Integrated Air Defence Systems

Integrated Air Defence Systems

On the lead up to EW & Radar 2016 which will be held in March in Ankara,

Turkey, Alan Warnes looks at the integrated air defence system network and

how the US is trying to develop new EW systems to tackle their threat.

An air defence system or an integrated air defence system (IADS) is essentially

a series of sub systems which when working together are tasked to provide an

air defence shield over a designated area. These individual platforms or sub-

systems can be:

1. Airborne - aircraft or Remote Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS)

2. Ground based air defence (GBAD), maritime-based, or a combination

of the above

3. Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)

To be effective they have to work in real-time using tactical data links; Link 16

is one of the most important systems.

At a very basic level, air defence is made up of four elements. There are

sensors, shooters, command control (C2) and communications. The sensors

are used to detect and track potential targets. The shooters shoot at targets.

Command makes the decisions on which targets are to be engaged and

when. Meanwhile, comms relays information and orders back and forth

between the other three.

Target altitude is a very important issue in relation to air defence. Like all air

battles it is three dimensional, and GBAD is a tough place to be in an air

battle. Understanding the role altitude plays in the air defence fight is

paramount to 3D battle space training. It’s easy to draw engagement circles

around GBAD locations and imagine an impenetrable wall for aircraft but

when the air versus the GBAD battle happens the air force usually comes out

the winner.

In general a country’s Air Defence HQ or an alliance’s Combined Allied

Operations Centre (CAOC) will have control over:

1. Ground Based Air Surveillance Radars, often located at higher altitudes

away from clutter, pick up unidentified tracks and work with the

ADHQ/CAOC.

There are many companies providing these systems – Lockheed Martin is one

of the most popular in the west, offering the AN/TPS-59 Long Range Air

Surveillance Radar; AN/FPS-117 Long Range Air Surveillance Radar; AN/TPS-77

Long Range Air Surveillance Radar and TPS-77 Multi-Role Radar. There is also

the Giraffe family of radars on offer by Saab, with the UK having acquired the

Giraffe AMB for protection of the Falklands. Raytheon is offering the Air and

Missile Defense Radar – now officially designated as AN/SPY-6 – which is the

US Navy's next generation integrated air and missile defense radar. It is

currently planned to be deployed on the DDG-51 Flight III destroyer beginning

in 2016. The radar significantly enhances the ships’ ability to detect air and

surface targets as well as the ever-proliferating ballistic missile threats.

Northrop Grumman’s latest offering is the AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task

Orientated Radar (G/ATOR) In October, Northrop Grumman Corporation was

awarded a $58 million contract from the US Marine Corps to develop and test

the Ground Weapon Locating Radar (GWLR) mode for the AN/TPS-80

Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar (G/ATOR). The GWLR mode is a software

update that brings additional mission capability to the ground-based multi-

mission Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar developed by the

Department of Defense (DOD). G/ATOR will perform four principal missions

using the same hardware. When all modes are fully implemented, Marine

Corps operators will have a common hardware solution with the ability to

switch between air surveillance, air defense, ground weapon locating, and

air traffic control through software.

The GWLR mode enables G/ATOR to detect and track time-critical incoming

threats, such as rockets, mortars and artillery rounds. Once the radar has

detected incoming threats, the system rapidly analyzes their ballistic

trajectories and computes their impact points which enables rapid and

accurate threat engagement by counterfire forces.

2. Airborne Early Warning, AWACS or SIGINT aircraft also detect airborne

threats. In many respects, airborne systems are the preferred type to utilize for

sensors and shooters, due to systems capabilities. Airborne sensors (AEW,

AWACS, etc.) still encounter potential issues with Line of Sight (LOS) due to

clutter and curvature of the earth, however due to the comparatively high

altitude (E-3 AWACS service ceiling is 35,000 ft) versus ground-based sensors,

the radar horizon is much less of an issue. There are many special mission

aircraft out there that can cover these roles – the most popular are the

Boeing 737 AEW&C, Northrop Grumman (E-2D Hawkeye), Saab (Erieye system

on differing platforms) as well as the older E-3.

Also, airborne shooters in a CAP can provide 'shooter' coverage of a

significantly larger area than the same number of ground-based AA or SAM

units could. Some of the disadvantages of airborne systems are the costs,

limitations in availability due to pilot/operator and equipment fatigue and

maintenance, as well as generally requiring a greater amount of technical

and logistical support due to the increased complexity of such systems.

3. Ground Based Air Defences

Some nations take a layered approach to ground based air defences

combining radars with the missiles. The Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) is a

group of anti-aircraft weapons and tactics that bolster defence against low-

altitude air threats, primarily helicopters and low-flying close air support

aircraft.

Shooters and sensors should all be integrated with regular and realistic

training. Then you have to test the air defence network against an

opponent’s jamming/Electronic Warfare.

Russia’s most recent solution to SHORAD is the Pantsyr-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) -

a close-in air defence system designed to defend ground installations against

a variety of weapons including fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, ballistic

and cruise missiles, precision-guided munitions and unmanned air vehicles. It

can also engage light-armoured ground targets.

It was designed by the KBP Instrument Design Bureau of Tula, Russia, and is

manufactured by the Ulyanovsk Mechanical Plant, Ulyanovsk, Russia. It has

the reporting name SA-22 Greyhound. Pantsyr combines two 2A38M 30mm

automatic anti-aircraft guns developed from the two-barreled 30mm GSh-30

gun. The Pantsyr S1 air defence missile / gun system can function in several

wave bands and operate on a multimode adaptive radar-optical control

system. The system has been designed to engage all target types, especially

high-precision weapons, considering their developments as far ahead as

2020-2025. It has a high kill probability of about 0.7 to 0.95 against all targets.

Its automatic combat capability makes it operate both autonomously and

also as a separate unit. It is one of the ‘double-digit’ SAMs the west fears

because of its capabilities. In May 2000, the United Arab Emirates ordered 50

96K6 Pantsyr-S1 systems, mounted on MAN SX 45 8×8 wheeled vehicles. The

order was worth $734m. The first batch was delivered in November 2004.

However a new radar was requested by the UAE and first deliveries of the

completed system took place in 2007. Syria has placed an order for 50

Pantsyr-S1 systems. Deliveries began in June 2008. Jordan has also placed an

order for an undisclosed number of systems.

Many armies have chosen not to equip their MANPAD/V-SHORADs units with

passive alerting devices like the British Air Defence Alerting Device (ADAD).

This is an infrared scanner and processor providing target detection and

prioritization. The British Army uses such a system to automatically slew the

Starstreak High Velocity Missile (HVM) weapon on to the target. The Starstreak

is designed to counter threats from very high performance, low-flying aircraft

and fast 'pop up' strikes by helicopter attacks. The missile, which travels at

more than three times the speed of sound, uses a system of three dart-like

projectiles, allowing multiple hits on the target. HVM can be fired from the

shoulder, from a lightweight multiple launcher or from the Stormer armoured

vehicle. The portable shoulder-launched (single missile) Starstreak is

assembled and ready to fire in a few seconds. Preparation for firing involves

clipping an aiming unit on to the missile canister. The aiming unit includes an

optical head consisting of a stabilisation system, an aiming mark injector and

a monocular sight. The target is acquired and optically tracked using the

monocular sight and aiming mark. The lightweight multiple launcher (LML) has

an automatic fire unit and can be carried on any light wheeled vehicle, such

as a Land Rover. The multiple launcher employs three canister missiles

together with clip-on equipment and a standard aiming unit. Three targets

can be engaged in quick succession without the need for reloading.

Meanwhile the Starstreak SP HVM is mounted on a tracked Stormer vehicle.

The system has eight rounds of Starstreak missiles ready to fire, with a further 12

missiles carried.

The HIMAD (High to Medium Air Defence) systems are designed to track and

destroy aircraft, cruise missiles, air-to-surface missiles, and tactical ballistic

missiles. The main ones are the USA’s Patriot PAC-3, Russia’s S-300P missile (SA-

10 Grumble) or China’s HQ-9. The latter, the newest of the three incorporates

technology from the Russian and US missile systems, and pre-existing Chinese

ones. Many of the Middle East countries have reinforced their air defences

with Patriot because of the threat from Iran.

THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) divides air defence of the battle

space into domes of responsibility based on altitude and defensive weapon

ranges.

The Lockheed Martin THAAD defence missile system is an easily transportable

defensive weapon system, to protect against hostile incoming threats such as

tactical and theatre ballistic missiles at ranges of 200km and at altitudes up to

150km.The THAAD system provides the upper tier of a 'layered defensive

shield' to protect high value strategic or tactical sites such as airfields or

populations centres. The THAAD missile sites would also be protected with

lower and medium-tier defensive shield systems such as the Patriot PAC-3

which intercepts hostile incoming missiles at 20 to 100 times lower altitudes.

The THAAD battery typically operates nine launch vehicles each carrying

eight missiles, with two mobile tactical operations centres (TOCs) and a

ground-based radar (GBR).

The cueing for the THAAD system is provided by the Raytheon Systems

AN/TPY-2 ground-based radar (GBR) for surveillance, threat classification and

threat identification. THAAD can also be cued by military surveillance

satellites such as Brilliant Eyes.

The ground based radar units are C-130 air transportable. The AN/TPY-2 radar

uses a 9.2m² aperture full field of view antenna phased array operating at I

and J bands (X band) and containing 25,344 solid-state microwave transmit

and receive modules. The radar has the capability to acquire missile threats

at ranges up to 1,000km.

A significant limiting factor for GBAD systems, at least amongst the sensors

and to a lesser degree shooters, is the negative impact that ground cover,

terrain and the horizon/curvature of the earth has upon line of sight (LOS).

This can be overcome by flying airborne early warning (AEW) and airborne

warning and control systems (AWACS).

Areas where LOS is blocked are 'blind-spots' where targets could potentially

ingress/egress, or perhaps break any target locks upon themselves. The only

way to reduce or eliminate these 'blindspots' is with the inclusion of additional

systems to provide coverage of the area(s) and have a communication

system capable of relaying information back from the off board sensor.

There are a few examples of Over the Horizon Radars (OTHR) where LOS is not

an issue, however such radars are suitable for target detection and tracking,

but not engagement since such radars do not provide 'target quality' data

for the missile.

OTR is a type of radar system that has the ability to detect targets at very long

ranges. Typically the range stretches to hundreds or thousands of kilometers,

beyond the radar horizon, which is the distance limit for ordinary radar.

4. Quick Reaction Alerts (QRAs) manned by air defence fighters armed with

short range/long range missiles. Their responsibility is to stop or intercept

unidentified aircraft. In the UK this responsibility falls to the Typhoons on QRA

at RAF Coningsby, Lossiemouth or Mount Pleasant (Falkland Islands).

5. RPAS. These will normally have EO/IR sensors on board which can datalink

the imagery to the ground station, thus providing the ADHQ with another set

of eyes. Some, like the MQ-9 Reaper will also have weapons on board, like

Hellfire. It is capable of being both the sensor and the shooter and is

controlled by a pilot and a sensor operator working in a remote workplace.

They are often thousands of miles away from the RPAS and target.

Combating hostile IADS - US Airborne Electronic Attack

The US are the main players in electronic warfare in the west, and everyone

else follows. Trying to counter the GBADs and its SAMs, is what the USA calls

Airborne Electronic Attack. Back in 2001 when the Department of Defense

published its AEA Analysis of Alternatives, the study was scoped to address

how the US would equip itself to take down future enemy integrated air

defence systems.

Participants included the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. The focus of

communications jamming was to disrupt the command and control links

within the IADS. Over the next decade or so, with wars in Iraq and

Afghanistan, the US forces moved towards irregular warfare operations, and

the AEA mission was to change. It concentrated on jamming remote control

improvised explosive devices (RCIEDs) – which saw the EA-6B Prowlers, EC-

130H Compass Call and EA-18G Growlers involved. Today the USA’s emphasis

on the Air-Sea Battle is seeing the traditional use of AEA return – to defeat an

advanced IADS. The two main players are the Air Force and the Navy. The

Air Force’s global strike mission requires strike aircraft to penetrate deep into

defended air space in the presence of anti-access/area-denial threats such

as the S-300 and S-400 air defence systems. This will see the USAF depend on

expendable stand-in jammers to cover the strike aircraft as they head and

operate in the target area.

The Army is also looking at its AEA requirement which should provide

communications jamming, offering a persistent presence within the

battlespace and come under the direct control of the Brigade Combat Team

commander.

The Navy‘s AEA mission focuses on supporting the aircraft carrier’s strike

missions. This requires manned stand-off and unmanned stand-in AEA

platforms to jam advanced air defence and coastal defence radar networks.

This will require the Air Force and Navy to acquire stand in jammers that can

enter the strike area quickly and jam advanced threats up close for the

relatively short period of time the strike aircraft are over the target area.

One of the most revolutionary ways of carrying out the AEA mission by forging

a solid AEA strategy into its broader Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)

EW concept. This will come from a combination of F-35B performing the lethal

suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) alongside tactical unmanned

aircraft equipped with communications and radar jammers. It’s clear the

unmanned platform could play more roles in a complex system of systems.

Solutions

One project is the USAF’s ADM-160C Miniature Air Launched Decoy – Jammer

(MALD-J). The programmable, expendable, stand-in jammer being

developed by Raytheon Missile Systems in Arizona, Tucson could actively

degrade or disrupt enemy early warning and acquisition radars, particularly

those of Chinese or Russian origin. The MALD-J adds a radar jamming

capability to the basic MALD-B decoy platform that protects US and allied

aircraft by duplicating their combat flight profiles and radar signatures.

However they don’t have the same flexibility as the bigger platforms.

One option could be to have a dedicated jammer on a longer duration

platform, like a low observable platform or the JSF. But then there is the

problem that a LO aircraft will be defeated once it turns on its jammer.

This could be fixed by integrating the MALD-J onto a General Atomics MQ-9

Reaper and development work is continuing.

The Army’s Networked Electronic Warfare Remotely Operated (NERO) is a

pod contained communications jamming system carried aboard the MQ-1C

Gray Eagle RPAS to provide beyond line of sight jamming capability in

support of ground troops. NERO is an offshoot of the Army’s Communication

Electronic Attack with Surveillance and Reconnaissance (CAESAR) which

carries the same pod on the C-12 King Air.

However the Army does not have immediate plans to place a jammer on a

smaller UAV, although the Army's Intelligence and Information Warfare

Directorate has experimented with smaller UAV jammers.

The Army is contemplating what platform is best suited to conduct airborne

electronic attack in the future. The CEASAR C-12 aircraft were rapidly

developed for a specific mission to meet the warfighter's immediate needs

outside of the normal acquisitions process.

The successful results of NERO testing will be an important asset for developing

the Army's Multi-Function Electronic Warfare capability and the payloads will

be used for additional testing for airborne electronic warfare. However MFEW

is not a program which limits the Army’s ability to fund it. Currently, MFEW is a

“concept” caught up in the often-grueling process of becoming a formal

Army requirement. Once the CDD (Capabilities Development Document) is

completed and approved, MFEW can become a program of record and

receive a budget. MFEW is scheduled to enter service in 2023 and reach full

operational capability (FOC) in 2027.

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