Author: LIM, P.

Esmeraldo Gatchalian Vs Comelec

Statutory Construction Concept: General words construed generally

Facts: Petitioner Gatchalian is a candidate to become a delegate in the

constitutional convention election in 1970. In his petition he is assailing

two Comelec Resolutions, RR-707 and RR-731 that allegedly violate

Sec.56 of The Revised Election Code.

Comelec Resolution RR-707 states that “donation of billboards to the

commission by foreigners or companies or corporations owned and

controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not covered by the

provision of sec.56 of the revised election code.

Comelec Resolution RR-731 likewise states that “to the effect that the

ban in sec.56 of the revised election code does not cover the projected

campaign for funds and other contributions by the advertising council of

the Philippines and others similarly situated during the 120 days

immediately preceding a regular or special election. That in line with RR-

707 donations and contributions for the above campaign may be received

from foreigners, companies wholly or partially by foreigners.

Sec.56 of the Revised Election Code states that “No foreigner shall aid any

candidate, directly or indirectly or take part in or to influence in any

manner any elections.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the comelec but was denied and

pursuant to Article 10 sec.2 of the constitution filed a case for review of

the comelec ruling. He is contending that the ruling is null and void as

being contrary to law and was a grave abuse of discretion and praying for

a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction.

Issue: WON the comelec resolutions were violative of sec.56 of the

revised election code

Held: Yes it was violative of sec.56 of the revised election code.

Ratio:

The court divided its decision into four parts or four words that clearly

showed the legislative intent in the statute:

1. The phrase any elections includes the election for the delegates of

the constitutional convention. Any election means that this includes

Author: LIM, P.

elections provided by the laws and the constitution as well as any

that may be established or required to be held pursuant to law

2. Foreigner in the statue refers to both natural and juridical persons,

associations and groups with or without legal personality. The

framers of the law intended to include juridical persons because

they have a larger base of members and are financially capable of

influencing the outcomes of elections.

3. Any candidate refers to both “some candidates” and “All

candidates” It has been held that any candidate voted for at any

election refers to candidates and the term any person is not limited

to any person in the singular but is applicable as well to two or

more persons.

4. The last word is “Aid” which refers to support , to help, to assist or

to influence the decision

Ruling: The Court ruled that if foreign donations are allowed to influence

our policy making bodies that we will in effect open the floodgates to

foreign control. The respective resolutions are therefore void.

GEOTINO V

Claudio vs. COMELEC

Petition: certiorari and prohibition

Petitioner: JOVITO O. CLAUDIO

Respondent: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,

COMMISSION ON AUDIT and RICHARD ADVINCULA

Ponencia: MENDOZA, J.

FACTS:

1) Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner in G.R. No. 140560, was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in

the May 11, 1998 elections. He assumed office on July 1, 1998.

2) Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay

City gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for

loss of confidence.

3) On May 19, 1999, at the residence of barangay chair Benjamin Lim, Jr. in Barangay 11, Zone

4, Pasay City, several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of

convening the PRA.

4) Richard Advincula, private respondent in G.R. No. 140560 and petitioner in G.R. No. 140714,

was designated chair.

5) On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and

sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, entitled

RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF

PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE.

6) In a letter dated June 29, 1999, Advincula, as chair of the PRA, invited the Mayor, Vice-

Mayor, Station Commander, and thirteen (13) Councilors of Pasay City to witness the formal

submission to the Office of the Election Officer on July 2, 1999 of the petition for recall.

7) As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by an affidavit of

service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor.

Author: LIM, P.8) Pursuant to the rules of the COMELEC, copies of the petition were posted on the bulletin

boards of the local COMELEC office, the City Hall, the Police Department, the public market

at Libertad St. and Taft Avenue, and at the entrance of the Sta. Clara Church on P. Burgos

St., all in Pasay City.

9) Subsequently, a verification of the authenticity of the signatures on the resolution was

conducted by Ligaya Salayon, the election officer for Pasay City designated by the

COMELEC.

10) Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub,

and Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition.

11) In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and

dismissed the oppositions against it.

12) On the issue of whether the PRA was constituted by a majority of its members, the

COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more

than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its records showed the total

membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the Department of Interior and

Local Government (DILG) showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,876.

13) In either case, since only a majority is required to constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority had

been obtained in support of the recall resolution.

14) Based on the verification made by election officer Ligaya Salayon, the COMELEC found the

signatures of 958 members of the PRA sufficient.

15) On whether the pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of petitioner was a

prejudicial question which must first be decided before any recall election could be held, the

COMELEC ruled that it was not and that petitioner was merely using the pendency of the

case to delay the recall proceedings.

16) Finally, on whether the petition for recall violated the bar on recall within one year from the

elective official's assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in the negative, holding that recall

is a process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on

July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner Claudio's assumption of office, it was

held that the petition was filed on time.

17) Hence, these petitions.

ISSUES:

WHETHER, under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) . . . .

A. The word "recall" in paragraph (b) covers a process which includes the convening of the

Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution.

B. The term "regular local election" in the last clause of paragraph (b) includes the election period for

that regular election or simply the date of such election.

RULING + RATIO:

1) YES. The COMELEC maintains that the process of recall starts with the filing of the petition for

recall and ends with the conduct of the recall election, and that, since the petition for recall in this

case was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner's assumption of office, the

recall was validly initiated outside the one-year prohibited period.

Both petitioner Claudio and the COMELEC thus agree that the term "recall" as used in §74 refers to a

process. They disagree only as to when the process starts for purposes of the one-year limitation in

paragraph (b) of §74.

We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory recall

assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local

government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC,

the verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the

holding of the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph (b) of §74, "recall"

refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local

official or elect his replacement.

First, §74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On

the other hand, §69 provides that "the power of recall . . . shall be exercised by the registered voters

of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the

electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office,

Author: LIM, P.the limitations in §74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the

term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA

and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least

25 % of the voters for a petition for recall.

The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to be found in the

purpose of the limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls: (1)

that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of the official

concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular

local election.

The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an

elective local official. In the Bower case cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC, it was held

that "The only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before

petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly

elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and

decisions." The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall because the

Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that "no removal petition shall be filed

against any officer or until he has actually held office for at least twelve months." But however the

period of prohibition is determined, the principle announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to

provide a reasonable basis for evaluating the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this

case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to

initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a local official.

To construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose

of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the

constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on

the day of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation

of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b)

includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly

curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such

assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the

expression of confidence in the incumbent.

Our esteemed colleague Justice Puno says in his dissent that the purpose of the one-year period in

paragraph (b) is to provide the local official concerned a "period of repose" during which "[his]

attention should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by disturbance due to political

partisanship." Unfortunately, the law cannot really provide for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in

politics. From the day an elective official assumes office, his acts become subject to scrutiny and

criticism, and it is not always easy to determine when criticism of his performance is politically

motivated and when it is not. The only safeguard against the baneful and enervating effects of

partisan politics is the good sense and self restraint of the people and its leaders against such

shortcomings of our political system. A respite from partisan politics may have the incidental effect of

providing respite from partisanship, but that is not really the purpose of the limitation on recall under

the law. The limitation is only intended to provide a sufficient basis for evaluating and judging the

performance of an elected local official.

To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary

proceedings to initiate recall —

1. Because §74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to §69, is a power which shall be

exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such

right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the

one-year period provided in paragraph (b);

2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for

judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and

3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings

would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.

As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner

assumed office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date.

Author: LIM, P.

2) The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year

immediately preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the

campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly said

so.

Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may

be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office

of an elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the

period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a

period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph

(b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation

must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local

government units "more responsive and accountable."

Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus

Election Code, unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90)

days before the day of the election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's

interpretation that the second limitation in paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would

emasculate even more a vital right of the people.

DISPOSITION:  

WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 140560 is DISMISSED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R. No.

140714 is DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and academic.

PILAR v. COMELEC (1995)

Petition: Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Resolution

dated April 28, 1994 of COMELEC

Petitioner: Juanito C. Pilar

Respondent: Commission on Elections

Ponencia: Quiason, J.

DOCTRINE: Where the law does not distinguish

Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi

lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. No distinction is to be made in the application of a

law where none is indicated.

FACTS:

1. On January 13, 1992, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations

Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local

Elections on May 11, 1992) to implement the provisions of Sec. 14 of R.A. 7166 on election

contributions and expenditures.

2. On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his CoC for the position of member of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. However, on March 25, 1992, petitioner

withdrew his CoC.

3. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065, COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of P10,000 for

failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.

4. Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and

expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his CoC 3 days after its filing.

Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political

contest, and should have either won or lost."

5. In M.R. No. 94-0594, COMELEC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, and deemed final

M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner then went to the COMELEC en banc, which also

denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994.

6. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Author: LIM, P.

ISSUE:

1. WoN petitioner cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and

expenditures

PROVISIONS:

Sec. 14 of R.A. 7166

o “An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral

Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes”

o “Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement.

Every candidateand treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after

the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full,

true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with

the election. . .”

RULING + RATIO:

1. NO. Petitioner is liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures.

a. Sec. 14 of R.A. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his

statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner, however, argues that he is a

“non-candidate”, and such argument is without merit.

i. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish,

courts should not distinguish. In the case, as the law makes no

distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his

candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be

deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but

also to one who withdrew his candidacy.

b. Also, Sec. 14 of R.A 7166 uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the

word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty

which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or

where public interest is involved. We must apply the general rule.

c. The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately

expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to

pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and

compelling the publication of the same. It is not improbable that a candidate who

withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even

in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not

all too remote.

d. It is worth mentioning that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation

where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure.

Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file

a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided

that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no

expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact."

e. Lastly, under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus

Election Code of the Philippines), it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of

certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative

liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his

candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.

DISPOSITION: petition DISMISSED.

Manila Herald Publishing vs Ramos (1951)

Author: LIM, P.

Petition: certiorari with preliminary injunction

Petitioner: MANILA HERALD PUBLISHING CO., INC., doing business under the name of

Evening Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, Inc

Respondent: SIMEON RAMOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, MACARIO

A. OFILADA, Sheriff of City of Manila, ANTONIO QUIRINO and ALTO SURETY AND

INSURANCE CO., INC

Ponencia: TUASON, J.

Doctrine: Honestly, hindi ko gets. Huhu. Pero i did my best. And sana matanggap niyo yun

at magawa akong patawarin. Nagmamahal, Czar.

1.) Respondent Antonio Quirino filed a libel suit against Aproniano G. Borres (editor), Pedro

Padilla (managing editor) and Loreto Pastor (reporter) of the Daily Record, a daily

newspaper published in Manila. They were asking for damages and thus secured a writ of

preliminary attachment upon putting up a bond and the Sheriff levied an attachment upon

certain office and printing equipment found in the premises of the Daily Record. (1st case)

2.) In response, the Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc. and Printers, Inc., filed with third-party

claims, alleging that they were the owners of the property attached. The sheriff required of

Quirino a counter bond to meet the claim of the Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and

another bond to meet the claim of Printers, Inc. These amounts, upon Quirino's motion filed

under Section 13, Rule 59, of the Rules of Court, were reduced by the court to P11,000 and

P10,000 respectively.

3.) The Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. and Printers, Inc. commenced a joint suit against

the sheriff, Quirino and Alto Surety and Insurance Co. Inc., in which the former sought (1) to

enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the attachment of the properties above

mentioned and (2) P45,000 damages. (2nd case)

4.) The first case was being handled by Judge Sanchez which was pending. The second

case fell in the branch of Judge Pecson and he issued a writ of preliminary injunction to

desist proceeding with the attachment of the said properties.

5.) The second case was transferred to Judge Simeon Ramos granted the petition on a

bond but set aside the order on a motion for reconsideration

6.) Upon the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Ramos required the parties to submit

memoranda on the question whether the subject matter of the 2nd case should be filed in an

independent action or by means of a complaint in intervention in the 1st case. His Honor

declared that the 2nd case is "unnecessary, superfluous and illegal" and so dismissed the

case. He held that what Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, Inc., should do was

intervene in the 1st case.

ISSUES:

1.) W/N Judge Ramos has authority to dismiss the 2nd case at the stage when it was thrown

out of court

2.) W/N the Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, Inc., should come as

intervenors into the case for libel instead of bringing an independent action

3.) W/N Judge R has interfered with the actuations of Judge S

FIRST ISSUE: NOPE.

The question of dismissal in the 2nd case was suggested by Judge Ramos on a ground

perceived by him. To all intents and purposes, the dismissal was decreed by the court on its

own initiative.

Section 1 Rule 8 enumerates the grounds upon which an action may be dismissed, and it

specifically ordains that a motion to this end be filed. This is an express requirement which

does not give the court power to dismiss the case without the requisite motion duly

presented.

Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides for the cases in which an action may be dismissed,

and the inclusion of those therein provided excludes any other, under the familiar

maxim, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The only instance in which, according to said

Author: LIM, P.Rules, the court may dismiss upon the court's own motion an action is, when the "plaintiff

fails to appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of

time or to comply with the Rules or any order of the court."

The Rules of Court are devised as a matter of necessity, intended to be observed with

diligence by the courts as well as by the parties for the orderly conduct of litigation and

judicial business. In general, it is compliance with these rules which gives the court

jurisdiction to act.

The court acted with grave abuse of discretion if not in excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing

the case without any formal motion to dismiss.

SECOND ISSUE: (Ito ata yung pinakaimportant kasi may fancy terms) YUP

Section 14 of rule 59 provides for the steps to be taken when the property attached is

claimed by the other person than that defendant or his agent. "Nothing herein contained

shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper

action." What is "proper action"? Section 1 of Rule 2 defines action as "an ordinary suit in

court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a

right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong," while section 2, entitled "Commencement of

Action," says that "civil action may be commenced by filing a complaint with the court."

"Action" has acquired a well-define, technical meaning, and it is in this restricted sense that

the word "action" is used in the above rule. In employing the word "commencement" the rule

clearly indicates an action which originates an entire proceeding and puts in motion the

instruments of the court calling for summons, answer, etc, and not any intermediary step

taken in the course of the proceeding whether by the parties themselves or by a stranger.

The most liberal view that can be taken in favor of the respondents' position is that

intervention as a means of protecting the third-party claimants' right is not exclusive but

cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring a new, independent suit. It is significant that

there are courts which go so far as to take the view that even where the statute expressly

grants the right of intervention is such cases as this, the statute does not extend to owners

of property attached, for, under this view, "it is considered that the ownership is not one of

the essential questions to be determined in the litigation between plaintiff and defendant;"

that "whether the property belongs to defendant or claimant, if determined, is considered as

shedding no light upon the question in controversy, namely, that defendant is indebted to

plaintiff."

Separate action was indeed said to be the correct and only procedure contemplated by Act

No. 190, intervention addition to, but not in substitution of, the old process. The new Rules

adopted section 121 of Act No. 190 and added thereto Rule 24 (a) of the Federal Rules of

Procedure. Combined, the two modes of redress are now section 1 of Rule 13, the last

clause of which is the newly added provision. The result is that, whereas, "under the old

procedure, the third person could not intervene, he having no interest in the debt (or

damages) sued upon by the plaintiff," under the present Rules, "a third person claiming to be

the owner of such property may, not only file a third-party claim with the sheriff, but also

intervene in the action to ask that the writ of attachment be quashed." Yet, the right to

inetervene, unlike the right to bring a new action, is not absolute but left to the sound

discretion of the court to allow. This qualification makes intervention less preferable to an

independent action from the standpoint of the claimants, at least. Because availability of

intervention depends upon the court in which Case No. 11531 is pending, there would be

assurance for the herein petitioners that they would be permitted to come into that case.

Little reflection should disabuse the mind from the assumption that an independent action

creates a multiplicity of suits. There can be no multiplicity of suits when the parties in the suit

where the attachment was levied are different from the parties in the new action, and so are

the issues in the two cases entirely different. In the circumstances, separate action might,

indeed, be the more convenient of the two competing modes of redress, in that intervention

is more likely to inject confusion into the issues between the parties in the case for debt or

damages with which the third-party claimant has nothing to do and thereby retard instead of

facilitate the prompt dispatch of the controversy which is underlying objective of the rules of

pleading and practice. That is why intervention is subject to the court's discretion.

THIRD ISSUE: NOPE

Author: LIM, P.The objection suggests the motion to discharge the preliminary attachment is that by doing

so one judge would interfere with another judge's actuations.

It has been seen that a separate action by the third party who claims to be the owner of the

property attached is appropriate. If this is so, it must be admitted that the judge trying such

action may render judgment ordering the sheriff of whoever has in possession the attached

property to deliver it to the plaintiff-claimant or desist from seizing it. It follows further that the

court may make an interlocutory order, upon the filing of such bond as may be necessary, to

release the property pending final adjudication of the title. Jurisdiction over an action

includes jurisdiction over a interlocutory matter incidental to the cause and deemed

necessary to preserve the subject matter of the suit or protect the parties' interests. This is

self-evident.

The petition for certiorari is granted with costs against the respondents except the

respondent Judge.

Buenaseda v. Flavier

G.R. No. 106719

September 21, 1993

Petitioners: Dra. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Lt. Col. Isabelo Banez, Jr., Engr. Conrado Rey

Matias, Ms. Cora S. Solis and Ms. Enya N. Lopez

Respondents: Secretary Juan Flavier, Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, and NCMH

Nurses Association (represented by Raoulito Gayutin)

Ponencia: Quiason, J.

Petition: petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary

Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of

Court

FACTS:

1. Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7,

1992, directing the preventive suspension of petitioners. The petition also asks for an order

directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-

Rosero from participation in the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner.

2. The questioned order was issued in connection with administrative complaint filed with the

Ombudsman by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft

and Corrupt Practices Act.

3. On September 10, 1992, this court required respondents’ to Comment on the petition and

thereafter, received a “Supplemental Petition and an Urgent Supplemental Manifestation”

from petitioners dated September 14 and 22, 1992.

4. On the same day of September 22, 1992, the court “Resolved to REQUIRE the

respondents to MAINTAIN STATUS QUO pending filing of comments on the original

supplemental manifestation”.

5. On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of

Health to comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 and in a Resolution dated

October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health to comment on the said

motion.

6. On September 29, 1992, respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted its Comment

on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation in a pleading

entitled “Omnibus Submission”.

Author: LIM, P.7. Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in contempt

and to disbar them.

8. On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a “Manifestation and Supplement to ‘Motion to

Direct Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with the 22 September 1992 Resolution’ “

and on November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November

10, 1992, alleging that:

xxx (b) the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992

is to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners’ preventive suspension, the

status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant petition; xxx.

9. This court, in the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, required respondent Secretary to

comply with the said status quo order stating that:

“xxx the last peaceable uncontested status xxx was the situation xxx wherein

petitioners were then actually occupying their respective positions, the Court hereby

ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform the duties of their respective

positions xxx, and that respondents and/or any and all persons acting under their

authority desist and refrain from performing any act xxx until further orders from the

Court.”

PROVISION:

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770—Preventives Suspension. The Ombudsman or his

Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority

pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the

charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave

misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant

removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may

prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the

Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except

when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due

to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of

such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein

provided.

ISSUES:

WoN the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and

employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the

investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.

HELD:

YES. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees

working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman.

When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the

suspension: of a public official or employees, it referred to “suspension”, as a punitive

measure. All the words associated with the word “suspension” in the provision referred to

penalties in administrative cases (e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure).

Author: LIM, P.Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” should be given the

same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is

equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by

considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively

suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a

procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with

the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.

DISPOSITION:

The petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the

Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

Mutuc vs. COMELEC

Petition: Prohibition

Petitioner: Amelito Mutuc

Respondent: COMELEC

Ponencia: Fernando, J

DOCTRINE: (Use of Associated Words)

Ejusdem generis - general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the

same kind or class as those specifically referred to.

FACTS:

Petitioner Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. After setting

forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the

Constitutional Convention, COMELEC informed him that his Certificate of Candidacy was given due

course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud

speakers citing a provision in the Constitutional Convention Act which made it unlawful for candidates

"to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as

pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas,

shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin." It was the

COMELEC’s contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped

voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material and subject to confiscation.

ISSUES:

WON the usage of jingles in mobile units equipped with sound systems is prohibited by the

Constitutional Convention Act as it falls within the scope of “and the like” stated in the provision.

PROVISION:

Constitutional Convention Act which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request

or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever

nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes,

and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin."

RULING + RATIO:

NO the use of jingles is not prohibited as it does not fall within the scope of “and the like”

stated in the provision.

A well known principle is ejusdem generis which states that the general words following any

enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to.

In this case, what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to

as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

Author: LIM, P.Therefore the order of the COMELEC is not justified as the using of jingles in mobile units equipped

with loud speakers cannot be considered as a distribution of gadgets.

Also if the provision is to be construed to probity the use of a taped jingle, it would be unconstitutional

as it could be considered an abridgment of free speech or free press.

Cagayan Valley Enterprises v Court of Appeals (1989)

Petition: certiorari

Petitioner: The Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. represented by its President, Mr. Rogelio Lim

Respondent: CA and La Tondena, Inc.,

Ponencia: REGALADO, J.

FACTS:

18) La Tondena registered with the Phil. Patent Office the 350 c.c. white flint bottles used for

Ginebra San Miguel back in 1953.

19) On 1981 La Tondena filed a case against for injunction and damages at tlehe lower court

against Cagayan Valley Enterprises for using its bottles, with the mark La Tondena and

Ginebra San Miguel stamped out and filling it instead with petitioner’s product, an alcoholic

labeled “Sonny Boy”. They did this without the consent of LTI.

20) Cagayan answers: LTI has no cause of action, because it failed to comply with Sec. 21 of RA

166. This provision allegedly requires LTI to include the mark “Reg. Phil. Pat. Off.” For their

patented bottle. Further, they aver that LTI has no protection under RA 623, as amended by

RA 5700, because its product (hard liquor) is not contemplated. What IS contemplated by the

law are beverages like Coca-Cola, Sprite, and other products that have the mark “Reg Phil

Pat Off”.

a. Therefore, LTI has no defense for their product is not exactly pantented. Therefore,

Cagayan was not infringing any rights whatsoever. And as far as marks were

concerned, the bottles used by Cagayan for “Sonny Boy” was not marked with “La

Tondena” or “Ginebra San Miguel”.

21) The Lower Court finds in favor of Cagayan, and the CA reverses the decision.

22) Hence, these petitions.

PROVISIONS:

RA 623, as amended by RA 5700:

SECTION 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the manufacture, bottling, or selling of soda water, mineral or aerated

waters, cider, milk, cream or other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels and other similar containers, or in

the manufacturing, compressing or selling of gases such as oxygen, acytelene, nitrogen, carbon dioxide ammonia, hydrogen,

chloride, helium, sulphur, dioxide, butane, propane, freon, melthyl chloride or similar gases contained in steel cylinders, tanks,

flasks, accumulators or similar containers, with the name or the names of their principals or products, or other marks of

ownership stamped or marked thereon, may register with the Philippine Patent Office a description of the names or marks, and

the purpose for which the containers so marked and used by them, under the same conditions, rules, and regulations, made

applicable by law or regulation to the issuance of trademarks.

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the manufacturer, bottler, or seller, who has

succesfully registered the marks of ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section, to fill such

bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators or other similar containers so marked or stamped, for

the purpose of sale, or to sell, disposed of, buy or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or not, to use the

same, for drinking vessels or glasses or drain pipes, foundation pipes, for any other purpose than that registered by the

manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos or

imprisonment of not more than one year or both.

SEC. 3. The use by any person other than the registered manufacturer, bottler or seller, without written permission of the latter

of any such bottle, cask, barrel, keg, box, steel cylinders, tanks, flask, accumulators, or other similar containers, or the

possession thereof without written permission of the manufacturer, by any junk dealer or dealer in casks, barrels, kegs boxes,

steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators or other similar containers, the same being duly marked or stamped and registered

as herein provided, shall give rise to a prima facie presumption that such use or possession is unlawful.

Author: LIM, P.ISSUES:

WHETHER, under RA 623 as amended by RA 5700, there is apparently no need to place the term

“Reg Phil Pat Off”, since the law only requires that this phrase be printed on the CONTAINER.

WHETHER there is no need to distinguish between bottles that state “PROPERTY OF La Tondena”

and those simply marked as “La Tondena”

WHETHER the mark “La Tondena” and “Ginebra San Miguel” constitute sufficient notice to Cagayan

that the bottles were property of LTI

WHETHER the product of LTI is not within the contemplated beverage protected by RA 623 when it

cites “other lawful beverages”, as Ginebra is alcoholic thus not necessarily lawful.

RULING + RATIO:

1) YES. According to RA 623, there is no need for there to be strictly any literal indication that

the bottles are patented. All that is required is that they are labeled with the name of the

manufacturer. The phrase “Name or Mark of Ownership” simply means the name of the

applicant or his principal. That the law only protects the containers of the bottles is specious.

Why would congress pass a law with the title that reads below for the CONTAINERS of the

bottle?

2) YES. There is no need. To omission of the phrase “Property of” does not remove the bottles

from the ambit of protection that RA 623 provides.

3) YES. They constitute sufficient notice. So long as the name of the manufacturer is present, it

is in compliance with the law.

4) NO. Ginebra, thus the bottles of LTI, are indeed within the protection of RA 623. The title of

the law reads: An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks,

Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers. Thus, the contemplated intent of the legislature

is to provide protection for the VESSELS of these beverages. When the law discussed “other

lawful beverages”, it meant beverage in a general sense. And although alcohol is regulated it

is not prohibited.

a. The court ruled in Destileria Ayala Inc. vTan Tay & Co. that the whole point of RA 623

was for people to be able to immediately identify the make and the manufacturer of

the beverage he is partaking in. Thus, he may ascertain and identify if the beverage

is congruent with the company’s product.

DISPOSITION:  

WHEREFORE, Petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Petitioner is held in CONTEMPT OF COURT and ordered to pay a fine of 1000 pesos.

SO ORDERED.

Sarmiento v. Mison

Petition: Petition for prohibition

Petitioners: Ulpiano Sarmiento

Respondent: Salvador Mison

Ponencia: Padilla

DOCTRINE:

By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express

enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments

to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission

on Appointments.

FACTS:

Author: LIM, P.1. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the appointment of respondent Salvador Mison as

Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, alleging that his appointment was without the confirmation

of the Commission on Appointments, in accordance with Section 16 of Article VII.

2. The respondents counter by saying that the confirmation of the Commission of Appointments

in this case was not needed, an appointment to his position does not require the confirmation of the

COA but is vested solely on the President alone.

3. Looking at the historical background, the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments

required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our

political history that the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935

Constitution, transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar

malpractices.

4. On the other hand

On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was

molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the

President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.

Hence this issue

ISSUE:

WoN the appointment of the respondent needed the confirmation of the Commission on

Appointments as provided for in the 1987 Constitution?

PROVISIONS:

ARTICLE VII, Section 16

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the

heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of

the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are

vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose

appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to

appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the

President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether

voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the

Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

RULING + RATIO:

No, the President need not get the confirmation of the COA in appointing the respondent. From the

aforquoted provision it may be surmised that there are four groups of officers contemplated. The first

group clearly provides that their appointments need confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments. The second, third, and fourth group of officers, to which the respondent belongs to,

are the ones contented in this case. By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory

construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow

that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent

(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover looking at the intent of the

constitutional framers, it may be seen that except as to those officers whose appointments require the

consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art.

VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by the

Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that

the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what they were doing and of the

foreseable effects thereof.

The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or

qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or

qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of

Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein

enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED.

Without costs.

Author: LIM, P.

PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs SECRETARY OF

LABOR (1999)

Petition: Certiorari related to 3 cases filed with the Med-Arbiter

Petitioner: Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc.

Respondent: Secretary of Labor, Med-Arbiter Napoleon Fernando, Pepsi-Cola Supervisory

Employees Organization – UOEF (GR 96663); Office of the Secretary Department of Labor and Hon.

Celenio N. Daing, In His Capacity as Med-Arbiter Labor Regional Office No. X, Cagayan De Oro City,

Cagayan de Oro Pepsi Cola Supervisors Union (UOEF) (GR 103300)

Ponencia: Purisima

DOCTRINE:

Necessary implication may be invoked if an unreasonable construction of the provision of the law with

regard to people/items who/which are or are not included in said provision results in a “withdrawal”

from the clear purpose and intent of the law

FACTS:

1. Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (PCEU) filed a petition for certification election

with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-

Cola Philippines (Pepsi).

2. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition, but with the explicit statement that PCEU was affiliated

with Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (UOEF) and 2 other rank-and-file unions, the

PCLU and the PEUP.

3. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines then filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to Set

Aside, Cancel and/or Revoke Charter Affiliation of the Union, entitled PCPPI v. PCEU-UOEF

on the grounds that

a. The members of the Union were managers

b. A supervisors’ union cannot affiliate with a federation whose members include the

rank and file union of the same company

4. Pepsi also filed an urgent ex-parte motion to suspend the certification election

5. PCEU argued that Art. 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, did not prohibit a

local union composed of supervisory employees from being affiliated to a federation which

has local unions with rank-and-file members as affiliates.

ISSUES:

1. WoN a supervisors’ union can affiliate with the same Federation of which two (2) rank and file

unions are likewise members, without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code (PD 442), as

amended, by Republic Act 6715

2. WoN confidential employees can join the labor union of the rank and file

PROVISION:

Article 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by, RA 6715

o Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of

supervisory employees.

Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor

organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in

a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or

form separate labor organizat ions of their own

RULING + RATIO:

1. NO. A supervisors’ union can affiliate with the same Federation of which two (2) rank

and file unions are likewise members, without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code

(PD 442), as amended, by Republic Act 6715

a. Despite a resolution of the Union withdrawing from the Federation, the Court still

decided to provide a guideline for future reference

b. In Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma, the court ruled that “if the intent of

the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank-and-file

Author: LIM, P.or where the supervisors’ labor organization would represent conflicting interests,

then a local supervisors’ union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national

federation of union of rank-and-file employees where that federation actively

participates in union activity in the company”

c. The limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors’ wanting to join a rank-and-file

union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors’ local union applying for membership

in a national federation the members of which include local unions of rank and file

employees

d. The intent of the law is clear especially where, as in this case at bar, the supervisors

will be co-mingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own

bargaining unit

2. NO. Confidential employees cannot join the labor union of the rank and file

a. In the case of National Association of Trade Unions (NATU) “A confidential employee

is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or

care and protection of the employer’s property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code

singles out managerial employee as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor

organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are

similarly disqualified”

b. In the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on

the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its interests

are well protected

c. The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are

union members

d. It is the same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential

employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the

disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision

DISPOSITION: Petitions in consideration DISMISSED

- Subject Decision, dated October 4, 1991, of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is

MODIFIED in that Credit and Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are highly

confidential employees not eligible for membership in a supervisors’ union

PEOPLE vs MANANTAN

Petition: appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the

information against the defendant

Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondent: GUILLERMO MANANTAN

Ponencia: REGALA, J law library

FACTS:

1.) Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged for violating Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Section 54 of

the said Code reads:

No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no

member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer

or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein,

except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.

2.) A preliminary investigation resulted in the finding a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by

defendant.

3.) He pleaded not guilty, and moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the

defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

4.) The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54.

However, defense counsel cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, where

it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the

authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.

ISSUE: W/N a justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code law library

1.) Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers enumerated in

Section 54. He submits the aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which

provided the following:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. - No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace,

or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or

Author: LIM, P.any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any

manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.

Section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace," the omission revealed the intention

of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its operation.

The court however points out that the above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. Under Section 449, the word

"judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase "of First instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised Election

Code, no such modification exists. In other words, justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the

Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified. In Section 54, however, there was

no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of

the more generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to

comprehend all kinds of judges, such as justices of the peace.

A justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is

indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority.

2.) Based on a narration of the legislative development or history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, the first

omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the

present code. However, in the two instances when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357

and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the

First Instance." In other words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the

words "justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the peace"

were omitted.

The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion that when the

legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer

from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".

3.) The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the

said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If

that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and

deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the

omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature

did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan

political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised

Election Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."

The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but

rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative

enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has

only been a substitution of terms.

When the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and justice of the peace", found in Section 449

of the Revised Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the

scope of the term not just one class of judges but all judges, whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special

courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations.

4.) The Courts applied the rule of "expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that

justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its

provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not

so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the

maximexpressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked. The legislature had not intended to exclude a

justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54 for there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule

of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case is

remanded for trial on the merits.

The People of the Philippines v. Teodoro Tamani

Petition: Appeal the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela

Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondent: Teodoro Tamani

DOCTRINE: REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS

"referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object"

FACTS (Procedural):

Author: LIM, P. Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of

appeal was forty-seven days late which appellant's counsel did not oppose.

Lower court's decision convicting defendant Tamani was served on his counsel

A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied.

A copy of the order of denial was served by registered mail to defendant's counsel through

his wife.

He had eleven days within which to appeal. He filed his notice of appeal only on September

10, 1963 or 48 days after.

Defendant's counsel, filed a sworn statement that the court's order was never brought to his

attention and averred that his wife must've lost the envelope containing the order.

The trial court opined that the wife's affidavit should have been submitted but the trial court

gave due course to the appeal

FACTS (Substantive): *sorry mejo magulo ito*

Two different set of facts were presented to the Court.

Tamani:

o At the time of the murder he was at the house of his cousin

o A confession was forced out of him by NBI Agent Almeda

o According to the father of the deceased, Francisco Siyang, it was Gaspar Ibarra and

Melchor Tumaneng who fired the shots and killed Jose Siyang

o Ibarra and Tumaneng were hired by Mayor Domingo to kill Siyang

Prosecution:

o Villamor Tamani, respondent's cousin, functioned as acting mayor when Domingo

was suspended.

o When Domingo came back, Villamor Tamani returned to his position as Vice Mayor

and summoned Tamani and one Cadawan to liquidate the Mayor.

o Tamani and Cadawan crossed the Mrs. Ibarra's yard, where Mrs. Ibarra saw Tamani

carrying a gun.

o According to Mrs. Ibarra, they were headed to Pua's store where Mayor Domingo

was.

o Tamani fired two volley's hitting Siyang with through and through gunshot wounds

and hitting Mayor Domingo on his palm

o Tamani signed and thumbarked two sworn statements before the NBI agent

wherein he confessed that he was the one who shot Siyang and Mayor Domingo

ISSUES:

Procedural:

2. WoN the appeal should be effected only within the 15-day period after promulgation

Substantive:

3. WoN Tamani's alibi can be given serious consideration

PROVISION:

Rule 122 of the Rules of Court

o SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.—An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days

from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period

for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is

filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the

defendant or his attorney.

RULING + RATIO:

Procedural Issue: The clear terms mentioned in the specific provision in the Rules of Court

leaves no room for doubt that the appeal should be affected within 15 days from promulgation

of the judgment.

Author: LIM, P. In Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court the word "must" is synonymous with "ought" which

connotes compulsion.

The word "promulgation" should be construed in the same section as referring to

"judgment"; "notice" as "order"

The construction is sanctioned by the rule REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS meaning

"referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object" or "let

each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively"

When the order was served by registered mail on July 13th on appellant's counsel, he had

only 1 day to file his notice of appeal, and not eleven days

That kind of construction is an application by analogy of the rule governing appeals in civil

cases (Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court)

However, considering that appellants right to seek a review of his case was lost by reason of

his counsel's inadvertence and considering further that the briefs have been submitted, the

Court has resolved to review the record to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice

Substantive Issue: No. It cannot be given serious consideration.

The settled rule is that an alibi, to be tenable, must be such as to preclude the possibility of

the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of

its commission.

Appellant's alibi does not satisfy that basic requirement. Moreover, it was not corroborated

by Vice-Mayor Tamani or by any other person. Its concocted character is manifest.

Disposition: the appeal is dismissed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.