Statcon Finals Reviewer

Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. National Labor Relations Commission

“The rule followed in this jurisdiction since Madrigal v. Rafferty (38 Phil. 414 [1918]) is that great weight shall be given to the interpretation or construction given to a statue by the Government agency called upon to implement the statute. In this case, the weight in favor of the Department of Labor should be greater, because the Department is not interpreting or construing a statute, but it had explained the extent of its own rule.”

Rejected Maxim(s):2a) Contemporanea expositio est optima est fortissima in lege. - Contemporary construction is strongest in law.

Endencia and Jugo v. David

“The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. “

Maxim(s):1)Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet - Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law.

People v. Ferrer

“The test formulated in Nebia vs. New York, and adopted by this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia, is that “if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial interpretation to that effect renders a court functus officio.”

Maxim(s):9b) Littera necat spiritus vivificate

9c) verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire

“As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force, violence or other illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist Party of

Vea Kristine R. ValloI-A

the Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to clearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic institutions in this country.”

Maxim(s):37) Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat

“Section 1 provides that “This Act shall be known as the Anti-Subversion Act.” Together with the main title, the short title of the statute unequivocally indicates that the subject-matter is subversion in general which has for its fundamental purpose the substitution of a foreign totalitarian regime in place of the existing Government and not merely subversion by Communist conspiracies.”

Maxim(s):24a) Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda

“The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear terms the nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. A narrow or technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent.”

Maxim(s):9b) Littera necat spiritus vivificate

9c) verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas

“Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction.”

Maxim(s):6c) Verba egis non est recedendum - From the words of the Statute there should be no departure

7a) Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent - When the language of the law is clear, there should be no departure.

30a) Expressio Unius est exclusio alterius - The express mention of one person thing or consequence implies exclusion of all others.


Rejected Maxim(s):25a) Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam - A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used.

CIR v. Limpan Investment Corporation

“Court may not construe when Statute is clear- Construction or Interpretation comes only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without it. It is the very last function which the Court should exercise, for if there is more application and less construction, there would be more stability in the law.”

Maxim(s):6c) Verba egis non est recedendum - From the words of the Statute there should be no departure.

7a) Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent - When the language of the law is clear, there should be no departure.

26) Ubi lex non distinguit necnon distinguere debemus. - Where the law does not distinguish, the Courts should not distinguish.

35) Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis. - A thing not being expected must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule.

Del Rosario v. COMELEC

“It is patent from the aforequoted title that the inclusion of the phrase “To propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines” is superfluous and therefore unnecessary; because the very title expressly states that the act implements Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 2 and 4, respectively of 1967 and 1969, and both Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 likewise categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Convention called for therein is “to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines,” which phrase is reiterated in Sec. 1 of both Resolutions. “

Maxim(s):20b) In eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus


“Furthermore, it is not required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be comprehensive in matters of detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead Congress or the people. All the details provided for in R.A. no. 6132 are germane to and are comprehended by its title.” Maxim(s):D) Nigrum nunquam excedere debet rubrum

People vs. Buenviaje

“Assuming without conceding that chiropractic does not fall within the term “practice of medicine” in its ordinary acceptation, we have the statutory definition in Section 770 of the Administrative Code and which clearly includes the manipulations employed in chiropractic.”

Maxim(s):6e) Littera scripta Manet. – The written word endures.- Sec 770 of Revised Administrative act includes practice of Chiropody.

7a)Absoluta sententia expositore non indigent. – When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.- When it says that practice of Chirpody is included in the practice of medicine, then the law is clear.

25a) Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam. – A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used. – Chiropractice is to be understood in the context of practice of medicine.

Municipal of Jose Panganiban vs Shell Co. of the Phils., ltd

“Its provisions that certain sections of the revenue code should be amended and that local governments should be granted a taxing power not therebefore enjoyed by them are not really its subject matter, but rather, the 2 modes or means devised by Congress to realize or achieve the alleviation of the Highway Special Fund.”

Maxim(s):12a) Ea est accipienda interpetatio quae vitio caret – That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice

37) Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat – A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it.


Ichong vs Hernandez and Sarmiento

“It is true that the term “regulate” does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of “nationalization” and “prohibition”, which term express the 2 main purposes and objectives of the law. But “regulate” is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization.”

Maxim(s):24a) Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda – General words should be understood in their general sense

9f) Quando verba statute sunt speciali, ratio autem generalia, statum generaliter est intelligendum – When the words used in a statute are special, but the purpose of the law is general, it should be read as the general expression.

De Villa v. Court of Appeals

“It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish (#26). Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something useless compelling reasons to justify it (# 17, 35, 43).”

Maxim(s):26) Ubi lex non distinguit necnon distinguere debemus -Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish

17) Ibi quid generaliter conceditur, inest haec exceptio, si non aliquid sit contras jus basque – Where anything is granted generally, exemption from rigid application of law is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right

35) Excemptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis - A thing notbeing expected must be regarded as coming within the purview of thegeneral rule

43) Strictissimi juris - Follow the law strictly

“More importantly it is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning”

Maxim(s):


B2) Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur – A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence

“The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show (B2) that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view (9C).”

Maxim(s):B2) Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur – A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence

9C) Verba intentioni non e contra, debent inservire - Words ought to be more subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the words

National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr.“The law itself distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that INP as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.”

Maxim(s):27) Dissilum dissimilis est ratio - Of things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar

“In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statue means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberation may be adopted.”

Maxim(s):B2) Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur - A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence

“Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the law if it runs counter to the legislative intent.”

Maxim(s):9C) Verba intentioni non e contra, debent inservire - Words ought to be more subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the words

“Examining the records of Bicameral Conference Committee (B2), we find that the legislature did intend to exclude the members of the PC (9C) from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as the retirement age is concerned.”

Maxim(s):B2) Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur- A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence



“Senator Maceda: That was the rationale, that was the tie-up. Since we are relaxing the entry, we should speed up (on retirement)”

Maxim(s):9A) Ratio legis est anima legis - The reason of the law is the soul of the Law

“In applying the provision of Sec. 89 in favor of the local police force as established in PD 765, the court does not, in any manner, give any undue preferential treatment in favor of the other group (12A). On the contrary, the Court is merely giving life to the real intent (9A) of the legislators based on the deliberations (B2) of the Bicamenral Conference…”

Maxim(s):12) Ea est accipienda interpretatio quae vitio caret – That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice

9A) Ratio Legis est Anima Legis - The reason of the law is the soul of the law.

B2) Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur - A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence

China Banking Corporation v. Ortega

“It will be noted from the from the discussion of the conference committee (B2) report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill 3977, which became RA 1405, that the it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment (9C).”

Maxim(s):B2) Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur – A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence


“(Vol. II, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, No. 12, pp. 3839 – 3840, July 27, 1955)” (B2)

Maxim(s):B2) Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur - A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence


“It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, (11E) even if ordered by the court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank (12A).”

Maxim(s):11E) Lex semper intendit quod convenit rationi - The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason.

12A) Ea est accipienda interpretatio quae vitio caret – That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice

People v. Carlos

“The People’s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The various provisos mentioned, in our opinion, are allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People’s Court Act; they are subordinate to its end. The multitude of matters which the legislation, by its nature, has to embrace would make mention of all of them in the title of the act cumbersome.”

Maxim(s):9a) Ratio legis est anima legis – The reason of the law is the soul of the law37) Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat – A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying

People v. Lim“But should he have intended to make the ban for all time, then said FAO No. 37-1 would be inoperative in so far as it exceeds the period of five years for any single period of time; but it does not necessarily render void FAO No.37-1”

Maxim(s):37) Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat – A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying

People v. Valensoy

“He moved to quash the information on the ground that as the title of Act No. 1780 does not embrace weapons other than firearms, the inclusion of section 26 in the said Act outlawing the concealment about one’s person of a bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris or other deadly weapon.”

Maxim(s):


36) Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum – The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself

“The constitutional prohibition against the enactment of bills into law embracing more than one subject not expressed in the title of the bills, referred to private or local bills only.”

Maxim(s):30) Espressio unius est exclusio alterius – The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others

“This constitutional provision has reference to bills henceforth to be enacted into law and not to a law in force and existing at the time the Constitution was adopted or took effect.”

Maxim(s):37) Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat – A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying

46a) Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis – A new statute should affect the future, not the past

Co v. HRET

“The court interprets section 1, paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.The provision in paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women.”

Maxim(s):9c) Verbaintentioni, non e contra, debentinservire.Words are to be subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the words.

“There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.”

Maxim(s):B2) Ambiguitasverborum patens nullaverificationeexcluditurA patent ambiguity can be cleared up by extrinsic evidence.

“The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from Feb 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must be retroactive.”


Maxim(s):9c) Verbaintentioni, non e contra, debentinservire. Words are to be subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the words.

12a) Ea estaccipiendainterpretatio quae vitio caret. That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice.

48) Favorabiliasuntamplianda, odiosarestringenda. Penal laws favorable to the accused must be given retroactive effect.

Rejected Maxim(s):46a) Lexprospicit, non respicit The law looks forward not backward.

“A constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter thereof.”

Maxim(s):37) Interpretatiofiendaestut res magisvaleat quam pereat. A law should be interpreted with the view of upholding rather than destroying it.

9b) Litteranecatspiritusvivificat. The letter kills but the spirit gives life.

“The constitutional provision in question is therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not nee for the curative provisions.”

Maxim(s):11a) Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda estute vitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, adopt an interpretation that avoids absurdity and inconvenience.

12a) Ea est accipienda interpretatio quae vitio caret. That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice.

Sarmiento v. Mison

“By following the rule in statutory construction, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.”

Maxim(s):


30a) Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. The express mention of the one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.

31) Argumentum a contrario. Negative-Opposite Doctrine: what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.

43) Strictissimi juris. Follow the laws strictly

“Given the above 2 extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution, struck a ‘middle ground’ by requiring the consent of the CA for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointments of the other officers.”

Maxim(s):39a) Distingue tempora et concordabis jura. Distinguish times and you will harmonize law.

39b) Tempora mutantur et leges mutantur in illis. Times have changed and the laws change with them.

B2) Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verification excluditur. A patent ambiguity can be cleared up by extrinsic evidence.

9a) Ratio legis est anima legis

6a) Index animi sermo est.

42a) Privlegia recipient largam interprettationem voluntate consonam concedentis. Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them.

“In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were 2 major changes proposed and approved by the Commission.”

Maxim(s):B2) Ambiguitasverborum patens nullaverificationeexcluditur. A patent ambiguity can be cleared up by extrinsic evidence.

“The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commissions show the following. “….dialogue of the deliberations…”

Maxim(s):


9d) Benignus leges interpretande sunt, quod voluntas earum conservetur. Laws are to be construed liberally so that their spirit and reason are preserved. (The statements made during the Constitutional Commissions show the reason behind the exclusion of heads of bureaus from the need of the Commission of Appointment’s consent.)

9c) Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire. Words ought to be more subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the words. (The intention was to exclude heads of bureaus as is clear from the records of the Constitutional Commissions.)

“The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of ‘heads of bureaus’ from the appointments that need the consent of the CA.”

Maxim(s):30b) Expressum facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.

30a) Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The express mention of the one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.

7a) Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent. When the language of the law is clear, no need for explanation.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR

“…Such arguments are no longer tenable. Albay had since been modified and superseded by Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr., where this Court En Banc expressly ruled that FIRB Resolution Nos. 10-85 and 1-86 are valid…”

Maxim(s):1) Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet – Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquire the force of law.

5a) Stare decisis et non quieta movere – Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.

“A denial of the tax-exempt status of NPC, as sought by respondents, would not only be legally untenable and subversive of doctrinal stability but would also lead to disastrous practical consequences.”

Maxim(s):5b) Interest republicae ut sit finis litium. – The interest of the state demands that there be an end to litigation.


“Additionally, other local government entities might even be induced to covet and grab other properties of the NPC in the guise of collecting local taxes. The far-reaching consequence of such eventuality would not be difficult to imagine.”

Maxim(s):12a) Ea est accipienda interpretatio quae vitio caret. – That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice.

“Definitely, it would seriously impair the capacity of the National Power Corporation to fulfill its statutory mandate to carry out the ‘total electrification of the Philippines through the development of power from all sources to meet the needs of industrial development and rural electrification.’”

Maxim(s):9a) Ratio legis est anima legis. – The reason of the law is the soul of the law.

“In the end, the Supreme Court has the constitutional duty not only of interpreting and applying the law in accordance with prior doctrines but also of protecting society from the improvidence and wantonness wrought by needless upheavals in such interpretations and applications.”


JM TUASON & CO. vs. MARIANO & AQUIAL & CORDOVA

“Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.”

Maxim(s):5a) Stare decisis et non quieta movere – Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.

“It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the court’s time and energies at the expense of other litigants.”



People vs Macarandang

“The appointment of the accused as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Sec 879 of the Revised Administrative Code.”

Maxim(s):6a) Index animi sermo est: Speech is the index of the intention (rejected)

29) Ejusdem generis: Of the same kind

9b) Littera neact spiritus vivificat: The letter kills but the spirit gives life

People vs Mapa

“The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt.” Maxim(s):7a)Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent: When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required

38a) Pari material: Of the same matter

“The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, “it shall be unlawful for any person to ***possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefore, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition.” The next section provides that “firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the AFP], the Philippine Constabulary. Guars in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails” are not covered “when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.”

Maxim(s):30a) Expressiouniusestexclusioalterius: The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.


36b) Ex tota material emergatresolutio: The exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together

Senarillos vs Hermosisima

“It is elementary that the interpretation placed by this Court upon RA 557 constitutes part of the law as of the date is was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect”

Maxim(s):1) Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet: Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law

2a) Contemporaneaexpositioest optima et fortissima in lege: Contemporary construction is the strongest in law

“The subsequent reaffirmation of their decision by the Civil Service authorities could not invalidate a proceeding that was illegal and ab initio void.”

Maxim(s):3c) Quod ab initio non valet in tractutemporis non convalescit: That which was originally void, does not by lapse of time become valid

“That the investigation of police officers under RA 557 must be conducted by the council itself, and not by a mere committee thereof, is now established jurisprudence and no longer open to question since our decision in Festejo vs. Mayor of Nabua reaffirmed in subsequent decisions”

Maxim(s):46a) Lexprospicit, non respicit: The law looks forward, not backward

Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations

“R.A. 3452 created the RCA on June 14, 1962 as service agency or instrumentality of the government to implement government policies and programs. This republic act simultaneously abolished NARIC; Commonwealth Act 246 (Budget Law) is now the law applicable governing the extra hours of work of employees of the administration and not anymore Commonwealth Act 444 (Eight-hour Labor Law)”

Maxim(s):


38b) Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus - Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of law

“While executive construction is not necessarily binding upon courts, it is entitled to great weight and consideration. The reason for this is that such construction comes from the particular branch of government called upon to implement the particular law involved. Thus, unless the President specifically appropriates the 25% compensation, RCA is not liable to the abovementioned obligation.”

Maxim(s):2a) Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege - contemporary construction is strongest in law

Salaria v. Buenviaje

“Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree No. 20 states that except when the lease is for a definite period, the provisions of par. 1 of Art. 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines insofar as they refer to the dwelling unit or land on which another’s dwelling is located shall be suspended until otherwise provided; but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court of the Philippines on lease contracts, insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this act shall apply.”

Maxim(s):38b) Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus - Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of law

“No. Memorandum Circular No. 970 was issued by the President stating that “except for the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees … bona fide tenants of dwelling places covered by said decree are not subject to eviction, particularly if the only cause of action thereon is personal use of the property by the owners or their families.” Construction by Executive Branch of Government of a particular law although not binding upon courts must be given weight as the construction comes from that branch called upon to implement the law. The ground relied upon by the lessor in this case, namely, personal use of property by the owner or lessors or their families is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees.

Maxim(s):2a) Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege - contemporary construction is strongest in law

30a) Expressio Unius est exclusion alterius - the express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others


University of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals

“R.A. No. 51 which allows the President of the Philippines to reorganize within one year the different Executive Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities of the Government, including the Corporations owned or controlled by it; EO No. 94 sec. 158 stating that the PGH is hereby transferred from the office of the President to the University of the Philippines, together with its personnel, powers, functions, duties, records, equipment, supplies and unexpended balance of appropriations. The appropriations for the PGH shall continue to be itemized in the annual general appropriations act.”

Maxim(s):38b) Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus - Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of law

6c) Verba Legis non est recedendum - From the words of the statute there should be no departure

“The management of Philippine General hospital was initially under the Office of the President of the Philippines. Under RA 51 and E.O. 94, the President transferred them under herein Respondent. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the President and Board of Regents of the U.P. possess full and final authority in disciplining, suspension, and removal of the civil service employees of the University, including those of the Philippine General Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of the Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals.”

Maxim(s):50) Generalia specialibus non derogant - A general law does not nullify a specific or special law

20a) Ex necessitate legis - By the necessary implication of law

9c) Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire - Words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words

United Christian Missionary Society vs. Social Security Commission

“The plain text and intent of the pertinent provisions of the Social Security Act clearly rule out petitioner’s posture that the respondent Commission should assume, as against the mandatory imposition of the 3% penalty per month for late payment of premium remittances…”


Maxim(s):6A ) Index Animi Sermo Est – Speech is the index of intention

“The prescribed penalty is evidently of a punitive character, provided by the legislature to assure that employers do not take lightly the State’s exercises of the police power in the implementation of the Republic’s declared policy “to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and (to) provide protection to employers against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death.”

Maxim(s):9A )Ratio Legis est Anima Legis – The reason of the law is the soul of the law

“In this concept, good faith or bad faith is rendered irrelevant, since the law makes no distinction between an employer who professes good reasons for delaying the remittance of premiums and another who deliberately disregards the legal duty imposed upon him to make such remittance.”

Maxim(s):26) Ubi Lex non distinguit necnon distinguere debemus - When the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish

“Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no room for interpretation and construction of the statute.”

Maxim(s):7A) Absoluta Sententia Expositore non Indiget – When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required

“…for otherwise we would be sanctioning the Commission’s reading provided therein, and hindering and defeating the plain purpose and intent of the legislature.”

Maxim(s):6D ) Maledicta et expositio quae corrumpit textum – It is bad construction which corrupts the text

12A) Ea est accipienda interpretatio quae vitio caret – That interpretation to be adopted is that which is free from evil or injustice.

Marcos Yra vs. Maximo Abaño


“The contemporaneous construction of the law by two departments of the Government – one in the legislative branch (Philippine Assembly) and the other from the executive branch (Executive Bureau)- though not binding on the Courts, is entitled to the Court’s respectful consideration.”

Maxim(s):2A – Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissimo in lege – Contemporary construction is strongest in law.

GO CHIOCO V. MARTINEZ (Ang hirap baguhin ng format nito… bahala na to haha) Latin Maxims:B Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur (A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence)“and the foregoing conclusion is fully sustained not only by the history of the Usury Law, but also by the preamble of the law itself.”

36b Ex tota material emergat resolutio (The exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together)“By the preamble, because speaking of the necessity of the intervention of the prosecuting attorney in actions resulting from the violation of the Usury Law, as well as of the penal sanction, said preamble gives.”

9a Ratio est anima legis (The reason of the law is the sould of the law) / 9b Littera necat spiritus vivifica (The letter kills but the spirit gives life) / 9c Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire (Words ought to be more subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the words) / 37 Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis veleat quam pereat (A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it)“Therefore, there can be no room for doubt that it was not the intention of the Philippine Legislature to forfeit the principal in condemning usury by means of a law.”

LUZON STEVEDORING CO. V. TRINIDADLatin Maxims:25d Verba generalia restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel personam (General words should be confined according to the subject-matter or persons to which they relate)/11e Lex semper intendit quod convenit rationi (The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason)/9a Ratio legis est anima legis (The reason of the law is the sould of the law)“The definition of lexicographers, however, cannot always be adopted as a correct meaning for statutory words and phrases. The intention of the Legislature and the object which it intended to attain must be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the meaning of words and phrases used, rather than the set definition of lexicographers.”

11c Argumentum ab inconvenient plurimum valet in lege (An argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law)/48 Favorabilia sunt ampliand, odiosa restringenda (Penal laws are favorable toe the accused are given retroactive effect)


“Moreover, revenue laws imposing taxes on business must be strictly construed in favor of the citizen. In construing a word or expression in the statute susceptible to two or more meanings, the court will adopt that interpretation most in accord with the manifest purpose of the statue as gathered from the context.”

HOME INSURANCE COMPANY V. EASTERN SHIPPING LINESLatin Maxims: 48 Favorabilia sunt ampliand, odiosa restringenda (Penal laws are favorable toe the accused are given retroactive effect)/9c Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire (Words ought to be more subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the words)“To repeat, the objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of our courts. The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the development of trade relations and which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among countries.”

11e Lex semper intendit quod convenit rationi (The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason)“The defendant American corporation in General Corporation of the Philippines v. Union Insurance Society of Canton Ltd. Et al. entered into insurance contracts without the necessary license or authority.”

37Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis veleat quam pereat (A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it)/8 Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis (Equity never acts in contravention of the law)“There is no question that the contracts are enforceable. The requirement of registration affects only the remedy.”

36 Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statum (The best interpreter of the law is the statute itself)“The old Section 69 has been reworded in terms of non-access to courts and administrative agencies in order to maintain or intervene in any action or proceeding.”

14 Jurae naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem (It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a stranger should reap the pecuniary produce of another man’s work)21 Ubi jus, ibi remedium (Where there is no right, there is a remedy for violation thereof)/42a Privilegia recipiunt largam interpretationem voluntate consonam concedentis (Priveleges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them)/48 Favorabilia sunt ampliand, odiosa restringenda (Penal laws are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect)“In L-34382, respondent Eastern Shipping Lines is ordered to pay the petitioner, with interest at the legal rate from January 5, 1968 until fully paid and respondent Angel Jose Transportation Inc. is ordered to pay the petitioner also with interest at the legal rate from January 5, 1968 until fully paid. Each respondent shall pay one-half of the costs. The counterclaim of Angel Jose Transportation Inc. is dismissed.”


CENTRAL CAPIZ V. RAMIREZ

“Even had the legislature intended to include private as well as public land within the scope of the Act, this intent fails because under the Act as entitled such attempt would be in direct violation of section three of the Act of Congress, which provides that: “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”

Maxim(s):D) Nigrum nunquam excedere debet rubrum - The black should never go beyond the red

“That eliminating the phrase “and for other purposes” from the title of said Act, the same must be considered and treated as though reading: “An Act to amend and compile the laws relative to lands of the public domain.”

Maxim(s):15a) Surplusagium non nocet - Surplusage does not vitiate a statute

PEOPLE V. PURISIMA

“In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure – a presidential decree in these cases – the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law.”

Maxim(s):9A) Ratio legis est anima legis - The reason of the law is the soul of the law

“Whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.”

Maxim(s):11A) Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum - Where there is ambiguity, the interpretation of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted


11B) Legis construction non facit injuriam - The construction of the law will not be such as to work injury or injustice

“The explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree.”

Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses xxx.”

Maxim(s):36D) Nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere posit antequam totum iterum atque iterum perlegit - The sense and meaning of the law is collected by viewing all the parts together as one whole and not of one part only by itself

* The statute should be taken as a whole, including the preamble

“A construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.”

Maxim(s):12A) Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret - That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice

* If intent were not an element, it would have resulted to absurd penalties and P.D. 9 would have been an easy means of extortion for the police.

“Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused.”

Maxim(s):48A) Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda - Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect

ADDITIONAL LATIN MAXIM: 41D) Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea - The act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty - The accused had no criminal intent, he not guilty of violating P.D. No. 9

EUGENIO V. DRILON


“The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced.”Maxim(s): 36B) Ex tota material emergat resolutio - The exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together9A) Ratio legis est anima legis - The reason of the law is the soul of the law

“The law must favor the weak and the disadvantaged. P.D. 957 was enacted with no other end in view than to provide mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations and machinations of ‘unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers,’ and such intent is nowhere expressed more clearly than its preamble xxx.”

Maxim(s):36B) Ex tota material emergat resolutio - The exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together

9A) Ratio legis est anima legis - The reason of the law is the soul of the law

“From a dedicated reading of the preamble, it is manifest and arguable that the legislative intent must have been to remedy the alarming situation by having P.D. 957 operate retrospectively.”

Maxim(s):9A) Ratio legis est anima legis - The reason of the law is the soul of the law

“Indeed, a strictly prospective application of the statute will effectively emasculate it, for then the State will not be able to exercise its regulatory functions and curb fraudulent schemes and practices perpetrated under or in connection with those contracts and transactions which happen to have been entered into prior to P.D. 957, despite obvious prejudice to the very subdivision lot buyers sought to be protected by said law.”

Maxim(s):36A) Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum - The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself

37) Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat - A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it

-----AT THIS POINT I HAVE GIVEN UP ON FORMATTING (SAKA NAKAKAHILO DIN PAG ISANG FORMAT LANG HAHA)-----


APARRI V. COURT OF APPEALS (Adarna)

1. The statute is undeniably clear. It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and phrase of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed

[6C] From the words of the statue there should be no departure

2. and, where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words [

[7A] When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required

3. The reason for the rule is that the legislature must be presumed to know the meaning of words, to have used words advisedly and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute

[6A] Speech is the index of intention

PEOPLE V. QUIJADA (Adarna)

1. In short, there is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 that manifests, even vaguely, a legislative intent to decriminalize homicide or murder if either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, or to convert the offense of illegal possession of firearm as a qualifying circumstance if the firearm so illegally possessed is used in the commission of homicide or murder


2. To charge the lawmaker with that intent is to impute an absurdity that would defeat the clear intent to preserve the law on homicide and murder and impose a higher penalty for illegal possession of firearm if such firearm is used in the commission of homicide or murder

[11A] Where there is ambiguity, the interpretation of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted


3. What then would be a clear case of judicial legislation is an interpretation of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 that would make it define and punish a single integrated offense and give to the words WITH THE USE OF a similar meaning as the words AS A RESULT OR ON THE OCCASION OF, a meaning which is neither born out by the letter of the law nor supported by its intent

[6D] It is bad construction that corrupts the text

4. Worth noting is the rule in statutory construction that if a statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation, leaving the court no room for any extended ratiocination or rationalization of the law


BARANDA V. GUSTILLO (Adarna)

1. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says


2. The statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction


3. According to Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means "ought to, must, ...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to express what is mandatory."

[24A] General words should be understood in their general sense [B] A patent ambiguity CAN be cleared up by extrinsic evidence

4. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529



PRIMICIAS V. MUN. OF URDANETA (Adarna)

1. Municipal Ordinance No. 3 is said to be based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law.

[49] Leges posteriores contrarias abrogant

PEOPLE V. PALMA (Adarna)1. A general law cannot repeal a special law by mere implication. The repeal must be express and specific.

[50] Generalia specialibus non derogant

CASCO PHIL. CHEMICAL CO. V. GIMENEZ (Adarna)

1. Urea formaldehyde referred to by the law is distinct from urea and formaldehyde as separate materials. Individual statements made by senators on the floor of the Senate do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives. Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill, which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.

[6] Verba legis non est recedendum

2. The national insitute of science and technology states that ureaformaldehyde is a chemical compound that is the product of the combination of urea and formaldehyde

[25] Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam

TAMAYO V. GSELL (Macalino)


1. “Generally speaking, when a statute has been adopted from another State or country and such statute has previously been construed by the courts of such State or country, the statute is deemed to have been adopted with the construction given to it.”

“The law being so clearly traced to its source and the intention of the Legislature being so apparent, it is necessary to ascertain and be guided by the decisions of the courts in the United States construing essentially the same law.

[1] LEGIS INTERPRETATION LEGIS VIM OBTINET (Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of the law) [B2] AMBIGUITAS VERBORUM PATENS NULLA VERIFICATIONE EXCLUDITUR (A patent ambiguity CAN be cleared up by extrinsic evidence)

*Anything that can shed light should be used

ZAMORA V. CIR (Macalino)

1. “It is true that Bulletin F has no binding force, but it has a strong persuasive effect considering that the same has been the result of scientific studies and observation for a long period in the United States after whose Income Tax Law ours is patterned.”

[B2] AMBIGUITAS VERBORUM PATENS NULLA VERIFICATIONE EXCLUDITUR (A patent ambiguity CAN be cleared up by extrinsic evidence)*Anything that can shed light should be used

OSSORIO V. POSADAS (Macalino)

1. “We see no reason for not applying to the instant case the resolution of the United States Department of Treasury passed upon a case that originated in the Philippines, and therefore, arrived at after a consideration of our laws on conjugal properties and those o separate property of husband and wife, quoted with approval”

[B2] AMBIGUITAS VERBORUM PATENS NULLA VERIFICATIONE EXCLUDITUR (A patent ambiguity CAN be cleared up by extrinsic evidence)* Anything that can shed light should be used

HOWDEN CO. V. CIR (Rueda)


1. The principle of legislative approval by re-enactment is not applicable to this case since Sec. 53 and 54 were never re-enacted Republic Acts 1065, 1291, 1505 and 2343 were merely amendments in respect to tax rate of tax imposed in Sec. 53 and 54.

[2a] Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege [REJECTED] [6c] Verba legis non est recedendum [REJECTED]

2. The administrative rulings relied upon by the taxpayers were only contained in letters to tax payers.

[4] Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur [REJECTED]

BENGZON V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE (Rueda)

1. Philippine Legislature intended the Act to be an appropriate measure with various items is apparent from a reading of Sec. 12 thereof whereby the Legislature anticipated the possibility of a partial veto by the Governor-General.

[36] Optima sstatute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum [6a] Index animo sermo est

2. When the Chief Executive took action, the Legislature made no attempt to override the veto or to amend the law to being into being the section which the Governor-General has eliminated.

It has been the practice of the Chief Executive in the interpretation of his constitutional powers to veto separate items in bills analogous to that. Such practice has been consented in previously without objection.

[2b] Optima Est Legum Interpres Consuetudo [3a] Optimus interpres rerum usus


LAXAMANA V. BALTAZAR (Rueda)

1. Sec. 2180 of the Revised Administrative Code, applies to municipal officers in general while Sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code applies to the office of mayor in particular. The section omitted reference to temporary vacancy of such office because 2195 governed the contingency.

[1] Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet

2. The rule is based on the theory that the legislature is acquainted with the contemporaneous interpretation of a statute, especially when made by an administrative body or executive officers charged with the duty of administering or enforcing the law, and therefore impliedly adopts the interpretation upon re-enactment.

[2a] Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege

3. Where one statute, deals with a subject in general terms and another deals with a particular, the two should be harmonized and if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general.

[50] Generalia specialibus non derogant

TANADA V. CUENCO (Tagra)

1. While it is true that the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, would in effect be limited to seven, instead of nine, members it must be conceded that the present composition of the Senate, where-in twenty-three of its members belong to one party and one member belongs to another, was not foreseen by the framers of the Constitution. Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations cannot be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three Justices of the Supreme Court, three members nominated by the majority party and either one or two members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.


[9a] Ratio legis est anima legis

2. As a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any application. Where the meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning. The reason is that the application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional provisions that when applied to statutory provisions, and that, except as to matters committed by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts even in a doubtful case. Hence if in the judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount consideration of public policy, it may be rejected.

[2a] Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege [REJECTED]

3. As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, while that which is within the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is not within the statute, but, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit.

[9a] ratio legis est anima legis

4. Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main argument in support of the mandatory character of the constitutional provision relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word “shall”, therein used, is imperative in nature and that this is borne out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated Februrary 1, 1939, pertinent parts of which are quoted in the footnote.

[2a] Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege [REJECTED]

5. Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegated to the Constitutional Convention, when they faced the task of providing for the adjudication of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the Legislative Department, Dr. Jose Aruego, a member of said Convention, says:

"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to the lawmaking body the determination of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members was not altogether satisfactory. There were many complaints against the lack of political justice in this determination; for in a great number of cases, party interests controlled and dictated the decisions. The undue delay in the


dispatch of election contests for legislative seats, the irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of them, and the very apparent injection of partisanship in the determination of a great number of the cases were decried by a great number of the people as well as by the organs of public opinion.

"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this function assigned to it in the organic laws was by no means great. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice in the decisions that there was, gradually built up a camp of thought in the Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the determination of election contests, following the practice in some countries, like England and Canada.

"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. 1, pp. 257-258; emphasis supplied.).

This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in its session of February 22, 1956, Senator Sumulong declared:

".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members, that is virtually placing the majority party in a position to dictate the decision in those election cases, because each House will be composed of a majority and a minority, and when you make each House the judge of every election protest involving any member of that House, you place the majority in a position to dominate and dictate the decision in the case and result was, there were so many abuses, there were so main injustices: committed by the majority at the expense and to the prejudice of the minority protestants. Statements have been made here that justice was done even under the old system, like that case involving Senator Mabanag, when he almost became a victim of the majority when he had an election case, and it was only through the intervention of President Quezon that he was saved from becoming the victim of majority injustices.”

"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system, but the record will show that those cases were few and they were the rare exceptions. The overwhelming majority of election protests decided under the old system was that the majority being then in a position to dictate the, decision in the election protest, was tempted to commit as it did commit many abuses and injustices."

Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members: Three of them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes, and three from the party having the second largest number votes so that these members may represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines."

Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed himself as follows:.


"Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the election, the returns and the qualifications of the members of the legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a time when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative department. So the election, returns and qualifications of the members, of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive body to determine the election, returns and qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also expressed as to whether that should continue or not, and the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that provision was the fact that was, among other things, the system obtaining in the United States under the Federal Constitution of the United States, and there was no reason why that power or that right vested in the legislative body should not be retained. But it was thought that would make the determination of this contest, of this election protest, purely political as has been observed in the past."

[B2] Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur

6. It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.


7. This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In fact, Senator Sabido-who had moved to grant to Senator Tañada the privilege to make the nominations on behalf of party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate-agrees with it. As Senator Sumulong inquired:

"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of creating this Electoral Tribunal so as to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in the Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330; emphasis supplied.).

"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).

Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:


".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal situation." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 349; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: ."..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become members of the Tribunal it is hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect the protestants or the protegees. It is hoped that they will act as judges because to decide election cases is a judicial function. But the framers of, the Constitution besides being learned were men of experience. They knew that even Senators like us are not angels, that we are human beings, that if we should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be free from partisan influence to favor our party, so that in, case that hope that the three from the majority and the three from the minority who will act as Judges should result in disappointment, in case they do not act as judges but they go there and vote along party liner, still there is the guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices who have no partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the majority from controlling and dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded by the Congressmen or Senators who are members the Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan motives to serve, either protestants, or protestees. That is my understanding of the intention of the framers of the Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.”

[6c] Verba legis non est recedendum

8. What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. 11.


9. It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 329, 342, 349, 354, 359, 375). Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its


letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.


10. Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party 12 has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Tañada felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Tañada did not nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall.

[12a] Ea est accipienda interpretatio quae vitio caret

Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Tagra)

1. That should have resolve the question. However, with the filing of this petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to “give substance to equality among the three branches of government” in the words of Commissioner Rigos.


2. In the course of deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas’ accepted amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applies to all taxpayers.



3. The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers.

[32] Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est [REJECTED]

4. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Convention relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate such contention.


5. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.

[6c] Verba legis non est recedendum

6. With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that “the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution” in Perfect v. Meer as affirmed in Endencia v. David must be discarded.

Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet [REJECTED]

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals (Uy)

1. “As held in the case of Tuason, Jr. vs. Lingad, is indicative of legislative intention to support the principle of good faith.”

[1] Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet (Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law.)

2. “Principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by re-enactment clearly obtains in this case.”

[2A] Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissimo in lege (Contemporary construction is strongest in law.)


3. “It is clear from the circulars promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has no retroactive application where to apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers.”

[12A] Ea est accipienda interpretatio quae vitio caret (That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice.)

4. “In so far as the enumerated exceptions are concerned, the petitioner does not fall under any of them.”

[30A] Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.) [35] Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis (A thing not being expected must be regarded as coming within the purview of the

general rule.)

5. “When the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 4-71, revoking General Circular No. V-334.”

[46A] Lex prospicit, non respicit (The law looks forward, not backward.)

6. “The authority of some administrative officials to modify or change, much less reduce, the basis or measure of the tax should not be read into law.”

[6D] Maledicta et expositio quae currumpit textum (It is bad construction which corrupts the text.) [REJECTED]

7. “The provision on non-retroactivity is inapplicable in the present case in the General Circular No. V-334 is a nullity because in effect, it changed the law on the matter.”

[46D] Leges quae retrosiciunt, et magna cum cautione sunt adhibendae neque enim Janus locatur in legibus (Laws which are retrospective are rarely and cautiously received, for Janus has really no place in the laws.) [REJECTED]


Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System (Uy)

1. “Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. “

[7A] Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent (When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.)

2. “Where there is a right there is a remedy. “

[21A] Ubi jus, ibi remedium (Where there is a right, there is a remedy for violation thereof.)

3. “In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.”

[24A] Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda (General words should be understood in their general sense.) [24B] Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum (A general statement is understood in its general sense.)

4. “When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.”

[25A] Verba accipienda sunt secundum subectam materiam (A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used.)

5. “Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.”


[37] Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat (A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it.)

Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp (GMCR) v. NLRC and Salazar (Vallo)

1. Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code repeats and firms out the Labor Code Provisions.

[2A] Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege (Contemporary construction is strongest in law)

2. The wording of the Labor Code Is clear and unambiguous “ An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement”

[6a] Index Animo Sermo Est (Speech is the index of intention) [6C]: Verba Legis Non Est Recedendum (From the words of the statute there should be no departure) [7a] Absoluta Sententia Expositore Non Indigent (When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required)

Domingo v. Commission on Audit (Vallo)

1. General Appropriations Act of 1989, 1990, 1991 clearly provide that transportation allowance shall not be granted to officials who are assigned a government vehicle or use government motor transportation

[7a] Absoluta Sententia expositore non indigent (When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required) [6a] Index Animo Sermo Est (Speech is the index of intention)

2. The case of Bustamante v. Commissioner was used as a precedent since in this case, the COA also disallowed the claim for transportation allowance of National Power Corporation’s legal counsel for he was already issued with a government vehicle.

[1] Legis Interpretatio Legis Vim Obtinet (Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law)

3. If before it was permitted that even though the government has assigned vehicles for the officials and their personnel to use, said officials can still claim for transportation allowances. To avoid uncertainties, the government has issued PD 733, General Appropriations Act of 1988, 1990, 1991 to make it clear that said officials can no longer claim for transportation allowances once vehicles have been issued to them for their use.


[39B] Tempora mutatur et leges mutantur in illis (Times have changed and laws have changed with them)

4. Webster Dictionary defines the word “assign” as “to transfer (property) to another in trust”

[24A] Generalia Verba Sunt Generaliter Intelligenda (General words should be understood in their general sense)

5. Had the legislative intent been that government officials issued an official vehicle could still collect transportation allowance if they do not actually use, the word “use” instead of “assign” should have been employed.

[6b] Animus Hominis Est Anima Scripti (The intention of the party is the soul) [6e] Littera Scripta Manet (The written word endures) [6f] Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus (Things thus standing)

Luzon Brokerage Co v. Public Service Commission (Vallo)

1. It has been customary based on previous acts that the trucks of petitioner were not considered/regarded by the government nor the respondent as common carriers/ public utility. More so, the length of time that the petitioner had been engaged in the brokerage business showed that PSC never had jurisdiction over the company’s trucks.

[2b] Optima Est Legum Interpres Consuetudo (Custom is the best interpreter of the statute)

2. The mere omission of the phrase “for public use” in the definition of public service does not warrant the interference that the legislature meant to extend the jurisdiction of PSC to private enterprises not devoted to public use. The idea of public use is implicit in the term “public service”. A public service is a service for public use. The insertion of the phrase “for hire or compensation” is of no significance as it is a stock phrase found in most definitions of a common carrier and a public utility.

Public service and public utility must be understood in their context. Petitioner’s trucks are not to be considered as Public utility (for hire/compensation) since said trucks are intended to merely transfer the cargoes to where it should be, from depositing to warehouse.

[25a] Verba Accipienda Sunt Secundum Subjectam Materiam (A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used)


3. Even though there have been changes in the definition of the term “public service”, no alterations were made in the provisions of other sections of Public Service Law. These provisions were intended for common carriers and no amendments were made to include private carriers, which clearly signifies that the legislature did not make such radical change.

[36A] Optima Statute Interpretatrix Est Ipsum Statutum (The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself) [36b] Ex Tota Materia Emergat Resolutio (The exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together)

BAUTISTA, Vem

1. Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union

3: All presumptions are indulged in the favor of constitutionality… It is necessary to premise that there are some thoroughly established principles, which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtains in the instant case are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a stature, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt…

… Courts do inquire into the wisdom of laws. 68 Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by the people, are presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of the people, and it may change the laws accordingly…

20: Ex necessitate legis (By necessary implication of the law)It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time. It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union.

9a: Ratio legis est anima legis (The reason of the law is the soul of the law)37: Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat (A law should be interpreted with a view upholding rather than destroying it.)Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up,


they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.

2. Tañada vs. Tuvera9a: Ratio legis est anima legis (The reason of the law is the soul of the law)24a: Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda (General words should be understood in their general sense)The term “laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

Reject: 33: Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential (A qualifying word or phrases should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent)… The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, whish cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

A: Ignorantia Legis non excusat (Ignorance of the law excuses no one)Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.

3. Gutierrez vs. Carpio1: Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinetAs to the kind of month, it is to be noted that, according to the ruling in the case of Guzman vs. Lichauco, article 7 of the Civil Code has been modified by section 13 of the Administrative Code, according to which “month” now means the civil or calendar month and not the regular thirty day month.

TONGCO, Candice

Magtoto vs. Manguera 1. 39bTempora mutatur et leges mutantur in illisTimes have changed and laws have changed with themApplication: We did not immediately follow the American Rule. We only followed it step by step. Hence, in the 1973 Constitution, the Miranda-Escobedo doctrine of the United States Supreme Court was adopted, as a "new right" granted to detained person.

2. 46aLex prospicit, non respicitThe law looks forward, not backward.


Application: The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel provided in Sec 20, Art 4 of the 1973 Constitution only has prospective effect. It did not exist before the incorporation of the New Constitution,

3.12a, 36eEa est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caretThat interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil and injustice.Ex antecendentibus et consequetibus fit optima interpretationA passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and follows it.Application: Giving such provision a retroactive effect would have great unsettling effects on the administration of justice. It may lead to acquittal of guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to the People and the offended parties in criminal cases where confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and in accordance with the rules then in force at that time.

4. 27Dissimilum dissimilis est ratioOf things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar.Application: The rule that penal laws favorable to the accused should be given retroactive effect refer to substantive penal laws, while the constitutional provision in question is basically a procedural rule of evidence involving the incompetency and inadmissibility of confessions and therefore cannot be included in the term "penal laws."

Filoteo vs. Sandiganbayan 1. 46aLex prospicit, non respicitThe law looks forward, not backward.Application: Waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should be admissible because the 1973 Constitution did not contain the right against an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel which is provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

2. 1Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet


Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law.Application: Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with the assistance of counsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court, through Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The Court specifically ruled that the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means.

3. 49Leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogantLater statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto.Application: After the effectivity of paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, rights cannot anymore be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

CASTOLO, Camille

Regalado vs Yulo

Latin Maxims:

6c Verba legis non est recedendum: From the words of the statute there should be no departure

All are agreed that the language that should prevail in the interpretation is Spanish.

2a Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege: Contemporary construction is strongest in law

The Solicitor-General properly invites attention to the history of the law and from that history would deduce the legislative intention to be effectuated.

9 Ratio legis est anima legis: The reason of the law is the soul of the law.

It is of course a cardinal rule that the practical construction of a statute by the department whose duty it is to carry its execution is entitled to great weight. Nevertheless the court is not bound by such construction and the rule does not apply in cases where the construction is not doubtful.

6d Maledicta et expositio quae corrumpit textum: It is bad construction which corrupts the text.


But we cannot reach that result when to do so compels us to rewrite a law and to insert words or phrases not found in it. If the court should do that it would pass beyond the bounds of judicial power to usurp legislative power.

The intent of the Legislature to be ascertained and enforced is the intent in the words of the statute. If legislative intent is not expressed in some appropriate manner, the courts cannot by interpretation speculate as to an intent and supply a meaning not found in the phraseology of the law. In other words, the courts cannot assume some purpose in no way expressed and then construe the statute to accomplish this supposed intention.

6b Animus hominis est anima scripti: The intention of the party is the soul.

That the natural and reasonable meaning of the language used in Act No. 3899 leaves room for no other deduction than that a justice of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act and who completed sixty-five years of age on September 13, 1934, subsequent to the approval of the Act, which was on November 16, 1931, and who by the law was required to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933, is not affected by the said Act.

B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Latin Maxims:

40 Salus populi est suprema lex: The voice of the people is the supreme law.

42 Privilegia recipiunt largam interpretationem voluntate consonam concedentis: Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them.

In reconsidering its Order dated November 3, 1986, this Court is guided by the clarification of the date of effectivity of P.D. 2016 by the National Housing Authority which is the alter ego of the President of the Philippines who issued Presidential Decree 2016 and Presidential Decree 1517 to which the former decree is intimately related. In the communication dated October 21, 1986 to the defendant by the General Manager of the said National Housing Authority it is stated thus: Please be informed that the date of issuance of PD 1517 is 1978 and ten years or more reckoned from that date is 1968. Hence, tenant families who should benefit from this Urban Land Reform Program are those who have been residing in the area for ten (10) years or more prior to the issuance of said P.D. 1517.

38b Intepretre et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus: Every statute must be construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of law.

The above-quoted provisions should not be isolated from the other provisions of P.D. 1517 and P.D. 2016.

36 Optima statute interpretatix est ipsum statutum: The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself.

It is an accepted canon of construction that the intention of the lawmakers must be ascertained not from a consideration of a single word or a particular phrase of the law, but from the context of the whole statute, including its whereas clauses.

9 Ratio legis est anima legis: The reason of the law is the soul of the law.

Upon examination of the whereas clauses of P.D. 2016, We are informed of the premises/purposes for its issuance, namely: to supply or correct the deficiencies in the implementation of P.D. 1517 — that despite the institution by said decree of a nationwide land reform program and the proclamation of urban land reform zones or areas for priority development, "resident families" therein nonetheless "are being evicted from such lands" in violation of Section 6 of said P.D



Which provides that qualified families in said zones/areas "shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to purchase the same"; and that landowners of subject lands are able to go around said provision (Section 6)

12 Ea est accipienda interpretatio quae vitio caret: That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice

By offering to sell the land to occupant families at a very high price which is beyond the occupant's capacity to pay and subsequently evicting them for failure to exercise their option to buy the said land, thus rendering the said decree inoperative and of no consequence

11e Lex semper intendit quod convenit rationi: The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason.

We are convinced that the more rational reading of the said provision is that the ten-year period must be reckoned from 1968, ten years before the issuance of P.D. 1517.

48 Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda: Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.

9d Benignus leges interpretandae sunt, quod voluntas eraum conservetur: Laws are to be construed liberally, so that their spirit and reason be preserved.

This interpretation would give more rights to the intended beneficiaries of the decree and thus make more meaningful the constitutional objective of decent housing for all persons, in the cities and in the farms.

Other Related Subjects: Property, Land Titles

Araneta vs. Dinglasan

Latin Maxims:

9a Ratio legis est anima legis: The reason of the law is the soul of the law.

Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution.

11a Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum: Where there is ambiguity, the interpretation of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted.

The consequences of the various constructions offered will also be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.

24 Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: General words should be understood in their general sense.

Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope."

6c Verba legis non est recedendum: From the words of the statute there should be no departure.


The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency."

P1 Against exceeding limitations of legislative power.

It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view.

37 Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat: A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it.

The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either.

12 Ea est accipienda interpretatio quae vitio caret: That interpretation is to eb adopted which is free from evil or injustice.

If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto. (Also 11)


As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law.

37 Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat: A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it.

Anyway, if we are to uphold the constitutionality of the act on the basis of its duration, we must start with the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period.

P1 Against exceeding limitations of legislative power.

As we have indicated, the period that best comports with constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the conventing of that body.

49 Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant: Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto.

GESMUNDO, Cheska

Employees’ Club , Inc. v China Banking Corporation

“The latter Act expressly provides that all interests – and this word includes the interest arising from a contract of lease, like that which the petitioner-appellee has in its favor – in land registered in the registry under said Ac are not only susceptible of registration therein but must necessarily be registered in order to affect third persons.”

24A Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. General words should be understood in their general sense.

McMicking v Lichauco


“It must not be forgotten however that both the classification and the incidents of judgments, orders, and decrees have been largely modified under the new Code of Civil Procedure, which is drawn in large part from American and English precedents, so that it is necessary to look rather to the spirit than the letter of the technical legal terminology used in the Spanish code, when rules of law couched in the legal phrasing of that code are made applicable to the judgments, orders, or decrees, mentioned in the other.”

9B Littera necat spiritus vivificat. The letter kills but the spirit gives life.

8A Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis. Equity never acts in contravention of the law.

37 Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding it rather than destroying it.

US v Quintanar

The English text, which provides that “on and after March 1, 1908” is the one that must govern, according to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 63. The appellants cannot escape the penalty imposed by the said section on account of its erroneous translation.

6B Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul.

MANGCO, Caloy

Reyes v. Wells

The prohibition contained in said law against a witness’ testifying upon any transaction or communication between himself and a deceased person, it is substantially the same as that contained in section 383, No. 7 of our Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2252. And therefore, we believe that the construction placed upon it by the court in the cases cited is applicable to the case at bar.

Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur

(A patent ambiguity can be cleared up by extrinsic evidence)

(Layman’s words: If you copy a law from another country verbatim, you copy how they interpret it also)

Philippine Education Co., Inc. v. Soriano

It is not disputed that our postal statues were patterned after similar statues in force in the United States. For this reason, ours are generally construed in accordance with the construction given in the United States to their own postal statues, in the absence of any special reason justifying a departure from this policy or practice.

Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur




The reason behind this rule being that, in establishing and operating a postal money order system, the government is not engaging in commercial transactions but merely exercises a governmental power for the public benefit.

Ratio Legis est anima Legis

(The reason of the Law is the soul of the Law)

Cruz v. Pahati

But this principle cannot be applied to this case which is covered by an express provision of our new Civil Code. Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter must undoubtedly prevail in this jurisdiction.

NOT: Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur



Verba Legis non est recedendum

(From the words of the statute, do not depart)

Matthew Ong People vs. Hernandez“The Executive Bureau, as well as the Department of the Interior and the Attorney-General, interpreting section 2659…”“Being undoubtedly of the same opinion, the Insular Auditor…”2a – CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITIO EST OPTIMA ET FORTISSIMO IN LEGE – Contemporary construction is strongest in law.Interpretation and opinions of the Executive Burau, Department of the Interior and the Attorney-General are expressly made constructions on the law.

“Act No. 3030 has impliedly repealed section 407, because disqualification incident to the nonpayment of taxes is not specified therein.”32 – CASUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABNDUS EST – A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. Non-payment of taxes as grounds for disqualification to hold an elective office in Act No. 3030 has been intentionally omitted.

“To the effect that long continued administrative interpretation of a tax law, while not conclusive, should be followed unless clearly erroneous and we are of the opinion that it is not so in this case.”49 – LEGES POSTERIORS PRIORES CONTRATIAS ABROGANT – Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto. Act No. 3030 has impliedly repealed Section 407 because disqualification incident to the non-payment of taxes is not specified.

Sagun vs. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation“The PHHC in excluding these unit has interpreted the term “dwelling units” to include only those which are…”


“We see no reason to disturb the interpretation of R.A. 3802 given by the PHHC.”2a – CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITIO EST OPTIMA ET FORTISSIMO IN LEGE – Contemporary construction is strongest in law.Interpretation of the PHHC is an expressly made construction.

“…are intended for residential purposes in accordance with the legislative intent and not commercial or store units.”9a – RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA LEGIS – The reason of the law is the soul of the law. Legislative intent in R.A. 3802 is to treat differently dwelling and commercial units in the sale to the tenants.

“…with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.”6a – INDEX ANIMI SERMO EST – Speech is the index of intention.From the words of R.A. 3802, “dwelling units” it is evident that the legislative intent was to treat differently dwelling and commercial units in the sale to the tenants.

Philippine Global Communications, Inc. vs. Relova“…as well as the contemporaneous construction placed upon it by the governmental agency charged with its enforcement and the opinion of the former Secretary of Justice.”“…the BOC construed the legislative franchise of petitioner…”“The opinion of the Secretary of Justice…”“The above-quoted opinion was reiterated and reaffirmed by the Undersecretary of Justice…”2a – CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITIO EST OPTIMA ET FORTISSIMO IN LEGE – Contemporary construction is strongest in law.Interpretation by the following are an expressly made construction.

“Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from consideration of the statute as a whole…”“However, a reading of other sections of the law, aside from Sections 1 and 17…”36b – EX TOTA MATERIAL EMERGAT RESOLUTION – The exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together.There is a need to look at all Sections of R.A. No. 4617 as it reveals that the petitioner is granted authority to establish branches.

“…the grantee may establish stations in such places…”“…and determine the stations to and from which each such frequency and wave lengths may be used…”“...caused by the construction or operation of the stations of the grantee.”

42a – PRIVILEGIA RECIPIENT LARGAM INTERPRETATIONEM VOLUNTATE CONSONAM CONCEDENTIS – Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them. The privilege (franchise) granted to petitioner must be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the legislature/

Asturias Sugar Central v. Commissioner of Customs


Considering that the statutory provisions in question have not been the subject of previous judicial interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of “judicial respect for administrative construction,” would, initially, be in order.2a) Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissima in lege. Contemporary construction is strongest in law.

Especially when the construction or interpretation is long continued and uniform or is contemporaneous with the fist workings of the statute, or when the enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency. 2a) Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissima in lege. Contemporary construction is strongest in law.2b) Optima est legume interpres consuetudo. Custom is the best interpreter of statute.

Congress would have amended section 23 of the latter law so as to overrule the long-standing view of the Commissioner of Customs that the one-year period therein mentioned is not extendible4) Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur. Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate.

Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tarrif and Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be given controlling weight.2a) Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissima in lege. Contemporary construction is strongest in law.

Manila Jockey Club, Inc v. Amusements Board et al.

Appellants’ contention cannot be sustained. Section 4 of RA 309, as amended by RA 983, by express terms, specifically reserved 23 Sundays and 16 Sundays for the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White Cross, Inc. and the PCSO and 12 Saturdays to the president for other charitable, relief, or civic purposes. These days cannot be disposed of by the GAB without authority of law. 38b) Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus. Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of law.6c) Verbal legis non est recedendum. From the words of the statute there should be no departure.

When therefore RA 1502 was enacted by increasing by six sweepstakes draw and races, but without specifying the days for holding them, the GAB had no alternative except to make room for the additional races, as it did, from among only available racing days unreserved by any law – the Sundays on which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races, subject to licensing and determination by the GAB.38b) Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus. Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of law.

The law does not authorize the holding of horse race with betting on week days.2b) Optima est legume interpres consuetudo. Custom is the best interpreter of statute.


Be that as it may, since the law has given certain amount of discretion to GAB in determining and allocating racing days not specifically reserved, and since the court does not find that a grave abuse of discretion has been committed, there seems to be no reason, legal or otherwise, to set aside the resolution of GAB.3a) Optimus interpres rerum usus. The best interpreter of usage is law.

This is therefore not a case where a doubtful wording is sought to be interpreted; rather if we adopt appellants’ theory, we would be supplying something that does not appear in the statute.B2) Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verification excluditur. A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence.

On the principle of contemporaneous exposition, common usage and practice under the statute, or a course of conduct indicationg a particular undertaking of it, will frequently be of great value in determining its real meaning, especially where the usage has been acquired in by all parties concerned and has extended over a long period of time.6c) Verbal legis non est recedendum. From the words of the statute there should be no departure.

Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency v. Collector of Customs

In construing the law now in question, we should take into consideration its history, relative situation and the conditions existing at the time it was enacted. B2) Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verification excluditur. A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence.39a) Distingue tempora et concordabis jura. Distinguish times and you will harmonize law.

Notwithstanding that fact the wharfage tax in question has been continuously levied and collected from 1901 up to the present time. 2b) Optima est legume interpres consuetudo. Custom is the best interpreter of statute.3a) Optimus interpres rerum usus. The best interpreter of usage is law.

Congress in 1905 under similar conditions, and of the present law of 1909 and of the continuous construction of the law placed upon it by government officials, and the further fact that the duty in question has been paid without and protest or objection for 26 years during which time the government has expended millions of pesos in the construction of wharves in all of its principal ports of entry and that congress has never seen fit to repeal the law of 1909.38a) Pari material. Of the same matter.2a) Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissima in lege. Contemporary construction is strongest in law.

1st Round


Alalayan v. National Power Corporation

D Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet RubrumThe black ( body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the red (title or rubic of the statute printed in red).It must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each every end and means necessary for its accomplishment. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents.

Cordero v. Cabatuando

D Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet RubrumThe black ( body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the red (title or rubic of the statute printed in red).The constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in the instant case, has a single subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid.

Tobias v. Abalos

20 (a) Ex necessitate legisBy the necessary implication of law.The creation of a separate congressional district for manadaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a hughly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.

D Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet RubrumThe black ( body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the red (title or rubic of the statute printed in red).The title of RA 7675 “ An act converting the municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong” necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.

9(d) Benignus leges interpretandae sunt, quod voluntas eraum conserveturLaws are to be construed liberally, so that their spirit and reason be preserved. A liberal construction of the “one title-one subject’ rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.


2nd Round

Silva v. Cabrera

43 Strictissimi juris.Follow the law strictly.After examining the law, particularly the language used in Sections 3 and 32, the Court agree with the petitioner that the delegation made to Attorney Aspillera, especially considering the manner in which he received the evidence was contrary to the provisions of the Public Service Act. The reception of evidence in a contested case may be delegated only to one of the Commissioners and to no one else. However, under Section 32, of the same Act even in contested cases or cases involving the fixing of rates, any attorney or chief of division of the Commission, a clerk of court of Courts of First Instance, or a Justice of the Peace, may be authorized to take depositions or receive the testimonies of witnesses, provided that the same is done under the provisions of the Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.

6 (c) Verba legis non est recedendumFrom the words of the statute there should be no departure AND/OR 7 (a) Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.The ruling will greatly handicap the public Service Commission and slow down its tempo in its disposal of contested cases; but where the law is clear, neither this court nor the commission may on the grounds of convenience, expediency or prompt dispatch of cases, disregard the law or circumvent the same.

Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission and Kayumanggi Radio Network Incorporated

6(c ) Verba legis non est recedendum.From the words of the statute there should be no departure.Also, in the words of RA No. 2036 itself, approval of then Secretary of Public Words and Communications was a precondition before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas where it desires to operate.

7 (a) Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent.


When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.It is clear from the provision which enumerates the functions of the National Telecommunications Commission that the exemption enjoyed by radio companies from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission and the Board of Communications no longer exists because of the changes effected by the Reorganization Law and implementing executive orders.

49 Leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant.Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto.Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D. No. 1 insofar as it amends the Public Service law (CA No. 146, as amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound by its provisions.

5 (a) Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.The same issue was decided in the following cases: Philippine Long Distance Telephone co. v. City of Davao; Olongapo Electric Light and Power Corp. v. National Power Corporation, et al.It has been repeated time and again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed.

National Federation v. Eisma

49 Leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant. Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. In this case, the applicable law is Article 217 as amended by Presidential Decree 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1980.

6 (c) Verbal legis non est recedendum. From the words of the statute there should be no departure.Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred to him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanies a strike. That was squarely within the express terms of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated.


5 (a) Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.This is also in consonance to the three decisions the Court held regarding the same issue (Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez, Ebon v. De Guzman, and Aguda v. Vallejos).

United States v. De Guzman

Latin Maxims:

“We have frequently held that, for the proper construction and application of the terms and provisions of legislative enactments which have been borrowed from or modeled upon Anglo-American precedents, it is proper and oftentimes essential to review the legislative history of such enactments and to find an authoritative guide for their interpretation and application in the decisions of American and English courts of last resort construing and applying similar legislation in those countries (Kepner v. US)”

11F Ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jusLike reason does make like law

11G Argumentum a simili valet in legeAn argument drawn from a similar case, or analogy, prevails in law

11H De similibus idem est judiciumConcerning similars, the judgment is the same

11I Ubi eadem est ratio, ibi est eadem legis dispositioWhere there is the same reason, there is the same law

“From a review of the history and development of the practice under consideration, and reasoning along the line of the above cited cases, we are all agreed that the failure of the accused in the case at bar, faithfully and honestly to carry out his undertaking to appear as a witness and to tell the truth at the trial of his coaccused, deprived him of the right to plead his former dismissal as a bar to his prosecution…”

22A Ex dolo malo no oritur actioAn action does not arise from fraud

22B Nullius commodum capere potest de injuria sua propriaNo one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act

Basiana, Sr. vs. Luna

Latin Maxims


“Both the purpose and language of Section 47 as amended by Republic Act No. 4388 indicate that the enumeration of permanent and prominent objects that may be used as tie points is exclusive.”

6B Animus hominis est anima scriptiThe intention of the party is the soul

9D Benignus leges interpretandae sunt, quod voluntas earum conserveturLaws are to be construed liberally, so that their spirit and reason be preserved

30A Expressio unius est exclusio alteriusThe express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others

“… to eliminate claim jumpers and minimize overlapping of claims”

6B Animus hominis est anima scriptiThe intention of the party is the soul

“The last sentence of Section 47 states that ‘the declaration of location that has no bearing and distance to a tie point as herein described shall be null and void.’”

30A Expressio unius est exclusio alteriusThe express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others

Baga v. PNB

“A second reason against the opinion of the court below is that RA 390, being a special law limited it its operation to money benefits from Veteran’s Acts, must control as against the provisions of the new Civil Code, which is a general statute.”

Latin Maxims:

50 Generalia specialibus non derogantA general law does not nullify a specific or special law

35 Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptisA thing not being expected must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule

Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp (GMCR) v. NLRC and Salazar


GR. No 82511

March 3, 1992

Ratio & Latin Maxims :

2A : Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in legeContemporary construction is strongest in law.

Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code repeats and firms out the Labor Code Provisions.

6a: Index Animo Sermo EstSpeech is the index of intention6C : Verba Legis Non Est RecedendumFrom the words of the statute there should be no departure. 7a: Absoluta Sententia Expositore Non IndigentWhen the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.

The wording of the Labor Code Is clear and unambiguous “ An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement”

Domingo v. Commission on AuditGR. No. 112371October 7, 1998

Ratio & Latin Maxims:

7a: Absoluta Sententia expositore non indigent When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required. 6a: Index Animo Sermo EstSpeech is the index of intention

General Appropriations Act of 1989, 1990, 1991 clearly provide that transportation allowance shall not be granted to officials who are assigned a gov’t vehicle or use government motor transportation

1: Legis Interpretatio Legis Vim ObtinetJudicial construction and interpretation of


a statute acquires the force of law.

The case of Bustamante v. Commissioner was used as a precedent since in this case, the COA also disallowed the claim for transportation allowance of National Power Corporation’s legal counsel for he was already issued with a gov’t vehicle.

39B: Tempora mutatur et leges mutantur in illisTimes have changed and laws have changed with them

If before it was permitted that even though the government has assigned vehicles for the officials and their personnels to use, said officials can still claim for transportation allowances. To avoid uncertainties, the government has issued PD 733, General Appropriations Act of 1988, 1990, 1991 to make it clear that said officials can no longer claim for transportation allowances once vehicles have been issued to them for their use.

24A: Generalia Verba Sunt Generaliter IntelligendaGeneral words should be understood in their general sense.

Webster Dictionary defines the word “assign” as “to transfer (property) to another in trust”

6b: Animus Hominis Est Anima ScriptiThe intention of the party is the soul6e: Littera Scripta ManetThe written word endures. 6f: Clausula Rebus Sic StantibusThings thus standing

Had the legislative intent been that government officials issued an official vehicle could still collect transportation allowance if they do not actually use, the word “use” instead of “assign” should have been employed.


Luzon Brokerage Co v. Public Service Commission

G.R. No. L-37661

November 16, 1932

Ratio & Latin Maxims:

2b: Optima Est Legum Interpres ConsuetudoCustom is the best interpreter of the statute

It has been customary based on previous acts that the trucks of petitioner were not considered/regarded by the government nor the respondent as common carriers/ public utility. More so, the length of time that the petitioner had been engaged in the brokerage business showed that PSC never had jurisdiction over the company’s trucks.

25a: Verba Accipienda Sunt Secundum Subjectam Materiam

A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used.

The mere omission of the phrase “for public use” in the definition of public service does not warrant the interference that the legislature meant to extend the jurisdiction of PSC to private enterprises not devoted to public use. The idea of public use is implicit in the term “public service”. A public service is a service for public use. The insertion of the phrase “for hire or compensation” is of no significance as it is a stock phrase found in most definitions of a common carrier and a public utility.

Public service and public utility must be understood in their context. Petitioner’s trucks are not to be considered as Public utility (for hire/compensation) since said trucks are intended to merely transfer the cargoes to where it should be, from depositing to warehouse.

36A: Optima Statute Interpretatrix Est Ipsum Statutum

The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself

36b: Ex Tota Materia Emergat Resolutio


The exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together.

Even though there have been changes in the definition of the term “public service”, no alterations were made in the provisions of other sections of Public Service Law. These provisions were intended for common carriers and no amendments were made to include private carriers, which clearly signifies that the legislature did not make such radical change.

Case: Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v Central Bank of the Philippines

(No. L-8888; Nov. 29, 1957)

1. In support of its contention appellant quotes from dictionaries and encyclopedias interchangeably using the words “chocolate”, “cacao” and “cocoa”. Yet we notice that the quotations refer to “cocoa” as “chocolate nut” “chocolate bean” or “chocolate tree.” And the legal exemption refers to “chocolate” –not bean, nor the nut nor the tree.

Maxim Rejected:

B2: Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verification excluditur 25b: Verba mere aequivoca, si per commune usum loquendi in intellectu certo sumuntur, talis intellectus preferendus

est

2. In view of the forgoeing, and having in mind the principle of strict construction of statutes exempting from taxation, we are of the opinion and so hold, that the exemption for “chocolate” in the above section 2 does not include “cocoa beans”. The one is raw material, the other manufactured consumer product; the latter is ready for human consumption; the former is not.

Maxim Accepted:


43: strictissimi juris

3. However, we annot stop here, because in August 1954 – suit was brought in May 1954 – Congress approved R.A. 1197 amending section 2 by substituting “cocoa beans” for “chocolate.” This shows, maintains the appellant, the Legislature’s intention to include cocoa beans in the word “chocolate”

Maxim Rejected:

46: lex prospicit non respicit

4. Courts do not usually give decisive weight to one legislator’s opinion, expressed in Congressional debates concerning the application of existing laws.Maxim Rejected:

B2: Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verification excluditur

5. The impression prevailed that, as the law then stood chocolate candy or chocolate bar was exempted, but cocoa beans were notMaxim Accepted:

B2: Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verification excluditur 2a: Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege


Case: People v. Manantan (No. L-14129; July 31, 1962)

1. It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peaceMaxim Accepted

24a: generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda

2. The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim “casus omisus” can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officer precluded from engaging in partisan political activities.Maxim Rejected:

32: Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est

3. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Sec. 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were called “judges”.Maxim Accepted:

24a: generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda

4. The application of the rule “casus omisus” does not proceed form the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration.Maxim Rejected:

48: favorabilia sun amplianda, odiosa restringenda


5. The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.Maxim Rejected:

48: favorabilia sun amplianda, odiosa restringenda 43: Strictissimi juris

6. Thus, cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will govern.Maxim Accepted:

9c: verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire

7. It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute.Maxim Rejected:

43: Strictissimi juris

8. Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of “expression unius, est exclusion alterius” in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54.Maxim Rejected:

30: expression unius est exclusion alterius


9. Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things no so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow.Maxim Accepted:

11e: lex simper intended quod convenit rationi 12b: lex inusta non est lex

Case: Director of Lands v. Abaja (No. 42134; Oct. 21, 1936)

1. …the motion was not filed within the time limite prescribed by Act No. 4043. On April 20, 1934, the judge of the said court denied the motion of the appellants in an order the dispositive part of which is follows…Maxim Accepted:

5b: interest republicae ut sit finis litum

2. In determining the intention of the lawmaker, we are permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents or the legislative history of the statute involvedMaxim Accepted:

9d: benigus leges interpretandae sunt, quod voluntas eraum conservetur 38b: interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimist interpretandi modus


3. It will also be observed that the body of Acto No. 4043, like those of Acts Nos. 3059, 3672 and 4195, employ the phrase “are about to be, declared land of public domain.”Maxim Accepted:

6b: animus hominis est anima scripti

4. All that the proclamation did was to copy the title of the statute to which it referred. At any rate, the intention of the Legislature, as disclosed by a uniform trend of legislation, is clearly expressed in the body of Act No. 4043, and it is our duty to give effect to that intention in the case before us.Maxim Accepted:

6c: verbal egis non est recedendum 7a: absoluta sentential expositore non indigent

De Los Santos Vs. Mallare

Where and When:

City of Baguio, August 31, 1950

Operative Statute:

1935 Constitution

Facts:

On, July 16, 1946, Petitioner was appointed city engineer or Baguio by the president and was confirmed by the CA. On June1, 1950, Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment to the said position. De los Santos refused to vacate his position and commenced these proceedings. De lo Santos cites Article 7, section 4 of the 1935 constitution which says no “No officer or employee of the Civil Service may be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law”. Respondents contend that the position belongs to the “unclassified service.” They also cite Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, which authorizes the President to remove at pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein, including the city engineer.


Issues:

W/N Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code is still in force

W/N the position of a city engineer belongs to the “unclassified” service as a highly technical position

W/N the petitioner could be removed at the pleasure of the President

Held:

1.) No. Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code predates and is inconsistent with the 1935 Constitution. It has been repealed by the Constitution.

2.) No. The position of the city engineer is not a highly technical position

3.) No. He is protected by the security of tenure.

Latin Maxims

1.) (43a) Strictissimi Juris = Follow the law strictly

The position of the city engineer is not a highly technical position and the Constitution states that a person holding the said post cannot be removed at the mere pleasure of the President.

2.) (39a) Distingue tempora et concordabis jura = Distinguish the times and you will harmonize the law

The Revised Administrative Code can no longer be interpreted to allow the removal of the city engineer at the mere discretion of the President because of the existence of the 1935 constitution and the provisions on Civil Service created to rectify the problems prevalent and the time of its formulation.

Applicable Subjects: Constitutional Law

Civil Liberties Union V. Executive Secretary

When: February 22, 1991

Operative Statue: 1987 Constitution


Facts:

Executive Order 284 was issued stating the following

Section 1: Even if allowed by law, a member of the cabinet cannot hold more than two positions in the government and receive corresponding compensation thereof

Section 2: If a member of the cabinet holds more than two positions, he must relinquish the excess position to the one next in rank

Section 3: At lease 1/3 of the boards of GOCCs should be cabinet members

Secretary of Justice rendered an opinion stating that cabinet members may hold other public office when a.) allowed by the constitution b.) allowed by law c.) allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions, citing Section 7, paragraph 2 of article 9 of the constitution. The said provision states that “unless otherwise provided by law or by the primary functions of their office, no appointed official shall hold any other office or employment in the government..”

Petitioners allege that this E.O. is unconstitutional as it runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the constitution which prohibits cabinet members from holding any other office, profession or employment during their tenure.

Issues:

W/N E.O. 284 is unconstitutional

Held:

Yes. it is contrary to the constitution in the sense that it allows cabinet members to hold an extra position when the constitution generally does not allow them to do so. Cabinet members are only allowed to hold extra positions when it is specifically provided in the constitution.

Latin Maxims:

1.) (9a) Ratio Legis est Anima Legis = The reason of the law is the soul of the law

The intent of the framers was to make the restrictions stricter for the executive branch

2.) (B2) Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verification excluditur = a patent ambiguity can be cleared up by extrinsic evidence

The ambiguity of the two seemingly contradictory provisions can be clarified by looking at the records of the discussions of the framers of the constitution


3.) (6c) Verba legis non est recedendum = From the words of the statue there should be no departure

(43a) Strictissimi Juris = Follow the law strictly

(36d) Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum = the best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself

The constitution is clear that cabinet officials cannot hold any other position in the government or practice any other profession during their tenure.

4.) (12a) Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret = that the interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice

(37) Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat = the law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it

To declare the E.O. as constitutional and to follow the interpretation of the Secretary of Justice would render the stricter limitations on the executive department inoperative and would defeat the purpose of preventing cabinet members from using government positions as cash cows.

Applicable Subjects: Constitutional Law


People V. Munoz

Where and When: February 9, 1989 in Balite Sur, San Carlos City, Pangasinan.

Operative Statute: 1987 Constitution

Facts:

On June 30, 1972, 11 armed men, at the behest of one of them who claimed to have been victimized by cattle rustlers, set out to punish the suspected perpetrators. Only four of them were identified, including the respondents. After a series of events, they ended up killing 3 unarmed people in front of their families. The accused was convicted of multiple counts of murder with a lot of aggravating circumstances. Munoz did not appeal but the other respondents did. However, the court rejected their alibis and ruled that all of them were co-conspirators.

Under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum penalty for murder was set at reclusion temporal, with death as the maximum penalty. However, Article III, section 19 of the 1987 constitution stated that “Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua”

In view of this, earlier cases were decided that changed the graduation of penalties in murder so that a person convicted of murder with aggravating circumstances would not have the same penalty as a person without any aggravating circumstances.

Issues:

W/N the changes in the penalty structure for murder as set by earlier decisions are binding

Held:

No. The changing of the penalties amounts to judicial legislation. The constitution does not abolish the death penalty, neither does it amend the system of penalties in the RPC.

Latin Maxims:

1.) (6d) Maledicta et expositio quae corrumpit textum = bad construction corrupts the text


The understanding of the said provision of the constitution by the earlier decisions and the alteration of penalties interpret the constitution erroneously and gives it an interpretation different from the intended meaning

2.) (7a) Absoluta sententia expositore non indigent = when the language is clear, no explanation is required

The language in the constitution does not say anything about altering the penalties in the RPC, thus it is no longer necessary to construe the meaning of the ambiguous discussions of the constitutional commissions.

Applicable Subjects: Criminal Law, Constitutional Law

J.M. Tuason & Co. Vs Land Tenure Administration

GR No. L-21064

Where: Tatalon Estates, Quezon City

When: February 18, 1970

Organic Law: 1935 Constitution (As amended in 1940)

1935 Constitution: Article XIII, Sec. 4

“The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.”

Republic Act 2616

“An act providing for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City and for the sale, at cost, of the lots therein to their present bona fide occupants, and authorizing the appropriation of ten million pesos for the purpose.”

Facts:

Petitioners are the owners of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City, the land being expropriated by Congress in RA 2616. The land is being expropriated by the state to its current occupants in the exercise of the state’s power of eminent domain. The petitioners


sought to nullify Republic Act 2616 and challenged its constitutionality. According to them, the Constitution clearly said “lands” and not “landed estates”, therefore, Congress has no power to expropriate the Tatalon Estate which is considered as a “landed estate”.

Issue:

Is RA 2616 unconstitutional?

Held:

No, RA 2616 is valid and constitutional. The words used in the constitution should be given their ordinary meaning, unless it is a word that has acquired technical interpretation. The word “lands” has a broad sense, enough to cover even “landed estates.” The intent of the framers of the constitution to grant Congress the power of eminent domain as a tool for social justice cannot be frustrated by bad construction.

Relevant Maxims:

That the objective sought to be attained by the framers of the Constitution in crafting Article XIII can be derived from the words of the provision:

6A – Index animi sermo est.

Speech is the index of intention.

On the use of the word “lands” in the Constitution to mean its generic/ordinary meaning:

24 – Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda.

General words should be understood in their general sense.

That what the text in the Constitution compels acceptance and negates the powers of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. There are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum:

6C – Verba Legis non est recedendum

From the words of the statute there should be no departure.

6D - Maledicta est exposition quae corrumpit textum.


It is bad construction which corrupts the text.

7A – Absoluta sententia expositore non indigent.

When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.

The power of Congress to expropriate lands, as given by the Constitution, is far from limited. Its discretion is not to be interfered with.

42a – Privilegia recipient largam interpretationem voluntate consonam concedentis.

Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them.

On using the historical basis of Article XIII as reference for further understanding of what the provision is supposed to mean:

B2 – Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verification excluditur

A patent ambiguity can be cleared up by extrinsic evidence

36E – Ex Antecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretation.

A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and follows it.

That it is the duty of the Courts to conform the Policies set by the Constitution and not to block their realization:

37 – Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valet quam pereat.

A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it.

The constitution, as an Organic Law, should be allowed to grow and change with the times. Its permanency of it can only be maintained by giving it flexibility to adapt, in order to survive the complexities that time may bring in its wake.

39B – Tempora mutantur et leges mutantur in illis.

Times have changed and laws changed with them

On justifying the power of the State to expropriate private lands and limit the amount of land private individuals may own:

40C – Privatum incommodum public bono pensatur.

The Private interests of the individual must give way to the accommodation of the public.


That the Constitution clearly set its social and economic policies which are Expressed by the constitution itself:

36A – Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum.

The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself.

36B – Ex tota materia emergat resolutio.


Encounter again in: Constitutional Law

Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections

GR No. L-34150

Where:

When: October 16, 1971

Organic Law: 1935 Constitution (As amended in 1940)

1935 Constitution: Article XV, Sec. 1

“The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.”

Facts:

The 1971 Constitutional Convention was convened to propose amendments to the 1971 Constitution, among these proposed changes was the lowering of the voting age from 21 years to 18 years. The Convention wanted to introduce this amendment submit it to the people for ratification via plebiscite ahead of the other Constitutional amendments the convention intends to introduce. Senator Arturo Tolentino petitioned for prohibition to restrain the respondent COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite on the grounds that it would be in violation of the Constitutional mandate in Article XV which states that there shall only be one election/plebiscite where all the amendments shall be ratified by the people as a whole.


Issue:

Would the proposed plebiscite for the ratification of just 1 amendment in the Constitution violate the 1935 Constitution?

Held:

Yes, the proposed plebiscite would be in violation of the Constitution. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution contemplates only a single election – regardless of the number of amendments – to ratify the proposed amendments in the Constitution. The court also submits that the people must be given ample time to reflect on the Constitutional amendments, not in isolation, but in relation to the entire Constitution. The Constitution should be taken as one organic act, an integrated and harmonious document. Thus, any amendment is as important as the whole of it, and the people should be able to accept or reject the Constitution in its entirety.

Relevant Maxims:

On whether or not the holding of multiple elections is in violation of the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution:

6C – Verba legis non est recedendum



When the Language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.

On whether the proposed amendments to the Constitution should be submitted for ratification individually or in its entirety:


The Exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together.

36C – Injustum est, nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula proposita indicare vel respondere

It is unjust to decide or to respond as to any particular part of a law without examining the whole of the law.

36D – Nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere posit antequam totum iterum atque iterum perlegit.

The sense and meaning of the law is collected by viewing all the parts together as one whole and not of any part only by itself.



Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Latin Maxims:

17.) Ibi quid generaliter conceditur, inest haec exception si non aliquid sit contras jus basque – where anything is granted generally, exemption from rigid application of law is implied that nothing shall be contrary to law and right. [With regard to the written notice the Supreme Court also stated that they are not abandoning the doctrines laid out in De Conejero and Buttle, and what is done is simply adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.]

8a.) Aquitas nunquam contravenit legis – Equity neer acts in contravention of the law. [The intent of the lawmakers of Article 1088 of the Civil Code is to properly notify the sale to the redemptioner, in this instant case the right of redemption lapsed not by days by years, more than 13 years.]

11d.) Verba nihil operari melius est quam absurde – it is better that words should have no operation at all than that they should operate absurdly. [The intent of the lawmakers of Article 1088 of the Civil Code is to properly notify the sale to the redemptioner, in this instant case the right of redemption lapsed not by days by years, more than 13 years.]

12a.) Ea est accipienda interpretatio quae vitio caret – that interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice. [The intent of the lawmakers of Article 1088 of the Civil Code is to properly notify the sale to the redemptioner, in this instant case the right of redemption lapsed not by days by years, more than 13 years.]

12b.) Lex injusta non est lex – An unjust law is not a law. [The Supreme Court could not accept the respondents pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister, considering that a fence had been built around the portioned lot, also, a semi-concrete building was erected by the son of Alonzo, these acts are acts of an owner.]


6c.) Verba Legis non est recedendum – From the words of the statute there should be no departure. [Operative Statute: Article 1088 of the Civil Code]

9a.) Ratio legis est anima legis – the reason of the law is the soul of the law. [It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover the intent of the lawmaker.]

Vda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

Latin Maxims:

6b.) Animus homis est anima scripti – the intention of the party is soul. [The Supreme Court submitted to the fact that the accident took place before the marriage, but the marriage also took place before Conrado’s death.]

7a.) Absoluta sententa expositore non indigent – when the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required. [ Operative Statute:

Section 9 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act ]

9d.) Benignus leges interpretandae sunt, quod voluntas eraum conservetur – laws are to be construed liberally, so that their spirit and reason be preserved.

12a.) Ea est accipienda interpretatio quae vitio caret – that interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice.


37.) Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat – a law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it. [ The Supreme Court held that they have stressed tima and time again that where the law is clear, their duty is to apply it to the facts as found.]

Tinio, et al. v Frances, et al.

Latin Maxims:

9a.) Ratio legis est anima legis – the reason of the law is the soul of the law. [the Supreme Court held that the requirement in Section 20 of the Public Land Act seeking for the original homesteader to have complied with all the requirements of the law, but cannot continue with the homestead through no fault of his own.]

37.) Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat – a law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it. [Looking into Section 18 Public Land Act, the required 5 years was even extended to 25 years if without approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, showing the strength in the policy of the legislator to emphasize the conservation of a land that has been acquired under the Public Land Law for him/her.]

38.) Pari material – of the same law. (there is an amendment)

1) Campos Rueda Corp vs. Sta. Cruz Timber Co., Inc. and Feliz The rule, furthermore appears to be in accord with the weight of American authority, including the Federal courts and those of the State of California from which our own rules of practice and procedure were mainly taken.


Latin Maxim: B2 – Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur (A patent ambiguity can be cleared up by extrinsic evidence)

The 3 cases all used this legal maxim. In all 3 cases, the Court removed from the “four corners of the law” and went to the Court decisions and interpretations of the Court of the State from which the statute/law was copied from.

Explanation: When copying the text of the law (of another State), not just the bare text is to be copied. What is also copied is how the words were interpreted, understood and applied by the foreign Courts at the time such law was copied. It is important to note thought that the interpretation of the foreign courts is only persuasive on our courts because we are a sovereign state. The different understanding and interpretation though must be based on good reason.

2) ANG GIOK CHIP V. SPRINGFIELD FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY As the Philippine law was taken verbatim from the law of California, in accordance with well-settled canons of statutory construction, the court should follow in fundamental points, at least, the construction placed by California courts on a California law.

We cannot believe that it was ever the legislative intention to insert in the Philippine Law on Insurance an oddity, an incongruity, entirely out of harmony with the law as found in other jurisdictions, and destructive of good business practice.





3) AQUILINO F. PANDO V. CARMEN KETTE and GEORGE C. SELLNER The provision of our Code of Civil Procedure having been adopted from section 692 of the California Code, it must be understood that our law was promulgated with the construction placed upon it by the State of California.




People of the Philippines v. Manaba

The Spanish equivalent of the word “filed” is not bound in the Spanish text, which is controlling, because it was the Spanish text approved by the legislature.

Latin Maxim: 6b Animus hominis est anima scripti - The intention of the party is the soul.

People of the Philippines v. Yabut


It is clear that the appellant’s deduction from the English translation of the caption of Article 160 could not be drawn from the Spanish caption. There is no warrant whatever for such deduction. There is not the slightest intimation in the text of Art 160 that said article applies only in cases where the new offense is different in character from the former offence for which the defendant is serving the penalty. The language is plain and unambiguous.

Latin Maxim: 7a Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget – When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.

When the text of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section for interpretation of the text, especially where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords or reference aids.

The titles are nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the articles of the Code. They cannot in any event have the effect of modifying or limiting the unambiguous words of the text. Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, but not to create doubt nor to limit or control the plain language of the law.

Latin Maxims:

16a Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat. – False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the stature.

16b Nil facit error nominis cum de corpore vel persona constat. – Error in name does not make an instrument inoperative when the description is sufficiently clear.

*Headnote will not kill the body because the body is more important. The body determines the actual thing.

People of the Philippines v. Mendoza

The English text of Section 2654 is defective as the head note clearly shows that this section is only applicable when a person fraudulently deposit’s a ballot in the ballot box. The evidence presented was insufficient to convict that defendants fraudulently deposited the ballots in question. Judgment was reversed.


Latin Maxim: D Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet Rubrum – The black (body of the act) should never go beyond the red (title or rubric of the stature printed in red). (Or the opposite: The title or rubric should be part of the body.)

De Los Santos Vs. Mallare

Consti Case about security of tenure. Respondents Contend that the position of City Engineer is a Highly technical position.

Latin Maxims

3.) (43a) Strictissimi Juris = Follow the law strictly

The position of the city engineer is not a highly technical position. As such, a person holding the said post cannot be removed at the mere pleasure of the President because the constitution clearly provides for the security of tenure of such a position.

(39a) Distingue tempora et concordabis jura = Distinguish the times and you will harmonize the law

The Revised Administrative Code can no longer be interpreted to allow the removal of the city engineer at the mere discretion of the President because of the existence of the 1935 constitution and the provisions on Civil Service created to rectify the problems prevalent and the time of its formulation.

Civil Liberties Union V. Executive Secretary

Consti case on the limitation on the Executive branch from holding any other office/employment/profession

Latin Maxims:

5.) (9a) Ratio Legis est Anima Legis = The reason of the law is the soul of the law


The intent of the framers was to make the restrictions stricter for the executive branch

6.) (B2) Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verification excluditur = a patent ambiguity can be cleared up by extrinsic evidence

The ambiguity of the two seemingly contradictory provisions can be clarified by looking at the records of the discussions of the framers of the constitution.

7.) (6c) Verba legis non est recedendum = From the words of the statue there should be no departure

(43a) Strictissimi Juris = Follow the law strictly

(36d) Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum = the best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself

The constitution is clear that cabinet officials cannot hold any other position in the government or practice any other profession during their tenure.

8.) (12a) Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret = that the interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice

(37) Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat = the law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it

To declare the E.O. as constitutional and to follow the interpretation of the Secretary of Justice would render the stricter limitations on the executive department inoperative and would defeat the purpose of preventing cabinet members from using government positions as cash cows.

People V. Munoz

“Article III, section 19 of the 1987 constitution stated that “Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua”

Latin Maxims:


3.) (6d) Maledicta et expositio quae corrumpit textum = bad construction corrupts the text

The understanding of the said provision of the constitution by the earlier decisions and the alteration of penalties interpret the constitution erroneously and gives it an interpretation different from the intended meaning .

4.) (7a) Absoluta sententia expositore non indigent = when the language is clear, no explanation is required

The language in the constitution does not say anything about altering the penalties in the RPC, thus it is no longer necessary to construe the meaning of the ambiguous discussions of the constitutional commissions. It is clear from the text that the Constitution does not abolish the death penalty, only suspends its execution.

J.M. Tuason & Co. Vs Land Tenure Administration

Relevant Maxims:

That the objective sought to be attained by the framers of the Constitution in crafting Article XIII can be derived from the words of the provision:

6A – Index animi sermo est.

Speech is the index of intention.

On the use of the word “lands” in the Constitution to mean its generic/ordinary meaning:

24 – Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda.

General words should be understood in their general sense.

That what the text in the Constitution compels acceptance and negates the powers of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. There are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum:

6C – Verba Legis non est recedendum



6D - Maledicta est exposition quae corrumpit textum.

It is bad construction which corrupts the text.


When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.

The power of Congress to expropriate lands, as given by the Constitution, is far from limited. Its discretion is not to be interfered with.

42a – Privilegia recipient largam interpretationem voluntate consonam concedentis.

Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them.

On using the historical basis of Article XIII as reference for further understanding of what the provision is supposed to mean:

B2 – Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verification excluditur

A patent ambiguity can be cleared up by extrinsic evidence

36E – Ex Antecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretation.

A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and follows it.

That it is the duty of the Courts to conform the Policies set by the Constitution and not to block their realization:

37 – Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valet quam pereat.

A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it.

The constitution, as an Organic Law, should be allowed to grow and change with the times. Its permanency of it can only be maintained by giving it flexibility to adapt, in order to survive the complexities that time may bring in its wake.

39B – Tempora mutantur et leges mutantur in illis.

Times have changed and laws changed with them

On justifying the power of the State to expropriate private lands and limit the amount of land private individuals may own:

40C – Privatum incommodum public bono pensatur.

The Private interests of the individual must give way to the accommodation of the public.

That the Constitution clearly set its social and economic policies which are Expressed by the constitution itself:


36A – Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum.

The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself.




Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections

Relevant Maxims:

On whether or not the holding of multiple elections is in violation of the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution:

6C – Verba legis non est recedendum



When the Language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.

On whether the proposed amendments to the Constitution should be submitted for ratification individually or in its entirety:


The Exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together.

36C – Injustum est, nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula proposita indicare vel respondere

It is unjust to decide or to respond as to any particular part of a law without examining the whole of the law.

36D – Nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere posit antequam totum iterum atque iterum perlegit.

The sense and meaning of the law is collected by viewing all the parts together as one whole and not of any part only by itself.



MANIKAD V. TANODBAYAN

6A: A mere cursory reading of the legal provision relied upon by the petitioners show their submission to be devoid of merit. Indubitably, the aforecited provision empowers the EPZA not only to exercise police authority but also to perform such functions as are usually assigned to the prosecution service.

7A: There is nothing in the context of the said provision to even intimate that the latter functions are to be exercised in an exclusive manner. While the adjective “sole” was used in conjunction with “police authority,” no similar term or synonym was employed to describe the other powers vested by Section 7 on the EPZA.

6C: It is a basic rule of statutory construction that a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein.

ENRILE V. SALAZAR

5: The ruling in Hernandez should not be abandoned because its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented which are persuasive enough to warrant complete reversal.

48: The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed, the writ being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.

46: *Rejected* The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. 1: But statutes do not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of the people with the specific form given them by the

judicial decisions interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and content to such norms. In time, statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms.


37: Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretations of a statute become part of the law as of the date that the law was originally enacted, this is not to be applied rigorously where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous doctrine of long-standing, and most especially where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one.

12A: Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex post facto law and the due process clause.

FLORESCA V. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

42B: The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

8A: However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the WCA should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

40B: Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant case. The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice.

9B: The spirit of the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, “the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life.”

17: Hence, even the legislator himself through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes, “do and must legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply. Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.

To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damage suits based on torts would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the WCA but a departure from the principles involved in the long


history of workmen’s compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of the WCA, a provision reiterated in the present Labor Code on employee’s compensation. And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system, individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interest of their entire working class.

Case: Nicolas Y. Feliciano vs. Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.

Section 2174 of Revised Administrative Code (Requirements for Municipal Mayor)

"An elective municipal officer must have been, at the time of the election, a qualified voter and resident in the municipality for at least one year, owing allegiance to the United States; he must be not less than twenty-three years of age, . . . ,"

CLUE: THE USE OF SEMI COLON AFTER UNITED STATES

Latin Maxim:

11A- Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum

Where there is ambiguity, the interpretation of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted

11E- Lex semper intendit quod convenit rationi

The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason


Case: United States vs. William C. Hart, C. J. Miller, and Serviliano Natividad

Section 1 of Act No. 519: Every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support;…. is a vagrant.

–A person is not guilty of vagrancy under the second paragraph of section 1 of the Vagrancy Act for frequenting saloons, dram shops, or gambling houses, unless it be shown that he is without visible means of support.

Stat Con; Punctuation Employed

-If the punctuation of a statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of a statute as thus punctuated. But an argument based on the punctuation alone is weak and not conclusive.

Latin Maxim:

11A- Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum

Where there is ambiguity, the interpretation of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted

11E- Lex semper intendit quod convenit rationi

The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason

12A- Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret

That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice.

Case: In re Estate of Johnson


Section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure- the order admitting the will is, in the absence of fraud, effective against all persons. The fact that an heir or other interested party lives so far away as to make it impossible for such party to be present at the date appointed for the probate of the will, does not render the order of probate void for lack of due process.

Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure- for the probate of the will of a citizen of another state or country is applicable to the case of a citizen of a State of the American Union domiciled in the Philippine Islands.

CLUE: capital S in the word State is used and refers to the US and not another country.

The rule of hermeneutics on punctuations and capitalizations are of low degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written words.

Latin Maxim:

51d- Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet Rubrum

The black (body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the red (title or rubric of the statute printed in red)


STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINES

Construction, defined

Caltex v. Palomar

Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and the intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.

Legislative Intent/Ratio Legis – Dura Lex Sed Lex – when the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation/Plain Meaning Rule/Spirit and Purpose of Law

RCBC v. IAC

When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true intent. A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of two or more possible meanings, in which case, the Court is called upon to exercise one of its judicial functions, which is to interpret the law according to its true intent.

Regalado v. Yulo

The intent of the Legislature is to be ascertained and enforced is the intent expressed in the words of the statute. The courts cannot assume some purpose in no way expressed and then construe the atatute to accomplish this supposed intention.

Matabuena v. Cervantes

The principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what us written; whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedial by an adherence to its avowed objective.

Del Mar v. Pagcor

In the interpretation of statutes, it is not proper or permissible to inquire into the motives which influenced the legislative body, except insofar as such motives are disclosed by the statute itself.


Cecilleville Realty and Service Corp. v. Court of Appeals

Where the law is unambiguous and clear, it must be applied according to its plain and obvious meaning, according to its express terms.

Ursua v. Court of Appeals

There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.

Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines construction of a provision of law – it is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made.

Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.

If the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. The proper interpretation of a constitutional provision depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than the framers’ understanding thereof.

Ut res magis valeat quam pereat

JMM Promotions and Management Inc., v. NLRC

In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect. Construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of the harmonious whole.

Wisdom/Practicality of Law

RCBC v. IAC

The holding that suspension of actions for claims against a corporation under rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the application or a petition for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC – may, to some, be more logical and wise but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of the law.


To insist on such ruling, no matter how practical and noble, would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law – plainly judicial legislation.

Lacson v. Roque, et al.

Mere silence of the statute with respect to notice and hearing will not justify the removal of such an officer without knowledge of the charges and an opportunity to be heard.

Quintos v. Lacson, et al.

As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, it is the duty of the courts to interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise and salutary. If the law is deemed unwise and detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of public officers, proper representations and requests may be made to the Legislature.

Executive/Administrative Interpretation

UP v. Court of Appeals

The previous uncontested acts of the Civil Service authorities in endorsing to the University for action the administrative cases of Hospital employees Fernandez and Gorospe, and declaring that “the Bureau had no disciplinary jurisdiction over said employees in view of the provisions of the University charter,” constitutes contemporary interpretation of highly persuasive character.

Enrique v. Court of Appeals

Great weight accorded to interpretation or construction of a statute by the government agency called upon to implement the same.

Literal Interpretation

Bello v. CA

This Court has cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity) and that therefore a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. In the construction of its own Rules of Court, this Court is all the more so bound to liberally


construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the void – that is certainly within the spirit and purpose of the Rule to eliminate repugnancy and inconsistency.

Salaria v. Buenviaje

Construction by Executive Branch of government of a particular law although not binding upon courts must be given weight as the construction comes from that branch of government called upon to implement the law.

Valid in part, void in part

Barrameda v. Moir

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.

Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy

A separability clause states that if for any reason, any section or provision of the statute is held to be unconstitutional or (invalid), the other section(s) or provision(s) of the law shall not be affected thereby. It is a legislative expression of intent that the nullity of one provision shall not invalidate the other provisions of the act. Such a clause is not, however, controlling and the courts may, in spite of it, invalidate the whole statute where what is left, after the void part, is complete and workable.

Ambiguity, construed against party who caused it

Reyes v. dela Cruz

If there is any ambiguity or obscurity in the interpretation and meaning of a contract, the same shall not favour the party who cause such ambiguity or obscurity.

Ildefonso v. Sibal

Agreements must be construed according to the intention of the parties.


Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance Company Ltd.

The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith not for the insured alone, but equally so for the insurer; in fact, it is more so for the latter, since its dominant bargaining position carries with it stricter responsibility, By reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company over the terms and phraseology of the insurance contract, the ambiguity must be strictly interpreted against the insurer and liberally in favour of the injured, especially to avoid a forfeiture.

Baylon v. Court of Appeals

If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control.

Law does not distinguish, Courts should not distinguish

Colgate Palmolive Phil., Inc. v. Gimenez

General terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by specific language which indicates the statute’s object and purpose. The rule is applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.

Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. The rule of construction, that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals, when used in connection with them, does

not require the rejection of the general term entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the legislative intent and is to be considered in connection with other rules of construction.

Phil. British Assurance Co. v. IAC

There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.

A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.

Mandatory and Directory

Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre


The provision in the Local Government Code providing for such release uses the word “shall” and as a rule, the term “shall” is a word of command that must be given compulsory meaning.

Marcelino v. Cruz

Constitutional provisions are directory, and not mandatory, where they refer to matters merely procedural.

Brehm v. Republic

Mandatory provisions prevail over directory ones.

Expressio unius est exclusion alterius

City Government of San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes

It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.

People v. Moro Macarandang

“Peace officers” are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms.

Peope v. Mapa

The fact that a person, found in possession of an unlicensed firearm, is a secret agent of a provincial governor does not exempt him from criminal liability. The law does not contain any exception for a secret agent.

People v. Santayama

At the accused’s apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is enunciated in the case of People v. Macarandang, holding that the appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879.” The case of People v. Mapa revoked the doctrine in Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of the accused’s appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol.


Ejusdem Generis

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. SSS

The rule of ejusdem generis applies only when there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the lawmaking body would thereby hindered and defeated.

Mutuc v. COMELEC

Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specificially referred to.

Statement of Individual Legislator

Casco Phil. Chemical Co. v. Gimenez

Individual statements made by Senators on the floor of the Senate do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives.

Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board

In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain information as to the intention or meaning of the author or authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. The legal act, so to speak, is made up of two elements – an internal and an external one; it originates in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure of the latter may defeat the former.

Noscitur a sociis

Nagtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.

Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or pharse should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated, and, since the word “gambling” is associated with “and other prohibited games of chance,” under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, the word should be read as referring only to illegal gambling.


AND/OR

Romulo, Mabanta v. Home Development and Mutual Fund

The term ‘and/or’ means that the effect shall be given to both the conjunctive “and” and the disjunctive “or;” or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended bu the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive “or” alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive “and” will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone.” It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using the term “and/or” is that the word “and” and the word “or” are to be used interchangeably.

Retroactivity

Espiritu v. Cipriano

Statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of enactment.

Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est

People v. Manantan

The rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.

Computation of Time

Viray v. CA

The rule that excludes the last day of a period, should the same be a holiday, refers to the performance of the act prescribed or required. But it does not apply where at the end of the period no such act is to be done.

Liberal or strict construction

- statement of a rule when there is ambiguity


- if procedural: liberalHolographic wills: Ajero v. CA

Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.

Naturalization Laws: Ong Chia v. Republic

It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.

Labor Statutes: A.L. Ammen v. Borja

Labor: liberal construction in favour of labor statutes.

Tax Exemptions: Esso Standard v. Acting Commissioner of Customs

Exemption from taxation is not favored. Exemptions in tax statutes are never presumed. Exceptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favour of the taxing authority.

Taxation: Manila Railroad v. Collector of Customs

It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the Government and in favour of the citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import.

Pleadings and Rules: Del Rosario v. Hamoy

Rules of Court mandates a liberal construction in favour of the rules and pleadings to effect substantial justice.

Domalanta v. CA

On certain occasions, this Court has allowed liberality in the construction of the rules. The present case, however, does not warrant such liberality because the decision of respondent CA is satisfactorily supported by the records.


Quibuyen v. CA

Pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be construed liberally, in order that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims, and that a possible denial of substantial justice, due to legal techincalities, may be avoided.

Contracts of Insurance: NPC v. CA

Contracts of insurance construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should be interpreted in favour of its beneficiary.

Corporation Law: Home Insurance Co. v. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.

The objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of our courts. The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the development of trade relations and which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among countries.

Probation: Pablo v. Castillo

Probation law is not a penal statute and therefore, the principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. The Court has pronounced that the policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot prevail against the categorical provisions of the law.

Retirement Laws: Request of Clerk of Court Tessie L. Gatmaitan

Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favour of the retiree.

Interpretation of laws: Buenaseda v. Flavier

Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed. A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives

which it was created.

Interpretation of Peanl Statutes – Retroactivity


U.S. v. Cuna

Penal laws are to be given retroactive effect only in so far as they favour the defendant charged with a crime or a misdemeanour, and that, when a penal law is enacted repealing a prior law, such repeal does not have the effect of relieving the offender in whole or in part of penalties already incurred under the old law, unless the new law favors the defendant by diminishing the penalty or doing away with it altogether, and then only to the extent to which the new law is favourable to the offender.

People v. Tamayo

The doctrine was clearly established that in the Philippines, repeal of a criminal act by its re-enactment, even without a saving clause, would not destroy criminal liability.

U.S. v. Go Chico

It is clear from the authorities cited in the Act under consideration that the legislature did not intend that a criminal intent should be a necessary element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly. The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to interpretation.

U.S. v. Estapia

All the words of a statute should, when possible, be given some meaning, and when the legislator makes use of words of limitation, he must be presumed to have intended to limit and restrict, in some way, the word or idea with reference to which such words of limitation are applied.

State Prosecutors v. Muro

Judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration.

Effects of Repeals and Amendments – General and Special Laws – Implied Repeal

Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty

Special laws or charters may not be amended, altered, or repealed by a general law, by mere implication.


Repeal of laws by implication is not favored. The mere repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear in order to warrant the court in holding that the later in time repeals the former, when it does not in terms purport to do so.

It is well settled that a special and local statute is not repealed by a subsequent statute unless the intent to repeal or alter it is manifest, although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the cases in the special law.

Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general – the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special – the fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general – one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case.

Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano

A repealing clause in an Act which provides that “all laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly” is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore.

Almeda v. Florentino

Repeals by implication are not favored, unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended and courts are duty bound to adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible.

Sanchez v. Rigos

In construing different provisions of one and the same law or code, such interpretation should be favored as will reconcile or harmonize said provisions and avoid a conflict between the same.

Exceptions are not favored, unless the intention to the contrary is clear.

Mecano v. Commission on Audit

The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.

There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency


takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.

Lastly, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that repeals by statute by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.

City of Basilan v. Hechanova

Whenever there is a conflict of an ordinance with a statute, the former must give way.

Arenas v. City of San Carlos

The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute. When there is irreconcilable repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the statute, the former is given precedence over the latter on the ground that it is the latest expression of the intent of the legislature.

U.S. v. SolimanG.R. No. 11555 January 6, 1917

The courts of Spain and the learned commentators on Spanish law have construed these provisions to mean that such penal laws are to be given a retroactive effect only in so far as they favour the defendant charged with a crime or misdemeanour, and that, when a penal law is enacted repealing a prior law, such repeal does not have the effect of relieving an offender in whole or in part of penalties already incurred under the old law, unless the new law favors the defendant by diminishing the penalty or doing away with it altogether, and then only to the extent to which the new law is favourable to the offender.

We conclude therefore that in any case in which a statute prescribing a penalty for the commission of a specific offense is repealed, and in which the new statute provides new and distinct penalties for the commission of such offense, the penalty which must be imposed on one who committed the offense prior to the enactment of the repealing statue is that one which is more favourable to the convict.

48: Penal laws which are favourable to the accused are given retroactive effect


Tac-an v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. L-38736 May 21, 1984

Suffice it to say that at times material to the case, i.e. when the Deed of Quitclaim was executed, when the approval by the Provincial Governor was given and when the approval was revoked, Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu were in full force and effect and since they were substantive in nature the repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect.

46A: The law looks forward, not backward

Ramos v. Municipal Council of Daet, et alG.R. No. January 31, 1959

In other words, the proviso did mean to legalize all those establishments illegally operating on May 21, 1954, or to exempt them from regulation. Republic Act 1224 contained no repealing section, and did not repeal Republic Act 979 in so far as those establishments were concerned. Note, furthermore, that such final proviso exempted establishments operating under Commonwealth Act 485 entitled “an act to permit bets in the game Basque Pelota.” If, as maintained by appellee, the last proviso repealed Republic Act 979, then it must be held that Commonwealth Act 485 was likewise repealed, and it is now illegal to bet in the Jai Alai.

This case may still be viewed from a different angle: The cabaret on Salcedo Street had been closed about March 155; there is no doubt that the closing was legal, because petitioner went to court and lost; the affair was therefore a finished matter, and this petition is in effect a request to establish a cabaret on Salcedo Street; as such it must be governed by Republic Act 1224. It can not be argued that petitioner simply asks for re-opening or return of the cabaret that had been illegally suppressed; because the padlocking in 1955 was legal at that time; indeed, it was upheld by the courts.

The repeal of a statute will not operate to impair rights vested under it, or to revive rights lost or taken away under the repealed statute, or to affect acts performed or suits commenced, prosecuted, and concluded under the former law; and the repeal of a statute does not undo or set aside consequences of its operation while in force unless so directed by express language or necessary implication.

5A: Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled5B: It is in the interest of the State that there be an end to litigation


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