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Intel Corporation

Rachel Taylor

February 15, 2011

Group F: The Fisher Business Group

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Table of Contents

Background

Industry Analysis

SIC/NAICS Codes

Competitor Analysis

ARM Holdings PLC

Texas Instruments Inc.

CEVA, Inc.

Company Analysis

Strengths

Weaknesses

Opportunities

Threats

Financial Analysis

Profitability: Return on Assets Ratio

Liquidity: Current Ratio

Leverage: Debt to Equity Ratio

Efficiency: Asset Turnover Ratio

Recommendations

Immediate

Short-Term

Long-Term

Appendix

The Founding Team

The Competitors

Profitability: Return on Assets Ratio

Liquidity: Current Ratio

Leverage: Debt to Equity Ratio

Efficiency: Asset Turnover Ratio

Bibliography

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Rachel Taylor

February 15, 2011

Group F: The Fisher Business Group

Intel Corporation

Background

Intel was created in the spring of 1968 by Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore. Prior to starting Intel,

the two worked at Fairchild Semiconductor. Arthur Rock and Andy Grove also left Fairchild to follow Noyce

and Moore. The four men joined together and became Intel’s founding team [see Appendix: Images 1-4],

(Casadesus-Masanell, 57).

Intel’s focus was developing integrated circuit memory devices. In 1969, Intel announced its first

product, the 3101 Schottky bipolar random access memory, also referred to as RAM. Shortly thereafter, Intel

began experimenting with three process technologies in an attempt to get into the highly demanded dynamic

random access memory (DRAM) market. The company invented a metal-oxide semiconductor (MOS)

transistor that allowed them to move into the market’s leadership position (Casadesus-Masanell, 58). Utilizing

this MOS process, Intel created the 1103 DRAM. This product was much lower in price than traditional

memory. It was more cost effective to build and had a higher performance level all while being smaller in

size. Intel’s new 1103 DRAM was the first commercially successful semiconductor memory device, which

quickly replaced the original magnetic core memory. As a result, Intel dominated the semiconductor market.

Their invention was considered “the technology of choice for computer makers from 1970 onwards”

(Casadesus-Masanell, 58).

During the time Intel was leading the semiconductor market, they continued to evolve their DRAM

technology. As a result, Intel produced the world’s first erasable programmable read - only memory or

EPROM for short. The EPROM saw a large demand by engineers, who would need to quickly reprogram a

chip whenever they made a mistake. Not fully understanding the value created by the EPROMs to the

engineers, Intel initially priced them at a point competitive to the standard ROM technology. They later raised

the price and increased their profits. Grove once said, “DRAMs gave us fame, but EPROMs gave us riches”

(Casadesus-Masanell, 59). With their EPROM device, Intel was able to remain as the main player in the

market until the Japanese introduced a similar product in the 1980s. However, in the early 1990s, Intel shifted

from manufacturing EPROMs to manufacturing flash memory.

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In 1971, Intel launched the very first microprocessor, the 4004 microprocessor. Unfortunately, Intel’s

management did not recognize the market for microprocessors in desktop computers, since microprocessors

were initially used in calculators and as components in industrial controls (Casadesus-Masanell, 60). As a

result, they did not patent their creation. It was not until 1977 that Intel saw the microprocessors potential in

the personal computer market when the Intel 8080 microprocessor was used in one of the first PCs, the Altair

8800. With the increasing popularity of Intel’s microprocessor, their position in the DRAM market fell. Intel

made the decision to leave the DRAM market and focus more of their development of the microprocessor and

flash memory (Casadesus-Masanell, 60).

In 1980, Intel implemented a marketing and sales campaign called “Project Crush. This campaign

secured Intel’s new 8088 microprocessor in IBM’s first PC. By 1983, IBM had become a very successful PC

company and had grown to become a Fortune 500 Company (Casadesus-Masanell, 61). The success of IBM

propelled Intel into the leadership position within the microprocessor industry. The Intel microprocessor had

become known as “the industry standard.” As the PC market soared during the 1980s, Intel was always

introducing faster and more improved microprocessors. In 1985, Intel decided that they would become a sole-

source manufacturer and eliminated their previous cross-licensing strategy (Casadesus-Masanell, 62). Intel’s

position in the PC market appeared to be unbeatable.

The 1990s started out rough for Intel. They were faced with a traumatic lose when Bob Noyce died

suddenly from a heart attack. However, in 1991, Intel developed the “Intel Inside” brand marketing campaign.

This campaign forced computer original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to “use the Intel Inside logo in

their advertisements, as well as the Intel Inside sticker on their products to indicating that the Intel processor

was indeed inside” (Casadesus-Masanell, 8). The campaign was successful for Intel. In 1993, Intel introduced

the Pentium processor, which was much more powerful and faster than the original processors. By 1994, Intel

processors were powering about eighty-five percent of all desktop computers, (Intel’s History of Innovation).

By the end of the 1990s, Intel Inside had “become one of the world’s most recognized brands” (Casadesus-

Masanell, 8).

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As Intel entered the millennium, they were still developing newer and better processors. They began

to create processors for special markets, such as the value PC market segment and the high performance

workstation and servers market (Casadesus-Masanell). Intel continued to innovate and expand their product

line to include chipsets, motherboards, and peripherals, allowing them to quickly become a household name

in the computer industry.

Industry Analysis

Intel falls into several category codes within the North American Industry Classification System

(NAICS) and the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. They include, for NAICS, code 334413-

Semiconductor and Related Device Manufacturing; code 334111 Other Electronic Computer Manufacturing;

code 334119- Other Computer Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing; and code 423430- Computer and

Computer Peripheral Equipment and Software Merchant Wholesalers (NAICS Code Lookup). Intel also

classifies, for SIC, as code 3674- Semiconductors and Related Devices; 3571- Electronic Computers; and

3577- Computer Peripheral Equipment (NAICS Code Lookup).

According to Yahoo! Finance (Top Semiconductor-Broad Line Companies), Intel’s direct competitors

within the semiconductor industry include ARM Holdings PLC, Texas Instruments Inc., and CEVA, Inc.

ARM Holdings PLC “designs microprocessors, physical intellectual property, and related technology

and software, as well as sells development tools to enhance the performance of high-volume embedded

applications” (ARM: Profile for ARM Holdings PLC). They also offer design consulting, support,

maintenance, and training services. Often times the company licenses and sells their technology and products

to other electronic companies. ARM Holdings PLC also manufactures, markets, and sells their

microprocessors, integrated circuits, and standard processors to companies who incorporate these elements

into their products. The leadership team of ARM Holdings PLC include Warren East (CEO) [see Appendix:

Image 5], Tudor Brown (Co-Founder and President), Michael Muller (Co-founder, and Chief Technology

Officer), Tim Score (Chief Financial Officer), and Michael Inglis (Executive VP and General Manager of

Processor Division) (ARM: Profile for ARM Holdings PLC). In terms of profitability, ARM Holdings PLC

has a profit margin of 21.15% and an operating margin of 26.33%. The company’s return on assets is 6.94%

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and their return on equity is 10.53%. During the last fiscal year, they generated $406.6 million in revenue

with a $280 million gross profit (ARM: Key Statistics for ARM Holdings PLC).

Texas Instrument Inc. “engages in the design and sale of semiconductors to electronics designers and

manufacturers worldwide” (TXN: Profile for Texas Instrument Inc.). They specialize in three major segments;

analog, embedded processing, and wireless. The analog segment includes their high-performance products

that use their standard analog semiconductors, such as amplifiers, data converts, and interface

semiconductors. The embedded processing segment includes digital signal processes (DSPs) that

instantaneously compute mathematical equations and microcontrollers. The wireless segment does the

designing, manufacturing, and selling of application processors and products, such as the digital light process

(DLP) products used in projectors, microprocessors, and integrated circuits, graphing and scientific

calculators, and the licenses technologies to other electronic companies. Texas Instrument Inc. uses their

products in the communication, computing, industrial, consumer electronics, automotive, and education

industries. The leadership team of Texas Instrument Inc. include Richard Templeton (Chairman and CEO)

[see Appendix: Image 6], Kevin March (Chief Financial Officer, Chief Accounting Officer, and Senior VP),

Gregg Lowe (Senior VP and Manager of Total Analog Business Unit), Kevin Ritchie (Senior VP and

Manager of Technology & Manufacturing Group), and Greg Delagi (Senior VP and General Manager of

Wireless Terminals Business Unit) (TXN: Profile for Texas Instrument Inc.). In terms of profitability, Texas

Instrument Inc. has a profit margin of 23.11% and an operating margin of 31.53%. The company’s return on

assets is 21.57% and their return on equity is 32.03%. During the last fiscal year, they generated $13.97

billion in revenue with a $5 billion gross profit (TXN: Key Statistics for Texas Instrument Inc.).

CEVA, Inc. “engages in designing and licensing silicon intellectual property (SIP) for the headsets,

portable multimedia, and consumer electronics markets” (CVA.L: Profile for CEVA Inc.). They specialize in

digital signal processor (DSP) cores. CEVA, Inc. licenses these components, such as application-specific

platforms (video, audio, voice over internet protocols, and Bluetooth) and various software components to

markets including handsets, mobile broadband netbooks, eReaders, mobile internet devices, tablets, portable

video players, mobile TVs, personal navigation devices, MP3 players, DVD/blue-ray players, digital TVs,

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game consoles, hard drives, and telecommunication devices. They license their products to OEMs worldwide

to utilize them in their products. The CEVA, Inc. leadership team consists of Gideon Wertheizer (CEO) [see

Appendix: Image 7], Yaniv Arieli (Chief Financial Officer, Principal Accounting Officer and Treasurer),

Issachar Ohana (Executive VP of Worldwide Sales), Aviv Malinovitch (VP of Operations), and Erez Bar-Niv

(Chief Technology Officer) (CVA.L: Profile for CEVA Inc.). In terms of profitability, CEVA, Inc. has a

profit margin of 25.33% and an operating margin of 21.99%. The company’s return on assets is 3.61% and

their return on equity is 7.40%. During the last fiscal year, they generated $44.91 million in revenue with a

$34.35 million gross profit (CVA.L: Key Statistics for CEVA Inc.)..

Company Analysis

Intel has several strengths that give the company an advantage over its competition. First, Intel is a

dominant leader in the market. They were the first to introduce a microprocessor, which changed the PC

market forever. Their position in the market soared once they became the provider for IBM computers. As the

computer industry experienced rapid growth, so did Intel. The company became so well known that its

technology was viewed as the “industry standard.” Over the 2010 year, Intel was recognized for its global

brand recognition and was among the top companies in the world. They were listed as World’s Companies

with the Highest Reputation in Governance, Innovation, Leadership, Performance, Products/Services, and

Workplace (Intel Corp Rankings).

Intel’s second strength is their Intel Capital program. For this program, Intel invests in companies

where they outsource their technology. Their investment in these companies is a way to make sure that the

companies help Intel develop and create their products in a timely manner. By 2002, Intel had invested in

nearly 400 companies in the communication and computing industries and several billion dollars were

returned to Intel. More recently, in 2009, Intel invested in Conservus International, Pulse Technologies, and

Vertex Animation Studio in the Middle East and Turkey to aid in the development of innovative hardware,

software, and local content (“Intel Capital Invests”).

Intel’s third strength is their ambitious pursuit of new business developments. From the very

beginning, Intel was always engaging in research and development ventures to create faster and more

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powerful products. They were always striving to bring the best inventions to the market. Their trend in

innovations began with the DRAM, then the EPROMs, and then the microprocessor. Still today, Intel

continues to develop new products. In 2008, Intel developed AMT, or Active Management Technology,

which is security software that monitors and fixes problems on any platform regardless of the operating

system (Saint-Hilaire).

Intel’s fourth strength is its investment in the communication and networking industry. Sean Maloney

of Intel Communications Group once said, “Despite the recession, there is no shortage of humans who want

to communicate” (Casadesus-Masanell, 14). Intel saw the communications industry as a form of strategic

growth for the company. Their biggest communications investment was for WiFi in 2003; the wireless

broadband networks. More recently, in 2009, Intel saw potential in portable, handheld devices. They have

invested in the creation of a new chip called “Moorestown”, which will launch Intel into the consumer

electronics and wireless devices businesses (Copeland, Partanen, & Kattan).

Even as a leader in the market, Intel is not without its share of weaknesses. First, Intel lacks a strong

presence in the mobile market. Microsoft is currently a well established player in this industry. Just a few

weeks ago, Nokia announced that they would “establish a future smartphone strategy around Microsoft’s

Windows Phone OS” (Shah, “Nokia-Microsoft”). Last year, at the Mobile World Congress, Nokia and Intel

announced that they would be working together to develop Meego, a Linux-based OS developed in

collaboration with Intel, for use in smartphones and tablets. However, this partnership failed to materialize

and Intel still has virtually no presence in the smartphone market. This reduces Intel’s opportunity to compete

against ARM, another manufacturer of processors (Shah, “Nokia-Microsoft”).

Intel’s second weakness is the technological problems that are associated with some of their products.

Over the years, Intel has had some minor and major setbacks in their technology development. These issues

were not only embarrassing to Intel, but “cast doubts as to whether Intel has the capabilities to compete

effectively in these more competitive new businesses” (Casadesus-Masanell, 15). The major problems

included capacity shortages, various product recalls, product delays, and cancellation of announced products.

In 1994, Intel received a great deal of media coverage when a math professor found a “bug in the Pentium”.

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In January of this year, Intel announced that they found a design error in the support chip, called Cougar

Point. They have just recently discussed a fix to this new problem. However, this error could cost Intel as

much as $700 million (McGrath).

Intel’s third weakness is their occasional delay in manufacturing and their limited supply of new

products. Most of Intel’s new problems are often only available in short supply as it takes Intel time to ramp

up their production to full capacity. This leaves the computer companies waiting anxiously for their shipment

of microprocessors. Over the past several years, Intel has been suffering from such manufacturing delays.

This leaves Intel overpromising and under delivering to their investors (Edwards & Karif).

Intel’s fourth weakness is their problems with antitrust laws. In 2008, Intel received a subpoena from

the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. They had been accused of antitrust violations in the microprocessor

market. This claimed followed a series of antitrust investigations of Intel’s chip business from around the

world (Greenburg).

Intel, even though a current leader, has several opportunities for growth and expansion. First, Intel

can capitalize on the growth of the worldwide internet. By taking advantage of the global internet trend, Intel

can increase their global market share while generating more profits. Second, Intel has the opportunity to

increase their presence in the mobile market. In 2010, Intel acquired McAfee. Intel now has an opportunity to

use McAfee’s security expertise “to help bolster the viability of internet connected devices” (Reisinger).

Intel’s third opportunity lies in their ability to form strong partnerships. With Intel’s innovative use of the

latest technology, they are in the perfect position to form partnerships with value-added resellers, distributors,

original design manufacturers, original equipment manufacturers, and independent software vendors and

software developers. Partnerships will allow Intel to expand into new industries with new businesses (Intel

Corporate Website). Intel’s fourth opportunity is the growth of the U.S economy as we make our way out of

the recession. As the economy gets better and better, consumers will be more confident in their purchase

behavior. They will be willing to spend more money on higher priced goods, particularly electronics such as

PCs and handheld devices. This change in spending patterns will bring increase sales and market share for

Intel.

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Currently, there are four major trends that threaten Intel. First, the quick changing technology

threatens Intel’s ability to continue their strategy of developing more powerful and faster products. With so

many new technological advancements, the development of innovative products is become more challenging.

Just as Intel might master one product, the technology changes and the product quickly becomes obsolete

(Ross). Second, Intel is threatened by the decline of PC sales. In 2009, Microsoft experienced its largest

decline in sales in 23 years. Their sales fell about 15-17%. This is a major threat to Intel, since they are the

main supplier of processors in the PC market (Vance). The third threat to Intel is the intense level of

competition within the processor market. During 2009, AMD gained market share against Intel. Intel lost

4.7% of the total market while AMD saw an increase of 4.6% during the first quarter of 2009 (Shah, “AMD

Gains”). AMD’s gain was a direct result of offering lower prices than Intel, in addition to sending out more

shipments of products. Intel’s fourth threat comes from the regulations imposed by the US Federal Trade

Commission. Over the course of Intel’s history, they have had several run-ins with violating regulations and

laws set by the FTC. Every time Intel is faced with another allegation, their manufacturing, as well as their

brand image, is jeopardized. This threatens Intel’s position in the market, their relationship with their

partners, and their credibility among consumers.

Financial Analysis

When analyzing Intel’s (INTC) financial situation, we compare their ratios to their largest

competitors, including ARM Holdings PLC (ARMH), Texas Instruments Inc. (TXN), and CEVA Inc.

(CEVA). When conducting a thorough analysis, one examines the company’s profitability, liquidity,

leverage, and efficiency over a period of time, such as from 2007-2009. All of the following ratios were

calculated using data from the 10 year income statement and 10 year balance sheet for each of the three

competitors, as well as Intel, provided by Morningstar.

To determine the profitability of a company, one often looks at the return on assets ratio. The return

on assets ratio analyzes how well a company uses its total assets to generate earnings (“Return on Asset

Ratio”). It is calculated by dividing the net income by the company’s total assets. As Chart 1 and Graph 1 in

the Appendix indicate, TXN has the highest return on assets, followed by INTC.

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To determine the liquidity of a company, one often looks at the current ratio. The current ratio

measures a company’s ability to pay off any short-term obligations (“Current Ratio”). It is calculated by

dividing the company’s current assets by the company’s current liabilities. As Chart 2 and Graph 2 in the

Appendix indicate, CEVA has the highest current ratio, while ARMH has the lowest.

To determine the leverage of a company, one often looks at the debt to equity ratio. The debt to equity

ratio shows how much of a company’s equity and debt is being used to finance its assets (“Debt to Equity”). It

is calculated by dividing the company’s total liabilities by the shareholders equity. As Chart 3 and Graph 3 in

the Appendix indicate, INTC and TXN are relatively close, with INTC having a slightly higher ratio. CEVA

has the lowest debt to equity ratio of all the companies analyzed.

To determine the efficiency of a company, one often looks at the asset turnover ratio. The asset

turnover ratio shows the relationship between a company’s assets and revenue (“Asset Turnover Ratio”). It is

calculated by dividing the company’s revenue by their total assets. As Chart 4 and Graph 4 in the Appendix

indicate, TXN has the highest ratio, followed by INTC. CEVA has the lowest asset turnover ratio of all the

companies analyzed.

Recommendations

Based on the analysis of the semiconductor industry and the analysis of Intel, there are several

strategic recommendations that will increase Intel’s share of the market. For the first immediate

recommendation, Intel should increase the awareness of their Intel Capital program. It is through the Intel

Capital program that Intel invests money in “innovative technology start ups and companies worldwide”

(“Intel Capital Announces”). This program not only benefits Intel and the companies they invest in, but

demonstrates the importance of corporate responsibility. If Intel would promote the program and increase its

awareness, other companies would follow Intel’s example. This would ultimately result in an increase in

global innovation.

The second immediate recommendation for Intel is to invest more in R&D within the rapidly growing

mobile market. However, Intel has essentially no presence in this industry. If they invest more in the R&D for

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hand held devices, they would be able to enter the market effectively. This strategy would increase Intel’s

share of the processors that are utilized in such gadgets and generate more revenue for the company.

The first recommendation for short-term implementation is for Intel to introduce a new marketing and

advertising campaign. Even though Intel’s “Intel Inside” campaign was a huge success, and still is, it would

be beneficial for Intel to develop a new campaign to put them back in the spotlight. By introducing a new,

captivating branding campaign, Intel’s awareness and recognition would be revitalized. A successful

campaign would result in increase market share and profits for Intel.

The second recommendation for short-term implementation is for Intel to step up their product

auditing. During 1999 and 2000, Intel experienced various product recalls due to technical difficulties of their

products. These recalls not only were embarrassing to Intel, but opened the door for its competitors. If Intel

were to increase their product auditing and conduct rigorous quality monitor, Intel would be able to be more

confident about the products they put on the market. This would decrease the risk of product recalls and

technical difficulties. As a result, Intel would experience increasing market share and profits.

The first recommendation for long-term implementation for Intel is for Intel to continue their

development of innovative products. Being in a world where technology is constantly changing, Intel must

keep up with its competitors by introducing newer and better products that utilize the last technology. By

expanding their product lines, Intel will be able to increase their position as a leader in the technology focused

industries. This strategy will also benefit the long-term direction of the company and propel Intel into new

business markets.

The second recommendation for long-term implementation for Intel is for Intel to work to improve

their manufacturing and supply capacity. Whenever Intel introduces a new product, it often takes a large

amount of time to get production up to full capacity. As a result, Intel has no choice but to send its customers

small shipments of products. This gap tends to leave Intel’s customer waiting for their highly demanded

shipment of Intel product. If Intel were to improve their manufacturing and supply capacity, Intel would be

able to have a better balance of supply and demand for their products. This would result in more efficient

operations, allowing Intel to generate larger profits.

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Appendix

Intel’s Founding Team

The Competition

Image 1:

Robert Noyce

Image 2:

Gordon Moore

Image 3:

Arthur Rock

Image 4:

Andy Grove

Image 7:

Gideon Wertheizer, CEO

CEVA, Inc.

Image 6:

Richard Templeton, CEO

Texas Instruments Inc.

Image 5:

Warren East, CEO

ARM Holdings PLC

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Profitability: Return on Assets Ratio

Return on Assets

2007 2008 2009

INTC

Net Income 6,976.0 5,292.0 4,369.0

Total Assets 55,651.0 50,715.0 53,095.0

Return on Assets 0.125353 0.104348 0.082286

ARMH

Net Income 73.5 80.4 62.8

Total Assets 1,105.0 1,219.5 1,363.7

Return on Assets 0.066516 0.065929 0.046051

TXN

Net Income 2,657.0 1,920.0 1,470.0

Total Assets 12,667.0 11,923.0 12,119.0

Return on Assets 0.209758 0.161033 0.121297

CEVA

Net Income 1.3 8.6 8.4

Total Assets 129.0 137.6 155.4

Return on Assets 0.010078 0.0625 0.054054

Chart 1

Graph 1

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

2007 2008 2009

Return on Assets

INTC

ARMH

TXN

CEVA

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Liquidity: Current Ratio

Current Ratio

2007 2008 2009

INTC

Current Assets 23,885.0 19,871.0 21,157.0

Current Liabilities 8,571.0 7,818.0 7,591.0

Current Ratio 2.786723 2.541699 2.787116

ARMH

Current Assets 283.3 278.5 380.6

Current Liabilities 120.9 153.3 169.7

Current Ratio 2.343259 1.816699 2.242781

TXN

Current Assets 6,918.0 5,790.0 6,114.0

Current Liabilities 2,025.0 1,532.0 1,587.0

Current Ratio 3.416296 3.779373 3.852552

CEVA

Current Assets 87.3 96.0 113.0

Current Liabilities 10.0 12.1 11.9

Current Ratio 8.73 7.933884 9.495798

Chart 2

Graph 2

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2007 2008 2009

Current Ratio

INTC

ARMH

TXN

CEVA

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Leverage: Debt to Equity Ratio

Debt to Equity Ratio

2007 2008 2009

INTC

Total Liability 12,889.0 11,627.0 11,391.0

Shareholder Equity 42,762.0 39,088.0 41,704.0

Debt to Equity Ratio 0.301412 0.297457 0.273139

ARMH

Total Liability 124.9 155.1 170.8

Shareholder Equity 980.1 1,064.4 1,192.9

Debt to Equity Ratio 0.127436 0.145716 0.14318

TXN

Total Liability 2,692.0 2,597.0 2,397.0

Shareholder Equity 9,975.0 9,326.0 9,722.0

Debt to Equity Ratio 0.269875 0.278469 0.246554

CEVA

Total Liability 14.6 15.9 16.4

Shareholder Equity 114.4 121.7 139.1

Debt to Equity Ratio 0.127622 0.130649 0.117901

Chart 3

Graph 3

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

2007 2008 2009

Debt to Equity Ratio

INTC

ARMH

TXN

CEVA

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Efficiency: Assets Turnover Ratio

Asset Turnover Ratio

2007 2008 2009

INTC

Revenue 38,334.0 37,586.0 35,127.0

Total Assets 55,651.0 50,715.0 53,095.0

Asset Turnover Ratio 0.688829 0.741122 0.661588

ARMH

Revenue 516.7 551.3 473.9

Total Assets 1,105.0 1,219.5 1,363.7

Asset Turnover Ratio 0.467602 0.452071 0.34751

TXN

Revenue 13,835.0 12,501.0 10,427.0

Total Assets 12,667.0 11,923.0 12,119.0

Asset Turnover Ratio 1.092208 1.048478 0.860385

CEVA

Revenue 33.2 40.4 38.5

Total Assets 129.0 137.6 155.4

Asset Turnover Ratio 0.257364 0.293605 0.247748

Chart 4

Graph 4

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

2007 2008 2009

Asset Turnover Ratio

INTC

ARMH

TXN

CEVA

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