Inequality:  Race,  Gender,  Class,  and  Politics  

         

Leslie  McCall  Professor  of  Sociology  and  Political  Science  (courtesy)  

Faculty  Fellow,  Institute  for  Policy  Research  Northwestern  University  

l-­‐mccall@northwestern.edu          

Outline  and  Summary    (1) Racial  inequality:  remarkable  (and  troubling)  stability  over  

time  (focus  will  be  on  black/white  inequality);  increasing  attention  to  racial  divides    

(2) Gender  inequality:  stabilizes  in  late  1990s;  women’s  economic  trends  now  looking  more  like  men’s,  leading  to  stagnant  middle  class  family  income    

(3) Class  inequality:  grows  within  racial  groups,  among  men,  and  among  women;  median  incomes  stagnate  since  late  1990s,  only  top  earnings  and  incomes  grow    

(4) Politics:    concerns  about  income  inequality  reflect  concerns  about  economic  opportunity;  politics  today  are  analogous  to  politics  in  civil  rights  era,  which  focused  on  reducing  inequality  in  order  to  expand  opportunity  

Racial  Gaps  in  Unemployment  Widen          

                                         

 M.  Hout  &  E.  Cumberworth  (Russell  Sage  Foundation  Brief,  2012).

1st Qtr, 2015 10.4% 7.3% 5.1% 3.8%

Peak unemp. rate, all: 10.0% (2009)

Black/White  Gaps  in  Earnings  Widen

 

   N.  Irwin  et  al.  (New  York  Times,  2014).

Racial  Gaps  in  Median  Income  Unchanged  (Black/White)  or  Widen  (Hispanic/White)  

 

     C.  DeNavas-­‐Walt  &  B.  Proctor  (U.S  Census  Bureau,  2014).

Black/White  Gaps  in  Income:  Progress  at  Bottom    

   

     D.  Bloome  (American  Sociological  Review,  2014).

Racial  Gaps  in  Wealth  Larger  than  in  Income  and  Widen    

                 

   N.  Irwin  et  al.  (New  York  Times,  2014).  

Women’s  LFPR  Stops  Increasing  in  Late  1990s  

                 

M.  Hout  &  E.  Cumberworth  (Russell  Sage  Foundation  Brief,  2012).

Women’s  LFPR  Falls  Relative  to  Other  Countries    

   

                               F.  Blau  &  L.  Kahn  (American  Economic  Review,  2013).

Women’s  Median  Earnings  Stop  Increasing  in  Late  1990s    

       C.  DeNavas-­‐Walt  &  B.  Proctor  (U.S  Census  Bureau,  2014).

Women’s  Hourly  Wages:  Only  Top  Quintile  Still  Rising

WOMEN      J.  Bivens,  H.  Shierholz,  &  L.  Mishel  (State  of  Working  America,  2012).

Men’s  Hourly  Wages:  Only  Top  Decile  Still  Rising

MEN    J.  Bivens,  H.  Shierholz,  &  L.  Mishel  (State  of  Working  America,  2012).

Only  Earnings  of  Postgrads  Continue  to  Rise  

                 D.  Autor  (Science,  2014).

Similar  Levels  of  Earnings  Inequality  among  Men  and  Women    

L.  McCall  (Council  for  Contemporary  Families  Brief,  2014).

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Ratio  of  Top  to  Bottom  Weekly  Earnings  among  Full-­‐Time  Workers  ,  1970  to  2010

Women

Men

Source: Author's  analysis  of  the March  Current  Population  Survey.  Top  earnings  are  the  average  earnings  of  workers  in  the  85th  to  95th  percentiles.  Bottom  earnings  are  the  average  earnings  of  workers  in  the  5thto  15th  percentiles.  Sample  includes  25  to  54  year-­‐olds  who  are  not  self-­‐employed.  

Post-­‐Tax  and  Transfer  Median  Income  Also  Stagnates    

                                 P.  Armour,  R.  Burkhauser,  &  J.  Larrimore  (National  Tax  Journal,  2014).

Part  I:  Summary    (1) Racial  inequality:  remarkable  (and  troubling)  stability  over  

time  (focusing  on  black/white  inequality);  increasing  attention  to  racial  divides    

(2) Gender  inequality:  stabilizes  in  late  1990s;  women’s  economic  trends  now  looking  more  like  men’s,  leading  to  stagnant  middle  class  family  income    

(3) Class  inequality:  grows  within  racial  groups,  among  men,  and  among  women;  median  incomes  stagnate  since  late  1990s,  only  top  earnings  and  incomes  grow  for  both  men  and  women  

Part  II:  Politics  of  Inequality    

 (1)    Beliefs  about  Inequality  and  Opportunity    (2)  Political  Discourses  of  Inequality

   

Americans  Have  Long  Desired  Less  Income  Inequality  (GSS)  

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1987# 1992# 1996# 2000# 2008# 2010# 2012#

Percen

t# Income#differences#in#America#are#too#large#

Agreement # ######and#strong#agreement####################################ISSP$Median#########################################

By  Some  Measures,  Intolerance  Has  Increased  Over  Time  (GSS)  

 

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1987# 1992# 1996# 2000# 2008#2010#2012#

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t#

Income#differences#are#too#large#Inequality#con?nues#to#exist#to#benefit#rich#and#powerful#Large#income#differences#are#unnecessary#for#prosperity#

#Agree#and##strongly#agree###

   

   

228K  

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800K  

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                                                 US  Public  (GSS)                                Top  1%  (SESA)    Estimated  pay  &  ratio                                Desired  pay  &  ratio                                      Estimated                Desired   2000:  13/1          2010:  32/1                  2000:    4/1            2010:  7/1                      2011:    93/1        2011:  50/1                                                                                              

         Americans  Not  More  Likely  to  Be  Duped  by  American  Dream  (GSS/ISSP,  2010)

96#92#

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Parent's) ) )))Coming)from)a ))))))))Knowing)the)educa6on...))))))))))))))))wealthy)family... ))))))))right)people...####################################is#essenBal/very#important#for#geIng#ahead#(%)#

Hard)work#is#essenBal/very#important#for#geIng#ahead#(%)##################################

Americans’  Optimism  about  Upward  Mobility  Fluctuates  

 

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1987" 1992" 1994" 1996" 1998" 2000" 2002" 2004" 2006" 2008" 2010" 2012"

Percent"

Agree"and"strongly"agree"

Disagree"and"strongly"disagree"

Neither"agree"nor"disagree""

"The"way"things"are"in"America,"people"like"me"and"my"family"have"a"good"chance"

of"improving"our"standard"of"living.""

Inequality  Trends  Hold  after  Compositional/Behavioral  Controls  (outcome  =  average  of  three  inequality  questions  scaled  from  0  to  1)  

 

-0.05

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15 19

92-1

987

1996

-198

7

2000

-198

7

2008

-198

7

2010

-198

7

2012

-198

7

1992

-198

7

1996

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2000

-198

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-198

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Avg

. dis

cret

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ange

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198

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ith 9

5% C

I

Each%year's%increase%rela.ve%to%1987,%without%controls%

Each%year's%increase%rela.ve%to%1987,%with%all%controls%and%interac.ons%%

Trends  Affected  by  Mobility  Optimism  and  Political  Orientation  (outcome  =  average  of  three  inequality  questions  scaled  from  0  to  1)  

 

-0.05

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15 19

92-1

987

1996

-198

7

2000

-198

7

2008

-198

7

2010

-198

7

2012

-198

7

1992

-198

7

1996

-198

7

2000

-198

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2008

-198

7

2010

-198

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2012

-198

7

Avg

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198

7 w

ith 9

5% C

I

Model&includes&all&controls&except&focal&variable(s)&

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!plus!focal!variable:&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&plus!focal!variables:&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&mobility&op8mism&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&poli8cal&ideology,&par8sanship&&&

Trends  Less  Affected  by  Demographics  and  Economic  Status  (outcome  =  average  of  three  inequality  questions  scaled  from  0  to  1)  

 

-0.05

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15 19

92-1

987

1996

-198

7

2000

-198

7

2008

-198

7

2010

-198

7

2012

-198

7

1992

-198

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1996

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2000

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2008

-198

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2010

-198

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-198

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Avg

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cret

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198

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ith 9

5% C

I

Model&includes&all&controls&except&focal&variable(s)&

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!plus!focal!variables:&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&plus!focal!variables:&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&demographics&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&educa9on,&family&income&&&

Summary  of  Beliefs        

(1)       Most  Americans  desire  less  inequality    (2)       Intolerance  of  inequality  is  increasing  by  some  measures    (3)     Many  Americans  recognize  barriers  to  opportunity    

(typically  more  than  in  other  countries  and  more  than  top  1%)  

 (4)       Such  perceptions  are  increasing  by  some  measures    (5)     Concerns  about  opportunity  are  associated  with  desires  

for  less  inequality  (McCall  2013)  

     

   

What  are  the  political  implications?        

New  Framework    (1) Dominant  redistributive  models,  and  elite  partisan  

approaches  that  embed  these  models,  are  limited:    

Conservatives/Republicans:      “equalize  opportunities,  not  outcomes”  (e.g.,  economic  growth,  education)                          Liberals/Democrats:  “equalize  outcomes”  (e.g.,  taxing  and  social  spending).      

(2) Non-­‐elite  driven  alternative  (e.g.,  MacLean  2006):    “equalize  outcomes  to  equalize  opportunities”  (e.g.,  civil  rights  rights  agenda  –  EEO,  affirmative  action,  comparable  worth).    

    Alternatives,  Part  I:  Labor  Market  Redistribution  (i.e.,  “equalize  outcomes  to  equalize  opportunities”)  

 

Examples:    

(1) Say-­‐on-­‐pay  laws  (Switzerland,  Dodd-­‐Frank)  (2) Disclosure  of  executive/median  worker  pay  (Dodd-­‐Frank)  (3) EU  caps  on  banker  bonuses  (4) B  Corp  and  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  movements  (5) Employee  Stock  Ownership  Plans  (Blasi,  Kruse  &  Freeman)  (6) Anti-­‐Wal-­‐Mart  campaigns  (Ingram,  Qingyuan  &  Rao)    (7) Minimum/living  wage/wage  theft  campaigns    (8) Fast  food  worker  strikes  for  higher  pay  (9) Family  leave  campaigns  (Milkman  &  Appelbaum)  (10) State  anti-­‐de-­‐unionization  battles  (Ohio,  Wisconsin)  (11) Ban-­‐the-­‐box  and  other  anti-­‐discrimination  efforts  (12) Wage  targeting:  A  Triple  Mandate  for  the  Fed  

 

Alternatives,  Part  II:  Education  (not  Welfare)  (i.e.,  “equalize  outcomes  to  equalize  opportunities”)  

 “Raises  tax  on  household  income  at  and  above  $250,000  (and  $125,000  for  individual  filers).  Reduces  income  taxes  on  unemployment  benefits  in  2009.  Provides  funds  currently  budgeted  for  education,  health  care,  public  safety,  other  services.”    

      Oregon  Ballot  Measure  66/67    Passed,  54%  of  vote,  January,  2010  

“Temporary  Taxes  to  Fund  Education.  Guaranteed  Local  Public  Safety  Funding.  Initiative  Constitutional  Amendment.”  

California  Proposition  30  Passed,  55%  of  vote,  November,  2012  

Alternatives,  Part  II:  Education  (not  Welfare)  (i.e.,  “equalize  outcomes  to  equalize  opportunities”)  

 Other  Examples:    

(1) Bill  Di  Blasio:  Raise  taxes  on  rich  to  fund  universal  pre-­‐K  (2)  “Millionaire  taxes”:  New  Jersey  (2004),  California  (2005),  

Maryland  (2008),  Hawaii  (2009),  Wisconsin  (2009),  New  York  (2009),  Connecticut  (2010)    (see  Young  and  Varner)  

(3) Social  Investment  and  Inclusion  strategies  in  Europe    e.g.,  UK  Commission  on  Social  Mobility  and  Child  Poverty  (Reeves;  Morel,  Palier  &  Palme;  Larsen)  

(4) Focus  on  “IGM”  definition  of  opportunity  in  US    (Chetty  et  al.)  

(5) Apprenticeships  and  Training  Partnerships  (e.g.,  Lerman;  Center  on  Wisconsin  Strategy)  

No  Increase  in  Desire  for  Government  Redistribution    

-0.35

-0.30

-0.25

-0.20

-0.15

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92-1

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7 Model&excludes&inequality&a1tudes&index&(but&includes&controls)&1

03

05

07

0

1987 1992 1996 2000 2008 2010 2012

Government Should Reduce Rich/Poor Gap (%)

Increase  in  Desire  for  Spending  on  Education

-0.35

-0.30

-0.25

-0.20

-0.15

-0.10

-0.05

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20 19

92-1

987

1996

-198

7

2000

-198

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2008

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2010

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Avg

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198

7 Model&excludes&inequality&a1tudes&index&(but&includes&controls)&1

03

05

07

0

1987 1992 1996 2000 2008 2010 2012

Supports more Spending on Education (%)

Testing  Preferences  for  Labor  Market  Redistribution    

General  Social  Survey  (GSS/ISSP),  2012  (eqwlth)  Amazon  Mechanical  Turk  Survey  (Mturk),  2014  (N=953)      “Some  people  think  that  the  government  ought  to  reduce  income  differences  between  the  rich  and  the  poor,  perhaps  by  raising  the  taxes  of  wealthy  families  or  by  giving  income  assistance  to  the  poor.  Others  think  the  government  should  not  concern  itself  with  reducing  this  income  difference  between  the  rich  and  poor…  What  comes  closest  to  the  way  you  feel?”    1=  Government  should  do  something  to  reduce  differences  .  .  .  

7=  Government  should  not  concern  itself  with  such  differences    

 

Testing  Preferences  for  Labor  Market  Redistribution      

General  Social  Survey  (GSS/ISSP),  2014  (new  question,  not  available)  Amazon  Mechanical  Turk  Survey  (Mturk),  2014  (N=953)      “Some  people  think  that  major  companies  ought  to  reduce  pay  differences  between  employees  with  high  pay  and  those  with  low  pay,  perhaps  by  reducing  the  pay  of  executives  or  by  increasing  the  pay  of  unskilled  workers.  Others  think  that  major  companies  should  not  concern  themselves  with  reducing  this  pay  difference  …  What  comes  closest  to  the  way  you  feel?”    1=  Major  companies  should  do  something  to  reduce  differences  .  .  .  

7=  Major  companies  should  not  concern  themselves  with  such            differences  

Testing  Preferences  for  Labor  Market  Redistribution  (mTurk  survey,  2014)  

28# 25#

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,#'14#

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,#'14#

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,#'14#

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,#'14#

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,#'14#

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,#'14#

Percen

t#

#####Support#for#government#and#business#to#reduce#income#differences#(%)#!!!!!!!Republicans! ! !!!Independents !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Democrats#############

Testing  Preferences  for  Labor  Market  Redistribution  (mTurk  survey,  2014)  

19# 21#

4#7#

11#

37#

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2#7#

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Don't#Re

duce#

Low#Inco

me#Ind#Char

i?es#

High#Inco

me#Ind#

Governm

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Major#Com

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Don't#Re

duce#

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i?es#

High#Inco

me#Ind#

Governm

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Major#Com

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Percen

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Which#of#the#following#groups#has#the#greatest#responsibility#for#reducing####differences#in#income#between#those#with#high#and#low#incomes?#(%)#!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Republicans!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Independents !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#############

Revise  Conventional  Models    (1) Conservatives/Republicans:        

 

From  “equal  opportunity,  not  equal  outcomes”  to  ???              

       Liberals/Democrats:            

From  “equal  outcomes”  to  ???    (e.g.,  “taxing  &  spending”  to  “taxing  for  opportunity”)      

(2) Non-­‐elite  alternative  draws  analogy  from  civil  rights  strategies:    

 

 Reduce  labor  market  and  educational  inequality  as  an  equal  opportunity  strategy  (e.g.,  affirmative  action,  comparable  worth)  

Conclusion        

   Absence  of  political  and  economic  innovation  and  leadership  is  primary  obstacle  to  reducing  inequality,  not  public  tolerance  or  ignorance.    New  emphasis  in  research  literature  on  connections  between  racial,  gender,  and  class  inequality,  and  the  political  strategies  to  address  each  are  converging.