TARGET2 155terrorism 16, 41, 87, 96Thatcher, Margaret 9, 251–253 trade policy 16, 26, 53, 191–194,

201 Transatlantic Trade and Investment

Partnership (TTIP) 130, 190Transparency Register 115, 119Tsipras, Alexis 24Turkey 22, 202, 206, 213–214, 217,

231

UK Independence Party (UKIP) 251–257

Ukraine 2, 23, 56, 100, 202–208, 223–226, 230, 235, 240–242, 256

Unilever 177, 182United Kingdom (UK) see Britain United Nations (UN) 86–87, 91,

94, 197, 202–203, 222–223, 230–231, 256

United States of America 3, 9–16, 19, 29, 50–51, 70, 87, 94, 126,

136, 152–155, 161, 164, 181–188, 191–198, 200–207, 221, 229–231, 234–239, 245

and Bretton Woods 153and confederalism 62and trade with EU 130, 141, 175,

179, 190, 252, 262, 264Supreme Court of 92–93see also North American Free

Trade Agreement

Vanackere, Steven 44Van Rompuy, Herman 32, 56Verdun, Amy 100Verheugen, Günther 39de Villepin, Dominique 223Vogel, David 200Volcker, Paul 130

Werner Plan 128, 153Whitman, Richard 217 worker mobility see people,

movement of Working Time Directive (WTD) 41,

263World Food Programme (WFP)

230World Trade Organization

(WTO) 91–94, 184–186, 257, 262

World Wide Fund for Nature 115

Yanukovych, Viktor 240–241Yugoslavia 60, 191, 219



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