1

The Management in Public Management:

A Canonical Perspective

H. George Frederickson

Edwin O. Stene Distinguished Professor of Public Administration

Department of Public Administration

University of Kansas

1445 Jayhawk Boulevard

4060 Wescoe Hall

Lawrence, KS 66045-3177

Phone: 785-864-9090

Fax: 785-864-5208

E-Mail: gfred@ku.edu

Edmund C. Stazyk

Assistant Professor

American University

School of Public Affairs

Department of Public Administration & Policy

4400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20016

Phone: 202-885-6362

Fax: 202-885-2347

E-Mail: stazyk@american.edu

2

Abstract

Public management in both theory and practice is particularly vulnerable to the fads and fashions

of private sector management. We argue this vulnerability runs counter to public interest by, in

part, supplanting public management knowledge, facts, and values in the name of efficiency,

effectiveness, and innovation. Nevertheless, a body of public management knowledge exists.

This knowledge can be found in a core set of readings, which derive from the Public

Administration Canon. We further argue those hoping to understand the ―management‖ in

public management must be familiar with the requisite body of ideas, concepts, and theories

found within this Canon.

3

The Management in Public Management: A Canonical Perspective

There can be little doubt public management—both in theory and practice—is

particularly vulnerable to the fads and fashions of the private sector. Ideas that work well in the

private sector are often borrowed wholesale by public managers in the name of efficiency and

innovation, with little care or thought given the unique political and institutional environment of

public organizations (e.g., Rainey, 1983; Rainey & Bozeman, 2000). Moreover, the latest public

management mot de courant can be carried from organization to organization, usually by

consultants, in a diffusion unencumbered by any significant evidence that it works (DiMaggio &

Powell, 1983). Just the most recent list is impressive—total quality management, balanced

scorecards, six sigma, evidence-based management, performance management, and the great

elephants of public management fashion: leadership and accountability.

We argue the tendency to borrow ideas and management practices from the private sector

is at best misguided, and at worst foolhardy and harmful to the public interest. By losing sight of

what makes the public sector unique and distinct from the private sector, and, more specifically

what distinguishes public management from more general forms of management, we risk

emphasizing the values of efficiency, effectiveness, and innovation at the cost of trivializing

other values relevant to public organizations and the citizenry—values like equity, fairness,

responsiveness, and transparency. In addition, we fall prey to a more basic shortcoming: we

allow private sector management ideals to supplant public management knowledge. Public

management knowledge is, itself, imbued with management facts and management values

unique—dare we say, almost exclusive—to public organizations. These management facts and

values have often developed over years (sometimes hundreds of years) of trial and error,

ultimately accumulating into managerial practices and expertise that have tended to serve public

4

organizations and citizens quite well. By allowing private sector management principles to

displace public management knowledge, we jeopardize our hold on accrued public management

facts and values.

Despite this challenge, public management knowledge is not only found in the accrued

and accumulated facts and values held by public managers. It also exists in a core body of

documents—primarily books—that trace and record what we know about public organizations

and managing such organizations. Familiarity with this core literature is essential to

understanding what makes public organizations and the management of public organizations

distinct from private sector management. Our paper describes and demarcates elements of this

fundamental body of scholarship. By doing so, we further seek to distill the essence of public

management knowledge.

To capture the essence of public management knowledge amidst broader management

facts and values, our effort draws two basic separations. First, from the general subject of public

management we separate the particular subject of management, holding the management in

public management to be unique and deserving of specific detailed attention. Second, we

separate contemporary fads and fashions in the management of public management from the

bedrock or canonical ideas, concepts, and theories in public administration and public

management literature and their applications in practice. Using these two separations, we

explicate (or unbundle) from the broader subject of public management the unique management

knowledge in public management. This knowledge is part of a broader Public Administration

Canon, and the Canon represents, we argue, the fundamental requisite body of ideas, concepts,

and theories required for any primary understanding of public administration and the

management in public management.

5

The canon we present is an epistemological approach to knowledge. In the present case,

we interpret epistemology to mean the overlap of beliefs about management in public

management on one hand, and facts about management in public management on the other. In

that overlap, one finds the management canon in public management, actual knowledge, or, an

epistemology of management in public management (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1. Public Management Epistemology

Why A Public Administration Canon?

Our primary objective is to identify an epistemology of management unique to public

management. To achieve this end, we attempt to uncover the [modern] origins of public

management knowledge and to trace the evolution of these origins to the present day. Our

emphases are primarily conceptual and theoretical, leaving the more applied and practical

aspects of the study of public management to other discussions. Put another way, we focus less

on the changing practices of public management and more on the changing concepts and theories

Management Facts

Management Beliefs

Management Knowledge/ Management

Canon

6

that account for, cause, or explain those practices. We are especially concerned with the

interplay of theory and empirically based knowledge.

We further assume there is a Public Administration Canon (hereafter, The Canon), a core

or primary body of literature essential to any in-depth understanding of the subject. Historically,

a canon represented the choice of books central to instruction in a given course or teaching

institution. Colleges with "great books" curricula are examples of the application of the logic of

the canon. In our attempt to distill an epistemology of management unique to public

organizations, we apply the logic of the canon. Yet, given the breadth of scholarship written on

public administration and related topics, it is necessary to set boundaries for our endeavor. To

fix these boundaries, we pose a relatively straight-forward question: Given the limits of time and

the abundance of reading materials, what shall the aspiring and discriminating public

administration scholar read? In the search for public management truth, which authors and books

are essential, primary, fundamental—in short, canonical?

Within The Canon, there are several genre, including, but not limited to, the Historical,

Sociological, Economic and Rational Choice, and Public Management genres.1 Moreover, each

genre contains several unique perspectives or vantages. For instance, the Historical genre

consists of a Hamiltonian vantage. The Canon can also be understood as a hierarchy of genres.

In recent generations, the Economic and Rational Choice genre rested at the apex of The Canon.

In earlier generations, the Sociological genre was exalted, later to be replaced by the Social

Science Behavioral genre and the Decision-Theoretic genre. Hierarchies change over time as

tastes and needs change. But the canonical literature upon which each genre rests changes

1 A complete list includes the Historical, Sociological (or Weberian), Traditional Public Administration, Political

Science, Social Science Behavioral, Economic and Rational Choice, Policy and Policy Implementation, Decision-

Theoretic, and Public Management genres.

7

slowly, only when there are profoundly important additions to The Canon, additions almost

always based on contributions that are notably prophetic or profoundly original.

Cognition cannot proceed without memory, and The Canon is the true art of memory.

Memory is, of course, individual. But the capacity of the individual to build upon memory and,

as is said in the modern scientific world, contribute to the body of knowledge, elevates memory

and its contributions to The Canon—ultimately to the ages.

All canons, including the Public Administration Canon, are elitist—the best of our

literature. While claiming to "open up the canon," counter-canons are also elitist, after all, how

can a theory or concept claim to be the best and not to be elite? This is not a problem because

The Canon has a tendency to expand, be updated, and be less and less exclusive.

The Canon is an expression of power, filled with preferences, advantages, disadvantages,

biases, and values. For example, much of the Traditional genre of The Public Administration

Canon privileges governmental appointments and promotions based on civil service merit—

advantaging those with merit and disadvantaging those without merit. Likewise the Traditional

genre of The Canon defended a neutral public service, masking the use of power by civil

servants. The Public Management Canon is particularly interesting because it is so directly

connected to government power and its exercise. Because governmental and political power is

embedded in The Canon, it is far more than just literature.

We believe those who aspire to the first rank of public administration scholarship must

read the Public Administration Canon. It is folly to assume one is the first to have engaged the

conceptual, theoretical, and methodological challenges of public administration and, more

specifically, public management. The best works of those who have heretofore considered our

subject are now part of The Canon. Today the best research and writing in the modern field is

8

rooted in The Canon. Too much of what passes for scholarship in contemporary public

administration is ignorant of our canonical foundations. Too many public management scholars

are doing their work in space, work that will not endure because it is not attached to our

foundations. Our hope in this paper is to apply the logic of The Canon to begin distilling a

public management epistemology connected to our history. We begin this task by isolating

several, but certainly not all, of the key readings and arguments underpinning each of unique

vantages contained in the broader Public Management genre.

The Public Management Genre

In applying the logic of the Public Administration Canon, there are many approaches one

might take to arrange key arguments from the Public Management genre and its related

scholarship. We argue the Public Management genre can be grouped into distinct perspectives,

including the Scientific Management, Administrative Management, Human Relations,

Traditional Management, and New Public Management vantages. We draw on knowledge

inherent in these individual vantages to begin fleshing out a public management epistemology.

Doing so provides a relatively simple and straightforward method for organizing public

management knowledge into convenient blocks of information. Providing a detailed review of

all scholarship informing each different vantage is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this paper.

Consequently, we review only those works considered fundamental to our current task. We

begin by examining key literature in the Scientific Management vantage, and then proceed

through each subsequent perspective, isolating the key works and arguments underpinning that

vantage.

9

The Scientific Management Vantage

In many ways, the birth of modern public management traces to Frederick W. Taylor

(1919, 2003) and the rise of the Scientific Management movement. Taylor, who began his career

as an American mechanical engineer, is widely considered the father of the Scientific

Management movement and one of the first management consultants. His interest in improving

industrial efficiency by changing the nature of work stands as one of the first recorded instances

in which the study of work and work processes were deemed significant in their own right

(Drucker, 1974). Taylor believed businesses could be made stronger and more profitable by

developing collaborative partnerships between organizational leaders and workers.2 Through

piece-meal wage systems, workers, in Taylor‘s mind, were capable of exerting more control over

their incomes and financial well-being. Yet, organizational heads also stood to gain from

altering work processes.

Simply, organizational heads could increase employee efficiency by identifying the ―one

best way‖ to accomplish tasks, which would have positive spillover effects on overall

organizational productivity and efficiency. Efforts to determine the ―one best way‖ for

accomplishing tasks were guided by carefully designed time and motion studies that focused on

the individual component parts of any given job. Once the best way for accomplishing these

component job parts was determined, tasks could be standardized across the job class to capture

the efficiencies of the best method. Efficiencies could also be attained by developing tools and

work conditions that promoted the ―one best way‖ of accomplishing job tasks, as well as by

ensuring employees accurately and adequately pursued this best method in their own jobs. To

secure cooperation from employees, Taylor argued organizational heads needed to employ and

2 Taylor‘s view of what constitutes a collaborative partnership between organizational heads and workers is rather

limited, focusing generally on the notion of collaboration vis-à-vis pay.

10

rely on a cadre of mid-level managers, who would ultimately be responsible for managing and

overseeing the daily work of employees.3 These managers would be responsible for: 1)

replacing rule-of-thumb work methods with methods based on the scientific study of job tasks; 2)

selecting, training, and developing employees according to scientific principles; 3) supervising

and providing detailed instruction to employees; and 4) providing a separation (i.e. a division of

labor) between the planning of work based on scientific principles and the actual execution of

this work by employees (Taylor, 1919). In this sense, the best results for an organization occur

when a qualified and scientifically-trained management team leads cooperative employees who

are themselves following scientifically-derived standardized work processes.

On whole, Taylor‘s (1919) principles were poorly received, viewed by many as

dehumanizing and coercive. For others, his principles spelled a direct challenge to unions and a

threat to the work of craftsman and artisan.4 However, many of Taylor‘s predecessors and

contemporaries, taking a more even-tempered approach, fared better in promoting the notion that

management could, in fact, be guided by scientific principles. For instance, the work of scholars

such as Henry Gantt (1916) and Frank and Lillian Gilbreth (1917) was aimed at increasing

efficiency rather than controlling employees. Gantt and the Gilbreths acknowledged

psychological factors influenced employee performance, and sought to emphasize measures that

3 In addition to developing his principles of Scientific Management, Taylor was also concerned about the effect of

―soldiering‖ or ―loafing‖ among employees, which he believed could lead to decreases in employee productivity and

efficiency. Taylor maintained it was, in part, the goal of managers to prevent soldiering and loafing and to secure

cooperation from employees.

4 Even though Taylor was heavily criticized, it is worth mentioning his work and principles found a voice in

government. For instance, future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, was an advocate for Taylor‘s Scientific

Management principles in the Eastern Rates Case before the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1910. In fact,

Brandeis is credited with first using the team ―Scientific Management.‖

Similarly, Taylor himself testified on the merits of his approach before a Special Committee of the House of

Representatives convened to investigate the Taylor system and other ―shop management‖ approaches (Taylor,

2003).

11

improved, for instance, employee job satisfaction. In this sense, their work offers a more

constructive and humanistic view of management reforms guided by Scientific Management

principles. Similarly, Henri Fayol (1930), a French scholar, contemporaneously developed

principles similar to those espoused by Taylor and U.S. Scientific Management proponents.

Fayol, however, went further than Taylor by developing a comprehensive, general theory of

management, which set forth the basic components, principles, duties, and qualities of

administration and management.

Despite the concerns of critics, many of the principles set forth by Taylor and subsequent

Scientific Management scholars remain in use today. For instance, modern factories and

government organizations (e.g., the U.S. Postal Service) pay particular attention to the physical

design and layout of an employee‘s work area, recognizing well-designed work environments

increase employee productivity and efficiency (Rainey, 2009; Frederickson & Stazyk,

Forthcoming). Moreover, the work of Scientific Management scholars influenced—in quite

different ways—members of the Administrative Management perspective.

The Administrative (or Classical) Management Vantage

In many ways, the early roots of the Administrative Management vantage trace to key

elements of the Scientific Management movement. As such, there is significant overlap in the

fundamental assumptions of the Scientific Management movement and Administrative

Management theories. In fact, two of the most well-known Administrative Management

theorists, Luther Gulick and Lyndal Urwick (1937), who were responsible for editing Papers on

the Science of Administration, were heavily influence by the work of Henri Fayol. One of the

papers in the Papers on the Science of Administration, ―The Administrative Theory of the State,‖

12

is by Fayol and was written in 1923—fourteen years before the publication of ―Papers.‖ Fayol,

however, died in 1925.

Given this interest, Gulick and Urwick‘s approach to Scientific Management emphasized

the word ―management‖ in the phrase ―Scientific Management.‖ They were primarily interested

in how effective organizations are organized and managed and believed it possible to build a

―science‖ of management by systematic observation, careful description, and through logic and

deduction. From such an approach, they believed there would emerge an epistemology of

organization and management, and, with a scientifically-based epistemology, both government

and industry could be made more efficient and effective. They were men engaged in

organizational affairs and particularly organizational reform, and were not primarily interested in

the study of organization and management for its own sake.

Perhaps most notable in the connection between Fayol and Gulick is the matter of the

provenance of POSDCORB. Nineteen years before the publication of Gulick‘s famous ―Notes,‖

Fayol wrote the five primary ―functions‖ of management were: planning, organizing,

commanding, coordinating, and controlling (Fayol, 1930). This list of managerial functions is

similar to Gulick‘s catalog of ―the various functional elements of the work of a chief executive

because ‗administration‘ and ‗management‘ have lost all specific content.‖ POSDCORB

consists of the initials of the words describing the seven primary executive functions:

Planning,

Organizing,

Staffing,

Directing,

Co-ordinating,

13

Reporting, and

Budgeting (Gulick & Urwick, 1939, pp. 88-89).

Gulick writes further: ―This statement of the work of a chief executive is adapted from the

functional analysis elaborated by Henri Fayol in his ‗Industrial and General Administration‘‖

(1930). Gulick goes on to claim that these seven ―elements,‖ ―activities,‖ or ―duties‖ are the

work ―of any chief executive.‖ It appears that, at the time, Fayol‘s list of managerial functions

was well established and that Gulick‘s contribution was mostly to repackage them and add the

POSDCORB acronym. In the arcane way that scholarship evolves, because of the acronym, it is

Gulick‘s work which has survived, mostly as an object of scholarly criticism but also,

particularly more recently, as an object of favorable consideration (Graham & Hays, 1993; Meier

& Bohte, 2000).

Gulick, however, was not alone in suggesting effective management depended on the

division and coordination of work. Similar arguments were made by James Mooney (1930) in

The Scalar Principle. Mooney suggested management rested on three principles: the co-

ordination principle, the scalar principle, and the functional principle. The co-ordination

principle subsumed the scalar and functional principles, essentially holding individuals within

organizations work together toward a common goal or objective under the guidance of a leader

capable of securing coordination from workers. For the organizational head to secure this

coordination, it was necessary for authority and responsibility to be delegated to lower levels

within the organization. This delegation of authority and responsibility was accomplished by

relying on the functional principle, in which authority is assigned based on differentiation among

job tasks.

14

The work of Gulick and Mooney may seem vague or overly prescriptive—points raised

by critics like Herbert A. Simon—but their work clearly represents one of the first,

comprehensive efforts to consider the role of management within organizations. Like Weber

(see Gerth & Mills, 1946), Gulick and Money emphasized the role of formal structure, based on

a hierarchy of authority, within organizations.5 They argued lines of authority must be clear,

span of control should be narrow, and tasks should be highly specialized. In this sense, Gulick

and Mooney stressed the importance of rationality and consistency within organizations, going

so far as to argue organizations could be designed to increase efficiency, effectiveness, and

rationality. While these notions remain important in many government organizations today, it is

also worth noting Administrative Management theorists have influenced government in other

meaningful ways. For instance, Gulick and fellow Administrative Management scholars played

an important role in the reorganization of the federal government through their interactions with

Congress in the Brownlow Committee and the Hoover Commission.

The Human Relations Vantage

At some level, the principles associated with the Scientific and Administrative

Management vantages had a kind of commonsense quality that was appealing to public

administration scholars and practitioners. Yet, the logic underpinning these movements was not

without criticism. Much of this criticism finds its roots in the subsequent Human Relations

perspective, which argued many of the so-called scientific or managerial principles tracing from

these movements were top-down, essentially prescriptive, and tended to underemphasize more

natural forms of cooperation (Frederickson & Smith, 2003, p. 100). These criticisms found a

home in the emerging field of industrial-organizational psychology, which, in its earliest forms,

5 Weber himself is often considered among scholars interested in classical management theories. Given the number

of studies devoted to Weber‘s work and due to the inherent constraints of conference papers, we have opted not to

consider Weber‘s scholarship here.

15

developed a management perspective standing in sharp conflict with prior views about the

fundamental nature of human behavior in organizational settings—a standpoint now most

frequently associated with the Human Relations school of thought.

One of the earliest perspectives associated with the Human Relations vantage is found in

the work of Mary Parker Follett. Follett was generally supportive of Administrative

Management theorists and the effort to develop administrative principles. However, Follett

herself has long been praised for the originality of her scholarship, which is viewed by many

academics and management experts as being well ahead of its time. In The Giving of Orders,

Follett (1940) proposed supervisors and subordinates cooperate in shared participative processes.

These processes would be based on a common understanding of a particular situation and its

subsequent needs. Supervisors and subordinates would follow the ―law‖ of the situation rather

than rely on formal orders passed from supervisors to subordinates through a hierarchy of

authority. In this sense, Follett‘s work foreshadowed much of the later participative management

movement, leaving scholars to argue Follett‘s work fits well with the Human Relations

perspective, the Traditional Management approach, and subsequent feminist theories.

The viewpoints expressed in the Human Relations vantage also owe much to a series of

experiments conducted at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company during the

1920s (see e.g., Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939).6 Through these experiments, scholars

described the Hawthorne effect, which explains worker productivity as a function of observers‘

attention rather than as a result of physical or contextual factors (Frederickson & Smith, 2003, p.

101). Subsequent interpretations of the Hawthorne effect suggest the conclusions drawn by the

original researchers were too simplistic, and that workers saw in the experiments altered forms of

6 Other developments, such as the creation of Maslow‘s (1954) hierarchy of needs, also played an important role in

the Human Relations movement. Again, given the constraints of a conference paper, we have opted to limit our

discussion to the most fundamental readings in the current endeavor.

16

supervision they preferred, ultimately increasing productivity (Greenwood & Wrege, 1986;

Burrell & Morgan, 1980; Frederickson & Smith, 2003). Nevertheless, most organization

theorists hail the Hawthorne experiments as groundbreaking for identifying the influence of

social and psychological factors on work behavior. Moreover, the Hawthorne Studies inspired

the work of Douglas McGregor, who became one of the most influential contributors to the

Human Relations movement and school of thought.

Douglas McGregor (2006), a long-time scholar at the MIT Sloan School of Management,

further challenged Scientific and Administrative Management theories by asserting successful

management largely rests on ―the human side of enterprise.‖ He argued conventional

organization theory was guided by a single, pervading assumption: ―Authority is the central,

indispensible means of managerial control…The very structure of the organization is a hierarchy

of authoritative relationships‖ (McGregor, 2006, p. 24). It is from this simple, pervading

assumption that other organizational principles, including span of control, unity of command,

staff and line, and scales of authority, ultimately derive. He suggests conventional managerial

policy draws on this postulation and consequently assumes a rather negative view of employee

behavior. McGregor characterizes this view as the Theory X approach to understanding

employee behavior. The Theory X approach assumes:

1. The average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it if he

can;

2. Because of this human characteristic of dislike of work, most people must be

coerced, controlled, directed, threatened with punishment to get them to put forth

adequate effort toward the achievement of organizational objectives; and

17

3. The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid responsibility,

has relatively little ambition, wants security above all (pp. 45-46).

McGregor acknowledges the Theory X approach provides some explanation of human

behavior, but also notes there are many examples of employees who behave in ways that are not

entirely consistent with this view of human nature (p. 47). As such, he suggests human behavior

can also be understood through an alternate lens—one that recognizes other forms of employee

behavior, social influence, and control. McGregor characterizes this as the Theory Y approach,

which holds:

1. The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is natural as play or rest;

2. External control and the threat of punishment are not the only means for bringing

about effort toward organizational objectives. Man will exercise self-direction

and self-control in the service of objectives to which he is committed;

3. Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards associated with their

achievement;

4. The average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to accept but

to seek responsibility;

5. The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, ingenuity, and

creativity in the solution of organizational problems is widely, not narrowly,

distributed in the population; and

6. Under the conditions of modern industrial life, the intellectual potentialities of the

average human being are only partially utilized (pp. 65-66).

This approach stresses the creation of conditions within organizations that allow employees to

achieve their own goals. To the extent that an organization can generate employee commitment

18

to organizational goals, thereby aligning organizational and individual goals, organizations will

be most likely to fulfill their goals when employees are allowed to work toward achieving their

own personal goals, interests, and objectives (pp. 67-76).

In this sense, McGregor‘s description of Theory X and Theory Y, along with his

assumptions about employee behavior, stand in sharp contrast to the Scientific and

Administrative Management approaches, which tended to take a negative view of employee and

employee motivation. That said, the work of McGregor and of other Human Relations theorists

has its own critics. These critics have complained Human Relations theorists focused too

heavily on the human element within organizations, largely ignoring the relevance of the

structural characteristics of organizations and other important organizational dynamics. In this

way, Human Relations scholars fell prey to the same charge they levied against Scientific and

Administrative Management theorists; they assumed an overly narrow view of organizations and

employee behavior. Critics also claimed Human Relations scholars failed to provide sufficient

empirical evidence that improved human relations would improve individual and organizational

performance (e.g., Perrow, 1970).

Despite these criticisms, there can be little doubt the Human Relations vantage has played

an important and powerful role in shaping what we know about organizations—both public and

private—and employee behavior. The Human Relations approach highlights the importance of

social and psychological factors in organizations and among employees. Public organizations

that fail to pay attention to these factors are likely to have employees with lower levels of

commitment and job satisfaction and higher employee turnover. Moreover, the significance of

the Human Relations movement has led to increased interest in the social aspects of

organizations. Much of the scholarship written in this vein can be found in the social psychology

19

literature, which arguably constitutes its own unique perspective.7 8 For the sake of time, we

offer a cursory review of key social psychological theories, beginning first with the work of Katz

and Kahn (1966).

Katz and Kahn‘s (1978) contribution to the study of organizations and management

begins with the assumption that the field of psychology has ―been impeded by an inability to deal

with the facts of social structure and organization,‖ and, as such, psychologists have largely

ignored the study of organizations and institutions, which represent a central area of human

behavior (p. 2). Responding to this challenge, Katz and Kahn, applying an open systems

perspective, sought to examine the psychological components of social structures within

organizations and institutions. Simply, they argued organizations could best be understood by

examining ―patterned behavioral events,‖ which were created and maintained by employees

through the structuring of individual roles in an organization (p. 754). Individual roles lack

constantacy, and are, instead, ―predicated on the continuing motivational and cognitive processes

that keep (or fail to keep) the individuals performing their roles‖ (p. 755). The notion that

organizations can be understood by examining patterned behavioral events alongside individual

organizational roles forms, in many ways, the crux of their contribution, pointing to the inherent

power and relevance of social roles and identification. Moreover, their argument highlights the

importance of job design, employee participation, and the impact of organizational change on

individual roles as one considers the structure of organizations and how structure and social

interactions shape employee behavior.

7 The social psychology perspective was influenced, in part, by work in the field of sociology. The best known

influences from sociology include Berger and Luckman (1967) and Kuhn (1962).

8 The Human Relations approach has also influenced so-called postmodern theories in public administration. The

postmodern approach, while not discussed here, also represents a vantage informing our public management

epistemology.

20

In many ways, Karl Weick (1979) expands on the assumptions made by Katz and Kahn.

Like Katz and Kahn, Weick suggests it is useful to consider organizations as a collection of

shared meanings or understanding. However, Weick draws more heavily on Berger and

Luckman‘s (1967) theory of the socially constructed reality, arguing one approach to

understanding organizations and the reasons why people organize can be found in the idea of

sense-making. Sense-making recognizes ―organizing is also built around feelings, actions, and

desires and collective attempts to understand them‖ (Weick, 1979, p. 134). Efforts to understand

one‘s environment translate into the creation of enacted environments. These enacted

environments become reality for the organization and individuals within the organization;

moreover, the existence of enacted environments can explain, for instance, why ―actions taken

during…consequential moments will often look absurd‖ to outsiders (p. 228). Weick‘s

discussion of sense-making, along with Katz and Kahn‘s discussion of ―patterned behavior,‖

have resonated with public administrators, pointing to the influence group behaviors and social

interactions play in shaping organizational outcomes.

The Traditional (or Generic) Management Vantage

The Traditional Management vantage, much like the Human Relations movement,

challenged many of the principles espoused by Scientific and Administrative Management

theorists. However, this challenge was much more direct, with many early Traditional

Management theorists arguing the fundamental assumptions drawn by Scientific and

Administrative Management scholars were simply incorrect. One of the strongest critiques came

from Chester Barnard.9

9 Barnard‘s scholarship has been associated with the work of Administrative Management and Human Relations

theorists. However, his strongest influence rests in the field of management. As such, we believe he fits most

clearly in the Traditional Management vantage.

21

Barnard (1968), considered a pioneer in the fields of management and public

administration, directly challenged core assumptions about organizations. He suggested

organizations were systems of consciously coordinated activities or forces occurring between

two or more individuals. This view stands in stark contrast to the then prevailing notion that

organizations were best understood as hierarchical forms of coordination and control.

By asserting this new perspective on organizations, Barnard also challenged the notion

that authority primarily flows down the hierarchy. In fact, through his ―theory of authority,‖

Barnard demonstrated considerable power accumulates at the base of the hierarchy (Frederickson

& Smith, 2003, p. 100). This theory holds authority is a form of communication found within

formal organizations. Authority helps govern the actions of employees, but any attempt to

communicate authority to workers will be ineffectual unless: 1) employees accept this

communication as a legitimate form of authority, and 2) the method for communicating authority

is also accepted by employees (Barnard, 1968, p. 163). Simply, Barnard recognized individuals

within the organization hold considerable power through their ability to obey or disobey so-

called top-down authority.

Given the power employees hold to either follow or ignore top-down authority, Barnard

suggests theories of management must account for an organization‘s culture of work, as well as

the preferences and attitudes of workers and the extent to which employee needs and interests

align with management policies and direction. The primary role of the executive, again given

the power employees hold, is to secure the cooperation of workers through effective

communication, or ―general aspects of persuasion,‖ which include ―the establishment of

inducements and incentives, and direct negotiation‖ (Barnard, 1968, p. 229). For Barnard, this

suggests organizational leaders should include employees in decision-making processes or find

22

other means to demonstrate the importance of the individual to the organization. In this sense,

Barnard‘s theory is unique—particularly when compared to Scientific Management principles—

by holding authority is delegated upward rather than directed downward (Frederickson & Smith,

2003, p. 101).

Barnard‘s work is clearly influential in its own right, and is often required reading for

students in public administration and business administration programs even today. However,

The Functions of the Executive is also important insofar as it inspired the work of Herbert A.

Simon, a Nobel Laureate in Economics. Simon found Barnard‘s work quite convincing. He was

also tremendously critical of Luther Gulick‘s heuristic, arguing POSDCORB was trafficked from

Scientific Management scholars and, more importantly, represented a series of proverbs rather

than management ―principles‖ (Simon, 1946).10

Simon was particularly critical of the ―mutually contradictory pairs‖ character of

proverbs. ―A fact about proverbs that greatly enhances their quotability is that they almost

always occur in mutually contradictory pairs ‗look before you leap‘ – ‗but he who hesitates is

lost‘‖ (p. 53). Simon further argued, ―Since one is never at a loss to find one that will prove his

point – or the precisely opposite point, for that matter – they are a great help in persuasion,

political debate, and all forms of rhetoric. But when one seeks to use proverbs as a basis of a

scientific theory, the situation is less happy. It is not that the propositions expressed by the

proverbs are insufficient; it is rather that they prove too much. A scientific theory should tell

what is true but also what is false‖ (p. 53).

10

While there is evidence Gulick adapted POSDCORB from the work of Henri Fayol, many now consider Simon‘s

critique to be unfair for three reasons. First, at no point in Notes on the Theory of Organization does Gulick describe

POSDCORB as a series of management principles. Second, scholars have increasingly argued POSDCORB aptly

describes many of the common functions of organizations. Third, scholars have suggested, even if Simon was

correct, proverbs often tells us something meaningful about life; in this case, POSDCORB represents a form of tacit

management knowledge that has inherent meaning for those interested in organizations.

23

Rather than the proverbs put forward by Gulick and others associated with Scientific

Management, Simon proposed a science of organization based on decisions—particularly

rational decisions (Simon, 1947). There can be no doubt that the epistemology of decision

theory is more scientifically empirical than the epistemology of traditional Scientific

Management. Some would go further and argue that the epistemology of decision theory is more

―true‖ than the epistemology of traditional Scientific Management, and that, therefore, Scientific

Management is ―proverbial‖ or inclines toward the use of proverbs.11

That is probably the case.

In Administrative Behavior, Simon (1947) suggested human choice and decision-making

are particularly important to organizations. He argued studies of organizations typically

emphasize organizational action, rather than the processes behind determining what is done in

these organizations. As such, he attempts to develop a science of administrative decision-

making that captures ―the process of choice which leads to action‖ (p. 1). This approach, as

Frederickson and Smith (2003) argue, is ―based on the logical positivist argument that there must

be a primary distinction between facts, which can be tested and verified; and between individual

and collective preferences and values, which cannot be scientifically verified‖ (p. 162). A theory

of administrative decision-making is therefore based, in Simon‘s mind, on a form of efficient

administrative rationality. Administrative rationality reflects a means-ends logic in which

―alternatives are chosen which are considered to be appropriate means for reaching desired ends‖

(Frederickson & Smith, 2003, p. 162). However, this rationality is limited or bounded insofar as

means and ends are often inseparable and unclear. Both because and in spite of this bounded

rationality, organizations—as well as individuals within these organizations—will make

11

The work of Simon, March, and others could easily form its own genre—a Decision-Theoretic genre. For present

purposes, we combine this Decision-Theoretic genre with the Traditional Management vantage.

24

decisions focused on maintaining predictability, stability, and equilibrium in the pursuit of

organizational objectives.

Simon‘s arguments have been incredibly influential in public administration. Moreover,

his work is credited with attempting to ―(1) clarify and put in priority order organizational values

and objectives; (2) consider the available alternative or alternatives that might achieve those

objectives; (3) analyze alternatives to find the alternative or group of alternatives most likely to

achieve preferred objectives‖ (Frederickson & Smith, 2003, p. 164). His assumptions have,

nevertheless, been challenged insofar as they failed to adequately describe ―the shared values of

decisionmakers and their collective commitments to organizational purposes,‖ as well as ―actual

patterns of organizational decisionmaking‖ (p. 165).

Subsequent scholars have attempted to develop theories of decision-making that are more

nuanced or more accurately describe how decisions happen. For instance, in The Intelligence of

Democracy, Lindblom (1965) argued decision-making in organizations required manipulated or

mutual adjustments by those involved. As Frederickson and Smith (2003) argue, Linblom‘s

work helped set the stage ―for the transition from decision theory based on rationality to decision

theory based on bounded rationality‖ (p. 165). James G. March‘s (1994) book, A Primer on

Decision Making, follows a similar vein.

March‘s early scholarship was heavily influenced by his interactions and work with

Herbert Simon. However, in his later work, March offers a convenient perspective on decision-

making, as well as a synthesis of the knowledge on bounded rationality found in the fields of

sociology, social psychology, business administration, and elements of public administration.

Simply, March‘s perspective, expressed most clearly in A Primer on Decision Making, is based

on the logics of appropriateness and consequences. Individuals within organizations are

25

assumed to be both rational and goal-oriented. However, their understanding of organizational

rationality and goals, as well as their own roles, is ultimately defined by rules within the

organization. These rules, which may be formal and informal, are history-dependent and

represent decisions made in the face of limited rationality and ambiguity. This creates a situation

in which ―organizations guide individual action by providing the content of identities and rules

and cues about when and how to make rational decisions‖ (Frederickson & Smith, 2003, p 174).

Guided action occurs in the framework of loose coupling, garbage cans, and attention—

each of which are attempts to manage organizational ambiguity. Loose coupling maintains

―institutions trade central control, comparability, and standardization for autonomous groups of

decisionmakers organized around specializations, clientele, or geography,‖ thereby exchanging

―high levels of overall institutional ambiguity for lower levels of subunit ambiguity‖

(Frederickson & Smith, 2003, p. 177). These subunits provide an environment in which specific

competencies (through the attention made possible by loose coupling arrangements) and specific

organizational needs will find one another, allowing for decisions to be made in the garbage can.

Although his work has been criticized by those who believe the garbage can approach

inappropriately depicts rational decision-making process, March‘s work has been incredibly

influential, and represents a well-grounded and theoretically-driven approach to the topic.

While the scholarship of Simon, Lindblom, and March clearly represents the best and

most well-known group of decision-theories, other theories influencing public management

knowledge also exist. One such group of theories traces to choice-based cooperation studies,

such as those exemplified in well-known prisoners’ dilemma models. In this case, Robert

Axelrod‘s (1984; 1997) work is most influential. Axelrod‘s scholarship relies on formal

mathematical models and a game theoretic approach to describe instances in which cooperation

26

may be manifest among individuals. This modeling, which uniquely and intentionally fails to

account for certain decision-making elements (such as efforts among individual participants to

determine their counterpart‘s future decisions), prompts Axelrod to provide his tit-for-tat strategy

of cooperation. The overall robustness of the tit-for-tat strategy caused Axelrod to further

generate a theory of cooperation, which acknowledges the tit-for-tat strategy often fails as the

best approach for individuals and groups of individuals. While incredibly complex, Axelrod‘s

work represents one of the most well-developed formal tests of bounded rationality and decision-

making.

The work of decision theorists, like Simon, points to another stream of research relevant

to the Traditional Management vantage. Simon, even in his 2000 John Gaus Lecture, maintained

public and private organizations were fundamentally alike along most important characteristics.

The notion that organizational theories are generic, despite any differences in organizational

setting or sector, pervaded much of the early management scholarship (see e.g., Pugh, Hickson,

and Hinings (1969)). In part, this trend reflected a concern among scholars that emphasizing

sector differences would severely limit the overall generalizability of any given organizational

theory. However, early findings from the Aston Studies suggested variables such as size, task,

and technology (meaning organizational processes) mattered more for organizational outcomes

than whether an organization operated in the public or private sector (Pugh et al., 1969). This

view dominated the study of organizations until the early 1980s, at which point scholars such as

Rainey and Bozeman began paying closer attention to the factors likely to distinguish public and

27

private organizations from one another (see e.g., Rainey, 1983; Rainey & Bozeman, 2000;

Bozeman, 2002).12

A great deal of management scholarship written in this generic tradition exists and is

relevant to public organizations. As such, a complete review of scholars subscribing to the

generic management approach is beyond the scope of this paper. However, given the importance

of such theories to public organizations, we choose to briefly review three of the more influential

scholars working in this tradition: James D. Thompson, Henry Mintzberg, and Rensis Likert.

James D. Thompson (1967), a contingency theorist, was particularly interested in

determining why organizations choose to act in certain ways. He argued organizational realities

were shaped, in large part, by the external environment the organization confronts.

Organizations look to their external environments to determine what they should be doing (their

goals and domains), as well as what they are responsible for achieving (their tasks). In other

words, organizations look to their external environments for task and domain consensus. At

times, organizations will experience instances of environmental uncertainty, which makes it

difficult for the organization to determine whether its goals and tasks are appropriate. During

instances of extreme environmental uncertainty, organizations attempt to cope with this

uncertainty by ―buffering‖ their technical cores, or those functions most important to the

organization and its continued survival. There are many buffering strategies employed by

organizations. Some are intended to protect the organization against future uncertainties, while

others reflect efforts to mitigate present uncertainties. Basically, these take two forms. First, to

protect against future uncertainties, organizations attempt to be as diverse and decentralized as

possible. Second, in times of uncertainty, organizations increase their degree of hierarchical

12

Many other scholars have argued the public sector differs from the private sector in meaningful ways. A small

sample includes, Appleby (1945), Downs (1967), Linblom (1977), and Allison (1980). However, recent public-

private distinction scholarship has been much more systematic in its approach.

28

authority in an effort to engage in boundary-spanning activities. These boundary-spanning

activities provide the organization with the knowledge necessary to more fully protect and buffer

their technical cores. Thompson‘s ideas have been incredibly influential in public

administration, and have inspired others, including Henry Mintzberg.

Mintzberg (1979), who sought to synthesize knowledge about the structure of

organizations, is best known for his identification of ―the five basic parts of organizations,‖

which include (1) an operating core, (2) a middle line, (3) a strategic apex, (4) a technostructure,

and (5) support staff (p. 20). In essence, Mintzberg argues structure matters for organizational

outcomes, often providing insight into the reasons organizations behave as they do.

Organizations are not simply reacting to environmental uncertainty; instead, their response is

typically patterned upon the organization‘s internal structure, which creates various ―pull‖

factors the organization must address during instances of uncertainty (see e.g., p. 469).

Frederickson and Smith (2003) summarize some of these factors in the following way:

The strategic apex will pull in the direction of centralization and

standardization. Middle management will tend to balkanize and

protect turf. The technostructure will join the strategic apex in a

pull to standardize. The support system will be inclined to

collaborate and network. Finally, the operating core will see a

powerful pull to professionalize (p. 78).

Nevertheless, Mintzberg (1979) argues his ―set of configurations [should be] treated as a

typology of ideal or pure types, each one a description of a basic kind of organizational structure

and its situation,‖ leaving room for the existence of hybrid structures (p. 473). While

Mintzberg‘s work remains important today, it is not without criticism.

29

One such criticism originates from the work of Donald A. Schőn (1983). Schőn attempts

to describe how managers address the challenges they face in their jobs. He argues the work of

scholars such as Barnard and Mintzberg, while important, has split the field and training of

managers insofar as it undervalues experience (reflection-in-action) by over-emphasizing theory

and technique (technical rationality) (pp. 239-240). Schőn maintains practitioners rely more

heavily on their experiences and on-the-job improvisation than on what they learn in graduate

school. As such, he argues practitioners, hoping to make good policy choices, should and must

structure their lives such that they can engage in reflection-in-action. This is important to Schőn

because ―the existence of a widespread capacity for reciprocal reflection-in-action is unlikely to

be discovered by an ordinary social science which tends to detect, and treat as reality, the

patterns of institutionalized contention and limited learning which individuals transcend, if at all,

only on rare occasions. The extent of our capacity for reciprocal reflection-in-action can be

discovered only through an action science which seeks to make what some of us do on rare

occasions into a dominant pattern of practice‖ (pp. 353-354). That said, this approach, while

important, is not particularly useful in helping either practitioners or scholars understand or

categorize the broader experiences of managers and organizations in meaningful ways.

Nevertheless, the work of Schőn and others clearly points to a stream of scholarship that

attempts to adapt what we have learned about individuals, and efforts to motivate these

individuals, from management theory. One such example is found in the work of Rensis Likert

(1967). Likert‘s work on The Human Organization depicts a redesigned management system

that can theoretically be used to achieve increased productivity, higher financial success, and

improved labor relations by placing greater emphasis on employees. Simply, Likert argues

organizations, seeking to ensure high levels of productivity, must make the best possible use of

30

their employees. This occurs when leaders rely on a participative-group system, in which leaders

have confidence in subordinates, employees have a high degree of commitment to the

organization‘s goals and objectives, communication is strong, cooperative teamwork is common,

and economic rewards are based on mutually determined goals. Consequently, Likert‘s work

reflects a trend toward paying more attention to the relationship between individuals and

organizations in ways that mesh Traditional Management theories with ideas like those espoused

in Human Relations perspective.

Before progressing, we would be remiss if we failed to note important theories were

developed in public administration between the Scientific Management movement and the onset

of the New Public Management movement. Many of these theories are important in identifying

a public management epistemology. A short list includes Blau (1955, 1964), Selznick (1966,

1984), and Cleveland (1972), though many other scholars also make relevant contributions.

Once again, the constraints of a conference paper prevent discussing the important contributions

of each of these scholars.

The New Public Management Vantage

During the 1980s and 1990s, several public management scholars began more fully

exploring whether organizational theory should, in fact, treat management across the public and

private sectors generically. In essence, scholars writing in this vein offered a rejoinder to

proponents of the Traditional Management vantage, arguing there are important differences

between public and private organizations (e.g., Rainey, 1983; Rainey & Bozeman, 2000;

Bozeman, 2002). Admittedly, certain perspectives found in Traditional Management theories—

particularly notions related to organizational size, task routineness, and work processes—are

indeed relevant to public organizations and, consequently, appear to be generic in nature.

31

However, public management scholars have systematically identified a range of factors that

clearly distinguish public organizations from private firms. For instance, much of the research

suggests public organizations are subject to goals that are more numerous, ambiguous, and

complex. Similarly, the environment of public organizations is often quite different, requiring

public managers to cope with, and respond to, requests, expectations, and oversight from a

broader audience and range of interests (e.g., politicians, special interest groups, and

constituents). Perhaps most significantly, scholars analyzing public-private distinctions highlight

the normative, value-laden nature of government—or, more specifically, the notion that

government exists to fulfill the public interest by fulfilling public values. Often the private

sector, which is driven by a profit motive and subsequently tends to view actions in the short-

term, is ill-equipped or uninterested in providing for the public interest.

We believe such findings point to the importance of recognizing what is unique about,

and in, public management. However, much of the scholarship written over the past 30 years

under the so-called New Public Management movement ignores key messages grounded in

public-private distinction scholarship. In part, this trend reflects the colonization of earlier

Traditional Management theories and practices, such as management by objectives and total

quality management, in the public administration arena. However, it also represents a concerted

effort by politicians and certain scholars to reform public organizations in ways that will

ultimately make public and private organizations more alike in their day-to-day operations. In

the U.S. context, the roots of the New Public Management vantage largely trace to David

Osborne and Ted Gaebler‘s (1993) work on reinventing government and the Clinton-Gore

National Performance Review. However, the vast majority of New Public Management

32

scholarship comes from reform efforts in countries like New Zealand and the United Kingdom

from the 1980s to the early 2000s.

Generally, the work contained within the New Public Management vantage suggests

public organizations must focus more heavily on performance outcomes and increasing

efficiency. To reach these ends, New Public Management proponents argue market-based logics

and private sector initiatives need to be more fully instituted in public organizations. Hood

(1991) goes so far as to suggest New Public Management has been shaped by ―new institutional

economics‖ (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; Williamson, 1975), which emphasizes notions like

principle-agent theory, transaction cost economics, bureau maximization, and quasi-market

theory. Taken together, these theories suggest large public organizations tend to be wasteful and

self-interested budget maximizers. However, New Public Management proponents offer three

general solutions to manage big runaway bureaucracies. First, large organizations should be split

into several smaller agencies. Second, competition between organizations must be introduced.

Finally, organizational budgets should be managed better by, in part, developing economic

incentives similar to those offered in private organizations (e.g., pay-for-performance,

broadbanding, team-based pay). Such efforts are meant to increase individual and organizational

performance and innovation, while also promoting better use of organizational resources.

The New Public Management vantage also offers many other recommendations for

improving organizational performance. For instance, proponents suggest organizations should

be downsized and decision-making should be decentralized. Public organizations should view

citizens as customers, and, as such, these organizations should be service-oriented. Efforts to

reform how public policy is created, implemented, and administered are necessary. Networks

play a substantial role in shaping public policy and performance outcomes. And finally,

33

proponents suggest government operations should be subject to greater transparency and

accountability.13

On whole, these recommendations are anchored in public-choice theory, and

the movement‘s conclusions are directed toward altering the structure of public organizations in

ways that are intended to promote performance gains. Before concluding this section, it is also

worth mentioning there is a great deal of debate about the continued dominance of the New

Public Management perspective. Some claim New Public Management is alive and well; others

suggest New Public Management has declined (Hughes, 2003) or that a new movement—usually

characterized as Digital Era Governance—has begun (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & Tinkler,

2006). In either case, we believe it is too early to begin identifying new management knowledge

coming from the decline or replacement of the New Public Management movement.

Reflections on the Canon: Our Public Management Epistemology

We begin by noting our efforts to identify a public management epistemology are, at best,

cursory in the present work, due mainly to the natural constraints of a conference paper.

Nevertheless, we believe the scholarship reviewed here offers a solid representation of the

prevailing facts, values, and subsequent wisdom and knowledge housed within each of the

vantages discussed. Moreover, these different viewpoints clearly communicate meaningful

information about management in the public sector. A brief catalogue of the key messages

contained within each vantage includes the following:

1. From the Scientific Management vantage, we learn public organizations can be

made stronger and more efficient by attending to the physical design and layout of

an employee‘s work environment. Organizations are likely to perform better with

a sensible division of labor and a competent, highly-trained, and knowledgeable

13

A good summary of key elements of the New Public Management movement can be found in Kettl (2000) and

Peters and Pierre (1998).

34

workforce. Management should oversee the activities of workers and serves as

the bridge between organizational leaders and workers.

2. From the Administrative Management vantage, we learn organizations can be

designed in ways that promote efficiency, effectiveness, and rationality. The

success of these efforts often rests in the formal structure of an organization,

which should be based on a hierarchy of authority. In this hierarchy, lines of

authority must be clear, span of control should be narrow, and tasks should be

highly specialized. More importantly, we learn management matters, and that

managers are ultimately responsible for ensuring core organizational functions

(e.g., planning, coordinating) are met.

3. From the Human Relations vantage, we learn employees matter, and the

relationship between workers and managers is often dynamic, interrelated, and

complex. Employees are motivated by a wide range of intrinsic and extrinsic

interests. Social dynamics and psychological factors influence the actions and

behaviors of workers in highly nuanced ways. Individuals also shape the

environment and context of their organizations, highlighting the importance of

social roles and identification, job design, employee participation, and

organizational change on performance. Managers must be acutely aware of

employees‘ needs and interests; failing to do so has implications on employee job

satisfaction, commitment, and turnover.

4. From the Traditional Management vantage, we learn considerable power rests at

the base of the hierarchy. Employees have a great deal of say in shaping

organizational outcomes. Consequently, employee needs, organizational culture,

35

leadership, and communication patterns all influence individual and

organizational performance. We also learn organizational goals matter, but the

ability of organizations to act rationally in decision-making processes tends to be

hampered by various forms and sources of uncertainty, which explains why

individuals and organizations often arrive at less than optimal solutions.

Uncertainty—especially environmental uncertainty—causes organizations to take

steps to protect core functions and mitigate uncertainty. Finally, various

structural characteristics, including organizational size, task routineness, and work

processes, also shape organizational outcomes in meaningful ways. For instance,

organizations that are larger or who have work tasks and processes that are fairly

routine tend to be more effective and efficient when decisions are centralized and

the organization is more bureaucratic.

5. Finally, from the New Public Management vantage, we learn systems of

governance matter for public organizations. Organizations hoping to survive and

thrive must connect actions to outcomes. Public managers must be service-

oriented. Decisions must happen quickly, and are often subject to considerable

scrutiny. Systems of accountability and transparency help ensure decisions will

be viewed as legitimate. In the future, managers will likely face increased

competition for already scarce resources. Networks provide an opportunity to do

more with less, but raise other, considerable challenges (e.g., accountability and

transparency).

Together, each point adds meaning and perspective to our understanding of management

in the public sector. We learn management, in general, is highly contextualized and dynamic.

36

More importantly, we also learn public management is subject to a unique set of challenges,

often due to the political environment within which public organizations inherently operate.

Failing to account for these challenges and differences is risky, leaving public management

practitioners and scholars open to borrowing the wrong ideas from the private sector—ideas that

conflict with the distinctive contextual environment of public organizations. We see some

evidence of this trend in the New Public Management scholarship and in recent practice. For

instance, in the U.S., efforts taken by both Presidents Bush and Obama to reform the federal pay

system by introducing pay-for-performance are clearly in-tune with prevailing New Public

Management assertions; yet, the benefits of pay-for-performance in public organizations lack

support in much of the public management research (Ingraham, 1993; Kellough & Lu, 1993;

Perry, Engbers, & Jun, 2009). In fact, some public management scholarship goes so far as to

suggest efforts to introduce pay-for-performance may actually harm public sector performance

by, for instance, diminishing the intrinsic, altruistic motives of public employees (Houston, 2009;

Moynihan, 2008). Such examples highlight our field‘s real need to more clearly demarcate and

draw upon the unique knowledge found in the Public Management genre.

Conclusions

In this paper, we have argued borrowing ideas and management practices from the

private sector can be misguided and harmful to the public interest. It causes public management

scholars and practitioners to lose sight of what distinguishes the public sector from the private

sector, and emphasizes certain values at the cost of others. In addition, this trend allows private

sector management ideals to supplant public management knowledge. Public management

knowledge is, itself, imbued with management facts and values unique to public organizations.

These management facts and values have often developed over years of trial and error, and

37

represent the sum total of a group of managerial practices that have historically served public

organizations and citizens well. By allowing private sector management principles to displace

public management knowledge, we jeopardize our hold on accrued public management facts and

values. It is essential managers and scholars, hoping to avoid this pitfall, familiarize themselves

with the public management knowledge found in the core body of documents and books that

record what we know about public organizations and managing them.

Works Cited

Appleby, P. H. (1945). Big democracy. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.

Allison, G. T. (1980). Proceedings of the public management research conference. Washington,

DC: Office of Personnel Management (127-53-1).

Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Axelrod, R. (1997). The complexity of cooperation: Agent based models of competition and

collaboration. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Barnard, C. I. (1968). The functions of the executive (30th

Anniversary Edition). Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press.

Berger, P., & Luckman, T. (1967). The social construction of reality. New York, NY:

Doubleday.

Blau, P. (1955). The dynamics of bureaucracy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Blau, P. (1964). Exchange and power in social life. New York, NY: Wilson.

Burrell, G., & Morgan, G. (1980). Sociological paradigms and organizational analysis. London:

Heinemann.

Bozeman, B. (2002). Public-value failure: When efficient markets may not do. Public

Administration Review, 62, 145-161.

38

Cleveland, H. (1972). The future executive: A guide for tomorrow’s managers. New York, NY:

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.

DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and

collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147-

160.

Downs, A. (1967). Inside bureaucracy. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.

Drucker, P. (1974). Management: Tasks, responsibilities, practices. New York, NY: Harper &

Row.

Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Bastow, S., & Tinkler, J. (2006). New public management is dead—

long live digital era governance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,

16(3), 467-494.

Fayol, H. (1930). Industrial and general administration. London: Pitman Publishers.

Follett, M. P. (1940). Dynamic administration: The collected papers of Mary Parker Follett (H.

C. Metcalf & L. Urwick, Eds.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Frederickson, H. G., & Smith, K. B. (2003). The public administration theory primer. Boulder,

CO: Westview Press.

Frederickson, H. G., & Stazyk, E. C. (Forthcoming). Bureaucracy: The visible hand. In R.

Durant (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of American bureaucracy (pp. 583-621). Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Gantt, H. L. (1916). Industrial leadership. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Gerth, H. H., & Mills, C. W. (1946). From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Gilbreth, F., & Gilbreth, L. (1917). Applied motion study. New York, NY: Sturgis & Walton.

39

Graham, C. B. Jr., & Hays, S. W. (Eds.). (1993). Managing the public organization (2nd

Ed.).

Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.

Greenwood, R., & Wrege, C. (1986). The Hawthorne studies. In D. Wren & J. Pearce II (Eds.),

Papers dedicated to the development of modern management (pp. 24-35). Washington,

DC: The Academy of Management.

Gulick, L., & Urwick, L. (Eds.) (1937). Papers on the science of administration. New York, NY:

Institute of Public Administration.

Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons? Public Administration, 69(1), 3-19.

Houston, D. J. (2009). Motivating knights or knaves? Moving beyond performance-related pay

for the public sector. Retrieved 1 September 2009 from

http://www.aspanet.org/scriptcontent/custom/staticcontent/t2pdownloads/HoustonComm

entary.pdf.

Hughes, O. (2003). Public management and administration: An introduction (3rd

Ed.).

Bassingstoke, UK: Palgrave.

Ingraham, P. W. (1993). Of pigs in pokes and policy diffusion: Another look at pay-for-

performance. Public Administration Review, 66(4), 486-495.

Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. (1978). The social psychology of organizations (2nd

Ed.). New York,

NY: John Wiley & Sons.

Kellough, J. E., & Lu, H. (1993). The paradox of merit pay in the public sector: Persistence of a

problematic procedure. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 13(2), 45-64.

Kettl, D. (2000). The global public management revolution: A report on the transformation of

governance. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

40

Likert, R. (1967). The human organization: Its management and value. New York, NY:

McGraw-Hill Co.

Lindblom, C. E. (1965). The intelligence of democracy: Decision making through mutual

adjustment. New York, NY: The Free Press.

Lindblom, C. E. (1977). Politics and markets. New York, NY: Basic Books.

March, J. G. (1994). A primer on decision making: How decisions happen. New York, NY: The

Free Press.

Maslow, A. H. (1954). Motivations and personality. New York, NY: HarperCollins.

McGregor, D. (2006). The human side of enterprise (Annotated Ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-

Hill Co.

Meier, K. J., & Bohte, J. (2000). Ode to Luther Gulick: Span of control and organizational

performance. Administration & Society, 32, 115-137.

Mintzberg, H. (1979). The structuring of organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,

Inc.

Moynihan, D. P. (2008). The normative model in decline? Public service motivation in the age of

governance. In J. L. Perry & A. Hondeghem (Eds.), Motivation in public management:

The call of public service, 247-267. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Niskanen, W. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de

Gruyter.

Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1993). Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is

transforming the public sector. New York, NY: Plume.

Perrow, C. (1970). Organizational analysis. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

41

Perry, J. L, Engbers, T., & Jun, S. Y. (2009). Back to the future? Performance-related pay,

empirical research, and the perils of persistence. Public Administration Review, 69(1),

39-51.

Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (1998). Governance without government? Rethinking public

administration. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 10, 35-48.

Pugh, D. S., Hickson, D. J., and Hinings, C. R. (1969). An empirical taxonomy of work

organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 14, 115-126.

Rainey, H. G. (1983). Public agencies and private firms: Incentive structures, goals, and

individual roles. Administration & Society, 15, 207-242.

Rainey, H. G. (2009). Understanding and managing public organizations (4th

Ed.). San

Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Rainey, H. G., & Bozeman, B. (2000). Comparing public and private organizations: Empirical

research and the power of the a priori. Journal of Public Administration Research and

Theory, 10(2), 447-469.

Roethlisberger, F. J., & Dickson, W. J. (1939). Management and the worker. Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press.

Schön, D. A. (1983). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action. New York,

NY: Basic Books, Inc.

Selznick, P. (1966). TVA and the grass roots: A study in the sociology of formal organization.

New York, NY: Harper Torchbooks.

Selznick, P. (1984). Leadership in administration: A sociological interpretation. New York, NY:

University of California Press.

Simon, H. A. (1946). The proverbs of administration. Public Administration Review, 6, 53-67.

42

Simon, H. A. (1947). Administrative behavior. New York, NY: The Free Press.

Simon, H. A. (2000). Public administration in today‘s world of organizations and markets. PS:

Political Science & Politics, 33(4), 749-756.

Taylor, F. W. (1919). The principles of Scientific Management. New York, NY: HaperCollins.

Taylor, F. W. (2003). Scientific Management. New York, NY: Routledge.

Thompson, J. D. 1967. Organizations in action: Social science bases of administrative theory.

New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Weick, K. E. (1979). The social psychology of organizing (2nd

Ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-

Hill.

Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications. New

York, NY: Free Press.