INTEGRATED AIR & MISSILE DEFENCE STUDY · Air Vice-Marshal John Blackburn AO (Retd) April 2017...

Air Vice-Marshal John Blackburn AO (Retd)

April 2017

INTEGRATED AIR & MISSILE DEFENCE STUDY

The Challenge of Integrated Force Design

Cover page illustration source

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Peacekeeper-missile-testing.jpg - time exposure showing the multiple re-entry vehicles deployed by one LGM-118A Peacekeeper missile being tested at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall.

National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry

Creator: Blackburn, John, 1956- author.Title: Integrated air and missile defence : the challenge of integrated

force design / AVM John Blackburn AO.ISBN: 9780992341619 (paperback)Subjects: Air defenses--Australia.

Ballistic missile defenses--Australia. Air warfare. Australia--Armed Forces

CONTENTS

Preface ….….3

ExecutiveSummary ….….4

WhatIsIAMD?…theneedforaNarrative? ….….6

WhatThreatsArePromptingAnIncreasedPriorityForIAMDintheUS?…….9

WhatIsTheUSDoingAboutIAMD?;aretherelessonswecanlearn?…….11

WhatIsAustraliaDoingAboutIAMD?-Whatelsecouldbeaddressed?…….16

WhatAreTheLessonsForProgram-LevelCapabilityDesign? …….19 ConclusionsAndRecommendations …….24

AFinalThought …….27

MajorSponsorProfiles …….28

AbouttheWilliamsFoundaMon:

TheSirRichardWilliamsFounda=onisanindependentresearchorganisa=onwhosepurposeistopromotethedevelopmentandeffec=veimplementa=onofna=onalsecurityanddefencepoliciesastheyimpactonAustralia’sabilitytogenerateairpowerappropriatetoitsuniquegeopoli=calenvironmentandvalues.

The Founda=on aims to strengthen Australia’s na=onal security byadvoca=ngtheneedforforward-lookingpolicieswhichtakefulladvantageofthepoten=alforairpowertoshapeandinfluenceregionalsecurity;andbypromo=ng construc=ve debate regarding the implementa=on of suchpolicies.

hNp://williamsfounda=on.org.au

AbouttheAuthor:AirVice-MarshalJohnBlackburnAO(Retd)MAMDefStud

Johnre=redfromtheRoyalAustralianAirForcein2008astheDeputyChiefof theAirForce followingacareerasanF/A-18fighterpilot, testpilotandstrategicplanner. Hisseniorposts includedCommanderoftheIntegratedArea Defence System located in Malaysia, commanding a mul=-na=onalheadquarters established to effect the Five Power Defence Arrangements,and Head of Strategic Policy in the Defence Headquarters. He is now aconsultantinthefieldsofDefenceandNa=onalSecurityandisamemberoftheRAAFReserve.

InhisRAAFReserverole,hesupportedtheChiefofAirForceinthedesignofPlanJerichoin2014,andservedastheteammentorun=lDecember2015.

His pro-bono roles have included being the Chairman of the KokodaFounda=on Board (now the Ins-tute For Regional Security [IFRS]), and theDeputyChairmanoftheWilliamsFounda=onBoard.HeiscurrentlyaFellowofboththeWilliamsFounda=onandtheIFRS.

John has published reports on Cyber Security, Defence Logis=cs, DefenceWhitePapersandFuelSecurity.HeholdsaMastersofArtsandaMasterofDefenceStudies.

hNps://www.linkedin.com/in/john-blackburn-ao-80324932/

e 2WilliamsFounda-onIAMDReport

PREFACE

TheWilliams Founda=on conducted an Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) studybetweenSep16andFeb17toexplorethechallengesofbuildingAustralia’sIAMDcapabilityandtheimplica=onsfortheDepartmentofDefence’sintegratedforcedesignfunc=on.ThestudywasfocussedattheProgramlevelofcapability.

The study incorporated a visit to theUS for amonth to explore the IAMDchallengewithUnited States Defense Forces and Agencies, think tanks and Industry. The ini=al studyfindingswerethenexploredinAustraliainthreeDefenceandIndustryworkshopson31Jan17and1Feb17,usingaChathamHousemodelofunaNributeddiscussions. ManyofthestatementsmadeinthisreportarenotreferencedastheyarederivedfromtheseChathamHousediscussionsandassociatedmee=ngs.

IAMDisahighlycomplex issue;commentsmadeinthisreportshouldnotbeconstruedinanywayasbeingcri=caloftheIAMDapproachoftheDepartmentofDefence.Thisreportcannotaccount for the full complexityof the integrated forcedesignprocess that isbeingaddressedwithinDefence;however,itmayoffersomevalueinprovidingsugges=onsbasedonthestudyfindings.

Thisstudywouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthesupportandassistanceofseveralareaswithin the Australian Department of Defence, the US Defense Department, Industry andthinktanks. TheWilliamsFounda=ondeeplyappreciatesthesupportof the IAMDStudymajorsponsors,LockheedMar=nandNorthropGrumman.ThanksarealsoduetoJacobsinfundingtheservicesofDrGaryWaterswhoprovidedvaluablesupport in theresearch forthestudyandintheproduc=onoftheworkshopnotes.

ThisreportrepresentstheviewsofAVMBlackburn(Retd),theIAMDStudylead.Thisstudyreportisinten=onallyhighlevelandbrief;intheauthor’sexperience,longanddetailedreportsarerarelyreadbyseniordecisionmakers.

Profiles of the IAMD Studymajor sponsors, LockheedMar=n andNorthropGrumman, are at thebackofthisreport.


EXECUTIVESUMMARY

TheIntegratedAirandMissileDefence(IAMD)Studyaddressedfiveques=ons.Thestudyfindingsaresummarisedundereachques=on.

WhatisIAMD?IAMD is a complex issue. The 2016 Australian Government’s Defence White Paperrecognised the air and missile threat to deployed forces and the likelihood that it willincrease intheyearsahead. TheDefence Integrated InvestmentProgram(DIIP) listedanIAMDProgramtobedeliveredintheperiod2018-2030withsome$2-$3Ballocated.

WhilstthereisanIAMDProgramiden=fiedintheDIIP,withcomponentProjectslisted,itisalistofequipmentandsystemsandnotanarra=veorvisionofwhatIAMDisandhowwewilloperatetoaddressthethreat. WeneedanIAMDnarra=vetoprovidethecontextof,andfocusfor,ourIAMDProgram.

So,wherecanwe look foranarra=ve? TheUnitedStates Joint IntegratedAirandMissileDefense: Vision 2020 notes that at its core, IAMD is the integra=on of offensive anddefensiveopera=onsagainstair-breathingandmissilethreats,meanttocounteranenemy’sabilitytodegradeordisruptouropera=onsandprojec=onofcombatpowerinacontestedenvironment. The IAMD Vision emphasises that if deterrence fails, neutralising anadversary's offensive air and missile assets prior to use con=nues to be the preferredmethodtonegatethemand,withthecurrentandprojectedgrowth inthreats, istheonlyprac=cal means to defeat large threat inventories. The Joint Integrated Air and MissileDefense:Vision2020 is clearandconciseandcouldprovideagoodnarra=veonwhich todevelopanIAMDProgramforAustralia.

WhatthreatsareprompMnganincreasedpriorityforIAMDintheUS?UScommentatorshavestated that“neverhas theUnitedStates facedamorecomplexorcomprehensive global challenge in this area, and the forecast for 2020 and beyond is nomoreop=mis=c…Successinnega=ngitwilltakenolessthanabold,holis=creimaginingofAmerica’sIAMD.”

ItisapparentthatthegapbetweenthethreatandtheADF’sIAMDcapabilityisgrowingandislikelytobelargerinadecadethanitisnow,despitethesignificantlevelofinvestmenttheGovernmenthascommiNedtointheDIIP.

WhatistheUSdoingaboutIAMD/aretherelessonswecanlearn?

WhilsttheUSJointVisionforIAMDisimpressive,theUSisfacingsignificantchallengesinitsexecu=on.UnderstandingthesechallengesisimportantforAustraliaaswebeginourIAMDjourneywithfarlessresourcesthanarebeingappliedtothechallengeintheUS.

This reportdescribes these challengesand summarises some of the lessonsgleaned fromthe US experience. The cri=cal issue is that an IAMD Program cannot be built purelyboNom-up if it is to be both effec=ve and affordable; a top-down direc=on and focus isessen=al.ThereisaneedforanIAMDProgramRoadmap,thatisaDirec=veandnotonlyarecommenda=on.


ThereareclearleadersintheUSintermsofIAMDsystemsthinkingthatcanprovideapathforAustralia to follow, ifweareprepared toacceptadegreeofdevelopmental risk. Thealterna=ve isacquiringcurrent technology IAMDcomponents thatarenotsuitable for thefuturethreatenvironment,resul=ngingreateropera=onalriskforthefutureforce.

WhatisAustraliadoingaboutIAMD?-Whatelsecouldbeaddressed?

DefencehasabudgetedIAMDProgramtobedeliveredinthetimeframe2018-2030. ThefirsttwoIAMDrelatedProjectstobeconsideredunderthenewDIIP,AIR6500andLand19Phase7B, are closely coordinated and are focussed on the integrated outcome of theProjects.

Theapproachbeingadopted for the initial IAMDProjects is laudable;however,Defence isyet todevelopan IAMDProgram-leveldesign thataddresses thecomplexityof IAMDasa“SystemofSystems,”ashasbeendoneintheUS.

Given theprojected gapbetween threat and capability, simply execu=ng theDIIPwill notsuffice ifAustralianGovernmentsofthenextdecadewishtohavetheop=onofdeployingforcesintotheIndo-Pacificregion. Defencewillneedtoapproachthechallengesomewhatdifferently than it has done to date. A top-down IAMD Program design will afford theopportunitytomaximiseourIAMDcapabilityandaddressthegrowingthreat-capabilitygap.

At first glance, it seems obvious that an IAMDProgramdesign should be developed as amaNerofpriority.However, it isdifficulttoseehowanIAMDProgramcanbedesignedbyitselfwithout concurrently considering many of the other Programs in the new DefenceProgramStructure;therealityisthatanIAMDProgramincorporatescomponentcapabili=esofmanyotherPrograms.

WhatarethelessonsforProgramlevelcapabilitydesigninAustralia?Trying to “design” 40 highly interlinked and inter-dependent Programs separately wouldseemtobeanimpossibletask. Thischallengegivesrisetotheques=onofwhetherornottheDefenceProgramstructure,ascurrentlyemployed,enables integrated forcedesignbyindividualPrograms? Theconclusionreachedinthisstudy isthatthe integrateddesignofthe futureDefence forceneeds to startat theCapabilityStream level. Once thatwork isdone, subordinate Program designs can be developed. There needs to be an integratedteam that performs this func=on; however, if this cannot be resourced then a top-downdesignwillremainanunfulfilledaspira=on.

RecommendaMonsThisreportrecommenda=onsinclude:

➢ Defence should commence the design of the integrated force at the Capability Streamlevelfirst.

➢ ThedesignoftheIAMDProgramshouldbeapriorityandshouldbeguidedbyintegratedforcedesignattheCapabilityStreamlevel.Theresul=ngIAMDProgramRoadmapneedstobeaDirec=veratherthanjustarecommenda=on.

➢ The IAMD Program needs to iden=fy the Strategy and Roadmap for IAMD to addressissuessuchaswhowefollowandwhatlevelofacquisi=onriskisappropriate,giventheopera=onalriskswemayfaceinthefuture.


WILLIAMSFOUNDATIONIAMDSTUDYREPORT

TheIntegratedAirandMissileDefence(IAMD)Studyaddressedfiveques=ons.Thestudyfindingsaresummarisedundereachques=on.

WHATISIAMD?…theneedforaNarra6ve

IAMD is a complex issue. It is not just a maNer of acquiring pieces of equipment andsystemsthatcanbeusedtogethertoaddressagrowingsecuritythreat.Aswewilldiscussinthisreport,itismuchmorethanthat. BuildingasharedunderstandingofwhatIAMDis,the threatswewill face in the future and howwe, togetherwith our allies,will need tooperatetoaddressthatthreatisthefirststepinunderstandingwhatIAMDisandwhatwemustdotoaddressthethreat.

Theresearchforthisstudylookedforapublicnarra=veorvisionaboutIAMDandwhatweinAustraliaaredoingtoaddressthethreat.Thatnarra=veisyettobewriNenforAustralia’sIAMDProgram.ThatdoesnotmeanthattheAustralianGovernmentandourDepartmentofDefencearenotaddressing the issue, theyare. There is significanteffortand investmentbeingapplied to the IAMDchallengeasdetailed in the2016DefenceWhitePaper (DWP)andtheassociatedDefenceIntegratedInvestmentProgram(DIIP).

The2016DWPrecognisedtheairandmissilethreattodeployedforcesandthe likelihoodthatitwillincreaseintheyearsahead.Itnotedthattorespondtothesedevelopmentswemustincreasinglydevelopcapabili=eswhichcanprotectourforceswhentheyaredeployedacross large geographic areas, par=cularly in air and missile defence and an=-submarinewarfare,andbeNer link theADF’s individual capabili=es toeachother. TheGovernment1

hascommiNedto upgradetheADF’sexis=ngairdefencesurveillancesystem,whichcouldbeusedasa founda=onfordevelopmentofdeployed, in-theatremissiledefencecapabili=es,shouldfuturestrategiccircumstancesrequireit.

TheDIIP iden=fies capability components of an IAMD capability, including the upgradeofthe ADF’s exis=ng air-defence systems, including command, control, communica=ons,computers and intelligence (C4I) systems and sensors. It states that Defence will alsodevelop a Joint BaNle Management System to beNer coordinate and synchronise ADFopera=onsandthatthefutureground-basedair-defencesystemwillreplacetheRBS-70witha short-rangeman-portable surface toair systemby theearly2020s, tobe supplementedlaterbyamedium-rangesurface-to-airmissilesysteminthemidtolate2020s,providingalayeredair-defenceagainstabroadrangeofcapableairthreats. Table7oftheDIIPlistsan2

IAMDProgramtobedeliveredintheperiod2018-2030withsome$2B-$3Ballocated.

DefencehasabudgetedIAMDProgramiden=fiedwithsomecomponentcapabili=es listedin theDIIP; however, it is a list of funded equipment and systems and not a narra=ve orvisionofwhatIAMDisandhowwewilloperatetoaddressthethreat.DoesthatmaNer?

DepartmentofDefence,2016DefenceWhitePaper(Canberra:CommonwealthofAustralia,2016),para1

2.45

DepartmentofDefence,2016IntegratedInvestmentProgram(Canberra:CommonwealthofAustralia,2

2016),paras5.23–5.28


Thisreportarguesthatthelackofanarra=veisanissuefortworeasons:• Firstly,Defencenowhasastructureforcapabili=esthatgroupsProjectsinto“Programs”thatallowforthecontextofaProjecttobeunderstoodandtoaddresshowcapabili=eswillworkinanintegratedmannertodelivertherequiredopera=onaleffects.Anarra=veof what the Program is trying to achieve and how the capabili=es will need to workcollec=vely is necessary to provide that context and to be able to communicate thatcontext to Government. The Government could consider investment decisions byProgramandnotbyindividualProjects,asiscurrentlythecase.

• Secondly,withoutaclearnarra=vetosetthecontext,itisvirtuallyimpossibletodevelopanintegratedProgram-leveldesignforourIAMDcapability.

So,wherecanwelookforanarra=ve? PerhapstotheUnitedStates…thefive-page2013United States Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020 envisages that all3

capabili=es including defensive, passive, offensive, kine=c, non-kine=c (cyber warfare,directedenergy,andelectronicaNack)aremeldedintoacomprehensivejointandcombinedforcecapableofpreven=nganadversaryfromeffec=velyemployinganyofitsoffensiveairand missile weapons. At its core, IAMD is the integra=on of offensive and defensiveopera=onsagainstair-breathingandmissilethreats,meanttocounteranenemy’sabilitytodegrade or disrupt our opera=ons and projec=on of combat power in a contestedenvironment.

TheJointIntegratedAirandMissileDefense:Vision2020emphasisesthatifdeterrencefails,neutralisinganadversary'soffensiveairandmissileassetspriortousecon=nuestobethepreferredmethodtonegatethem,andwiththe increasinggrowth innumbers, is theonlyprac=cal means to defeat large threat inventories. This link between offensive anddefensive operaMons for IAMD is criMcal. It notes that it will require the horizontalintegra=on of component capabili=es, and the ver=cal integra=on of policy, strategy,concepts. tac=cs, and training. The Joint Vision concludes by sta=ng that to succeed inIAMD,theUSmustoffsetfewerresourceswithmoreinnova=ontodevelopandmaintainanaffordable, integrated, interdependent Jointandcombinedapproach. Investments shouldfollow a well-reasoned, cost-balanced course, leveraging innova=ons in employment ofkine=candnon-kine=cmeasuresthatembraceawidespectrumofac=veandpassivepre-and post-launch solu=ons. Importantly, it notes that the US IAMD capability must bedesignedfromthebeginningtobeinteroperable. 4

The Joint Integrated Air andMissile Defense: Vision 2020 is clear and concise and couldprovideabasisonwhichtodesignanIAMDProgramforAustralia.Readerswithaninterestin this topic should refer to hNp://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publica=ons/JointIAMDVision2020.pdf

JointIntegratedAirandMissileDefense:Vision2020,5December2013.3

Ibid.,page5.4


Atitscore,IAMDistheintegrationofoffensiveanddefensiveoperationsagainstair-breathingandmissilethreats,meanttocounteranenemy’sabilitytodegradeordisruptouroperationsandprojectionofcombatpower.

Therearesomecri=calpointsthatmeritre-emphasis,inpar=cularthatofIAMDcomprisingintegrated offensive and defensive opera=ons and that it must be designed from thebeginningtobeinteroperable. Thisispar=cularlyimportantinlightofthegrowingthreatforecastsdiscussedlaterinthisreport.

ThediagrambelowprovidesamodeloftheUSJointIAMDspectrumofopera=ons. LerofLaunchreferstothenega=onofanadversary’soffensiveairandmissileassetspriortouse.

Given that this is an Australian report, a spor=ng analogy is appropriate. So,imaginethatyouareplayingcricketandyouarethebatsman. Unfortunately,the laws of the game are changing and instead of facing one bowler, you arenowfacing10,concurrently.Theyarealsonotusingastandardsizeballthatyoucanseeeasilyandsomeoftheballsaremovingathypersonicspeeds.Op=onAis to swing wildly and hope that you hit something. This, in IAMD terms, iscalled“rightof launch.” Op=onB is touse theotherbatsmanat thebowler’sendof thecricketpitchtotargetthebowlersastheyrunuptobowlandtohavetheremainderofthebasngteamrunontothefieldatthebowlers.Ataminimumtheywillbedistracted;ideallysome will no longer be able to bowl. The end result is that your basng problem issignificantlyreduced.This,inIAMDterms,iscalled“leroflaunch.”

If your lifedependedon thegame’soutcome,youwouldensure thatyour IAMDProgramdesign included ler of launch. Whilst some puristswould argue that the analogy is notcricket;goingtowarwithoutanintegratedleroflaunchcapabilityisnotsmart.

Finally,IAMDisnotasingle-Servicerole,despitethe“Air”terminologyandtheassignmentoftheleadoftheIAMDProgramtotheAirForce;IAMDisasharedresponsibilitythatwillrequire integrated opera=ons between all three Services, supported by GovernmentAgencies,andintegrated,whereappropriate,withalliedandcoali=onforces.


WHATTHREATSAREPROMPTINGANINCREASEDPRIORITYFORIAMDINTHEUS? The future IAMD environmentwill be characterised by a full spectrum of air andmissilethreats – ballis=cmissiles (suchas thoseof ChinaandNorthKorea illustratedbelow), air-breathingthreats(cruisemissiles,aircraR,UnmannedAircraRSystems), long-rangerockets,ar=llery andmortars, u=lising a range of advanced capabili=es such as stealth, electronicaNack,manoeuvringre-entryvehicles,decoys,andadvancedterminalseekerswithprecisiontarge=ng.Thesethreatswillcon=nuetoevolve,increasingthestressonallareasofdefencesandexpandingthescopeofIAMDopera=ons.5

GeoffreyF.Weiss,Seeing2020:America’sNewVisionforIntegratedAirandMissileDefense,JointForce5

Quarterly76,30Dec14.


NeverhastheUnitedStatesfacedamorecomplexorcomprehensiveglobalchallengeinthisarea,andtheforecastfor2020andbeyondisnomoreoptimistic…adireandgrowingairandmissilethreattotheUnitedStatesanditsinterestsaroundtheworld.Successinnegatingitwilltakenolessthanabold,holisticreimaginingofAmerica’sIAMD.5

GraphicscourtesyoftheCSISMissileDefenseProject

Overthenexttwodecades,atleasthalfoftheworld’sadvancedcombataircrararmedwithextendedrangemissilesandsupportedbyhighlysophis=catedinforma=onnetworks,willbeoperated by Indo-Pacific countries. Some regional countries can be expected to acquire6

longer-rangeprecisionguidedmissiles,includingship-basedmissiles. Newweapons,manynot yet conceived, can also be expected to enter the region, resul=ng from technologicaladvances in areas such as quantum compu=ng, innova=ve and addi=ve manufacturing,hypersonics,directedenergyweapons,andunmannedsystems.Thethreatischanging,andinsomecases,changingquiterapidly. Forexample,ChinaandRussiaareaccelera=ngthe7

development of air-breathing and boost-glide hypersonicweapons systems, and both arebelievedtobetarge=ng2020fordeploymentofthefirstopera=onalunits. Threatsnow8

combine speed and manoeuvrability with range and accuracy, and hypersonic missilesexacerbatethethreatastheygobeyondpurelyballis=ctrajectoriesandthuswillneednewapproachestodefeatthem.Theevolvingthreatisnotatradi=onalone;hencetheresponseneeds to be non-tradi=onal across all dimensions (including opera-ons, acquisi-on andsustainment)aswellasthewarfigh=ngdomains.

AgrowingdebateintheUnitedStatesistheissueofhowtodeveloparobustyetaffordableIAMDsystem. InhisCSISpaperGeWngtotheElusive“RightSideoftheCostCurve”,BGENTodorov(USAFRet)notedthat“theUSanditspartnerswillfacenotonlyballis=cthreatsbutalsolow-cross-sec=oncruisemissilesandotherair-breathingthreats…warsarenotfoughtin stovepipes, yet we are largely developing capabili=es that way, without pusng muchthoughtintohowtofoldinotherelementsoftheintegratedairequa=on.” Henotedthat“Giventhatanadversarymaybeabletolaunchlargenumbersofrela=velyinexpensiveyetincreasinglycomplexmissiles,reducingthecosttoproduceveryexpensiveweaponssystemsorfindinglessexpensivewaystointercepttheseadversarialmissilesisparamount.” 9

The informedviewdiscussed in the IAMDstudyworkshopswasthat thegapbetweenthethreatandtheADF’sIAMDcapabilityisgrowingandislikelytobelargerinadecadethanitisnow,despitethesignificantlevelofinvestmenttheGovernmenthascommiNedtointheDIIP. This isnotaproblemunique toAustralia, it is commonchallenge facedbyWesternforces;astheUSJointIAMDVision2020notes:“IAMDsystemsareexpensivebynature–wesimplywillnotbeabletoaffordeverythingweneed.” 10

DepartmentofDefence,2016DefenceWhitePaper,,para2.41.6

SincethemostrecentForceStructureReviewwascompletedin2014(insupportofthe2016Defence7

WhitePaper),thestrategicsitua=onhasevolvedsuchthatseveralballis=candcruisemissileprogramshaveemergedthatwerenotenvisagedin2014.

GuyNorris,ClassifiedReportonHypersonicssaysUSLackingUrgency,AW&ST,14Feb17.8

BGENKennethE.Todorov(USAFret),GeWngtotheelusive“RightSideoftheCostcurve”,CSISMissile9

DefenseProject,April2016,Pages6-7.

JointIntegratedAirandMissileDefense:Vision2020,5December2013,page1.10


ThegapbetweenthethreatandtheADF’sIAMDcapabilityisgrowingandislikelytobelargerinadecadethanitisnow,despitethesignificantlevelofinvestmenttheGovernmenthascommittedtointheDIIP.SimplyexecutingtheDIIPwillnotsuffice.

So,whatdoesthismeanforAustralia?Simplyexecu=ngtheDIIPasalistofProjectswillnotsuffice ifAustralianGovernmentsofthenextdecadewishtohavetheop=onofdeployingforces into the Indo-Pacific region in an environment where the IAMD threat is growingrapidly;wewillneedtoapproachthechallengesomewhatdifferentlythanwehavedonetodate. As will be discussed later in this report, a broader range of approaches will berequired tomi=gate this changing threat landscape, including the Command and Control(C2)arrangementstobeNersynchroniseandcoordinateallavailablesystems,includinglerof launchmeasures. This change in approach will necessitate revised thinking around11

Concepts ofOpera=on (CONOPS), integrateddesign, acquisi=on and sustainmentbutwill,ini=ally, need a beNer understanding of how the gap can be closed across the range ofpossibleresponses,includingsystems,processesandpeople.

WHATISTHEUSDOINGABOUTIAMD;aretherelessonswecanlearn?

The United States Department of Defense’s Joint Vision for IAMD provides a clear andconcisedescrip=onofIAMDandtheUSGovernment’sintent. TheUSJointIntegratedAirand Missile Defence Organisa=on (JIAMDO) has been set up to manage the US IAMDporwolio,andto iden=fyandcoordinaterequirements tosupportefforts todevelop IAMDsolu=ons for thewarfighter. JIAMDOalsodevelopsandmaintains the IAMD roadmap;12

iden=fies and develops IAMD opera=onal concepts, joint requirements, systeminteroperability,andopera=onalarchitectures;assessesandvalidates IAMDcapabili=esbymeans of simula=ons, technology demonstra=ons, and exercises; and advocates for thewarfighters’desiredIAMDcapabili=eswithintherequirementsandinvestmentprocesses.

TheUSframeworkisimpressiveandyetitisfacingsignificantchallengesinexecu=on. Thisstatement is not meant to diminish the US IAMD Program, but rather to highlight thesignificant challenge that IAMD poses. Recognising these challenges is important forAustraliaaswebeginourIAMDjourneywithfarfewerresourcesthanarebeingappliedtothechallengeintheUS. Thisreportwillhighlightsomeofthelessonsiden=fiedintheUSIAMDProgramsand suggestwhat approachesmaybeadoptedbyAustralia to learn fromtheUSexperience.

IAMDDirecMon.SignificantresourceshavebeenappliedintheUStoIAMD.Forexample,the JIAMDO ini=ally had around 130 people in the organisa=on focussed on the IAMDchallenge;incontrast,inAustralia,wewouldhavefewerthan5peoplefocussedonanIAMDProgram at the strategic headquarters level. Despite the US’s clear vision and appliedresources,thereares=lldifficul=esinbuildingasharedunderstandingoftheirwayaheadintermsofwhatisneededandwhen. OneissuethattheJIAMDOfacesinitstaskisthat,asJointstaff,their IAMDRoadmapremainsarecommenda-on,butnotadirec-veandwhilsttheir guidance is influen=al in the budge=ng process, there is no direct control over the

LerofLaunchreferstothenega=onofanadversary’soffensiveairandmissileassetspriortouse;theUS11

JointIAMDVision2020notesthatthelinkbetweenoffensiveanddefensiveopera=onsforIAMDiscri=cal.

TheAustralianDepartmentofDefencedoesnothaveaJIAMDOequivalent,despitetheGovernment12

commitmenttoinvestbillionsofdollarsinIAMDoverthenextdecade.Thatsaid,theforma=onofanorganisa=onthesizeandcomplexityoftheJIAMDOwouldnotbefeasibleforaDefenceForcethesizeofAustralia’s;however,theneedforsomeformofresourcedorganisa=onthattakesresponsibilityfortheintegratedoversightofPrograms,suchIAMD,isnecessary.


Servicebudgetswhichdrivecapabilityacquisi=on. AlessonforAustraliainthiscaseisthatthereneedstobeanIAMDRoadmap,builtbyanintegratedDefenceteam,thatisaDirec=veand not just a recommenda=on. The smaller size of our Defence Bureaucracy and theforma=on of the Defence Headquarters in mid 2017 should make an integrated IAMDdirec=ve,towhichallServicesandAgenciessignupto,feasible. ThislessoncouldapplytoallProgramsandnotjustIAMD.

IAMD Design. To explore IAMD, the study used the simple model illustrated below,wherebyIAMDwasviewedthroughthecomponentsofPlaworms,C4ISRandWeaponswithanintegra=ngIAMDCONOPS. Theessenceofbeing“Integrated”inanIAMDcapabilityisto ensure that all of the essen=al components are given appropriate considera=on. TheUSAFAirSuperiority2030FlightPlanReporthighlighted“innova=onsmustbepairedwithvalid concepts of opera=on to make them effec=ve in the expected opera=onalenvironment”. The integra=ngCONOPS isanessen=alcomponent that ismissing in the13

Australianconsidera=onofIAMD. 14

Examples of theUS experience / issues related to these IAMD components thatAustraliacouldlearnfrominclude:

➢ A top-down, integrated design across the IAMD components is necessary for forceeffec=venessandfor formalUScer=fica=onof thekillchaintoassure interoperability/integra=on with US Forces where appropriate. This implies the need for an IAMDarchitecture,basedonaCONOPS,thatisestablishedearlyinthedesignprocess.

USAFAirSuperiority2030FlightPlan,EnterpriseCapabilityCollabora=onTeam,May201613

WhilstDefencehasanOpera=onalConceptforthe1to10year=meframe,theAJOC,andaclassifiedIAMD14

Opera=onalConcept,thereisnotaConceptofOpera=ons(CONOPS)forIAMD.ACONOPSshoulddealwiththe“how”theADFwilloperateinsufficientdetailtosupportthedevelopmentofForceArchitectures.


ThereneedstobeanIAMDRoadmap,thatisaDirectiveandnotjustarecommendation.

➢WhilstC4ISRisthe“glue”ofanIAMDcapability, IAMDisa lotmorethanjustC4ISR. ItcannotbebuiltwithanarrowfocusononecomponentorelementofanIAMDsystem.

➢ The US experience indicates that most current US C4ISR systems are developed in aboNom-up fashionand integrated in an “arer-market”mannerbecause theyarebeingacquiredinstand-alone,stove-pipedProjectswithliNleapparent“5thGenera=on”baNlemanagementthought-leadershipevident.

➢ Therealityofstove-pipeddevelopmentpriori=esinsomeADFcapabili=es;e.g.,thoseofthe Joint Strike Fighter, may result in key plaworm or sensor systems not being fullyintegratedintothebroaderIAMDsystemonintroduc=ontoservice. Therefore,analysisof such plaworm systems is essen=al as a part of the ongoing IAMDdesign process toensure that plaworm upgrades do, in =me, address cri=cal IAMD integra=onrequirements. Forexample,priori=sa=onof future JSFupgrades toensure that sensorinforma=on canbe fully sharedwith other plaworms and systemswherenecessary forIAMD purposes, would improve Force survivability in a future air and missile threatenvironment.

➢ IAMDOpenSystemsArchitecture(OSA) -Lessons fromexis=ngUSC4ISRsystemshavehighlightedthat integra=on isseriouslyhinderedwithoutwell-definedanddocumentedinterfaces; indeed, some systems have had to be re-engineered using OSAs to ensureopera=onal effec=veness. An OSA approach would provide an adaptable and readilyupgradable technology basis for newand legacy plaworms. Using COTS hardware andsorware as the architectural basis, OSA would support the rapid development andintegra=on of new plaworm capabili=es. Selec=ng an OSA approach across mul=pleplawormsoracrosstheenterprise,setsthestageforrapidcapabilityinser=on,sorwarecommonalityandreuse,andinteroperability. Thekeytoobtainingtransientopera=onaladvantageinthefuture(touseaRAAFPlanJerichoterm)willbetheadop=onofanOSA-baseddesign. A lessonforAustralia is that theearlyadop=onofanOSAstandard,orstandards,cognisantoftheOSAsystemswealreadyhaveinserviceorareacquiring,willbeessen=alforourIAMDProgram.Thislessoncould applytoallProgramsandnotjustIAMD.


WhilstC4ISRisthe“glue”ofanIAMDcapability,IAMDisalotmorethanjustC4ISR.Itcannotbebuiltwithanarrowfocusononecomponentorelement.

TheIAMDProgramcannotbebuiltpurelybottom-upifitistobebotheffectiveandaffordable;atop-downdirectionandfocusisessential.

➢ Cybersecurity.Itiscri=caltorecognisethatCybersecurityrequiresa‘systemsofsystems’approach that ismanaged architecturally and cannot be addressed separately by eachProject. Cybersecurity cannot be simply added to an IAMD system “later.” Given theunclassified nature of this report, it is not appropriate to delve deeply into thecybersecurityaspectsofafutureIAMDsystem;however,whatisevidentisthataboNom-up approach to building an IAMDProgram, Project by Projectwithout a Program-levelarchitecture,willresultinunacceptablecybersecurityrisks. Thisissuedoesapplytoall15

ProgramsandnotjustIAMD.

IAMDSystemsFeasibilityTimeline. ItbecameevidentduringtheIAMDstudythattheissueof“aspira=onversusreality”maynothavebeengivenenoughfocus,par=cularlyintheDIIP. Thediagrambelow isanaNempt to represent the=megapbetweenaspira=onandreality for capabili=es which comprise two of the three IAMD Program componentsaddressedinthisstudy,plawormsandC4ISR. Ifweexaminetheaspira=onversusrealityoftheJSFProject,forexample,wheretheAirForcegoalistotransi=ontoa“5thGenera=on”capability, we can observe a significant delay in the delivery of the capability which theAustralianGovernmentdecidedtooffsetwiththeacquisi=onoftheF/A-18FSuperHornetsas a riskmi=ga=onmeasure. It would not be an exaggera=on to recognise that the lagbetween “5th Genera=on thinking” about plaworms, such as the JSF, and that of C4ISRsystems is considerable. TheADFhasa capabilityaspira=on for IAMDC4ISRcomponentsthatfrankly iswell inadvanceofwhat iscurrentlyavailableonthemarket intheUS(suchsystems are in development.) “5th Genera=on thinking”with respect tomanyweaponssystems is further in lag. Given that weapons are the IAMD component that actuallyproducestheendresult,thatlagindesignthinkingisaconcern.

ValuableInforma=onAssuranceexper=seisbeingdevelopedinthecivilandeduca=onalsectorsin15

Australia.Forexample,seehNps://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/australian-centre-for-cyber-security/research-themes/technologies-cyber-security-informa=on-assurance-and-situa=onal-awareness


Abottom-upapproachtobuildinganIAMDProgram,ProjectbyProjectwithoutaProgram-levelarchitecture,willresultinunacceptablecybersecurityrisks.

Whocouldwefollow? ToexaminewhoismakingclearprogressintheIAMDarena,weneedto lookbeyondthecomponenttechnologiestothedesignoftheIAMDsystemitself.ThereareclearleadersintheUSintermsofIAMDsystemsthinkingthatcanprovideapathforAustralia to follow. These include theUSN’sNavy IntegratedFireControl–CounterAir(NIFC-CA) Program, the US Missile Defence Agency’s Command and Control, BaNle16

Management, and Communica=ons (C2BMC) Program and the US Army’s IAMD BaNleCommandSystem(IBCS)Program. TheUSNiscoordina=ngwiththeUSAFonNIFC-CAandtherearecallsforcoordina=onbetweenNIFC-CAandtheUSArmy’semergingIBCS. Such17

Programs could inform the design of an integrated capability to meet Australia’srequirements if we are prepared to accept a degree of developmental risk, albeit muchlower than if we were leading the development ourselves. The alterna=ve is acquiringcurrent technology IAMD components that are not suitable for the future threatenvironmentresul=ngingreateropera=onalriskforthefutureforceaswetrytointegratethosecomponentsinanarer-marketmanner.

TheUSNhasaggregatedcapabili=esunderthreeprincipalpillars:baNlespaceawareness,assuredcommand16

andcontrol,andintegratedfires;thesethreepillarsaretheunderpinningsforIAMDinpar=cular.TheUSNavyhasdevelopeditsNavyIntegratedFireControl–CounterAir(NIFC-CA)capabilitythatprovidesintegratedfirecontrolfortheatreairandan=-shipcruisemissiledefenceinthetac=calenvironment.Thecapabilitygreatlyexpandstheover-the-horizonairwarfarebaNlespaceforsurfacecombatantstoenablethird-partytarge=nganduseofsmartmissiles.

TheUSPACOMCommander,AdmiralHarris,recentlyreiteratedhisdesiretohavetheArmy’sIAMDsystem17

(IBCS)integratewiththeNavy’sNIFC-CA-hNp://breakingdefense.com/2017/02/link-army-navy-missile-defense-networks-adm-harris/


IntegratedFireControl(IFC)referstotheparticipation,andcoordination,ofmultipledistributedsensorsandweaponsintacticalengagementsofenemytargets.Forexample,itenablesthe:➢ selectionofthebestweapon/sandthebestsensor/stoworktogetherto

improvetheprobabilityofdestroyingatargetandtherebymaximisetheeffectofalimitednumberofweapons.

➢ shootertofireaweaponsatatargetbeyonditsownsensorcoverage.➢ continuedoperationofaweaponsplatformafteritsownweaponshavebeen

fired,e.g.aJSFcouldcontinuetoprovidevaluablesituationalawarenessandtoengagetargetsusingoff-boardweapons.

WHATISAUSTRALIADOINGABOUTIAMD?-Whatelsecouldbeaddressed?

Asnotedpreviously,Defencehasabudgeted IAMDProgramwithsome$2B-$3Ballocatedfor an IAMDProgram to be delivered in the period 2018-2030. Someof the first IAMDrelatedProjectstobeconsideredunderthenewDIIPareAIR6500(upgradingofexis-ngair-defence systems including command, control, communica-ons, computers and intelligence(C4I) systems and sensors) and Land 19 Phase 7B (replacing Army’s Ground Based AirDefence missile system.) The Projects are closely coordinated and are focussed onintegratedoutcomesratherthanpurelyindividualProjectgoals.

Theapproach for these twoProjects, inpar=cular, isagoodexampleofwhatAirMarshalDavies, the Chief of Air Force (CAF), discussed during his recent launch of the Air Force’sStrategy:“IwouldlikeAirForceinajointcontexttobegintoputthejointeffectbeforeourownAirForcerequirements.IwantArmy,Navy,APSandotheragenciestoknowin-matelywhatAirForcecandoforthem.” AirForceispusngthejointeffectfirstinitsapproachto18

AIR6500.

The CAF’s intent is par=cularly important, given historical approaches to interoperabilitypriori=es. It is evident, from the IAMDworkshop discussions, that the priori=es for someADFServices inthepasthavebeenfor interoperabilitywiththeirsisterServices intheUS,vicewithin the ADF. That focus needs to change to ensure that equal interoperability /integra=onpriorityisaffordedtothejointeffectthatourForceswillneedtoachieve.

So,iftheini=alProjectcoordina=onappearstobeeffec=ve,whychangeanything,whydosomethingdifferent?Therearetworeasons.

➢ Firstly it is apparent that simply implemen=ng the Projects listed in the DIIP will notsuffice; despite the significant investment commitment made by the AustralianGovernmentthegapbetweenthethreatandtheADF’s IAMDcapabilitygap is likelytobelargerinadecadethanitisnow.WewillneedtodosomethingdifferentifwearetoachievetherequiredlevelofIAMDcapabilityinthefuture.

➢ Secondly, theexperienceof theUS is thataneffec=ve IAMDcapabilitycannotbebuiltpurely boNom-up from a narrow Project perspec=ve; if it is to be both effec=ve andaffordable,atop-downdirec=onandfocusisessen=al.Theapproachbeingadoptedfortheini=alIAMDrelatedProjectsislaudable;however,DefenceisyettodefineanIAMDProgram-leveldesignthataddressesthecomplexityof IAMDasa“SystemofSystems,”as has been done in the US. A top-down approach will afford the opportunity tomaximiseourIAMDcapabilityandaddressthegrowingthreat-capabilitygap.

ThedevelopmentofsuchadesignwillrequireustofirstunderstandthecomplexityoftheIAMDchallengeforusandtodevelopanarra=veorvisionofwhatIAMDisandhowwemayoperatetoaddressthethreat.Defencefacesitsownuniquesetofchallengesinintegra=ngthebespokeandextantcommunica=onsandC2elementswithinAustraliaandtheADFwiththe systems being acquired such as the JSF, the SEA 4000 AirWarfare Destroyerwith itsAegisSystem,SEA5000FutureFrigatewiththeAustraliandevelopedCEAradar,AIR6500,Land19Ph7B,theP8andtheTriton,theF/A-18SuperHornetandtheGrowler,andtheE-7Wedgetail. These are only some of the systems that will need to be integrated whilstaddressingcybersecuritydemandsandwhilstimplemen=ngconceptssuchasLive/Virtual/Construc=vetraining.

RAAFAirForcenews,Vol.59,No.1,February9,2017,pp.4-5.18


AreweatriskofrelearningthelessonsoftheUSIAMDexperience? Intheabsenceofanintegrateddesign,wecouldacquireIAMDcomponentsinastove-pipedorclusteredfashion,deferringthefullsystemintegra=onoftheIAMDProgramtoan“arer-market”problemandincurring unnecessary future opera=onal risk and considerable addi=onal cost as a result.ThislessoncouldapplytoallProgramsandnotjustIAMD.

Themainrecommenda=onthatemergedfromtheini=alstudyresearchwasthatanIAMDProgram-leveldesignneedstobedevelopedasamaNerofpriorityinordertoprovideatop-down, integrated design across all IAMD component and related Projects. Thisrecommenda=on implies,atfirst glance, thedevelopmentof an IAMDnarra=ve,CONOPSguidance, and architectures. Whilst the US IAMD vision and resul=ng JIAMDO guidanceprovidesagoodtemplateforAustralia,itneedstobeadaptedforAustralia’sspecificneedsandcircumstances.

TheAustralianIAMDProgramneedstodevelopaRoadmapforIAMDthataddressesissuessuchaswhowefollowandwhatlevelofacquisi=onriskisappropriategiventheopera=onalriskswemay face in the future. SuchaRoadmapshould iden=fy ini=alProject stepsandhowwewilleventuallyintegratewiththefutureUSIAMDProgram,asillustratedbelow.


The IAMD study also iden=fied a number of key ques=ons and issues that should beaddressed in addi=on to CONOPS, C4ISR++, Plaworms and Weapons, in the Australiancontext,asapartoftheIAMDProgramdesignprocess. Defencehasbeenprovidedwithamore comprehensive list; however, examples of these addi=onal ques=ons/issues are asfollows.

➢ IntegraMon vs Interoperability. An IAMD Program design will require decisions to bemade such as: what has to be integrated with the US, and what simply has to beinteroperable.With the increasing threat,greater integra=onwillbeneededwithalliesforsomecapabili=esandsystems.Forexample,theADFwillu=lisena=onalandcoali=onsensorstotakeadvantageoftheen=reforce’ssitua=onalawarenesstohelporientatetheCommander and to support coordinated decisions across the Joint force, which willemployeffectors,bothkine=candnon-kine=c. IAMDsystemsandtheassociatedIAMDarchitecturemustsupportthislevelofintegra=on.

➢ People. Amajorconcern iden=fied isthatofthepeoplewhowilloperateandsupportthe future IAMD system. It is evident that theUSdoes not have sufficient C2 trainedpersonnel todothe job; this,andtheir training, isakey limi=ngfactor. It is importantthatAustraliadeterminesup-frontiftheIAMDsystemsiden=fiedandfundedintheDIIPwillbe supportedby sufficientnumbersofpeople trained toperform thecri=cal IAMDrolesandtosupporttheIAMDsystems.

➢ AcquisiMonandSustainmentmodelswerehighlightedasa significant risk factor. Forexample,theUSAFAirSuperiority2030FlightPlanReport notedtheneedtoimplement19

acquisi=on approaches thatmatch the tempo of technology development cycles. Thereport’s lead author BGENAlex Grynkewich states “if the (US) Department of Defensedoesnotchangeitsacquisi=onapproach,ourcapabilitydevelopmentwillbeoutpacedbyothersaroundtheworld.Wearealreadybehindinmanyareas,andwemustactnoworour remaining technologicaladvantageswill con=nue toerode…wemust improveourabilitytodevelopandfieldcapabilityintheinforma=onageorwewillnotwinthe2030fight.” There is a need to review Australia’s acquisi=on and sustainmentmodels to20

determineiftheyarefitforpurposeforthisnextgenera=onofcapabili=es,suchasIAMD,and flexible enough to cope with the rate of threat growth, par=cularly given thatAustralia’s Defence industry base is significantly smaller than that of theUS. Defencecannot build and operate an integrated force using business models developed foracquiring and sustaining stand-alone, stove-piped capabili=es. Parallel development,spiral development, capability inser=on, evolu=onary acquisi=on and sustainment allneedtobeincorporatedintothewayofthefuture. This issueappliestoallProgramsandnotjustIAMD.

Before discussing how Defence could go about designing the overall IAMD Program, itshould be recognised that there are =ming impera=ves for a number of IAMD relatedProjects, suchasLand19Phase7B,whichareacquiringcapabili=es toaddresssignificant,exis=ng, capability deficiencies. It is therefore important to recognise that any proposedProgramdesignac=onsshouldnotinadvertentlyimpedethe=melydeliveryofhigh-priority

USAFAirSuperiority2030FlightPlan,EnterpriseCapabilityCollabora=onTeam,May201619

BGENAlexGrynkewich,TheFutureofAirSuperiority,PartIV,Autonomy,Survivability,andGeWngto2030,20

hNps://warontherocks.com/


near-term Projects; they need to be developed concurrently and then integrated. TheProgramdesignfunc=onneedstocatchupwithProjectsunderway,notimpedethem.

So, how dowe address IAMD Program designwithout over-complica=ng the issue? WereturnheretothethoughtsoftheCAF,AirMarshalDavies,whorecentlydiscussedbuildingDefence capability using a mental model of a “town plan.” He portrayed Projects as“streets”inatown. Theyleadforward,arekeypartsofthetownbuttheyneedanoveralltown plan which guides how the streets are aligned and how they integrate with thecommon services, power, water, sewerage, that all "streets" need and that cannot beinstalledarerwardswithoutsignificantcostsanddisrup=ons.ThetownplancanbeseenasananalogyforProgram-leveldesign. Thisapproachiseasytovisualiseandthereforemorelikely tobemoreuseful forsome, thanthecurrentDefenceProgramstructureanddesignprocess.

What could the townplan look like?Can therebe a townplan just for IAMD? As notedpreviously,most,ifnotall,oftheissuesandques=onsthataroseintheIAMDstudyapplytothemajorityoftheDefenceProgramsandnotjusttoIAMD. So,beforerecommendinganapproachtoAustralia’sIAMDProgram,wewillfirstaddresswhatarethelessonsforoverallProgram-level capability design from this study. In par=cular, is the Defence ProgramstructuresuitableforintegratedforcedesignbyindividualPrograms?

WHATARETHELESSONSFORPROGRAM-LEVELCAPABILITYDESIGN?

Thereare40Programs listed in theDefenceProgramstructure thatwasdevelopedundertheFirstPrinciplesReview(FPR).ThirtysevenoftheProgramsareallocatedacrossamatrixofCapabilityStreamsandCapabilityManagerDomains,asillustratedonthenextpage.TheProgramterminologygetssomewhatconfusingwhenyourealisethattheDIIPalsoreferstomorethan200“Programs”inthetablesofkeyinvestmentdecisions,themajorityofwhichare,infact,Projects.

An IAMD Program is certainly a useful construct to discuss how a group of Projects,integrated by a common design, could address a growing air and missile threat and,therefore,itwouldbevaluableforGovernmenttounderstandhowcomponentProjectswillintegratetoaddressasecurityneedoracapabilityvulnerability. AnIAMDProgramwouldalsobeofassistanceinover-sigh=ngagroupofProjectsthatareintheacquisi=onprocess,toensurethattheyremainintegrated. However,itisdifficulttoseehowanIAMDProgramcanbedesignedbyitselfwithoutconcurrentlyconsideringtheC4ISRdesignaspectsoftheISREW, Space andCyber StreamPrograms and, from the Plaworm component, the designaspectsof the LandCombat&AmphibiousWarfare, StrikeandAirCombat, andMari=meWarfareStreamPrograms.


Most,ifnotall,oftheissuesandquestionsthataroseintheIAMDstudyapplytothemajorityoftheDefenceProgramsandnotjusttoIAMD.

TheProgramdesignfunctionneedstocatchupwithProjectsunderway,notimpedethem.

The reality is that an IAMD Program incorporates component capabili=es of many otherPrograms.

Considera=onof theweaponscomponentofan IAMDProgramwouldalsobeachallengegiven that the only weapons-specific Program is “Explosive Ordnance,” which appears tohave a logis=cs focus, with the majority of weapons systems spread amongst the otherPrograms,asapartofintegratedcapabili=es.

This discussion of the Program design challenge points towards an ‘Integrated by design’theme. This themehasbeenexplored in theRAAF’s Plan Jericho as ameansof thinkingbeyond component capabili=es and results in the Jerichomemewhere “top-downdesignmeetsboNom-upinnova=on.” Thismemeisaspira=onalascapabilitydevelopmenthas,inreality, been “ boNom-up design results in the need for top-down innova=on”wherewehave had to rely on arer-market integra=on to achieve the required capability.Complica=ngthisissueevenfurtheristhatthe40Programshavebeenallocatedtomul=pleleads and the linkages between the Programs do not appear to have beenwell defined,otherthantheirrela=veposi=ononamatrix.TheIAMDProgramisundertheStrikeandAirCombatCapability Stream, andunder the leadershipof theChief ofAir Force; is that theappropriateloca=onfortheIAMDProgram?


Trying to “design” 40 highly interlinked and inter-dependent Programs separately wouldseem to be an impossible task. To achieve an integrated force by design, you need anintegratedProgramstructure.Infactthereisone,ifitisused.

The DIIP states “… the six capability Streams in the framework that are used in theIntegrated InvestmentProgramtobeNerrepresentthekeyforceelements–howtheyaretypicallyemployedandtheirplannedenhancements.Thiswasadeliberatemoveawayfromdescribingourcapabilityinvestmentplansinastove-pipedstructure.” 21

It would therefore seem sensible not to try to start Program-level design by individualPrograms but rather by Streamswith each Program then integra=ng the detailed StreamdesignaNributeswhereappropriate;i.e.theStreamdesignmustbeundertakenpriortotheindividualProgramdesign. Thisapproachwouldreducetheintegrateddesignstartpointto6 Streams vice 40 Programs. If we are to achieve an integrated force, we need to stop“driving”ProgramsasiftheywereProjects.Theyaredifferentbeasts.

Defencecouldcommencethedesignofthe integratedforceattheStreamlevelfirst, thenthe design aNributes for each Stream could be applied to individual Programs whereappropriate. Apossiblepathaheadfor IAMDdesign, forexample,couldbetoprototypethe design of the ISREW, Space and Cyber Stream by collec=vely analysing all of thatStream’s Programs, along with the IAMD Program, in order to derive integrated designaNributes. Why include the IAMD Program? Because C4ISR is the “glue” of an IAMDcapabilityandthatshouldbethestar=ngpointforanIAMDdesign.ItisthislaNerpointthatleadstotheconclusionthattheposi=oningoftheIAMDProgramundertheStrikeandAirCombatCapabilityStreamisnotop=mal. ThediagramonthenextpagesuggestsashirintheIAMDProgramtotheISREW,SpaceandCyberStreamtosupportthestartoftheStreamdesignapproach.

DepartmentofDefence,2016IntegratedInvestmentProgram(Canberra:CommonwealthofAustralia,21

2016),Page13.


To achieve an integrated force by design, you need an integrated Programstructure…Infactthereisone,ifitisused.

Ifwearetoachieveanintegratedforce,weneedtostop“driving”ProgramsasiftheywereProjects.Theyaredifferentbeasts.

AnexampleStreamdesignaNributewouldbethatofOSA. ItwouldbepointlesstospecifyanapproachforOSAforjustoneProgram;itsurelymakessensetoapplysuchanapproachacrossallrelevantProgramsandinturntheircomponentProjects. 22

WhatcouldCAF’s“townplan”looklikeinthiscase? Arealworldtownplancanconsistofmul=plelayersasdiscussedpreviously. Ifyoubuilda“street”,youneedtocomplywiththedesignrequirementsfortheselayers.

ADefence Capability town plan could comprise six layers as illustrated on the next page.Taking into account the plethora of Defence Strategic guidance, the integrated designfunc=ontakesplaceinthesixCapabilityStreamsfirst.TheIAMDProgram,inthiscase,actsas the lens that focusses the design aNributes from the relevant Streams onto the IAMDProjects and maps out the IAMD Program Roadmap. The Projects then ensure that thedesign aNributes are incorporated in the Project requirements and if they cannot, theDefence InvestmentCommiNee is advised so that theappropriate risk assessment canbemadeandtheProjectdirectedaccordingly.

OneoftheissuesisthattheUShastwodifferent,concurrent,pathsofdevelopmentforOSA:FACEand22

OMS.Toanextent,Defenceneedstomakeavaluejudgementonwhichdirec=ontofocuswhilstkeepingitsop=onsopentochangedirec=on.ACentreofExcellencecouldbeanop=ontoprogressorganicunderstandingofOSAcoretofuturesystemsdevelopment.


ISREW,SpaceandCyberStreamdesignedfirst

Proposed

Whatdifferencecouldthismake,oristhisjustanotherDefenceprocesschange?Ifyouputyourself in the posi=on of an IAMD Project Manager, they currently have no integratedProgram-level design. They have to read and then interpret a large amount of detailedstrategic guidance in order to develop Project requirements. Trade-offs that have to bemadeattheProjectlevel,usuallytonarrowthescopeoftheProjecttomeetscheduleandbudgetdirec=ves,aredonewithoutanintegrateddesignandwithoutaclearunderstandingoftheconsequencesofdecisionsonforceintegra=on. Thisprocesscanresultinincreasedopera=onalriskforthefutureADF. Adifferentapproachisneededtogetontothepathtoanintegratedforce;star=ngthedesignprocesswithsixelementsisamorecomprehensibleandthusachievabletask,thanstar=ngthedesignwith40elements.

Whocanperformthisdesignfunc=on?Itrequirespar=cularskills,experienceandcogni=veability. ItisevidentindiscussionwithDefencethatthereareinsufficientpeoplewiththeseaNributes to have separate design teams in each of the Capability Manager Domains.Frankly, theCapabilityManagershaveveryhighworkloads in their raise, trainandsustainrolesaswellaswithProjectdesignandtransi=on,withouthavingtoindividuallytakeonthenewdistributedProgram-leveldesignresponsibili=esthatareinmanycasesmuchbroaderthantheirownDomains.Thereneedstobeanintegratedteamthatperformsthisfunc=on;however, if this cannot be resourced then a top-down design will remain an unfulfilledaspira=onandourDefenceForceswillincurunnecessaryopera=onalriskinthefuture.

Apossible solu=onariseswhenwe look at how theADFfights. Weplan andfight as anintegrated team under Commander Joint Opera=ons (CJOPS), without CJOPS having to“own”allofthepeoplewhoareforceassignedtoanopera=on. Perhapswecouldachievean integrated force design using the samemodel; i.e. an integrated cross-capability team


whoworkcoopera=velyundertheleadershipoftheViceChiefoftheDefenceForce(VCDF)Group to incrementally design the integrated force without having to be posted to theGroupfull=me.

It is also evident that industry will need to be closely involved in this integrated designfunc=on. SignificantstrideshavebeentakenoverthepasttwoyearswiththepartnershipmodelbetweenDefenceandIndustry;thePlanJerichoProgramofWorkisagoodexampleofthischange.However,furtherdevelopmentofthispartnershipmodelwillbenecessaryifDefence is to be able to develop a realis=c and feasible integrated force design as,par=cularlyinthecaseofIAMD,USIndustryisattheforefrontofIAMDsystemsdesign.Thisexper=sedoesnot,asyet,existinAustralia.

HavingdiscussedtheissueofProgram-levelIntegratedForceDesign,weturntothespecificissueoftheIAMDProgram. Earlier inthisreporttherecommenda=onwasmadethatanIAMDProgram-leveldesignneedstobedevelopedasamaNerofpriorityinordertoprovideatop-down,integrateddesignacrossallIAMDcomponentandrelatedProjectsandthatthisimplies, at first glance, the development of an IAMD narra=ve, CONOPS guidance, andarchitectures.HavingdiscussedthechallengesofProgram-levelintegratedforcedesignitisevidentthattheIAMDProgramdesigncannotbeini=atedattheProgramlevelanditshouldbeguidedbyini=alintegratedforcedesignattheCapabilityStreamlevel.

A suggestedpriority is toprototype thedesignof the ISREW, Space andCyber Streambycollec=velyanalysingallofthatStream’sPrograms,alongwiththeIAMDProgram,inorderto derive integrated design aNributes. If this approach is successful, a similar approachcouldbeusedfortheremainingfiveStreams.

Following thedevelopmentof the Stream-level designs, the IAMDProgramdesign canbeundertaken to focus the Stream design aNributes onto the IAMD related Projects and toproduceanIAMDNarra=ve,CONOPSguidance,ArchitecturesandaRoadmapdirec=ve.

CONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS

IAMDisacomplexissue.BuildingasharedunderstandingofwhatIAMDis,thethreatswewillfaceinthefutureandhowwe,togetherwithourallies,willneedtooperatetoaddressthatthreatisthefirststepinunderstandingwhatwemustdotoaddresswhatisassessedasagrowingthreat.

The2016DWPrecognisedtheairandmissilethreattodeployedforcesandthe likelihoodthatitwillincreaseintheyearsahead.TheDIIPlistedanIAMDProgramtobedeliveredinthe period 2018-2030 with some $2-$3B allocated. Whilst there is a budgeted IAMDProgram iden=fied with component capabili=es listed in the DIIP, it is a list of fundedequipment and systemsandnot anarra=veor “vision”ofwhat IAMD is andhowwewill


The design of an IAMD Program should be guided by integrated force design at theCapability Stream level; the priority should be to prototype the design of the ISREW,SpaceandCyber Streamby collectively analysingall of that Stream’sPrograms,alongwiththeIAMDProgram,inordertoderivecommondesignattributes.

operatetoaddressthethreat.WeneedanIAMDnarra=veorvisiontoprovidethecontextof,andfocusfor,ourIAMDProgram.

The 2013 United States Joint Vision 2020 for IAMD notes that at its core, IAMD is theintegra=onofoffensiveanddefensiveopera=onsagainstair-breathingandmissile threats,meanttocounteranenemy’sabilitytodegradeordisruptouropera=onsandprojec=onofcombatpowerinacontestedenvironment.TheIAMDVisionemphasisesthatifdeterrencefails,neutralisinganadversary'soffensiveairandmissileassetspriortousecon=nuestobethepreferredmethodtonegatethemand,withthecurrentandprojectedgrowthinthreats,is theonlyprac=calmeans todefeat large threat inventories. This linkbetweenoffensiveanddefensiveopera=ons for IAMD iscri=cal; LerofLaunch isnotop=onal,without itwewillleaveourforcesexposedinfutureregionalopera=ons.

The US framework is impressive and yet it is facing significant challenges in execu=on; agrowingdebateintheUnitedStatesistheissueofhowtodeveloparobustyetaffordableIAMDsystem.RecognisingthesechallengesisimportantforAustraliaaswebeginourIAMDjourneywithfarfewerresourcesthanarebeingappliedtothechallengeintheUS.

UScommentatorshavestatedthatsuccessinaddressingthegrowingIAMDthreatwilltakeno lessthanabold,holis=creimaginingofAmerica’s IAMD. ThegapbetweenthethreatandtheADF’sIAMDcapabilityisgrowingandislikelytobelargerinadecadethanitisnow,despitethesignificantlevelofinvestmenttheGovernmenthascommiNedtointheDIIP.

Simplyexecu=ngtheDIIP,aslisted,willnotsufficeiftheAustralianGovernmentsofthenextdecadewishtohavetheop=onofdeployingforcesintotheIndo-Pacificregion;wewillneedto approach the challenge somewhat differently than we have done to date. This willnecessitate revised thinking around concepts of opera=on, integrated design, acquisi=on,sustainment,processesandpeople.

This report summarisessome of the “lessons”gleaned from theUS IAMDexperienceandsuggestswhatapproaches couldbeadoptedbyAustralia. Thecri=cal issuesare thatanIAMDProgramcannotbebuiltpurelyboNom-upifitistobebotheffec=veandaffordable;atop-downdirec=onandfocusisessen=al. ThereisaneedforaDirec=ve,suchasanIAMDRoadmap,thatisanintegrateddirec=onvicearecommenda=on.WithoutsuchaDirec=ve,capabili=escanandwillbebuiltinastove-piped,boNom-upapproach.

ThereareclearleadersintheUSintermsofIAMDsystemsthinkingthatcanprovideapathforAustralia to follow. SuchProgramscould form thebasisofan integratedcapability tomeetAustralia’srequirementsifwearepreparedtoacceptadegreeofdevelopmentalrisk,albeitmuch lower than ifwewere leading thedevelopmentourselves. Thealterna=ve isacquiringcurrenttechnology IAMD componentsthatare not suitable for the futurethreat environment resul=ng in greateropera=onal risk for the future force aswe try tointegratethosecomponentsinanarer-marketmanner.

ThefirstIAMDrelatedProjectstobeconsideredunderthenewDIIP,AIR6500andLand19Phase7B, are closely coordinated and are focussed on the integrated outcome of theProjects. The approach being adopted for the ini=al IAMD Projects is laudable; however,Defence is yet to define an IAMD Program-level design that addresses the complexity ofIAMDasa “SystemofSystems,”ashasbeendone in theUS. A top-downapproachwillafford the opportunity tomaximise our IAMD capability and address the growing threat-capabilitygap.


At first glance, it seems obvious that an IAMDProgramdesign should be developed as amaNerofpriority. However,itisdifficulttoseehowanIAMDProgramcanbedesignedbyitselfwithoutconcurrentlyconsideringmanyoftheother39ProgramsinthenewDefenceProgramStructure;therealityisthatanIAMDProgramincorporatescomponentcapabili=esof many other Programs. Trying to “design” 40 highly interlinked and inter-dependentProgramsseparatelywouldseemtobeanimpossibletask. Theconclusionreachedisthatthe integrated design of the futureDefence force needs to start at the Capability Streamlevel.Oncethatworkisdone,subordinateProgramdesignscanbedeveloped.Thereneedstobeanintegratedteamthatperformsthisfunc=on;however, ifthiscannotberesourcedthenatop-downdesignwillremainanunfulfilledaspira=on.

Thefollowingrecommenda=onsaremade.

➢ Defence should commence the design of the integrated force at the Stream-level first.ThedesignaNributesforeachStreamcouldthenbeappliedtoindividualProgramswhereappropriate. The priority should be to prototype the design of the ISREW, Space andCyberStreambycollec=velyanalysingallofthatStream’sPrograms,alongwiththeIAMDProgram,inordertoderivecommondesignaNributes.

➢ ThedesignofanIAMDProgramshouldbeapriorityandshouldbeguidedbyintegratedforcedesignattheCapabilityStreamlevel.TheIAMDProgramwouldactasthelensthatfocusses the design aNributes from the relevant Streams onto the IAMD Projects andmaps out the IAMD Program Roadmap. The IAMD Program Roadmap needs to be aDirec=ve rather than just a recommenda=on; an IAMDProgramcannotbebuilt purelyboNom-upbyProjects if it is tobebotheffec=veandaffordable; a top-downdirec=onandfocusisessen=al.

➢ The IAMDProgramneeds to iden=fy the Strategy andRoadmap for IAMDandaddressissuessuchaswhowefollowandwhat levelofacquisi=onrisk isappropriategiventheopera=onalriskswemayfaceinthefuture.Sucharoadmapshouldiden=fyini=alProjectstepsandhowwewilleventuallyintegratewiththefutureUSIAMDProgram.

➢ TheProgramdesignfunc=onneedstocatchupwithProjectsunderwayandnotimpedethem.


AFINALTHOUGHT

The discussion of the challengesDefence faces in Integrated ForceDesign, and the IAMDProgram in par=cular, provided the opportunity to postulate what Defence should dodifferently in order todesign andbuild the integrated force. The following “integratedforce hypotheses” were developed by the Williams Founda=on to be tested at theIntegratedForceSeminartobeheldinApril2017.

➢ Wemustoperateasanintegratedteamfromthedesign,throughdeliverytotheopera=onoftheforce;failuretoactassuchwillincurunacceptableriskinfutureopera=ons.

➢ Ifwedon’t‘design’theintegratedforcewearecommiNedto“arer-market”integra=on.

➢ Wecan’tbuildandoperateanintegratedforceusingbusinessmodelsdevelopedforacquiringstand-alone,stove-pipedcapabili=es.

➢ ‘Design’isaboutmorethanjustplawormsandsystems-itisalsoabouthowweacquire,operateandsustainanintegratedforceinamorecomplexinterconnectedglobalcontext.

➢ Ifweover-complicatethe‘design’processwewillstalloureffortsandgetthesameresultswehavehadoverthepast20years–stove-pipedcapabili=es.

➢ Wemust,however,recognisethatthetaskloadofthethreeServicesintheirRaise,Train,SustainandCapabilityManagerrolesmeansthatsimplydeliveringalargevolumeofforcedesignguidancetothethreeServiceswillnotwork.

➢ Culturalchange,asreflectedinCAF’sstrategicplannarra=ve,isrequiredtopriori=setheintegratedforceoutcomesovertheindividualforcepriori=eswhereappropriate.

ThereadermaycaretoreflectonthesehypothesesinlightoftheReport’sfindings.


MAJORSPONSORPROFILES

Lockheed Martin - For Security, For Industry, For Australia

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Ourexperiencewithprogramssuchas theF-35 JointStrikeFighter; theCommand,Control,BaNleManagement andCommunica=ons (C2BMC) systemand theAegis combat system, alliedwithourextensive knowledge of open system architectures, model-based engineering, agile developmentprocessesandcrossdomainsolu=onswillbeleveragedtosupportthedevelopmentofanAustralianIntegratedAirandMissileDefencecapability,andwithforcetransforma=onandtherealiza=onof5thGenera=oncapabili=esinAustralia.

LockheedMar=nstandsreadytoassisttheAustralianDefenceForcewithrealizingitsvisionforthefuture.

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Decisionsuperiorityinthecontested,informa=on-centricopera=ngenvironmentsofthefuturerequirestheintegra=onoffirh-genera=onairplawormsintothejointforce.Byleveragingtheadvancedsensor,datafusionandcommunica=onstechnologiesavailabletofirh-genera=onairborneplaworms,anetworked,firh-genera=onjointforcewilldeliverop=misedpowerinallopera=ngenvironments–space,air,land,mari=me,electromagne=candcyber.

Asapioneerofopenarchitectureintegra=onandindustryleaderoffirh-genera=onC4ISRsystems,NorthropGrummandesignsitssystemswithbeNer,faster,moreprecisedecisionsaspriority.Bytrulynetworkingsensors,weaponsystemsandcommand-and-control,oursystemsdrama=callyimprovesitua=onalawarenessandenablerapid,accuratedecisionmaking.Ourextensiveexperiencedevelopingandfieldingtheseadvancedsystemsincomplexenvironmentsprovidesasolidfounda=ontomeetthechallengesofjointandcoali=onintegra=oninthecontested,resource-limitedopera=onalenvironmentsthatwilllikelycharacterisefuturewarfare.

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INTEGRATED AIR & MISSILE DEFENCE STUDY · Air Vice-Marshal John Blackburn AO (Retd) April 2017...

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Transcript of INTEGRATED AIR & MISSILE DEFENCE STUDY · Air Vice-Marshal John Blackburn AO (Retd) April 2017...