Sen Gurhan-Canli Morwitz 2002 JCR

8/22/2019 Sen Gurhan-Canli Morwitz 2002 JCR

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2001 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc. Vol. 28 December 2001

All rights reserved. 0093-5301/2002/2803-0004$03.00

Withholding Consumption: A Social DilemmaPerspective on Consumer Boycotts

SANKAR SENZEYNEP GURHAN-CANLIVICKI MORWITZ*

This article draws on social dilemma theory and reference group theory to under-stand the individual boycott decision and tests the predictions stemming from thisconceptualization in two experiments. Consistent with our predictions, consumerslikelihood of participating in both economic and social-issue boycotts is jointlydetermined by their perceptions of the boycotts likelihood of success, their sus-ceptibility to normative social influences, and the costs they incur in boycotting.Consumers success perceptions are, in turn, determined by their expectations ofoverall participation and efficacy, as well as the message frame inherent in pro-

boycott communications. Two key determinants of consumers boycotting costsare their preference for the boycotted product and their access to its substitutes.More specifically, consumers who are more susceptible to the normative influenceexerted by the reference group of potential boycotters are more influenced byexpected overall participation rates in their boycott likelihood.

U.S. consumers boycotted PepsiCo for doingbusiness in Burma because of that countryspoor human rights record. The boycott costPepsiCo more than it earned from its opera-tions in Burma and it eventually heeded theboycotters demands, pulling out of Burma.

(Wah

1998)

California gasoline prices increased by 40 per-cent in one month in the spring of 1999. Agroup of Californian consumers called for aone-day boycott of gasoline stations on April30, 1999. Despite the boycott, prices did notfall. (Williams 1999)

B oycotts have become a pervasive and potent instrumentof consumer discontent in todays marketplace. Con-sumers are increasingly willing (Smith 1990) to withholdpatronage to curb perceived market abuses and/or increasecorporate sensitivity to their economic, political, and socialconcerns (Economist1990; Ferguson 1997). Such consumer

activism has been greatly aided in recent years by boycott

*Sankar Sen is associate professor of marketing, School of Management,Boston University, Boston, MA 02215 ([email protected]). Zeynep Gurhan-Canli is assistant professor of marketing, University of Michigan BusinessSchool, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234 ([email protected]). Vicki Mor-witz is associate professor of marketing and Edythe and George HeymanResearch Fellow at the Stern School of Business, New York University,New York, NY 10012 ([email protected]). The authors are gratefulto the editor, associate editor, and the reviewers for their input and guidance,and Sucharita Chandran for her help with data collection.

organizers use of the Internet as a quick, cheap, and ef-fective way of informing millions of consumers about boy-cotts. Today, over 800 products, not to mention whole statesand countries, are targeted for boycotts worldwide (Ferguson1997). The growing significance of boycotts for consumers,marketers, and public policy makers has spurred investi-gations into their historical evolution (Smith 1990), financialimpact (Miller and Sturdivant 1977), and key dimensions,such as action orientation (media-oriented vs. marketplace-oriented; Friedman 1991) and influence type (economicpressure vs. image pressure; Garrett 1987). However, littleresearch effort has thus far been directed toward a theoreticalunderstanding of the individual consumers decision to par-ticipate in a particular boycott (cf. Belch and Belch 1987;Friedman 1991).

This article represents an initial attempt to understand theindividual boycott decision. In particular, we propose thatthe decision to withhold consumption of a desirable productor service in the interest of achieving a collective social or

economic gain can be conceptualized as a social dilemma.Social dilemmas are situations in which the interests of in-dividual members of a group are at odds with the collectiveinterests of that group (van Lange et al. 1992), forcing in-dividuals to choose between maximizing selfish and collec-tive interests. Reference group theory suggests that in suchcontexts, the trade-offs consumers make between such in-dividual and group incentives are likely to hinge signifi-cantly on the social pressure they feel to comply with thebehaviors of relevant reference group(s) (e.g., the boycotting


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400 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

group). Consequently, we draw on both social dilemma andreference group theories to investigate the determinants ofand the mechanisms underlying the individual decision toparticipate in a boycott. In two experiments, we examinethe interactive effects of consumers expectations regardingboycott success (i.e., expectation that the social problem will

be solved), their susceptibility to normative reference groupinfluence (i.e., social pressure to comply), and the costs theyincur in boycotting (i.e., the costs of cooperation) on theirboycott decision (i.e., cooperation in a social dilemma).

CONSUMER BOYCOTTS

A consumer boycott is an attempt by one or more partiesto achieve certain objectives by urging individual consumersto refrain from making selected purchases [from one or moretarget organizations] in the marketplace (Friedman 1985,p. 97). Boycotts are of two basic types: economic or mar-keting policy boycotts aim to change the boycott targetsmarketing practices, such as lowering price (e.g., the Cal-

ifornia gas boycott; the New York City movie theater boy-cott [New York Times 1999]), whereas the more recent po-litical or social/ethical control (Smith 1990) boycotts attemptto coerce their targets toward specific ethical or sociallyresponsible actions, ranging from responsible employmentand manufacturing practices to the support of specific causes(e.g., the PepsiCo boycott; the Mitsubishi boycott over itsalleged destruction of rain forests; see Fitzgerald 1993).

Notably, boycotts are qualitatively different from an in-dividuals personal decision to withhold consumption of agood in that they constitute an organized, collective, butnonmandatory (i.e., no formal sanctions can be imposed onnoncompliers) refusal to consume a good. In this sense, thedynamics underlying an individuals decision to participate

in a boycott are similar to those underlying peoples par-ticipation in labor movements such as strikes (see Gallagherand Gramm 1997), which are organized and collective butcannot mandate individual participation.

Prior research (Garrett 1987) links the individual decisionto boycott to a range of disparate factors, such as boycottawareness, personal values (e.g., social responsibility), so-cial pressure, the credibility of the boycott leader(s), boy-cotting costs, and the congruence between boycott goals andparticipant attitudes. However, both the absence of a co-herent theoretical framework and the paucity of empiricalsupport undermine the significance of these findings. Next,we draw on social dilemma theory and reference grouptheory to develop a conceptual model of the individual boy-cott decision.

CONSTRUCTS AND HYPOTHESES

Boycotts as Social Dilemmas

Social dilemmas are situations in which members of agroup face a conflict between maximizing their personalinterests and supporting that of the group (Dawes 1980;Hardin 1968). Each individual is best off acting in her self-

interest regardless of what the other persons do, but in doingso all individuals are worse off than if they had cooperatedin the collective interest. Social dilemmas are defined bythree properties (van Lange et al. 1992): (1) compared to acooperative decision, a noncooperative decision made byany given group member always yields greater utility to that

individual, regardless of the decision made by others; (2)compared to a cooperative decision, a noncooperative de-cision is always harmful to others; and (3) the loss in ag-gregate utility to others resulting from a noncooperativedecision is greater than the utility gained by that individual(i.e., the harm done to others by noncooperation is largerthan the personal gain to the noncooperating individual).Thus, social dilemmas involve the interplay between selfishmotives and cooperation that requires individual sacrifice inthe short run for the benefit of all individuals in the longrun.

We suggest that consumer boycotts can be conceptualizedas social dilemmas. For the typically small subset of con-sumers who are true believers in the boycott cause (Ma-honey 1976), the personal importance of the boycott issueis likely to ensure participation even if the costs of with-holding consumption of the boycotted product are high.Most consumers, however, are likely to be disinclined toparticipate (i.e., to act in self-interest) because the certaincosts each of them incurs from withholding consumptionare likely to outweigh the uncertain utility obtained throughboycotting. Yet, each consumer in this group of potentialboycotters is likely to be better off if most, if not all, mem-bers of this group chose to participate in the boycott, con-tributing to a higher likelihood of its success.

While this tension between social and personal interestcharacterizes all boycotts, it can be most clearly understood

in the case of economic boycotts (Rea 1974; Smith 1990),where consumers attempt to reverse what they consider tobe an excessive or unjustified price increase for a product(e.g., the New York movie theater boycott). If the new,higher price is not prohibitive then the utility consumersderive from the product at such a price, UProduct (high price), islikely to be less than that from the regularly priced product,UProduct (regular price), but more than that derived from not con-suming the product at all, UProduct (boycott). Thus, as long as theprice increase does not offset the positive utility consumersgain from the products consumption (i.e., UProduct (regular price)1 UProduct (high price) 1 UProduct (boycott)), each consumer is betteroff consuming the higher-priced product than not consumingit at all, regardless of others boycotting behavior (Rea

1974). However, the likelihood of the price being restoredto its original level increases with the percentage of con-sumers who boycott. Consequently, if all, or even most,consumers free ride on the boycotting efforts of others theneveryone will be worse off in the long run, consuming theproduct at a permanently higher price. Thus, the individualstrategy of not boycotting is suboptimal, in terms of thelong-term collective welfare of all affected consumers, rel-ative to that of cooperation.

A key factor affecting consumers consideration of col-


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CONSUMER BOYCOTTS 401

FIGURE 1

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INDIVIDUAL BOYCOTT DECISION

lective interests in their boycott decision is the social pres-sure they are likely to feel, both internally and from externalsources, to act in the boycotting groups interests. However,

while social dilemma research has examined the effect ofvarious group characteristics (e.g., size, cohesiveness, com-munication) on the individual decision to cooperate, littleattention has been devoted to the extent and nature of thepressure or influence exerted by such groups on the coop-eration decision. Next we draw on reference group theory(e.g., Hyman and Singer 1968) to articulate why and forwhom such social influences might affect the boycottdecision.

The Role of Reference Group Influence

Research (see, e.g., Childers and Rao 1992) suggests thatpeoples consumption decisions are strongly influenced by

their reference groups (i.e., groups that an individual usesas a guide for behavior in a specific situation). Such groupscan be primary or secondary, formal or informal, and as-pirational or dissociative (see Hoyer and MacInnis [2000]for details). Moreover, the influence exerted by such groupscan be normative (i.e., rewards/punishment or conformancebased) and/or informational (i.e., expertise based). We ex-pect such reference group influences to also affect consum-ers boycotting decisions: the set of potential boycottersconstitutes a clear reference group that is likely to provide

implicit and sometimes explicit guidelines regarding co-operation. Clearly, such influence is going to be strong whenthe group is primary, formal, and/or perhaps aspirational

(e.g., in the case of the true believers). By providing rel-evant information about the boycott, this group is also likelyto exert informational influence (Burnkrant and Cousineau1975). However, even the informal, secondary group of po-tential boycotters can under certain conditions exert signif-icant influence on individual cooperative behavior. For in-stance, research (e.g., Fisher and Ackerman 1998) suggeststhat some consumers may be particularly susceptible to thenormative influence exerted by this group, feeling pressureto comply with its expectations or to associate themselveswith it through compliance. Such consumers are likely tobe motivated to boycott not only to achieve its objectivesbut also to comply with the wishes of the boycotting groupin an effort to gain group membership or approval. Next,

we present a conceptual framework (fig. 1) that articulatesthe interactive effects of consumers susceptibility to nor-mative influence, their expectations of boycott success, andthe costs they incur in withholding consumption on theirlikelihood of cooperation.

Cooperation in Boycotts

According to social dilemma theory (van Lange et al.1992), consumers expectations regarding the likelihood of


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boycott success (i.e., likelihood that the social problem willbe solved) is likely to be a principal input into their estimateof the expected utility of participation. This suggests thataside from consumers susceptibility to normative influence,their decision to cooperate is likely to depend on certainkey factors in the boycott context (fig. 1) that influence the

perceived likelihood of boycott success (e.g., expectationsof overall participation, perceived efficacy, and proboycottcommunication) and the costs of withholding consumption(e.g., product substitutability and product preference).

Factors Influencing the Perceived Likelihood ofBoycott Success

Expectation of Overall Participation. Both social di-lemma theory and reference group theory suggest a strongpositive link between peoples expectation of overall co-operation and their own cooperation (Fisher and Ackerman1998; Klandermans 1992). In social dilemmas, people aremore likely to cooperate when widespread cooperation by

others makes the solution to the social problem (i.e., boycottsuccess) more likely. According to reference group theory,such conditional cooperation may also arise because of ref-erence group influence to comply with social norms, whichare inferred from overall cooperative behavior or expecta-tions thereof. Therefore, we expect consumers boycott will-ingness to vary positively with their expectation of overallparticipation. It is important to note, however, that referencegroup theory suggests (Bearden, Netemeyer, and Teel 1989)that participation based on compliance with such normativeinfluence is likely to be more pronounced for consumerswho are more susceptible to it. Thus, the boycotting behaviorof consumers who are more (vs. less) susceptible to nor-mative social influence will increase to a greater extent withincreases in their expectation of overall participation.

H1: The positive effect of overall participation expec-tation on boycott participation likelihood will begreater for those who are more susceptible to nor-mative social influence than for those who are lesssusceptible.

Perceived Efficacy. Social dilemma research suggeststhat cooperation varies directly with consumers perceivedefficacy, or the extent to which one believes that each par-ticipant, oneself included, can contribute significantly to theachievement of collective goals (van Lange et al. 1992). Inparticular, studies attest to the negative relationship between

peoples efficacy perceptions and their likelihood of freeriding on the sacrifice of cooperators; consumers are lesslikely to free ride if they perceive that their own contributioncan actually make a difference.

More specifically, consumers efficacy perceptions arelikely to interact with their expectations of overall partici-pation to affect their perceptions of boycott success likeli-hood and, consequently, their participation likelihood. Whenconsumers believe that each persons contribution can makelittle difference to the boycotts outcome (i.e., low efficacy),

their participation willingness is likely to depend largely ontheir expectations of overall participation. This is becauseconsumers, under low efficacy conditions, may believe thatthere is strength in numbers. They may also, under suchconditions, be more inclined to look to others to guide theirown behavior (van Lange et al. 1992). However, if consum-

ers feel that each boycotter (including herself) can, by her-self, make a difference to the boycotts outcome (i.e., highefficacy), then their expectation of overall participation maybe less relevant to their participation willingness. In otherwords, when consumers believe that they themselves canmake a difference by participating in a boycott, their like-lihood of doing so is likely to be less contingent on howothers behave (Wiener 1993). Thus, we expect that:

H2: The positive effect of overall participation expec-tation on boycott participation likelihood will begreater when perceived efficacy is low than whenit is high.

Proboycott Communication. Consumers perceptionsof boycott success likelihood are also likely to depend onthe proboycott communications they are exposed to. Socialdilemma research underscores the importance of persuasivecommunication in inducing cooperation (Klandermans1992; Wiener and Doescher 1991), but the precise charac-teristics of effective communication remain largely unartic-ulated. Given that consumers reactions to persuasive com-munication are often susceptible to the frame of thecommunicated message (see Rothman and Salovey [1997]for a recent review), we examine how the specific messageframe adopted by boycott organizers in their proboycottcommunications affect consumers perceptions of the like-lihood of boycott success.

Alternate message frames can result from whether theproboycott message highlights the positive outcomes (i.e.,gains) associated with boycotting and/or boycott success orthe negative outcomes (i.e., losses) that result from forgoingcooperation and/or boycott failure. Several related streamsof research suggest that these alternate proboycott messageframes are likely to affect consumers participation likeli-hood by affecting, among other things, their perceptions ofthe boycotts likelihood of success. In general, the outcomemade more salient by a specific message frame is likely toexert a disproportionate influence on peoples judgments bymaking them focus on it over the less salient, complemen-tary outcome (Rothman and Salovey 1997). Not only arethese salient outcomes more accessible at the point of judg-

ment, but they also carry greater weight as judgmental inputs(Menon, Raghubir, and Schwarz 1995).

More specifically, people often generate subjective esti-mates of an outcomes likelihood based on its salience(Tversky and Kahneman 1973). Thus, consumers subjectiveboycott success likelihood estimates are likely to be biasedtoward the outcome (success or failure) made salient by themessage frame. Related to this, the frame-induced salientoutcome may serve as an anchor for consumers successlikelihood estimates (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Since


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subsequent additional information- or cognitive elaboration-based adjustments from such anchors are usually insuffi-cient, the success frame is likely to yield a higher boycottsuccess likelihood estimate than the failure frame. As aresult, consumers boycott success likelihood estimates andtheir consequent participation willingness are likely to be

greater when a proboycott communication highlights thedesirable consequences of boycott success than when it high-lights the undesirable consequences of boycott failure.

H3a: Participation likelihood will be higher when theproboycott message has a success frame thanwhen it has a failure frame.

If the message frame affects the perceived likelihood ofboycott success, then it should also moderate the interactiveeffect of overall participation expectation and perceived ef-ficacy on boycott likelihood (i.e., hypothesis 2). These threeitems of information are all inputs into a fundamental ques-tion underlying a consumers boycott decision: is this boy-

cott going to be successful? Moreover, research suggeststhat in answering this question (i.e., making a predictionabout boycott success likelihood), consumers are likely tobe susceptible to confirmatory biases, focusing selectivelyon information that confirms rather than disconfirms thelikelihood of boycott success (Friedrich 1993; Sanbonmatsu,Posovac, and Stasney 1997). Therefore, if a success framedproboycott communication, by itself, provides consumerswith confirmatory evidence that the boycott will be suc-cessful, then such information is likely to be sufficient im-petus for participation, rendering the efficacy and overallparticipation information somewhat redundant. In otherwords, consumers reliance on these alternate inputs intothe success likelihood judgment and, consequently, the boy-

cott decision, is likely to be diminished in the presence ofsuccess framed proboycott communication.

However, when the proboycott communication constitutesa disconfirming input (i.e., when it is failure framed) intothe boycott success likelihood prediction, consumers aremore likely to attend to independent confirming inputs, suchas overall participation expectation and perceived efficacy,making them more relevant to the boycott success likelihoodestimation process. Consequently, their influence, undersuch conditions, on the boycott decision is likely to begreater. In sum, we expect consumers boycott likelihoodto be more influenced by the interactive effects of perceivedefficacy and overall participation expectation (i.e., hypoth-esis 2) when the proboycott message has a failure rather

than a success frame.Finally, if consumers use all three items of information

(i.e., proboycott message, participation expectation, and ef-ficacy) to gauge boycott success likelihood and if this like-lihood estimate drives their boycott willingness, then theinteractive effect of these three information items on par-ticipation should be at least partially mediated by their per-ceptions of boycott success likelihood. More specifically,such success perceptions should mediate, at least partially,(a) the effect of the message frame on boycott likelihood

and (b) the interactive effect of participation expectation andefficacy on boycott likelihood when the message frame isnegative.

H3b: The interactive effect of consumers overall par-ticipation expectation and perceived efficacy on

their boycott likelihood will vary with the frameof the proboycott message. This interaction ismore likely to occur when the proboycott mes-sage has a failure frame than when it has a suc-cess frame.

H3c: The interactive effect of these three antecedentsof boycott success likelihood on consumers par-ticipation likelihood will be at least partially me-diated by their perceptions of the boycotts like-lihood of success.

Factors Influencing the Costs of Withholding

Consumption

While social dilemma research (Lynn and Oldenquist1986) acknowledges the pivotal role played by the costsassociated with cooperation, surprisingly little research hasexplicitly explored the effects of such costs on cooperation.In the boycott context, two factors that influence the costsconsumers incur in boycotting are inherent in the nature ofconsumption itself. The first cost stems from consumersintrinsic preference for the boycotted product: consumerswith higher (vs. lower) preference for the boycotted productwill be less likely to participate in the boycott because itwill be more difficult for them to withhold consumption. Aperhaps more interesting cost arises from the availability in

the marketplace of suitable substitutes for the boycottedproduct. When a satisfactory substitute exists, consumerscan minimize the costs of not consuming the boycotted prod-uct by simply switching to this substitute. In the absence ofsubstitutes, however, consumers can do little, in terms ofconsumption, to alleviate this cost. Therefore, we expect theavailability of suitable substitutes for the boycotted productto increase consumers participation likelihood.

In addition, product preference and substitutability arelikely to interact with consumers expectations of overall par-ticipation. According to social dilemma theory, a key driverof peoples decision to not cooperate is their aversion to beinga sucker (see Komorita and Parks [1994] for review), or tosuffer by withholding consumption while free riders (i.e.,

noncooperators who benefit from others cooperation) con-tinue to obtain the utility associated with consumption. Re-search (see van Lange et al. 1992) suggests that consumersare more likely to cooperate in the face of free riders whenthe costs of cooperation are lower. Thus, when consumerscost of boycott cooperation is low (i.e., they have access tosubstitutes or their product preference is low), they are likelyto be less concerned about the extent of free riding, or con-versely, overall boycott participation. In contrast, when nosubstitutes are available or product preference is high (i.e.,


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high boycotting costs) consumers are likely to be more con-cerned about being a sucker, not wanting to make difficultsacrifices in vain or upon which others might free ride. Con-sequently, the boycotting behavior of consumers in these highcost conditions is more likely to be influenced by their ex-pectations of overall participation.

H4a: Consumers boycott participation likelihood willbe higher when their preference for the boycottedproduct is low than when it is high.

H4b: The positive effect of overall participation ex-pectation on boycott participation likelihood willbe greater when consumers preference for theboycotted product is high than when it is low.

H5a: Consumers boycott participation likelihood willbe higher when they have access to substitutesfor the boycotted product than when they do nothave access to any substitutes.

H5b: The positive effect of overall participation ex-pectation on boycott participation likelihood willbe greater when consumers do not have accessto any substitutes for the boycotted product thanwhen such substitutes are accessible.

OVERVIEW OF STUDIES

We conduct two experiments to test our conceptualizationof the individual boycott participation decision (fig. 1). Thefirst study focuses, in the context of communications abouta price boycott, on the three key antecedents of consumersperceptions of boycott success likelihoodexpectation ofoverall participation (Participation Expectation), perceivedefficacy (Efficacy), and the message frame of proboycottcommunication (Message Frame)to understand their in-teractive effects on participation likelihood (hypotheses 1,2, and 3). This study also examines the moderating effectof consumers susceptibility to normative influence (SNI).In study 2, we focus on real, ongoing, social-issue boycottsto examine whether and how product preference and sub-stitutability interact with consumers expectation of overallparticipation to affect both their participation intent and ac-tual boycotting behavior (hypotheses 4 and 5). Subjects inboth studies and all associated pretests were undergraduatesat a large east coast business school.

STUDY 1

Design and Procedure

In developing the price-increase boycott scenario for thisstudy, we sought products that subjects, faced with a sudden,unjustified, and relatively sharp price increase, would ac-tually consider boycotting (i.e., minimize floor effect) yetwould find somewhat difficult to give up due to the lack ofsuitable substitutes (i.e., minimize ceiling effect). Based on

these criteria, we selected seven categories: the universitybookstore, movie theaters, taxicabs, compact discs, cableTV, public transportation, college tuition, and for each,asked47 pretest subjects to indicate (i) their involvement with thecategory (three seven-point scales), (ii) their usage patterns(including purchase frequency in some categories), and (iii)

their willingness to boycott that category (seven-point scale)if prices suddenly and inexplicably increased by 25%. Wepicked movie theaters as the boycott target based on rela-tively high usage rates (approximately two movies permonth), moderate involvement levels (rating of approxi-mately 4), and consumers willingness to boycott a 25%price increase (rating of approximately 5).

This study had a 2 (Participation Expectation) # 2 (Ef-ficacy)# 2 (Message Frame) between-subjects design. Par-ticipation Expectation was manipulated through informationin the form of survey results about the percentage of otherpotential boycotters who intended to participate (low p15%, high p 80%). Efficacy was manipulated through in-formation in the form of expert opinion about the extent towhich each additional participant could affect the boycottsoutcome (low p no effect, high p significant incrementaleffect). Message Frame was manipulated by making salientin a proboycott message the consequences of boycott success(Success) or failure (Failure). Susceptibility to normativeinfluence (SNI) was measured using those eight items inBearden et al.s (1989) susceptibility to interpersonal influ-ence scale that correspond to the normative influence factor.

One hundred forty-seven subjects completed this studyas part of a class requirement. First, subjects were asked toread an article from a respected local newspaper about acall for a boycott of all movie theaters in a major Americancity by a consumer advocacy group over what it felt to be

an unjustified and excessive price increase of one dollar(approximately 12%). This article contained both the Par-ticipation Expectation and Efficacy manipulations (appen-dix). After reading the article, subjects were exposed to aflyer released by the boycott organizers that contained,among other information, the Message Frame manipulation(appendix).

Subjects first indicated their Boycott Likelihood using aseven-point multi-item scale (Mp 5.3, SDp 1.4, ap

). The first item assessed boycott intention (Definitely.92not boycott/Definitely boycott). The remaining four itemsmeasured subjects attitude toward boycotting (Very nega-tive/Very positive, Not at all favorable/Very favorable, Verybad idea/Very good idea, Not at all useful/Very useful).

Next, they responded to a set of questions that served aschecks for the Participation Expectation, Efficacy, and Mes-sage Frame manipulations as well as the newspaper articlesbelievability and the flyers persuasiveness. Specifically,subjects (i) indicated the percent of city residents who statedthat they would boycott the movie theaters (Mp 45.6,

), (ii) expressed their level of agreement (1 pSDp 32.9Definitely disagree, 7 p Definitely agree) with the state-ment: According to the newspaper article, the participationof each additional person will have a significant effect on


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the likelihood of a successful boycott (Mp 4.00, SDp), and (iii) indicated the extent to which they felt that2.00

the flyer stressed the pros of boycotting versus the cons ofnot boycotting (1 p Only stressed the pros of boycotting,7 p Only stressed the cons of not boycotting; Mp 4.7,

). Three seven-point scales were used to assessSDp 2.0

both the believability of the newspaper article (Not at allbelievable/Highly believable, Not at all true/Absolutely true,Not at all credible/Very credible; Mp 5.0, SDp 1.1,

) and the persuasiveness of the arguments in theap .87flyer (Very weak/Very strong, Not very convincing/Veryconvincing, Not very persuasive/Very persuasive; Mp

). Subjects then provided their per-4.5, SDp 1.4, ap .92ception of boycott success likelihood (Success Perception;appendix), followed by their SNI (Mp 3.0, SDp 1.3,

) ratings (Bearden et al. 1989). Finally, they pro-ap .89vided information regarding their monthly consumption offirst-run movies ( ) and were debriefedMp 2.0, SDp 1.6and dismissed.

Results

All dependent variables and, as per the guidelines delin-eated in Perdue and Summers (1986), manipulation checkitems were analyzed using the full ANOVA model withParticipation Expectation, Efficacy, Message Frame, SNI,and their interactions as independent factors. We obtainedtwo SNI levels by dividing subjects into two groups (highand low) around the median value of their SNI scores. Com-parable analyses using the continuous SNI measure yieldedcomparable results. The significant results are presentednext. Details of all analyses can be obtained from theauthors.

Manipulation Checks. Subjects appeared to perceivethe Participation Expectation, Efficacy, and Message Framemanipulations as intended. Subjects in the Low ParticipationExpectation condition recalled that 15.3% of the potentialboycotters had agreed to boycott, whereas those in the Highcondition recalled that 76.9% had agreed to do so( ). Similarly, the efficacy per-F(1, 146)p 1095.9, p ! .01ceptions of Low Efficacy subjects were much lower thanthose of the High Efficacy ones (M p 2.97, M pLow High

). Finally, subjects in the5.05; F(1, 146)p 60.7, p ! .01Success Message Frame condition perceived that the pro-boycott message stressed the pros of boycotting rather thanthe cons of not boycotting to a greater extent (5.65) thanthose in the Failure Message Frame condition (3.66;

). No other effect was of a sig-F(1, 146)p 46.9, p ! .01nificant size (as ascertained by q2) relative to the primarymanipulation-check effect in any of the three ANOVAs (seePerdue and Summers [1986] for details), indicating that un-intended crossover effects or contamination across the in-dependent factors, if any, were negligible. In addition, sub-

jects found the newspaper article to be believable (5) andthe flyer to be somewhat persuasive (4.5), and these per-ceptions did not vary significantly across the different ex-perimental conditions.

Effects on Boycott Likelihood. Participation Expecta-tion had a positive main effect on Boycott Likelihood (Par-ticipation Expectation: M p 5.60, M p 4.97;High Low

). Moreover, as expectedF(1, 146)p 8.5, p ! .05, hp .23(hypothesis 1), this main effect was qualified by a significantParticipation # SNI interaction (F(1, 146)p 4.68, p !

): the Boycott Likelihood of the high SNI sub-.05, hp .17jects was significantly affected by Participation Expectation(M p 4.63, M p 5.77; F(1, 69)p 12.4, p ! .05,Low High

) whereas that of the Low SNI ones was nothp .28( ). The main effect of Partici-M p 5.28, M p 5.45Low Highpation Expectation was also qualified by a marginally sig-nificant Participation # Efficacy interaction (F(1, 146)p

). In line with hypothesis 2, Boycott3.0, p ! .10, hp .14Likelihood did not vary significantly with Participation Ex-pectation when Efficacy was High (M p 5.26, M pLow High

), but increased significantly with increasing Participation5.50Expectation (M p 4.66, M p 5.70; F(1, 71)p 10.5,Low High

) when Efficacy was Low.p ! .01, hp .25Consistent with hypothesis 3a, Message Frame also had

a significant main effect on Boycott Likelihood(M p 5.55, M p 5.00; F(1, 146)p 5.8, p ! .05,Success Failure

). Moreover, in line with hypothesis 3b, Boycotthp .19Likelihood was more sensitive to the Efficacy # Partici-pation Expectation interaction in the Failure Message Framecondition than in the Success one (fig. 2), as revealed bythe significant Participation Expectation#Efficacy#Mes-sage Frame interaction ( ). MoreF(1, 146)p 5.02, p ! .05specifically, subjects Boycott Likelihood did not vary sig-nificantly across the different Efficacy (M p 5.54,Low

) and Participation Expectation conditionsM p 5.56High( ) in the Success Message FrameM p 5.36, M p 5.74Low Highcondition. However, in the Failure Message Frame condi-tion, we obtained a crossover interaction of Efficacy andParticipation Expectation on Boycott Likelihood. While Par-ticipation Expectation did not affect Boycott Likelihood( ) in the High Efficacy condi-M p 5.20, M p 5.16Low Hightion, Participation Expectation had a significant positive ef-fect on Boycott Likelihood (M p 4.04, M p 5.72;Low High

) in the Low EfficacyF(1, 36)p 16.1, p ! .05, hp .31condition.

Mediating Effect of Success Perception. We testedwhether the interactive effect of the three information itemson consumers Boycott Likelihood was mediated by theirSuccess Perception (i.e., hypothesis 3c) using proceduresidentified by Baron and Kenny (1986). The basic test forsuch mediation hinges on three statistical outcomes in full-

model ANOVAs: (a) the interactive effect of the indepen-dent variables (i.e., the Participation Expectation#Efficacy# Message Frame interaction) on the dependent variable(Boycott Likelihood) must be significant, (b) the interactiveeffect of the independent variables on the mediator variable(Success Perception) must be significant, and (c) when themediator variable is added to the analysis in a, the interactiveeffect of the independent variables on Boycott Likelihoodmust become nonsignificant (i.e., full mediation) or dimin-ished (i.e., partial mediation).


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FIGURE 2

STUDY 1: EFFECT OF PARTICIPATION EXPECTATION,PERCEIVED EFFICACY, AND PROBOYCOTT MESSAGE

FRAME ON BOYCOTT LIKELIHOOD

All three outcomes were supported, confirming hypoth-esis 3c. First, the Participation Expectatio ffi-n# Ecac essage Frame interaction was significant in they#MBoycott Likelihood ANOVA. Second, this three-way inter-action was also significant ( ) inF(1, 146)p 9.45, p ! .05an equivalent Success Perception ANOVA. Finally, whenSuccess Perception was added as an independent factor tothe Boycott Likelihood ANOVA, not only was it a signif-icant predictor ( ), but also the pre-F(1, 146)p 39.3, p ! .01

viously significant Participation Expectation # Effica-cy# Message Frame interaction was no longer significantat the .05 level ( ).F(1, 146)p .70, pp .40

To further interpret our complex mediation finding, wealso tested the two, more specific, expectations that consti-tute hypothesis 3c. First, the significant main effect of Mes-sage Frame on Boycott Likelihood should be at least par-tially mediated by Success Perception (i.e., simple medi-ation). We found support for this expectation. In a full-modelANOVA, Message Frame is a significant predictor of Boy-

cott Likelihood. Moreover, Message Frame was a significantpredictor of Success Perception in an equivalent model( ). Finally, when Success Percep-F(1, 146)p 5.37, p ! .05tion was added to the Boycott Likelihood model, MessageFrame was no longer significant at the .05 level( ).F(1, 146)p 2.09, pp .15

Second, the significant interactive effect of ParticipationExpectation and Efficacy (i.e., Participation Expecta-tion# Efficacy) on Boycott Likelihood in the Failure Framecondition (i.e., hypothesis 2) should be at least partially me-diated by Success Perception (i.e., a two-factor mediated mod-eration; see Baron and Kenny 1986, p. 1179). Based on me-diation analyses conducted on subjects responses in theFailure Frame condition, we found support for this expec-tation as well. The Participation Expectation# Efficacy in-teraction was significant ( ) in anF(1, 73)p 7.5, p ! .01ANOVA of Boycott Likelihood with Participation Expecta-tion, Efficacy, SNI, and their interactions as predictors. Thisinteraction was also significant ( ) inF(1, 73)p 4.1, p ! .05an equivalent ANOVA of Success Perception. Finally, when

Success Perception was added to the Boycott LikelihoodANOVA, the effect of the Participation Expectation # Ef-ficacy interaction was substantially attenuated (F(1, 73)p

).23.7, p ! .06; %Dq p68.4

Summary

This study shows that, in line with social dilemma andreference group theories, the positive effect of subjects ex-pectation of overall participation in a boycott on their boy-cott likelihood is greater for those who are more susceptibleto normative influence and who have weaker efficacy per-ceptions. This study also underscores the importance of mes-sage framing in proboycott communications; when a success

frame is used, subjects boycott likelihood is relatively im-mune to variations in their participation expectation andperceived efficacy. However, when a failure frame is used,subjects boycott likelihood is an interactive product of theirparticipation expectation and efficacy. Notably, these inter-active effects of frame, overall participation expectation, andefficacy appear to be mediated by subjects perception ofthe boycotts likelihood of success.

The next study focuses on the relationship between con-sumers boycotting behavior and the costs they incur fromboycotting. In doing so, we also try to address some of thelimitations of study 1. First, although the study 1 boycottscenarios were believable, they were hypothetical and there-fore may not accurately represent real boycott situations. In

study 2, we focus on real, ongoing boycotts. Also, our Par-ticipation Expectation manipulation (i.e., Lowp 15%; Highp 80%) may have been viewed as unrealistic. In study 2,the high and low Participation Expectation levels are basedon pretest subjects own estimates of the percent of con-sumers that would need to boycott for the relevant boycottto succeed. Also, measuring subjects SNI after elicitingtheir boycott intentions may have caused the latter to influ-ence the former. While additional tests revealed that sub-

jects SNI measures were no higher in the High Participation


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Expectation condition than in the Low one and the overallcorrelation between SNI and Boycott Intention was only.06, in study 2 we measure subjects SNI before their ex-posure to boycott information. Finally, study 1 focused onboycott intentions, not actual behavior. Since intentions arenot perfect predictors of behavior, it is possible that actual

boycott behavior may differ from subjects stated intentions.Therefore, in addition to intentions, in study 2 we measureactual boycotting behavior.

STUDY 2

Stimuli Development

This study examines the effects of product preference andsubstitutability (see fig. 1) on subjects willingness to par-ticipate in real, ongoing social-issue boycotts. Using twopretests, we selected two social-issue boycotts that met thefollowing criteria: (a) the boycotts be real and currentlyunder way, (b) both the boycotted product(s) and the boycott

issue(s) be somewhat relevant to the subject population, (c)this populations awareness of and participation in the boy-cotts not be so high as to overwhelm the experimental ma-nipulations, and (d) substitutes for the boycotted productsbe available. Specifically, 36 subjects in the first pretestindicated their liking for and loyalty to the products of sev-eral current boycott targets (e.g., Nike, Colgate-Palmolive,Proctor & Gamble, grapes). For each of these boycott tar-gets, 43 subjects in a second pretest provided informationabout their awareness of the boycott, their participation inthe boycott, the extent to which they cared about the boycottissue, the percent of people they thought needed to partic-ipate in the boycott for it to succeed, and the perceiveddifficulty of finding satisfactory substitutes for the boycotted

products.Based on these pretests we picked the boycott of (1)

Colgate-Palmolive products (including Colgate toothpaste)because of the companys use of animal testing, and (2)Proctor & Gamble (P&G) products (including Crest tooth-paste) because of the companys presence in Burma, a nationwith a poor human rights record. Pretest subjects awarenessof these boycotts was low (M p 0%, M p 4.8%;Colgate Crest

), and no subjects were currently partic-zp 1.06, pp .29ipating in these boycotts. Furthermore, there were no sig-nificant differences (based on seven-point scale ratings) inthese subjects willingness to boycott (M p 3.3,Colgate

), the extent to whichM p 3.4; t(42)p .15, pp .88Crestthey cared about the boycott issues (M p 3.2,Colgate

), and their ability to findM p 3.7; t(42)p .91, pp .37Crestsatisfactory substitutes for the target brands (M pColgate

). Also, their pref-2.3, M p 3.0; t(42)p 1.1, pp .26Cresterence for (M p 4.7, M p 4.3; t(35)p 1.1, ppColgate Crest

) and loyalty toward (.26 M p 3.3, M p 3.3;Colgate Crest) these brands did not var yt(35)p .03, pp .98

significantly.It is important to note that the fact that the toothpastes

(i.e., Crest and Colgate) manufactured by these two boy-cotted companies are substitutes of each other permitted us

an efficient operationalization of substitutability. Specifi-cally, subjects were randomly chosen to have either Crestor Colgate toothpaste be the boycott target brand and theother be the substitute brand. We manipulated substituta-bility by offering them either (i) a choice between the targetbrand and the substitute brand (i.e., both Crest and Colgate),

(ii) the target brand only (i.e., Crest [Colgate] only for thoseexposed to the Crest [Colgate] boycott), or (iii) the substitutebrand only (i.e., Crest [Colgate] only for those exposed tothe Colgate [Crest] boycott). This allowed us to use the samechoice sets and, therefore, compare choice shares of thesetwo brands across the two boycott scenarios.

Design and Procedure

This experiment had a 2 (Participation Expectation)# 3(Substitutability) between-subjects design. The Low (15%)and High (50%) levels of the Participation Expectation fac-tor were based on the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percen-tiles, respectively, of pretest subjects estimates of the per-

centage of people who needed to participate for the relevantboycotts to succeed. Substitutability, at three levels (TargetBrand p boycott target brand only, Substitute Brand psubstitute brand only, and Both Brandsp both brands), wasoperationalized at the point of product choice as describedabove. Finally, we measured both subjects preference fortheir boycott target brand (i.e., Preference; see appendix)and SNI ( ) and divided themMp 2.9, SDp 1.1, ap .88into two groups around each variables median rating. No-tably, this experiment included additional control conditionsin which subjects made toothpaste choices in the three Sub-stitutability conditions without any prior exposure to boycottinformation. These choices served as baseline measures ofthis populations preferences for their target toothpaste brand

in the different Substitutability conditions.The study was conducted in three separate sessions to

minimize demand and carryover effects. One hundred sixty-six subjects completed all three sessions, which were inter-spersed among several other unrelated studies, as part of aclass requirement. Subjects responses in the different ses-sions were matched using their student numbers. The firsttwo sessions were conducted in laboratories outside of class,while the third session was conducted in class. In the firstsession, subjects completed the SNI scale (Bearden et al.1989) and indicated their Preference for 18 different nationalbrands, including the target Crest and Colgate ones.

In the second session, subjects were assigned, at random,to read a newspaper article about either the Crest or the

Colgate boycott. As in study 1, this article contained theParticipation Expectation manipulation (appendix). Subjectsthen indicated their Boycott Likelihood using a multi-itemscale ( ). This scale was iden-Mp 4.7, SDp 1.6, ap .96tical to the one in study 1 with the exception of two addi-tional boycott intention items (seven-point scales; Extremelyunlikely/Extremely likely, Not at all probable/Highly prob-able). Next, subjects indicated the importance to them ofthe boycott issue (Issue Importance; appendix). Because thisstudy focused on real, social-issue boycotts, we expected


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substantial variation among subjects on this measure. As instudy 1, subjects then responded to several checks, includingthat for the Participation Expectation manipulation (Mp

), the newspaper articles believability33.7, SDp 18.8( ), and the persuasiveness of Mp 5.2, SDp 1.1, ap .86the arguments it contained ( ).Mp 4.8, SDp 1.4, ap .93

We assessed subjects boycotting behavior in the thirdsession. Approximately one week after subjects were ex-posed to the boycott information (i.e., on the last day ofclass) one of the researchers (who was not present duringthe first two sessions) went to all the classes that had com-pleted the first two sessions and informed subjects that asa reward for participating in all the marketing studies overthe course of the semester (completed in three one-hoursessions) the department was offering them a free product(i.e., a thank you gift) donated by a consumer goods firm.The length of time between exposure to boycott informationand choice was selected to minimize potential demand ef-fects but ensure that subjects could still recall the boycottinformation. Each subject received a sheet of paper con-

taining a list of the brand(s) corresponding to one of thethree Substitutability conditions: (i) Crest toothpastes only,(ii) Colgate toothpastes only, and (iii) Crest and Colgatetoothpastes. To further reduce task transparency, we includedmultiple Crest and Colgate product types (e.g., Tartar Con-trol, Baking Soda, Fluoride) in the relevant choice sets (ap-pendix). Subjects were asked to choose a brand from theirchoice set by checking it. It is important to note that theyalso had the option of not choosing any of the brands intheir choice set (i.e., a no-choice option; Dhar 1997). Sub-

jects who selected a brand received the actual product fromthe researcher. We lost one subject between the first twosessions and this third one, resulting in a total of 165 ob-servations in our choice data.

Each class was debriefed after all subjects completed thischoice task. While it was clear from the ensuing discussionthat subjects recalled the boycott information from session2, none of them indicated being aware of an explicit con-nection between the third session and the prior two. In fact,many were surprised to learn that the thank you gift waspart of the boycott study, suggesting that the use of the threeseparate sessions run by different experimenters did helpcontrol for potential demand effects.

The control choice shares for the target products were ob-tained using an identical procedure among students from thesame population ( ) who had completed three hoursnp 101of studies that did not include this one. In other words, thesesubjects participated in session 3 but not sessions 1 and 2.

Results

As in study 1, Boycott Likelihood and all the manipu-lation check items were analyzed using the full ANOVAmodel with Preference, Participation Expectation, SNI, andtheir interactions as independent factors. While the two lev-els of SNI and Preference used in these analyses were ob-tained through median splits, analyses based on continuousmeasures of these variables yielded comparable results. An

analogous ANOVA of Issue Importance did not reveal anysignificant variations across different experimental levels.However, because subjects responded to real boycotts, weincluded Issue Importance as a covariate in all analyses.Notably, excluding Issue Importance from these analysesdid not alter our findings. Finally, an ANOVA with Pref-

erence as the dependent variable and Participation Expec-tation, SNI, and their interaction as independent factors re-vealed that Preference did not vary significantly across theexperimental conditions. The significant results are pre-sented next. Details of all analyses can be obtained fromthe authors.

Manipulation Checks. As in study 1, subjects per-ceived the Participation Expectation manipulation as in-tended (M p 18.6%, M p 48.9%; F(1, 165)pLow High

). There was no evidence of unintended cross-291.7, p ! .01over effects or contamination across the independent factors(Perdue and Summers 1986). Subjects also found the news-paper article to be believable (5.15) and its arguments to be

moderately persuasive (4.82). These ratings did not varyacross the experimental conditions.

Boycott Likelihood. As in study 1, Participation Ex-pectation had a positive effect on Boycott Likelihood(M p 4.66, M p 4.75; F(1, 165)p 5.82, p ! .05,Low High

). Moreover, this main effect was qualified by ahp .13marginally significant Participation Expectation # SNI in-teraction ( ); in line with hypoth-F(1, 165)p 3.69, p ! .10esis 1, Participation Expectation had a significant effect onthe High SNI subjects Boycott Likelihood (M p 4.65,Low

), but notM p 4.95; F(1, 82)p 9.8, pp .05, hp .16Highon that of the Low SNI ones ( ).M p 4.66, M p 4.53Low High

As expected (hypothesis 4a), Preference had a significant

negative main effect on Boycott Likelihood (M pLow).4.90, M p 4.49; F(1, 165)p 4.39, p ! .05, hp .11High

However, contrary to hypothesis 4b, the effect of Partici-pation Expectation on Boycott Likelihood did not increasewith their Product Preference (Participation Expecta-tion# Preference: ). This suggests that theF(1, 165)p .01moderating effect of Product Preference on the ParticipationExpectationBoycott Likelihood relationship may be non-linear. For instance, Participation Expectation may affectsubjects Boycott Likelihood the most when their Preferencefor the boycotted product is moderate rather than low (i.e.,they will boycott regardless of others participation) or high(i.e., they will not boycott, regardless of others participa-tion). Finally, Issue Importance (i.e., the covariate) was also

a positive predictor of Boycott Likelihood (bp .78,p ! .01).F(1, 165)p 190.65,

This studys main focus, however, was on boycotting be-havior and its dependence on Participation Expectation,Product Preference, and Substitutability. We used subjectssession 3 brand choices to create two related measures ofboycotting behavior: Match and No Choice. Match reflectedthe boycotted brands choice share in the Target Brand andBoth Brands Substitutability conditions and was obtainedby recoding the choice data for each subject in these con-


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ditions. If a subject chose the boycott target brand, Matchwas coded as 1. If a subject chose the substitute brand ordid not choose any brand, Match was coded as 0. Thus, alower percentage of Match in a given experimentalconditionreflects stronger boycotting behavior in that condition. NoChoice captured the withholding of consumption and was

obtained by recoding subjects choices in all three Substi-tutability conditions into a Choice/No Choice dichotomy. Ifa subject refrained from choosing a brand in session 3, NoChoice was coded as 1. If a subject chose a brand in session3, No Choice was coded as 0. Thus, a higher percentage ofNo Choice in a particular experimental condition reflectsstronger boycotting behavior in that condition. Since Matchand No Choice are correlated ( ) and therp .56, p ! .01results for both measures are very similar, only the Matchresults are presented. Interested readers can obtain the fullset of results from the authors.

Choice: Boycott versus Control. Prior to the analysesinvolving Match, we contrasted the choices of the subjects

in the experimental boycott conditions to the choices of thosein the control conditions. As expected, exposing subjects toboycott information made them more likely to boycott thetarget brand. Specifically, a significantly greater percent ofsubjects in the boycott conditions chose not to receive anybrand (27.8%, ) than in the control conditions (6.8%,np 165

). More specifically, when nonp 101; zp 4.17, p ! .05substitutes were available (i.e., the Target Brand and the OtherBrand conditions), a significantly lower percent of subjectsin the experimental boycott conditions chose a brand (66.2%,

) than in the control conditions (86.3%,np 107 np 51;). Finally, in line with hypothesis 5a, thezp 2.63, p ! .05

availability of substitutes had a bigger effect on choice in theboycott conditions than in the control ones. Specifically, in

the boycott conditions, more subjects chose a product whenthey had access to substitutes (M p 82.8%, npBothBrands

) than when they did not (58 M pTarget Brand andOther Brand). This difference was66.2%, np 107; zp 2.27, p ! .05

much smaller in the control conditions (M pBothBrands96.0%, np 50; M p 86.3%, np 51;Target BrandandOther Brand

).zp 1.71, p ! .10

Match. We tested hypotheses 4 and 5 through anANOVA with Participation Expectation, SNI, Preference,Substitutability, and their interactions as independent factorsand Issue Importance as a covariate. Since Match has nomeaning in the Other Brand Substitutability condition, inwhich subjects session 3 choice sets did not contain their

boycott target brand, we restricted our analysis to obser-vations in the Target Brand and Both Brand Substitutabilityconditions. Since Match is a dichotomous variable, we alsoconducted the same analysis using a logistic regression andobtained the same pattern of results.

Variations in Match in the different experimentalconditionssupported hypothesis 4a, hypothesis 5a, and hypothesis 5b.Subjects were more likely to boycott when product preferencewas low (hypothesis 4a): Preference was a positive predictorof Match (M p .26, M p .51; F(1, 109)p 8.3, p !Low High

). However, hypothesis 4b was again not sup-.05, hp .25ported: the effect of Participation Expectation on Match wasno greater when Preference was High (M p .44,Low

NS) than when it was LowM p .56; F(1, 55)p .7,High( NS). SubjectsM p .35, M p .19; F(1, 51)p 1.7,Low Highwere also more likely to boycott when substitutes were avail-

able (hypothesis 5a): Match was lower in the Both Brands(.28) than in the Target Brand (.51) Substitutability condition( ). This was qualified byF(1, 109)p 7.2, p ! .05, hp .23a significant Substitutability# Participation Expectation in-teraction ( ) supporting hypothesisF(1, 109)p 10.6, p ! .055b: in the Target Brand Substitutability condition, Match waslower when Participation Expectation was High (.38) thanwhen it was Low (.67; ).F(1,51)p 6.72, p ! .05, hp .22In other words, the positive effect of participation expectationon boycott behavior was greater when no substitutes wereavailable.

Interestingly, Participation Expectation did affect Matchin the Both Brands Substitutability condition: Match wasactually higher when Participation Expectation was High

(.40) than when it was Low (.15; F(1,55)p 4.44, p !). While this was unexpected, it could be that.05, hp .18

when substitutes were available higher overall participationencouraged subjects to free ride because they felt that theboycott would succeed regardless of their participation giventhat others were boycotting and it was easy for them to doso. Finally, these Participation Expectationbased variationsin Match were confined largely to the High SNI subjects(Target Brand: M p .75, M p .36, F(1, 24)p 6.8,Low High

Both Brands:p ! .05, hp .23; M p .08, M p .57,Low High) rather than the Low SNIF(1, 25)p 7.4, p ! .05, hp .24

ones (Target Brand: Both Brands:M p .58, M p .40;Low High).M p .21, M p .25Low High

Summary

This study examines boycotting behavior in real social-issue boycotts to confirm and generalize the study 1 findingthat subjects expectation of overall participation affectstheir likelihood of participating in a boycott and that thiseffect varies directly with their susceptibility to normativeinfluence. This study also demonstrates that subjects like-lihood of participating in a boycott is influenced by theirpreference for the boycotted product and the availability ofsubstitutes for it (i.e., the costs of boycotting). The availa-bility of substitutes (i.e., lower cost) not only increased sub-

jects boycotting likelihood but also reduced the influenceof overall participation expectation on boycott likelihood.

While lower preference for the product (i.e., lower cost) alsoincreased subjects boycotting likelihood, it did not mod-erate the overall participation expectationboycotting like-lihood relationship.

DISCUSSION

Much is known today about the forces affecting and un-derlying consumption. Less is understood, however, aboutwhen and why people resist consumption (cf. Penaloza and


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Price 1993). This article contributes to our scant but growingunderstanding of consumer resistance by providing insightsinto the determinants of and mechanisms underlying con-sumers decisions to withhold consumption of a good in theinterest of achieving some collective benefit. In particular,we propose and demonstrate that the individual participation

decision in a boycott can be conceptualized as a social di-lemma, influenced by reference group effects.

Theoretical and Marketing Implications

Consumer Boycotts. Extant boycott research has fo-cused primarily on macro-level characteristics of boycotts,their targets and their sponsors. Moreover, insights into theindividual boycott participation decision have revolvedaround a somewhat idiosyncratic set of individual- and boy-cott-specific factors (see Garrett [1987] for recent review).This article contributes to our understanding of consumerboycotts by highlighting the individual-versus-group tension

at the heart of the individual boycott decision. In particular,our findings suggest that consumers uncertainty about theextent to which people can (i.e., efficacy) and will (i.e.,overall participation) contribute to the boycotts success isa key barrier to their willingness to participate.

The importance of these uncertainties regarding collectivebehavior to the participation decision is corroborated bysome qualitative research we conducted to understand thereasons underlying subjects decision to participate in twoseparate price boycotts (CD stores and movie theaters) intheir local area. While several subjects referred, in theirretrospective verbal reports, to the trade-offs between theshort-term costs (I like music too much, Im not willingto sacrifice my viewing pleasure, I will miss listening to

the latest CDs) and long-term benefits of boycotting (Par-taking in the boycott will be economical in the long run,My extra little effort will save me in the long run, Idboycott because in the long run Ill benefit with lowerprices), they expressed doubts about the boycotts likeli-hood of success (I dont think the boycott would work,I dont imagine the boycott will be successful, [The boy-cott] may not necessarily achieve its goal), and more spe-cifically, widespread participation (Not enough peoplewould boycott, Even if I did boycott, there would not beenough people who joined, so it would be unsuccessful,Other people [most of them] wouldnt think it was worththe time or effort).

Some subjects explicitly linked their own participation to

overall participation (My participation would revolvearound how much of the public participated, Though Idboycott if many people do, I would boycott . . . becauseeveryone else is, If others wont, I wont either) whileothers referred to their aversion to free riding (I feel therewould be too many people that wouldnt boycott, thus ren-dering my efforts useless, For this action to be reallyeffective, most of the people would have to boycott CDs.But the truth is that . . . Every person thinks that othersshould be the one doing the boycott, while she or he enjoys

the latest releases, I will not because there wont beenough people to boycott anyway in order to restore originalprices, so I will suffer for nothing) or low perceived ef-ficacy (I wont boycott . . . because theres nothing youcould do about it, One person more or less would nothelp/hurt the boycott, I feel as though I cant make a

difference) as reasons for not participating.

Social Dilemmas. This article also contributes to ourunderstanding of cooperation in social dilemmas in severalways. First, while prior social dilemma research has ex-amined the effect of certain group characteristics (e.g., size,cohesiveness, communication) on individual cooperation be-havior, the nature and extent of the influence(s) such groupsexert have received little attention. This research draws onreference group theory to implicate the normative influenceexerted by the group of potential boycotters as a key de-terminant of cooperative behavior. In particular, consumerssusceptibility to normative influence appears to moderatethe effect of such group influences on their cooperation

behavior. At the same time, we extend reference group re-search in the consumption domain by demonstrating thatreference groups also influence consumer decisions to with-hold consumption.

Second, while researchers have conceptualized peoplesoverall participation expectation and perceived efficacy asinterdependent inputs into their estimate of the likelihoodthat the social problem will be resolved (Klandermans1992), insights into the precise relationships among theseexpectations have been largely elusive (Wiener 1993). Ourresults help disentangle these interactive effects and supportthe general notion that overall participation expectation andperceived efficacy are used to estimate a boycotts likelihoodof success. More specifically, these factors appear to be

significant inputs into consumers subjective estimates ofboycott success, affecting such estimates in a specific andpredictable manner when consumers have no independentreason to believe that the boycott will be successful.

Third, our results underscore the importance of cooper-ation costs to the cooperation decision. Specifically, we findthat boycott participation is greater when the costs associatedwith withholding consumption are lower (e.g., substitutesare available, product preference is low). Notably, these fac-tors affecting cooperation costs do not appear to operate inthe same manner: whereas the substitutability factor inter-acted in a predictable manner with subjects overall partic-ipation expectation to affect cooperation, this was not so forproduct preference. Perhaps overall participation expecta-

tion only has an effect when consumers product preferenceis moderate but not when it is high (and they are, therefore,unwilling to boycott regardless of what others are doing) orlow (and they, therefore, do not use the product). Moregenerally, our results suggest that cooperation in social di-lemmas can be obtained without resorting to a structuralsolution by highlighting the availability of substitutes wher-ever appropriate.

Finally, much social dilemma research emphasizes theimportance of persuasive communication in overcoming the


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individual reluctance to cooperate (Klandermans 1992). Akey contribution of this article stems from its focus on howmessage-related factors influence cooperation in a social di-lemma. Specifically, we communicate participation and ef-ficacy information in the context of a newspaper article andfind systematic and predictable effects of such information

on consumers perceptions of boycott success likelihoodand, in turn, their cooperation likelihood. More important,this article is, to the best of our knowledge, the first todemonstrate significant message framing effects on coop-eration in social dilemmas. While framing in the social di-lemma context has been conceptualized rather broadly (e.g.,Klandermans 1992), research (see Schwartz-Shea and Sim-mons [1995] for review) has focused primarily on how al-ternate frames of the social problem (e.g., whether a publicgood is perceived as a gain or a loss) affect cooperation.Our study focuses, instead, on the procooperation messageframes produced by the alternate collective outcomes (i.e.,successful vs. unsuccessful resolution of the problem) ofindividual action to demonstrate that by merely highlighting

these alternate outcomes, procooperation communicationcan significantly increase cooperation likelihood. The im-plications of these findings for proboycott communicationsare discussed next.

Proboycott Communications. While consumer boy-cotts today are more prevalent than ever, boycott organizersare rarely successful in inducing widespread participation,regardless of the boycotts final outcome (Ferguson 1997).This may stem, at least partly, from a lack of knowledgeabout the characteristics of effective proboycott communi-cation, which is perhaps the most important and often onlyinstrument of persuasion at the organizers disposal. Thisarticle adds to our understanding of effective proboycott

communication by examining how elements of such com-munications form and content affect participation likeli-hood. Our findings suggest that such communication maybe more effective if it highlights the consequences of boycottsuccess over failure; when proboycott communication isframed in terms of success, additional information about theexpected overall participation level and each participantsefficacy appears to have little effect on participation like-lihood. Thus, given that overall participation and efficacyestimates are typically difficult to come by, our results sug-gest that the absence of such potentially persuasive infor-mation can be at least partially compensated for by merelyhighlighting the consequences of a successful boycott. Thisfinding corroborates Wiener and Doeschers (1991) rec-

ommendation that the communication strategy of social mar-keters trying to overcome the sucker effectbased barrier tocooperation should emphasize that the collective goal islikely to be reached.

Conversely, when boycott failure is salient among poten-tial participants (as is probably often the case), our findingssuggest that both overall participation and efficacy infor-mation, if available, can have significant effects on partic-ipation likelihood. In most boycotts, consumers low par-ticipation willingness is likely to be a function of their low

overall cooperation expectation and low efficacy (i.e., theyare likely to be in the Negative Frame, Low Efficacy, andLow Participation Expectation condition of study 1). Ourresults suggest that in such situations, providing evidenceof a high anticipated level of overall participation or of highefficacy can significantly boost participation.

Limitations and Future Research

Many of this articles limitations stem from the experi-mental context used to examine the individual boycott de-cision. For instance, we use student subjects. Notably, stu-dents may be more likely, in general, to participate inboycotts because of a greater inclination toward activismduring this stage of their lives. However, there is little reasonto expect the dynamics underlying the boycott decision tobe different for students (compared to other consumers).Nevertheless, future research on the individual boycott de-cision using a broader base of respondents is essential. Inaddition, subjects were exposed to information about overall

participation levels and efficacy as well as the proboycottmessage in quick succession and in a specific order. Clearly,in real world boycotts, exposure to such information variesboth in terms of quantity, sequence, and temporal distance.Future work is needed on how these factors affect the re-lationship between consumers perceptions and their partic-ipation likelihood. The related issue of source credibility,either of the boycott organizers or of the boycott target(issuing antiboycott messages), was also not examined,pointing the way to future research. Similarly, higher issueimportance ratings in study 2 relative to those obtained inits pretests point to possible response biases born of infor-mation salience or social desirability. Future empirical workin this domain needs to check and, if necessary, control for

such potential biases.In a real world boycott, withholding purchase is typically

accompanied by monetary savings (i.e., the price) to theconsumer. We chose not to simulate purchase in study2instead, measuring boycotting in terms of subjects re-

jection of a free productto avoid potential ceiling effectscaused by subjects unwillingness to pay for the product notonly because it was being boycotted but also because they

just did not want it at that time. While we believe that ourboycotting measure provided a conservative test of our pre-dictions, future research is needed to generalize our findingsto contexts where boycotting is accompanied by monetarysavings. Finally, we assumed that the boycott decision islargely a rational rather than an emotional one and that, in

general, boycotts are viewed either neutrally or positivelyby the majority of consumers. Future research needs to ex-amine whether boycotts, in general, generate positive ornegative affect, and if so, how that moderates the decisionto participate in specific boycotts.

The effect of the boycott targets reactions on consumersparticipation decision is another important issue for futureresearch. In particular, boycott targets, in an attempt tocounter proboycott messages, may attempt to repudiate boy-cott organizers claims, deny responsibility, or highlight a


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boycotts inability to successfully resolve the focal issue.Boycott targets may also try to minimize the importance ofthe boycott issue (i.e., reduce cooperation utility) while high-lighting that of its products (i.e., increase cooperation costs),or emphasize how and why the boycott might fail (i.e.,minimize the perceived likelihood of success). Future re-

search needs to explore the moderating effect of such boy-cott target reactions on boycott likelihood.

The boycotted product in study 1, movies, is typicallypublicly consumed; most consumers go to movie theaterswith members of their reference group. Even when they dogo alone, others can observe their entry into the theater. Onthe other hand, the boycotted product in study 2, toothpaste,is usually privately consumed. While we found referencegroup effects for both types of products, it is likely thatnormative reference group influences will be stronger in thecase of publicly consumed products (e.g., driving a Mit-subishi or wearing a fur coat) or when boycott organizersor participants purposefully monitor and publicize productconsumption. Future research needs to examine how the

magnitude of such reference group effects varies with thedomain in which the boycotted product is usually consumed.

If the individual decision to boycott can indeed be con-ceptualized as a social dilemma for a wide range of products,issues, and people, then much can be gained from drawingon extant social dilemma research to better understand thisdecision. For instance, individual behavior in social dilem-mas has been characterized in terms of a rich set of indi-vidual and group-related factors (see Komorita and Parks1994; van Lange et al. 1992). These include the size, iden-tity, cohesiveness, and interdependence structure of a group;the amount and nature of communication and commitmentwithin groups; the identifiability of group members (in-cluding expectations of future interactions); and individual

differences, not only in terms of gender but also socialvalues(i.e., emphasis on cooperation, individualism or competi-tion), trust, and feelings of personal responsibility. Most, ifnot all, of these variables are relevant to a better under-standing of cooperation in boycotts. Consequently, a com-prehensive characterization of the individual boycott deci-sion in terms of the interactions of these variables with thevariables examined in this article represents a potentiallyfruitful future research agenda. More generally, social di-lemma theory itself can serve as a fruitful theoretical frame-work in our efforts to understand any kind of consumerbehavior that involves trade-offs between individual andgroup needs (e.g., consumption of public utilities, reactionto shortages (e.g., consumption of overharvested fish), char-ity and donating behavior, group dynamics and decision-making within families and organizations).

APPENDIX

FIGURE A1

STUDY 1: BOYCOTT SCENARIO (LOW PARTICIPATIONEXPECTATION; LOW EFFICACY)


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FIGURE A2

STUDY 1: PROBOYCOTT COMMUNICATION

NOTE.Top, Failure frame; bottom, Success frame.


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414

FIGURE A3

STUDY 2: BOYCOTT SCENARIO (CREST; LOW PARTICIPATION EXPECTATION)


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415

FIGURE A4

STUDY 2: CHOICE TASK


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FIGURE A5

MEASURES

[Received June 1998. Revised April 2001. David GlenMick served as editor, and William O. Bearden served as

associate editor for this article.]

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