FPRC Journal Journal 2013(3) ... Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIAS)...

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2013 (3) ISSN 2277 – 2464

FPRC Journal

____________________________________________________ (a Quarterly research journal devoted to studies on Indian Foreign Policy)

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Focus : India-Myanmar Relations

Responses, Articles

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Foreign Policy Research Centre NEW DELHI (INDIA)

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FPRC Journal 2013(3) India-Myanmar Relations

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Preface India has a special relationship with Myanmar. Long standing historical, cultural and religious links with Myanmar underpin this broad-based relationship. There are cross-border ethnic links, too, with Naga and Mizo tribes inhabiting both sides of the India-Myanmar border. Myanmar is now rising in India’s foreign policy priorities, that the earlier policy constraints of democracy and China are reduced, and that there are grounds now for being more upbeat than previously. The prospects for an enhanced economic partnership, in particular, in the energy sector,it is hoped, will add to this substantive and comprehensive relationship.

It is very heartening to note that a wide galaxy of writers have focused on important themes and other related issues in their writings and comments, for this special issue of FPRC Journal on India –Myanmar Relations.

We express our heart-felt thanks to our contributors who have shared our sentiments and accepted our invitation to enrich the contents of the Journal.They are always our source of strength. Mahendra Gaur Indira Gaur Director Mg. Editor

Foreign Policy Research Centre New Delhi


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FPRC Journal

Focus : India-Myanmar Relations Contributors :

RESPONSES :

1. Amb. PREET MALIK Ambassador to Myanmar. 1990-92

2. Dr Arvind Gupta, Director General Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi


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3.Dr. Renaud EGRETEAU Research Assistant Professor Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (inc. Centre of Asian Studies) The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR

4.Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray Singapore based security Analyst/ consultant. Former Deputy Director in India's National Security Council Secretariat, New Delhi


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(5) Sreeradha Datta (PhD)

Director Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIAS) KOLKATA , India

(6) Bertil Lintner Swedish Journalist, Writer Expertise on Burmese issues


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(7) Ms. Moe Thuzar ISEAS Fellow and lead researcher for socio-cultural affairs at the ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC) at ISEAS

Articles

1.Hon’ble Amb. (R) Trevor Wilson Visiting Fellow,

Dept. of Political & Social Change, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific


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2. Prof. Kanbawza Win formerly, the Foreign Affairs Secretary to the Prime Minister of Burma

3. Shri P.M. Heblikar Managing Trustee, Institute of Contemporary Studies Bangalore (ICSB)


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4.Dr. Rajaram Panda Visiting Faculty at the Centre for Japanese, Korean and Northeast Asian Studies, School of Language, Literature & Culture Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University and Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

5. Dr. Alistair D. B. Cook

Visiting Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore


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6. Col. VIRENDRA SAHAI VERMA Honorary Fellow , Institute of Chinese Studies Delhi

7.Dr. Swapna Bhattacharya (Chakraborti) Professor & former Head , Dept. of South & Southeast Asian Studies, University of Calcutta


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8. Col R Hariharan Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group

9. Syed Ali Mujtaba ,Ph.D, Senior journalist based in Chennai,India


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10. Prof.E.Bijoykumar Singh Economics Department ,Manipur University

11. C. S. Kuppuswamy Consultant with the South Asia analysis Group (SAAG)

a retired officer of the Indian Army and former Director of the Cabinet Secretariat


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12.Dr. SANTISHREE DHULIPUDI PANDIT PROF.Dept.of Politics and Public Administration

University of Pune,India

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Dr. RIMLI BASU RESEARCH FELLOW Dept. of Politics and Public Administration,University of Pune

13. Dr. (Mrs) Munmun Majumdar Associate Prof. Dept of Political Science ,North-Eastern Hill University,

Shillong, Meghalaya,India


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14. Dr.Rakhee Bhattacharya Fellow at Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies,

New Delhi

15. Varigonda Kesava Chandra Research Associate,

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy,

National University of Singapore

16. Lindsay Hughes Research Analyst at Future Directions International , Perth, Australia


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17. Monish Tourangbam Associate Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

18. Hu Xiaowen PhD Candidate of Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University;

Research assistant of Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences

19.Dr. Rahul Mishra Researcher , Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses,

New Delhi


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RESPONSES (pp.15-53) (1) Ambassador PREET MALIK DOB 18.02.1937 1954-1958 Worked as junior executive in Kalinga Industries Ltd., Cuttack, Orissa. ED: BA (Hons.) Economics and Human Geography. May 1962 Joined the Indian Foreign Service. Nov. 1963-Apr. 1966 Third Sec/Second Sec. Embassy of India Cairo. May 1966-Oct. 1967 Second Sec./Acting High Commissioner, High Commission of India Singapore. Nov. 1967-Apr.1970 Second Sec./First Sec. Political Office for Sikkim and Bhutan. 1970-73: First Secretary and Acting PR. Permanent Mission to the UN, Geneva. Dealt with Economic issues and was the representative to the Governing Body of the ILO and the WHO Committees. Dealt with WIPO (copyright and patent regimes and issues). Chairman Committee on Implementation of Conventions of the ILO. Delegate to the International Maritime Conference. Delegate to the Committee on Disarmament. Delegate to the G-77 issues on trade policy and development. Delegate to the Narcotics Commission and part of the negotiating team on the Convention on Psychotropic Substances and Prevention of Trafficking in Drugs. Was involved with the Prepcoms on Law of the Seas, Environment and the specialized Committee of UNCTAD on Lead and Zinc. 1973-76: Ambassador to Bahrain. 1976-79: Director Ministry of Commerce. Formulated policies of distribution of export quotas for Textiles. EXIM policy on manufactures. Bilateral trade policy issues on South Asia, WANA and Africa. Multilateral trade policy issues including regional trading arrangements and bilateral payments arrangements. Oil/Energy related policy and trade issues consequent on oil price hikes of 1973 and policy determination to ensure adequate oil import flows, petroleum product flows and dissolution of the bilateral payments outstandings/credits via oil imports from Egypt. 1979-81: Ambassador to Cuba. This was the period when Cuba held the Chairmanship of NAM. Participated in several Committees on sectoral subjects dealing with technical assistance, trade and development including issues relating to Global Negotiations and Monetary issues. 1981-83: High Commissioner to Tanzania and Seychelles. 1983-86: Deputy Permanent Representative and Minister E&P to the Permanent Mission of India to the UN, New York. Dealt specifically with economic and social issues; dealt also with the Budget and Administrative Committee of the UN. Vice President of ECOSOC. Delegate to the International Population Conference, Mexico. Dealt specifically with issues relating to Money and Finance, Trade Policy issues including the Uruguay Round of Negotiations and matters relating to IBRD, IMF, GATT and UNCTAD at the UN in New York and Geneva. Dealt directly with UNDP and its meetings in New York and Geneva. Dealt with OPEC countries on oil and trade policy factors relating to development of the G-77 and the NAM member States. 1983-90: High Commissioner to Malaysia and Brunei. Dealt with Petronas relating to India’s bilateral energy supplies and cooperation issues including the 1990 emergency requirements of crude to meet India’s needs. 1990-92: Ambassador to Myanmar.


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1992-95: first as Additional Secretary and then as Secretary (Economic Relations) in the Ministry of External Affairs. Was on the FIPB and the Steering Committee on Economic Reforms. Associated with the drafting, negotiation and adoption of Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements. Issues relating to the establishment of the WTO at the conclusion of the URN. Specific dealings in the new areas of TRIMS, TRIPS, Trade and Environment and in defining policy options on the Indian approach to Trade and Labour. Coordinated the response of the GOI on economic and trade policy issues including energy supply and investment issues. This involved extensive consultations on policy issues and approaches with the economic and social ministries and departments of the GOI and the Prime Ministers Office. Headed the relations with SAARC and was involved in the definition and the initiation of SAFTA. Actions to promote India as an Investment Destination. Accompanied the Prime Minister on various official visits (USA, Germany, UK, Vietnam and Singapore, Oman, DAVOS etc.) dealing with economic and business aspects. Associated with defining the look east policy announced in Singapore by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. Specialized on all aspects of Economic Diplomacy both Multilateral and Bilateral. Dealt with economic and trade policy issues in NAM, G-77 and G-15. Established the informal dialogue between the G-15 and the G-7. Set up the Sectoral Dialogue between India and ASEAN and laid the foundations for India attaining the full dialogue status with ASEAN. Dealt with issues arising out of WTO commitments in the context of Globalisation and its effect on the Indian efforts to integrate its economy into the global economy. Established the institutional dialogue with OECD and MITI of Japan. Dealt with economic issues relating to India and the EU. From 1995 onwards have been associated with some leading Corporates as Advisor on Corporate, restructuring and financing issues. Acted as Corporate Advisor to the Chairman of the Kirloskar Group one of India’s top Business groups. Also advised the RPG Group and The leading United States float glass manufacturer Guardian International. These assignments were held during the period April 1995 to March 2002. For one year advised Dua Consulting in New Delhi. Dealt with Trade Policy issues relating to anti-dumping, subsidies and safeguards. In this regard have a consultancy arrangement with a leading British Law Firm where have been advising on trade policy actions to clients that include clients from Japan, India, the UK and at the EU. Worked for the development of a plan for extending advise to an African Government on WTO, EU, Regional arrangements etc negotiating techniques including advisories on issues relating to subsidies, anti-dumping and safeguards as well as on new issues in the WTO. Separately advising Indian firms on anti-dumping actions in India and against them at the EU. Extensive work on developing papers on strategic issues and areas of Indian interest where China is concerned. Subjects covered in this respect are:

1. State Owned Enterprises in China with a particular emphasis on subsidies and trade distorting actions. 2. China’s Financial System and the impact on it of the accession to the WTO. 3. China’s Textile industry and the manner in which it has managed itself under trade restrictions including

the manner in which it has circumvented the MFA. 4. China’s Cyber warfare capacities and techniques. 5. China – Strategic Defense Hi-Tech Upgradation


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Served as Director on several company Boards from 1995-96 to 2001-2002. Have written extensively on Indian Foreign Policy and economic diplomacy in the Financial Express during the period 1995-2000. Have made contributions to the publication Indian Foreign Policy Agenda for the 21

st Century:

1. The Changing Face of India’s Economic Diplomacy: The Role of the Ministry of External Affairs. 2. Indo-Myanmar Relations.

Have developed a confidential paper on Energy Strategy and Security for the NSA. With Publishers book on India Myanmar relations Senior Advisor to Ashurst a leading International Law Firm covering areas specific to its India Practice from 2002 to 2011.

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Answers to the questions raised by the FRPC are provided ad seriatim:

1. A growing Indo-Myanmar relationship has the potential to make a significant impact on South Asia, but also in the larger Asian region. Do you agree with this assessment?

In response to this question it is essential to place Myanmar within the contextual parameters of the importance of its geo-strategic position and the security implications of its still unresolved ethnic divides need to be put in perspective. This is also important as the opportunity that Myanmar projects can be exploited to the mutual advantage of India and Myanmar while it does not necessarily have to come in conflict with Myanmar’s other great neighbour China. The factual position is that Myanmar’s geographical location places it on the cross roads linking South Asia with South East Asia, and South Asia with East Asia inclusive of The Peoples Republic of China.This places it in a unique position to connect these three regions enabling the establishment of a multi-dimensional relationship across the regional borders. For India in particular it establishes a land bridge connecting it to the ASEAN Region; an area that is of great strategic importance to India, that has the potential of becoming a positive factor in promoting the socio-economic development linkages between western Myanmar and the North Eastern States of India suggesting a logical sub-regional framework within the India-ASEAN FTA as well as the bilateral comprehensive strategic arrangements between India and SE Asian countries. Myanmar is also a key to furthering India’s Look East Policy (LEP) with a focus on India’s NE Region as integral to that policy and its inter-active framework. The LEP is an important plank for India to forge direct links with SE Asia and the Far East, a


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region where a close relationship helps serve India’s interests: political, economic and strategic; making it a key imperative for India to attain its historical over reach as an Asian power and to achieve its potential as a major economic power and a key driver of the global economy. In a sense this is a dynamic that works towards the realisation on a more pragmatic basis the Nehruvian vision of a united Asia playing a dominant role for peace and development as part of a globalizing world. A vision that was dear to Nehru’s heart at the time of India’s independence, a vision that lay shattered on the rock of differences that came to impact the relations between India and China. It is worth recalling at this stage that both Nehru and the then Burma Prime Minister U Nu had come to look on the PRC as a disruptive force in the region, self serving and unreliable. The fact that Myanmar lies between two large neighbours China and India, projects both an opportunity and a security dilemma for India. As long as the Myanmar borders that form the homelands of its ethnic minorities are not at peace and under the unquestioned administrative control of the Government of Myanmar, these areas are subject to exploitation by outside forces and where the writ of Nay Pi Daw would continue to be flouted. The current situation in the Kachin State is a case in point where China has shown that it can raise the threat level to serve its own interests and along side that it continues to retain linkages with Indian insurgents by providing material support to these groups utilizing the Kokang Armed force as an intermediary. While the security threat is an obvious issue Myanmar also serves as a potential source that could encourage a greater degree of political and security related relationship neutered in the medium term by cooperation for socio-economic development based on the border development arrangements between the two countries. The implications areself-evident, as this would involve linkages between the development programmes of the two countries covering the NE Region of India and the western states and divisions of Myanmar bordering on India. For India the moves so far made to progress Myanmar through a mix of political and economic reforms that favour the setting up a democratic state that also favours the setting up of an open economy leveraged by market forces and encourages global investment, is an attractive proposition. These developments have encouraged India to make moves that offer cooperation that covers all aspects of a bilateral relationship between two close neighbours: political, here there are programmes that cover the Parliamentary system and the connected governance system; socio-economic development that covers the different dimensions of economic activities and investment by Indian entities that would target economic growth through collaborative efforts. All that has been put across so far clearly establishes the significance of Myanmar


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to India. There is no question that the involvement of ASEAN in the development and economic aspects of the NE Region that has a heavy emphasis on specifics of socio-economic development of the region would help involve a coordinated approach that would also bring in the adjoining western frontier regions of Myanmar within the evolving developmental model. Further the tourism potential of the NE Region is a significant part of the ASEAN involvement. There is little doubt that this area can attain its potential only when the infrastructure for the purpose is put in place this would find its natural outlets also in the adjoining areas of Myanmar. Given that the NE Region has a key to play in the achievement of the over all targets set under the LEP, Myanmar becomes an even more significant factor as an actor in the coordinated developmental arrangements with both economic and business benefits flowing out of the Indo-ASEAN cooperative efforts in India’s NE Region. The benefit of India’s Myanmar engagement for South Asia as a whole is a more complex issue. Indo-Myanmar relations in the post 1992 period have grown to acceptable levels with India having made significant commitments to assist Myanmar by increasing investment to its infrastructure development, a push to India Inc.to make business investments, and in the Border Development Arrangement that involves India in the socio-economic and institutional development in the ethnic areas of Myanmar that border on India’s sensitive NE Region. With the rest of South Asia at present the relations are cordial, except with Bangladesh with whom the Rohingya issue is a stumbling factor, but do not have any substantial depth. What is important though is Myanmar having developed a political space for South Asia and could look on South Asia as a whole as an important future market once its economic potential has been appropriately developed making it a major Asian economy. There is however little doubt that it is India that is the country of South Asia with whom Myanmar would continue to have close relations and with the connectivity with India and the economic and business role increasingly binding the two countries together this would serve as a major opening to the rest of South Asia. The key factor in the relationship however is the Geo-strategic imperatives that Myanmar signifies for India’s relations with SE Asia as well as with East Asia particularly China. Myanmar is providing infrastructural linkages to China that places it in contention as an alternative route to the Malacca Straits for transporting its energy supplies. It is also placed to providing alternative routes and connectivity to the Yunann and Schwan provinces of China to the Bay of Bengal and beyond. For India the South Western Sea face of Myanmar has now become central its alternative route to the NE Region via Myanmar’s Chin State to Mizoram and beyond. This provides connectivity to the NE Region to the Bay of Bengal and also to the ASEAN Region as a whole. It would thus be correct to assume that once the infrastructure that would connect India with South East Asia and China is in place, providing both road and rail connectivity, it would bring the whole of


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Eastern Asia into close and direct contact particularly Thailand and the connecting ASEAN lands of which relations with Vietnam have an increasing strategic value. In straight value terms it can be put across that once the land connectivity has been established and the rules of pass through traffic have been put in place these linkages could be of benefit not only to India but also to the entire SAARC and ASEAN regions. The trigger point would obviously be the very large and growing presence of the consumer community within the SAARC countries. This would however be possible if the India Pakistan economic relationship develops to its logical conclusion.

2. India sees connectivity through Myanmar as crucial for its ‘Look East Policy’ and development of ties with the Asean countries. Looking back, can it be said that the policy has been successful?

There is an increasing clarity to India’s relations with the ASEAN States with the strategic and the economic values being underwritten by both the FTA’s and the Comprehensive Strategic Agreements. Narasimha Rao was the Indian Prime Minister who recognised the imperatives that were to guide India’s Look East Policy being centred on SE Asia and the Far East. It was for that reason that he announced the LEP from a platform in Singapore that was chaired by Lee Kuan Yew who had been perhaps the strongest advocate for India to play its rightful role in Asia.

The relations with SE Asia were developed on an axis that did not involve Myanmar

till the late 90’s even though Myanmar had agreed to become part of ASEAN in 1991 being made a full member in 1997. It is essential to understand that till Myanmar remained a closed economy; even though under the SLORC and subsequently under the SPDC a policy of granting to the Myanmar economy a market driven face had been put forward; it was a limited access player and did not lend itself as an ASEAN opportunity.

India had promoted itself up the ASEAN ladder without attaching any role to

Myanmar in that context. However Myanmar was included in the LEP from the initial period itself as it was of strategic importance and was seen as a possible outlet for the NE Region as an inclusive market partner and a possible alternative connectivity route for that sub-region. Further in the post 1992 period India came to place an emphasis on energy cooperation with a focus on Myanmar as a partner in that area. With India looking on infrastructure development that would help substantiate Myanmar’s role as a land bridge between India and SE Asia. The importance of that country to India’s relations with ASEAN and the further evolution of the LEP with a greater focus on


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the developing economic and business linkages between the NE Region and the ASEAN, the role of Myanmar has become an essential part of the India ASEAN relationship. Despite all of this one has to see to what extent the policy has so far achieved its objectives. For the policy to succeed it is crucial that what has been targeted is achieved in a reasonable time frame and should be embedded into the policy objectives. As is evident the policy objectives are the evolution of a secure environment that is built on the back of infrastructure development covering the NE region and Myanmar in tandem, The extension of institutional backup to socio economic development of the adjoining areas of Myanmar that would involve areas of public health, education, agricultural extension systems, industrial development based on a common market approach and the development of tourism that would cover both the NE Region and Myanmar ; with these being locked into the overall tourism systems of India and the ASEAN Region, are now clear imperatives of the relations. The crucial factor that is essential to the logical realisation of the potential of these goals particularly as these could help in the stabilisation of the adjoining ethic minority areas of Myanmar is the time bound development of the necessary infrastructure on both sides of the common borders of the two countries.

3. ‘Let’s not be over-optimistic about Burma’ , the opposition leader Aung San

Suu Kyi said. She would want India to look at the situation in Myanmar, which is in transition from one form of governance to another, “in a very practical way”. In what specific ways can India help Myanmar at this stage of its political transition?

The Suu Kyi statement quoted above covers, to my mind, two specifics. The first being the issue of democracy and the second being the involvement of India in the economic and business areas of the opening economy of her country. The first aspect in a sense is related to the fact that Myanmar in political terms could be described logically as a polity in transition. This calls for an understanding of what has so far happened, despite the overall implications of the provisions of the 2008 Constitution the President permitted a twisting of the electoral rules that enabled Suu Kyi and her NLD to fight the bye-elections and win 48 seats. This has in an effective sense brought Suu Kyi and her party into the mainstream of Myanmar’s politics and has given a push to national reconciliation promising an eventual democratic polity. However the 2008 Constitution continues to act as a barrier to the Thein Sein political reform process unless it is significantly amended adopting a fully democratic political system that would be based on a Federal Arrangement that is the demand of the ethnic minorities. In other words the 2008 Constitution has for all practical purposes to be replaced. This is a difficult


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situation as the Armed Forces are unlikely to acquiesce in any arrangement that threatens their power base and ability to retain the power to intervene. Further while they may agree to share power and even contemplate a bending of the Constitutional provisions, that at present rule out the possibility of Suu Kyi becoming President if her Party sweeps the polls of 2015, they would do so as long as they retain the overall control on the direction that her Government would adopt including an ability to intervene if they feel that their control is under threat. What Suu Kyi wants from India is that it should try and influence President Thein Sein to continue to introduce reforms that would establish a true democracy. India has taken steps to assist in the reform movement by encouraging relations on a Parliament-to-Parliament basis. It has also undertaken to support Thein Sein’s economic reforms that are focused on rural development that would also benefit possibilities at the level of grass roots democratic institutions. Providing them with economic teeth is the other aspect of the Indian involvement, this is being done through institutional arrangements and technology transfer offers. Suu Kyi is being regularly kept in the picture on the steps that India has undertaken and intends to continue with on the platform of democracy. Suu Kyi has also maintained that India’s economic policies and business trends in Myanmar should be in keeping with the aspirations of the people of Myanmar. Implying that India should do all it can to assist in the socio-economic development of Myanmar that helps the people of the country to progress and strengthen their capabilities to advance up the economic ladder. In other words India’s economic presence should be people oriented and in cooperation with the aspirations of the people. She has also mentioned that the infrastructure investments being made by India are of mutual benefit and should focus to a large extent on improving the lot of the people of Myanmar. None of her positions is in any way against India taking steps to promote economic cooperation with the present Government nor is she blind to the fact that while India has emphasized the social development aspects of the relationship that would obviously be of direct benefit to the people of her country, and the positives that should flow out of India’s involvement in the infrastructure development projects, she is a realist enough to accept that the business relations have to guided by a profit motive and that without that investment would hardly take place. The areas of cooperation that would assist Myanmar and would be of mutual benefit relate to grass routes democracy evolving in Myanmar; here India can provide the institutional underpinnings that would provide content to the democratic reform process. By granting access, to the Myanmar Parliamentarians covering all hues of the current political mainstream thinking in India, to the manner in which both the Indian Constitution and the governance system delivers in a Federal Arrangement that does not in any way prevent the State meeting any


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challenges thrown up by internal threats to the sovereignty and integrity of the nation. Emphasis on social development both at the local level and the Union level by establishing cooperation in the areas of public health, education, local manufacturing to support the agricultural system including the setting up of a support system as well as cooperative production and marketing systems. Rapid development of infrastructure that would bring the entire Indian market area and the ASEAN market area closer through land linkages and would bring the development goals of Myanmar as a target area for India’s economic decisions. A common market like development arrangement that links India’s NE Region to the adjoining regions of Myanmar particularly those West of the Irrawaddy, furthering this along the road of greater Indian involvement with ASEAN. Promote by all financial means the involvement by India Inc. to look upon Myanmar as a major investment destination. These are some clear imperatives that should be driving the Indian engagement with Thein Sein’s Myanmar that would not only place India as a meaningfuleconomic partner but also as a realistic political partner who is willing to assist on a pragmatic level his approach to national reconciliation that covers both the democratic and economic reform process.

4. As Myanmar is now rising in India’s foreign policy priorities, there should be a strategically pre-emptive effort to forestall Myanmar, a next door neighbour, from becoming a vehicle through which huge problems could be created for India. What are the promise and challenges of ‘a new relationship?

The common Colonial period that both India and Myanmar had been visited upon, left two issues at the closing of the colonial period; the first related to the issues of land and business dominance by the Indian community in Burma and the second that continues to haunt both is the failure to provide a pragmatic political solution that would safe guard the interests of the ethnic minority in Burma. The Ethnic issue and the failure of the Burman’s to live up to the promises of the Aung San negotiated Panglong Convention has resulted in years of confrontation and was largely responsible for the authoritarian rule imposed by Ne Win in 1962 that thereafter continued in unbroken sequence by the SLORC and its successor the SPDC. The Military still retains its views on preserving the sovereignty and integrity of the country by imposing central rule that is now underwritten by the 2008 Constitution. The first area of economic dominance by the Indian’s was solved by two measures adopted by the Government of Burma, by the agricultural reforms that were adopted under U Nu’ prime Ministership. This ensured without any real protest by the Nehru Government in India and deprived the mainly the Chettiar land holdings of over 60% in the rice bowl of Burma. Subsequently Ne Win implemented the goal of his party to nationalize the economy leading to the Indian business community


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loosing its stronghold of the economy and the evacuation of over 100 000 Indians by the GOI ; again there was no real protest against the measures directed against the Indian business community. In actual fact it would appear that the powers that be in India were sympathetic if not in approval of the measures having “universal implications” that were adopted by U Nu and Ne Win. The economic issues that were largely directed towards Indian interests have left one lesson behind; while in todays terms and the investment encouraging environment that the Thein Sein Government has come to promote opportunities, that could be of interest to India Inc., Indian business should never be seen to dominate the economy but should to an extent have local partners particularly ensuring that these are not people of Chinese or Indian origin. As Suu Kyi put it squarely the presence should never be dominating and should be of visible benefit to the people of Myanmar. A tall order indeed where the profit motive drives any business investment. This also means that Indian business has to ride to an extent on the coat tails of the ASEAN and the Japanese or Koreans. Or it has to have financial safeguards extended to it by the GOI and Indian financial institutions. However one area that throws open possibilities is the setting up of Specialized Economic Zones that would integrate the issues of local raw materials, business enterprise and vocational training centers that would encourage and be based on cooperative efforts by Myanmar and Indian entrepreneur’s with such efforts concentrating on arrangements on a cross border basis bringing in locales in India’s NE Region and the adjoining regions of Myanmar into the equation to mutual benefit. The issues of security posed by the insurgencies on the Indian side and the encouragement that they receive by the unsettled nature of the Myanmar ethnic regions that adjoin India, often have been an area of consistent refrain in the relations between the two countries. The other element has been the exploitation of the Indian insurgency movement by China and by Pakistan firstly in East Pakistan and subsequently in Bangladesh. The problem that Myanmar faces is related directly to the issue of resolving the political problems both of a constitutional and an administrative nature with the ethnic minorities. What makes this an issue of greater salience is the fact that almost the entire border area of Myanmar is the homeland of the ethnic communities of which the Chin State, the Naga Tribal areas of the Sagaing Division and the Kachin State border India. The demand of the ethnic states is for a federal Myanmar that grants them “real autonomy” the ideal situation being that the Central entity should have control over External affairs, Defence and Finance leaving everything else to the federated states. They want the 2008 constitution to be re-written endorsing an acceptable Federal System for the country. Albeit there are ceasefire arrangements at present in prevalenceand negotiations on a political settlement are in process, the ongoing war with the Kachin’s is indicative of the political stumbling blocs.


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What the Kachin problem has also thrown up is the fact that China retains its role to play mischief that is represented by two development ; first is the arming with sophisticated weapons the Kokang ethnic army, the second is the open support that is being extended by the Kachin ethnics of the Yunann province of China. The Kachin have shown that they are more comfortable negotiating with the Myanmar Government on Chinese soil. What India has to keep in mind is that the control over the frontier states by the ethnic minority where economic development has been largely absent or minimal can be exploited as they have been in the past, by any authority in China that is inimical to the Myanmar as has happened in the past. It is in India’s interests that a political settlement between the Ethnic and Burman people is arrived at that spells peace and stability in the frontier regions of Myanmar. This would make the joint and cooperative arrangements between the two countries more meaningful in containing any support to Indian insurgents including safe havens and training areas within Myanmar to them. It would also help contain the exploitation of these developments by Chinese interests inclusive of the material support that is at times being offered to Indian groups through the Kokang. India has already arrived at a Border Areas Development Agreement with Myanmar; this was part of the Joint Statement that was issued during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit in 2012 to Nay Pi Daw. Under this the most important aspects are the development of medical and public health areas, education and vocational education institutions, development assistance in developing the local economy, both agricultural and non-agricultural and the evolving of local administration. The Indian approach has to be along the rural development schemes and local area developmental processes that are part of the Indian experience. The main element behind this involvement remains the stabilization of the area that would have a stimulating impact also on India’s NE Region. It would be a truism that if the Frontier areas of Myanmar are not stabilized and secure they would continue to pose a existential problem for India that would continue to be exploited by a China that has continued to show that it would do so whenever it feels that this route would put pressure on India and keep it focused on the immediate region and not succeed in its LEP policy making it a major and effective player on the Asia-Pacific scene that China wants to dominate and where it sees Myanmar as integral to its attaining its aggressive goals particularly over the Indian Ocean Region.

5.Defence cooperation between India and Myanmar is an important facet of bilateral relations. But India’s posture in the matter of defence cooperation with Myanmar now needs to be tempered, keeping in view the realities of ethnic turmoil in that country, caution defence experts. How far do you share their concerns?


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Defence cooperation is a vital area of the new emphasis that India has placed on Myanmar that is in democratic transition. Myanmar itself has shown a desire to reduce its defence dependence on China. It is not only to India that it has projected this area of cooperation but has tried to broaden its defence equipment acquisition from other suppliers to meet its requirements. It is the contention of many within the Indian defence establishment that the supplies of a limited nature that has been undertaken by India have been found to be superior to that supplied by China. This may be so however though it may have contributed to Myanmar asking for greater involvement of India on the defence side, the main driving force is Myanmar desiring a lowering of China’s dominance in this area that assumed that position in the post 1988 period when the rest of the world including India for that matter decided to isolate a Burma that was being ruled by a brutal military regime. Today the situation has changed thanks to a more open and practical role having been adopted by a nominally democratic military dominated government. If we have accepted the role of supporting the reform minded Thein Sein and to encourage him further in his reform efforts it is a clear essential that India should along with others help him in his efforts to reduce his dependence on China in the defence area. It makes no sense to hedge our bets in this regard particularly as we have also accepted a role in assisting Thein Sein in the socio-economic development of the Frontier States as part of the political process that he is trying to put in place in direct negotiation with the ethnic groups including the Kachins. While the frontier states continue to pose a security problem till a political system acceptable to all is put in place we need to assist him in every way that we can to assure a secure future for Myanmar including the defence area covering equipment supplies, software and training areas.

6. How far the prospects for an enhanced Indo-Myanmar economic partnership, in particular, in the energy sector will add to this substantive and comprehensive relationship?

The evolving economic partnership between India and Myanmar has assumed a multifaceted appearance covering a number of areas that have undertakings that are of essential importance to the NE Region connection with Myanmar and further with ASEAN States as a whole; it is also a major component as a positive for the growth of bilateral trade and investment that place the whole of the India and Myanmar on the trade map of the two countries. The Energy area is an important aspect of the economic and business relationship. The other major area of concentration is the development of infrastructure of which perhaps the two most prestigious projects are the Kaladan multi modal transport project to which are linked the development of the Sitwe Port and a futuristic Sitwe SEZ. The other being the Trilateral Highway Project that would connect Moreh (India) on the Indian side to Mae Sot in Thailand through the main land areas of Myanmar ; this 1360 Kilometre project is the logical outcome of the interest in India to utilise the


27

land bridge potential that Myanmar offers providing a land link to SE Asia and progressing the intent of the LEP. It would also offer an alternative route to India’s increasing economic and strategic interests in Vietnam. Another significant economic development has been the agreement for India to provide economic assistance in reviving the garment industry in Myanmar inclusive of capacity building. This could also become an area of linkage between India’s textile industry, the garment industry in Myanmar and a strengthening of India’s garment industry by providing additional capacity to offer large scale value based exports to the global market as an alternative to the present dominance of China of the textiles global market. The cooperation in the area of energy development in Myanmar by Indian companies, the support for the technological renovation of the Thanlyin Refinery and the up gradation of theThanbayakan Petrochemical Complex for which India has extended concessional lines of credit are indicative of the increasing Indo-Myanmar cooperation in this area of economic activity. Indian companies are also involved in the exploration and production of oil and gas as well in the pipeline projects. The main issue of India ensuring that in the future India is able to set up a pipeline that would convey gas to India, the most logical route would of course through Bangladesh but that is not the only way ;it could also be sent along an alignment that enters India through the NE Region. Energy cooperation is a significant area of Indo-Myanmar economic relations however the main relationship is between China and Myanmar where the twin pipeline projects not only relate to gas exports from Myanmar where ONGC is also involved but also as a route that would serve as an alternative supply route for the Gulf energy imports of China enabling to avoid the Malacca Straits. The energy area and the future investments in this area have to be a priority not only in the possible export to India of oil and gas but also as an area for the production of petro-chemical products and fertilisers for India’s agriculture growth. It can be stated as part of India’s pragmatic growth oriented relations with Myanmar that the Energy area can be an essential part of the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. One area that India appears to be failing is in the development of Hydropower projects that would also have as a major component the agricultural development of the very large and presently backward Sagaing Division of Myanmar that adjoins India. The NHPCIL that was tasked with developing the technical parameters and subsequently of executing the Tamanthi and the Shwezaye projects has concluded that these are not feasible for technical and commercial reasons. This is very unfortunate and shows a lack of innovative enterprise by India. There are other India based entities qualified to look into the issues raised both technical and commercial that would assist in finding adequate solutions and make it possible to


28

realise these projects. Presently this has shown that India still suffers from a disappointing gap between promise and performance. Perhaps what makes for a clear enunciation of the increasing importance of the relations is the fact that trade between the countries from insignificant levels in the 80’s is now in the US $ billion plus range. However it is still a very low level particularly when one looks at the potential that the future holds out both in sub-regional terms inclusive of manufacturing, as well as in the area of tourism and the IT areas. The SEZ’s in the offing should also lead to greater economic growth and the transport links that the infrastructure arrangements in progress to enhance the connectivity of the NE Region to other areas of Asia are bound to add a fresh dimension to the economic and business relations between the two countries.

7. Do you think ASEAN, BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) have helped India and Myanmar to come closer?

Myanmar became a member of ASEAN in 1997 but had accepted the invitation to join ASEAN in 1991. It has faced a rather turbulent relationship within ASEAN particularly as the ASEAN relations with the USA and the EU questioned the legitimacy of the Myanmar presence and functioning as a member of ASEAN while its proclaimed human rights violations and brutality towards its own people remained an issue. Let us not forget that in the period 1988 to 1992 India had also played a role of questioning the legitimacy of the military government in power particularly after the 1990 elections had clearly ruled in favour of an elected government, a result that the SLORC had refused to implement. However after Thein Sein came to power being elected to rule under the provisions of the 2008 Constitution and subsequent implementation of the political and economic reforms the world image of Myanmar has changed in a positive context. Its role in ASEAN was now accepted and Myanmar is today part of the central counsels of the regional body. The ASEAN position of Myanmar is of great import to India’s Look East Policy and the central role that Myanmar is placed to play in the integrating of the NE Region within the LEP and India’s cooperation with the ASEAN places Myanmar’s importance to India within the correct perspective. India has been developing and implementing ASEAN related programmes that place the relationship with Myanmar in the ASEAN context inclusive of the involvement of programmes that are directed towards India’s North East. BIMSTEC and The Mekong Ganga Cooperation arrangements are playing a role in bringing to the region a direction towards closer trade and economic relationships including the FTA type relationship under BIMSTEC and project oriented developments under the MGC; however these are still to realise the potential that they cover and while they certainly bring the relations in the agreed areas into focus they are secondary to the bilateral arrangements between the two countries.


29

The MGC however has one benefit in that it attracts the involvement of the Asian Development Bank and thus does have an increasing role in the project related development cooperation for instance in the area of tourism. Of all the areas the one that holds the greatest promise is the ASEAN relationship. Bimstec in once sense is is important as it helps focus Myanmar’s relations not only with India but also other South Asian Countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Considering the problems that afflict the relations between Bangladesh and Myanmar this is one forum where the pure dynamics of the trade and economic relations comes to the fore.

8. Do you agree withthe suggestion that fear of China was behind India's involvement in Myanmar?

This is an interesting question and consistently crops up in any discussion of Myanmar’s relations with India. Historically India has had a civilizational role resulting in India having an impact on religion, the Pegu period saw Hinduism prevail, the Pagan period saw the blossoming of Buddhism that prevails to this day, the script of the country and many terms were influenced by the Pali language of Southern India and the monarchical system that was ended by the British colonial system was influenced by the doctrines of Manu and by Brahminical practices. The Indian influence in these areas remains a positive force for India to have a close relationship with Myanmar. China has always had a more aggressive relationship with Myanmar and has often adopted interventionist policies. Forces from China destroyed the Pagan Kingdom along with the Yunann based Shan’s. In the post independence period China exploited the political disruptions in Burma by providing material and at times direct military support to the Communist Party of Burma and the WA and Shan insurgent groups. China therefore is a country that poses a threat to Myanmar and it is only after the events of 1988 that it came to play the role of the underwriter of the Myanmar Military regime. In this role it assisted Myanmar to come to ceasefire arrangements with a number of ethnic forces and at the same time established its economic and commercial position as a partner in development and in providing defence security. In the period 1988 to 1991 when China was consolidating its position as the saviour of the military regime in the face of global opposition and the more serious to the SLORC the Indian opposition to it, India despite what was evident that its refusal to deal with the SLORC was counter productive and was pushing Myanmar into the Chinese hands, India maintained its position of support to the forces of democracy in particular Suu Kyi and in fact had almost broken off all economic, and political relations while maintaining the formal diplomatic relations. This is surely an answer to all those who suggest that India’s Myanmar policies and relations are guided and driven by a fear of China.


30

The sharing of the Colonial relations between India and Burma that had even led to Myanmar forming an administrative part of British India till 1937 led to the establishment of institutional arrangements that created commonality to administrative and legal practices and kept the two countries close to each other. Developments on Myanmar’s borders causing ethnic related insecurity impacted on India and created the need very early on for cooperation between the two administrations that would work against the insurgencies and insurgents. This area was one where India faced a constant problem of support being extended by the Chinese to the Indian insurgents. The fact that Rangoon and New Delhi were able to set in place the mechanisms that till this day remain in place show clearly that the relations between India and Myanmar are driven by the dynamics of bilateralism that are relevant to themselves irrespective of the Myanmar China relations. In todays terms the Myanmar China relations are being cut to an acceptable size, this is possible as Myanmar is no longer an international pariah and because even during the Than Shwe period attempts were made by both India and Myanmar to establish a more balanced and pragmatic relationship that offered India as a useful economic partner. In the Thein Sein period we have a push by Myanmar for a greater involvement of India not because this would negate Myanmar’s relations with China but in order that Myanmar maintains a balance in its relations with its two large neighbours. China has a strategic engagement with Myanmar that has led to its placing in Myanmar two programmes that benefit it both by providing an alternate route for its energy supplies to the Malacca Straits and also for a new road rail link that would grant its Yunann province with a port directly linked to it on the Sea of Martaban that would provide it with an opening to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean Region as well to South East Asia. This is a serious development as it can grant China with a means of engaging India on its sea doorsteps. It is this development that India needs to counter by adopting means that would contain China whenever it poses a threat to India’s interests both in its strategic and security areas. It is also worth noting that these developments are part of China’s threat perception that have been further emphasised by the US rebalancing towards the Asia Pacific; the implications are obvious and are directly related to China’s assertiveness in the South China Seas etc. Obviously these have an implication for India that is considered to play the role of the strategic alternative. This is a role that India can only play if it is willing to come to understandings with the USA, Japan and other powers involved in the Asia Pacific region. Another aspect that grants credence to the fact that Myanmar considers India as a role player that would help re-balance the Myanmar China equation is that Thein Sein wants India to play a greater role in extending aid and assistance to Myanmar


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particularly in areas of infrastructure and institution building. Only recently during the ASEAN India summit in India India has extended a fresh aid package of over $ 900 million. This is however not enough to reduce the Chinese dominance in these areas, India does not have the extensive resources that are needed to meet Myanmar’s requirements, the solution would lie in brining together the ASEAN, Japan and the International Financial Institutions in a cooperative arrangement along with India to help meet Myanmar’s needs. To conclude India has to be involved because it is in India’s strategic interests, and not out of fear of China’s presence. We have to meet China head on where it threatens India’s strategic interests or poses a security threat but not because we fear its presence in our neighbourhood.

9 President Obama urged India to accept expanded international responsibilities commensurate with its role as an emerging power. Is there an opportunity in Myanmar for U.S.-India Strategic Coordination?

The issue is not just that India and the USA should evolve a relationship that is driven by common perceptions of strategic interests and thus to coordinate relations in that regard to attain their strategic interests. This is like motherhood the givens are universally understood. The Obama observation obviously points to the two countries working together to contain an assertive China. India has its own bilateral threats to counter that are posed to it by two nuclear powers China in Tibet and Pakistan on its western borders. India has to grant its first priority to meet these threats and at the same time not let them come in the way of its growing economic strengths thus in a sense limiting its main areas of concentration on developing its internal resources. However it has also to ensure that its energy deficits are met by secure supplies, that it keeps the trade lanes secure and that it counters China’s forays in the Indian Ocean Region that also is of importance in the availability of strategic commodities essential to meet India’s immediate and future needs. These are givens that require a measure of understanding with the USA and its re-balancing policy towards the Asia Pacific region. It is the nature and the extent of the understanding that has to be worked out between the two powers within the Indian perception that the USA tends to be an unreliable partner as its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown.

10. The issue of Pyongyang’s suspected linkages with Naypyidaw’ gain salience for India, particularly in the light of the fact that Pyongyang-Islamabad nexus was partly responsible for the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capability. Similarly, missile and nuclear developments in Myanmar have the potential to undermine regional stability and security due to Pakistan’s nuclear brinkmanship


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strategy. Should India encourage Myanmar to have a dialogue with its neighbours that aims at transparency about its nuclear plans?

From time to time there have been references to Myanmar’s nuclear designs there has been however nothing to show that Myanmar has muddied its NPT or IAEA obligations and is engaged today in any nuclear activity outside those obligations. In fact in its exchanges at the highest levels the Myanmar leadership has made it clear that it does not have either the means or the inclination to go nuclear let alone develop nuclear weapons. We are aware that the Myanmar military is possessed of missiles but these are weapons obtained from China and Russia and do not have any nuclear intent. The relations re-established with North Korea in 2007 did bring to the fore the possibility that Nuclear and missile technology may be on the agenda. However after the Thein Sein Government came to power there have been no moves that would sustain the feelings that such collaboration between Myanmar and North Korea are underway. The various IAEA protocols including the additional protocol, there are enough safeguards in place including the issues of accountability and transparency, India as a member of the IAEA’s Governing Body has ample opportunity to review IAEA reports on Myanmar and could take up any issues that it feels need to be clarified on the bilateral basis.

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(2) Dr Arvind Gupta

Director General Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses NewDelhi

Dr Arvind Gupta is the Director General of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. He also heads the Nuclear & Arms Control Centre of the Institute. His current interests include the international security issues, India’s foreign policy, energy security, climate change, technology & internal security issues. He has three books, several edited books and a number of academic publications to his credit. He has been a member of several task forces on issues such as space security, climate change, cyber security, nuclear disarmament etc.

____________________________________

FPRC Journal-15-India-Myanmar Relations-Q

Q.1 A growing Indo-Myanmar relationship has the potential to make a

significant impact on South Asia, but also in the larger Asian region.

Do you agree with this assessment? Ans. Yes. I do agree with this assessment. Given the geopolitical location of Myanmar at the cross section

of South Asia, South East Asia, China and the Bay of Bengal, it is obvious that a stable and strong

Indo-Myanmar relationship will be a factor of stability and prosperity.

Q.2 India sees connectivity through Myanmar as crucial for its „Look East

Policy‟ and development of ties with the Asean countries. Looking

back, can it be said that the policy has been successful? Ans. The Look East policy has brought concrete dividends to India although much more can be done.

Strong Indo-Myanmar ties will give a fresh lease to India’s Look East Policy. Connectivity between

India & ASEAN through Myanmar can be increased. Myanmar can be a gateway for India to the larger

Asian Region. Stronger ties with Myanmar can bring prosperity and development to India’s NE

Region.

Q.3 „Let‟s not be over-optimistic about Burma‟ , the opposition leader

Aung San Suu Kyi said. She would want India to look at the situation

in Myanmar, which is in transition from one form of governance to

another, “in a very practical way”. In what specific ways can India

help Myanmar at this stage of its political transition? Ans. Myanmar is in transition. Democracy has yet to consolidate. Ethnic issues are not fully resolved.

Myanmar, though rich in resources, has yet to achieve the levels of economic development that


34

other ASEAN countries have. In view of these factors, we can be cautiously optimistic about

Myanmar.

Q.4 As Myanmar is now rising in India‟s foreign policy priorities, there

should be a strategically pre-emptive effort to forestall Myanmar, a

next door neighbour, from becoming a vehicle through which huge

problems could be created for India. What are the

promise and challenges of „a new relationship‟ ? Ans. India and Myanmar have a long historical relationship. The ties got disrupted due to a variety of

developments within Myanmar. A lot of time was lost. The relationship is now being built again.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Myanmar last year and set the tone for a new relationship.

One of the important elements of this relationship is economic cooperation. An ambitious agenda of

cooperation has been chalked out. Security cooperation is also an important part of the new

relationship. Border management will be an important component of this relationship. The potential

of India-Myanmar relationship is huge and should be exploited. The bilateral relationship will be a

broad based relationship and not confined to just one aspect. India shall be pro-active and invest in

bilateral ties.

Q.5. Defence cooperation between India and Myanmar is an important

facet of bilateral relations. But India‟s posture in the matter of

defence cooperation with Myanmar now needs to be tempered,

keeping in view the realities of ethnic turmoil in that country, caution

defence experts. How far do you share their concerns? Ans. Defence cooperation is an important part of Indo-Myanmar relationship. Cooperation in this sphere

will lend stability to bilateral relations. The specific areas of cooperation will be decided mutually

keeping in mind the relevant factors. Too much caution may also be counter-productive. India should

take a pragmatic view on this issue.

Q.6. How far the prospects for an enhanced Indo-Myanmar economic

partnership, in particular, in the energy sector will add to this

substantive and comprehensive relationship?

Ans. Economic cooperation will be the backbone of the Indo-Myanmar relations. In the energy sector, a

production sharing contract between the government of Myanmar and the Jubilant Energy of India

has been signed. Indian companies can also invest in Myanmar’s oil and gas sector. India can also

help Myanmar in the downstream sector. India, Myanmar & Bangladesh can join in transporting

Myanmar gas.

Q.7. Do you think ASEAN, BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC)

have helped India and Myanmar to come closer?

Ans. Myanmar is an important member of ASEAN, BIMSTEC and MGC. India & ASEAN are developing a

blueprint for further development of their relations. Last year, on the conclusions of a

commemorative India-ASEAN Summit, the two sides issued a vision document. There is ample scope

in deepening India-ASEAN cooperation. Myanmar can play an important role in this. If these sub-


35

regional initiatives grow, the entire region will benefit. Myanmar’s own interest will be served by

actively participating in these groupings. Myanmar will take ASEAN Chair in 2014. This can be a

significant moment for India’s Look East policy. Myanmar will also host the next BIMSTEC Summit.

India should help Myanmar in steering the BIMSTEC agenda.

Q.8. Do you agree with the suggestion that fear of China was behind

India's involvement in Myanmar?

Ans. Uni-dimensional analysis of a relationship is seldom helpful. Myanmar has a relationship with China.

India should certainly take note of it but it should develop its own ties with Myanmar independently.

Q.9. President Obama urged India to accept expanded international

responsibilities commensurate with its role as an emerging power. Is

there an opportunity in Myanmar for U.S.-India Strategic

Coordination? Ans. India-Myanmar & US-Myanmar relations are still developing. Myanmar is in transition. As of now, I do

not see a strategic partnership between India, US and Myanmar.

Q.10. The issue of Pyongyang‟s suspected linkages with Naypyidaw‟ gain

salience for India, particularly in the light of the fact that Pyongyang-

Islamabad nexus was partly responsible for the development of

Pakistan‟s nuclear and missile capability. Similarly, missile and

nuclear developments in Myanmar have the potential to undermine

regional stability and security due to Pakistan‟s nuclear brinkmanship

strategy. Should India encourage Myanmar to have a dialogue with its

neighbours that aims at transparency about its nuclear plans? Ans. India should discuss such issues with Myanmar and clarify the situation.

********************


36

(3)Dr.Renaud EGRETEAU Research Assistant Professor Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (inc. Centre of Asian Studies) The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong SAR

http://www.ppaweb.hku.hk/ppa/index.php/faculties/name/egreteau http://www.hkihss.hku.hk/en/about_hkihss/people/academic_research_staff/bio_renaud_egreteau.html http://www.egreteau.com

Dr. Renaud Egreteau (PhD Sciences Po Paris 2006) joined the Hong Kong Institute for the

Humanities & Social Sciences in September 2009, as Research Assistant Professor. Born and

bred in France, he holds degrees in Political Science (Institut d‟Etudes Politiques, Bordeaux and

Paris) and Asian Studies and languages (Hindi, INALCO Paris, 2002). He received in 2006 his

doctoral degree in Political Science (maj. Comparative Politics in Asia) from the Institut d‟Etudes

Politiques of Paris (CERI-Sciences Po Paris). His thesis, written in French, deconstructed the

conventional argument of a China-India strategic rivalry taking shape in contemporary Burma

(Myanmar). Before relocating to the University of Hong Kong, he was a part-time lecturer

(Comparative Politics and International Relations in South and Southeast Asia) at Sciences Po

Paris (2008-09) and Associate Researcher with the Bangkok-based Institute for Contemporary

Research on South East Asia (IRASEC).

Research Interests

Trained as a political scientist, he first focused his research work on interstate relations, mostly

through the examination of the China-India and India-Burma/Myanmar relationships. He then

explored democratization processes and ethnic politics in praetorian contexts using most

specifically the case of Burma/Myanmar, a field he has been exploring for a decade now. He

recently moved beyond classical theories based on nation-state frameworks to research Indian

and Burmese transnational actors, their diasporic networks and solidarities, forced, return and

global migration, as well as their socio-political and economic impact in and on an interconnected

Asia today.

Keywords: Political Science, International Relations, Democratization, Civil/Military Transition, Diaspora

Studies, Migration, Repatriation, Refugees, China, India, Burma/Myanmar.

On-going Research Projects At HKU

1. “Is there a rivalry? New perspectives on the China-India strategic dyad”, HKU Seed Funding Programme

for Basic Research (HK$ 120,000), 2009-11.

2. “A study of the background, role and networks of Burmese Muslims of Indian origins in Yunnan”, Hang

Seng Bank Golden Jubilee Education Fund for Research, Hong Kong (HK$ 40,000), 2010-12.

3. “Back from Golden Land. Repatriation experiences, shifting identities and contemporary influence of

Burmese-Indian returnees in Calcutta & Madras, India”, HKU Small Project Funding (HK$ 53,950), 2011-

13.

Recent Publications

Books

2013. forthcoming in January. (with Larry Jagan), Soldiers and Diplomacy in Myanmar: Understanding the Foreign

Relations of a Praetorian State, Singapore: NUS Press, in print by November 2012.

http://www.ppaweb.hku.hk/ppa/index.php/faculties/name/egreteau

http://www.hkihss.hku.hk/en/about_hkihss/people/academic_research_staff/bio_renaud_egreteau.html

http://www.egreteau.com/


37

2010. Histoire de la Birmanie contemporaine: le pays des prétoriens, Paris: Fayard.

2003. Wooing the Generals: India‟s New Burma Policy, New Delhi: Authorspress.

Refereed Book Chapters

2012. “Burmese Tango: Indian and Chinese Games and Gains in Burma (Myanmar) since 1988”, in Devare, Sudhir T.,

Swaran Singh & Reena Marwah, eds., Emerging China: Prospects of Partnership in Asia, New Delhi: Routledge, 269-292.

2010. “India‟s Unquenched Ambitions in Burma”, in Dittmer, Lowell, ed., Burma or Myanmar? The Struggle for National

Identity, Singapore: World Scientific, 295-325.

2010. (with David Camroux) “Normative Europe meets the Burmese Garrison State: Processes, Policies, Blockages and

Future Possibilities”, in Cheesman, N., Skidmore, M. & Wilson, T., eds., Ruling Myanmar: from Cyclone Nargis to National

Elections, Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 267-293.

Peer-reviewed Journal Articles

2012. “Are We (Really) Brothers? Contemporary India as Observed by Chinese Diplomats”, Journal of Asian and African

Studies 47: Online iFirst (forthcoming Fall 2012).

2012. “The China-India Rivalry Reconceptualized”, Asian Journal of Political Science 20(1): 1-22.

2011. “A Passage to Burma? India, Development and Democratization in Myanmar”, Contemporary Politics 17(4): 467-

486.

2011. “Burmese Indians in Contemporary Burma: Heritage, Influence, and Perceptions since 1988”, Asian Ethnicity 12(1):

33-54.

2010. “Intra-European Bargaining and the „Tower of Babel‟ EU Approach to the Burmese Conundrum”, East Asia [An

International Quarterly] 27(1): 15-33.

2008. “India‟s Ambitions in Burma: More Frustration than Success?”, Asian Survey 48(6): 936-957.

2008. “India and China Vying for Influence in Burma: A New Assessment”, India Review 7(1): 38-72.

Policy-oriented Publications

2011. “Jade or JADE? Debating International Sanctions on Burma‟s Gem Industry”, Asia-Pacific Bulletin No. 132,

Washington DC: East-West Center, October 13, 2011.

2010. “It Takes Two to Tango: India and Burma‟s Delicate Dance”, Asia-Pacific Bulletin No. 66, Washington DC: East-West

Center, August 24, 2010.

Book Reviews

2012. Book Review of “Hangen, Susan, 2010. The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal: Democracy in the Margins, London:

Routledge”, Asian Ethnicity 13(3): 315-317.

Encyclopedia Entries

2012. “Country in Focus: Burma/Myanmar”, Political Insight 3(2), September 2012, pp. 30-33.

2012. (with Abel Tournier), “Birmanie : Prémices d‟une transition annoncée”, in Jammes, Jérémy & Benoît de Tréglodé,

eds., Asie du Sud-Est 2012, Paris: IRASEC-Les Indes Savantes, pp. 91-111.

2011. “Myanmar/Burma: Secession and the Ethnic Conundrum”, in Pavkovic, Aleksandar & Peter Radan, eds., Ashgate

Research Companion on Secession, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 475-477.

Non-refereed Publications (French and English)

2012. “Reflections: Assessing Recent Ethnic Peace Talks in Myanmar”, Asian Ethnicity 13(3): 311-313.


38

2012. “Birmanie: la transition octroyée”, Etudes, Tome 416, No. 3, mars 2012, pp. 151-161.

Medias & Op-eds (French and English)

2011. “Pourquoi la Birmanie s‟éveille”, L‟Express, 30 novembre 2011, p. 82.

2011. “Birmanie: la démocratie par le haut?”, Lemonde.fr, 6 décembre 2011 (online).

2011. “L‟armée birmane fait-elle le printemps?”, Libération, 1er novembre 2011, p. 22.

2011. “Global Insider: Myanmar‟s Regional Relations”, World Politics Review, May 4, 2011.

2010. “Junte birmane cherche habits civils”, Le Monde Diplomatique, Décembre 2010, p. 12.

The HKU Scholars Hub

http://hub.hku.hk/rp/rp00855 Contact

HKIHSS, Room 221

May Hall, The University of Hong Kong

Phone: +852 3917 5921 / Fax: +852 2559 6143

E-mail: [email protected]

____________________________________________

Questionnaire –India-Myanmar Relations

1. A growing Indo-Myanmar relationship has the potential to make a significant

impact on South Asia, but also in the larger Asian region. Do you agree with this assessment?

I am not convinced that the enhancement of the Indo-Myanmar relationship will dramatically impact

the whole region. Even if more-than-cordial relations are established between Naypyidaw and New

Delhi, there are many other impediments to be taken into account. The Indo-Burmese borderlands

are far from offering a stable polity, and the region has all the chances to remain a hotbed of

instability even if India and Myanmar build some sort of friendlier and more strategic relationship.

Furthermore, one should not forget the ups and downs of Bangladesh’s relations with both India and

Myanmar, which are critical elements too. If New Delhi and Dhaka prove increasingly at odds in the

near future, the whole region might suffer from these renewed tensions. Likewise, if the tensions

between Bangladesh and Myanmar’s Rakhine State persist, however good the partnership between

India and Myanmar is, the region will suffer from a salient instability. Finally, the Sino-Indian equation

has to be considered too, of course.

2. India sees connectivity through Myanmar as crucial for its „Look East Policy‟ and development of ties with the Asean countries. Looking back, can it be said that the policy has been successful?

India has long argued that Myanmar was its logical gateway to Southeast Asia, but this has long

been a pipedream. India has proved far more successful in getting commercial and diplomatic

toeholds in East and Southeast Asia just by bypassing Myanmar. And it will probably continue to

do so, unless it invests massively and appropriately throughout Myanmar. The TransAsia

Highway project – whose purpose is to link India’s northeast to Thailand via Mandalay – is still in

its infancy, two decades after the idea was first put on the table; talks about reviving the Ledo

Road between Assam and Yunnan through northern Burma have been going on for years too;

and the Kaladan River project in which India has agreed to invest some US$ 120m can only

boast a very limited scope – it indeed aims to link landlocked Mizoram to the Indian Ocean, but

http://hub.hku.hk/rp/rp00855

mailto:[email protected]


39

through a region (the Rakhine State and the port of Sittwe) almost completely disconnected from

the booming and more populous central Myanmar. Talks about connectivity are here, but there is

still not much substance.

3. „Let‟s not be over-optimistic about Burma‟ , the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi said. She would want India to look at the situation in Myanmar, which is in transition from one form of governance to another, “in a very practical way”. In what specific ways can India help Myanmar at this stage of its political transition?

India is in good position to further its policy of development, capacity-building and empowerment,

and invest in grand infrastructure projects. This is what has to be done in Myanmar; New Delhi

would be wise to do just what it has massively done since 2001 in Afghanistan. India has long

been overcautious in Myanmar, with discourses on assistance been there, but not systematically

followed by extensive programmes and massive funding focused on development. Probably the

new Indian ambassador to Yangon, coming from Kabul, will keep this in mind.

4. As Myanmar is now rising in India‟s foreign policy priorities, there should be a strategically pre-emptive effort to forestall Myanmar, a next door neighbour, from becoming a vehicle through which huge problems could be created for India. What arethe promise and challenges of „a new relationship‟ ? I’m not convinced that there is, or will be, a ‘new’ relationship. India will follow its path in Myanmar

according to the same policy objectives that first drove it closer to its Burmese neighbor in the mid-

1990s. I’m not convinced either that Myanmar’s domestic conundrum will be extended to India. India

is already facing huge sociopolitical challenges, especially in its Northeast. I don’t see what problems

can be brought for Myanmar into India: India’s Northeast is already plagued with corruption, ethnic

insurgency, criminal networks and a despairing hostility between the Center and the periphery.

5. Defence cooperation between India and Myanmar is an important facet of

bilateral relations. But India‟s posture in the matter of defence cooperation with Myanmar now needs to be tempered, keeping in view the realities of ethnic turmoil in that country, caution defence experts. Again, India has long been cautious in its dealing with the Burmese military authorities. Trust is a

difficult thing to build. For twenty years, New Delhi’s security establishment has wanted a friendlier

cooperation from the local Burmese military and police authorities – in particular to crack down on

Northeast criminal and rebel groups lodged in Burmese jungles. This has however proved quite

difficult to get. But at least a dialogue and strategic interactions have been established between

Naypyidaw and New Delhi. India has been able to get its security concerns heard and understood by

the Burmese over the years. Besides, Myanmar’s ethnic conundrum is well known to Indian

policymakers, so I don’t see why some defence experts would feel concerned; defence cooperation is

in any case minimal.

6. How far the prospects for an enhanced Indo-Myanmar economic partnership, in

particular, in the energy sector will add to this substantive and comprehensive relationship? The commercial and financial partnership between India and Myanmar is still far from being

comprehensive. India has invested so little over the years, focusing mostly on trade, and a few

infrastructure projects that have hardly develop smoothly. Smaller regional powers such as South

Korea or Malaysia have proved more successful and managed to dramatically expand their economic

presence in the country, unlike a neighboring India. Besides, India’s tentative economic thrust in


40

Myanmar was spearheaded by its state-run enterprises, not its dynamic private sector – unlike in

Africa for instance. One should be cautious too. Myanmar is on the verge of becoming another

country falling into the resource curse trap. The country is rich in natural resources and lacks so many

basic infrastructures. Its economy is based on a powerful oligarchic system in which the military and a

few corrupt cronies are still dominant players, despite the recent opening-up. This is the perfect

recipe for a resource curse. Foreign investors – and Indians in particular – would be wise not to join

only the hunt for extractive resources (and the energy sector in particular) in Myanmar but also

position themselves as do-gooder, and creators of jobs for the Burmese– not only looters. In 2011,

the suspension of the Chinese-owned hydropower project of the Myitsone dam by the new

government in Naypyidaw perfectly illustrated the re-emerging Burmese resentment against potential

foreign exploitation. Something Indians in, and from, Burma should remember.

7. Do you think ASEAN, BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) have

helped India and Myanmar to come closer? BIMSTEC and MGC were, in the early years, the perfect diplomatic platform for Burmese diplomats.

They needed to be heard, and accepted as equal partners by their regional counterparts. Through

these two forums, Burmese and Indian policymakers were also able to discuss, especially on non-

political affairs, without having to deal with the continuing Western ostracism – something which has

long been welcomed by Burmese leaders. Yes, both organizations were a positive asset, although

the momentum seems now to have faded away..

8. Do you agree with the suggestion that fear of China was behind India's involvement in Myanmar? Security analysts in India are obsessed by the Chinese challenge. This remains the dominant

discourse in New Delhi. Talks of a ‘Great Game’ taking shape in the Indian Ocean and in or around

Myanmar are nothing new. This was certainly the main reason during the 1991-95 years for India to

strategically move into Burmese field and depart from its earlier idealistic posture. But now, I think the

Chinese threat it is far less a significant motivation for India to get closer to Myanmar. Security circles

in India must have gotten some re-assurance about the lesser threat China poses in Myanmar –

remember that sinophobic sentiments still linger in Myanmar. Indians probably are concerned by the

Chinese challenge elsewhere in the region.

9. President Obama urged India to accept expanded international responsibilities commensurate with its role as an emerging power. Is there an opportunity in Myanmar for U.S.-India Strategic Coordination? Potentially yes. But I don’t see it as a priority. There are other fields in which India would like to see

the Indo-US cooperation going forward, and other issues where the collaboration between

Washington and Delhi is more critical. And India now sticks to a non-interference policy, unlike the US.

So I don’t see New Delhi really obliging. After all, India has long lambasted the US approach in

Myanmar, and elsewhere in the world.

10. The issue of Pyongyang‟s suspected linkages with Naypyidaw‟ gain salience for

India,particularly in the light of the fact that Pyongyang-Islamabad nexus was partly responsible for the development of Pakistan‟s nuclear and missile capability. Similarly, missile and nuclear developments in Myanmar have the potential to undermine regional stability and security due to Pakistan‟s nuclear brinkmanship strategy. Should India encourage Myanmar to have a dialogue with its neighbours that aims at transparency about its nuclear plans?


41

I think we should update our understanding of the alleged Myanmar-North Korea linkages. At least,

Washington has, lately. So New Delhi should too. There has been no proven credible (and

threatening) connection between Naypyidaw and Pyongyang over the past few years – including in

the nuclear field. There were rumors of Than Shwe’s regime aiming to use the potential nuclear threat

as a strategic tool in the late 2000s. It raised concern indeed, and the Burmese seemed to have

played with fire for a little while. But now that they open up, they know that they can gain far more

from a closer relationship (including through military dialogue) with the US than with North Korea – or

Pakistan for the matter.

11. Should India encourage Myanmar to have a dialogue with its neighbours that

aims at transparency about its nuclear plans?

I think we should update our understanding of the alleged Myanmar-North Korea linkages. At least,

Washington has, lately. So New Delhi should too. There has been no proven credible (and

threatening) connection between Naypyidaw and Pyongyang over the past few years – including in

the nuclear field. There were rumors of Than Shwe’s regime aiming to use the potential nuclear threat

as a strategic tool in the late 2000s. It raised concern indeed, and the Burmese seemed to have

played with fire for a little while. But now that they open up, they know that they can gain far more

from a closer relationship (including through military dialogue) with the US than with North Korea – or

Pakistan for the matter.

Dr. Renaud Egreteau has co-authored with Mr. Larry Jagan Soldiers and Diplomacy in Burma: Understanding the Foreign Relations of the Burmese Praetorian State (Singapore: NUS Press, 2013), released this June 2013.

*******************


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(4) Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray

Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray is a Singapore based security Analyst/ consultant. He served as a Deputy Director in India's National Security Council Secretariat, New Delhi. Prior to his official tenure, he served in various think tanks in India including the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), Guwahati, Assam, which he headed as Director. He received his doctoral degree from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Routray specialises in decision-making, governance, counter-terrorism, force modernisation, intelligence reforms, foreign policy and dissent articulation issues in South and South East Asia. He writes extensively in various journals, print media and on the Internet. His writings have appeared in various international forums including Janes Intelligence Review, Asia Times and Wall street Journal. His monograph "National Security Decision-Making in India" has recently been published by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, where he was a Visiting Research Fellow. Routray remains a key commentator on Indo-Myanmar relations and writes annual essays on Myanmar for the Armed Conflict in South Asia project of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. He can be contacted at [email protected] and followed on Twitter @BibhuRoutray.

_______________________________________________________

Questionnaire –India-Myanmar Relations 1.A growing Indo-Myanmar relationship has the potential to make a significant impact on South Asia, but also in the larger Asian region. Do you agree with this assessment? The growing Indo-Myanmar relations and its parameters have significant transformative impact on both South Asia and the larger Asian region. The successful fruition of the vital projects both countries envisage can upgrade the ways South Asia connects with Southeast Asia and pave way for greater economic integration between the two regions. This will have significant impact on the state of economy and development between the two regions. Similarly, Myanmar's cooperation would be instrumental in addressing many of the ills- arms and drugs smuggling- that affects the region. 2. India sees connectivity through Myanmar as crucial for its „Look East Policy‟ and development of ties with the ASEAN countries. Looking back, can it be said that the policy has been successful? The particular land connectivity projects between India and Myanmar are well known. India has offered to help Myanmar upgrade its Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo road (160 kilometre in length), build the Kaladan multi-modal transit transport project that involves setting up roads and inland waterways from Sittwe port in Myanmar to Mizoram; and some segments of the 1360- kilometre trilateral highway project connecting Moreh (Manipur) to Mae Sot (Thailand) through Myanmar. Progress on all these projects have been slow. The trilateral highway project (Moreh to Mae Sot), for example, was conceived at the trilateral ministerial meeting on transport linkages in Yangon in April 2002 and is now expected to be operational by 2015-16. In addition, land and sea connectivity between India and Myanmar remains poor too. Air India with a twice-a-week service between Kolkata and Yangon, is the only direct air link between the two countries. Travellers intending to travel to Myanmar otherwise travel to Bangkok to catch a connecting flight. Sea connectivity remains even poorer. As Myanmar plans to set up three major ports in Kyaukpyu, Kalagauk, and Dawei in the coming years, New Delhi will have to think seriously about improving the level of shipping links. 3. „Let‟s not be over-optimistic about Burma‟ , the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi said. She would want India to look at the situation in Myanmar, which is in transition from one form of governance to another, “in a very practical way”. In what specific ways can India help Myanmar at this stage of its political transition?


43

There are two opinions regarding the ongoing process of reforms in Myanmar. The first one is represented primarily by the western as well as the ASEAN countries. They believe that the reforms undertaken are for real and will transform Myanmar's political landscape completely in the times to come. The second group which includes the ethnic and opposition groups within the Myanmar and many strategic analysts outside, is suspicious of the real intentions of the military. They find the reforms thus far superficial and completely reversible. Aung San Syu Kyi is somewhere in the middle of these divergent views. She has benefited from the ongoing reforms process, but the process, according to her, is yet to impact decisively on the political sphere. India has a plenty of indirect opportunities to be involved in the reforms process. It can use its fairly healthy contacts with the ruling regime to push for the political reforms process which includes amending the constitution, inclusive dialogue with the ethnic groups and holding of a free and fair parliamentary elections in 2015. However, given the fact that reforms are continuing and have acquired a pace and character of their own, a policy of wait and watch would be more advisable. Given that future is somewhat uncertain and the opposition's governance abilities are unknown, too much of aggressive pushing may be counter-productive. At the same time, New Delhi needs to prepare for all future scenarios. It must build contacts with all probable leaders who would assume leadership roles in the years to come. Some bridges (presently there are none) can be built with the ethnic groups. It must not be caught napping in the event of a significant political transformation. 4. As Myanmar is now rising in India‟s foreign policy priorities, there should be a strategically pre-emptive effort to forestall Myanmar, a next door neighbour, from becoming a vehicle through which huge problems could be created for India. What are the promise and challenges of „a new relationship‟ ? Myanmar's ungoverned borderlands have remained a source of strength for the insurgencies in India's northeast. Even in their most weakened state since past couple of years, insurgent outfits have been able to sustain and carry out intermittent strikes exploiting a sense of safety they enjoy inside Myanmar. Arms and narcotics have flowed into the northeast region with devastating impact. Additionally, Myanmar to an extent has also been used by China (which incidentally funded the northeastern insurgencies for a long time both through official and unofficial channels) to encircle India. Myanmar's significance for India's security can hardly be over emphasised. This creates a special scope for dialogue and cooperation between India and Myanmar, which needs to factor in India's security concerns in that country. Over the years, India has attempted to fulfil Myanmar's logistical requirements to carry out operations against the northeastern rebels. However, such intermittent operations have achieved only transient impacts. Myanmar continues to cite the weakness of its military to permanently dislodge these insurgents from its territory. One only can hope that in the days to come, such operations would increase in their frequency and make it more difficult for the insurgents to engage in a 'dismantle and reinstall'-strategy. India's also hopes that its greater engagement with Naypyidaw will create more opportunities for it to deal with the Chinese aggressive intents. The Chinese footprints in Myanmar are deep and wont disappear, even in the face of growing local discontentment against its projects. However, India's growing presence in Myanmar can create a level playing field. For this, India's bureaucracy and political leadership would have to get into a more active mode, dealing with the inertia, red tapism and lack of vision that has hindered India's global power ambitions. 5. Defence cooperation between India and Myanmar is an important facet of bilateral relations. But India‟s posture in the matter of defence cooperation with Myanmar now needs to be tempered, keeping in view the realities of ethnic turmoil in that country, caution defence experts. How far do you share their concerns? Stabilising its insurgency affected northeast through cooperation from Myanmar played as a driver behind New Delhi's policy of supplying military hardware to that country. Apart from China, Myanmar acquired new weapons systems from numerous countries, including India, Singapore, Pakistan, North Korea, Ukraine and Israel. New Delhi had hoped that the weapons supplied would be used to upgrade the


44

capacities of the Myanmar military vis-a-vis the Indian insurgents. However, there have been at least one instance in which the Myanmar military has been found using Indian supplied Swedish anti-tank 84mm Carl Gustaf rocket launchers against the Kachin rebels. This called for caution and additional preventive mechanisms to forestall the repeat of such scenarios. Future supplies must have inbuilt mechanisms to prevent such abuse. While New Delhi does hope that its supplies add to the capacities of the military vis-a-vis the northeastern insurgents, it would like to stay away from assisting, albeit indirectly, the campaign against annihilating the ethnic rebels in Myanmar. 6. How far the prospects for an enhanced Indo-Myanmar economic partnership, in particular, in the energy sector will add to this substantive and comprehensive relationship? India ranks as the world's eleventh greatest energy producer, accounting for about 2.4 per cent of the world’s total annual energy production, and also as the world's sixth greatest energy consumer, accounting for about 3.3 per cent of the world's total annual energy consumption. Myanmar’s oil and gas reserves are of critical interest to India’s future energy requirement. Myanmar has oil reserves of around 600 million barrels and total gas reserves of 88 trillion cubic feet (TCF). Indian companies like the overseas arm of India's Oil and Natural Gas Commission - ONGC Videsh Ltd - and Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL) and ESSAR etc have made investments in the oil and energy sector of Myanmar. OVL and GAIL together hold 30 per cent stake along with Daewoo 60 per cent and Korea Gas 10 per cent of offshore Block A-1 gas field. However, in spite of the involvement of OVL and GAIL in exploration activities in the offshore A1 and A3 natural gas fields along the Rakhine coast, India vis-à-vis China has suffered a number of setbacks in getting gas from Myanmar. Myanmar in 2008 withdrew India’s status as preferential buyer and in stead declared its intent to sell them to China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for 30 years beginning 2013. Starting October 2009, the CNPC started building a crude oil port in Myanmar to cut out the long detour oil cargoes take through the congested and strategically vulnerable Malacca strait. Earlier, in a similar move in December 2005, Myanmar had declined gas supply to the Myanmar-Bangladesh-India pipeline. Instead, it had signed an agreement with Hong Kong-listed Petrochina, under which Myanmar’s Ministry of Energy agreed to sell 6.5 TCF from A-1 block (Rakhine coastline) reserve through an overland pipeline to Kunming (China) for 30 years. This had made the proposed tri-nation Myanmar-Bangladesh-India pipeline project redundant. However, India has little option but to stay engaged in Myanmar. 7. Do you think ASEAN, BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) have helped India and Myanmar to come closer? Since 1997, ASEAN, BIMSTEC and since 2000, MGC have been crucial forms for India-Myanmar cooperation. The wide area of cooperation under each of these forums, ranging from free trade agreements, education, culture, transport, communication and tourism creates enormous opportunities for both countries to grow closer and prosper. These forums, apart from bilateral diplomacy, provide opportunities for sustained dialogue and engagement. 8. Do you agree with the suggestion that fear of China was behind India's involvement in Myanmar? Denials by the political elites and the foreign policy establishment notwithstanding, various authors have argued that India’s present pragmatic policy towards Myanmar has to be understood in the light of New Delhi's worries of being encircled by China. To an extent, meeting the growing profile of China in Myanmar has been one of the many drivers of India's policy towards Myanmar. Intelligence inputs that the Chinese have built monitoring facilities at Myanmarese ports near the strategic Straits of Malacca as part of their “string of pearls” strategy to encircle India has raised India's concerns. Similarly, Chinese investments in mining and energy sectors in Myanmar has been interpreted as cases of lost opportunities in that country. However, as mentioned earlier, China is one of the many drivers of India's Myanmar policy. India's energy requirements, its look-east policy, the goal to pacifying the insurgencies in the northeast are the other important drivers.


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9 President Obama urged India to accept expanded international responsibilities commensurate with its role as an emerging power. Is there an opportunity in Myanmar for U.S.-India Strategic Coordination? Apart from the basic tenets of international conduct and belief in fundamental values of democracy, governance and reforms, India and United States have divergent strategic interests in Myanmar. While Myanmar is an important country for the US 'pivot to Asia'-policy in its attempt to contain China and gain a decisive strategic dominance in Southeast Asia, for India interests are far more permanent. Sharing 1338 kilometres-long international borders, Myanmar- both its stability and volatility impacts on India's security on a permanent basis. While both India and US can forge a bond to push the process of political reforms, India's policy towards Myanmar should remain independent taking its own national interests in that country into account. 10. The issue of Pyongyang‟s suspected linkages with Naypyidaw‟ gain salience for India, particularly in the light of the fact that Pyongyang-Islamabad nexus was partly responsible for the development of Pakistan‟s nuclear and missile capability. Similarly, missile and nuclear developments in Myanmar have the potential to undermine regional stability and security due to Pakistan‟s nuclear brinkmanship strategy. Should India encourage Myanmar to have a dialogue with its neighbours that aims at transparency about its nuclear plans? Much of narrative on Myanmar's nuclear aspirations with help from North Korea are speculative and hence, anecdotal. About seven years ago, Myanmar acquired precision machinery from Germany, Switzerland and Singapore. Some analysts concluded these were part of an attempt to set up facilities for enriching uranium. Several other experts disputed that conclusion. According to American sources, "under a November 2008 accord North Korea agreed to help Myanmar build medium-range, liquid-fueled ballistic missiles." In 2009 and 2011, two North Korean ships suspected to be heading to Myanmar with military cargoes in were tracked by the US Navy and sent back. However, Myanmar has consistently issued denials. Moreover, the current state of reforms process eliciting loosening of the sanctions regime and international investment in the country, which can be derailed in the event of Myanmar attempting to go nuclear, acts as additional deterrent. In November 2012, Myanmar declared that it will sign an international agreement that would require it to declare all nuclear facilities and materials. In December 2012, Myanmar's military chief, Vice Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, declared that his country plans to use nuclear technology for medical, research and energy purposes but will not develop atomic weapons. Myanmar is assuming chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014 is another factor which will retain sufficient attraction to be a responsible player. For the time being, Myanmar going nuclear is not be a high priority area of concern for New Delhi.

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(5) Sreeradha Datta (PhD) Director Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIAS)

KOLKATA , India Sreeradha Datta is Director, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIAS), Kolkata. She specialises on contemporary development in South Asia. Her publications include three books Bangladesh: A Fragile Democracy, and The Northeast Complexities and its Determinants, Caretaking Democracy: Political Process in Bangladesh 20060-8 and edited books and monograph. She has published research articles in various national and international journals including Energy Policy, South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, South Asia, International Institute for study of Islam in Modern World (ISIM). She has been part of various track-II dialogues in South Asia, functioning as a resource person for various meetings, government agencies and diplomatic dialogues. She regularly interacts with various policy institutes, think tanks and security establishments and has been contributing to or interviewed by to national and international media outlets including the Voice of America, BBC, Time, Newsweek and The Economist, New York Times, Daily Star etc.

________________________________________________________________


1.A growing Indo-Myanmar relationship has the potential to make a significant impact on

South Asia, but also in the larger Asian region. Do you agree with this assessment?

Yes while India is geographically located within South Asia Myanmar is located in the

Southeastern Asia. But both the sates, given its unique geographical location has political,

economic and cultural linkages with all of the Asian region presently which infact is a legacy

of the past. Thus impact of the growth of India –Myanmar ties will not be limited to only

specific areas of South Asia.

2. India sees connectivity through Myanmar as crucial for its „Look East Policy‟ and development of ties with the Asean countries. Looking back, can it be said that the policy has been successful?

The physical connectivity between India and Myanmar has not seen much progress in the

last few years but India has been able to increase its trade and other linkages with

Myanmar over the same period in continuation of its Look East policy thrust towards

engaging with its Southeast Asian neighbours. India has in the last decade deepened its

engagement with these neighbours and continues to increase its political and economic ties

with several of the states in the region.

3.. „Let‟s not be over-optimistic about Burma‟ , the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi

said. She would want India to look at the situation in Myanmar, which is in transition from one form of governance to another, “in a very practical way”. In what specific ways can

India help Myanmar at this stage of its political transition?

India can play a significant role in improving its education sector. It can also facilitate their

access to high quality education in within India. When expanding the education facilities in

Northeast India, it is important to factor-in and invite students from Myanmar through

special scholarship programmes. Easing of travel procedures for students from Northern


47

Myanmar to educational institutions in Northeast India will help both the countries. India is

one of the very few countries in the neighbourhood that can play a significant role in

training people for strengthening public institutions and a stronger civil society.

4. As Myanmar is now rising in India‟s foreign policy priorities, there should be a

strategically pre-emptive effort to forestall Myanmar, a next door neighbour, from becoming a vehicle through which huge problems could be created for India. What arethe promise and challenges of „a new relationship‟ ?

Myanmar has embarked on a path of political reform. But this must also necessitate the

availability of well-trained manpower that can implement and take forward the various

reform initiatives. Also apart from the difficulties within its domestic front, political

transition in Myanmar will be influenced by the policies of major powers. The policies of

organizations such as the EU and ASEAN, and the policies of countries such as the US, India

and China will play a significant role in impacting the transition process in Myanmar. These

are both opportunities as well as challenges that Myanmar will have to deal with. India as

an immediate neighbour will also have to support Myanmar and its political transformation

in any manner that Myanmar may wishes to seek from India.

5.Defence cooperation between India and Myanmar is an important facet of bilateral

relations. But India‟s posture in the matter of defence cooperation with Myanmar now

needs to be tempered, keeping in view the realities of ethnic turmoil in that country, caution defence experts. How far do you share their concerns?

Defence cooperation certainly is an important facet of the bilateral relations. But India has

always been cautious and mindful of all domestic issues with all its neighbours when

establishing such ties and in future too India will continue to do so. India is not unaware of

the prevailing ethnic tensions within Myanmar and will not initiate any measure contrary to

any interests within the state.

6. How far the prospects for an enhanced Indo-Myanmar economic partnership, in particular, in the energy sector will add to this substantive and comprehensive relationship?

The prospects and possibilities on the energy sector are immense. India will certainly be

interested in building and strengthening such ties. Given the potentials this sector will

indeed be a strong element of the bilateral ties.

7. Do you think ASEAN, BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) have helped India

and Myanmar to come closer?

India and Myanmar have long established strong bilateral ties. These organisations and their

processes are important and help to strengthen the regional ties alongside the bilateral

engagement.

8. Do you agree with the suggestion that fear of China was behind India's involvement in

Myanmar?

China is a strong player in the region and India is cognizant of that. But to suggest that fear

of China led to India’s engagement with Myanmar cannot be substantiated at all. Given not

only the nature of the contemporary ties but also the historical facts the two neighbours

have enjoyed a relationship that has not been influenced by other regional or external

actors.


48


Yes, there is certainly scope for that. But the nature and nuances will depend on the mutual

interests of all the three states.

10. The issue of Pyongyang‟s suspected linkages with Naypyidaw‟ gain salience for India,particularly in the light of the fact that Pyongyang-Islamabad nexus was partly responsible for the development of Pakistan‟s nuclear and missile capability. Similarly, missile and nuclear developments in Myanmar have the potential to undermine regional stability and security due to Pakistan‟s nuclear brinkmanship strategy. Should India encourage Myanmar to have a dialogue with its neighbours that aims at transparency about

its nuclear plans?

Presently there is very little to suggest that Myanmar will act in any manner that is

irresponsible or that will give way to regional tensions. Given the many challenging tasks

that lie ahead the nation to strengthen its political reforms the priorities for India lies in

contributing and supporting that process in the immediate future.

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(6) Bertil Lintner

Journalist, Writer Expertise on Burmese issues

Website Asia Pacific Media Services Bertil Lintner (born 1953) is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about

Asia for nearly four decades.[1]

He was formerly the Burma correspondent of the now defunct Far Eastern Economic Review and currently works as a correspondent for Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet and Politiken of Denmark. He has written extensively about Burma, India (especially the North East), China and North Korea in various local, national and international publications of over thirty countries.

[1] He is considered to be the first

journalist to reveal the growing relationship between Burma and North Korea on strategic cooperation. He mainly writes about organized crime, ethnic and political insurgencies, and regional security. He has published several books including, "Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma's Struggle for Democracy", "Blood Brothers: The Criminal Underworld of Asia" and "Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North Korea Under The Kim Clan".

[2]

Lintner is one of many blacklisted journalists who have not officially been allowed to enter Burma since 1985. The previous Burmese government body, the State Peace and Development Council, said his reports on Burma were groundless and based on wishful thinking. Ironically, blacklisted journalists tend to garner better respect as primary sources, and due to this, Lintner was the first foreign journalist to learn about Aung San Suu Kyi's release from house arrest in 1995. Lintner has since shifted to Laos and North Korea, but he continues to be interested in Burma. He is a regular contributor to YaleGlobal Online, the Wall Street Journal and Asia Times Online.

Lintner lives in Chiang Mai, Thailand with his wife Hseng Noung, an ethnic Shan from Burma. They have a daughter who was born in Kohima, India, during their epic "18-month, 2,275-kilometer overland journey from northeastern India across Burma’s northern rebel-held areas to China" in 1985-87. They travelled by foot, jeep, bicycle, and elephant, becoming the first outsiders in over four decades to cross the isolated area, then controlled by various ethnic insurgents. This culminated in his first book, "Land of Jade: A Journey from India through Northern Burma to China".

[1]

In 2004, Lintner received an award for excellence in reporting about North Korea from the Society of Publishers in Asia. He was also the president of the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand (FCCT) from 1993-95.

[1]

Bibliography

1. Land of Jade: A Journey from India through Northern Burma to China, Orchid Press, Bangkok, 2011. 2. World.Wide.Web: Chinese Migration in the 21st Century—and How It will Change the World, Orchid Press,

Bangkok, 2011. 3. "Great Game East: India, China and the Struggle for Asia’s Most Volatile Frontier", Harper Collins, New

Delhi, 2012. 4. "Merchants of Madness: The Methamphetamine Explosion in the Golden Triangle" (coauthored with

Michael Black), Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 2009, 180 p. 5. "The Kachin: Lords of Burma's Northern Frontier", Teak House Books, Chiang Mai, 1997.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sweden

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Journalist

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertil_Lintner#cite_note-Bio-1

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far_Eastern_Economic_Review



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Svenska_Dagbladet

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politiken

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertil_Lintner#cite_note-Books-2

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blacklist

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burma

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Peace_and_Development_Council

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aung_San_Suu_Kyi

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_arrest

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YaleGlobal_Online

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wall_Street_Journal

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asia_Times

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chiang_Mai

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thailand

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shan

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kohima


http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Society_of_Publishers_in_Asia&action=edit&redlink=1





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1.A growing Indo-Myanmar relationship has the potential to make a significant impact on South Asia, but also in the larger Asian region. Do you agree with this assessment ? Indo-Myanmar relations have always been cordial but somewhat cool. Myanmar prefers to look east (SE Asia) and north (China). But Myanmar would be interested in improving relations - and trade - with India to counterbalance the unprecedented influence that China has gained in Myanmar since the upheavals of 1988 (when the West, and India and Japan, condemned the massacres of pro-democracy demonstrators in Myanmar). 2. India sees connectivity through Myanmar as crucial for its ‘Look East Policy’ and development of ties with the Asean countries. Looking back, can it be said that the policy has been successful? Only partly successful, the infrastructure on the Indian as well as the Myanmar side has to be upgraded.

3.. ‘Let’s not be over-optimistic about Burma’ , the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi said. She would

want India to look at the situation in Myanmar, which is in transition from one form of governance to

another, “in a very practical way”. In what specific ways can India help Myanmar at this stage of its

political transition?

Not really, the Myanmar regime (with the military at its apex) has its own agenda and seldom listens

to advice from outsiders. India could, however, offer scholarships to Myanmar students to help

educate a new generation of Myanmar citizens and bring them into the modern world.

4. As Myanmar is now rising in India’s foreign policy priorities, there should be a strategically pre-emptive effort to forestall Myanmar, a next door neighbour, from becoming a vehicle through which huge problems could be created for India. What are the promise and challenges of ‘a new relationship’ ?

The main challenge is that fact that several insurgent groups from the Northeast (ULFA, NSCN[K], PLA, UNLF) maintain camps on the Myanmar side of the border, some of them close to Myanmar army bases. Evidently, Myanmar, preoccupied with its own insurgents, view those rebel groups as "India's problem". But this is an old problem that has to be tackled. 5. Defence cooperation between India and Myanmar is an important facet of bilateral relations. But India’s posture in the matter of defence cooperation with Myanmar now needs to be tempered, keeping in view the realities of ethnic turmoil in that country, caution defence experts. How far do you share their concerns?

I share those concerns. The armed conflict in Kachin State should be a major concern, and a reason to act carefully, especially since Swedish-made Carl Gustaf rocket launchers ended up in the hands of the Myanmar army, and those rocket launchers could be traced to a shipment to India from Sweden, see 28 January 2013 Jonathan Ashworth: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he has had discussions with his EU counterparts on the discovery of the use of Swedish-made weapons in Burma. Mr Swire: In December last year, Sweden's Agency for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls said an investigation had revealed that the Swedish-made weapons found by Kachin forces in early December were part of a larger shipment of arms Sweden sold to the Indian Government. It remains unclear how they ended up being used in Burma. Swedish Trade Minister, Ewa Bjorling, has requested clarification from Indian authorities on the matter.


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http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130128/text/130128w0001.htm#13012847000020 6.How far the prospects for an enhanced Indo-Myanmar economic partnership, in particular, in the energy sector will add to this substantive and comprehensive relationship? Possible, but there are also many other contenders, foreign countries and companies which want to exploit Myanmar's energy potential (China and Thailand: hydroelcctric power and natural gas; Western companies: oil) 7. Do you think ASEAN, BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) have helped India and Myanmar to come closer? Not really, those groupings don't have much clout or influence on developments.

8.Do you agree with the suggestion that fear of China was behind India's involvement in Myanmar?

Partly, yes. After 1988, India supported the pro-democracy movement to counter China's influence,

but when it became clear that the pro-democracy movement was not going to come to power any time

soon, India shifted its priorities to engagement with the Myanmar regime, for the same reason. India

does not want to have a pro-Chinese neighbour on its eastern flank.


Yes, because India and the US share a common concern here: China's influence in Myanmar. The US did not change its Myanmar policy because it was concerned about democracy and human rights, that's just window dressing, the China factor was the most important (and Myanmar's military cooperation with North Korea, which set off alarm bells in Washington).

10. The issue of Pyongyang’s suspected linkages with Naypyidaw’ gain salience for India,particularly in the light of the fact that Pyongyang-Islamabad nexus was partly responsible for the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capability. Similarly, missile and nuclear developments in Myanmar have the potential to undermine regional stability and security due to Pakistan’s nuclear brinkmanship strategy. Should India encourage Myanmar to have a dialogue with its neighbours that aims at transparency about its nuclear plans?

See 9. Yes, India could encourage Myanmar to be more transparent but I doubt whether the Myanmar military would listen. There is increased frustration in the US over this as well, the US has done a lot to help Myanmar break its isolation and shifted its policy from condemnation to engagement. But the North Koreans are still there. The recent sanctioning of Lt-Gen Thein Htay, who heads the Directorate of Defense Industries (DDI), for “illicit trade in North Korean arms to Burma" was a warning to the Myanmar government. The US knows as well as everybody else that Lt-Gen Thein Htay wasn't acting on his own in a private capacity, he was just following orders and carrying out duties assigned to him. But by sanctioning one individual of his calibre, the US put the Myanmar government on notice.

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(7) Ms Moe Thuzar

Moe Thuzar is an ISEAS Fellow and lead researcher for socio-cultural affairs at the ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC) at ISEAS. Starting July 2012, she was appointed Fellow at ISEAS. Before Moe joined the ASC in May 2008 she headed the ASEAN Secretariat’s Human Development Unit, which coordinated ASEAN cooperation in labour, youth, social welfare, education, women’s affairs, poverty reduction and rural development, health, and civil service matters. At ISEAS, Moe has co-authored with Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Myanmar: Life After Nargis (ISEAS, 2009), and has co-edited with Yap Kioe Sheng, “Urbanisation in Southeast Asia: Issues and Impacts” (ISEAS, 2012). She has written on Myanmar for Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 2012-2013 and Southeast Asian Affairs 2012, and has contributed a chapter on Myanmar's readiness for the ASEAN Economic Community for an edited volume "ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard: Performance and Perception" (ed. Sanchita Basu Das, ISEAS, 2013). In July 2012, she took on responsibilities as coordinator of the Myanmar Study Group at ISEAS. She is also a resident analyst for Channel News Asia’s Think Tank programme. Moe is working on a review of Myanmar’s foreign policy, focusing on the post-1988 period. Her other research interests cover urbanisation, environmental cooperation in ASEAN, and ASEAN’s dialogue relations. Moe was a Temasek scholar for the Master in Public Policy Programme at the National University of Singapore.

_________________________________________


1.A growing Indo-Myanmar relationship has the potential to make a significant impact on South Asia, but also in the larger Asian region. Do you agree with this assessment? - Yes, I do agree. Myanmar constitutes the strategic land link between India and the wider ASEAN region, as well as with countries in East Asia such as China. Greater multi-sectoral interactions between India and Myanmar can contribute positively to regional connectivity. 2. India sees connectivity through Myanmar as crucial for its „Look East Policy‟ and development of ties with the Asean countries. Looking back, can it be said that the policy has been successful? - In my view, the policy needs to be given effect by national-level commitments on both the Indian and Myanmar sides. The border areas of both India and Myanmar can still be said to

be among the lesser developed regions of both countries. Connectivity projects in these regions therefore need to be accompanied with community awareness and development initiatives aimed at reducing poverty, creating more opportunities for income generation and lessening the rural-urban migration flows.

3.. „Let‟s not be over-optimistic about Burma‟ , the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi said. She would want

India to look at the situation in Myanmar, which is in transition from one form of governance to another, “in a

very practical way”. In what specific ways can India help Myanmar at this stage of its political transition? - Myanmar has embarked on an ambitious programme of political, economic and social

reforms, which are being implemented at a pace that is acknowledged as fast by many in

and outside the country. In January 2013, Myanmar launched a Framework on Economic

and Social Reforms to her development partners and donors. It is interesting that

Myanmar, in transforming the political process, looked to India's model (among others),

with regard to central and local government structures. As Myanmar moves along the path

towards democratisation, both countries can leverage on the bilateral cooperation

mechanisms to identify priorities under Myanmar's framework for reforms that encourage

participatory and deliberative processes in implementing important projects.


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4. As Myanmar is now rising in India‟s foreign policy priorities, there should be a strategically pre-emptive effort to forestall Myanmar, a next door neighbour, from becoming a vehicle through which huge problems could be created for India. What arethe promise and challenges of „a new relationship‟ ? - In a way, Myanmar and India are "relearning" the process of partnerships in addressing common or shared issues and concerns along their shared border. This "new relationship" under the aegis of PM Manmohan Singh and President Thein Sein has political/strategic and economic implications. I believe it is incumbent on both leaders and their leadership in the respective national context, to minimise the negative and encourage the positive impacts of joint or bilateral projects and initiatives.

5. Defence cooperation between India and Myanmar is an important facet of bilateral relations. But India‟s posture in the matter of defence cooperation with Myanmar now needs to be tempered, keeping in view the realities of ethnic turmoil in that country, caution defence experts. How far do you share their concerns? - Myanmar is in the midst of peace negotiations with several armed ethnic groups. Myanmar's neighbouring countries have a stake in ensuring that the peace negotiations

progress towards workable solutions that all parties can accept or agree to. 6. How far the prospects for an enhanced Indo-Myanmar economic partnership, in particular, in the energy sector will add to this substantive and comprehensive relationship? - I believe any review of existing (or initiation of new) energy projects should focus on the mutual benefits for developing the border regions and communities where these energy projects may be located. It is important that any enhanced partnership - whether political

or economic - overcomes past suspicions and mistrust. 7. Do you think ASEAN, BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) have helped India and Myanmar to come closer? - Yes. I think the sub-regional arrangements may have helped move the process of getting closer along more than the regional interactions.

8. Do you agree with the suggestion that fear of China was behind India's involvement in Myanmar? - I would see it more as the need to balance interests, both on the part of India and of

Myanmar.


- Myanmar is currently the country coordinator (in ASEAN) responsible for ASEAN-US dialogue, for the period 2012-15. Additionally, Myanmar will chair the East ASia Summit (where India and the US participate) during her ASEAN chairmanship year of 2014,

together with the ASEAN-India and ASEAN-US Summits. It is conceivable that there will be some areas of overlap in Myanmar's coordination of the agendas of these important meetings and dialogues.

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(pp. 56-296) 1. Amb. (R) Trevor Wilson

Myanmar : International Perspectives on Reform – Responses from the US, UK, EU, China, Japan, and Australia (pp.56-78)

2. Prof. Kanbawza Win

Rohingya is not the case of Citizenship but that of Human Rights (An Ethnic attempt to solve the Rohingya Crisis) (pp.79-111)

3. P.M. Heblikar India-Myanmar relations (pp.112-114)

4. Dr. Rajaram Panda Myanmar’s Integration to the International Community (pp.115-128)

5. Dr. Alistair D. B. Cook

National Security and the Eastern Promise of Myanmar in Transition (pp.129-132) 6.Col. Virendra Sahai Verma

Chinese - Myanmar Relations under stress (pp.133-135) 7.Dr. Swapna Bhattacharya (Chakraborti)

My Engagement with Myanmar and her people: Memories Experiences and the Lessons learned (pp.136-156) 8. Col R Hariharan

Myanmar’s democracy, a work in progress (pp.157-160)

9. Dr. Syed Ali Mujtaba

India-Myanmar Relations - Wuthering Heights (pp.161-169)

10. Prof.E.Bijoykumar Singh

Indo Myanmar Relations: Looking East from the North east (pp.170-182)

11. C. S. Kuppuswamy

India - Myanmar Economic Relations (pp.183-189) 12.Dr. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit

& Dr. RIMLI BASU

US PENETRATION IN ASIA-PACIFIC, RISE OF CHINA AND THE PAWN CALLED MYANMAR: THE INDIAN RESPONSE (pp.190-217)


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13. Dr. (Mrs) Munmun Majumdar

Positioning Myanmar in India’s Look East Policy (pp.218-232) 14. Dr.Rakhee Bhattacharya

Stilwell Road – the Road to Hope for Northeast India (pp.233-239) 15. Varigonda Kesava Chandra

India’s Struggle for Myanmar’s Energy (pp.240-248)

16. Lindsay Hughes Principles, Pragmatism, and Pipelines: The Evolution of India’s Myanmar Policy (pp.249-259)

17.Monish Tourangbam US Policy towards Myanmar: The Big Shift and Regional Impact (pp.260-265) 18. Hu Xiaowen

Triangular Relationship of China, India and Myanmar after Democratic Reform of Myanmar (pp.266-283) 19. Dr. Rahul Mishra

Myanmar and The US: Tying Up The Loose Ends (pp.284-296)

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Myanmar : International Perspectives on Reform –

Responses from the US, UK, EU, China, Japan, and Australia

Trevor Wilson Visiting Fellow,

Dept. of Political & Social Change, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific

(Trevor Wilson retired in August 2003 after more than thirty-six years as a member of the Australian foreign service, and after serving as Australian Ambassador to Myanmar (2000-03). Since October 2003 he has been a Visiting Fellow on Myanmar/Burma at the Department of Political & Social Change, School of International, Political & Strategic Studies, Australian National University. Since 2004, Trevor Wilson has been co-convener of the Myanmar/Burma Update conference series at the Australian National University. He has (co)-edited five volumes of the conference papers, Myanmar’s Long Road to National Reconciliation (ISEAS 2006); and, with Monique Skidmore, Myanmar: The state, community and the environment (Asia Pacific Press, 2007); and Dictatorship, disorder and decline in Myanmar (ANU E-Press, 2008); and with Monique Skidmore and Nick Cheesman, Ruling Myanmar From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections (ISEAS 2010) and Myanmar’s Transition: Openings, Obstacles and Opportunities (ISEAS 2012 forthcoming) based on the 2011 Myanmar/Burma Update. With David Kinley, he co-authored a case study of Australia’s human rights training in Myanmar ‘Engaging a pariah: Human rights training in Burma/Myanmar’ (Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29 No. 2, May 2007). He has written numerous opinion pieces and given many interviews about the situation in Myanmar/Burma.- July 2012)

Different countries have reacted differently to Myanmar‟s reforms, depending on their previous policies (sanctions vs engagement), their current political viewpoint, their perceived long-term strategic and/or economic interests, and the legal and other constraints they have to navigate to promote greater cooperation with Myanmar. It goes without saying that Myanmar‟s immediate neighbours were motivated to be among the first to welcome the reforms and to shift their own policies, while for more distant developed countries Myanmar was neither important enough nor sufficiently well known to prompt more substantive or more expeditious reactions. In every sense, the presence of Nobel Peace Prize winner and “democracy icon”, Aung San Suu Kyi made a great difference to the timing, the level and the nature of international responses before and after Myanmar‟s reforms began.1

1 As US Myanmar expert David Steinberg said: “No living foreigner has shaped contemporary U.S. attitudes toward a single country more than Aung San Suu Kyi. As the seemingly vulnerable international avatar of democracy, she has effectively determined the parameters of possible U.S. policy choices. Although her Burma/Myanmar specific goals and those of the U.S. overlap, they are not contiguous. That country is a „boutique‟ issue in U.S. politics - important but not of the highest priority.” (Steinberg 2010)


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Changes in Myanmar came quickly once the main opponent of change, former head of the military regime and former Head of State, Senior General Than Shwe stepped down of his own accord on 30 March 2011. If anything, Myanmar‟s changes initially came faster than the international community‟s responses, although international responses were also quite rapid and in some cases quite dramatic. One element that may have slowed down shifts in international policies toward Myanmar was the fact that Myanmar‟s own proclivity in the past for isolation and neutralism meant that it did not have many traditional friends or like-minded supporters in the international community. Indeed, other than Aung San Suu Kyi, few Myanmar nationals were known among their peers in other countries or around the world. Moreover, there was a widespread suspicion that the new Myanmar leadership was making similar promises to those made in the past, and that they would (once again) not be fulfilled. In addition, the governments of OECD countries were being fiercely warned by pro-democracy Burma activist organisations that it was premature to lift sanctions and most unwise to offer international assistance to the new Thein Sein government as some sort of “reward”.

Generally speaking, as at early 2011, international policies towards Myanmar were based on an unusual conjunction of circumstances: member countries of the OECD (which is the main Official Development Assistance coordinating organization) had concerted their policies and applied various sanctions against Myanmar. None of these sanctions was endorsed by the United Nations, so they were all administered separately under “autonomous” sanctions regimes, which varied quite significantly in their content, according to the political exigencies of the sanctions imposing country. Most sanctions regimes included restrictions on the types of ODA that were permitted, on military cooperation and arms sales, and on political contacts; after 2007 some regimes included economic sanctions either in the form of assets freezes, or (in the cases of the United States and the EU only) some restrictions on trade with Myanmar. None was specifically based on any international authority, although the boards of the World Bank, the IMF, the Asian Development Bank, and UNDP had taken formal decisions at the instigation of the United States, to limit their cooperation with and assistance to Myanmar. The only Asian countries supporting any sanctions against Myanmar were the two Asian members of the OECD, Japan and the ROK.

Politically, the pro-democracy, anti-military regime activist campaign‟s global reach, intensity and content (in terms of accounts of human rights abuses it publicized) had a considerable impact on the attitudes of the international community, even in states which did not impose sanctions. It caused other countries including Myanmar‟s neighbours and fellow ASEAN members as well as India (and China) to be very


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cautious in reacting to the changes in Myanmar starting in 2011. Governments in these countries were conscious that the Burmese Army had a long track record of not relinquishing power, and that periods of positive change in Myanmar were often followed by more repression and bad “governance”. Many expressed concern that the reforms were not irreversible, whatever that meant. So during 2011 and early 2012 (until the by-elections on 1 April 2012), many foreign governments had still not firmly settled on their responses to Myanmar‟s reform program, although many reforms had already been announced, and in some cases fully implemented. International sanctions may have contributed slightly to persuade the Burmese Army to hand over power when it did, although only in conjunction with other policies (such as engaging with Myanmar and exposing it fully to international expectations). However, in all cases sanctions have nearly destroyed the substance of the international community‟s relations with Myanmar, leaving little more than the bare bones of relationships that originally benefited those countries as well as Myanmar. Thus, it is no easy task now for any of these countries to re-design and rebuild individual relationships with Myanmar, or to create new institutions for this purpose, and there is no way such tasks could be accomplished quickly. Ultimately, once again the main losers will be the ordinary people of Myanmar, who will miss out economically, intellectually, socially and even spiritually. Under pressure to restore relationships with Myanmar as expeditiously as possible, it is inevitable that mistakes might be made, that wrong directions might be chosen, and that unnecessary costs might be incurred as these states work at dealing more effectively with Myanmar. But at least, the international community would have stepped up to assist the people of Myanmar. Once there was clear evidence that a process of genuine reform was under way in Myanmar, especially when it was realized that the 1 April 2012 by-elections had been genuinely free and fair, the general reaction from the international community was to try to encourage and support this reform process, which was in fact something that international opinion had been requesting for a long time. Contrary to some of the commentary from the activist community, the general reaction was first to confirm and test the claims for reform, not just to “reward” the Thein Sein government unquestioningly. Obviously, the timing and nature of any international response called for careful judgements, and moving too quickly or too far was to be avoided. There was never much hard evidence that these initial international responses were premature, or represented unthinking assessments of actual changes, or that they had done any “harm”. Rather, there was a great deal of evidence that the people of Myanmar wanted strong international support for reform so that reforms could not be turned back or, worse, not succeed. Moreover, it was widely recognized that


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capacity building to carry out Myanmar‟s reforms was critically absent and that some international assistance directed at overcoming specific capacity deficits was urgently needed Indeed, one of the great risks generally was that Myanmar‟s reforms might fail, or that the Thein Sein government might lose its resolve, or that the Burmese Army might become frustrated and disillusioned and intervene, possible through a coup against President Thein Sein. Instead of Myanmar becoming a case study for what it was possible to achieve under the right conditions – even through much maligned “top-down” reform – Myanmar might have once again provided a lesson from its failures. Early international statements of support for the Thein Sein Government‟s policies during 2011–12 did not mean that international endorsement of reforms was simply a crude attempt at reassuring the military, or that the international community was turning a blind eye to ongoing problems, or that there was no pressure or desire for further reforms and for changes in areas not yet addressed. Indeed, pro-democracy activists themselves went to great lengths to remind the international community, and the international media, that domestic insurgency against the Kachin, Karen and Shan minorities continued, that human rights abuses had not stopped, that effective rule of law was still not prevailing, and that the army (and others who might have committed abuses in the past) were still not being brought to account. Indeed, for much of the first two years of the Thein Sein Government, the overseas activist movement was assiduous in publicizing residual problems and the shortcomings of announced reforms, and continuously challenged President Thein Sein (and to some extent Aung San Suu Kyi as well) to be more ambitious in pursuing reforms. In some cases, the overseas activist movement was actually slow, or reluctant, to acknowledge the significance and reality of changes. There was certainly a noticeable tendency on the part of the activist campaigns to believe that no retired general of the Burmese Army could be capable of genuine intentions regarding reforms. Yet in other cases, NGO groups such as environmentalists actually seized the opportunities of the new openness to assist Myanmar lawyers trying to secure better land-rights, and better workers‟ rights. The extent of such NGO assistance was not necessarily disclosed or acknowledged – perhaps for fear that it would be blocked if it did become more widely known. One of the most resounding endorsements, as testimony to the international community‟s response to Myanmar‟s reforms, was contained in the communiqué from the US-hosted G-8 Summit at Camp David in May 2012:

We pay tribute to the remarkable efforts of President Thein Sein, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and many other citizens of Burma/Myanmar to deliver democratic reform in their country over the past year. We recognize the need to secure lasting and irreversible reform, and


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pledge our support to existing initiatives, particularly those which focus on peace in ethnic area, national reconciliation, and entrenching democracy. We also stress the need to cooperate to further enhance aid coordination among international development partners of Burma/Myanmar and conduct investment in a manner beneficial to the people of Burma/Myanmar.i

Indeed, as late as October 2012 at the annual IMF meeting in Tokyo, donors were urged by Burma activists not to “rush into” Burma but to “tread carefully”.ii But the unexpected enthusiasm to re-engage with Myanmar was not only politically driven, but also commercially driven, as representative from international companies came to see Myanmar with their own eyes.

United States The single most important country in terms of potential influence in Myanmar has always been the United States, even when the military regime was at its peak strength. But it was also the country whose Burma policy was for many years after 1988 almost set in concrete, contained more separate elements in terms of sanctions, and was surrounded by most political hurdles (although it was never divided over simple Democrats vs Republicans lines). Successive US Administrations and especially the US Congress were never prepared to acknowledge the counterproductive impacts of sanctions (although the State Department did so occasionally, but was not recognized for this). Moreover, direct US influence over the policies and behaviour of Myanmar military regimes had been rather limited. At those times when US policy allowed US support for anti-narcotics programs, Washington could exercise some influence, and can probably claim some credit that Myanmar‟s military regimes actually adopted many anti-narcotics measures which reduced – even if it did not eliminate – drug trafficking from Myanmar. But effective political inter-action between Washington and successive Myanmar governments was minimal, and Myanmar‟s military leadership was only indirectly and rarely ever exposed to high-ranking US representatives (and vice versa). US policy was locked into unquestioning support for Aung San Suu Kyi, and was never able to stand up to lobbying from the pro-National League for Democracy lobby in the United States. A large proportion of world-wide funding for the pro-democracy movement came from the United State – from the National Endowment for Democracy and from the Open Society Foundations of financial entrepreneur George Soros.2 For many years these programs supplemented US sanctions as the preferred US approach to Burma. 2 NED funding alone over the six years to 2013 averaged US$4 million a year (based on NED Annual

Reports).


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However, US policy toward Myanmar was always going to change after Myanmar‟s November 2010 elections, once Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in September 2009 that previous US policies (both sanctions and limited engagement) had failed. The key factor underlying the final change was probably the fundamental US inability to counter China‟s apparently growing influence in Myanmar. Essentially, the United States had dealt itself out of the strategic card game by pursuing an approach of minimal contact with the Myanmar leadership3 and pursuing stronger support for activists in exile under President George W. Bush. Whereas the United States was potentially always the one country that could exercise real influence over the Myanmar leadership, by 2009 it found itself a virtual bystander as China‟s ties with Myanmar deepened and US sanctions were proving counter-productive. US policy had long been hostage to the wishes of Aung San Suu Kyi, who at that stage (throughout 2011) was not contemplating any form of cooperation with the new Myanmar Government. However, as soon as President Thein Sein announced his substantive reform agenda on 31 March 2011, the way was clear for US policy to change. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton‟s visit in November 2011 paved the way for a presidential visit by Barak Obama in December 2012, and the easing most – but not all – US sanctions. These moves were also accompanied by fairly low-key US offers of cooperation with the Thein Sein government. Many of the initial US policy changes were as much symbolic as substantive, but they nevertheless carried considerable impact in Myanmar and elsewhere: Yet the response to Aung San Suu Kyi‟s visit to the United States was emotional and extravagant rather than realistic.iii Obama‟s 2011 “rebalancing” of US strategic policy – or the “pivot to Asia” 4 – reinforced the US decision to shift policy on Myanmar. Things started to change when US members of Congress started visiting Myanmar for the first time in decades. Thus Senator John McCain (R–Arizona), who has been the Republican Party Presidential candidate in 2008. visited Myanmar in June 2011 and again in January 2012. Senator Mitch McConnell (R–Kentucky) who had been instrumental in shepherding most anti-Myanmar legislation through the US Congress for 20 years, visited for the first time January 2012. Thereafter, pro-Burma congressional figures, who for many years blocked any US engagement initiatives with Burma, shifted their

3 Bush‘s Secretary of State, Condaleeza Rice, had virtually stopped attending ASEAN meetings where the

Myanmar delegation was headed by senior Burmese military represetatives. 4 “US President Barack Obama's speech to parliament”, Canberra, 17 November 2011 (carried in full in The Australian 17 November 2011. (Link: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/obama-in-australia/obamas-speech-to-parliament/story-fnb0o39u-1226197973237. Accessed 20 June 2013.)

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/obama-in-australia/obamas-speech-to-parliament/story-fnb0o39u-1226197973237

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/obama-in-australia/obamas-speech-to-parliament/story-fnb0o39u-1226197973237


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ground on sanctions and on re-engagement. Derek Mitchell, who had since July 2011 been “Special Envoy”, was named US Ambassador in July 2012, becoming the first US Ambassador since 1990. The “re-calibration” of US policy towards Myanmar that resulted has been much more widely supported and praised than might have been expected.iv From April 2012, the United States began easing its economic and some other sanctions, but President Obama Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said broader laws on sanctions against Burma would remain in place to safeguard against "backsliding". "We will be keeping the relevant laws on the books as an insurance policy, but our goal and our commitment is to move as rapidly as we can to expand business and investment opportunities," she said. In May 2012, President Obama explained that said Washington would work to "ensure that those who abuse human rights, engage in corruption, interfere with the peace process, or obstruct the reform process do not benefit from increased engagement with the United States."

While the United States has great influence over Myanmar‟s policy directions, there are still limits on what any US Administration can do. As former US Charge d‟Affaires Priscilla Clapp has argued:

The Administration nonetheless will continue to pursue “pragmatic engagement”, anticipating that the gradual development of dialogue between the Naypyitaw presidency and Aung San Suu Kyi may lead to further positive political developments, especially significant release of prisoners of conscience and genuine efforts at reconciliation with both the NLD and minority nationalities. The fact remains, however, that U.S. policy has very little influence on this process.v

US Commercial Ties After watching developments in Myanmar for more than a year, the US government eventually started to introduce measures to clear the way for greater US business activities in Myanmar, following the easing sanctions in 2012. When announcing the easing of some US sanctions in April 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had said: ''Our goal is to move as rapidly as we can to expand business and investment opportunities''. By the time of President Thein Sein‟s visit to Washington in May 2013 several measures were ready to be announced, but the scale of this “cooperation” is small, and its actual commercial impact will be quite modest. One such measure was the “Joint (Ministerial) statement on good governance and transparency in the energy sector”5 which became a political issue after it was raised publicly by Aung San Kyi. In addition, Acting United States Trade Representative Demetrios Marantis and Deputy

5 For the text, see: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209702.htm. Aung San Suu Kyi had raised

this issue after international NGOs singled out the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) for

criticism over its the lack of accountability.

http://burmanet.us2.list-manage.com/track/click?u=de1cb2dc3a1d3641b6857de4e&id=039e33cc34&e=2afe88a8a3


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Commerce Minister Dr. Pwint San of Myanmar signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) on 21 May 2013 in Washington, creating “a platform for ongoing dialogue and cooperation on trade and investment issues between the two governments”. vi Moreover, also during the visit of President Thein Sein to Washington in May 2013, the Myanmar-United States Trade Council announced that it had opened an office in Yangon.vii; On the other hand, the US commercial sector has been relative quick to take the first steps towards “normalizing” their relations with Myanmar, after submitting to wide-ranging unilateral US sanctions and negative US public opinion for so long. Following the easing of US economic sanctions against Myanmar during 2012–13, a number of major US firm have announced their “return” to Myanmar, beginning with Pepsi Cola (whose withdrawal in 1997 was in the headlines), General Electric, Deloitte, and Google. Several US firms used the May 2013 World Economic Forum meeting in Naypyitaw to announce their plans to re-engage with Myanmar – such as Microsoft (announcing a partnership with Myanmar Information Technology). Some signs had also emerged that US firms were beginning to worry that they might be missing out on the sheer commercial opportunities that Myanmar is seen as presenting. The optimistic view of Myanmar‟s prospects represented by the May 2013 report from consulting firm McKinsey could reflect this view.viii There is little doubt that US economic sanctions have worked against the commercial interests of US companies, some of whom are not currently well prepared to (re-) enter the Myanmar market. One of the motives behind the US business moves was the intention of countering China‟s commercial and strategic influence in Myanmar and Southeast Asia. Newly appointed US Ambassador Derek Mitchell wasted no time before seeking to stop such speculation. “China shouldn't worry about U.S. activities in the country, he said. "This is not a U.S. initiative in order to counter China or encircle China as some people in Beijing may fear," he said; a more stable Myanmar is in both superpowers' interests”.6

UK

6 Interview with Wall Street Journal, 19 August 2012. See:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443713704577599240759692770.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

http://burmanet.us2.list-manage1.com/track/click?u=de1cb2dc3a1d3641b6857de4e&id=83640c31b7&e=2afe88a8a3


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British policy has always been caught between the pressure from the active Burma lobby (the Burma Campaign UK) – inspired emotionally by British policy has always been caught between the pressure from the active Burma lobby (the Burma Campaign UK) – inspired emotionally by Aung San Suu Kyi‟s British connections and politically by one of the most aggressive and effective activist groups in the world – and more pragmatic policy options. Even more than US policy, British policy has been hostage to Aung San Suu Kyi‟s views: at some points, British diplomats would not contemplate new policy initiatives unless Aung San Suu Kyi explicitly endorsed them. Underneath, however, there was still a great deal of integrity in British policy with its commitment to openness, fairness and democratic ideals, however much these might seem at odds with crude past colonial divide-and-rule policies that the UK had practised in Burma. Whatever transpired in Myanmar, the British Government retained considerable flexibility, potentially, to implement more even-handed policies if it chose to, and if circumstances required. The UK was one of only a few countries where parliamentary reports had long questioned the efficacy of economic sanctions.7 Some British investment continued in Myanmar after the EU sanctions came into force, and while British tourism was “discouraged”, British travellers were frequent visitors to Myanmar. David Cameron was the first Prime Minister from a “western” country to visit Myanmar in late April 2012, when – with what at the time seemed unseemly haste – he foreshadowed the suspension (not rescinding) of UK sanctions against Myanmar. Their official “suspension” was announced at the annual EU meeting on the EU Common Policy a few days later, but their full abolition would await a formal EU decision a year later. The Cameron visit, as well as some later UK decisions in the next 12 months, gave the strong impression that the British Government was trying to make amends for UK business missing out on opportunities in Myanmar because of EU/UK sanctions. First, the British Board of Trade organized a “blue-chip” business delegation to Myanmar in July 2012, including companies such as Anglo American, BP, British Gas, Ernst & Young, Rolls Royce and Shell. Soon afterwards, the UK Board of Trade and Investment opened an office in Yangon. ix In June 2013, the Foreign Office announced the establishment of a “Myanmar Centre of Responsible Investment”. Also in June, 2013 UK Trade Minister Lord Green headed another British trade delegation.x

7 See House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, Report on ―The Impact of Economic

Sanctions‖ 24 April 2007.


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Meanwhile, in a joint British/Danish initiative, a Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business was set up from June 2013 in the British Embassy, Yangon. Headed by a former British Ambassador to Burma, Vicky Bowman, this centre will facilitate responsible business activities by the UK commercial sector. xi It is not clear how exactly the centre will operate, nor how its performance will be judged. No other country is seeking such a mechanism; no other country is so openly dismissing the various voluntary codes of conduct for international business (endorsed by the United Nations or the OECD). (The UK is also the base of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which the Thein Sein Government has said it will join.) Recent British Government statements refer (regretfully?) to the low level of UK-Myanmar trade and investment.

EU The backdrop to the EU‟s response to changes in Myanmar during 2011-12 was the EU sanctions regime, first adopted in 1996 under the EU “Common Policy on Burma”. The annual review of these sanctions was to become the only factually-based regular review of sanctions anywhere in the world that was sustained throughout their operation. By as early as 2012, EU high-level officials were foreshadowing increases in assistance and the relaxation of EU sanctions.xii Britain and France had agreed in February 2012 to call for "a gradual revision of European sanctions" and would propose at the next scheduled EU talks "the first measures in the very short term". The April 2012 review of EU policy was said to be taking place in order to “encourage signs of reform” in Myanmar. But Britain's Foreign Secretary, William Hague, and his French counterpart, Alain Juppe, in a gesture to appease activist hardliners had also agreed “that the EU must remain vigilant, with the democratic standards of partial legislative elections 1 April 2012 impacting the „new approach‟".xiii The official “suspension” of EU sanctions against Myanmar was announced at the annual EU meeting on the EU Common Policy on April 2012, fell short of what was desired by many. xiv In some ways, suspension of sanctions was the worst of all options: it did not convey clearly whether suspension was a prelude to abolition or a prelude to the re-imposition of sanctions; it did not make clear what it would take to end the sanctions; it gave no certainly at all to EU business, and therefore effectively stopped them from planning ahead for any business with Myanmar that would be possible after sanctions were lifted. As a political response, it just looked as if the EU could not make up its mind about what had happened in Myanmar. It was a strong disincentive to EU business firms, unless they were prepared to gamble on the sanctions not lasting much longer whatever else happened.


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Interestingly, EU policy had already relaxed to some extent. The EU rapidly responded to the opening of the country after 2010 and the government's commitment to reform by significantly increasing the amount – and scope – of assistance to €150 million over 2012-13, and to sectors of health education and “livelihoods”. As retired UK diplomat, and long-time critic of EU sanctions, Derek Tonkin, explained, it was a case of: “the politically inadmissible absence of effective sanction targets faced by the need to be seen to take action of some kind in the face of serious human rights issues”. xv EU assistance was appreciated because it was generous, innovative and effective. However, the EU was never able to exercise political leverage over Myanmar, because of the retention of sanctions, and the inept approach the EU took to its political relationships with Myanmar. When the EU “Troika” sought to engage with Myanmar leaders after 2000, it was always led at a low level, while the EU continued to prevent Myanmar ministers from participating in EU-ASEAN meetings held in Brussels. President Thein Sein finally visited Brussels in March 2013, before he visited any other major European capital. At the time of his visit, it was announced that the EU would restore Myanmar status under its Generalized System of (Tariff) Preferences, from which Myanmar has been suspended as part of the EU‟s first round of economic sanctions in 1997. (This had become a symbolic problem for the Burmese, probably much more than the benefits Myanmar would receive by readmission to the scheme.)

China Over recent decades, China has had to work hard at developing its strategic relationship with Myanmar alongside the need for a full day-to-day productive relationship. 8 During the sanctions period (1988-2011), China became Myanmar‟s main source of financial and technical support, in the process moving a long way from the pre-1988 days of a semi-hostile relationship because of China‟s longstanding direct and overt support for the Burma Communist Party. According to the official Myanmar media, Chinese investment over this period had indeed been large in terms of volume, although some of it took the form of concessional loans, and the

8 An accurate Chinese perspective on its relations with Myanmar can be found in an article by Professor

Li Chenyang (jointly with his associate Liang Fook Lye). Professor Li is the pre-eminent Chinese scholar

on Myanmar whose views closely reflect official Chinese thinking. The article is boldly entitled ―Chinese

policies towards Myanmar: a successful model for dealing with the Myanmar issue?‖, in China; an

Independent Journal. Singapore: East Asian Institute, 1 September 2009.


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conditionality applied was often not disclosed. For example, by October 2012 the cumulative level of Chinese investment was US$14 billion9

While China had little choice but to support Myanmar economically in this way, the Chinese government was often dissatisfied with the Myanmar military regime‟s policies and political management. China always urged Myanmar to pursue “stability”, which was code for asking the Burmese army to commit itself to genuine reconciliation with the political opposition and with ethnic groups. They also wanted Myanmar to have effective policies against all potentially harmful trans-border activities narcotics trafficking, smuggling, and people trafficking. China would have been pleased that the Thein Sein government made such a strong and early commitment to reform. Myanmar‟s reform agenda would quickly turn out to be rather different from the largely economic reforms China itself had undertaken after 1988. (China did not regard multi-party parliamentary democracy, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of association as important for China, and within one year, Myanmar‟s press freedom was arguably ahead of China.) China‟s official reactions to the dramatic changes in Myanmar were predictably prompt and proper. China‟s response to the content of Thein Sein‟s reforms was measured but supportive. China ensured that, as it was always at pains to do, it hosted Thein Sein on an official visit to China in May 2011 to demonstrate its support for the new Myanmar leadership. xvi China‟s clear commitment at that time to a new “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Myanmar was deliberate, but also conveyed that China was not about to walk away from its longstanding strategic interests in Myanmar – as a source of energy and for access to the Indian Ocean for Chinese commercial activities (not for military purposes). Thein Sein‟s September 2012 visit to Beijing was clearly intended to show that Myanmar wished to sustain its relationship with China even though it now enjoys strengthened diplomatic ties with the United States. 10 In other words, Myanmar's transition to democracy will not change the country's traditional friendship with China, Myanmar President Thein Sein was cited as telling Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping, supposedly amid concerns in China its neighbour could become a U.S. “ally”.11 Overall, not only is Thein Sein someone who is well known in Beijing, there are no suggestions to date that Thein Sein has any doubts about China‟s continuing importance to Myanmar (despite his 9 ―China Puts US$14 billion investment into Myanmar‖, New Light of Myanmar 5 October 2012.

10

―Thein Sein Cements China Ties Before US Trip‖, The Irrawaddy, 14 September 2012.

11

Reuters 22 September, 2012. See: http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/09/22/china-myanmar-

idINDEE88L00Z20120922.


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“suspension” of the Myitsone Dam), or that any occasional “issues” between them can be resolved.,

Yet, China was certainly unhappy about the September 2011 sudden and unexpected “suspension” of its controversial Myitsone Dam on the Irrawaddy River (which had previously been agreed to by the Myanmar military regime); and by the November 2012 break-down of law and order at the Chinese-run Letpadaung copper mine in central Myanmar. Not surprisingly, China is finding that it now must treat Myanmar as a normal close friend, rather than as a special case: it has had to engage in “public diplomacy” to persuade the Myanmar media of its good intention with regard to Myanmarxvii; a succession of senior Chinese commercial leaders have been unusually visible visiting Myanmar since 2012 to meet Myanmar government leaders; and generally, China has had to shift its behaviour towards Myanmar to appear more sensitive, more compliant and less aggressive. China had expected US relations with Myanmar would improve, and probably finds this better than to have Myanmar treated as a “pariah” by the United States, as well as better than China being Myanmar‟s sole source of financial support. xviii However, China may not want Chinese and US interests in Myanmar to be reduced to crude “strategic competition”, and may see the US policy shift as “opportunistic”.xix Yet China seems to be more comfortable with gradual and limited US engagement with Myanmar than closer Japanese and Indian engagement (both of which are often driven by overt anti-China sentiment). China seems to view Japanese and Indian policies toward Myanmar as self-centred, shallow and cynical. Here again, China‟s policy approach is rather heavy-handed and reflects its own prejudices against (for example) Japan and India. This is not unlike some of China‟s other regional policies since 2010, which often seem to be “all elbows” and more indicative of changing Chinese

Seemingly, out of respect for the Myanmar government in power, China long kept its distance from Aung San Suu Kyi, although it also sought to avoid alienating Suu Kyi unnecessarily. However, Suu Kyi‟s changed political role creates an unprecedented problem for China. Now, China‟s apparent reluctance to deal directly with Aung San Suu Kyi is a significant hurdle for better relations between China and Myanmar. Contacts between the two have occurred, but they are rare and indicate that China has problems with Suu Kyi either personally or politically, or both. Suu Kyi has tried to establish publicly that she sees no barrier to maintaining close relations with China, and that believes Myanmar should be friends with both the United States and China. She has herself (publicly and privately) called for “dialogue” with China, and China‟s


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Ambassador in Yangon finally met her in December 2011, without any publicity.12 There could be many reasons for China‟s apparent unhappiness over Aung San Suu Kyi, not the least of which might include her closeness to the United States. Suu Kyi has occasionally criticized China‟s role in Myanmar (recently, over its dam construction, its unregulated mining projects, etc), but she has always been measured in the criticisms, and she has often acknowledged Myanmar‟s appreciation for China‟s support over the years. Suu Kyi‟s criticisms of China have not been without foundation, and represent her response to public attitudes about China which are widespread in Myanmar. Yet curiously, the uncompromising stance of successive Myanmar military leaders against Aung San Suu Kyi was presumably one reason for China‟s continuous calls for political stability in Myanmar. China has of course, been alert to the impact of its presence on popular attitudes in Myanmar. China has, for example, been noted engaging in “public diplomacy” in Myanmar, something they felt little need for in the past when popular attitudes did not have much impact. The Chinese Embassy has in recent years launched public relations campaigns in Burma, centred around China‟s assistance towards building village schools, medical clinics, drilling water wells and providing other community improvement projects designed to show goodwill. This resulted in China being relegated to be more on the same footing as other foreign embassies than it had been previously. 13

Japan Japan‟s relationship with Burma/Myanmar has undergone many ups and downs since Burma‟s independence. Japanese policy towards Myanmar has always been fraught with problems, because it was – at several levels – caught between conflicting policy options. Japan‟s Liberal Democratic Party, which has mostly been the governing party, has always been split over Myanmar. At different times, political and economic ties were placed under stress from different quarters, and despite Japanese sentimentality about Burma, Japan‟s recent role there has been unremarkable. During the period 1996-2010, Japan‟s commercial presence in Myanmar contracted visibly.xx

12

According to an AsiaNews IT article, ―Aung San Suu Kyi calls on Beijing to dialogue with Burmese

opposition‖, 31 May 2011. Suu Kyi commented on this directly in this article: ―Answering a question

from the South China Morning Post (SCMP) on relations with Beijing, Aung San Suu Kyi said she has

"long sought" contacts with the Chinese leadership, which "has always shunned us."

13 “Jane Perlez And Bree Feng, “China Tries to Improve Image in a Changing Myanmar”, New York Times, : 18 May 2013.

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/p/jane_perlez/index.html


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Japanese investment slumped, and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Yangon had only about 50 participating members in 2010. A clear statement of Japan‟s “middle-of-the-road” policy was contained in a letter from then Prime Minister Hashimoto to ASEAN in 1997.

"Japan does not feel international isolation is the optimal way for the improvement of domestic situation in Myanmar. Rather, Japan thinks it important to give Myanmar incentives to behave in line with international norms by drawing it out as a member of the international community. From that point of view, Japan appreciates ASEAN's recent agreement to grant official membership to Myanmar sometime in the future. On the other hand, Japan also thinks that ASEAN membership should not provide a smokescreen for oppression in Myanmar. Accordingly, Japan hopes that ASEAN will handle the membership issue in such a manner as to contribute to the improvement of the domestic situation in Myanmar." 14

However, once the pattern of reform in Myanmar consolidated, Japanese semi-government agencies such as the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) were quick to reverse their earlier cautious policies: in September 2012, JETRO opening a new Business Support Centre in Yangon – a concrete example of injecting confidence back into Myanmar-Japan commercial relations. In February 2013, on the occasion of a high-level delegation visit, the leading Japanese business organization Keidanren signed an MOU with the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI). From early 2012, Japan‟s semi-government Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) has intensified its research program on Myanmar, under the rubric of “Policy Review on Myanmar Economy” and has already produce more than 10 separate research reports. According to Myanmar immigration figures, Myanmar received more Japanese business visitors in the year t May 2013 than from any other country.xxi Leading Japanese firms re-appeared to set up their offices – a KDDI office opened April 2013, The pattern of Japanese ODA to Myanmar over this period (1996-2010) was also somewhat erratic, as political problems and political openings alternated from time to time, and Japan was forced to adjust its Myanmar aid program. Thus, after Aung San Suu Kyi‟s release in 1994 and again in 2002, the Japanese Government sought to seize opportunities to diverge from strictly humanitarian assistance to continue long-

14

Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (under Regional Affairs): http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-

paci/myanmar/myanmar.html (accessed 15 June 2013).

http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/myanmar/myanmar.html

http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/myanmar/myanmar.html


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running but interrupted Japanese infrastructure projects, such as the upgrade of Yangon International Airport (1998-2000) and the refurbishment of Baluchaung power station (2001-03). xxii Each time this happened, Japanese intentions and solidarity were called into question. Whereas most donors to Myanmar readily share information about their ODA activities, this is not generally the case with Japan, so there is often the possibility of Japan being “out of synch”. After this patchy and changeable pattern of ODA, Japan now looks to have made some substantive long-term ODA commitments with considerable strategic importance on the basis of understandings with the Myanmar Government. These include committing to upgrade the mobile telecommunications network, to upgrade the Thilawa Special Economic zone near Yangon, and Japanese support for stock exchange. xxiii These activities are all vital to bring Myanmar‟s woefully inadequate infrastructure up to scratch. Probably only Japan would have the financial resources, technical know-how and project management and coordination capacity to undertake such ambitious projects. The benefits when they are completed will be felt across the country and will benefit the whole society. It is not really accurate to say that Japan was making a pitch for an exclusive stake in Myanmar. Nor is it correct to claim that Japan was ahead of others in committing to Myanmar. 15 What happened during the previous two decades was a steady and substantial fall-off in Japanese trade, investment and aid to Myanmar. Many Japanese firms found the overall business environment during the period of the military regime was decidedly unfriendly for profitable Japanese business; Japanese trading companies – critical as facilitators of Japanese business – had reduced their presence, the only Japanese motor vehicle manufacturing operation in Myanmar was Suzuki which withdrew from Myanmar as late as 2010; Competition with China is an underlying element of Japan‟s drive to expand its activities in Myanmar, now that the environment for such activities is more propitious. Japan has historically taken a sentimental view of Myanmar, regarding it a special area of interest, and it was always a matter of regret that politically Japan was unable to achieve its aspirations in Myanmar. However, China‟s (officially controlled) media was quick to warn that Japanese proposals for strategic alliances with SouthEast Asia were aimed at “encircling” China.16 (Perhaps reflecting a similar bias

15

―How Japan Inc Stole a March on Competitors to Enter Myanmar‖, Anton Sldkowski 16

―Chinese Media accuses Japan of attempting to ‗encircle‘ China‖, Press Trust of India quoting the

Economic Times, 30 May 2013. The article followed immediately after Japanese Prime Minister Abe‘s

high-profile visit to Myanmar the previous week.


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from their vantage point, commentators in London were speculating about Sino-US strategic competition over Myanmar.17 )

Australia The Australian Labor Party Government (2007-2013) responded promptly and positively, but cautiously to Myanmar‟s reforms. 18 After limiting the easing of its sanctions in January 2012, Australia was the first country to terminate all its economic and travel restrictions in June 2012 (this had been announced earlier by the new Foreign Minister Bob Carr in April 2012). Kevin Rudd‟s July 2011 was the first by an OECD Foreign Minister and the first visit by an Australia Foreign Minister in 9 years. Rudd himself was cautious about embracing Myanmar‟s reforms, and continued to press for urgent improvement to human rights practices.xxiv Like other countries, the Australian Government realized the need to rebuild links with Myanmar, and especially to restore business confidence after so many years of a fairly ineffectual “neither encourage nor discourage” policy on trade and investment. A trade and investment mission led by Bill Shorten, the influential Minister for Workplace Relations, and including senior representatives from eight Australia companies, visited Myanmar in October 2012. The Australian parliament actively solicited visited from both Myanmar speakers during 2012, and Australian non-government groups had promoted “second-track” exchange visits after 2010. Australia also increased its aid to Myanmar quite substantially. In quantitative terms, it already reached US$80m in 2013-14. But more significantly, as well as joining several multi-donor programs in health, livelihoods and peace support, Australia is also seeking to play a lead role in education. All of these programs are aimed at strengthening overall Myanmar capacity (government and non-government) in accordance with Myanmar‟s reform agenda. They have strong political support in Australia, and won endorsement from both the Myanmar Government and opposition. They also closely reflect Myanmar‟s considerable needs currently and looking ahead.

India How does India‟s response to Myanmar‟s reforms seem when compared to Myanmar‟s other major international partners (apart from ASEAN)?

17

Jurgen Haacke ―Myanmar; Now a Site for Sino-US Geopolitical Competition‖, in London School of Economics .

18

A new direction in Australian policy had been announced by then Foreign Minister Stephen Smith as

early as February 2010, in which the scope of Australian aid was broadened and Australian government

scholarships were provided for students from Myanmar for the first time since 1988.


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Since India‟s approach to Myanmar changed around 1993, self-interested Indian policies have generated numerous high-level visits between the two countries (political and military delegations mostly, but relatively few business delegations). Moreover, in the last 20 year, many bilateral agreements have been concluded between India which should have provided plenty of ballast for substantial productive relationships. Indeed, Indian probably had more formal agreements with Myanmar than any other country. However, India‟s policies under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao‟s quintessentially pragmatic 1993 “Look East” policy not only meant turning away from the democracy movement in Myanmar, but it also was without positive outcomes for India-Myanmar relations. All of this meant that India was left in a rather lonely position in 2011 when the Myanmar military regime relinquished power of its own accord. Over the years, Indian commentators have written extensively about “the strategic importance” to India of Myanmar, but this is largely rhetorical and based on shibboleths about the need for India to counter perceived Chinese footholds in Myanmar. However, Indian business has consistently ignored Myanmar, other than its interest in Myanmar‟s off-shore gas deposits. Moreover, cross-border trade and investment – occurring between the poorest and most inaccessible parts of both countries – is predictably small. In addition, despite having a sizeable border with Myanmar, India is the tenth largest investor in Myanmar with an investment estimated at a mere US$273.5 million in 2013 (compared to $2.3 billion in Chinese investment). In reality, the facts indicate that India‟s pro-military regime policies have not really “delivered” and indeed have disappointed many seeking a strengthening ties with Myanmar. This sad history of past India-Myanmar relations has probably complicated India‟s to responses to the Thein Sein government‟s reform program since 2011. Indian responses have been somewhat cautious, and have largely reacted to dramatic policy shifts by other countries. But neither Myanmar‟s current leaders nor India‟s current leaders can be blamed for this situation. When Indian President Manmohan Singh (who had been former Prime Minister Rao‟s close associate) visited Myanmar in May 2012, as usual a large number of bilateral agreements were signed between the two governments with the aim of fostering stronger linkages and “connectivity” between the two countries. So far India has only completed a relatively short “Friendship Highway” between Tamu (in China State) and Kalaymyo (in Sagaing State), while a much more ambitious Kaladan River infrastructure project in Rakhine State, agreed in 2008, remains unfinished and well behind schedule. An important element of


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President Manmohan Singh‟s May 2012 visit was his attendance at a forum hosted by the new Myanmar think tank, Myanmar Resources Development Institute. India‟s previous lack of principled support for political change in Myanmar was exposed more clearly than usual during Aung San Suu Kyi‟s November 2012 visit to India.xxv Suu Kyi herself had previously hinted at the disappointment she felt over India‟s policies since the mid-1990s Indian decision to shift to “engagement” with the military regime. Curiously, India‟s military cooperation with Myanmar is an undeveloped side of bilateral relations, although this is caused partly by India‟s reluctance to export lethal military materiel to Myanmar.

Conclusion It is immediately obvious that a pattern of cautious, and sometimes somewhat slow, but positive responses to the changes in Myanmar emerged from the international community, even though no organized response took place. Just as the United Nations did not initiate formal sanctions against Myanmar, so no international agency took responsibility for concerting or coordinating the international community‟s responses. Yet across the UN system – and more widely – transgressions by the military regime in “Burma” had occupied a great deal of attention throughout the United Nations over the last 20 years. Now, instead, the international financial institutions whose presence had been so missed – the World Bank, IMF and Asian Development Bank – led by example: quickly setting up their own offices in Myanmar, formulating their own medium-term assistance strategies, and agreeing on specific sectors they would each target for “rebuilding”. It was also clear that donors and developed countries in some ways were competing for an edge in offering capacity building to Myanmar, and in pursuing commercial opportunities for their own business interests. Many governments which had long boycotted trade and investment linkages with Myanmar, suddenly became ardent promoters of business in Myanmar. Not surprisingly, the Myanmar side was hard pressed to manage all these promises and opportunities. Other countries, who had never sought to isolate or punish Myanmar through unilateral sanctions, could only look on with amused irony – especially China, which had become Myanmar‟s main source of external support, and other Asian countries. In the background, however, a chorus of warnings and critical reports from human rights groups, pro-democracy activists and exiled Burmese groups continued to point out ongoing problems and abuses inside Myanmar. Some commentators and international media kept up a barrage of demands of Myanmar‟s reformers,


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reinforcing the impression that international expectations of Myanmar‟s leaders were perhaps higher than of any other country. Many of the fears and concerns being expressed were exaggerated or anticipated rather than real, but some are warranted. What is essential is that Myanmar not be distracted or diverted by these particular problems from its important nation-building reform agenda. Undeterred, on the whole, Myanmar‟s reformist leadership has adhered to its long-term ideals, struggled with unexpected realities on the ground (such as inter-communal violence), openly acknowledged its deep-seated capacity gaps, and courageously confronted awkward issues exposed by their new-found freedoms of expression, assembly and association. Remarkably, reforms are still occurring in a more open environment than ever (which is how critics can find so many activities to criticize), in a general atmosphere of stability and cooperation, and with a new realization that completing the tasks will be a long-term endeavour. Thein Sein, as well as Aung San Suu Kyi, have been amazingly active in appreciating and maintaining their international support through extensive travel schedules. (The only striking omission at this point – mid-2013 – is the absence of a visit to China by Aung San Suu Kyi. This is perhaps something that China needs to attend to.) The establishment of official representatives of the lead international financial institutions – the IBRD, the IMF and the ADB – after a gap of more than two decades is, of course, reassuring for donors generally. But their presence, and more particularly their unique ability to undertxxviake substantial cross-cutting programs with wide-ranging normative impact, are likely to become a turning point for the trend of both ODA flows and of long-awaited improved policy settings. Each of these has moved quickly to set out medium-term strategies in support of the reforms, with little obvious overlap or duplication. But they are starting virtually from a clean slate, and all donors will have to cope with the ongoing issues caused by inadequate and inaccurate data for some time. The Myanmar Government is naturally delighted with their return, and would be justified in feeling vindicated in the success so far of this home-grown transition in inducing their return. Hopefully, they will also take on board the urgent need for improved national information, beginning with the 2014 census which they committed to some time ago and which is now being undertaken with technical support from the United Nations and from donors such as Australia. Not surprisingly, the international community continues to be quite prescriptive about its expectations of Myanmar in the period ahead. In its June 2013 final report on Myanmar, for example, the Washington-based Asia Society identifies ten “challenges” ahead for Myanmar:


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1. Redefining and professionalizing the military‟s political and economic role 2. Firmly establishing the rule of law and strengthening the judicial branch 3. Protecting individual rights 4. Developing effective formulas for ethnic equality 5. Instilling social and religious tolerance 6. Rooting out corruption 7. Addressing the “missing middle,” a capacity void across the spectrum of the

government and the economy 8. Delivering the benefits of reforms to the broader population 9. Addressing land and property rights 10. Developing mechanisms for negotiating trade-offs between economic

development on the one hand, and social development and environmental protection on the other.

There is not a great deal of debate about the importance of these issues. Moreover, the Thein Sein government remains highly receptive to well-meant advice, and normally seeks to demonstrate its determination to make gradual progress towards widely agreed objectives, however awkward this might be. Fortunately, most international responses are also increasingly reflecting the need for long-term commitments of support. Donors are beginning to be more active in support programs, and are working more directly with the Thein Sein government not only though NGOs, with the objective of delivering long-term strategic progress. But critical capacity gaps in Myanmar at different stages in the “supply chain” of assistance is posing major challenge all round. And international donor agencies seem to be similarly suffering from over-crowding of their capacities to analyze, fund and manage programs and projects in Myanmar. It is significant that several of Myanmar‟s key international partners are equally interested in commercial prospects. Here they might also hope to see positive progress on reforms, including above all the political reforms that should bring improved governance, transparency and accountability. But the high level of commercial risk associated with Myanmar – which is currently a hot topic among prominent business analysts – means that trade and investment may not flow as quickly as some expect, especially if media reporting of domestic problems is exaggerated or melodramatic and sets off “alarm bells” among prospective business partners. It may turn out to be important that international donor community avoids falling into the trap of prematurely arriving at a mass conviction that Myanmar has failed, when it is just struggling to cope.


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Notes i G-8 Summit Statement, Camp David, 18-19 May 2012, para 35. ii See Johanna Son ―Donors Urged to Tread Carefully in Myanmar‖, 14 October 2012, Inter Press Service.

http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/10/donors-urged-to-tread-carefully-in-myanmar

iii “A moment in history no one could imagine”, Burma News International ,Written by Tom Stuart, Tuesday, 18 September 2012. http://www.bnionline.net/index.php/analysis/13733-a-moment-in-history-no-one-could-imagine-.html iv See for example, Calibrating U.S. policy on Burma Link: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/calibrating-us-policy-on-burma/2013/05/18/45cf6ca8-bf05-11e2-97d4-a479289a31f9_story.html. v Clapp, Priscilla. ―US policy toward Burma in the Post-Election Era‖ 2011.

vi Signed on 21 May 2013 in Washington DC.

See: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/may/u.s.-burma-sign-tifa

vii

Simon Roughneen ―Trade and Investment Key Issues During Thein Sein‘s US Visit‖, The Irrawaddy, 21 May

2013.

viii

―Myanmar is a High Risk, High Reward Investment‖, McKinsey, June 2013. ix See Alex Spillius “UK opens trade office as Western firms eye Burma riches”, Telegraph, 12 July 2012. x Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/uk-trade-minister-lord-green-to-visit-burma

xi Sponsored by the London-based Institute for Human Rights and Business and the Danish Aid Agency, Danida. Link: http://www.ihrb.org/news/2013/myanmar-centre-for-responsible-business.html xii

See Reuters article following a visit to Myanmar by Development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs. ―EU offers aid,

review of sanctions after talks with president‖.

xiii

―EU mulls lifting Burma sanctions‖, Agence France Presse (AFP), 18 January 2012.

xiv The full abolition of sanctions would await a formal EU decision a year later. xv

Derek Tonkin putting the case against sanctions as chair of Network Myanmar 2012. xvi

See reports on signing of a "comprehensive strategic cooperation partnership" agreement.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-05/28/content_12596729.htm.

xvii Jane Perlez and Bree Feng, “China Tries to Improve Image in a Changing Myanmar”, New York Times, 18 May 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/world/asia/under-pressure-china-measures-its-impact-in-myanmar.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 xviii

David Steinberg, ―China counter-pivots on Myanmar‖, Asiatimes Online 18 March 2013.

http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-01-180313.html.

xix

An interesting perspective is contained in an opinion piece ―China, Myanmar & the US: A history of political

expediency‖ available on the semi-official Chinese website China.org, by Hein Khaing, a Burmese of Chinese

descent, who was head of the Editorial Department at the Golden Phoenix, the only Chinese-language newspaper in

Myanmar.

http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/10/donors-urged-to-tread-carefully-in-myanmar

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/calibrating-us-policy-on-burma/2013/05/18/45cf6ca8-bf05-11e2-97d4-a479289a31f9_story.html

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/calibrating-us-policy-on-burma/2013/05/18/45cf6ca8-bf05-11e2-97d4-a479289a31f9_story.html

http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/may/u.s.-burma-sign-tifa

https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/uk-trade-minister-lord-green-to-visit-burma

http://www.ihrb.org/news/2013/myanmar-centre-for-responsible-business.html

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-05/28/content_12596729.htm

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/p/jane_perlez/index.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/world/asia/under-pressure-china-measures-its-impact-in-myanmar.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0



78

xx Kudo, Toshihiro “Myanmar and Japan: How Close Friends Become Estranged”, IDE Discussion Paper. No. 118. 2007.8 Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO xxi

Cited in Eleven Myanmar, 9 May 2013.

Link: http://flyinmyanmar.wordpress.com/2013/05/09/japanese-business-travellers-flock-to-myanmar/

xxii

Patrick Strefford, ―Japanese ODA diplomacy towards Myanmar: A Test for the ODA Charter‖, Ritsumeikan

Annual Review of International Studies, 2007. Vol.6, pp. 65-77.

xxiii Slodkowski, Antoni. “Daiwa looks to lead $380 million investment in Myanmar”, Reuters, 23 July 2012. xxiv Kevin Rudd, “First signs that Burma will improve human rights”, The Australian 14 October 2011. Link: www.foreignminister.gov.au/articles/2011/kr_ar_111014.html

xxv

Andrew Buncombe, ―Did India betray democracy in Burma?‖, The Independent (New Delhi), November 2012.

http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/did-india-betray-democracy-in-burma-8319856.html

xxvi

The World Bank‘s Board of Executive Directors endorsed an Interim Strategy for Myanmar in November 2012;

the Asian Development Bank developed an interim country partnership strategy (ICPS) for Myanmar for the period

2012–2014 in October 2012.

See: http://www.adb.org/countries/myanmar/strategy; in December 2012 the IMF announced a Staff-Monitored

Program during January-December 2013.

References Asia Society. Advancing Myanmar's Transition: A Way Forward for U.S. Policy, by Priscilla Clapp and Susan di Maggio. Washington DC: 2011. Egreteau, Renaud. “India and China Vying for Influence in Burma – A New Assessment”, India Review, Vol 7, Issue 1, 2008. pages 38-72. Kudo Toshihiro. “Myanmar and Japan: How Close Friends Become Estranged”, Institute of Developing Economies Discussion Paper No 118, August 2007. Myoe, Maung Aung, In the Name of Pauk-Phaw – Myanmar’s China Policy Since 1948. Singapore: ISEAS (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 2011. Seekins, Donald M. “Burma and U.S. Sanctions: Punishing an Authoritarian Regime”, Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 3 (May/June 2005), pp. 437-452. Steinberg,D.I. “Aung San Suu Kyi and U.S. Policy toward Burma/Myanmar”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol 29 No 3, 2010.

Steinberg,D.I. “Burma: Feel-Good US Sanctions Wrongheaded“, Yale Global Online, 2004. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/burma-feel-good-us-sanctions-wrongheaded Steinberg, David and Fan, Hongwei. Modern China-Myanmar Relations Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence, Copenhagen: NIAS (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies) Press, 2012.

********************

http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/articles/2011/kr_ar_111014.html

http://burmanet.us2.list-manage.com/track/click?u=de1cb2dc3a1d3641b6857de4e&id=169d3bfaa5&e=2afe88a8a3

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/10/16823059/myanmar-interim-strategy-note-period-fy13-14


79

Rohingya is not the case of Citizenship but that of Human Rights

(An Ethnic attempt to solve the Rohingya Crisis)

Prof. Kanbawza Win

formerly, the Foreign Affairs Secretary to the Prime Minister of Burma Kanbawza Win, (a) Prof. Ba Thann Win Ph.D. the incumbent dean of the AEIOU (All Ethnic

International Open University) programme in Chiang Mai University (Thailand) is formerly, the Foreign Affairs Secretary to the Prime Minister of Burma, when he joined the pro democracy

movement in 1988 and identified himself with the dissident groups in Diaspora.

He has worked in the University of Manitoba, Institute of Socials Science & Humanities

and later accepted the post of a Distinguished Visiting Professor at MSC, University of

Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.

He was called by the European Institute of Asian Studies, EU, Brussels, for sometimes before joining his better half in Thailand to inaugurate a Burmese University in Diaspora.

He had served as an Adjunct Professor at Simon Fraser University of British Columbia,

Canada. He has written several books and numerous articles on Burma. His writings and

speeches can be seen in the internet.

__________________________________

Executive Summary

This paper analyses the Rohingya issue as having a historical foundation. It has received global attention in fits and starts, whenever it has contributed towards destabilizing either existing or emerging power configurations in the region. Several articles are available on line putting their respective hypothesis and arguments but there is not a single party attempting to find the solution as one always blames the other. The Burmese Government sponsored Official Rakhine Committee is not so helpful either. This is an attempt to find the conflict resolution to at least stop the human rights violations and later to sort out the problem piece by piece. The paper traces the history of these migrant Rohingya from the Treaty of Yandabo ( & EWWWWWydkpmcskyf) signed on Feb.24th 1826 and listsfive solid reasons of why the Rohingya became stateless. He also highlighted the xenophobic Myanmar attitude (r[m jrefrm) towards the Non Myanmar ethnic nationalities and spearheaded by the various Burmese administrations and implemented by the Tatmadaw (Burmese Army) including the ongoing ethnic cleansing policies. The paper also dissects the Rohingya community, the simple poor farmers and working people against the elites in Diaspora fanned by the foreign intelligentsia to carve out the Arakan border area with Bangladesh, as something distinct, in order to have a place in the sun. Hence, the responsibility for the outbreak of the crisis should be shared equally by these self -appointed Rohingya activists as well as the Arakanese Buddhist zealots with the military hardliners and the ruling party controlling from behind. The conspicuous aspect of this piece is that the crisis is placed in the backdrop of Burmese National Identity Crisis with the international communities and the United Nations scrutinising the country’s change from military dictatorship to democracy. Economics, trade and business which are the components of Realpolitik will decide the fate of the Rohingya and it is suggested that a compromise solution in which both the Rohingya and the quasi military administration including the Arakanese Buddhist can came out with dignity.


80

1. Introduction

Modern Burma since its inception in 1948 had to grapple the issue of the people now calling themselves as

―Rohingyas‖ even though an average Burmese have barely heard this word. They are the people of Mayu Frontier

area adhering the Muslim faith (present-day Buthidaung and Maungdaw Townships of Arakan State) somewhat

isolated province in the western part of the country across Naaf River as boundary between Burma and Bangladesh. 1

The Rohingya issue has historical foundations, but it has only received global attention in fits and starts,

whenever it has contributed towards destabilizing either existing or emerging power configurations in the region. In

this sense, the interest in the new influx of Rohingyas into Bangladesh in June 2012, a trend that continues to date, is

connected to the broader politics of Burma‘s democratic ‗opening‘. The new refugees are fleeing bloody clashes

between the Muslim Rohingya and Rakhine Buddhists as armed gangs from both communities go for each other

throat while the Burmese security forces have stood by watching or, in some cases, targeting the Rohingya siding

with the Rakhine Buddhist.

Lots of articles are available on line putting their respective hypothesis and arguments for pro or against the

Rohingyas both by the Burmese nationals and foreigners. Some of them are well intentioned to find the truth but

most of the antagonist sides especially written by the Bangladeshi intellectuals are pro Rohingyas while the

Buddhists both Arakanese and Burmese nationals put up their arguments with no end in sight. But there is not a

single paper attempting to find the solution as one always blames the other.

The present paper is just a humble attempt to solve this problem taking into consideration of the national

sovereignty of Burma, as well as the humanitarian conditions of the these people categorize by the UN as the most

persecuted people of the world. The term ―Rohingya‖ came into use in the 1950s by the educated Bengali residents

from the Mayu Frontier Area, while most Burmese have not heard it before 1950.2 But there were claims that the

term "Rohingya" comes from Rohang, the Rohingya word for the Arakan state much earlier.3

2. The First Cause of Statelessness

(The British Colonialist Instigation of Mass Migration of Chittagonians)

After the first Anglo Burmese War (5 March 1824 – 24 February 1826) the British occupied Arakan, the

Western part of the country which was very scarcely populated 4 At that time the fertile land of Kaladan and Lemro

Valleys germinated nothing but wild plants.5 The British policy was to encourage the Bengali inhabitants from the

more populated Chittagong areas to migrate into fertile valleys in Arakan as agriculturalists which later produced

high-yield paddy fields. As the British East India Company extended the administration of Bengal to Arakan, there

was no international boundary yet between the two countries and no restriction was imposed on the emigration. A

superintendent, later an assistant commissioner, directly responsible to the Commissioner of Bengal, was sent in

1828 for the administration of Arakan Division, which was divided into three districts respectively: Akyab,

Kyaukpyu, and Sandoway with an assistant commissioner in each district.6 Therefore many hundreds, indeed

thousands of coolies came from the Chittagong District by land and by sea, to seek labor and high wages.7 By 1879,

the descendants of the coolies are already resident for the most part in the Kyauktaw and Myohaung (Mrauk-U)

townships, while Maungdaw Township has been overrun by Chittagonian immigrants. Buthidaung is not far behind

and new arrivals will be found in almost every part of the district.8

At first most of them came to Arakan as seasonal agricultural laborers and went home after the harvest was

done. R. B. Smart estimated the number at about twenty-five thousand during the crop-reaping season alone. He

added that about the same number came to assist in plowing operations, to work at the mills and in the carrying

trades. A total of fifty thousand immigrants coming annually were probably not far from the mark.9 This is also

because the colonial administration of India (at that time there was no East Pakistan or Bangladesh) regarded the

Bengalis as amenable subjects while finding the indigenous Arakanese too defiant raising in rebellion in 1830.10

The

flow of Chittagonian labour is the main impetus to the economic development in Arakan and within a few decades

along with the opening of regular commercial shipping lines between Chittagong and Akyab became an economic

success. The arable land expanded for four and half times between 1830 and 1852 and Akyab became one of the

major rice exporting cities of the world. Indeed during the century of British colonial rule the Chittagonian

immigrants became the numerically dominant ethnic group in the Mayu Frontier region. Thus the origin of

Chittagonian immigrants became Rohingya. (Please see Annex I)

During the colonial period the anti- Indian riots broke out in Burma because of the resentment against

unhindered Indian settlements particularly in Arakan, Tenasserim and Lower Burma (Yegar 1992:29-31). But those


81

riots that took place in Rangoon and other major cities in 1926 and 1938 never had had any effects on the peoples of

Arakan. A peaceful coexistence was possible for the two different religious, ethnic groups in the Mayu Frontier till

the beginning of the World War II. British administration to a certain extent gave the Muslim village communities

religious and cultural autonomy. So the new comers from the Chittagong District set up their village communities in

the frontier area. They occupied the villages deserted by the Arakanese during the Burmese rule and established

purely Muslim village communities. The village committee authorized by the Village Amendment Act of 1924

paved the way for the Imam (In Burma it is called Moulovi) and the trusteeship committee members of the village

mosque to be elected to the village council. They were also allowed to act as the village magistrates and Shariah was

somewhat in effect in the Muslim villages11

. At least the Islamic court of village had the jurisdiction over familial

problems such as marriage, inheritance and divorce. There was no internal sense of unrighteousness and presence of

nonbelievers in their community, and accordingly they believe no internecine struggle was for the time being

necessary.

After the Yandabo Treaty, (the end of the hostilities between Britain and Burma on 24th

Feb. 1826) the

British endeavour to take a sort of a census in the late 1851 to see how many ethnic races were their subjects

residing in Burma, 12

it listed nearly 200 ethnic races but did not categorise the immigrants from Chittagong as an

ethnic race because they essentially came from Chittagong and speak the same language and maintain their own

customs and laws which are all peaceful and co existing. This became the basis of the 1982 Citizenship Act. This act

states that as per the Treaty of Yandabo, signed during the First Anglo-Burmese war, anybody who was not a part of

Burmese kingdom, he/she and his/her descendents cannot be given the citizenship of Burma.13

3. The Second Cause of Statelessness

(The British promise an independent country to the Muslims)

In the Second World War together with the Japanese army came Bogyoke Aung San and the legendary 30

comrades the embryo of the Burma Independence Army. The British shows a clean pair of heels and withdrew to

India and when the British administration was withdrawn to India in 1942 the Arakanse hoodlums began to attack

the Muslim villages in southern Arakan and the Muslims fled to the north where they took vengeance on the

Arakanese in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships.14

Hundreds of Muslim inhabitants of Southern Arakan fled northward, and that there were cases of robbing

the Indian refugees on the Padaung-Taungup pass over the Arakan Yoma mountain ranges after the retreat of the

British from the Pegu Division and southern Arakan. The British left all these areas to the mercy of both Burmese

and Arakanese dacoits. Most of the estimated 900,000 Indians including several Rohingyas living in Burma

attempted to walk over to India…100,000 died at the time. Practically all Indians except those who were not

physically fit were utterly helpless, began to move from place to place in search of safety and protection until they

could reach India.15

The Japanese air force attacked Akyab on 23 March 1942 and the British moved their

administrative headquarter to India on March 30th

. The administration by martial law began in Akyab District on 13

April 1942 and with this racial tension burst to the surface, giving way to the public disorder. 16

The British were desperate and tried to marshal the support of the majority Muslims in that area to resist the

Japanese promising them an independent country in that area once the allies win. It tried to raise the Volunteer

Force. The V Force, as it is called by the British Army, was formed in 1942 soon after the Japanese operations

threatened the British position in India. Its principal role was to undertake guerrilla operations against Japanese, to

collect information of the enemy‘s movements and to act as interpreters. But the volunteers, instead of fighting the

Japanese, destroyed Buddhist monasteries and Pagodas and burnt down the houses in the Arakanese villages.17

They

killed the deputy commissioner of Akyab District and then massacred thousands of Arakanese civilians in the towns

and villages.

For most of the Chittagonians (who later will claim to be Rohingyas) it was a religious issue that would

necessarily lead to the creation of a Dah-rul-Islam, or at least to being united with their brethren in the west. It also

aimed at the extirpation of the Arakanese or being forced them to migrate to the south where there were

overwhelming majority of Arakanese Buddhists. The events during the war contributed the Chittagonians‘

immigrants later became known as Rohingya fervent sense of alienation from the heterogeneous community of the

Arakan. Probably the dream of an independent country in this Muslim enclave was kept alive by these Chittagong

immigrants that give rise to the fate of Rohingyas now. Hence the first culprit was the British colonialist. Just like

the Arab-Israel conflict it was the British that started the flame of the conflict when it promised both to the Jews and

the Palestinians a homeland if they fought the Germans from their side.


82

4. The Third Cause of Statelessness

(No allegiance to the Union of Burma)

Arakan was actually an independent kingdom with a king of its own until the Myanmar king Bodawpaya

annexed the country in 1784 and inflicted much cruelty carrying away the pride of the Arakanese Buddhist, the

image of Mahar Myamunni.18

Several Arakan Nationalist ran away to India and when the British occupied Arakan

they came back to their native land. However, the British had already installed a Zamindary System in which the

Bengali landowners were given thousands of acres of arable land on ninety-year-leases.19

The Arakanese peasants

who fled the Burmese rule and came back home after British annexation were deprived of the land that they

formerly owned through inheritance. Nor did the Bengali zamindars (landowners) want the Arakanese as tenants on

their land. Hence there was much resentment by the local people. Thousands of Bengali peasants from Chittagong

District were brought to cultivate the soil.20

Most of the Bengali immigrants were influenced by the Fara- i-di

movement in Bengal that propagated the ideology of the Wahhabis of Arabia, which advocated settling ikhwan or

brethren in agricultural communities near to the places of water resources. The peasants, according to the teaching,

besides cultivating the land should be ready for waging a holy war upon the call by their lords.21

For the

convenience of Chittagonians seasonal laborers the Arakan Flotilla Company constructed a railway between

Buthidaung and Maungdaw in 1914. Their initial plan was to connect Chittagong by railway with Buthidaung, from

where the Arakan Flotilla steamers were ferrying to Akyab and other towns in central and southern Arakan. 22

After the third Anglo Burmese War, the county was finished as a sovereign state, on Feb 26th 1887 Burma

became part of the British India, and Arakan was absorbed into Bengal state , so these Bengali immigrants feel quite

at home in Arakan. So also the Tavoynian residing in of Tenasserim were placed under the Commissioner of Penang

(now Malaysia).23

However, the world was moving on. The First World War came in 1914 and some of the British

Burma troops saw action in Mesopotamia and many of the Burmese youth‘s eyes were opened and the nationalist

movement in Burma was germinating.

It should be noted that all the Chittagonians and all the Muslims are categorized as Mohamedan in the

census reports. There was an increase of 206.67 percent in Mahomedan population in the Akyab District and it was

clear that only a few numbers of the transient agricultural laborers went home after the plowing and harvesting

seasons and most of them remained in Arakan, making their homes.24

The heyday of the migration was in the second

half of the nineteenth century after opening of the Suez Canal, for the British colonialists needed more labor to

produce rice which was in growing demand in the international market. In the 1921 Census, many Muslims in

Arakan were listed as Indians.25

But the colonial admiration had repealed the traditional patron-client relationship in the Arakanese villages

and the unanimously elected village headman had little influence on the elected village council because of the

British government policy of forbidding the village headman to take part in the activities related to the nationalist

movements.26

The Buddhist monks were vigorously active in the movements just like today. On the other hand

British administration to a certain extent gave the Muslim village communities religious and cultural autonomy. 27

In 1931, the Simon Commission was appointed by the British Parliament to enquire the opinion of Burmese

people for the constitutional reforms and on the matter of whether Burma should be separated from Indian Empire.

The spokesperson of the Muslim League advocated for fair share of government jobs, ten percent representation in

all public bodies, and especially in Arakan the equal treatment for Muslims seeking agricultural and business

loans.28

But in education, the Chittagonians immigrants were left behind the Arakanese throughout the colonial

period. According to the census of 1901 only 4.5 percent of the Bengali Muslims were found to be literate while the

percentage for the Arakanese was 25.5. Smart reported that it was due to the ignorance of the advantages of the

education among the Chittagonian agriculturists. Especially Butidaung and Maungdaw were reported to be most

backward townships because the large Muslim population in that area mostly agriculturalists showed little interest in

education. In 1894 there were nine Urdur schools with 375 students in the whole district.29

However, towards the middle of twentieth century a new educated and politically conscious younger

generation had superseded the older, inactive ones. In the period of the independence movement in Burma in 1920s

and 1930s when Bogyoke Aung San and his colleagues were active in independence movement, the Muslims from

the Mayu Frontier were more concerned with the progress of Muslim League in India. . This clearly proved that

their mentality is not with the Union of Burma but rather with the Muslims of India and from this thesis alone they

did not qualify in the ethnic nationalities of the Union of Burma.30

Before the beginning of the Second World War a

political party, Jami-a-tul Ulema-e Islam was founded under the guidance of the Islamic scholars. Islam became the


83

ideological basis of the party.

31 The delegation went over to Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan,

commonly called as Quaid-e-Azam (the great leader) and requested Ali Jinnah to take this Muslim enclave of

Buthidaung, Maungdaw and Ratheedaung into East Pakistan, as India and Pakistan were partitioned officially on 15

August 1947. They adopted the policy of irredentism in favor of joining East Pakistan with the slogan, ―Pakistan

Jindabad,‖ (Victory to Pakistan).32

Ali Jinnah replied that he had got enough problems in fighting for the dignity of

Muslim of India and turned it down.33

Evidently the Chittagonian Muslims were haunted by the specter of their

future living under the infidel rule in the place where the baneful Arakanese are also living. This policy faded away

when they could not gain support from the government of Pakistan. It also clearly proved that the Rohingya have

no inclination to be in the Union of Burma and is not one of the ethnic tribes of the Union.34

5. The Fourth Cause of Statelessness

(The Mujahid/Rohingya Muslim Rebellion)

After the central government refused to grant a separate Muslim state in the two townships, Buthidaung

and Maungdaw that lie along the East Pakistani (present-day Bangladeshi) border, Chittagonian from North Arakan

declared the jihad on Burma. They called themselves Mujahid. The name means "the founder and defender of

Islamic law" in Sunni Islam. In the early years of independence i.e. before 50s the words ―Rohingya‖ was not

popular yet and instead use this word ―Mujahid‖. Their revolt was intended to convert northern Arakan, especially

Buthidaung and Maungdaw Townships, into Dar al-Islam, the region under Muslim sovereignty where the Islamic

law prevails. Today these Rohingya Organizations still see the territory as Dar al-Harb, the territory of the Holy

War, and they believe that it is their obligation to wage Jihad on the Union of Burma. During the World War II, the

Arakanese inhabitants of Buthidaung and Maungdaw were forced to leave their homes. Even though the British

administration was re-established after the war, the Arakanese were unable to return to their homes.35

This tantamount to a direct affront and open challenge to the lawful authority of the Burma Government by

the migrated Chittagonians Muslim Community of Buthidaung and Maungdaw e Townships whose economic

invasion of this country was fostered during the British regime and dawn upon the Burmese government that unless

it deal with firmly and severely this alien community will rise again. Prime Minister U Nu and the Supreme

Commander of the Burmese Army, Lieutenant General Smith Dun, (at that time Ne Win has not replaced General

Smith Dun yet) to Akyab in October of 1948. It illuminates that the local officials in East Pakistan provided

information and aid to the insurgents from across the border. The Sub-Divisional Officer and the Township Officer

from Cox's Bazaar reportedly supplied the Muslim guerrillas with arms and ammunition. The wounded rebels were

apparently able to obtain treatment from the hospital in Cox's Bazaar. According to the report of the Deputy

Commissioner of Chittagong Hill Tracts, both the commissioner and the Burmese officials were informed that the

two Mujahid leaders, Jaffar Meah and Omra Meah, were hiding in Balukhali village in East Pakistan, near to the

Burmese border.36

The main financial source of the Mujahid Party was the smuggling of rice from Arakan to East Pakistan.

Their actions were part of an encompassing strategy to prevent the government forces from enforcing the prohibition

on exporting rice. To solve the problem of this rice shortage in the Chittagong District of East Pakistan, regional

officials seem to have sought cooperation with the Mujahid leaders. For many years the Mujahid Party leaders

monopolized this smuggling of rice across the border. The main objective of the rebellion was to absorb the western

frontier of Burma into East Pakistan. On May 18, 1949, The Hindustan Standard newspaper, reported the following

news about the Mujahids:

"A dangerous aspect of this fighting is its international aspect: the Moslem insurgents have been carrying

the Pakistani flag, and many of them clamor for the incorporation of this end of Arakan with Pakistan. The

great majority of Arakan Moslems are said to be really Pakistanis from Chittagong, even if they have been

settled here for a generation. Out of the 130,000 here, 80,000 are still Pakistani citizens."

These guerrilla operations are less a Muslim insurrection against the government than "communal action" against

the Arakanese - a prolongation of the Muslim-Buddhist riots of 1942. The Moslems, natives of Chittagong in what is

now part of Pakistan - fear oppression by the Arakanese. These Muslims are intensely clannish less than a million

strong, hate their Buddhist kith and kin, and are afraid of losing their identity in the growing Chittagongese

population coming in every day. Neither trusts the other.

But the cooperation between Burma and Pakistan improved the situation at the border after the instructions

from Karachi were strictly enforced. In order to advance their joint operation and communications, an agreement

was reached for the establishment of a Pakistani Consulate in Akyab and a Burmese Consulate in Chittagong. The


84

Burmese Army mount a major offensive and all the towns and major cities under the control of the rebels were

recaptured. The Mujahid/Rohingya rebellion lasted one more decade until the Mujahid/Rohingya Party surrendered

in 1960. Then in 1962 the Tatmadaw (Burmese army) came to power with General Ne Win who embarked upon a

xenophobic policy of Myanmarnization with its Burmese Way to Socialism taking the country to the status of the

Least Developed Country of the world. All foreigners‘ particularly Indian origin whether Hindu or Muslim was

single out and deported to India and Pakistan.

6. East Pakistan Became Bangladesh

Then in 1971 came the Bangladesh War of Liberation (Bengali: Muktijuddho) which resulted in the

creation of Bangladesh as a sovereign state from East Pakistan. The war pitted East Pakistan and India against West

Pakistan and lasted over duration of nine months. It is one of the most violent wars of the 20th century and witness

large scale exodus of 10 million refugees and displaced 30 million. Obviously, many of those from Chittagong fled

to Arakan swelling the population of the existing Chittagonians and even after the war is over most of the people

went back a few remain as the grass is much greener on this side of the border. Soon the elite Chittagonians

immigrants began to complain that the term ―Chittagonian Bengali‖ had arbitrarily been applied to them however

the majority of the migrant Chittagonians were being illiterate agriculturalists in the rural areas still prefers their

identity as Bengali Muslims.

In 1973, Ne Win‘s Revolutionary Council sought public opinion for drafting a new Socialist Constitution.

The Muslims from the Mayu Frontier submitted a proposal to the Constitution Commission for the creation of

separate Muslim state or at least a division for them.37

Their proposal was again turned down. When elections were

held under the 1974 Constitution the Bengali Muslims from the Mayu Frontier Area were denied the right to elect

their representatives to the ―Pyithu Hlut-taw‖ (People‘s Congress). After the end of the Independence War in

Bangladesh some arms and ammunitions flowed into the hands of the young Muslim leaders from Mayu Frontier.

On 15 July 1972 a congress of all Rohingya parties was held at the Bangladeshi border to call for the ―Rohingya

National Liberation.‖38

This became the last straw for Dictator Ne Win, who launched the operation Na Gar Min (Dragon King)

on February 6, 1978 starting first in the village of Sakkipara in Akyab district, where there were mass arrest and

torture of alleged collaborators and sympathizers of the Mujahid rebels. Over three months, approximately 200,000

to 250,000 Muslims, consisting mainly Rohingya fled to neighboring Bangladesh, where the government of

Bangladesh offered them shelter in makeshift camps. The United Nations recognized them as refugees and began a

relief operation. Officially, this campaign aimed at 'scrutinising each individual living in the state, designating

citizens and foreigners in accordance with the law and taking actions against foreigners who have filtered into the

country illegally'. In practice, this meant mass killings of Rohingya civilians, rape, torture, religious persecution and

more. Rohingya children were killed for no greater an offense than the mother failing to show proper identity cards.

More than 200,000 Rohingyas fled the country into Bangladesh during this time.

The arrival of so many refugees in an overpopulated Bangladesh has strained the relations between the two

countries and Bangladesh govt. Appeal to the UN for assistance. 13 refugee camps were established

7. The Fifth Cause of Statelessness

(Raison d'être of Bangladesh Disowning the Rohingyas) During the Independence War of Bangladesh most of the Muslims in Arakan including several

Chittagonians supported West Pakistan. Naturally when Bangladesh gained independence Dhaka followed the

policy of disowning those immigrant Chittagonians. So the elite Chittagonians immigrants have had no choice but

to insist firmly on their identity as Rohingyas. A bilateral agreement between Burma and Bangladesh in July 1978

was concluded in which the Rohingya were repatriated and by 1979 more than 180,000 had returned to Burma. In an

attempt to improve the condition of the refugee the UNHCR spend $7 million and in 1982 new citizenship law was

promalgamated with three classes of citizenship and most of the Rohingyas were not qualified for it.

But it is a fact that Burma‘s successive military regimes persisted in the same policy of denying Burmese

citizenship to most of the Bengalis immigrants, especially in the frontier area. They stubbornly grasped the 1982

Citizenship Law that allowed only the ethnic groups who had lived in Burma before the First Anglo-Burmese War

began in 1824 as the citizens of the country. By this law those Muslims had been treated as aliens in the land they

have inhabited for more than a century.39

According to the 1983 census report all Muslims in Arakan constituted

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bengali_language

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rohingya_people

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Refugee

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85

24.3 percent and they all were categorized as Bangladeshi, while the Arakanese Buddhists formed 67.8 percent of

the population of the Arakan (Rakhine) State. 40

Bangladesh has justified the denial of sanctuary through cold, legalistic claims. ―Bangladesh never signed

any kind of international act, convention or law for allowing and giving shelter to refugees, and we are not bound to

provide shelter to the Rohingyas,‖ said Bangladeshis Foreign Minister, Dipu Moni while pointing out that

Bangladesh is among the world‘s poorest and most densely populated countries, that in 1978 and 1991 it sheltered

Rohingyas fleeing ethnic cleansing in Burma and that as it struggles to meet the aspirations of its 160 million

citizens, it cannot consider another ―temporary‖ influx of refugees. The UN and the international human rights

watch bodies pressure on Bangladesh to allow the Rohingyas in the country which is the easiest solution. Instead of

forcing the Burmese authorities, Human Rights Watch and UNHCR are urging the authorities of Bangladesh to

allow the Rohingyas. Bangladesh justifies that it has ample problems of its own and should not bear the burden of

another country‘s hatred.41

But the intelligence reports said that Bangladesh military rulers armed the Rohingyas to fight for a Muslim

state in northern Arakan, only provoking harsher retribution on the community.42

But as of, Bangladesh's Awami

League government sees them as Islamist extremists closer to their arch-rivals, the Jamaat-e-Islami. The United

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has been asked to shut down Rohingya refugee camps in southern

Bangladesh. 43

Rohingyas face a deep well of hatred within Burma, where nation-building has often meant cutting

segments of the population out of the civic fabric. They are officially stateless. It‘s a pity that Bangladesh, itself born

in 1971 amid a massive refugee crisis, should be so unwilling to help.

8. Xenophobic Myanmar Attitude

Xenophobic Myanmar attitude can be interpreted in Burmese as Mahar Myanmar (r[mjrefrm) literally

interpreted means we Myanmar are superior. This attitude is the basis of the ethnic cleansing policy implemented

by the Burmese administration since its inception. The civilian government of U Nu prior to the military coup of

1962 made an attempt to achieve homogeneity by imposing religious and cultural assimilation. In 1953 the ministry

of Religious and Culture was created to promote the process of assimilation and eventually in 1961 Buddhism was

declared a state religion.44

Buddha Bar Thar Myan Ma Lu Myo(Ak"Nbmomjrefrmvlrsdk;) meaning in Burmese

was Myanmar Buddhism race was the slogan. When General Ne Win came to power in 1962, he went a step further

by removing the rights and culture of the ethnic nationalities as a means of creating homogeneous unitary state. This

he made it by declaring the Myanmar language as the only official language to be used in the country and making

Myanmar as the medium of teaching in all levels of education from primary to University. No doubt the standard of

education fell. He also prohibited the right for the ethnic peoples to learn their own languages. So the contemporary

history of Burma both in the civilian rule of U Nu and Ne Win the national building were based on the notion of one

language, one language and one religion.

Hence the changing of the country‘s name from Burma to Myanmar was an important step in assimilating

the ethnic nationalities and it was done by force, and for the last half a century the army (Myanmar Tatmadaw) had

implemented by killing the ethnic nationalities, destroying their livelihood, using rape as a weapon, waging war on

ethic nationalities religion and culture by means of various persecution, destroying the identity of the ethnic

nationalities.

The latest being the New York-based rights group , Human Rights Watch (HRW) said the government and

security forces in Arakan State committed ―crimes against humanity‖ during clashes between majority Buddhists

and minority Muslims in June and October 2013 that left at least 180 people dead and 120,000 displaced.45

The

security forces back by community leaders and Buddhist monks to ―conduct coordinated attacks on Muslim

neighborhoods and villages‖. The government as usual practicing its policy of lying the very concept of truth

denies.46

However, the irony is that the government dared not allowed an international observer in less the truth be

known in spite of several videos released by the media including the BBC and VOA .

Under the pretext of nation building, successive administrations have not only violated the basic human

rights but also all categories of collective rights. Under cover of national sovereignty, the rights of self determination

are rejected and in the name of national integration the right to follow different religions to practice different

cultures, and to speak different languages are deprived and in the name of national assimilation the rights to uphold

different identities and traditions are denied.

On the whole the outlook toward this ethnic question evolves, progressive or regressive - depending on the

policy and behavior of Burma's main political player the generals are not adjusting their views toward ethnicity or

the manner in which they will debate with anyone on it.47

The ethnic nationalities of Burma are waging a war of

http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/populations/ctydensityh.htm

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/226-bangladesh-back-to-the-future.aspx?utm_source=bangladeshtweet&utm_medium=execsum&utm_campaign=twitter

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303822204577466013262277468.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

http://1971liberationwar.weebly.com/refugees.html

http://www.independentworldreport.com/2009/09/caught-between-a-crocodile-and-a-snake/


86

survival against the Orwellian type of dictatorship It is against what they call the three A's -- annihilation,

absorption, and assimilation. In fact, just entering its seventh decade, it's the world's longest-running war for

autonomy.

So what is the rational of these Burmese leaders that harbours the Maha Myanmar mentality? They

erroneously construe that in the process of nation building they cannot accommodate other cultures, religious and

ethnic groups. The status of a fully recognized citizen can be attained only in integration even though they can

tolerate non integrated ethnic nationalities as guests but not as equal citizens.

If a cultural ethnic nationalities demands political recognition and identity, the state must reject that claim.

Because it is unable to accommodated a fragmented political identity, it will ultimately come into conflict with its

ethnic nationalities. Either the ethnic nationalities must be integrated within the majority culture destroying their

original cultural roots, or they must be denied the opportunity to enhance their cultural identity through political

means. A fragmented political identity is rejected as a solution, because it is a threat to unity, homogeneity and the

roots of the state‘s existence. They seem to be inspired by Pakistan and Malaysia that make Muslim and Nepal that

make Hindu as the state religion. Hence this is the basic philosophy of the Mahar Myanmar mentality which is

the crux of the Burmese problem.

To be very frank currently there are two types of Myanmar, Democracy loving Myanmar who really

believes in the Union of Burma and those Mahar Myanmar (r[mjrefrm )who still believes and interpret history

only from their narrow nationalistic Myanmar perspective. The latter is both hegemonic and myopically nationalistic

believe that linear progression of Myanmar, save the colonial interlude of a century from a Buddhist kingdom

originating in Pagan to today's modern nation-state are considered as a Mahar Myanmar. These Mahar Myanmar

imagine itself as a historically cohesive nation whose organizational integration with the ethnic nationalities in the

peripheries only needs to be completed either democratically or by force. The Juntas better known by their acronym

as the Care Taker Government, Revolutionary Council, BSPP (Burmese Socialist Programme Party) and later as

SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council), change to State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), and

in 2010 became the quasi civilian government still harbours a Mahar Bamar/Myanmar mentality somewhat akin to

Adolf Hitler‘s Nazi theory of the superiority of the Aryan race. Their philosophy is that Myanmar has a lineage

since the creation of the world.

But it has to be admitted that not only these Mahar Myanmar believe in this approach but also propagate

and interpreted in such a way that the majority of the international community who scarcely know where Burma is,

came to have a vague idea on this approach. Unless one is a scholar in the study of Burmese history, one could not

comprehend the general outline of the Burmese problem and the current crisis. Hence this gives the wrong

perception of the Burmese problem.

If one were to read the mindset of the Myanmar ethnic nationality, is that most of them construe the other

ethnic nationalities especially those who are residing on the hills such as Shan, Chin, Kachin, Karenni/Kayah are

wild heathen and such a categorization did not exclude their eventual incorporation into civilization by

acculturations.48

Hence it was not ethnic diversity but cultural practice which divided people socially not necessarily

politically. The Myanmar ethnic also looks down on the Arakanese and Mon. They are not categorize as hill people

as they worship the same Theravada Buddhism but the Myanmar view that these Arakan are Mon are the conquered

race and people and is not worth the political thought. What more prove is wanted when both the Arakanese and

Mon were not invited to the 1947 Panglong Conference and was taken for granted as part of Myanmar. This is the

essence if not crux of the Mahar Myanmar mentality.

Hence in the case of the Union of Burma, firstly it can be explained as the capture of the state by the

majority Myanmar ethnic group as arising out of the impact of the introduction of the modern state system upon

which the authority structure of the Myanmar society stands. This definitely, dispels and dislocated the elites and the

masses of the existing system many of who belong to the ethnic nationalities. 49

Secondly the domination of the state by one ethnic group the Myanmar ethnic group that give rises to the

―Ethnocratic Tendencies‖ in which the state act as an agency for that community in promoting its ethnic values as

the core component of the nationalist ideology.

Thirdly, ethnic struggles are explainable as the reaction to this disruptive penetration of the peripheral

communities by the weak ethnocratic state. This penetration provoked the collapse of the old authority structure

existing before the 2nd

world war in the British era and dislocated the old societal cohesion. It was replaced by the

new emergent elites with new levels and forms. This is the apex of the ethnic nationalities struggle against the

Myanmar ethnic dominated state.


87

Will history treat dictatorships with kindness and understanding? Will the future hold sympathy, garlands

and accolades for the successive Burmese Juntas, now that it is changing to democracy? 50

A military dictatorship is

best viewed as a transitory phenomenon, in the manner that certain weeds flourish briefly when the topsoil is freshly

disturbed. But there is a limit to how long topsoil is freshly disturbed, as against being cultivated. Sturdy plants

inevitably displace the transient species. This order of succession of plant communities is immutable in nature.

Ecosystem analogies are appropriate to understand the phenomena of the Junta, as its fate is also tied to the futures

of disturbed conditions. The Myanmar military administrations are ruthlessly repressive on people and exploitative

on resources. It has uncontrolled growth. If the Military administrations machine were compared to the

thermodynamic phenomena, the primary characteristic would be that it is extremely energy intense. The generals

rule is that the more energy intense. An occurrence is, the greater the problems of sustaining it will become, and the

shorter the expected life-span will tend to be. The Junta‘s phenomenon is a turbulence or conflagration that is

doomed to burn out and to completely collapse on it. This is absolutely inevitable.51

It was on this background that the Muslim enclave where the Rohingya resides is a concentration of nearly

ninety percent of the area‘s population, the distinguishing characteristics of their own culture and the Islamic faith

formed an ethnic and religious minority group in the western fringe of the country which is almost exclusively

Buddhist. For successive generations their ethnicity and Islam have been practically not distinguishable. 52

Hence

when it is placed in the backdrop of Myanmar Buddhist it became problematic.

On 12 July 2012 the president join forces with anti-Rohingya extremists when he said that the ―only

solution‖ would be to expel the Rohingya to other countries or to camps overseen by the UN High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR)—undoubtedly a reference to UNHCR camps in Bangladesh. ―We will send them away if any

third country would accept them,‖ Thein Sein said. ―This is what we are thinking is the solution to the issue.‖

With such kind of Burmese mentality it will be very difficult to solve this Rohingya problem. The UNHCR quickly

rejected the proposal, saying, ―As a refugee agency we do not usually participate in creating new refugees.‖ By

these words the world needs to educate the Burmese government of how to solve this problem in a humane, if not in

the real Lord Buddha‘s way and not as some of the Burmese Buddhist monks‘ way even though the swastika of the

Hitler‘s Nazi flag and the Buddhist emblem is almost the same it turns in different directions.

9. Chance to highlight Rohingya’s Plight

As describe earlier since the military take over the country in 1962s, Burma under General Ne Win has

launched its vigorous ethnic cleansing policy. Its aim is to create a ―pure‖ society of Myanmar race. The Junta

considered all the ethnic nationalities to be "undesirable" population residing in the country due to religious or

language, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these. But the problem in Burma is

that the ethnic nationalities have been residing in their specific area long before the Myanmar race came into

Burma.53

The central government dominated by the Myanmar continues to launch its vigorous ethnic cleansing

policies is everybody‘s knowledge.

The hidden purpose of ethnic cleansing is to remove the conditions for potential and actual opposition, by

physically removing any potentially or actually hostile ethnic communities. Thus ethnic cleansing in the broad sense

is the forcible deportation of a population which is defined as a crime against humanity under the statutes of the

International Criminal Court. In 1985 Anti Slavery International (ASI) was the first Non-Burmese organization to

raise the issue of concern about Burma at the United Nations. In March 1987 in response to growing reports of an

alarming catalogue of human rights abuses by the Tatmadaw, ASI sponsored a visit to Europe of a delegation from

the Karen National Union. This was the first time since Burma gain independence in Jan 1948 the ethnic nationality

delegation from one of Asia most war torn countries had entered such an international forum where its delegation

speak to the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva.

But after the 1988 third military coup,54

the ethnic cleansing of the Burmese regime has become a

worldwide international concern and experiences of other multi ethnic countries, such as Afghanistan, Yugoslavia,

Burundi, and Rwanda. Human rights abuses in ethnic nationality areas are the single most important cause of

conflict-induced internal displacement in Burma and the scale of atrocities committed by the Burmese army is

unparalleled within Asia. Elsewhere in Burma, human violations led to the displacement of large numbers of civilian

every year as the central government launched military operations well, but no firm estimate exists on the extent of

the problem. Displacement due to large-scale development projects is also on the increase, one current example

being the forced relocation of dozens of villages along the Salween River. In addition, hundreds of thousands more

have been displaced in schemes to resettle the urban poor. Hence, everybody knows that the military Juntas of

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court


88

Burma has vigorously carried on their ethnic cleansing policy all these years and since Rohingya are not even

recognize as one of the ethnic nationalities has embarked on their persecution.

In the abortive 1988 Democracy Uprising, the persecution in Burma capture the world media headlines

followed by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi attaining the Nobel Peace Prize, and so it was during the height of the ethnic

cleansing that the intellectuals of the Chittagonian migrants sympathizers together with some Bangladeshis

intelligentsia and political elite of these immigrants embarked on the identity of Rohingya and blew it to

unprecedented level what in Burmese we say (awmrD;avmifawma=umifvufckyfwD; ) meaning the wild cat take

the advantage when a wild fire broke out as it can easily pick out its prey. 55

In fact the term Rohingya is an old wine in a new bottle. What the Rohingya expert Jacques P Leider label

as

―An old noun in a new label. Old exceedingly rare in both Western and Asian sources---- unfamiliar to a

large part of the Muslim community of Arakan that is supposed to name.‖ 56

Even as I am writing this, most if not all of the Rohingya highlighting case was done in Al Jeezera (a Muslim News

Agency) by the Bangladeshi Professors, so it is no wonder that a Bengali will lobby for the Bengali immigrant and

supported by the Muslim News Agencies was very obvious and no wonder is abhorred by the Rakhine Buddhist.

The military regime launched another military operation mounted by the Burmese military in 1991-92

aiming at these Chittagonians immigrants, where more than 250,000 fled again to Bangladesh and the UN set up

some 20 refugee camps. The return of these refugees was again carried out by bilateral agreement. But by 1993

Burma has allowed the presence of UNHCR. The Arakanese construe that they fabricated the name Rohingya to

take advantage of the prevailing situation of the country especially in Arakan state, obviously any fabrication or

distortion done knowingly and willfully is a crime and is punishable by law. It was the common people that fled by

the thousands in 1996-97 and this time Bangladesh forcibly repatriated them until the UN intervene. As of 1999

some 22,000 refugees are still in Bangladesh.

Subsequently when the military Junta allowed the registration of the political parties they asked for their

parties to be recognized under the name ―Rohingya.‖ Their demand was turned down and they changed tactics and

formed a party, the National Democratic Party for Human Rights (NDPHR) that won in four constituencies in 1990

elections as eleven candidates of the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD) were elected to the legislature. However,

the Elections Commission abolished both the ALD and the NDPHR in 1991. Some of the party members went

underground and into exile. Recently, the main objectives of the movement of some groups have been to gain the

recognition of their ethnic entity in the Union of Burma and to obtain the equal status enjoyed by other ethnic

groups, even though some elements have adopted the radical idea of founding a separate Muslim state. The

following are the Rohingya organizations currently active on the Burma-Bangladesh border:-

1. RSO (Rohingya Solidarity Organization)

2. ARIF (Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front)

3. RPF (Rohingya Patriotic Front)

4. RLO (Rohingya Liberation Organization)

5. IMA (Itihadul Mozahadin of Arakan) 57

10. Dissecting Rohingya Community

(The elites and the mass)

There are two categories of Rohingyas, one, the majority if not nearly 90% of them are farmers, retailers,

petty traders and the working people most of whom can speak only Bengali and little or no education or knowledge

about Burma or the world. They lead a simple, contented life and want to live peacefully in their own place and have

little or no ambition, quiet happy with their way of life and the majority of them have no qualms when people called

them as Bengali Muslims or Kalar, the name which they have inherited traditionally indicating the place where they

came from. 58

A great many of them have not heard the word Rohingya and did not have the slightest idea what is all

about driven out of their traditional homes, or why they cannot live their peaceful life anymore as their predecessors.

The only thing they know is that they have become unbearable because of the Burmese security forces and the

unjust laws which were bestowed on them by the Burmese military in cooperation with the Rakhine neighbours.

The other less than 5% of the people are the elites and the radicals living either in Bangladesh, India,

Middle East and the West as most of the activists are. They want to have a finger in a big pie called the Union of

Burma, if not in the world. Considering themselves as distinct from the neighbouring Rakhines the want to make

their presence felt, and their golden chance came when General New Win started its ethnic cleansing policy not only

to the Rohingyas but to every ethnic who is not Myanmar. As describe earlier the educated one began to call


89

themselves as Rohingya which the majority of the Burmese construe that it was first used only at the beginning only

in the 50s, was now very much highlighted.

Besides the big question that can be asked to the majority of the self style Rohingyas is what they have

done during their stay in Burma? Have they worked persistently and prominently for their people? Now, only in

Diaspora they are making a hue and cry with the help of their Bangladeshi counterparts. It seems that these self style

Rohingyas aided by their Bangladeshi counterparts are more of a problem than a solution.

In fact during the civilian government of U Nu, the first President Sao Shwe Thaik has recognize these

Muslims as one of the ethnic races but not confine to Rohingya only, many Muslims like Kaman and others are and

were bona fide ethnic Muslims and have not problems living in Arakan their traditional homeland up to this day.

Only when the new foreign word of “Rohingya” was coined it became problematic. Thus their demand for the

recognition of their rights sounds a direct challenge to the right of autonomy and the myth of survival for the

Arakanese majority in their homeland. 59

For example in the Rohingya Manifesto of the Arakan Rohingya National

Organization (ARNO) they refer to Arakan as Rohang indicating that Rakhine word which is universally accepted as

Arakanese does not exist.60

In other words to an average man it can be interpreted that all Rakhine people who is

acknowledge by the other ethnic nationalities and Myanmar must be compelled to call them as Rohang.

On the other hand most of these Diaspora Rohingya are radicals and know only what they want resembling

something like an empty vessels that makes the most sound e.g. they are suspected to be the ones that put up the fake

pictures of Tibetan earthquake victims as Rohingyas being killed by the Rakhine Buddhists circulated on social

networks is but one example of how these zealots Diaspora Rohingya ended up causing them more harm than good. 61

These Diaspora Rohingya highlight the Rohingya case so much that groups hitherto unknown suddenly

noticed the existence of the Rohingya crisis and one of them was the Taliban. A spokesman for Taliban made threats

to Burma over the treatment of the Rohingya, and an Al Qaeda spokesperson later did the same. Having these

extreme terrorist organisations speaking up for the Rohingya played exactly into the hands of the racist nationalists

in Burma who are now busy stirring up anti-Muslim and anti-Rohingya sentiments. Already from the beginning of

the violence these nationalists have been calling Rohingya as terrorists, now link Rohingya with terrorists Al Qaeda. 62

In other countries, such as Belgium, extremist Muslim organisations supporting the cause of the Rohingya

has led some in that country to be cautious about supporting the Rohingya, for fear of being associated with this

extremism. On January 19th

Iran‘s Press TV quoted an Iranian MP saying an agreement had been reached for Iran to

set up a refugee camp in Burma for Rohingya people displaced by violence last year. It also reported that Iran was

putting forward a proposal on the Rohingya situation. Help from an authoritarian regime like Iran‘s, a major violator

of human rights of its own people, is an example of the kind of help the Rohingya could do without.63

Once and for

all, especially to the people of the Burma and the world Rohingya is somewhat related to terrorism.

Another aspect is that very few people except in the major cities of Burma knew about them. To them they

are just some Kalars causing trouble and let the government, whoever is in power, takes the necessary actions. To

the majority of the people of Burma the word Rohingya is an alien word trying to bestowed on them and some sort

of Islamic imperialism and have little or no sympathy for them. In fact they are being suspected of drawing up not

only the other local Muslims on their side but also the international Islamic community such as Arab and IOC for

help as they go shouting out for help and justice.

Besides most of these so called self appointed Rohingya leaders are radicals and extremist and have no

inkling for compromise or vision for the long term.64

In fact they are the ones that are exploiting the innocent

Rohingyas masses. I have very serious doubts whether they will ever go back to their people to serve once

everything is settling down. One of the major problems is how to placate these self appointed Rohingya that has no

relation with the mass of the Rohingya except to exploit them. Their motto is the name of Rohingya first where they

will have their say and the people of Rohingya became only second.

11. Rohingya‟s Identification with the Burmese Ethnic?

If the Rohingya belongs to the Burmese ethnic group, the big question is why does it not join or identifies

itself with the other ethnic movements when it is known that Burma has embarked upon the ethnic cleansing policy?

Way back in the 70s to be exact on May 10, 1976 at Manerplaw, the National Democratic Front (NDF) was

established by 12 different Ethnic political parties and organizations, such as the Arakan, Chin, Karen, Karenni,

Kachin, Lahu, Mon, Pa-O, Palaung, Shan and WA, but the Rohingya did not take part or even make an attempt to


90

identify itself with the persecuted ethnic nationalities of Burma. The conspicuous aspect of the Rohingya if

compared with the other ethnic nationalities is that they don‘t have a liberated area.

It is to be remember that NDF is the first and most successful union of all of the ethnic groups who are

working together to develop the best strategy for a Federal Union and topple military regime. The NDF aims at

equality right and self-determination right for all ethnic nationals and the establishment of a Federal Union based on

democratic principles. Its aim is as follows:-

1. All ethnic nationals must enjoy political equality, regardless of the size of their populations, advancement

and backwardness, in order to establish genuine national unity;

2. A state should be established for the Myanmar ethnic national in order to ensure the equality principle of

ethnic nationals in Burma and self-determination right;

3. Ethnic conflicts originating from political causes could only be resolved by political means and not by

military means, which has been the course successive Burmese regimes have been pursuing; and

4. The military regime attempting to resolve the conflict only by the military means should be overcome and

for that the democratic forces must be organized for united struggle against the military regime.65

The NDF‟s principles are for the betterment of the ethnic nationals and uphold national democratic principles and

cooperate with any organizations or individual which promote World peace and oppose dictatorship and is against

any system that suppresses multi-ethnic nationals‘ unity. The NDF observes international standards as well as the

value of local traditions whilst realizing its aims and objectives. It vowed to uphold equality, democracy, mutual

understanding and cooperation; and that any disagreement would be resolved through peaceful negotiation.

Twelve years after NDF was formed there was a democratic uprising in Burma known as the 8888 revolution

where the people of all walks of life participated, and most of the pro democracy students run away to the

peripherals of Burma. So the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) was founded November 1988 it includes the

National Democratic Front (NDF), the All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF), the Committee for

Restoration of Democracy in Burma, (CRDP, a Burmese Diaspora pro democracy group) the All Burma Young

Monks‘ Union (ABYMU), the Chin National Front (CNF) and many other groups; the aim of DAB is to free Burma

from the Burmese Junta and to establish peace, human rights and democracy. Again here we did not see any

semblance of Rohingya.

With a full support of the National Democratic Front, and the Democratic Alliance of Burma, the Burmese

exiled government better known as the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, NCGUB was

formed on December 18, 1990. However it leaves out the most important organization, i.e. the main opposition the

NLD, the National League for Democracy as several members including Dr Sein Win, the first cousin of Daw Aung

San Suu Kyi. So it become necessary again to form another United Front that shall include leaders from both

democratic forces and ethnic nationalities, to struggle against military dictatorship not only for democratic rights and

human rights but also for self-determination for ethnic nationalities. So In order to fulfil and realize this political

demand, the National Council of the Union of Burma, NCUB was finally formed on September, 1992, including

NLD (Liberated Area). But conspicuously Rohingya was absent. Thus it did not get the support of the struggling lot

of the Burmese ethnic nationalities which constitutes nearly 50% of the population of Burma. It seems that Rohingya

has alienated itself either from the majority Myanmar or the Non-Myanmar, the ethnic nationalities. In fact some

attempts were made by the Rohingya to join the opposition but was blocked by the Arakan. This compels both the

Juntas and the opposition that Rohingya is an alien race to Burma.

12. Rohingyas and the Burmese Muslims

Ethnic cleansing in Burma became more intensified after the democracy uprising of 1988 and Muslim were

no exception. Many of these Burmese Muslims fled to the Thailand-Burma border area and when I visited the Mae

La Refugee camp I was rather surprise to see 4 Masjid (Mosque) in that camp alone. I discovered that the Muslim

sector of the refugee populations is a significant and distinct minority centred, for the most part, in the Tak camps –

namely, Mae La, Umpiem, Mai La Oo and Nu Po; with a very small community also in Mae Ra Ma Luang.

Muslims have been part of the refugee setting on the Thailand Burma border since the first caseloads

arrived in 1984. 66

Despite strongly conservative elements within the Buddhist, Christian and Islamic faiths

represented within the populations, religious tolerance was, to a large extent, a universal facet in the refugee camps

as well as in Burma.

The All Burma Muslim Union (ABMU), formed in 1983, had its own battalion of troops and fought side by

side together with the KNLA (Karen National Liberation Army). After the outbreak of anti-Muslim riots in

Martaban, Moulmein and other towns in lower Burma, the Muslim Liberation Organisation of Burma (MLOB) was


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formed. Both the ABMU and MLOB are ‗active members‘ of the DAB.

67Yet Rohingya never identifies itself with

these Muslim groups to join the ethnic resistance. They are simply aloof and alien to the Burmese scene and no

wonder nobody in Burma accepted them.

From 1995-1998, Muslim communities, especially those close to markets, were targets of cross-border

attacks by Burma Army units and their proxies and in 1997 some 10,000 Muslims from Burma take refuge in

Thailand.68

This was confirmed when a member of a British human rights organisation who visited several camps

early in the year reported that ―10,000 Muslims from all over Burma now live in the border refugee camps‖. 69

Human Rights Watch reported that ―a disproportionately high number of Muslims joined ethnic Karen refugees

fleeing Papun and Dooplaya Districts during 1997, and that ―Muslim refugees reported that soldiers had destroyed

their mosques and schools and had ordered them to convert to Buddhism or leave the country‖.70

Muslims born and bred in Karen State who have fled to Thailand due to human rights violations associated

with the systematic oppression of, and specific operations against ethnic communities aligned to ethnic resistance

movements in Eastern Burma. In the main, they identify themselves as Karen Muslims or ―Karen Muslims‖

("K'Nyaw Thoo" in Karen) and closely associate themselves with the wider Karen struggle for recognition and

justice.71

This self-alignment is widely-held, as illustrated by a UNHCR survey, But the Rohingyas from western Burma, and who fled to Thailand due to a varying mix of economic

restrictions and associated human rights violations who has hitherto spent little or no time in Thailand were widely

engaged in trade, retail and service activities within the refugee communities, and more closely identify themselves

to their Indo/ Bengali ancestry. Generally, the main influx of this sector entered the camps during the 1990s and

early 2000s. These Rohingyas Muslims are not at all interested in identifying themselves with the other ethnic

groups even though they are refugees from the same country.

The other aspects which I also discovered in my research is that that even though there are several ethnic

groups in Arakan state such as Rakhine, Chin, Mro, Chakma, Khaman, Dainet and Mramagyi, Khaman adhere to

the Muslim faith and yet they seldom have any problem with the Rakhine. Hence we have to find out why Rohingya

was single out? Are they really alien?

13. Refusal of Accepting the Lingua Franca

For decades these ill-fated people calling themselves as Rohingya have been shunned, browbeaten and

subjected to ghastly physical and emotional abuse by the Burmese Military Juntas which indefatigably maintains,

the fact they are Bengali-Muslims who verbally communicate in a local dialect of Bengali is raison d'être –as more

often than not refused to speak the lingua franca which most of the ethnic nationalities of Burma do and stay in the

Union of Burma. Most of the ethnic nationalities residing in the Union of Burma can at least understand, if not speak

the Burmese language, as it is accepted as a lingua franca and this make it one of the most conspicuous aspects of

not accepting as one of them. It is also construe that the Bengali language which the Rohingya speaks, just like any

other Indian subcontinent language is not a Tibeto-Burman language.72

However, Burmese is spoken as a second language by most educated members of other ethnic groups

including the Rohingya elites, but some of those groups residing in remotes parts of Burma have little contact with

the national language and it seems that Rohingya is included in it. But as it stands today the majority of the ethnic

nationalities have recognized the need of the common language, if they were to continue to stay in the Genuine

Union of Burma and have accepted the Burmese language as a Lingua Franca a common language among them. To

deal not only with the Myanmar group but also to communicate with the other ethnic groups they were being forced

to use Burmese language. But Rohingya are not in this category. One of their justifications is that because General

Ne Win had kept them so isolated that they don‘t have any chance to communicate with the majority of the people

who speaks Burmese.

14. National Identity Crisis

The Rohingya crisis needs to be view from the perspective of modern Union of Burma since its founding is

still faced with national identity crisis, the word ―Burma‖ or ―Myanmar‖ still cannot be decided although the world

including the United Nations has to acquiesce to the word ―Myanmar‖ for obvious reasons. It has been argued by the

military that ―Burma‖ refers only to the majority Myanmar population, whereas ―Myanmar‖ is more inclusive and

therefore, more appropriate because it refers to all the peoples of Myanmar. Ironically, Burmese nationalist fighting

British colonialism in 1936, argued the reverse. Even in the contemporary history of Burma, Bogyoke Aung San, the

architect of modern Burma, (the father of the Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Burmese Nobel laureate and leader of the pro

democracy movement) who initiated the independence movement founded Doh Bama Asaiyone and not Doh

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Myanmar Asaiyone. The nationalists of the 1930s has emphasis has insisted that the word Burma is more

appropriate than Myanmar. Therefore, as far as the non-Myanmar is concerned, the real question is not what the

country is called but what political system will be decided for the non-Myanmar.

The word Myanmar is used because most of the Burmese Generals belong to this major race called

Myanmar and Myanmarnization over the other ethnic races is seen as a prelude to help justify their grip to power.

This is the embryo and crux of why ethnic cleansing against the ethnic races, especially to Karen, Kachin and Shan,

not to mention the Rohingya are still going on up to this day. It is somewhat similar to the Khmer Rouge changing

the name of Cambodia to Kampuchea, or the Sinhalese chauvinist who changed from Ceylon to Sri Lanka leaving

out the Tamils with tragic consequences.

The word Myanmar is not only chauvinistic but is synonymous with gross human rights violations. So if

one has democratic ideals in his heart should refrain calling the word Myanmar and continue to call Burma until

such time when human right prevail and democracy is obtained in Burma and the consensus of the people is reached

over the word Burma or Myanmar. This will also proves that dictators cannot change the name of the country and

forced the world to recognize it, no matter what justification they give.

In the Burmese language, Burma is known Myanmah or Bamar depending on the register used. The

changing of English versions of many place names in the country along with it, such as its former capital city from

"Rangoon" to "Yangon" has a connotation of Myarmarnization from the top-down program of political and cultural

reform. The Junta did not want ethnic names. Thus Pegu became Bago. In fact it was a Mon name called Utha Pegu

name from a Shieldrake bird and Nyaung Shwe was Yawnghwe in Shan language and the name was taken via

phonetics and, Mongnai become Moe Nae, Mong means town in Shan and the Burmese interpreted it as Moe which

means rain. This kind of Myanmarnization does not augur well for the genuine Pyidaungsu (Union).

Most opposition groups including the Diaspora groups and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, however, have rejected

such explanations, partly because they believe name changes must be democratically approved, and, partly, because

many believe that the Myanmar change is part of what the Dutch anthropologist Gustaaf Houtman has called a

policy of ‗Myanmafication‘.73

In essence, many non-Myanmar leaders regard this as Myanmarnization by another

name, and the latest stage in the sidelining of ethnic nationality cultures and promotion of a singular identity for the

country. In the process, it can be argued that Burma has taken on the form of an ‗ethnocratic‘ state, dominated by

Myanmar culture and people. 74

Their clarion call for deeper understanding of the crisis is not only confined to the Rohingya plight but also

of the contemporary history of Burma and national identity crisis of Burma, a resource rich country hem in between

the two giant neighbours of India and China whose combine population exceeds half of the world. Bangladesh alone

has more than three times the population of Burma while Burma‘s area is 5 times bigger than that of Bangladesh.75

These geo-strategic figures, together with their contemporary histories and attitudes of the people residing in that

place will delve deep into the psyche and the rationale of the ruling regime as well as that of the numerous ethnic

nationalities of Burma which will be helpful in deciphering the possible answer to this crisis. Even today Daw Aung

San Suu Kyi has said that ―Burma must decide for itself whether or not to grant citizenship to the Muslim minority

Rohingya, ―but she added that the government should listen to foreign experts and uphold international standards in

its citizenship laws.‖76

The Burmese military Juntas are not shy about their ethnic cleansing, since their inception in 1962 but in

Arakan state of Western Burma what is raison d'être that single out Rohingya leaving the other seven ethnic

minorities groups must be studied deeply.

Today the term ethnic nationalities no longer conveys a profound meaning‘, the state-controlled media has

claimed.77

‗Thanks to the unity and farsightedness of our forefathers, our country has existed as a united and firm

Union and not as separate small nations for over 2,000 years‘, the SPDC chairman General Than Shwe, erroneously

claimed in a 2002 address to the University for Development of National Races.78

This clearly depicts that the

Tatmadaw identified itself with the Myanmar group and bent on continuing the ethnic cleansing.

In fact the military officials have gone so far as to proclaim that the present government – through its

ceasefire policies of ‗national reconsolidation‘ – marks only the fifth ‗unified era‘ in the country‘s history: the fourth

being under Aung San 79

. All, official publications say, are ethnic Myanmar.80

In recent years, Burma‘s academics

have begun to look into these issues. Thant Myint-U, a Mahar Myanmar for example, has identified how the British,

while leaving many ethnic societies untouched, not only abolished the traditional institutions of power among the

Myanmar majority but also undermined any modernizing influences that sought to arise from within the royal court

system. Only the Buddhist Sangha (clergy) continued to any extent uninterrupted to the present. This suppression,

he argued, resulted in a legacy of ‗weak‘ institutions after independence and a vacuum which the Tatmadaw came to

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Register_(linguistics)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_(political)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yangon


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fill through another colonial legacy: a ‗Burmese ethnic nationalism‘ that evolved in the independence struggle,

based on ‗memories‘ of a former Burman polity at Ava, rather than on ‗a newer identity which would incorporate

the divers peoples inhabiting the modern state‘.81

It has also left an unhelpful historical narrative, rarely challenged

by leaders in the military or democratic opposition, of a successful war fought against colonial government by

Myanmar nationalists who then simply needed to unite with other indigenous ethnic groups to restore a historic

Myanmar state. He could not even comprehend that it is a Pyidaungsu a union of volunteers to form the Union of

Burma to get independence from the colonial power and as a test case would join the Myanmar ethnic group how

can an average Myanmar could think about it?

The military likes to say that there are 135 races or tribes in Burma implying that it is impossible to cater to

everyone and therefore, it is necessary to have a strong military to hold the country together. In fact 65 of the so

called 135 races are all from the Chin State, which makes up about 3% of the population and they live in an area that

makes up about 5%of the whole nation. In other words, the military is exaggerating the problem. According to

the current Junta, people who speak different dialects are classified as being of a different race. 82

It would be like

saying that somebody from Oslo is of a different race from somebody from Bergen. We all have differences but both

are of the same race.

A nation and a national identity are the outcomes of a process combining historical memory, cultural and

religion-dominated discourses, ontological experiences and rationalized action; they are not natural properties

primordialized in groups and individuals, although such claim of primordial attachment often are politically

important. Their representations are the result of political conjunctures and the distribution of power, and their

classification are always contested and reformulated.

Burma is located in a strategic location of India and China and the latter is seeking a way out to the Indian

Ocean, while the US wants a partner to balance China. What more, Burma has attracted some radical Islamic ideas?

Just before the riots in Rakhine State, Muslim insurgents were given a full autonomy opportunity in a milestone

agreement with Manila over Mindanao in the Philippines. The Muslim uprisings in Thailand and Bangladesh have

also concurred. Maybe all these could not be just coincidences but it plays an important part in the psyche of an

average Burmese. It must also be considered that after an Arab Spring, radicals have a chance to switch their

strategies and would probably be hunting for easier targets like Burma, where there is a chance as Burma is trying to

shake off the shackles of military dictatorship.83

Contemporary Burma is located in a contradictory and complex place- at the juncture between the

competing forces of globalization and localism, between the forces of Western capitalism and ―the Burmese way‖ to

development, and at the intersection of competing and sometimes contradictory notions of who, and indeed who and

what may constitute a modern Burmese polity. These contradictions and tensions are not exclusive to Burma, but

can be seen in conflicts within and between nation-states all over the world. Some social theorists argue that this

tension between an ever tightening of global interconnectedness, simultaneously with a fragmentation of social

relations in and between people in their local communities is the underlying and central theme in world politics at

the end of the millennium. With this in mind, where do we imagine Burma?

Buddhist monk-led demonstrations against the Muslim Rohingya are attempts to form a national identity on

Burmese Buddhist chauvinism.84

The monks were supporting a suggestion by President Thein Sein that the

Rohingya Muslim minority, numbering close to a million, should be segregated and deported. These generals are

considered monk killers but the quasi military government have successfully refashioned themselves as defenders of

Buddhist faith. Buddhism has been influenced by a racist nationalism that occasionally re-surfaces.

―In this particular instance it seems to be a case where there is a lot of debate

about what constitutes Burmese identity. And, the saying, you know, ‗to be Burmese is to be Buddhist‘ is

one that was first articulated in the early 1910s when the initial struggles for independence became and it

was a way of asserting Burmese identity vis-à-vis British colonial rule.‖ 85

Buddhism is treated as the defacto state religion, with a special recognition in the constitution, they don‘t have any

written laws and regulations, but practically, in the military if you are a Christian or if you are a Muslim you won‘t

be promoted more than colonel ranks. You won‘t be a senior leader in the military. Burma is fostering a xenophobia

that, if left unchecked, could get out of control somewhat similar to the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. While attempts at

achieving this unity have become increasingly brutal and repressive of Burma‘s complex ethnic (and political)

diversity, in recent times there has been a shift away from the ethnic nationalities demands for self determination

and autonomous space, to an sense that the current crisis can be resolve, not through armed struggle but by a

reconciliation process. A genuine willingness to embark on a political process whereby peace can be restored to

Burma, and a process for determining reconciliation, restoring confidence and negotiating difference must be


94

encouraged at all levels. In addition, the healing and unifying forces of politically engaged Buddhism can play a

pivotal role in bringing about the necessary change in Burma required for a genuine national reconciliation process

to begin. International pressure must continue to be maintained on the regime, as well as on opposition forces, to

carefully address and resolve these issues.

15. Why did the Rohingya Flee?

The root causes of the humanitarian crisis in Northern Arakan State and the driving force behind refugee

exoduses lie in the Burmese government‘s policies of exclusion and discrimination against the Rohingya. The

combination of abuses -- from the denial of legal status to restriction of movement and economic constraints --

creates food insecurity and makes life in Arakan unbearable. The military regime uses food as a weapon, and its

strategy has proven effective in compelling Rohingya to leave Arakan. The poor are the main target, while the

wealthy enrich the authorities through bribes and taxes, and act as agents to oppress the poor in exchange for

personal benefits.86

Many Rohingya, desperate to flee persecution and starvation, have attempted to escape to Thailand and

Malaysia in overcrowded boats not suited for ocean travel. 87

Human traffickers and human smugglers promise them

a better life and good jobs. The Rohingya find themselves in boats with faulty engines and an inadequate supply of

food and water to make the long trip. Many boats never reach their destination. Engines often fail several hours after

leaving port and the refuges are taken to destinations determined by ocean currents. In the most tragic situations, the

boats sink in the Bay of Bengal or in the Andaman Sea. An estimated one million Rohingya live in Bangladesh,

Thailand, Malaysia, the Middle East, and beyond.88

Bangladesh, Thailand, and Malaysia are not parties to the 1951

Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol. As a result, Rohingya refugees receive little or no legal protection in these

countries

The policies of ethnic cleansing practiced by Burma, are creating push-factors for forced migration and

therefore constitute the root causes of the ongoing refugee exodus. They can be summarised as follows: (1) Denial of citizenship: The Rohingyas have been rendered stateless through Burma‘s Citizenship Law

of 1982, which states that citizens are those whose ancestors settled in the country before 1823, the

start of the British colonisation of Arakan.

(2) Restrictions on freedom of movement: They are virtually confined to their village tracts. This lack

of mobility has devastating consequences, limiting their access to markets, employment opportunities,

health facilities and higher education.

(3) Obstacles to family development: Obstacles has been imposed to control birth and to limit expansion

of the Rohingya population. The Rohingya must apply for permission to get married, which is only

granted in exchange for high bribes and can take up to several years to obtain. Polygamy has been

prohibited, and widows must wait at least 3 years to remarry.

(4) Construction of “model villages‖ to resettle Buddhists onto Muslim land has been going on since the

1950s. Such demographic engineering is designed to alter the ethnic composition of the

region. There are already 26 such model villages of about 100 houses each in Northern

Arakan. Rohingyas are compelled to build houses for the new settlers. In addition to land confiscation

and forced labour, these programmes contribute to the exacerbation of inter-communal tension. In

addition to these policies of exclusion specifically targeting the Rohingya, economic policies are being

pursued to maintain underdevelopment. These are also practised in other ethnic areas, but considering

that 60% of the Rohingya population are landless and depend on a hand-to-mouth existence, the related

loss of income greatly contributes to food insecurity. It is a deliberate attempt to induce starvation and

trigger departures.

(5) Forced labour, Compulsory labour continues to be exacted by the army and the Na Sa Ka for

construction and maintenance of their camps, portering, sentry duty, the establishment of villages for

new settlers, for military-owned shrimp farms and plantations, for brick-baking, for collection of wood

and bamboo, etc.

(6) Arbitrary taxation, Arbitrary taxation and other forms of extortion are common practices. The tactic

of arresting people for minor offences and demanding high bribes in return for their release is also

widespread.

(7) Control of the economy through a monopoly system. All economic sectors are controlled through a

monopoly system based on licences, which totally forbids any free-enterprise initiative.89


95

The distressing realities in which the Rohingyas live in Arakan are the outcome of the policies listed above, and

demonstrate that there is no willingness on the part of the Burmese government to integrate this population. As long

as these policies remain in exodus will not be stemmed.

The systemic and discriminatory practice of forced labour against the Rohingya, has continued, or even

intensified, across large areas of North Arakan State in Burma, since deadly communal violence broke out in June

2012...in areas not directly affected by the June 2012 violence, i. e. North Maungdaw and Buthidaung Township,

forced labour remains much the same as in previous years and has even intensified in some areas. Large contingents

of army troops have been deployed after a state of emergency was declared on 10 June. As a result, there was a

substantial increase in demands for porters and guides in North Maungdaw and North Buthidaung to carry additional

rations or to accompany soldiers on patrol in border areas. Villagers were forced to remain 4 to 5 days at a time in

the hills along with army patrols. Large groups of forced labourers have also been summoned for road clearing and

emergency camp repair damaged by monsoon rains and forced cultivation in army camps and paddy fields has been

reported in many parts of Buthidaung. 90

Despite the reform agenda pursued by the Government of Burma and the Memorandum of Understanding

signed between the ILO and the Government aiming at the elimination of forced labour by 2015, there has been little

progress toward this objective in North Arakan and no effective measures have been implemented there to eradicate

forced labour. Forced labour continues to be widely and systematically practiced in North Arakan and little has

changed for the Rohingya population. Forced labour remains a major cause for flight.91

16. International Responsibility

The issue of the Rohingyas was created in course of time. Considering their present condition, it is surely a

case of stateless and refugees. They have been becoming subject to persecution, discrimination and torture since

long and unfortunately with due international attention. But so far there are little or no fruitful steps taken by human

rights protectors despite with severe maltreatment and sufferings imposed by the Burmese Military administrations.

For a long time the US and other countries also maintained a surreptitious silence.92

In contrast to the Thai-Burma border, very little international attention has been given to conditions on the

Bangladesh-Burma border. Consequently, Arakan State has remained a largely ignored region of Burma. Awareness

is generally limited to the, cycle of exodus and repatriation of Rohingya refugees.93 The international community did

not utter any word when the Rohingyas were denied of their citizenship rights, freedom of movement and many

other civil, political and economic rights. They were made stateless in the place which they call their own home.

They were subject to force labour and worst of all forced portering (forced to carry arms, ammunitions in military

operations and often walk in front of the soldiers so he will be the first to be blown up in case of a land mind). They

have lost their own home, land, property and all other tangible and intangible property.

In addition to this, physical violence, torture and other form of persecutions have prevailed over the years

on that community. They were always been subject to threat. The international community did not take any extol

their initiative to ease the situation in Burma.94

The UN or any other international community cannot force the

Burmese military to stop this systematic killing and genocide over there. Their counseling does not work there and

the Burmese authorities do not pay heed to their recommendations at all.

There is no denying that the calamitous ordeal of this Rohingya community of Burma has received

woefully inadequate media coverage over the years despite having been declared one of the most hectored, and

aggrieved tribal minorities in the world by the United Nations.95

This observable fact can be unswervingly attributed

to the thought-out recalcitrance of the media oligopolists to underlining the copious atrocities being committed

against Muslims in different parts of the world in general as part of a ploy to legitimize the ongoing war on

terrorism.

The neighbouring countries especially ASEAN which include three Muslim countries of Malaysia,

Indonesia and Brunei did do nothing if it is not related to economics and trade that will benefit them. In fact ASEAN

has been aware of the Rohingya‘s plight since the early 1990s, when nearly 250,000 fled to Bangladesh. In March

1992, Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi later Prime Minister said that the Rohingya refugee crisis

―Could no longer be regarded as Burma's domestic problem because the action by Burmese troops has burdened

neighboring countries and may disrupt regional stability.‖96

Singapore‘s Foreign Ministry said that the influx of

large numbers of refugees from Burma into Bangladesh was creating ―a potential area of instability for the region

and human suffering.‖ 97

“ASEAN cannot expect to be involved in more effectively—the issue of citizenship; and if a government of a

country says ‗These people are not [our] citizens,‘ I don‘t think it‘s ASEAN‘s role to go in and say, ‗You

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change your law! You change your Constitution!‘ Accept these people as your citizens!‘‖ was said by Dr.

Surin Pitsuwan, the General Secretary of ASEAN.98

ASEAN despite launching a new human rights body at the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh in November 2012—

including a clause acknowledging ―universal‖ human rights norms—the group has largely stuck to its non-

interference mantra.99

Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visited Burma on 22nd

April 2013, despite

telling journalists in Jakarta before his departure that he would ―continue helping to reach a positive outcome‖ on

the issue of the persecution of Muslim Rohingyas in Burma, the Indonesian president apparently made no attempt to

meet with Burmese Muslim or Rohingya representatives. 100

No doubt the Rohingya crisis has stirred sentiments among their Muslim brethren in the Middle East.

Several Muslims believe that the Western governments‘ normalisation with the Burmese government is unfair.101

In

1991, the Muslim world condemned the Burmese regime‘s actions. Prince Khaled Sultan Abdul Aziz, the

commander of the Saudi contingent in the 1991 Gulf War on his visit to Dhaka, strongly recommended Desert

Storm-like actions against Burma due to the atrocities committed against the Rohingyas.102

In 2008, Prince Khalid

Al Faisal, announced in Mecca that King Abdullah had approved a plan to grant legal-resident status to the

refugees.103

Mehrdad Baouj-Lahout, an Iranian Parliamentarian said that non-binding resolutions adopted by the UN

will not help to improve the situation of the Rohingya Muslims in Burma.104

―Kuwait deplores in the strongest terms acts of violence, including killing, displacing, and terrorizing, the

minority Rohingya Muslims in the western state of Rakhine in Burma, a high-placed source at the ministry

of foreign affairs commented.‖105

Many countries in the Middle East are expressing their concern over the human right violations committed against

the Rohingyas and are urging the Burmese government to take necessary actions. ―The full suspension of sanctions imposed on Burma by the United States hinges on addressing ongoing US

concerns over ethnic conflicts, the release of political prisoners and an end to the country‘s longstanding

ties with North Korea, It is going to require action for the release of political prisoners, to ensure human

rights for all in the country, whether citizen or not, to achieve national reconciliation.‖ said Patrick

Murphy, the US special representative for Burma.106

Thirty US-sponsored ―Coastal Crisis Management

Centers‖ will be set up in Bangladesh that would help with humanitarian relief and tackle crime along the

sea border. At last the US seems to be wakening that Burma alone cannot solve the ethnic crisis. Of late the

Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) officially launched the Global Rohingya Center (to advocate for

the rights of the Rohingya people and to improve their living conditions in their places of residence.107

The

center also plan to be a media resource providing crucial knowledge and up-to-date information to facilitate

an accurate and in-depth reporting on Rohingya issues. It will also try to assist international organizations

in developing plans to deliver assistance to alleviate the plight of the persecuted community.

The international community can and must help the violence against Muslim, widespread prejudice, and

complex historical background will make addressing religious tensions incredibly difficult, but no matter how

daunting the challenge is, these issues must be addressed. Many nations around the world have faced problems with

religious and communal tensions, including where such tensions have led to violence and widespread killings. The

experiences are wide and varied, including the experience of some ASEAN countries and the experience in Western

countries after 9/11.108

Since violence erupted in Rakhine state last June, the international perspective has changed. Communal

violence evolved swiftly into state sponsored abuses against the Rohingya, and these abuses have grabbed the

attention of the Muslim world. Muslim countries and organisations have expressed their concern, offered aid, and

the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation has been outspoken.109

Other individuals and organisations have also taken

up the cause of the Rohingya.

There is undoubtedly a great many difficulties in setting up some kind of task force or mechanism whereby

the international community provides assistance to Burmese political and religious leaders on promoting racial and

religious harmony. Not least of these is that it touches on so many sensitivities with the government and with

Burmese society. Burma‘s government and some members of Burma‘s democracy movement can be highly

sensitive about what they see an external interference.

But the fact that these issues are so sensitive is exactly why it is so important to try. There are reasons for

hope that the current crisis and deep rooted causes behind it can be addressed. Burma is lucky to be one of the few

countries with political and religious leaders who are widely admired and who carry real influence. That influence

can be used to calm the situation and confront prejudice. We have already seen how Islamic and Buddhist leaders in


97

Burma have met and pledged mutual understanding on religious freedom, and respect for each-others religion. They

need assistance and advice on how to make sure that trickles down and that the message reaches their followers.

They need to be ensuring that there is discussion and education that reaches the people on the street. Mutual

understanding must happen at the grassroots level, not just the leadership level. We have also seen how willing some

members of the 88 Generation Students have been to engage on this issue. They also need support and advice on

how to address these complex issues.110

But the main factor is that foreign powers, many of them hungry for a share of Burma‘s market and

resources, have also been treading carefully so as not to provoke the government. This is equally true of regional and

Western powers eager to tempt the country‘s rulers away from the influence of China, which has dominated the

Burmese economic landscape since the era of international sanctions and is increasingly seen as trying to project its

power further into the ASEAN countries and beyond. Given these circumstances, it is little wonder that the

international obligation to protect the Rohingya is often sidelined in favour of economic and geo-strategic

considerations. Unfortunately, the impetus for humanitarian action often comes more from the dictates of realpolitik.

The Irish Centre for Human rights Report finds that there is a reliable body of evidence pointing to acts

constituting a widespread or systematic attack against the Rohingya civilian population in North Arakan State. 111

These appear to satisfy the requirements under international criminal law for the perpetration of crimes against

humanity. After being hounded for decades, it is time that adequate attention is given to the plight of the Rohingyas.

The root causes of the situation of the Rohingyas must be further assessed, as failure to do so will undoubtedly lead

to a bleak future for this ethnic minority group. People committing, allowing, aiding and abetting these crimes must

be held accountable. The international community has a responsibility to protect the Rohingyas, to respond to the

allegations of crimes against humanity, and to ensure that violations and impunity do not persist for another

generation.

India is the only country that has opened its door to the Rohingya refugees. The United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees says ―India with its history, culture, traditions, is today an example of generosity in the

way it has opened its borders to all people who have come looking for safety and sanctuary. There are Tibetans,

Afghans, Myanmarese in India and it has maintained an open door policy for all. India has a generous approach in

relationship to all people and a proof of that is the granting of long term visas and work permits to refugees. We

consider India a more reliable partner in the world to guarantee that people who need help will find a place. And

more importantly at a time when there are so many closed borders in the world, and many people have been refused

protection, India has been generous‖.112

It should also be remembered that while prejudice is widespread, it most certainly isn‘t representative of

all of Burmese society, and that there are a great many people who reject nationalism, racism, religious prejudice

and intolerance. As one Muslim leader told Burma Campaign UK, even while riots in Meiktila and surrounding

towns were taking place: ―I don‘t want the international community to think all the Buddhist people in our country

are like that because they are not. Only some people have created this hatred against Muslims.‖ Buddhist Monks

helped Muslims fleeing the attacks in Meiktila, and Buddhists came onto the streets when there were fears of further

attacks against Muslims in Rangoon. There are a great many people who are willing to put themselves at risk to

confront prejudice. There is no quick fix and there are no easy answers in addressing these deep rooted problems in

a society fractured by decades of dictatorship and conflict. The challenges in addressing these problems are immense

and will require a wide variety of approaches. But the potential consequences if the current tensions continue to rise

and violence spreads are unthinkable. Everything that the international community can do must be done.

If violence continues to spread, it will increase instability across the country, there is the danger of the

military seizing power again with their rationale as that they alone can hold the country together and keep law and

order. We have to remember that the Nargis Constitution of 2008 allows the military to seize power if it decides

that:

‗If there arises a state of emergency that could cause disintegration of the Union, disintegration of national

solidarity and loss of sovereign power or attempts therefore by wrongful forcible means such as insurgency

or violence, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services has the right to take over and exercise State

sovereign power in accord with the provisions of this Constitution.‘

The military could attempt to apply the catch all phrase ‗disintegration of national solidarity‘ and the danger of a

military coup outside the Constitution, from an officer or officers using the same justification of restoring law and

order as the State Law and Order Restoration Council used in 1988. We are quite positive that the international

community would not want to see a new Burmese Junta again.


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17. Rohingya Crisis Can Delay the Reforms

―Arakan State is going through a profound crisis that threatens to spread to other parts of the country and

has the potential to undermine the entire reform process in Burma‘ While the process of reform is continuing in the

right direction, there are significant human rights shortcomings that remain unaddressed, such as discrimination

against the Rohingya in Rakhine State and the ongoing human rights violations‖ said Quintana, the UN

representative. 113

―They must not become entrenched and destabilize the reform process,‖ added Quintana, an

Argentine human rights lawyer. Also on June 10, 2012 President Thein Sein addressed the nation.

―If we are sticking to endless hatred and revenge by killing each other, it‘s possible that the danger will be

more widespread, not only in Arakan State, if that happens, make no mistake, it would cause a severe loss

to our fledgling democracy—stability and development.‖

Thein Sein was right that this unrest and continuing abuses by the security forces could derail the democratic reform

process and spread to other parts of the country, as other ethnic nationalities groups could become increasingly wary

of the government‘s proclaimed commitment to improving relations with ethnic populations. Today it would be

Rohingya‘s turn and the next who knows may be their turn as Burma has a good record of ethnic cleansing policy.

U Shwe Maung, a Member of Parliament for Burma‘s ruling Union and Solidarity Party (USDP) has

warned that simmering tensions between Buddhists and Muslims in Arakan State could lead to another outbreak of

communal violence.

―Only after proper analysis, I am telling you that we need to control it, not let it happen. We can see a lack

of the rule of law. Action taken by the local government is very unfair‖ 114

He called for the amendment to Burma‘s 1982 citizenship to be reviewed.

Washington which has been in the forefront in encouraging reforms worry Burma risks backsliding toward

military rule that ended two years ago. The rapid pace of change has also been accompanied by chaos, as ugly

sectarian tensions have surfaced and is afraid that the military may step in and set back the reform process. ―That

risk is very real,‖ said a Senior State Department official.115

Priscilla Clapp, a former US charge d‘affaires said the

presence of outside provocateurs could be part of a campaign to strengthen the military‘s hand and keep it involved

in maintaining order in the country.―The army clearly wants to remain a strong force and there are probably

divisions between the uniformed army and the ex-generals who run the government,‖ Clapp said.116

In fact it was suspected that the hard liners among the army work hand in glove with the ruling Union

Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) usually referred by the people of Burma as United in Slaughtering

Depaeyin Participants 117

deliberately created this incident just to prove that without the army, the country would go

to the dogs. In this sly way the hardliners in the army and cronies inside USDA want to get back power. A U.S.

government commission recommended that Burma remains on a State Department blacklist of 15 governments

responsible for "systematic" violations of freedom of religion Ongoing and important political reforms in Burma

have failed in the situation for freedom of religion and belief," the commission said.118

Quintana who visited Burma for five days last month and held talks with ministers, opposition leader Aung

San Suu Kyi and prisoners and also visited camps for displaced people uprooted by ethnic clashes in Arakan and

Kachin states and commented.

―Arakan State is going through a profound crisis that threatens to spread to other parts of the country and

has the potential to undermine the entire reform process in Burma, There remains a large gap between

reform at the top and implementation on the Ground‖ 119

Both Muslim and Buddhist Arakanese communities continue to suffer the consequences of violence that the

government has finally been able to control, though question marks remain over the extent to which excessive force

has been used. ―The Nasaka, a border security force accused of committing serious violations against Muslims,

should be suspended,‖ he said. More than 1,100 people, the vast majority of them Rohingya men and boys, are

reported to be detained, the UN envoy said, urging authorities to ensure that they are not mistreated. He saw ―no

evidence that the judiciary is developing any independence from the executive branch of government.‖ The quasi-

civilian government of President Thein Sein must address serious abuses by the junta and prosecute perpetrators.

Measures to ensure justice and accountability, and access to truth, must therefore remain part of Burma‘s reform

agenda.

Another aspect to be considered is that there is a danger that some donors could inadvertently cause more

tension between the communities. Some Muslim countries have pledged aid just for the Rohingya. 120

How will

local Rakhine people feel watching truck-loads of aid passing them on their way to Rohingya villages or camps? Aid

delivered in the wrong way could exacerbate tensions, hurting the Rohingya in the long term.


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There has been a growing international recognition and response to the reforms process and the chances of

losing track on this will be critical. The need to address the ethnic divide is a crucial component of the national

reconciliation process. Over the past year, the conflicts between the majority community backed by the military and

the ethnic groups is causing a deep divide within the reconciliation process that needs to be critically addressed if the

process is to continue smoothly. This unwillingness to address the problem is critical as it will impact Burma‘s role

as the ASEAN Chair in 2014.121

18. Prognosis

History has prove it that the Malay peninsular now Malaysia and Indonesia were once Buddhist countries

in history, but the Muslims being a dynamic religion used their various methods to proselytise their religion so

successfully that they have become Muslim countries; Buddhism has almost disappeared if not have become a

minority in these countries. Hence it is our historical task to defend Buddhism and Arakan is just the frontline of

Burma before the whole country will be devoured by Muslim. 122

This is the belief of the majority of the people in

Burma. In fact a whole book can be written to substantiate the anti-Muslim movement existing in Burma and the

responsible authorities turning a blind eye, not realising that this can lead to very dangerous and disastrous

consequences.123

The Burmese have long misinterpreted 786 as an International Muslim conspiracy to take over the world in

the 21st century including Burma, as they see 786 to represent 21 (7+8+6=21).124

But a meticulous research reveals

that it is a movement to follow the model of the Muslim 786, which is only used in South Asian Muslim tradition, a

representation of a Quranic phrase ―In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Ever Merciful.‖ In opposition to

786, the movement invented 969 as a symbol of a religious movement. In a country where numerology has a

powerful appeal, it is a mass-based Buddhist movement led by extremist monks including a firebrand named U

Wirathu, 125

usually known as Burmese Bin Laden. The number, 969, is derived from Buddhist tradition in which the

Three Jewels or Tiratana is composed of 24 attributes (9 Buddha, 6 Dhamma, 9 Sangha).

The average Burmese construe that the Burmese Muslims especially the alien word Rohingya is a

representative of a much wider imperialistic Muslim world of the most sinister design. What more proof is more

wanted then the World Muslim organization such as the Jeddah based OIC is using pressure by appealing to the

UNSC to intervene will strengthen the Buddhist extreme hands. 126

―Security Council must protect rights and lives

of Rohingya Muslims,‖ said Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, the OIC Secretary General. 127

He told Saudi Gazette that the

OIC will ask the UN Human Rights Council to send fact-finding mission to investigate all human rights violations in

Burma.

Hence to the campaigners, 969, is about protecting race and religion by peaceful or violent means. In

practice, it is explicitly an anti-Muslim campaign, not about preaching people the Buddha-nature of all beings, as

taught and practiced by Lord Buddha himself. In many townships across Burma, including capital regions, there are

local 969 committees that organize events and religious summons and distribute anti-Muslim materials such as CDs,

books and leaflets.128

The 969 campaign targets economic aspects by alleging that Muslims are dominating the

Burmese economy and that therefore Buddhists must not trade with Muslims. Instead, the campaigners recommend

that Buddhists buy and sell at Buddhist shops that display 969 signs and stickers. In Karen state, Buddhists are even

forced to trade only with Buddhists. There are local reports about Buddhists being beaten by members of 969

civilians and monks for trading with Muslims.

Muslims in Burma are portrayed as dangerous foreigners who came to the country only to dominate its

every aspect. They are accused of dominating the economy, destroying the cultural fabric of society by spreading

Islam in every way possible, luring women into Islam, and then monopolizing political power. The prime anxiety is

that the Burmese race/nation will become extinct if liars, aliens, ruthless people, and those who bite the hands of

their masters (often referring to Muslims as dogs) if they are not expelled. There are other important elements.

Different volumes of anti-Muslim books written by Buddhist monks are all similarly titled: "Fearful of losing

race/nation". These books, being circulated for the past few years, are the guidebooks of the campaign, featuring

stories of dangerous and hateful Muslims unfairly marrying Buddhist women or marrying without consent,

attempting to replace Buddhism with Islam, and undertaking universal missions to dominate the world

economically, politically and culturally. Muslims allegedly will take over the Buddhist nation unless effective actions

are taken to neutralize them and destroy every Muslim establishment seems to be the philosophy of the Burmese

mob. Citizenship is supposed to be defined in term of bloodline, as Immigration Minister Khin Yi indicated.129

But

this neo-Nazi movement doesn't work without popular support. That hundreds of people listen to the 969 summons

attests to its rise. This is not just public acceptance, but follow up to actions such as destroying Muslim shops in


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Mon state early this month after a 969 summons. On social media websites, particularly Facebook, various groups

relate to the 969 movement can be seen.

Nobel Peace Prize laureate and anti-apartheid leader Desmond Tutu has described the racist attacks against

Rohingya Muslims and wars in ethnic areas, as a ―new apartheid. And the most important thing is that this is a

moral universe. Right and wrong matters.‖130

Abu Tahay, a Rohingya community leader said Tutu‘s words offered a

guide to help Burma reach its goal of peace and harmony. ―If you see people as human, our goal is quite close. If

you base on nationality, our goal will become far away,‖131

he said. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has called for a review

of Burma‘s controversial 1982 citizenship law, which renders the Muslim Rohingya stateless, during a trip to

Japan.132

―We have to find out whether our citizenship law is fair or not; if it meets international standards, and

based on the findings, if necessary, the [law] must be revised. We should also determine if certain laws are

a hindrance to equal rights among citizens in the country, and revise them if we can.‖

It was on this backdrop that the Rakhine Buddhist population, public opinion in Burma as a whole, as well as in the

pro-democratic movement, are not disposed toward recognising the Rohingya Muslim population of Arakan as a

people of Burma. No doubt Rohingya organisations have been consistently blocked from joining umbrella

groups; opposition leaders, both inside and outside Burma, consider that the communal situation in Arakan can only

improve with a transition to democracy, but they suggest that under a federal system of governance, ethnic States

would enjoy self-determination and, therefore, the fate of the Rohingya could be decided by the people

of Arakan State, until and unless the Rohingyas became more friendly with the Rakhine. After one year of the flaring up of the Rohingya crisis, the government report on recommends that the

government upholds the controversial 1982 Citizenship Law and that it beefs up its security presence in Arakan

State, while also tightening immigration controls along Burma‘s border with Bangladesh.133

The report only pointed

out that the rapid population growth had led to the communal clashes with Buddhist communities, and

recommended voluntary family planning. It also recommends promoting peaceful co-existence between two

communities and resolving the refugee issue. The commission interviewed hundreds of members of both

communities and discovered that 96% of the Arakanese feel that the government had failed to protect them, while

more than 92% of the Rohingyas thought that it was because of the Arakanese Buddhist superior complexity.134

It

also recommended urgent humanitarian aid so that they can get ―access to safe and secure temporary shelters prior

to the monsoon season. The government needs to ban the use of hate language against any religion, to ban extremist

teachings and activities. The commission puts a heavy focus on strengthening the security government forces in

Arakan State and control immigration from Bangladesh into the state, located on western Burma‘s border.

An investigation by the New York-based group Human Rights Watch, released, accused Thein Sein‘s

government of ―ethnic cleansing‖ and crimes against humanity, and it said government security forces, local

Buddhist monks and Arakanese politicians, had played a key role in the violence. It is evident that the security

forces had failed to end and in some cases supported Buddhist attacks on Rohingya communities during the violence

on October, while they were also actively blocking aid deliveries to Rohingya refugee camps. 135

Evidently Rohingya leaders and activists have reacted angrily to the findings of the official investigation

Myo Thant, a Rohingya representative of the Democracy and Human Rights Party, told The Irrawaddy that the

report did not present a completely accurate picture of the Arakan situation.136

The commission recommended that

the Burmese government increase security in the troubled western region and said that resettlement of more than

100,000 displaced people should be held off until reconciliation measures are implemented. This will take time as

the government considered that it was more important in the short term to address humanitarian needs in the region.

The report said that ―it is extremely urgent to provide the Bengali IDPs with access to safe and secure temporary

shelters prior to the monsoon season.‖ The commission proposed that the Burmese government set up a ―truth-

finding committee‖ to look into the deeper causes of the 2012 violence, which began as rioting between Arakanese

Buddhists and local Muslims, and this was welcome by the Rohingya community.137

As expected, the commission

did not recommend any amendment to Burma‘s widely criticized 1982 citizenship law, which denies the Rohingya

Burmese citizenship. Phil Robertson, the deputy director of Human Rights Watch‘s Asia division, said that

―The commission missed a critical point when it failed to include reform of the 1982 Citizenship Act to

strip out discriminatory provisions and ensure that the law complies with international human rights

standards.‖138

As it stands now it is evident that on the Rohingya side there is

(1) History, (still debateable)

(2) Morality and


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(3) International Sympathy full stop.

On the Arakanese side

(1) The entire Myanmar ethnic Buddhist Community

(2)The government of the Union of Burma

(3) The entire ethnic nationalities and most importantly

(4) Realpolitik.

19. Just an Attempt of Solving

It is easy for an outsider like me to give a series of solutions to the Rohingya problem. But it is very

difficult to be on the ground in Arakan and imagine the authorities in Burma to implement them – for the ground

rules are very different from theory that is the problem. No doubt these Rohingyas are essentially stateless people –

(1) Bangladesh does not want them

(2) Burma in many respects also does not want to have them.

(3) There is tremendous discrimination on both sides. But the fact is that many tens or hundreds of thousands of people of Rohingya descent live territory and they are

not going to go away any time soon and one cannot ethnically cleanse them out of there, as Hitler did to the Jews.

On the other hand Burmese people desire to become global players and want to see it interacting far more

with non-Myanmar, non-Buddhist ethnicities. But the treatment of Muslims as the 'other' persists despite the

country's push to embrace the outside world and everything it offers.139

Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity and

Islam have flourished in Burma for centuries and those who professed the religions have been living through thick

and thin in the country. The Burmese government has rejected attempts to politicize and internationalize the

community unrest as a religious issue, saying the Arakan State clashes was not connected to religious oppression nor

discrimination.140

International groups have called for a solution to the unrest and efforts to bring the communities

closer together.

“Rohingya,” a term not accepted by the government of Burma141

as well as the people of Burma

particularly the Rakhines will have to be tackled. The case had been exploited by the extremist Rakhine local leaders

and Buddhist monks but also by the extremist Rohingya leaders based abroad fanned by some Bangladeshi

intellectuals and sympathise by some Islamic countries. In Arakan state, where tension between Buddhists and

Rohingya Muslims often spills over into violence, hypocrisy is very much evident in attempts by Arakanese to goad

public opinion against the Rohingya in the name of "nationalism" in as much as the Rohingya leaders try to force

this alien word to the Rakhine. These are the same Arakanese who, ironically, regularly accuse the government of

attempting to aggressively assimilate Arakanese into the Myanmar way of life.

The international community, the governments of the world, the world bodies such as the United Nations

General Assembly (UNGA), Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), South Asia Association for Regional

Corporation (SAARC), Association of Southeast Asian Countries (ASEAN) Non Aligned Movement (NAM),

International Non Governmental Organization (INGOs) and Human Rights Organization or name any associations

can do nothing or impose a solution to this problem. It all depends on the government of Burma for the decision.

The United Nations can decide anything but it is not binding until and unless it was imposed by the UN

Security Council and probably no one will take it to the UNSC and even if it is on the agenda can be vetoed by

Russia and China, the staunch patrons of Burma. Their findings may be pro and cons but it has to be decided by the

Government of Burma (Junta, Quasi military government of even a civilian government) and more or less will be

decided by the state‘s national interest. So the decision must be practical on the ground.

The 1982 law guarantees citizenship only for those who can prove that their family has lived in Burma for

at least three generations. But many Rohingya, who have lived in limbo along the Bangladeshi border for

generations, lack the necessary documentation and birth certificates to qualify. In November last year 2012, a

representative from the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) submitted a proposal to

revise the 1982 Citizenship Law but it was ―put on record‖, meaning that it was indefinitely postponed.142

Thein

Nyunt, chairperson of the New National Democracy Party, insisted that the law should not be revised. The United

Nation‘s Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Burma, Tomas Quintana, recently called on the law to be revised,

but faced an immediate backlash from parliamentarians and political parties who say the law is meant to protect

Burma from ―illegal immigrants‖.

The solution to the Rohingyas‘ problems requires that new policies be put in place to eradicate their

statelessness and respect their fundamental human rights. Political will is required to end these policies of exclusion


102

and discrimination. As long as they are considered illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, there is little hope of a

significant betterment of their status and living conditions.143

But the most important aspect is that the Buddhist, be

they Rakhine or Myanmar must have a forgiven heart. One could not take revenge on the current innocent Rohingya

simply because their fathers and grandfathers have bullied the Buddhist years ago.

However the most important aspect is that not only the issue of Rohingya but also of all the ethnic nationalities

related civil wars and violence in Burma will never be resolved unless the elite in the country especially the

generals adjust their attitude towards this ethnic nationalities and include them in the notion of a state.144

The Rohingya have to be integrated into the community. They must be persuaded to coexist with Rakhine

residents as before. Who destroyed this coexistence? It is the successive military Juntas. The people of Burma knew

that these Rohingya cannot be put into refugee camps as they do not want creating religious extremists. It is almost

impossible to send them back to their country or to a third country. Separating them from other ethnics would cause

problems at the times of implementing federal ideas. As secondary citizens, they cannot get the vote or cannot win a

seat in parliament. So what is needed to be done is to integrate them into the society. 145

Economical and educational

sectors need to be improved. Problems can be lessened if the areas are more developed and the locals become more

educated. However, they have to wait for at least two generations to get the vote and in the meantime should be

given permanent residence.

Still, Rohingyas are the burden not only on Arakan state, but also on the locals and the country itself .146

Once they

are officially registered as citizens or permanent residence, they can go freely throughout the country and enjoy the

rights of a citizen. The occurrences in Arakan State are a national issue, not international. The problems should be

solved by speeding up development projects to result in peaceful solutions. The more developed the area is and the

more the people are informed, the less likely such conflicts can emerge. The country leaders should take advices

from different perspectives. There are classic examples in the history. This crisis highlights the current political

changes, geo-politics and political circumstances in Burma.

So my humble or at least in my perspective is the right path of action is simply to confer them Permanent

Residence and make them comply with the national law of Burma and give them a chance to live peaceful with their

neighbours especially with the Arakanese and of course will have to bestowed on them perhaps some degree of

autonomy a little less similar to what the other ethnic nationalities are enjoying. 147

Make them adhere to the terms

of peace and peaceful coexistence agreed by them and help them to realize that they all belong to the same country

and owed allegiance to the Genuine Union of Burma. On the part of the Rohingyas, they will have to call themselves

as Arakanese Muslims not only to be more compatible with the mass of the people of Burma but also to show that

they really belong to the Union of Burma. In fact they have called themselves as Arakanese Muslim as far as 1913.

(See Annex III) and there was no problem at all. But the sad fact which I discovered in my research is that the so

called Rohingya leaders or activists are bent on coining the word Rohingya at any cost even at the extermination of

the whole of Rohingya population. Hence, the major share of the crisis can be blamed on them.

Some people proposed that any people residing in Burma prior 1948 should be given citizens. That is a

universal truth. But basing on the circumstances e.g. the Karen rebelled but KNU never utter a word that they will

join with any neighbouring country. They will fight for autonomy. The Shan started the resistance but they never say

that they want to be part of Thailand even though they speak a similar language, there are many Kachin in China but

KIA never uttered a word to be part of China, the Chin but CNF never say that they will join Mizoram even though

they speak the same language, the same religion and the same values. It was only the Rohingya/ Mujahid that

professed to join Pakistan and at one time fought under the banner of Pakistan flag. So before giving them full

citizenship let us test it with permanent residence for a couple of years and only when we discovered that they give

their allegiance to Burma and live according to the law we should give them citizenship.

This new coined word Rohingya which most people in Burma construe is very much anathema to the

Burmese Buddhist nationalist especially to the Rakhines. The Rohingya dream of setting up a small Islamic

township in Arakan state with the technical advice and financial support from religious extremists from foreign

countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan, and other Islamic countries is not feasible at all as it will infringe upon the

national sovereignty of Burma, according to a report from a commission set up to investigate the incident.148

If

Burma continues to be a democratic country may be in another generation or two the younger generation will be

more amenable to accept the word Rohingya and may grant them a full citizenships provided they prove to be one of

them. Let us leave it to our grand children and great grandchildren to decide. In the meantime the Rohingyas

especially the elites must realise that they cannot have the cake and eat it.

We will all have to recollect that this is but one aspect of Burma's numerous problems .So it would be hard


103

to isolate it just to that one particular issue because it is a very difficult and is very complex. One may unwittingly

say the wrong thing and suddenly violence breaks out.

A careless word may kindle strife,

A cruel word may wreck a life;

A timely word may lessen stress,

We need, a loving word that will heal and bless.149

But I construe that overall, the issue, combined with all the other ethnic groups, together with the treatment of the

poor and the farmers in the rural areas and the clear bias of so many of the new laws in favor of investors and

businesses instead of ordinary people, a lot of things are pointing in the wrong direction.150

The Genuine Union of Burma could be an equitable country, a country where everyone had land rights, it

could be a county where everyone has security of tenure, where displacement was relegated to the past, where you

had economic distributed equally, that they built green and sustainable cities with proper mass transit and all these

things. It is really easy to imagine really beautiful, pro-people, pro-human rights, pro-justice future for the country.

These are my utopia for my beloved native country but as Scott Leckie, the director of the Switzerland-based NGO,

Displacement Solutions has said in his Burma's human rights issues said. ―But there are just an ever-growing

number of events and policies and laws, and other things that are making those who wish for a happy future quite

worried.‖151

Even as I am writing this paper the Burmese government is systematically restricting humanitarian aid and

imposing discriminatory policies on Rohingya Muslims in Arakan State, writes Human Rights Watch ―The

government seems untroubled by the dire humanitarian conditions in the camps in Arakan State,‖152

There is no

action plan to resolve the crisis and continued inaction will only make the crisis worse.‖ On March 18, 2013, the

European Commission warned the situation would turn into a ―humanitarian disaster‖ if the internally displaced

people living on paddy fields and sand banks were not relocated to safer sites within weeks. In fact this was also

pointed out by the Rakhine Investigation Committee (see Annex IV).

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) likewise warned of a ―potentially

devastating‖ effect on displaced Rohingya when the rains start.

The government‘s failure to put forward plans or make efforts to return displaced Rohingya and other Muslims to

their original towns and villages heightens concerns of a long-term intent to segregate this population, It seems that,

―The unfortunate lesson from the violence in Arakan State is that so far the government does little to hold

accountable those who violate the rights of Muslims in Burma. By failing to stop violence and prosecute those who

incite it, the country‘s leaders are failing the test of reform.‖153

A small fountain of love which in Burmese we say ―Metta San Chaung Gale‖(arwWmprf; acsmif;uav;) is the centre piece of thriving relationship. Every religion either Buddhist or Muslims makes it clear to be people

who love- Love your religion, Love yourself and Love your neighbours are the basic facts.154

But it‘s hard to love

when we don‘t feel love. Hence make a little effort to love one another e.g. Rakhine and Rohingyas. Once you

become a practicing Buddhist or Muslims you will discover that- even towards those who don‘t show you love, and

these basic tenants will solve the problem between Rakhine Buddhist and Muslim Rohingyas.

End Notes 1. Dr Chan; Aye the Development of a Muslim Enclave in Arakan State of Burma. Kanda University of International

Studies. SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 2005, ISSN 1479- 8484 2. The creators of that term might have been from the second or third generations of the Bengali immigrants from the

Chittagong District in modern Bangladesh; http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm for the report to the

UNHCR. As a matter of fact The Muslims in the Arakan State can be divided into four different groups, namely the

Chittagonian Bengalis in the Mayu Frontier; the descendents of the Muslim Community of Arakan in the Mrauk-U

period (1430-1784), presently living in the Mrauk-U and Kyauktaw townships; the decendents of Muslim mercenaries

in Ramree Island known to the Arakanese as Kaman; and the Muslims from the Myedu area of Central Burma, left

behind by the Burmese invaders in Sandoway District after the conquest of Arakan in 1784

3. Though some Rohingya historians, like Khalilur Rahma, contend that the term Rohingya may be derived

from Arabic word Rahma meaning 'mercy', They trace the term back to a shipwreck in the 8th century CE, where an

Arab ship wrecked near Ramree Island, Arab traders were ordered to be executed by the Arakanese king. Then, they

shouted in their language, 'Rahma'. Hence, these people were called 'Raham'. Gradually it changed Rhohang and finally

to Rohingyas. Some say, Rohingyas were descendants of inhabitants of Ruha in Afghanistan.]Another historian, argued

that among the Muslim populations in Myanmar, the term 'Mrohaung' (Old Arakanese Kingdom) was corrupted to

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arabic_language

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_and_cartography_in_medieval_Islam

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_economics_in_the_world

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rakhine_people

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rohingya_people#cite_note-chowdhury-13


104

Rohang. And thus inhabitants of the region are called Rohingya. But whatever the case they have been living side by

side amicably until the new word ―Rohingya‖ was introduced in Arakan.

4. The Burmese has to cede, Assam, Manipur, Arakan and Tenasserim to the British refer to Maung Htin Aung (1967). A

History of Burma. New York and London: Cambridge University Press. pp. 212, 214–215 5. Look Charney 1999:279

6. Look at Furnivall 1957:29

7. Phayre 1836:696

8. Smart 1957: 89

9. Smart 1957: 99

10. Win;Kanbawza, Killing two birds with a stone a win win situation Euro Asia 19-7-2012 and in Asian Tribune

11. Charter 1938:34-38

12. See U K census 1851

13. Rajiv Sikri:Amb, Rohingya crisis a historical overview. Implications for national reconstruction, regional and

human security 14. Yegar 1972:67

15. Yegar 1972:67

16. Owen 1946: 26

17. Irwin 1946: 7-8, 16.

18. It is still stood today in Mandalay known as Arakanese Buddha

19. Zamindary System brought from Bengal

20. Report of the Settlement Operations in the Akyab District 1887-1888: 2, 21

21. Rahman 1979: 200-204

22. According to Dr Aye Chan‘s The Development of Muslim Enclave in Arakan State in Burma. In and Maungdaw

Township alone, there were, in the 1910s, fifteen Bengali Zamindars who brought thousands of Chittagonian tenants

and established Agricultural Muslim communities, building mosques with Islamic schools affiliated to them. However,

all these villages occupied by the Bengalis continued to be called by Arakanese names in the British records (Grantham

and Lat 1956: 41-43, 48-51).

23. The Roots Burma through the passage of time

24. Smart 1957:83

25. Bennison 1931: 213

26. Cady 1958: 172-273

27. See the writings of Maung Nyo, a kyun- ok (headman of the village tract) of Maungdaw Township recorded in History

28. Cady 1958: 294

29. Dr Chan; Aye the Development of a Muslim Enclave in Arakan State of Burma. Kanda University of International

Studies. SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 2005, ISSN 1479- 8484

30. Win;Kanbawza,: Killing two birds with a stone or a Win, Win Situation in Asian Tribune 18-2-2012 31. Khin Gyi Pyaw 1960: 99

32. Dr Chan; Aye the Development of a Muslim Enclave in Arakan State of Burma Kanda University of International


33. Interview with U Maung Tin the former

34. Win;Kanbawza,: Killing two birds with a stone or a Win, Win Situation in Asian Tribune 18-2-2012 35. Only 277 out of about 2400 indigenous Arakanese, could be resettled on the sites of their original homes

36. See Burma ‗s Western Border Report by the Diplomatic Correspondence

37. See Kyaw Zan Tha 1995:6

38. Mya Win 1992: 3

39. Dr Chan; Aye The Development of a Muslim Enclave in Arakan State of Burma Kanda University of International


40. Immigration and Manpower Department 1987:I-14

41. International Herald Tribune Global Opinion 19-6-2012

42. India Today No country for Rohingya 22-4-2013

43. Read more at:http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/rohingya-muslims-rakhine-myanmar-bordering-

bangladesh/1/259014.html

44. Cady; John F -A History of Modern Burma p 636

45. Michaels; Samatha, Burma Govt Accused of Ethnic Cleansing Against Rohingya Muslims Irrawaddy 22-4-2013

46. Ye Htut the Deputy Information Minister said that it is not acceptable

47. Perspective of Dr. Maung Zarni

48. Brown, David: The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia, London school of Economics p36

49. For example displacing of all the ethnic commanders and replace with the Myanmar ethnic group

50. La Raw Dr.Maran: The Nation-State of Burma and the Victimization of Its Co-founders Burma Debate Nov./Dec

1996

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Htin_Aung

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/rohingya-muslims-rakhine-myanmar-bordering-bangladesh/1/259014.html

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/rohingya-muslims-rakhine-myanmar-bordering-bangladesh/1/259014.html


105

51. La Raw Dr.Maran: The Nation-State of Burma and the Victimization of Its Co-founders Burma Debate Nov./Dec

1996



53. The Mon has been in Burma much earlier than the Burman/Myanmar

54. The 1st military coup was in 1958 label as a Caretaker Government, the 2nd in 1962 as the Revolutionary Council and

the 3rd in 1988 as SLORC (State Law and order Restoration Council)

55. The word Bangladeshi was used instead of Bengali to be more specific. India‘s West Bengal is a fourth most populous

state in India with a population of 91 million Bengalis far numerous than Burma itself.

56. P Leider;Jacques, ―Rohingya,‖Rakhaing and the Recent Outbreak of Violence A Note

57. Mya Win 1992: 3

58. The people of Burma usually call a person Kalar if his complexion is dark



60. Manifesto of Arakan Rohingya National Organization p 1

61. Burma Briefings Burma‟s Rohingya Could do Without Burma Campaign No 20 March 2013


63. Ibid

64. Once a person is elected to a Rohingya organization he holds that post for life

65. NDF Manifesto

66. TBBC Paper 3 Sides of a Story, a Profile of the Muslim communities in the refugee camps of the Thailand Burma

Border July 2010 67. Rianne ten Veen, ‗Myanmar‟s Muslims: The Oppressed of the Oppressed‟, Islamic Human Rights Commission

(IHRC), Wembley, UK,

68. ‗Burma Says No to Return of Muslims‟, Bangkok Post, 11 August 1997

69. http://www.jubileecampaign.co.uk/world/bur3.htm. See also Burma‟s Great Betrayal and another tragedy waiting

to happen. 24-2-98

70. Human Rights Watch Report 1998: Burma‘, at http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/Asia-01.htm

71. TBBC Paper 3 Sides of a Story, a Profile of the Muslim communities in the refugee camps of the Thailand Burma

Border July 2010

72. The majority of the people speak Tibeto-Burman languages. Tibeto-Burman speakers in Burma can be divided into six

distinct groups. The Burmish constitute the largest of these groups by population Nungish speakers live in upland areas

in Kachin State. The main Baric-speaking group is the Jingphaw in Kachin State. The Kuki-Naga-speaking peoples

include a large number of ethnic groups in the mountains along the border with India and Bangladesh. The Luish group

includes the Kado, who live near the border with the Indian state of Manipur. The Karen groups live in the hills along

the border with Thailand and the southern lowlands. The Lolo-speaking groups tend to be the most recent immigrants

to Burma; they live in the highlands of Shan and Kachin states.

73. Houtman, G., Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia

and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 1999, pp.137–56.

74. For a discussion, see Brown, op. cit.

75. Area of Burma is 676,600 sq.k, while Bangladesh has only147,600 sq but has a population of 161 plus million while

Burma has only 55 million

76. Zaung Htet;Tha Lun Rohingya Citizenship, a Burmese Decision; Suu Kyi to foreign Critics Irrawaddy26-2-2013

77. Working People‟s Daily, 6 August 1991

78. SPDC, Information Sheet, Yangon, Myanmar, No. C-2103 (I), 30 January 2002.

79. The others three are forged by the warrior king of Anawrahta, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya, who lived 700 years apart

between the eleventh and eighteenth centuries.

80. The ethnic identities of rulers in pre-colonial Burma are, in fact, not always clear. Kingdoms were poly-ethnic and

evolving, so it is questionable how far back modern ethnic identities can be attributed. The kings of Pagan, for

example, wrote in several languages, including Mon and Pali as well as Burmese. A comparison would be claims today

that King William ‗the Conqueror‘ in eleventh-century Europe was ‗French‘ or ‗English‘ rather than Norman.

81. Thant Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 254; for a

discussion of Buddhism in Burmese politics, see also Min Zin, ‗The power of Hpoun‟, The Irrawaddy, vol. 9, no. 9,

December 2001.

82. Yawnghwe; Sao Harn :The Non-Burman Ethnic People of Burma 83. Waia; zwell, Is radical Islamic idea forming in Burma? 3-11-2012 by an 18-year-old young editor of EMG

84. Authorities Nurture Burma‘s Buddhist Chauvinism, VOA Broadcast 8-9-2012

85. Juliane Schober, Juliane: is a scholar studying Burma‘s Buddhist traditions at Arizona State University

http://elevenmyanmar.com/opinion/1151-is-radical-islamic-idea-forming-in-myanmar


106

86. Lewa; Chris, Conflict, discrimination and humanitarian challenges in Northern Arakan State, Brussels 8-10-

2003

87. Kaladan News (26 Jan 08) BDR pushes back 19-Burmese national to Burma

88. Refugees International (19 Dec 08) Rohingya: Burma‘s forgotten minority


2003

90. An overview of forced labour practices in North Arakan, Burma (June to August 2012) submitted to ITUC by ILO

on Aug 2012

91. Forced labour still prevails: (An overview of forced labour practices in North Arakan), May 2012) ILO

92. International Herald Tribune Global Opinion 19-6-2012


2003


2003

95. The Express Tribune BLOGS 23-7-2012

96. FEER (10 Mar 92) Title unknown

97. New Straits Times (12 Mar 92) Islamic nations slam Myanmar for persecuting Muslims 98. Mizzima News ASEAN cannot support Rohingyas‟ citizenship claims: Surin 18 Nov.2012 in Phnom Penh

99. Roughneen;Simon, A Sad State of Affairs as ASEAN AWOL Over Rohingya Issue Irrawaddy 19-4-2013

100. Pye:Daniel, Indonesia President Visits Burma, Fails to Meet Muslim Leaders Irrawaddy 23-4-, 2013 |

101. Arab News, 5 March 2013

102. The National, 23 August 2012

103. Govindankutty; Janani Myanmar: Print Media Analysis Of The Rohingya Unrest – Analysis IPCS -- 5-4- 2013

104. The Iran Daily, 30 December 2012

105. Kuwait Times, 30 October, 2012

106. Boehler; Patrick ,US Envoy to Burma Says Peace Needed if Sanctions Are to Be Lifted 15-3-2013 Irrawaddy 107. Soudi Gazette; OIC launches Global Rohingya Centre 25-3-2013

108. An International Task force is needed to help tackle growing religious violence in Burma. Burma Campaign UK

No 19. March 2013


110. An International Task force is needed to help tackle growing religious violence in Burma. Burma Campaign UK

No 19. March 2013

111. The Irish Centre for Human Rights Reports Crime Against Humanity in Western Burma, The situation of

Rohingyas 112. The Hindu 3-1-2013

113. Nebehay; Stephanie Arakan Crisis Risks Spread, Endangering Burma Reforms: UN Retuers 8-3-2013

114. Boehker; Patrick, Ruling Party MP Warns of Renewed Arakan Violence Irrawaddy 13-3-2013

115. Penning; Matthew, In US, Fears that Burma Unrest Threatens Reforms A P writer 6-4-2013

116. Penning; Matthew, In US, Fears that Burma Unrest Threatens Reforms A P writer 6-4-2013

117. Because in May 2003 USDA (at that time it was not a party yet) they initiated an attempt to murder Daw Aung San Suu

Kyi and her party at Depaeyin village

118. UPI.Com & Big News Net Work U.S. report: Burma's reforms are failing 3-5-

2013: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/05/03/US-report-Myanmars-reforms-are-failing/UPI-

77951367554080/#ixzz2SHo7uYgZ 119. Nebehay; Stephanie,Arakan Crisis Risks Spread, Endangering Burma Reforms: UN Reuters 8-3-2013


121. Decan Chronocile 18th April 2013http://www.deccanchronicle.com/130416/commentary-op-ed/commentary/stateless-burma

122. Excerpts from an anti-Muslim pamphlet in Burmese, distributed in Rangoon prior to Oct. 1996

123. Time for Change, Muslim observer of the riots in Mandalay, March 1996

124. Tuscangate; Kosak, Burmese Neo-Nazi Movement Rising Against Muslims 24-3-2013 Asia

Sentinel, http://wp.me/p2JJuA-7T3 125. U Wirathu, is usually refer as a skin head saffron-robed pseudo-monk who was jailed in 2003 for his direct

involvement in the massacre of Muslim families and destruction of a mosque in the up-country town of Kyauk-hse, the

birthplace of the aging and retired despot Senior General Than Shwe.

126. Agence France-Presse (AFP).15-4-2013

127. OIC Urges UN Action on Burma Muslims, On Islam News 14-4-

2013http://www.onislam.net/english/news/asia-pacific/462267-oic-urges-un-action-on-burma-muslims.html

http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/AP-Forced_Labour_prevails.pdf

http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/tag/daniel-pye-the-irrawaddy

http://www.eurasiareview.com/author/ipcs/

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/05/03/US-report-Myanmars-reforms-are-failing/UPI-77951367554080/#ixzz2SHo7uYgZ

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/05/03/US-report-Myanmars-reforms-are-failing/UPI-77951367554080/#ixzz2SHo7uYgZ

http://www.deccanchronicle.com/130416/commentary-op-ed/commentary/stateless-burma

http://www.deccanchronicle.com/130416/commentary-op-ed/commentary/stateless-burma

http://wp.me/p2JJuA-7T3

http://www.onislam.net/english/news/asia-pacific/462267-oic-urges-un-action-on-burma-muslims.html

http://www.onislam.net/english/news/asia-pacific/462267-oic-urges-un-action-on-burma-muslims.html


107

128. Tuscangate; Kosak, Burmese Neo-Nazi Movement Rising Against Muslims 24-3-2013 Asia

Sentinel, http://wp.me/p2JJuA-7T3 129. Tuscangate; Kosak, Burmese Neo-Nazi Movement Rising Against Muslims 24-3-2013 Asia

Sentinel, http://wp.me/p2JJuA-7T3 130. Tutu Says Burma Must Avoid ‗New Apartheid‘ The Irrawaddy 27-2- 2013

131. Ibid

132. Nai: Aye Suu Kyi calls on citizenship law to be revised DVB 17-4-2013

133. See Annex

134. Phyo Tha;Kyaw, Controversial Citizenship Law to Assess Rohingya‟s Rights: Irrawaddy 29-4-2013

135. Ibid

136. Roughneen;Simon, Arakan Report Angers Rohingya Leaders Irrawaddy 29-4-2013| 137. Ibid

138. Ibid

139. Wade; Francis Islamophobia and the fear of 'the other' in Myanmar Aljazeera

140. Mizzima News 20-3-2013

141. The word Burma will be used as dictators cannot change the name of the country according to their whims and fancies

without the consensus of the people

142. Ibid


2003

144. Ganjanakhundee; Supalak Myanmar elite must alter their thinking on the Rohingya The Nation 27-2 2013

145. Waia; zwell, Is radical Islamic idea forming in Burma? 3-11-2012 by an 18-year-old young editor

of EMG

146. Ibid

147. Permanent Residence enjoys rights like any other citizens except the voting rights is the international norms.

148. Eleven News; Bengalis fancy a "Muslim state": Rakhine ethnic community 3-5-2013

http://elevenmyanmar.com/national/3330-bengalis-fancy-a-muslim-state-rakhine-ethnic-community 149. McCasland;David, Who Owns My Lips In Our Daily Bread April & May

150. Link: http://www.dw.de/myanmars-worrying-transition/a-16678063?maca=en-rss-en-world-4025-rdf 151. Burma‟s Worrying Transition in Deutche Welle

152. Drummond;Andrew Just what is going on in Arakan State? And how reformed in Burma really? Human Rights

Watch Bangkok 27-3-2013

153. Ibid.

154. O Love that will not let me go. Our Daily Bread 3-4-2013

Annex II Message from White House to Free Rohingya Campaign (FRC)

We remain deeply concerned about the situation in Rakhine State and continue to urge the Burmese government to

ensure that actions are taken to maintain calm and increase security and accountability, as these actions are essential

to prevent the recurrence of violence. We recognize the helpful role the military has played in restoring calm, and

we encourage the government

Annex I

The Assessment of the Census Reports for 1871, 1901, and 1911

Races 1871 1901 1911

Mahomedan 58,255 154,887 178,647

Burmese 4,632 35,751 92,185

Arakanese 171,612 230,649 209,432

Shan 334 80 59

Hill Tribes 38,577 35,489 34,020

Others 606 1,355 1,146

__________________________________________________

Total 276,671 481,666 529,



http://elevenmyanmar.com/opinion/1151-is-radical-islamic-idea-forming-in-myanmar

http://elevenmyanmar.com/national/3330-bengalis-fancy-a-muslim-state-rakhine-ethnic-community

http://burmanet.us2.list-manage2.com/track/click?u=de1cb2dc3a1d3641b6857de4e&id=7ceb6bf17e&e=6abb73a8ce


108

to invite assistance from international human rights monitors to ensure respect for human rights and international

humanitarian law. We further encourage the Government of Burma to enable safe, timely, and unhindered

humanitarian and medical access across Rakhine State to all persons in need.

We urge all parties to work together to restore security and stability according to international standards, and to hold

those responsible for the violence fully accountable under just and transparent procedures, adhering to the rule of

law.

We urge the Government of Bangladesh to respect its obligations under international law and to respect and to

reinstate its long-standing policy of non-refoulement, as persons fleeing the violence in Rakhine State may be

refugees or have other protection needs. We encourage the Government of Burma to also work with the international

community on confidence-building and reconciliation efforts. Achieving a long-term solution will require

addressing the of citizenship for the Rohingya population and ensuring their rights are fully protected.

Annex III


109


110

Annex IV

Executive Summary of the Rakhine Investigation Committee (Official)

Therefore, to address the root causes and problems, the Commission recommends the following:

- Agencies responsible for security should heighten cooperation and collaboration with one another.

- The number of security forces in Rakhine should not be withdrawn or reduced in any significant numbers.

- Border security must be increased. A skilled force especially trained and prepared in preventing and resolving

conflicts needs to be put in place as a preventive measure. Such a force must be trained and equipped with modern

and appropriate means of conflict resolution.

A bomb squad also needs to be established to guard against actions by extremist groups.

- In the event that intervention by the Tatmadaw (Armed Forces) is needed to prevent or stop sectarian violence,

those forces must be adequately equipped with weapons for conflict resolution.

- The security forces to prevent the violence must be fully prepared and able to access all areas rapidly. To this end,

they should be equipped with modern telecommunications systems, all-weather vehicles, speedboats and other

suitable transport.

- The role of the Navy needs to be expanded and strengthened. To this end, coastal radar stations and patrol aircraft

should be established. Close circuit television cameras and manmade barriers are needed for 24-hour surveillance

along the border.

- To work closely with the Navy, a marine or coastal patrol force should be established and equipped with assault

boats, in order to ensure effective patrolling of the Rakhine Coast.

- A Special Team comprising a civil-military mix needs to be established and made responsible for gathering

intelligence on extremist organizations and violent groups.

- As a matter of priority, the organization of Immigration service personnel (La-Wa-Ka) in Rakhine State must be

strengthened.

- The Border Immigration Headquarters personnel (BIHQ or Na-Sa-Ka) in Rakhine State have issued certain

administrative orders pertaining to control of the territory. Such control must be continued.

- The authorities should ensure that Rakhine State has an excellent transportation network.

- Bangladesh has scheduled general elections in December 2013. Spill-over effects – such as unrest and infiltration

by extremist groups – may affect the border regions in Rakhine State.

Accordingly, security and other necessary arrangements should be made well in advance.

- The authorities need to set up systems for conflict resolution, for analysis and implementation of Myanmar laws

and regulations, and for prevention of illegal immigration.

- The communities on both sides need to be educated on the relevant laws, regulations and policies and on the nature

of sanctions for those who break the law. Rakhine State‘s civil service needs to be strengthened, in particular, the

Office of General Administration and the Department of Religious Affairs.

- The authorities need to ensure that those who break the law are tried and punished swiftly following due process,

without discrimination between different groups, who should all be equal before the law.

- All who live in Myanmar, including civil servants, are subject to the country‘s laws, regulations and legal

procedures and should follow these rigorously. Those who break the law or act outside the procedures and

regulations should be prosecuted according to the law.

The Government and various organizations are now implementing emergency relief and recovery/rehabilitation

programmes that provide food, shelter, health and education services, and

livelihood opportunities. Although there have been some modest achievements, the response still has many gaps. An

estimated 15% of food needs are still unmet. Some 90% of needs are unmet in the construction and provision of

shelter. The need for shelter is all the more urgent because of the imminent arrival of the rainy season. Basic and

preventive health measures need to be improved and expanded. In the education sector, teachers are urgently

needed, as are other measures to re-open schools and provide a safe learning environment for children. To address

the above problems, the

Commission recommends the following measures as urgent priorities:

- The authorities need to assess and address child malnutrition in Rakhine State. The Inquiry Commission on the

Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State: Executive Summary of the Final Report 23 April 2013.

- Livelihood opportunities for families need to be urgently created and expanded.

- Before the arrival of the monsoon seasons, the IDPs who are in inadequate temporary shelters must be moved into

more secure buildings, and the overcrowding in IDP camps must be reduced.


111

- The authorities need to ensure safe water and adequate numbers of sanitation facilities in IDP camps and amongst

the IDP population.

- The frustration, trauma and anxiety experienced by communities need to be addressed, including through

psychosocial support and counselling.

- Concrete measures must be undertaken to reopen schools and to ensure that children are able to go to school.

- Civic education needs to be implemented to counter extremist teachings, especially in religious schools for the

Muslim communities in Rakhine State. As well, Muslim communities must be able to function in the Myanmar

language; to this end literacy courses3 need to be implemented amongst these communities.

- A local FM radio station broadcasting in local languages should be established, followed by a TV channel.

Rakhine State‘s economy and business environment need to be enhanced, so that livelihood and employment

opportunities are created and expanded. However, this will happen only if the two groups are able to live side-by-

side without conflict and tension. Accordingly, to promote peaceful coexistence, the Commission recommends the

following measures:

- All groups must be able to speak the Myanmar language, and understand Myanmar‘s traditional cultures. Measures

to promote such learning need to be implemented.

- Communication and interaction should be promoted between the Rakhine people and Bengali people.

- Measures need to be taken to instil a sense of loyalty and allegiance to the Union of Myanmar.

- The human rights of all groups must be protected.

- In dealing with illegal immigrants, the government should ensure adherence to human rights principles, taking into

account the international conventions and human rights laws ratified or acceded to by the Republic of the Union of

Myanmar.

- The government needs to urgently initiate a process for examining the citizenship status of people in Rakhine

State, implementing the provisions of the current 1982 Citizenship Law.

- The authorities need to ensure that justice and the rule of law prevail in resolving problems.

- Authorities will need to convene a Task Force comprising moderate leaders from both sides of the divide, to

oversee the implementation of the recommended measures.

- The Government needs to ban the use of hate language by against any religion. In particular, it needs to ban

extremist teachings and activities.

News media influence public opinion and have a special responsibility not to incite further hatred and violence.

Consequently, the Commission recommends the following:

- The responsible authorities need to ban language and actions that inflame tensions and create conflict. The

government needs to issue accurate and fact-based news to ensure openness and transparency and to counter

rumours and falsehoods.

- All villages and communities should be able to receive correct and factual news via radio programmes, news

bulletins, and public address systems. ***************************


112

India-Myanmar relations

P.M. Heblikar Managing Trustee,

Institute of Contemporary Studies Bangalore (ICSB)

P.M. Heblikar retired as Special Secretary to Government of India in September 2010 after over 38 years of service. He was twice decorated by the Government for Meritorious and Distinguished service besides other commendations. He specialized in insurgency and counter-insurgency related developments in India’s northeast region and its external ramifications. Areas of interest included South Asia and South East Asia and Africa. He held several prestigious and sensitive appointments whilst in service at very high levels and on specialist government committees. He is currently Managing Trustee, Institute of Contemporary Studies Bangalore (ICSB). He is a Visiting Professor at the Department of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Manipal University, Manipal (Karnataka), He teaches at the Christ University, Bangalore and at St Josephs College, Bangalore. He is an Adjunct Faculty at National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) Bangalore. The main focus is India’s national security, its interests and objectives. He has contributed articles on national security to several leading Indian magazines and newspapers and addressed seminars in India as well as overseas.

____________________________________________

India-Myanmar relations The return of the military to barracksin 2010 in Myanmar has changed the politico-strategic picture not only in India’s northeast but also equations in Southeast Asia. In the Indian context it has a significant meaning especiallysignaling the end of five decades long “cold war” or “trust deficit” that presided over bilateral relations between India and Myanmar. The fact that the changes in Myanmar were a result ofinternal forces rather than external agentsis important and underlined the maturity of its powerful elite. It is heartening to note that the present ruling dispensation, led by President TheinSein, is in the middle of its five year parliamentary tenure, barring some anxious moments,which is a matter of some satisfaction. In present context Myanmar has an important role in ensuring the security and safety of the northeast region of India especially containing the ethnic insurgency.This is mutually advantageous. Northeast India has a strategic international dimension. It is resource rich. It is not only India’s land bridge to Myanmar but also a gateway to Southeast Asia and beyond. Close proximity to international markets of southwestern China and Southeast Asia makes this region an important base for foreign and domestic investors and in Tandem with the Look East Policy (LEP) gives it’s the ability to tap into the markets of the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN), South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technology and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Effective linkages with both Myanmar and Bangladesh will give this landlocked region access to the ports of Chittagong, Sittwe and of-course, Haldia, India could always look at Homalin in Sagaing Division as yet another port for multi-modal transportation giving a new meaning to tourism, trade and commerce of this region. Development of a dedicated air services network is essential especially to parts of India and Myanmar which have cultural and social links as also business destinations.


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The internal developments in Myanmar continue to be watched by the Indian strategic community with due care and caution. India has great stakes in ensuring that the nascent movement towards multi-party democracy and rule by Constitution remains on track. Any setback in this process is bound to affect the security on India’s northeast region in particular. Senior Indian political analysts opine that the efforts towards democratization initiated by U Thein Sein and his reform minded colleagues are a challenge of major proportions. One of the major hurdles is the nature of the present constitution, though controversial and heavily tilted in favor of the military. The analysts note that the second and arguably very serious obstacle is the preamble of the Constitution that favors the majority community without providing safeguards to the ethnic and religious minority. Further, the ethnic civil war has been contained by several patch work ceasefire agreements and this animated relationship has often witnessed violence and ending in major military skirmishes. The religious intolerance between the Rakhine Muslims and the majority community has been a test of the fragile law and order machinery and patience of the minority groups. Events in the past have left an impression that the authorities lacked vision and ability to heal the wounds, the situation has worsened in recent months. Continued neglect of this sensitive and emotional subject could have graver repercussions and deteriorate into violence as witnessed twenty years ago and recently. Support to the Rohingya community could come from its traditional support base and introduce a new element into this sensitive region. This cannot be administered by laws made in Nay Pyi Taw or by sheer military might, China faces the same problem in Xinjian and is using methods that are widening the gap rather than addressing issues. Continued tensions could negate efforts of Bangladesh Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, who has dealt Islamic fundamentalism a massive blow in her present tenure. This has seen telling results. Myanmar authorities could well provide grounds for revival of Islamic extremism if they continue to ignore the problem. Reports emanating from Myanmar point to the upcoming government sponsored conclave of ethnic groups, which is expected to address several outstanding issues. No political event in Myanmar is complete without either a reference to DawAung San SuuKyi (ASSK) or the National League for Democracy (NLD). Despite efforts by the erstwhile State Peace and Development Committee (SPDC) to marginalize the NLD, it even today remains a powerful political force across the political spectrum and its role and influence cannot be underestimated. Like-wise, the role of ASSK in the national political context needs to understood, she has expressed a desire to run for the presidency. This is the scenario that Indian political establishment will need to keep in mind especially in the run-up to 2015 and 2020. In bilateral terms India has responded with alacrity to post 2010 developments in Myanmar. This has been underlined in political terms by the exchange of high level visits at the level of Head of State and Head of Government and others. The visit by ASSK several months ago to India was another manifestation of the desire to strengthen relations with high value political individuals. It will be remembered that India awarded her the prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru peace prize in 1993 even as the Indian army was flushing out Indian rebels operating in areas opposite Mizoram. The Myanmar army withdrew support to its Indian counterpart thus allowing the Indian Insurgent groups to escape capture. This commenced a period of extreme cold war between the two countries, which lasted till 1996. India needs to look to 2015 when the current dispensation will have to seek renewal of its mandate. President TheinSein has not indicated whether he will be a candidate at the 2015 polls, this is important and needs to be kept in mind especially the succession issue. ASSK has already announced her decision. The possibility of new equations emerging should be kept in mind as also the thinking in the powerful military establishment. More evidence is still needed to assess whether the process of democratization is on track and whether there is the stamina to move forward despite problems of ethnic and religious nature. India’s equation with the senior leadership of the NLD is well known. It is important also to gauge the mood of the “middle class” to recent developments. There is political vacuum in the countryespecially of leaders most of whom fell victims to the policies of Ne Win and that of his successors. India has every reason to increase its outreach to include the younger generation of the NLD, the future leadership of Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the various ethnic groups. This is very important. The Indian origin community too requires attention. India has


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contacts with some ethnic groups namely the Kachins and their southern cousins – the Chins.Sizeable bodies of students from these two groups have been to educational institutions in India. Myanmar’s military has dominated national life for over six decades and is well entrenched in the body politic. It not only controls the political scene but also the economy of the country to a large extent. The military will not cede reins of power in the absence of iron clad guarantees assuring its central role and therefore its interlocutors, both national and international, will have to live with this realism. In the Indian context, it must be said that the military of both countries have enjoyed excellent equation as witnessed by regular exchange of high level visits and other developments. The same is true in respect of the intelligence and security agencies. On the trade and investment side, Commerce and Industry minister, Anand Sharma’s June 6, 2013 stated at Nay PyiDaw that India will invest USD. 2.6 billion in next 2-3 years and bilateral trade is to reach USD. 3. billion 2015 from USD. 1.872 billion in 2012. India is currently Myanmar’s fourth largest trading partner after Thailand, Singapore and China. More obviously would need to done in critical infrastructure, social and agriculture sector. The involvement of the northeastern states in the trade and business activities of Myanmar is important. In fact integration of efforts is even more important. Northeast region should become a Special Economic Export Zone (SEZ). The involvement of the Chief Ministers of each of the states in this region is important and there is every reason for their presence in delegations to Myanmar or Bangladesh. This will augur well for the Look East Policy (LEP) and help expedite the development of the region. India has an enormous role in capacity building activities in Myanmar given the strength of the private and corporate sector especially in the education, family health, medical, research and referral in specialist medical services, law and judiciary, media and banking. India could also consider offering its police training and higher institutions of learning to Myanmar police department. In a country that is striving towards a civilian parliamentary democracy, strengthening of civilian police establishment is important. It is imperative that India too looks at various options to strengthen its presence and influence in Myanmar. One major priority is to look at joint ventures with Japan, Vietnam and South Korea which are already in the ambit of the Look East Policy, India’s LEP could enmesh with that of Japan’s Look West Policy (LWP). Taiwan is another major business partner in this region and should come within the expanded LEP. The efforts of the West bloc to re-engage Myanmar after decades of isolationis moving in the right direction and will take several years to achieve results. China will remain a key partner of Myanmar despite the winds of change, Myanmar is the key to China’s Look South Policy and it is unlikely that this will undergo major changes in the short-medium term. China has invested over USD.17.billion in Myanmar directly and indirectly and is unlikely to allow this to be threatened. The area surrounding India’s northeast region is gradually becoming internationally active. Myanmar’s return to the international fold has opened up many challenges for India. The most important one is to keep the process of democratization on track.Myanmar holds the key to peace and security in the region and especially on our side of the border. A sustained approach is now unavoidable and must become a comprehensive part of India’s national security policy.

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Myanmar’s Integration to the International Community

Dr. Rajaram Panda Dr. Rajaram Panda, an alumnus of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, is a leading expert from India on East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, with focus on Japan and Korea. He was formerly Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, and is currently Visiting Faculty at the Centre for Japanese, Korean and Northeast Asian Studies, School of Language, Literature & Culture Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University and Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. He is the author of seven books (2 sole-authored and 5 co-edited) and published over 100 research papers in professional journals. He has rich presence in websites, print and electronic media. He was Visiting Fellow at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, (1979), Australian National University, Canberra (1979), and Asahi Shimbun Foundation Fellow (1992-93) at Reitaku University. Dr. Panda will take up the Japan Foundation Fellowship from January 2014 at the Toin Yokohama University, Yokohama, for 10 months. Dr. Panda is widely traveled throughout Asia to present papers in conferences. E-mail: [email protected]

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Introduction Myanmar’s tryst with democracy, however managed it may be, seems to be bearing fruits as the international community is losing no time to embrace and also woo the country. After Myanmar’s military leaders formally stepped down in 2011, leaders from democratically elected countries have flocked to the country to encourage further political and economic changes. Leaders from the US, South Korea, India, Japan, Britain, and the United National Secretary General Ban Ki-moon made beeline to cultivate the leadership in Myanmar. While South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited Myanmar in May 2012, accompanied by several business leaders, including the president of Daewoo International Corp., which is spending $1.7 billion to develop a natural gas field in Myanmar and sell its production to China, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh became the first Prime Minister to visit Myanmar in 25 years. In particular, President Lee’s visit was significant in the sense that he travelled to Myanmar from Beijing, where he had met Chinese and Japanese leaders for an annual trilateral summit. This shows that both South Korea and Japan are on board so far as their countries’ Myanmar policy is concerned. In other words, there is recognition in the two East Asian countries about China’s incursion and growing influence in Myanmar, which has a large strategic connotation as well. Even India cannot ignore this fact. South Korea is the fourth largest foreign investor in Myanmar after China, Hong Kong and Thailand. Apart from pledging economic support, Myanmar’s military ties with North Korea and alleged links for nuclear weapon programs are not only worrying to South Korea but to India as well. So far as India is concerned, the single most factor that is driving both India and South Korea is geo-strategic and economic considerations. Besides Myanmar’s geo-strategic significance, both the countries have taken note that Myanmar is a resource rich country where China alone accounts for more than 70 per cent of FDI in the hydrocarbon sector. In India and elsewhere, the victory of Suu Kyi’s party, NLD, in the by-election is seen as further opening the doors for political reforms in the country.



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In the past, Suu Kyi has always urged New Delhi to play a more active role in democratization of Myanmar, insisting that India should not be driven purely by commercial considerations. While India always supported the pro-democracy movement, it also simultaneously courted the military junta as it tried to rein in rebels in the northeast and also to ensure that it did not lose out to other nations in tapping Myanmar’s considerable energy sources.

Myanmar and Europe On its part, Myanmar too has responded positively to outside world’s readiness to embrace into its fold and to integrate to their economies. This was demonstrably clear during President Thein Sein’s five-nation European tour in February 2013. President Thein Sein’s five nation tour of Europe was a clear indication of the Myanmar government’s eagerness to re-engage with the EU and its members. President Sein visited Finland, Austria, European Council, and Italy from 2 February to 7 March. While in Finland, President Sein held meetings with Finnish President Saului Niinisto and Nobel Laureate Martti Ahtisaari and held discussions on Myanmar’s on-going political reforms, peace-keeping processes and assistance in promoting human development tasks. The Finnish President promised to assist Myanmar in the establishment of good governance, rule of law and peace-keeping processes in the country. Nobel Laureate Ahtisaari discussed the role of the Crisis Management Initiative Group’s efforts in urging EU to engage with Myanmar. While in Austria on 5 March, Austrian President Dr. Heinz Fisher discussed with the Myanmar President political reforms, nation-building endeavours, peace-keeping processes with national races armed groups as well as the full lifting of sanctions imposed on Myanmar by the EU. President Sein also had discussion with Austrian Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament and discussed further strengthening of ties at the inter-governmental, inter-parliamentary and people-to-people levels. He also attended the Myanmar-Austria Economic Forum and urged those present to invest in Myanmar.


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In Brussels, President Sein called on the heads of the three EU institutions and discussed democratic reforms, peace-making processes with ethnic groups as well as promoting cooperation in education, health, tourism and exchange of culture between Myanmar and EU. What was significant was that the issue of human rights and lifting of sanctions were also raised. He also attended the signing ceremony on cooperation in Crisis Response between EU and Myanmar on 6 March. Whilst in Rome, President Sein discussed with his counterpart Giorgeo Napolitano about ongoing political economic reforms, promotion of human rights, peace processes, closer cooperation in trade, culture and other sectors, assistance in Myanmar’s agricultural development drive and microfinance works, and cooperation with two armed forces. During the visit, the Agreement on the Treatment (Cancellation and Rescheduling) of the Debt and Agreement on Debt-for-Development Swap was also signed. The Italian President and Prime Minister recognized the positive changes taking place in the country and promised to offer more help and closer cooperation and agreed that EU should lift the overall sanctions against Myanmar. What it transpired in concrete terms was that Myanmar was now eager to re-engage with the EU and its members. In the past, due to the sanctions imposed by EU, engagement at the highest level was unthinkable. The meetings in Brussels with the presidents of the EU Council, Parliament and Commission are signs that cooperation and readiness to engage with Myanmar are now gaining momentum. In his meeting with his counterparts and EU officials, President Thein Sein urged for the complete removal of sanctions as well as reinstating the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) to Myanmar. In return, EU committed more flow of aid, while at the same time adopting a wait and see approach. As part of its re-engagement policy, the EU has been in the forefront in providing assistance to end the conflict between the government and ethnic armed groups. Myanmar’s critical role in ASEAN Once a divisive pariah, Myanmar is increasingly being seen as the key to unity in Southeast Asia. The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations once disagreed with the West over Myanmar sanctions. Now the opening of the country's economy could help ASEAN attain a big prize. With Myanmar’s openings, the ASEAN hope to use this opportunity to form a Southeast Asian economic community by the end of 2015. These countries expect that an economic community would help cut costs and make it easier to do business across the region, thereby adding to the region’s already burgeoning appeal to outside investors.

Do these expectations reflect the ground realities? Much howsoever optimistic the ASEAN’s stand may be, it transpired in the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Brunei in early July 2013 that even a small-scale Southeast Asian version of the EU looks increasingly unlikely to happen soon.1 This is because disagreements over who is at fault for a throat-clogging haze blanketing parts of Malaysia and Singapore as well as saber-rattling over the disputed South China Sea overshadowed discussion on economic integration. It is a pity that despite more than four decades of cooperation, the region's countries are suspicious of any development that appears to trump national sovereignty. If ASEAN is going to become an economic bloc, member states will have to overcome this reluctance, given that any process of regional economic integration, and particularly the far-reaching project of a single market and production base, requires regional institutional and decision-making structures which go beyond the traditional sphere of the national autonomy and sovereignty. Another


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deterring factor could be the uneven economic development in ASEAN member countries. For example, Singapore is too wealthy vis-à-vis Myanmar which is newly reforming. However, so long as Myanmar keeps its doors open for business, investors will not remain shy of bringing investment money. Since the 2008 economic downturn in the West, the ASEAN countries have posted strong growth and the US-ASEAN Business Council, a US business-backed lobby group in the region, feels that if the cumulative economy of the region is measured as a whole, the ASEAN could create the world’s ninth biggest economy.

IF ASEAN succeeds to create a sort of mini-EU by 2015, the role of foreign businesses will be crucial. In this scenario, Myanmar will be a key driver of the proposed economic community. Myanmar was appointed as ASEAN chair for the first time in 2014, the pivotal year before the bloc is supposed to be established. The US removed the sanctions against what was a military dictatorship and likely to grant some of the same concessions to Myanmar as it gives to 127 other countries. The opening up of the US market, along with new curbs put on imports from neighboring Bangladesh means a good opportunity for the Myanmar garment makers. It would allow Myanmar’s vital garment sector, which employs around 150,000 people, to regain a foothold in the US market lost during the sanctions era. Yet, there still lurks a fear that once the economic bloc is created, it will benefit established companies from richer countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand over businesses from the poorer nations. Myanmar may have a critical role in pushing economic union plan but commercial rivalries could still disrupt that role. The fact that ASEAN economies are characterized by competition than complementarity cannot be ignored.

President Thein Sein’s visit to the US

When President Thein Sein visited the US and had a summit meeting with President Obama in May 2013, he became the first leader of Myanmar to do so in nearly half a century. It marked the latest US effort to reward him for introducing reforms after decades of military rule. The White House meeting with President Obama also represented a rapid diplomatic boost for Thein Sein, whom the US removed from a blacklist of foreign officials denied entry to the country in 2012. Obama previously recognized Myanmar’s reform efforts by making the first visit to that nation by a sitting US president in November 2012. The White House said Obama was committed to supporting countries such as Myanmar that make a decision to “embrace reform.”

The US policy towards Myanmar, however, does not have universal approval both in the US and Myanmar. Rights groups accused Obama of sending the wrong message to Myanmar. According to them, Thein Sein’s White House invitation reduced pressure on him to release political dissidents and stop alleged rights abuses against Myanmar’s ethnic minorities. Some US lawmakers also said they will try to slow the process of lifting US sanctions on Myanmar to keep the pressure on Thein Sein to address those concerns. But Obama’s intentions are long term. He wants to help Thein Sein to overcome resistance within the Myanmarese military toward further democratic change. By embracing Myanmar, Obama wants to strengthen his strategy to boost ties with Southeast Asian nations as a counterweight to China’s growing regional power.2

Myanmar’s leaders do indeed face critical challenges in restoring the country to full democracy. The decades of influence and control of the military would not go away so soon from the system. While further developing democracy, the leadership had to address communal and ethnic tensions and there have been excesses at times while controlling them. But a mix of strengthening democracy while creating economic opportunity is a double-edged sword. Controlling political dissent are addressing civil strife are new challenges to the leadership in Myanmar.


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But human rights activists do not buy this argument. The US-based group for Human Rights released a report in May, accusing the Myanmar authorities of standing by while militants attacked an Islamic boarding school in the central town of Meiktile in March 2013. It said assailants killed at least 20 children and four teachers.3 The report’s lead author, Richard Sollom, urged Obama to “persuade Burma’s leader that the only path from tyranny to democracy is through the promotion and respect of human rights.” Sollom also called on Thein Sein to support an independent investigation into the Meiktila killings and to “bring perpetrators to justice and speak out forcefully against ongoing anti-Muslim violence.”

On its part, the US has continued to advocate for continued progress on reform by Thein Sein's government, in close cooperation with Aung San Suu Kyi, civil society leaders, and the international community. The two leaders discussed the "many remaining challenges" and focused on how to develop democracy, end ethnic tensions particularly with the Rohingya Muslim minority in the Rakhine state, and improve the economic, social and human rights environment in Myanmar.

A point often overlooked is if the US has accepted the change of the country’s name from Burma to Myanmar. This time Obama and his Press Secretary Jay Carney called Burma as Myanmar, implying the US might have accepted the decades-long demand by the authorities of Myanmar that Burma be called Myanmar. It transpired soon that the US government over time has begun to allow limited use of the name Myanmar as a diplomatic courtesy, reminding that "Burma has undertaken a number of positive reforms, including releasing over 850 political prisoners," therefore the US government has responded by "more frequently using the name Myanmar".

Thein Sein did admit and Obama acknowledged that the transition to democracy is a long journey and that more has be to done regarding the establishment of a fully democratic system that respects ethnic minorities and subordinates the military to civilian oversight. Notwithstanding the longstanding and still essential relationship it shares with China, Myanmar may count someday among the close partners of the US within the framework of the global rebalance toward the Asia Pacific region.4

Rewarding the former pariah state for progress on reforms, Obama named the first US ambassador in two decades in May 2013 and announced a further easing of economic reforms. Derek Mitchell, former Secretary Clinton’s special envoy on Myanmar and who played a lead role in formulating the administration’s response to Myanmar’s movement towards reform over the past year will be US ambassador to Myanmar in 22 years. Calling the moves “the beginning of a new chapter” in relations with Myanmar, Obama said the new steps were part of the US making good on a pledge “to respond to positive developments in Burma and to clearly demonstrate America’s commitment” to a continuing transition.5

However, the administration’s efforts to calibrate the lifting of US sanctions to the pace of reforms in Myanmar are not to everyone’s liking. Some US lawmakers say the administration should be moving faster to lift all remaining sanctions, while some human rights groups criticize the actions taken so far as too much for too little – particularly in the area of minority rights.

Assessing Myanmar’s reforms

For more than half a century, Myanmar’s military governments were synonymous with brutality and corruption. Accused of savagery in their prosecution of civil wars with rebellious ethnic minorities, drug running, forced labor on a massive scale, and other human rights violations,


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successive generals brought the country, once one of Southeast Asia’s most prosperous nations, to economic ruin. A year ago the military stepped aside, handing power to a nominally civilian government made up largely of former generals that have instituted political reforms, signed ceasefires with most of the ethnic minorities, and promised economic modernization. Here are four reasons why the military changed its course:

(a) Leaders protecting themselves Gen Thein Sein, the man who ran Myanmar until last year, may have had his eye on history when he handed over power. Traditionally, Myanmar's military dictators who handed over power to the successive dictator have soon found themselves in jail or under house arrest and their relatives stripped of the wealth they had accumulated. By paving the way to a nominally civilian government, Than Shwe made sure that power is no longer wielded by one man who would be strong enough to turn on him. Instead, power in Myanmar today is diffused among the military, different factions of the government, and an increasingly active and demanding parliament. Than Shwe is now quietly in the background, presumably enjoying the material fruits he gathered while he ran Burma and decided who should be granted lucrative business deals in the resource-rich country.

(b) Decreasing dependence on China

Isolated from most of the western world by its behavior and by economic sanctions, Myanmar has been forced to rely more and more on its giant neighbor China. Beijing did its diplomatic best to support Myanmar in international fora and became Myanmar’s indispensable ally: the generals get all their weapons from China (which can set the price and the quality, in the absence of competition), do 35 percent of their trade with China, and have let Chinese firms build controversial dams in Myanmar to feed the Chinese appetite for hydroelectricity. Chinese businessmen and traders have been flooding into northern Myanmar in recent years, and they are not popular with the local people. Indeed, the Myanmar people have long mistrusted China, and the military has not forgotten that it spent a lot of time, and lost a lot of lives, putting down a Communist rebellion supported by Beijing. The Myanmar government appeared to decide that the only way to lessen its humiliating and debilitating dependence on China was to introduce a little competition from western nations. But to do that, they had to persuade the US and the European Union to lift the economic sanctions imposed because of their human rights violations. The best way to do that was to launch a political opening, and persuade the world that Myanmar was on the road to democracy. Therefore, holding elections are important.

(C) Ending western sanctions and economic woes

For 26 years, until 1988, the military government led by Ne Win imposed what it called a “Burmese Road to Socialism” which bore many similarities to North Korea’s economic path and led to many of the same appalling results. Subsequent efforts to open up the economy bore some fruit, but as more and more senior Myanmar officials traveled around Southeast Asia, the realization of just how far behind this country fell sunk in. Fifty years ago Myanmar


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was the biggest rice exporter in the world. Today it is the poorest country in Southeast Asia. They see this as a matter for national shame. Myanmar has committed itself to joining the ASEAN common market in 2015; if it is going to be able to catch up and keep up it needs to bring its economy into the 21st century, and to do that it needs international help from as many directions as possible. That means an end to western sanctions – and that means democratization, or at least enough to satisfy the West.

(D) Little credit goes to "Arab Spring"

What is happening in Myanmar, however, is not an Asian version of the “Arab Spring.” The generals launched themselves on the road to political reform several years ago, albeit slowly – long before they might have been frightened into it by events in the Middle East. More importantly, the reforms have not come as a result of popular uprisings; in fact the government successfully (if brutally) put down uprisings in 1988 and 2007, when many observers thought Buddhist monks might be leading a “Saffron Revolution.” Instead, the reform process has been imposed from the top down. The generals decided for their own reasons that they wanted to leave power on their own terms. Of course, watching the “Arab Spring” unrest spread around the Middle East, they probably congratulated themselves for being prescient.

According to Vikram Nehru, a senior associate in the Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “the progress in Myanmar is real, but that the country’s leaders have so far delivered more political than economic reforms”.6 While on political reforms, Myanmar can boast of releasing political prisoners, unmuzzling the press, allowing peaceful assembly of people, etc, in the economic realm, it has little to claim to feel proud. Among economic reforms, the Thein Sein government has passed a bill to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and liberalized other imports. There are other reforms agenda that include a central banking law, and other laws that “would provide basic institutional and legal frameworks for a functional economy”.7 The biggest challenge is how to deliver results quickly as inordinate delay will disillusion the people. In terms of resource endowment, Myanmar is blessed with plenty of oil, gas, jade, gems and minerals. The government has to ensure that money is channeled through the budget in a transparent fashion and used to increase infrastructure and provide additional resources for health and education for the poor.

According to Nehru, two things continue to hold back Myanmar’s economy: the need to liberalize investment licensing, and the need to confront the vested interests in trade—what he calls “the cronies and large business groups that benefited from the earlier regime and still dominate the economy. He further says: “So far the reforms that have taken place have not necessarily affected the small interest groups in Myanmar, and that will be the litmus test of how far this government is willing to go”.8 Under the current licensing system, licenses are allocated based not on “whether you are particularly efficient, but whether you can work the system”. “The system lends itself to corruption, creates monopolies, stops growth and investment,” he continues. “This will be a test of whether the government is willing to put together policies in the national interest and not in the interest of a few small and very powerful groups.”9

The real test of democracy that Myanmar will face is when elections are held in 2015. The question that looms is whether the military will retain its current share of parliamentary power and, more


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broadly, whether the elections will be free and fair. As these elections approach, outside observers must watch closely to ensure that the government does not roll back its reforms “or put the genie back in the bottle”. So far the US is concerned, it must be patient as the complicated domestic dynamics within Myanmar may contribute to the delay in consolidating further reforms. A prosperous, stable and democratic Myanmar is in the US interests, particularly the US rebalance towards Asia. Two difficult states –Myanmar and North Korea – continued to threaten to destabilize Asia. But now with Myanmar opting for democracy, North Korea will remain the only other country in Asia without democracy. It will be in everyone’s interest to support democracy in Myanmar because it will lend to greater stability across the region.

Japan and Myanmar

Going along with the international community to accommodate Myanmar after it choose to reforms, Japan’s Prime Minister too paid a visit to Myanmar in late May 2013 for a summit meeting with Thein Sein. The aim was to accelerate Japanese efforts to promote economic development and democratization there. Abe’s visit was the first time in around 36 years for a Japanese prime minister to visit Myanmar. The last was Takeo Fukuda in August 1977. Abe’s visit will also help counter Beijing’s influence in Myanmar, which grew during its years of long isolation under military rule. Abe also met Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi after the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner visited Japan in April 2013, the first time in almost 27 years at the invitation of the Japanese government.

In 1985-86, for nine months at Kyoto University, Suu Kyi did research on Myanmar’s independence movement and her father Gen Aung San, who was instrumental in achieving Myanmar’s (then called Burma) independence from Britain. When Myanmar was under the military rule and faced strong criticism from Western countries for its oppression of the democracy movement, Japan continued to have relations with the military regime. Suu Kyi criticized Japan for supporting the regime and expressed dissatisfaction with Japan’s economic assistance to Myanmar on the grounds that it would only benefit the military government. The Japan Times observed in an editorial thus: “The Japanese government should use Ms. Suu Kyi’s current visit to Japan as a good chance to strengthen channels of communication with her and the opposition forces in Myanmar so that Japan can have a broad-based relationship with the country.”10 After her election to the lower house of the Myanmar Parliament in April 2012, she visited Thailand, Switzerland, Norway, Ireland, Britain, the United States, India and South Korea but refrained from visiting Japan. Her decision later to accept the invitation meant she thought it would be in Myanmar’s best interest as Japan is a major donor of economic assistance. The editorial exhorted the Japanese government to establish a trustful relationship with her as her party might sweep the polls when held in 2015. Japan to support a leader who has been fighting for democratization for which she suffered 14 years in either jail or house arrest will be befitting for a country championing for rule of law, democracy and human rights.

Japan is aware that Myanmar has been attracting foreign investment since it started a transition towards democracy in March 2011 and does not want to lose the opportunity to participate. Myanmar is widely seen as Asia’s last untapped frontier with relatively cheap and abundant labour. Therefore, Abe decided to travel to Naypyitaw in May 2013 after the trilateral summit between Japan, China and South Korea in Beijing. During his summit with Thein Sein, Abe conveyed Tokyo’s intention to help improve the investment environment and infrastructure in Myanmar. He also announced plan to strengthen support for Myanmar’s ethnic minorities by building schools,


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providing technical assistance in farming and giving other forms of aid if a national reconciliation be reached.11 Abe pledged the support of the “whole of Japan”, its public and private sectors alike for the country’s reforms process to ensure its continued democratic and economic advancement. In particular, Japan’s assistance will be directed towards development of Myanmar’s infrastructure, such as its power grid, a high-speed communication network, transportation routes and waterworks, as well as thermal power operations and its legal system.12 Abe was accompanied with representatives of around 40 companies keen to explore a highly promising new market.

Abe inspected the Thilawa special economic zone near Yangon that is scheduled to open in 2015 with a fresh yen loan, and observed the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Japanese and Myanmar corporate representatives on the zone’s development. He later told a Japan-Myanmar business seminar attended by more than 400 people that his visit is not aimed at “simply calculating profits” that Japanese companies could rack up in the fast-emerging economy, but rather at “assisting the nation-building efforts of Myanmar, which is an old friend of Japan and overcame many difficulties.”13 The Thilawa economic zone is expected to draw a host of manufacturing companies, “symbolizes bilateral cooperation” between Japan and Myanmar and will generate significant new employment locally.

As a gesture of respect to history, Abe and his wife, Akie, laid a wreath at the Martyrs’ Mausoleum in Yangon to pay tribute to Myanmar’s independence hero, Gen. Aung San, Suu Kyi’s father, and his colleagues, who were assassinated at the site in 1947. He also visited a cemetery for Japanese who perished in the country during and after the war, as well as an elementary school on the outskirts of Yangon that was established with funds from a Diet lawmakers’ group headed by Abe in 2004.

Thus it transpired that Japan’s strategy towards Myanmar which had been one of “watching and waiting” during the long spell of military rule and international sanctions were now replaced by active economic engagement. Japanese aid has manifested itself in numerous ways, but not least in capacity-building via advice and support to the Myanmar government in areas such as banking budgetary and monetary policy. Significantly, Japan has also been a buyer of Myanmar’s rice export crop.

There is no doubt Japan's Myanmar is driven by economic consideration but it is also very closely aligned to the country's broader foreign policy goals. Like many countries, Japan has been concerned in recent years about the degree to which Myanmar had begun to fall under the sway of China, to the extent indeed of becoming a client state of this rising global power. Accordingly, Japan has been quick off the mark in providing Myanmar with strategic alternatives. Given Japan's long historical ties to Myanmar and the obvious strategic motivations, this was to be expected.14

Australia and Myanmar

Following other world leaders making effort to integrate Myanmar to the world community, Australia expressed eagerness to be partners in reforms. Prime Minister Julia Gillard (since replaced with Kevin Rudd) expressed to the visiting President Thein Sein in Canberra on 18 March that her government will be involved in Myanmar’s economic development projects.

Australia agreed to provide $20 million over two years for the first phase of the Myanmar-Australia Partnership for Reform. This Partnership will support the Myanmar Government to deliver its reform agenda—strengthening democratic institutions, promoting human rights, improving


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economic governance and advancing the rule of law. Thein Sein also met a dozen Myanmar students, studying in Canberra on Australia Awards scholarships. Their degrees range from Bachelors to PhDs, across subjects as diverse as health, education, and international relations, and will give them the skills needed to contribute to development and reform their country.

Australia’s existing aid program to Myanmar is set to increase to $100 million per year by 2015, improving health outcomes, increasing incomes of the rural poor and supporting the peace process. Out of this funding, $80 million over four years will support basic education and tertiary scholarships, and in 2013 alone Australian aid will help more than 34,000 children access early childhood education, train over 9500 teachers and provide supplies to 62,000 primary school students.

The Partnership builds on the Memorandum of Understanding on Development Cooperation between the two countries—the first such agreement Myanmar has signed with a Western nation. The Memorandum allows for close consultation to determine activities that will best support Myanmar’s reform agenda.

The partnership will contribute to sustainable and equitable economic development in Myanmar. Australia is supporting the Government of Myanmar’s commitment to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative to help ensure that the benefits of growth are felt by all Myanmar’s people. It will also support the Myanmar Human Rights Commission in its efforts to train government officials and civil society to be more accountable. Strengthening the Commission will help it build awareness of human rights issues in Myanmar.

Through its Australia Awards, Australia offers scholarships funded by the Australian Government, offering an opportunity to study, research and undertake professional development for the next generation of leaders from around the world. There has never been a more important time to provide this support for Myanmar. The ambitious program of reform being undertaken by the Myanmar Government cannot be realised without development of the nation’s human resources. The Australia Awards are keys to building the necessary skills to realise this goal.

Total Australian Government expenditure for the Australia Awards in 2012 was $334.2 million enabling more than 4900 recipients from more than 140 countries to undertake further study, research and professional development. There are 33 Myanmar students currently studying in Australia and another 30 are due to start in 2013. Australia Awards build enduring people-to-people links between Australia, its regional neighbours and the broader international community. Among the Awards Alumni are government ministers, members of parliament and ambassadors, as well as leaders in the fields of education, public health, trade, agriculture, education and economic development.

Google makes move

Google’s Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt, pressing his belief in the advantage of being a first mover, visited Myanmar in March 2013, the country with the third-lowest rate of Internet access in the world. The trip followed his controversial visit in January to North Korea, where there is no discernible Internet at all. But there is more to the difference between North Korea and Myanmar than 1 percent (the proportion of people in Myanmar with an Internet connection.) Pyongyang is showing no signs of opening up, while Myanmar has transformed itself through a wave of economic


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and political reforms into a potential fount of opportunity for foreign business people. Those reforms have unchained the Internet, for a start. Once among the most heavily censored in the world, Myanmar’s websites are now effectively free.

The reforms have also induced the US and other Western countries to lift almost all the economic sanctions they had imposed on the former military government. That has made business possible for Western firms that are now chomping at the bit to get a piece of the action in Asia’s last virgin market – one that is 60 million strong.

In Myanmar, Schmidt made a speech to entrepreneurs, computer enthusiasts, and business leaders before meeting government leaders. Though greater access to information will help business, one cannot expect immediate results. In the longer run, the prospect of a more prosperous Myanmar carries with it a rapidly expanding market for information technology products, but the country is currently the poorest in Asia, where even electricity supplies are unreliable. Internet access is not only paltry – ahead of only North Korea and East Timor in World Bank ratings – but also excruciatingly slow and prone to sudden cuts. “

Mobile phone access is also among the lowest in the world; only 9 percent of Myanmar’s citizens had a mobile phone at the beginning of 2013, compared to 70 percent in nearby Cambodia. And in neighboring Thailand there were more cell phones than citizens. The government hopes to increase access in Myanmar to 80 percent by 2016. The number of mobile phone owners is limited both by inadequate network infrastructure and the high price of SIM cards, which cost $226. But Thein Sein has made mobile telephones a key element of his government’s policy. In January 2013 the authorities invited international tenders for two telecoms licenses, which should be granted anytime in 2013.

SIM cards could cost just a few dollars, putting them within reach of most consumers, if the president has his way. Improved telecommunications would increase broadband speed and make Internet connections faster and more reliable. Cheaper SIM cards would open up the telephone handset market. Google, as the largest Internet company in the world and the maker of the Android platform for smartphones, stands to profit from both developments.

China and Myanmar

China had a leadership change in early 1013 but this is unlikely to dramatically change China’s Myanmar policy, notwithstanding Myanmar’s opening up policy. Myanmar occupies an important position in China’s long term plans to access the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean for strategic reasons. China has so far invested over $ 17 billion in Myanmar since the commencement of its “Look South” policy in the early eighties mainly in the infrastructure sector comprising communications, road, rail, shipping, ports and power generation. There is also the military cooperation component. The period 1990-2003 is considered to be the best in their bilateral relations during which Beijing successfully prevented international isolation of the military regime in exchange for economic and other opportunities.

China’s Look South policy was aimed to develop its poorer land-locked southern provinces and subsequently integrated them into that of Myanmar for economic benefit and to “create a north-south corridor” to gain access to the Indian Ocean through the Bay of Bengal. The oil and gas rich potential of Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal was one important consideration, the other was to reduce its dependence on the long and uneconomical South China Sea route to reach the Indian


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Ocean via the Malacca Straits. The carefully crafted plan began when China forced, its proxy, the Burma Communist Party (BCP) to cease its anti-Myanmar military operations and nudged sixteen other ethnic armies to “swap arms for peace” with the military junta to create peace and stability in the border regions so vital for its plans. This was followed by a period of honeymoon between the two countries.15

When the Myanmar leadership removed Lieut-Gen. Khin Nyunt, from three most powerful posts in 2004, it was a severe blow to China as he was distinctly pro-China. The rising chorus of anti-Chinese feeling within the armed forces and among the people is believed to be a significant reason along with the clamour for diversification away from China. Indian foreign policy planners, military experts and intelligence officials who interacted with Khin Nyunt at many levels will no doubt recall him as an astute and shrewd tactician. It may well be that Khin Nyunt’s ouster augured well for India.

Recently, Chinese influence in Myanmar has considerably waned. The military has returned to barracks, a new but controversial constitution is in place, parliament is in position, the civilian government of Thein Sein is in power and it has taken several important decisions including the much celebrated cancellation of the Chinese funded multi-billion dollar Myitsone power project. It has distanced itself from North Korea as seen in reports of Thein Sein-Hillary Clinton talks. There are many developments in Myanmar that would have been impossible to imagine few years ago.

Now that the world community has realized that the reforms are irreversible, China’s influence and leverage in Myanmar will considerably wane. So far, it is a “managed democracy” and the process of democratization is still way off. The present constitution is tilted heavily in favour of the military and this will gradually be changed. These changes in Myanmar present a serious dilemma for the new elite in Beijing. Beijing will certainly not rejoice the US “presence” as it would be detrimental to its long term interests. The monopoly of twenty years would be reduced with multiple players presently involved in Myanmar. China obviously values security, stability and absence of tension on its borders with Myanmar – this has been the corner stone of its Look South policy. It also has been an important player in helping to resolve ethnic issues especially of the Kachins, Shans and Karens with the federal authorities. Both sides have exchanged several high level delegations that are seen as confidence retaining measures. On its part China has cultivated political parties including NLD and kept its lines open to all shades of public opinion in Myanmar and outside. China will need to adjust to changing realities in Myanmar from its perspectives.

Though the West is injecting funds for infrastructural projects and modernizing Myanmar’s science and technology sector, it will take quite some time to balance the influence of China given China’s deep economic entrenchment in Myanmar over the years.16 To meet the increased Western influence in Myanmar, China too has started a new strategy: charm offensive whereby Beijing has ordered secretive state-owned Chinese companies to do something they have rarely done before – publicly embrace Western style corporate social responsibility practices and act humbly towards the people who live near their vaunted projects. In the long term, it is difficult to see a Myanmar where China is not important. But there is a chance that China will no longer be the dominant actor in Myanmar, and that worries China.17 Even the political section of the Chinese embassy in Yangoon has been urging the Chinese companies to retain support of the local communities. Although Facebook is blocked in China, the Chinese embassy in Myanmar created a Facebook page, a tool the Chinese officials in Yangoon are using to reach citizens. Whether China’s outreach efforts will quell anti-China protests is an open question.18


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Conclusion

Myanmar’s movement towards democracy and economic reforms are welcome signs for the ASEAN, Asia and the world. China may not be happy to see one of its two allies (the other being North Korea) is drifting away from its sphere of influence and in the process losing some of the strategic edge that it has been enjoying in this part of Asia for some time. From India’s point of view, a democratic neighbor with market economy is welcome as Myanmar is the gateway to its Look East policy. Myanmar remained the beneficiary of Chinese aid and assistance as well as maintained close military relations during the years when it faced international sanctions. These will not go away so soon. Therefore, the Myanmar leadership has taken pain to clarify to China that Myanmar’s opening up to the West will in no way dilute the strength of Myanmar’s relations with China. To what extent the Chinese leadership believes this is difficult to know but Chinese concerns would remain. From the US perspective, the addition of Myanmar as another spokexxvi in its Asia rebalancing policy will strengthen the US’ Asia strategy. China will find it compelling to readjust its own foreign policy strategy.

ENDNOTES

1. Simon Roughneen, “Once a divisive pariah, Myanmar may be key Southeast Asian key to unity?”, 2 July 2013, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2013/0702/Once-a-divisive-pariah-Myanmar-may-be-key-Southeast-Asian-key-to-unity?

2. “Burma’s Thein Sein White House visit is reward for reforms”, VOA, 20 May 2013, http://www.eurasiareview.com/20052013-burmas-thein-sein-white-house-visit-is-reward-for-reforms

3. http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/about/places/burma

4. “President Sein’s visit adds Myanmar to President Obama’s foreign policy achievement”, 23 May 2013, http://www.diplonews.com/intro/2013/20130522_ObamaSeinUSAMyanmar.php

5. Howard LaFranchi, “Obama names ambassador to Myanmar: Is US moving to slow or too fast?”, 17 May 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2012/0517/Obama-names-ambassador-to-Myanmar-Is-US-moving-too-slow-or-too-fast?nav=466548-csm_list_article-itemRelated

6. Catherine Cheney, “Myanmar’s Thein Sein Delivers Political Reforms, Lags in Economic Liberalization”, 21 May 2013, http:// www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/12966/myanmar-s-thein-sein-delivers-political-reform-lags-in-economic-liberalization?

7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid

10. “Ms Suu Kyi Visits Japan”, The Japan Times, editorial, 18 April 2013,

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/04/18/editorials/ms-suu-kyi-visits-japan/#.UXjBO6KBl9M

11. “Japan’s Abe to visit Myanmar in late May for summit with Thein Sein”, 25 April 2015,

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/25/national/japans-abe-to-visit-myanmar-in-late-may-for-

summit-with-thein-sein/#.UXjAoaKBl9M

12. “Visiting Abe assures Myanmar of support from ‘whole of Japan’”, 26 May 2013,

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/05/26/national/visiting-abe-assures-myanmar-of-support-from-

whole-of-japan/#.UaGsvaKBl9M

13. Ibid.

http://www.csmonitor.com/About/Staff/Simon-Roughneen

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2013/0702/Once-a-divisive-pariah-Myanmar-may-be-key-Southeast-Asian-key-to-unity

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2013/0702/Once-a-divisive-pariah-Myanmar-may-be-key-Southeast-Asian-key-to-unity

http://www.eurasiareview.com/20052013-burmas-thein-sein-white-house-visit-is-reward-for-reforms

http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/about/places/burma

http://www.diplonews.com/intro/2013/20130522_ObamaSeinUSAMyanmar.php

http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2012/0517/Obama-names-ambassador-to-Myanmar-Is-US-moving-too-slow-or-too-fast?nav=466548-csm_list_article-itemRelated

http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2012/0517/Obama-names-ambassador-to-Myanmar-Is-US-moving-too-slow-or-too-fast?nav=466548-csm_list_article-itemRelated

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/12966/myanmar-s-thein-sein-delivers-political-reform-lags-in-economic-liberalization

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/12966/myanmar-s-thein-sein-delivers-political-reform-lags-in-economic-liberalization

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/04/18/editorials/ms-suu-kyi-visits-japan/#.UXjBO6KBl9M

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/25/national/japans-abe-to-visit-myanmar-in-late-may-for-summit-with-thein-sein/#.UXjAoaKBl9M

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/25/national/japans-abe-to-visit-myanmar-in-late-may-for-summit-with-thein-sein/#.UXjAoaKBl9M

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/05/26/national/visiting-abe-assures-myanmar-of-support-from-whole-of-japan/#.UaGsvaKBl9M

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/05/26/national/visiting-abe-assures-myanmar-of-support-from-whole-of-japan/#.UaGsvaKBl9M


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14. “Japan quick to capitalize on Myanmar’s changes”, 5 June 2013,

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/12999/global-insider-japan-quick-to-capitalize-on-myanmar-s-changes?utm

15. For a Chinese perspective on China’s drive towards the Indian Ocean, see Fan Hongwei, “China’s Look South: hina-Myanmar Transport Corridor”, Ritsumeikan International Affairs, vol. 10, 2011, pp. 43-66. Available at http://r-cube.ritsumei.ac.jp/bitstream/10367/3399/1/asia10_fan.pdf

16. P.M. Heblikar, “Leadership Changes in China and its impact on Myanmar”, C3S Paper No. 1113, 23 March 2013, http://www.c3sindia.org/eastasia/3478

17. See, Thant Myint-U, Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012, pp.400

18. Jane Perlez and Bree Feng, “China Tries to Improve Image in a Changing Myanmar”, The New York Times, 18 May 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/world/asia/under-pressure-china-measures-its-impact-in-myanmar.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

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National Security and the Eastern Promise of Myanmar in Transition

Dr. Alistair D. B. Cook

Visiting Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore

Dr. Alistair D. B. Cook is a visiting research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He research interests focus on non-traditional security in the Asia – Pacific and has a particular interest in the economic and political development of Myanmar. He regularly appears in the media to discuss regional security issues and Myanmar current affairs, and is a resident analyst on Channel News Asia. He tweets regularly @beancook, his website is www.alistairdbcook.com and email is [email protected]

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Since the controversial 2010 national elections and the widely lauded 2012 by-elections in Myanmar, many countries have re-engaged with the once pariah nation.There is now a laundry list of countries that have embarked on removing or suspending many trade sanctions (an arms embargo remains) from the European Union to the United States and Australia. Other countries like Japan and South Korea almost immediately awoke their business networks in and around Yangon to promote trade and investment; whereas China has leveraged its position of non-interference to promote its own business and national security interests in Myanmar to become its number one foreign investor with its total injection of US$9.6 billion since 1988, which surpassed Thailand’s US$9.56 billion in early 2012. However, less clear is the Indian foreign policy strategy. While India promoted a Look East policy since 1992, in reality its policy remains overwhelmingly focused on traditional security concerns rather than a comprehensive engagement strategy. However, since the mid-2000s an increased number of economic investment projects in Myanmar are at various stages of development; yet there remains a real need to develop and pursue a comprehensive Look East policy towards Myanmar to unlock its position at the crossroads of South, East and Southeast Asia and assist in securing the transition to democracy in Myanmar. Indeed, the Look East policy remains wedded to rhetoric rather than reality on the ground. Initially the Look East policy recognized the post-Cold War period and the emergence of a strengthening China in Indian strategic calculations. Yet rather than shifting engagement from a focus overwhelmingly on traditional national security threats to a more comprehensive strategy that drew on economic cooperation and non-traditional security concerns with its neighbours through the opening up of its many federal states, particularly in the Indian North East, its focus remained in a framework that prioritized responses to military threats over and above the opening up of other potential avenues. While the economic relationship plays second fiddle to political security considerations, trade is still a major and strategically important relationship for Myanmar to tap into the growing wealth and consumer base that India holds and as an avenue to economically develop the Indian North East. The Indo-Myanmar trade relationship has grown from $87.4 million in 1990 – 1 to $557.68 million in 2005 to $1067.05 million in 2010 – 11, which ranks much below that of China and Thailand, Myanmar’s other neighbours. However, most recently India has provided more soft loans such as the announcement in August 2012 of a $500m loan, part of which will be used to construct a 3,200 kilometre trilateral highway, linking India, Myanmar and Thailand, which are promising signs that India is moving beyond its overwhelming focus on traditional national security concerns. This project is crucial within the

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regional development strategy to establish a Trans-Asian highway project which runs from Iran to China. It is important to note that the driver is the Indian government rather than the non-government sector based in India, which is an important spoke in the development of a comprehensive strategy and a needed shift away from the traditional security mindset. While the government remains the major driver behind the economic relationship, it must ensure that it creates a scenario conducive to promoting a multi-stakeholder environment to ensure greater stability and increase the opportunities available to the greatest number of people. As Myanmar is the only ASEAN member state to share a common land and maritime border with India, it is of significant strategic importance to advance the Look East policy. Myanmar’s position bridges ASEAN with India and also one connection between India and China, and China with ASEAN. Myanmar’s location between China and India is of geo-strategic importance to both countries and ASEAN member states. It shares 1,331 kilometres of border with India to the west and northwest and 2,204 kilometres of border with China to the east and northeast where significant cross border trade has formally and informally been taking place over the years. It is for these geographic reasons that there is great potential to further develop and integrate the peoples and economies of India and Myanmar. Indeed, compared to the significant cross border trade between Yunnan province in South western China, the cross border trade between India’s easternmost states remains low even with the 1994 border trade agreement and the operationalization of two border points.1A clear example of the reliance on the central government to drive forward economic interactions is the historic visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Myanmar in May 2012, which heralded the first official bus across the border from Imphal in India to Mandalay in Myanmar. There is a clear intention to further develop the economic relationship between India and Myanmar as witnessed at the June 2013 World Economic Forum meetings in Naypyidaw where several bilateral agreements were signed between the two governments. As with China, as India develops its economy significantly it needs access to more fuel and Myanmar provides one avenue to realise this.2 However, there are lessons to be learnt from the Chinese experience. China focused its relationship since 1988 in the military and economic realms, as a result of its non-interference policy. However, as the transition in Myanmar began, this focus did not prove to have solidly embedded the relationship. While it appears that China will remain at the top of the foreign investors, significant recalibrations are afoot. Since the 30 September 2011 suspension of the Myitsone dam project, a joint venture between China Power Investment Corporation and Myanmar’s Asia World Company, Suntac Technologies, Myanmar Electrical Power Enterprise, and Kansai Electric Power Company, the relationship between China and Myanmar has entered a post-Myitsone phase. Under the military junta, Chinese interests in Myanmar went through its capital city as part of its non-interference policy. However, since the opening up of political space, public protests and vocal opposition to Chinese investments have emerged, destabilizing the investments and sending reverberations back through China resulting in a ‘wake up’ call for Beijing. In response Chinese investors and public policy officials have revisited the relationship with local communities around the investments and realized community concerns need to be addressed directly to secure the investments. This is particularly the case as the TheinSein government responds to public concerns in some fashion with the potential for significant changes to the investments themselves and the regulatory regime that governs them.


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This rhetorical shift at present in the Chinese approach to its investments in Myanmar illustrates the limitations to an overwhelming focus on the military and economic spheres, and the need to engage the wider public. India is well positioned to have greater leverage than China in this regard because of its position as the world’s largest democracy and historical connections to the democratic movement in Myanmar. Indeed, the development of Indian smart power, empowering its civil society to lead its interactions with Myanmar and its people is essential. The linkages between the two peoples through Buddhism and the movement of peoples are key examples of this leverage. Within Myanmar, it is the Sagaing region, Chin and Kachin states which share borders with Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Assam, Manipur and Mizoram states of India. However, while on either side of the Indo-Myanmar border many share the same ethnicity, the underdevelopment and low policy ranking in Delhi has left this potentially fruitful exchange embryonic and stymied by other national security considerations such as clamping down on insurgency and the rise in Islamic extremism along its other borders in South Asia. While these are of clear concern, particularly given the Bodh Gaya temple blasts in July 2013, it is important to fully develop a comprehensive strategy to ensure a longer term and stable relationship, which will limit the impacts of short term policy challenges and security threats. Ultimately, India can provide Myanmar with some strategic necessities that China cannot. While these are often trumpeted in bilateral meetings and joint statements, they have yet to progress beyond mere rhetoric and symbolic policy into a functional legacy. Nonetheless, in this regard, India is well-placed to offer support to the Myanmar leadership and to assist in promoting Myanmar’s further integration into the international community3 and develop strong relationships across the developing world and its democracies. It is also well placed to offer technical assistance particularly in the IT sector for which India has become a major international hub, illustrated during Prime Minister Singh’s visit in May 2012, when the creation of an IT training institute was announced. While the shared history between Myanmar and India bodes well for future relations, internal dynamics will ultimately determine its fate if the current policy mindset remains unchallenged. It is time to develop Indian smart power which will reorient a traditional security approach to regional relations hinged on responses to short term threats and challenges, and move towards an engagement that seeks to nurture its relationships. Through the development of a multi-pronged and comprehensive approach that draws on all sectors within India to engage in varied ways from supporting the emerging democratic institutions in Myanmar through parliamentary exchanges and the sharing of institutional knowledge to the increased people-to-people interactions such as university student exchanges it will provide the building blocks to re-engage with the Myanmar people and promote a stronger and healthier long –term and comprehensive approach. Indeed, alongside the development of people-to-people interactions there is also a need to further trade links and develop closer economic ties drawing on the expertise not only of government but also the private sector. It is through this multi-faceted approach that will secure the interests of the peoples of both India and Myanmar. Finally the development of Indian smart power necessarily also develops the military relationship. There are several potential ways that the militaries can interact with one another to promote a stable relationship, most notably through the development of closer exchanges and training particularly given the potential shift in role of the military in Myanmar. It is now twenty years since the launch in 1993 of India’s Look East policy, yet India has failed to Move East in a comprehensive way and as a result, while India rises within the global system, their impact within Myanmar has remained limited. With a reorientation of the Look East policy to develop Indian smart power not only with Myanmar but further afield in East and Southeast Asia,


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there is a much greater chance to strengthen India’s hand in negotiations through building a longer term comprehensive and strategic policy that benefits the peoples of India and Myanmar as well. It is with the implementation of smart power adding in the important civil society role that the Eastern promise of Myanmar can be realized.

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1. Yhome, K. 2009. ‗India – Myanmar Relations (1998 – 2008): A Decade of Redefining Bilateral Ties‘,

ORF Occasional Paper, no. 10, January. New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation.

2. Egreteau, R. 2011. ‗A passage to Burma?India, development, and democratization in Myanmar‘,

Contemporary Politics, vol. 17, no. 4, December.

3. Borah, R. 2012. ‗India's huge stakes in Myanmar‘, Russia and India Report, April 23. Available at

http://indrus.in/articles/2012/04/23/indias_huge_stakes_in_myanmar_15552.html

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CHINESE - MYANMAR RELATIONS UNDER STRESS

Col. VIRENDRA SAHAI VERMA(R) Honorary Fellow

Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi

(Virendra Sahai Verma is a Hon Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies Delhi. He is an Indian

Army veteran having retired after impeccable combatant service of 34 years which include

1965 and 1971 wars as an artillery officer. He has later served in Ladakh, Lahoul and Spiti,

Kinnaur, Sikkim and Tawang in senior intelligence appointments. He is masters in Defence

Studies from Madras and Commerce from Rajasthan Universities and an MBA. Colonel

Verma has published so far 37 articles in main line national newspapers and prestigious

national and international journals and given interviews. He has presented so far 55 papers

in national and international seminars in 25 countries. The subjects of articles and

presentations are relating to China, India-China relations, Tibet-cultural and political, India-

Pakistan relations, nuclear issue, intelligence ethics, border area studies, Sino-Pak relations,

Gilgit and Baltistan, Buddhism in Himalayan belt, Soldiers role in peace making. Most of his

writings are peace oriented with emphasis on resolution of disputes with neighbors. His

current research interests are resolution of India-China border dispute, Maritime security in

Indian Ocean, resolution of Tibet issue, area studies in Himalaya region. He is member of

International Study Association USA, Member Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis,

New Delhi, Member International Intelligence Ethics Association, Washington DC, Member

Advisory Board Research Institute for European and American Studies, Athens Greece,

Member International Editorial and Advisory Board, London Security Study Series. Colonel

Verma is a peace activist and social worker. He is co-founder and Vice President of India-

Pakistan Soldiers’ Initiative for Peace which has a chapter in Delhi and Lahore. He

is President of 900 member Kulshrestha Kalyan Samiti which is providing financial

assistance to poor and unprivileged in society for the last 25 years.)

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Since the advent of civilian rule in March 2011 the relations between these neighbors have been drawing universal attention. In 1988 through coup d’état the military government had established bilateral relationship with China which was literally “Paukphaw” ( blood relations in Burmese) a term used by them. China had become a guardian of Myanmar. New President Thein Sein has sought to bring some balance in international relations. The suspension of Myitsone dam on 30 September 2011 by President Sein, which was planned to be constructed by China Power Investment Corporation, has been noted by Chinese as a beginning of a new phase. This was a very popular step by the civilian government as the hydroelectric dams were being opposed by the people, a quote by the President, “As our Government is elected by people, (our purpose) is to respect the people’s will.” Myitsone had become in 2011 the national symbol of unbridled foreign extraction of resources. Myanmar after two decades of intensifying relationship is now reducing it’s over dependence on China. Notwithstanding the above incident, China has substantial strategic interests in Myanmar and has invested heavily on its infrastructure. China ‘s main concern would be to protect their strategic interests and assets. It would be a diplomatic challenge for China that Myanmar leaders are not alienated. Mynamar would remain strategically important to China and reasons are summarized as follows:-

1. Energy Security. Chinese are exploring the ways around to avoid Malacca strait which could be a possible blockage in case of trouble with India or USA. Indian Navy‘s Andaman & Nicobar islands are termed by Chinese as ‘Iron Curtain’. Chinese economy is heavily dependent on fuel shipped through Malacca strait. Chinese are building new oil and gas pipelines across whole of Myanmar to transport crude oil from Middle East and Africa. The lines pass through Mandalay-Ruili on the border and then to Kunming the capital of Yunan province. ( see Map) They are building a new deep sea port and a airport terminal at Kyaukphyu, near Sittwe.This will avoid choke points of Singapore and South China Sea. China is putting $ 200 m towards upgrading airport at Cox’s Bazar, the country’s southernmost tip. Shweli Hydro Power Plant (600MW), largest in the country built by China is already supplying electricity to China. China’s Power Investment Corporation is planning to construct six hydro power plants on upper basin of River Irrawaddy which remain on board even after suspension of Myitsone dam by the President. These projects would give substantial presence of Chinese in power sector.

2. Border Trade. Myanmar is biggest trade partner of Yunnan province. There are four ‘first class gates’ for border trade between them and other countries. Twelve ‘second class gates’ serve exclusively Myanmar and China. However, the trade balance is unfavorable to Myanmar:- 2.01 China’s Export to Myanmar $ 4825 Million, China’s Import from Myanmar $ 1677 Million.


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3. Security of Border Areas. Myanmar has 135 ethnic groups though Burmese account for 70 % of population. Some of the ethnic groups are very powerful and have own armies. After persistent infighting amongst ethnic groups, the military government in 1997 brought cease fire and the ethnic groups were given autonomy in their respective regions. Some of the ethnic groups are still fighting with Government troops. Most of these regions are in border areas with China. It creates in China worst fears about the fragmentation of an unstable Myanmar. Kachin , a majority Christian in north, for instance resumed fighting in 2011 after 17 year ceasefire. Yunnan has reportedly drawn an emergency plans in case there is influx of refugees from south. China is keen to protect its vital assets of gas and oil pipelines in north of Myanmar. The Chinese Minister for Public Security visited Myanmar in January 2013 to express Chinese concern of security in border areas. Another problem which Chinese face in Myanmar, similar to other countries where they have constructed major projects, is lack of trust by local population and they see it as form of colonialism. Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar recently conceded that, “Myanmar is into a transitional period. There is new situation we have to face….. Chinese state owned enterprises shared some blame for negative view of China held in Myanmar.” Chinese are noting growing US relations with Myanmar being 2012 as the most eventful year. US investments sanctions were lifted on 11 July followed by suspensions of import bans on goods from Myanmar. This has enabled international agencies like World Bank and International Monetary Fund to begin re-establishing links with Myanmar. It also has enabled US Agency for International Development (USAID) mission to lend support for UNDP country programmes. The positive diplomacy was culminated with President Barack Obama’s visit to Myanmar on 19 Nov 2012. The long term perspective of Sino-Myanmar relations depends upon how democracy progresses inside Myanmar. If the democracy takes roots, the Chinese hold on their neighbor would be weaned. In by-elections held in April 2012 pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy had won 43 of 44 seats it contested. It is expected she would continue her spell in national elections due in middle of 2014. However, Chinese would strive hard to keep the relations at least left of the centre. Virendra Sahai Verma, a former army officer, is Hon. Fellow Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi. [email protected] http://virendrasahai.com

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My Engagement with Myanmar and her people: Memories Experiences and the Lessons learned

Dr. Swapna Bhattacharya (Chakraborti)

Professor & former Head Dept. of South & Southeast Asian Studies, University of Calcutta

Email: [email protected] Website: www.sbhattacharya.info

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Born in 1952 in Santiniketan, B.A in Sanskrit Hons and Political Science subsidiary ( 1971) M.A in Sanskrit, 1973, both at Visva Bharati, Santiniketan. M.A and Ph.D in South Asian History(1980 & 1985) University of Heidelberg, Germany. Ph .D . Supervisors: Professor Dr. Hermann Kulke and Professor Dr. Dietmar Rothermund. The Ph.D work sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Friedrich Ebert Foundation), Germany. Also studied and passed examinations in German language, German history, History of Southeast Asia, Indology, Pali,Modern South Asian Languages and literatures, Latin and Myanmar language. All exams at Visva Bharati & Heidelberg passed with Ist class. Since 1986 has been working in the Department ( formerly known as Centre for SSEAS) of South & Southeast Asian Studies, University of Calcutta. Worked as the Head of the Department during (2003-2005) and also as the Director, Centre for South & Southeast Asian Studies, served another term as the Head during Nov 2011-Feb 2012, supervised M. Phil Dissertations on Myanmar and Bangladesh in the Dept, acted as external Ph.D examiner at various universities in India, gave and still giving a number of UGC sponsored lectures as Resource person , presented papers , also chaired sessions in various national and international conferences and seminars on South and Southeast Asian Studies in India and abroad. Area of Specialization: Myanmar and Bangladesh. Being granted a leave from the University (Jan 2006- to Jan 2009) worked as a Fellow at the Maulana Abul Kalam Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIAS), Kolkata, under the Ministry of Culture, Govt. of India, on a project on the Rakhine (Arakan) State of Myanmar from South Asian Perspective. Published Ph.D Dissertation .Landschenkungen und Staatliche Entwicklung im fruehmittelalterlichen Bengalen 5-13 Jh..n.Chr. (Land Grants and State Formation in early medieval Bengal 5th-13th century), published by Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1985 taken note of various international experts. The second book ( translation from Wolfgang Mey’s German book ) in Bengali is Parvatya Chattogramer Kaumasamaj Ekti Arthasamajik Itihas ( Tribal Society of Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Socio-Economic History) published by Firma KLM, Kolkata 1997 also reviewed widely. The third book is India-Myanmar Relations 1886-1948, pub. By K.P Bagchi, Kolkata 2007 too received attention worldwide. The author has published about 60 articles covering the following areas: Buddhism in Myanmar and N.E India, British colonialism & Frontier Policy in South & Southeast Asia, synchretic ( mixed) traditions and acculturation in Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism, Rabindranath Tagore’s understanding of the Sino-Tibetan world and Southeast Asia with special reference to Myanmar, Indian Diaspora in Myanmar, Mahatma Gandhi’s understanding of colonial Myanmar, Myanmar Buddhist Pilgrim Centers in India & Nepal, Refugees and Human rights, the role of the United Nations in Peace process in conflict areas, Peace and Reconciliation in Myanmar from 1988-2012, Northeast India-S.E Bangladesh & western Myanmar, neo-Buddhist Revival


http://www.sbhattacharya.info/


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in India and contribution of Myanmar Theravada monks . At present teaches Southeast Asia besides in her own Department also at the Department of History, Institute of Foreign Policy Studies ( IFPS), and self-financed Buddhist Studies courses ( M.A & Post-Graduate Diploma) of Calcutta University. As invited Guest Lecturer also taught the History of Southeast Asia ( 19-20th centuries) at the P.G Department of History, University of Burdwan , M.A in Human Rights at the University of Calcutta. Member of a large number of International and National institutions of repute, former member of the Advisory Board of the SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, University of London, engaged in various academic and social welfare oriented, public awareness activities (through writings and T.V interviews) as Advisor, Patron, active member, regional coordinator etc in India and abroad, mostly govt. sponsored. This essay is somewhat different in scope and presentation from my earlier writings on Myanmar.

Over the last 25 years or so I have been studying, teaching and writing on Myanmar, though my

attention fell on the country through my Doctoral research works on early medieval Bengal ( 5th to

13th century) which I did along with a study of medieval Germany, at the South Asia Institute and

the Institute of History, University of Heidelberg. I have since then come a long way in my quest to

understanding of what actually means “ History” and what lesson one can learn from History? The

Buddhist routes, used by traders, pilgrims, fortune makers, knowledge bearers and knowledge

traders connecting the culture centres in Bengal-Bihar-Assam with similar centres in Myanmar---

attracted my attention in those days of 1980s. Studying the Sanskrit inscriptions, documenting land

grants given to Buddhist monasteries, Hindu temples and individual Brahmins, issued by the kings

of Bengal from the post-Gupta to Pala-Sena period( 5th-13th century A.D) was a fascinating

experience. The Hindu-Buddhist milieu of eastern India and Myanmar consisted of people who felt

united by the conviction of a single value; the message of renunciation, creativity and immortal

peace bound them together. In no other object than in art and architecture this common spirit, for

which I use the term “Indo-Myanmar Cultural Continuum,” examples of which I have given through

many other elements, movements, developments in various writings of mine, has been reflected.

But, most convincing is to study the archaeological sites in Mainamati, Paharpur, modern

Bangladesh, in Bodhgaya -Nalanda area of India and simultaneously the objects in Pagan in

particular, as also in various other sites in the Rakhine State( Arakan) and in Prome area. While the

Rakhines ( Arakanese) were closely connected with the Indian civilization, the Pyu people were

Sinitic in genre, but Indic in faith. The history of Myanmar can be characterised by a single feature,

that is the highest degree of accommodation with the “outsiders” , yet, not surrendering politically

to the outsiders. This is perhaps why, even an invader so powerful as Kublai Khan, had to retreat

and ultimately withdrew from Pagan. In no other country (besides India and Sri Lanka ) Buddhism

had such a strong root and continuity as in Myanmar. In no other country Buddhism showed the


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degree of tolerance and accommodation that Myanmar Buddhism showed in its long history.

Though Theravada in nature, it accommodated with various faiths popular in Mahayana school and

Hinduism. This is why during ancient time, Gods and Goddesses (Vishnu, Ganesha, Saraswati,

Lakshmi) popular in India also found immense popularity among ordinary people. In one way or

the other such legacies continue even in modern time among a section of Buddhist Myanmar

people. At least, this memory of culture sharing came up frequently while I entered in to

conversation with my Myanmar friends.

This faithful adherence to one’s own faith and ways remains till today very strong. This is reflected

in all elements of material and spiritual life: from the handicraft, textile, colour of the lungyis, the

art of cooking to, how the Myanmar people think about their life and about the world in general.

The Myanmar language, rich in vocabulary, indicates the process of constant interaction with the

outside world, yet, consolidation of her own identity.

Unfortunately, we, the Indian people, who have shared a wonderful past with the people of ancient

Myanmar, have hardly tried to ravel the charm of this relation. This loss or gap creates confusion

and quick conclusions. For example, there is a tendency among Indian scholars to interpret the

political struggle ( 1988- 2011- 2012) in Myanmar in terms of a conflict between Daw Aung San

Suu Kyi and the Army. In Myanmar, the struggle is actually between the evil versus the

righteousness, which can be seen as Adharma versus Dharma. The way President Thein Sein and

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, as someone sitting in the opposition, worked together for various national

causes can certainly be taken as an example. As I have discussed in a recently published article “

Myanmar’s Own way to Democracy, Peace and Reconciliation: Introspective Observations from a

Friend of Myanmar” in considerable detail the peace process, I need not repeat the same. The

enthusiasts can refer to the newly published book Searching for Non-0Western Roots of Conflict

Resolution: Discourse, Norms and Case Studies edited by Shantanu Chakrabarti, published by the

Institute of Foreign Policy Studies of Calcutta University.

Back in early 1980s when I was a student of Saya U Tin Htway at the South Asia Institute (

Suedasien Institut), Heidelberg University, I realized that Myanmar as a country and her people

could not be properly understood unless we feel what Metta ( loving kindness) means to a

Myanmar. My teacher, who is not only a true Buddhist, but also a renowned Pali scholar, quite


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often stressed the fact that one has to develop equanimity ( Upekskha) to find a solution to one’s

agony. In my quest to understand the minds of the Myanmar people I have learnt a lot not only

from great scholars and monks ( Sayadaws), policy makers, ministers, diplomats, librarians,

teachers, whomever I met in Myanmar, I have enriched my soul through interactions with very

ordinary people, many of whose dream is to visit India, especially Bodhgaya, at least once in life

time, for achieving the eternal merit. For the Indian and Myanmar people this punya will result in

having eternal peace, not to come back to this world of pain ( dukkham).

It is even more painful to see that while western scholars have been motivated to follow the

Buddhist way of metta and upeksha, a considerable number of Indian scholars mixed up academic

mission with personified views of Myanmar’s future. After all, as I have argued in one of my recent

writings, Myanmar would have her own form of Democracy, which may not be acceptable for all.

Yet, after 2014 only that form of government will be accepted, for which the mandate will be given

by the people in an expected free and fair election. The Red Army and Single Party System of

communist China and her allies, military backed or military controlled countries of South Asia (

Pakistan in particular) have created a situation under which Myanmar suffered a lot. Though India

has not experienced Army Rule, yet, democratic institutions, of which we are so proud of, may face

difficult time in days to come. No one can deny that Asia, the seat of the earliest civilization, is going

through an extremely challenging time. Like any other country, let therefore Myanmar choose her

own way to civil liberty, democracy and economic prosperity.

I must though submit that Myanmar govt. and Myanmar people consider India and the Indian

people as one of their most trusted partners. The length and breadth of the Agreements and MOUs

signed during last year’s visit of our Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Myanmar indicate the

degree of the trust that India enjoys from her closest partner. India’s rapid integration in to

ASEAN, of which Myanmar is a member since 1997, has directly contributed to this process of

building of mutual trust. A glance over the press release during Dr. Manmohan Singh’s visit

indicates that there is no area left in which India and Myanmar would work together for regional

peace and stability. Our University (Calcutta University) has signed a MOU for future collaboration

with Dagon University. The Vice Chancellor of Calcutta University Professor Suranjan Das, was one

of the members of this high level team and signed the MOU with his counterpart of Dagon, the

Rector, Professor Hla Htay. During my visit to Myanmar in October 2012 I could enjoy the fruit of


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this landmark event. I was one of the very few invited guests from outside who could participate in

the session of the Myanmar Academy of Arts and Sciences Conference, held at Yangon University.

The two universities are very closely connected, and the faculty members get transferred to either

of the universities as situation requires.

In my paper “ The University of Calcutta and Myanmar: Urgent Need for revisiting the golden era” I

pleaded for creating a better platform for interaction between scholars from Calcutta University

and universities of Myanmar, Yangon and Dagon in particular. The paper addressing the rich legacy

of intellectual and academic intercourse between the Pali Department of Calcutta University and

Yangon University stressed the need to include such subjects in the policy making process of both

the countries. During the colonial period, a considerable number of university Professors,

doctors, lawyers, civil servants in various posts were drawn from the Indian community. Their

contribution is however often remembered by Myanmar scholars of older generation. During the

visit to Yangon University, which was for the fourth visit to that renowned university, the names of

N.C Das and K.N Kar were referred by senior Professors, retired faculty members from Yangon

University. These Indian Professors from Calcutta taught ( 1948-1962) subjects like Eastern

Philosophy, Western philosophy, Ethics, advanced Logic, Language and Semantics. During my

earlier visit in Yangon University in 1995 and 2005 I remember meeting senior scholars who

remembered Professor Niharranjan Roy, who taught Buddhism and History at Yangon University

during 1950s. His love for Myanmar he has expressed through three major works on Buddhism

(each on Theravada and Mahayana) and Brahmanical Gods of Myanmar. I met also Myanmar

scholars who happened to be students of W.S. Desai, an Indian Professor of eminence who taught

History at Yangon University during the colonial period and after, and is also remembered for his

several books on the History of Myanmar.

Noble Laureate writer and Pro-Democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has presented two

important books which have considerably generated important discourses: Burma and India: Some

Aspects of Intellectual Life under Colonialism and Freedom from Fear and other Writings. In both the

books one can read hitherto unknown narratives from the field of intellectual encounter between

the two countries.Yet, the close academic network binding Yangon College, Judson College, Calcutta

University appeared to be a forgotten chapter altogether. Yangon University was a part of Calcutta

University until 1920-21. The patronage of Sir Asutosh Mukherjee, the Vice Chancellor of Calcutta


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University, in this mission of promoting Pali and Buddhist studies brining Calcutta closest possible

centre of learning for Asian neighbours, should be remembered in this regard. As a follow up

process of the two governments’ collaboration in the academic field conferences and seminars are

taking place now in both the countries. This is quite inspiring and should continue in future. The

Buddhists of modern Bangladesh ( Baruah community in particular) had a strong base in Yangon

and in Sittwe ( former Akyab). They were active in promoting people-to people contact through

their noble works: academic and social. The Yangon based Dharmadut Vihar stands witness to that

rich legacy of Bengal-Myanmar relation. It was nice to see the renovation-cum extension works

going on in this particular monastery during my last visit to Myanmar in April, 2013. Almost all the

great Indian reformers of Buddhism active in modern India maintained closest possible contact

with Myanmar. Some of their names are as famous as Dr. B.R Ambedkar. But, at the same time we

should remember the contribution of the great monks like Kripasharan Mahathera, U Chandramani,

Punnyachar among others. Enthusiasts can turn to one of my writings India and Myanmar: People,

Pilgrimage. Histories and the Present, published as an Occasional paper from the Centre for South &

Southeast Asian Studies, Calcutta University in 2010.

It is interesting to note that western countries, led by the U.S and her closest allies in

Europe (U.K in particular) imposed economic sanction on Myanmar in and from mid 1990s.

Though, now with the progress in democratic practices and reform one by one those countries

are withdrawing their sanctions, and extend their help in re-building the ruined economy, yet,

it may take sometime to bring back the lost trust. But, what I personally find very encouraging

that an active group of scholars from US.A (Cornell, Northern Illinois) and Europe ( U.K,

France, Holland & Germany) continued their academic engagement with Myanmar

throughout the period from 1988 till this day. The policy makers and think tanks in India could

consider starting similar academic forum in India like the US based ‘ Burma Study Conference’ that

could bring under a single umbrella all scholars of South Asia After all India’s existing potentiality

in scholarship on Myanmar is richer than that which exists in other countries from the region.

The United States and Germany have developed close academic contacts with the Myanmar. The

landmark event remains the visit of US President Barrack Obama to Yangon University on his way

to Cambodia, last year. The virulence of the American policy of constant warning on account of


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violation of human rights is no more to be witnessed at least in that form; it is being gently

transformed in to a relation of mutual respect.

Two regions of India were in closest contact with Myanmar: Bengal through land (Arakan-

Chittagong) and also through water, and the coastal Andhrapradesh, through maritime trade and

Buddhist network. In this regard I invite all Myanmar scholars in India to read the book Historical

Sites in Burma by Aung Thaw, former Director of Archaeology, who in describing almost each and

every archaeological site, brings Indian parallels, highlighting thereby the living contact between

the Indian and Myanmar people through trade, merit searching, adventures or otherwise. The Mons

( previously known with the name Telaings ) and the Rakhines ( Arakanese) of Myanmar showed

maximum accommodation with those, who actually emerged as the most powerful people, indeed,

the victor, precisely the Bamars ( the Burmans). As the eminent Myanmar scholar and an

important friend of India rightly says, driven by the cold and dry weather, the Bamars came down

from the North ( China) and eventually emerged as the most powerful race. Most fascinating part of

Myanmar history is the centrality that Buddhism played in the struggle for legitimacy, to rule over

the people. Buddhist scriptures, the Tripitakas, thus emerged with a special significance. And, here

also lies the importance of the Pali language for the Myanmar people. The importance of Chinese

language in modern Myanmar appears to me quite unnatural and imposed from above due to

economic dependence of Myanmar on China, while Pali as ancient language of Buddhism has a

special significance, of which the new generation of both the countries are not adequately informed.

While the Indic people went up to Brahmadesh, to preach the eternal truth, the Sinitic people, who

came down and settled along the Irrawaddy, in search of a better life and also as a result of the

constant struggle between various clans within their own territory. The Sinitic people came down

as deep as up the valley of the river Brahmaputra in Assam and what is known as Northeast India,

comprising the states of Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. In the classical

Sanskrit literature, the Sinitic people are called the Kirata, as hunting was one of their major

professions. One only has to read the excellent work by the great linguist Suniti K. Chattrerjee,

Kiratajana Kirti: Indo Mongoloid and their contribution in Indian culture. Abraham Grierson’s

Linguistic Survey of India, still considered as one of the most important reference works, also gives

detailed information on the movement of the Sino-Tibetan people, to which the Tibeto-Burmans of

Myanmar and Assam and adjoining regions belong. Even, the works of P.C Bagchi, the greatest


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sinologist of India, can be extremely enlightening to understand the spontaneity with which the

Sinitic people and the Indic people exchanged their ideas in the domain of Mahayana Buddhism

which actually triumphed over Theravada faith. That in Myanmar the faith remained Theravada, in

spite of intensive interaction with the Sinitic elements, indicates that in the minds of the Myanmar

people the message of renunciation and sacrifice received preference over business and enjoyment.

The poorest of the poor in Myanmar believe in the merit making through donation, Dana. This is

why in Myanmar people hardly go to bed with empty stomach. In the monastery there is always

something to eat. Even the big hotels have some system to feed monks with much dignity.

The culture of Myanmar embracing all aspects of material and spiritual life of an individual could

become so rich since it took the best from both the immigrant people, without loosing her own

treasure. As I see the Kula people (Indic) and Cina ( Sinic/ Sinitic) people interacted on the soil of

Myanmar, giving shape to grand cultural centres which is visible from the Rakhine coast up to

Upper Myanmar. While most of the Indians are almost totally ignorant of this rich cultural heritage

of Myanmar, it is so pleasing to see young scholars in Myanmar interested to study various schools

of Indian art ( like Amaravati, Gupta, Pala-Sena etc), and eager to come to India. Or, for example, to

meet friends in Myanmar, who would invite me each time on the last day of my departure, to

make a Pradikshin round the Shwedagon Pagoda, to pray for peace and prosperity for the people of

our two countries. Our joint prayers have not gone in vain: India and Myanmar have come closer in

various fields, science & technology, defence cooperation, business openings, banking, health

sectors, English language learning, exchange of scholars at university level, exchange of cultural

groups, celebration of Tagore birthday jointly, chanting of Pali Tripitaka with Myanmar monks

leading the procession, as witnessed in Bodhgaya in last winter.

More Memories:

I was invited by Professor Mahendra Gaur ,Director,FPRC, to contribute in this particular issue

on Myanmar, an article which should, as desired by him, focus more on my personal experiences

with the country. My first visit took place in 1995 while the last one was in April, 2013. This

request from the editor strengthened my hand, has given me the legitimacy to bring under

discussion quite a few memories from my days in Myanmar where I went back again and

again, not only driven by an unfeigned curiosity for the country and my academic


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commitment, but also being deeply impressed by the love showered on me by a wide range of

Myanmar people from various walks of life.

The list is impressive: from the Ministers, Directors of various govt institutions, Rectors of three

major universities, Yangon, Dagon and Mandalay, Policy making bodies, retired ambassadors with

military as well as civil background, scholars of international repute, high officials from the field of

Trade and Commerce- down to ordinary students, staff members of academic institutions and

simple shop keepers in markets across the country. Except on one occasion in 2006, when I was

part of an official delegation from MAKAIAS, on every occasion I planned extended stays beyond

the dates of my official duties ( conferences, field works etc) and then, with the help of my host

institutions ( Yangon University, Myanmar Institute of Strategic and international Studies, Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, Dagon university) could fulfil my dream in visiting quite a few places of

historical importance in Upper and Lower Myanmar. During the 2006 trip (good will visit organised

by MAKAIAS/Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies in collaboration with

MISIS/Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies) the experience was so very

pleasant, that many of my former colleagues from MAKAIAS started loving the country and her

people.

My country’s Embassy in Yangon also extended its kind cooperation especially on the occasion

when I was invited by our Ambassador H.E. Dr. V.R Seshadri to take part in an impressive

celebration. That impressive event was the joint celebration of Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore’s 150

years birthday. It was jointly organised in August 2011, by the Indian Embassy Yangon, ICCR (

Indian Council of Cultural relations) and Yangon University. I was amazed to see the wide

popularity of Tagore’s writings in Myanmar. It was even more inspiring to observe how the new

generation in Myanmar is following the footsteps of their elders carrying forward the rich legacy of

the thoughts of Tagore.

Indians came to Myanmar not only to work as labourers or in connection with money lending

business. Our countrymen had a great share in building institutions of governance, legal systems,

teaching professions and bureaucracy in colonial Myanmar, with much love and patience. As has

been mentioned in the beginning, the generation of scholars who remember the excellent teaching

of Indian professors, even during 1950s and 1960s, are quite senior. But, fortunately age has not

stopped them in sharing their memories with me.


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In the section that follows I will share with my readers my own experiences of observing the

people of Myanmar from the following aspects: a) colonial experience of Myanmar people and the

trauma of subjugation b) Influence of Buddhist morale and Buddhist rationale on the society c)

the experience of civil rule under U Nu with special reference to the 18 months caretaker

Government d) General Ne Win’s rise to power in 1962 d) end of Ne Win era and also end of the

isolation period e) Immediate ( 1988-89) ups and downs with a view to struggle within the army f)

Presence of US Navy on the Indian Ocean: in the Andaman Sea. g) Short interim period of civil rule

under President Dr. Maung Maung h) Khin Nyunt and his 7 point roadmap to democracy i) Fall of

Khin Nyunt ) Aung San Suu Kyi’s withdrawal from the Convention j) the achieved stability through

passing of the Constitution, ethnic rehabilitation through cooperation of the neighbouring

countries.

From the hard time ( 1960s-early 1980s) when only a few monks and a few dal ( pulse) traders

kept the flam of age old relation between India and Myanmar ( Burma) alive, to the recently

concluded MOUs, Agreements signed during Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh’s visit to

Myanmar, to which mention has already been made-- is a long way. I remember when I first visited

Myanmar in 1995 at the invitation of the Myanmar Historical Research Centre, I was so warmly

welcomed at their Conference—the first of its kind, where many big names from the arena of

Myanmar Studies assembled. General Khin Nyut opened the Conference and when I greeted him in

Myanmar language and told that I would like to come back again ( pyan la may ), he and all the

members of the host felt so happy that I spoke Myanmar language. Professor Daw Ni Ni Myint,

renowned historian, the then Director of the Universities Historical Research Centre, the author of

the book Burma’s Struggle against British Imperialism took personal care of me.

She and her whole team saw to it that I could undertake my trip to Upper Myanmar ( Pagan ,

Mandalay, Sagaing Hills ) with proper guidance etc. Even at that depressed economic condition,

the Myanmar Govt. paid for my stay in a city Hotel during the conference days. It indicates for me

the importance that the government and people of Myanmar gave to India, for; I was then really a

very junior scholar with very limited knowledge and publication on Myanmar. It was

communicated to me that along with two very eminent scholars from Thailand and U.K my name

was recommended by the Education Ministry to be accepted as the invited guests at the very first


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International Conference that took place at Yangon University in 1995, after a long spell of closure

and isolation. Needless to add that I felt very honoured and privileged. I gratefully remember the

kind help I received from the Ambassador H.E U Wynn Lwin, who is still active in his own way in

the field of policy making, consultation etc. and is one of the members of the “Most Eminent Group”

from the Civil Society. Ambassador U Wynn Lwin served his country as Ambassador to India

during 1990s. I gratefully remember his and his wife’s contribution in enriching my understanding

of their country.

Even after so many visits and so many experiences, in my memory ever so fresh remains the

statement of an old liftman in Shwedagon Pagoda who refused to accept me as a “ foreigner” as I

was telling him in Myanmar language that, “but I was one!” He simply invited me to come to his lift

which was actually for the Myanmar citizens. Of course I humbly refused, just to respect the then

prevailing rule of the country. This practice of separate lift is no more; the Myanmar nationals and

foreigners share the same lift and are led to the height of the Shwedagon Pagoda premises.

Let me share with you my experience of visiting the Prome ( Pye) archaeological site, called

Srikshetra, in Upper Myanmar in the year 2009. The year 2009 saw my longest stay in Myanmar

in connection with my project work at MAKAIAS. During this trip to Prome and adjoining areas I

met archaeologists, committee members of the Pagoda Management Body and site staff members,

museum staff etc. All of them have impressed me with their knowledge in Buddhism, Indian

religious traditions and one of them shared his experience of training in Archaeology in N.Delhi. I

forgot his name though. Yet, I remember his deep knowledge in Indian Art and Archaeology, and

also his regard for Indian historians like Niharranjan Ray, Dinesh Chandra Sircar, Nilakanta Shastri

and others.

I, as an Indian, felt ashamed thinking how many Indians would know that Myanmar is the

richest country in terms of art and archaeology! It is however nice to learn that a team of

archaeologists from India is engaged in the repairing of the Ananda Temple of Pagan. The

MOU between Dagon University and Calcutta University has also opened up opportunity for future

collaboration in areas such as: Archaeology and Art, Oriental Studies, including pali and Buddhist

Studies, Sanskrit, Indian Philosophy etc.. The entry of Myanmar in SAARC as observer, and her

membership in BIMSTEC strengthen the foundation of future collaboration between Bangladesh,

Myanmar and India in the field of art and Archaeology.


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My trip to Pegu ( Hamsavati ) and adjoining areas, Mandalay, Pagan and all places left a lasting

impression. Though basically Theravada, the worship of Hindu Gods and Goddesses as they were

incorporated in the pantheon of Mahayana influenced Buddhism, were widely practiced, not only

in bordering state of Arakan ( the modern Rakhine State ), but also in Upper Myanmar, among the

Pyus, at Pagan Empire, among the Bamars, and not to speak of among the Mons of Lower Myanmar,

from whom actually the Bamras learned their Buddhism. The concept of Punnya ( achievement of

merit) through pious works of various kinds which the Lord Buddha and his followers preached,

was so very common to Indian and Myanmar civilizations. The word Phongyi ( monk) is derived

from the word Punnya. There are several words in Myanmar language, which through phonetic

twist take a different shape, and unless one having knowledge in Pali, Sanskrit as well Myanmar

explains you, you cannot understand the meaning of not only that particularly word, but also the

meaning of the entire civilizational world of Myanmar and India. I suggest that every scholar in

India, whoever is seriously interested to understand the country, should learn Myanmar language,

to be able to enter in this fascinating world of Indo-Myanmar cultural continuum. And such

realization will give the right dimension of Policy formation at the highest level of bureaucracy.

I was fortunate to have a teacher at Heidelberg University, U Tin Htway, who, being a solid Pali

scholar, opened for me this vast door of what I have just stated as “Indo-Myanmar cultural

continuum”. After all, languages make an important component for culture anywhere in the world.

The very word Saya ( teacher) in Myanmar has its origin from Sanskrit Acharya or for example,

Takatai meaning University, has its origin in Taksasila, the famous Buddhist university, which

since 1947 has fallen under the political domain of Pakistan, but once part of this Indic world. The

impact of Buddhism in the Myanmar society was ( is still) so penetrating that a place name has

become a noun in Myanmar language! In the minds of the Myanmar people India has a very

privileged position. But, we, the Indians, are largely ignorant of our own past, of our own

history.

Remarkable is the appreciation of the Myanmar scholars for the works of Mahatma Gandhi,

Rabindranath Tagore, Sri Arabindo, Dr. Radhakrishnan, Swami Vivekananda, just to name a few

thinkers of modern India. We know that during the last phase of the nationalist movement of

Myanmar which is known as the Thakin period (1930s until the outbreak if the Second World

War), the works of Jawaharlal Nehru was widely read. Quite notable was the influence of


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Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Chandra Bose and M.N Roy on the nationalist

movement of Myanmar. This was one of the themes which attracted the attention of an eminent

German scholar Hans Bernd Zoellner who called me to join his panel at the Burma Study

Conference at Marseilles, in 2010. Of course, there were other areas of political, social and

economic developments in Myanmar which came under the purview of that particular

panel/session.

During my last two visits I witnessed enormous changes in various fields. But, among many things

what impressed me most was the huge number of newspapers in Myanmar language which were

coming out every day, or weekly. That in the tea shops, the people sat, read and discussed was a

common scene. But, now they sit with the newspapers and discuss among themselves the themes

that find coverage in the newspapers. The Myanmar people were and are still passionate readers.

Indeed, once the country was famous for its free press; newspapers in Myanmar (Burmese),

English, Indian languages and Chinese were coming out regularly.

Observations on Myanmar’s Crisis and Reconstruction: Lessons learned

Before going in to the core issue, i.e., the crisis and reconstruction in Myanmar 1948-2012, let me

share with you a few hard facts of the history of Southeast Asia which would help us to understand

the subject of our prime discussion in a wider context. This will explain the course of History as a

flow of events as they were anywhere else in the realm of South & Southeast Asia. But, it will also

highlight the “Myanmar Exceptionalism”. Of all the countries of S.E Asia, Thailand ( the kingdom of

Siam), remained “independent” even during heyday of imperialism and colonialism. In spite of

constant struggle between various ideologies, especially communism versus western capitalism

and civil-military skirmishes, Indonesia developed a relatively stable foundation on which she

could build a secular democratic republic. Quite often it is said that Indonesian democracy and

constitutional structure could offer a model for future Myanmar. During 1940s, Indonesia, India and

Myanmar ( then called Burma) indeed worked together in various Asian (Asian Relation

Conference, Conference for Indonesia, Colombo Plan Bandung Conference) platforms. I strongly

believe that the present political and economic condition within Asia and internationally is very

conducive to go back to that India-Myanmar-Indonesia Axis. The Philippines got massive support

(1898-1946) from the United States to become a modern state with a strong national identity.


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Malaysia was lucky to have a national leader like Tunku Abdul Rahman, who, prudently negotiated

many knotty problems of state building. On the other hand, China-backed communist insurgency

which found sympathy with the domiciled Chinese in Malay, delayed the process of independence

in Malaysia. Such communist insurgency in form of CPB (Communist Party of Burma), and later BCP

( Burma Communist Party) along with their sympathizers from various ethnic groups showed its

ugly face. Singapore emerged out of many complex developments, and also due to a strong anti-

Chinese sentiment of the Malay people, who developed the idea of Bhumiputra. Vietnam became a

sad story, as the French showed their neo-colonial aspiration, which unfortunately got support

from the United States. No less unfortunate was the case with Cambodia where things became

extremely complicated due to, once again, proxy wars fought on its soil. Indeed, in each and every

country we can observe a rotational existence of crisis, reconciliation and reconstruction, and then

again a new crisis. Like all other countries, Myanmar too fell prey to the cold War, communist

insurgency, constitutional crisis, vacuum in leadership due to the ghastly death of the father of the

nation, Bogye Aung San along with his cabinet just a few months before the country got her

independence. Added to it were the devastating effect of the World War Second and neo-

imperialism of communist China. Nehru could have played a greater role than he did play, in the

affairs of Asian countries, for he enjoyed a mass popularity in Asia. Yet, that was made impossible

by the emergence of an aggressive power, namely China, and constant conflict with Pakistan over

Kashmir. In the midst of all these, Myanmar, preferred--- call it a “crisis” or call it a “measure of

reconciliation”-- to increase her friendly distance from India.

Myanmar: The Exception?

It is in the backdrop of the above cited scenario that one has to understand the founding of the

ASEAN in 1967, with a philosophy of free market economy, relation based on free trade with

Europe, with an anti-communist posture and distance from the Soviet Block. It is no wonder

therefore that the ASEAN took quite a long time to bring durable order within her own domain, and

then to achieve the goal of regional peace and prosperity. Given a membership in 1997, Myanmar

today is well integrated in the ASEAN, and is going to be the host country in the 2014 ASEAN Meet.

But, Myanmar had already gone to “the other block” before the birth of the ASEAN in 1967. Ne

Win’s advent in the political arena had already decided Myanmar’s destiny. That Ne Win’s “

Positive Neutralism” was just another name of “ not annoying China”-- has been very clearly stated


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by none other than David Steinberg, when he was describing in his book Burma: A Socialist Nation

of Southeast Asia, the background considerations of Myanmar ( Burma) in 1979 when in the Havana

Session Myanmar withdrew from the NAM.

Let us see what was the Crisis during the period 1948-1962, that led to the fall of a civil

government in 1962, widening the path for such an autocratic and longest sustaining military

ruled state as that under General Ne Win?

Prime Minister U Nu had already experienced a break of Care taker Government” ( 1958-1960)

when he had to handover power to General Ne Win. Call it a crisis or a preventive

measure for avoiding total disintegration of the state itself, the fact remains that in spite of the

existence of a Constitution ( Constitution of 1947), the biggest challenge before U Nu

remained finding out ways and means to integrate the majority Bamars ( Burmans) with the

non-Bamars, the Karens in particular. To the second category however belong the Kachins,

Karens, Shans, Mons, Rakhines ( Arakanese), Chins, Karennis ( Kayas) , and smaller groups like

Pao, Wa, Naga, Lahu, Kokang etc. Having failed to cope with the armed insurgency that was

aiming at, not only autonomy, but also achievement of freedom・ U Nu made Buddhism the

state religion. In a country of a sizable Muslim and Christian population, this official change in

favour of Buddhism, the religion of the majority Bamars, disappointed the Karen, Kachin and

Chin Christians and a large number of Bamar and Arakanese Muslims. Source of further crisis

became U Nu’s denial to grant Statehood to culturally advanced two races: the Mons and the

Rakhines ( Arakanese), two of the major ethnic groups sharing cultural kinship with Indian

civilization. In external relations my understanding of U Nu’s foreign policy compels me to state

that he made too many experiments with his principle of friendship with all nations. Further at

home he rejected communism in favour of a Buddhist socialism and idea of welfare state, but,

continued a very friendly relation with communist China. This wooing China policy encouraged

China to get further involved in internal affairs of Myanmar. On the other hand, the hapless KMT

remnants, backed by the USA, got involved in drug and small arms business, making northern

Myanmar an extremely vulnerable area. Yet, I believe that without sincere cooperation from China,

Myanmar ‘s problem along her border and Kachin dominated North Myanmar as a whole is not

possible.


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Reconciliation though Reasserted State: 1962-1988

The “Re-asserted State” to use Robert Taylor’s phrase, under General Ne Win ( 1962-1988) is an

equally discussed chapter in History, as the period of Pro-Democracy Movement ( 1988-2010). The

first phase of the Revolutionary Council ( until 1974) fashioned after the model of Maoist China,

centralized everything within the state. The massive nationalization process not only pauperized

the once rich and culturally advanced Indian community, it made things so difficult that the Indians

left Myanmar altogether. The free press disappeared, so also English medium schools. Higher

education became irrelevant with the justification that the students might pose a challenge to the

state. It is all too common that an autocrat wanted some kind of legitimization of his power.

Therefore, the One Party Constitutional System through the establishment of BSPP (Burma Socialist

Program Party) and the propaganda of “ Shared Poverty” were in the air. However, neither the

drug problem, nor the proliferation of small arms, nor the insurgency and black marketing saw any

sign of disappearance. Out of this confusion the country which benefited most was again communist

China. Through gradual encroachment to Myanmar’s natural resources and occupation ( in one

form or the other) of strategic areas of northern Myanmar and Lower Myanmar ( Bay of Bengal

Area), and infiltration of her own people, it greatly controlled, at least indirectly many key areas.

Instead of choosing India, a section of Myanmar people chose communist China as their closest

partner. They seemed to have forgotten the fact that India stood by them during the most difficult

days of 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s. Since 1962 Myanmar developed a strong state machinery

with a strong Army (Tamadaw). Surrounded regionally and globally by countries with strong army,

why not? But, distance from India can only be explained by her preference for China as a closer

partner.

Period of Crisis, Reconciliation and Reconstruction: 1990-2012

The Constitution of 1974 has been replaced in 2010 by a new Constitution, which was compiled

through a long process of convention. It was not only a negotiation between the armed insurgent

groups who agreed to negotiate for a peaceful ceasefire, but it was a meeting of a large number of

civil society members from various works of life, quite a number of them are known to me

personally. The first Meeting of the Convention was in 1992. But, several breaks delayed the

process, leading its conclusion only as late as in 2008, when through a Referendum the constitution


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got the consent of the people. It happened in the time when the country was devastated by the

cyclone Nargis. So, the year 2008 can be considered as the year of crisis as well as reconciliation.

Valuable help from India during the post-Nargis period is gratefully acknowledged by the people of

Myanmar.

Myanmar today has achieved much of what she aspired to: almost insurgency free state, secure

border, lifting of economic sanctions by western countries and some old friends like Japan and

Australia, emerging private press, assurance of foreign direct investment, free market with some

restrictions, good relations with all neighbours, indeed all countries. The problem of the northern

Rakhine Muslims, I am sure, will also be solved in near future. The common people suffered a lot,

but, they are happy now, especially since they can go outside the country without much state

intervention, for example, on pilgrimages to India, a land of their beloved Buddha.

Throughout the period from 1988 to the present Myanmar has gone through various phases of ups

and downs. The SLORC ( State Law and Order Restoration Council) rule of 1988, election of 1990,

denial on the part of the Junta government to handover power to NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu

Kyi, consolidated challenge posed by the NCGUB ( anti-govt non-communist force backed by the

US) , repeated arrest ( protective custody) of Aung San Suu Kyi, fall of General Khin Nyut ( 2004),

capital shift from Yangon to Nay Pyi Taw ( 2005), demonstration of the monks ( 2007), the change

of SLORC to SPDC ( State Peace and Development Council) in 1997, and appearance of USDA (

Union Solidarity and Development Association 1993 ) and step by step implementation of Seven

agendas included in the “ Road Map to Democracy”. For all the members of Pyithu Hluttaw (

House of Representatives) and Amyotha Hluttaw ( House of nationalities) which includes not only

the majority party , USDP ( Union Solidarity Development Party) , but also Aung San Suu Kyi and

his colleagues from the NLD, following agendas get the maximum priority: the ensuring of law and

order, public livelihood, non-disintegration of the Union, nation’s sovereignty and solidarity. A

peaceful and prosperous Myanmar can contribute a lot in brining the badly needed stability in this

region, South Asia in particular.

After visiting Myanmar so many times and engaging myself with the country and her wonderful

people I am of the opinion that the time has come for India to learn the practice of Metta ( loving

kindness) and preaching and practising of Dhamma. The long desired peace and stability in


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Myanmar has not been achieved only through official means at highest level of the government. A

large number of civil society institutions and organizations, religious or otherwise, have

contributed a lot in this process. The name of Dr. Ashin Nyanissara, who is widely known as

Sayadaw Sitagu, should be mentioned in this connection. This great monk and his Sitagu

International Buddhist Academy based in Sagaing Hills, with branches in other cities, have a major

share in peace building process of Myanmar with India as a major partner. The Dhamma practised

by many other monks across Myanmar and religious leaders from other faiths too, is, what

Mahatma Gandhi described as “ Truth” and in Gurudev Tagore’s concept the “ Religion of

Humanity”. To young scholars of India and Myanmar my sincere appeal is to read what these two

creators of modern India wrote about the Myanmar people.

References:

Aung Thaw.1978. Historical Sites in Burma. Published by the Ministry of Union Culture, Govt of the Union of Burma. Bhattacharya, Swapna. 2005.’History of Buddhism in Myanmar: Interpretation from Indian Perspective’, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta. Vol XLVII. No 4. : 65-81 Bhattacharya, Swapna. 2006.’Rabindranth Tagore in Myanmar ( Burma) and Tagore’s Perception of Southeast Asia India Relations’ in Panda, Shishir & Brandtner, Martin eds. Interrogating History: Essays for Hermann Kulke. Delhi: Monohar:212-229 Bhattacharya, Swapna.2007. India-Myanmar Relations 1886-1948. Kolkata: K.P Bagchi Bhattacharya, Swapna. 2009.’ Experiencing the Depth of Bond between India and Myanmar’ . Dialogue , vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 160-183. Bhattacharya, Swapna.2013.’ Myanmar’s Own Way to Democracy, Peace and Reconciliation: Introspective Observations from a Friend of Myanmar’ in Chakrabarti, Shantanu ed. Searching for Non-western Roots of Conflict Resolution: Discourses, Norms and Case Studies. Institute of Foreign Policy Studies, Calcutta University, Kolkata in association with Knowledge World N.Delhi: 129-162 Bhattacharya, Swapna. Forthcoming. The University of Calcutta and Myanmar: Urgent need for Revisiting the Golden Era’. Paper presented at the Annual Congress of Myanmar Academy of Arts and Sciences 2012, ( 24.10-27.10.2012) , held at Yangon University. To be published by Myanmar Academy of Arts & Sciences. Chakravarty, Nalini Ranjan. 1971. The Indian Minority in Burma: The Rise and Decline of an immigrant Community. London: OUP Charney, Michael. 2009. A History of Burma. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press


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Chattopadhyay, Suniti Kumar. 1974. Kirata Janakirti. The Indo Mongoloid: Their Contributions to the History and Culture of India. Calcutta: The Asiatic Society Chronicle of National Development: Comparison between Period preceding 1988 and after ( up to 31-12-2007) , Printing and Publishing Enterprise, Yangon 2008 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. 1991. Freedom from Fear and other Writings ( Introduction by Michael Aris) N. Delhi: Penguin Books Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. 1990. Burma and India: Some Aspects of Intellectual Life under Colonialism. Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Shimla in association with Allied Publication Dr. Ashin Nyanissara ( Sayadaw Sitagu). 2009. The Buddha and His Noble Path. Sagain Hills: Sitagu International Buddhist Academy Das, Suranjan. 2012. Interview published in The Hindu, 31.05.2012. found in http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-otherstates/articl Devare, Sudhir. India and Southeast Asia towards Security Convergence. Singapore: ISSEAS. Fundamental Principles and Detailed basic Principles adopted by the national Convention in drafting the State Constitution, pub by Printing and Publishing Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Govt. of Myanmar Ganesan, N. & Kyaw Yin Hlaing eds. 2007. Myanmar State, Society and Ethnicity, Singapore & Japan, ISSEAS ( Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Hiroshima Peace Institute Gutman, Pamela. 2001. Burma’s Lost Kingdoms: Splendour of Arakan. Bangkok: Orchid Press Hla Tun Aung, Myanmar : The Study of Processes and Patterns, published by the National Centre for Human Resource Development, Ministry of education, Myanmar Hlaing Yin, Kyaw, Taylor, Robert H. & Maung Maung, Tin Than eds. 2005. Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS). Koh Kim Seng, 2011. Misunderstood Myanmar: An Introspective Study of a Southeast Asian State in Transition., Singapore: Humanities Press Luce, Gordon. 1969. Old Burma Early Pagan. Vol. I: New York: JJ Augustin Publisher Locust Valley Manguin, Pierre-Yves, Mani, A, Wase, Geoff. 2011. Early Interactions between South and Southeast Asia: Reflections on Cross Cultural Exchange. Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies & Delhi: Monohar Maung Maung (Dr. Maung Maung). 1961. Burma’s Constitution. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff

http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-otherstates/articl


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Maung Aung Myoe. 2009. Building the Tamadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces since 1948, Singapore, ISSEAS Ni Ni Myint. 1985.Burma’s Struggle against British Imperialism 1885-1995. Rangoon: The Universities Press Roy, Niharranjan. 1936. Brahmanical Gods in Burma. Calcutta: Calcutta University Press ( reprinted by Orchid Press , Bangkok 2001) Seshadri ( H.E Dr. ), V.R. ‘An Invitation from a neighbour’ published in Opinion Lead, The Hindu 22.4.2013 Silverstein, Joseph. 1997. ‘Five Years of failure in Burma’ in: Brown, Michael E. & Ganguly, Sumit. eds. Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia. CSIA Studies in International Security in cooperation with PBRC. Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press Singh, Uma Shankar. 1979. Burma and India 1948-1962. N Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing Company Smith, Martin. 1991. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, London Zed Books Soe Saing. 1990. ‘United Nations Technical and Economic Development in Burma’ in Than, Mya & Tan, Joseph L.H eds Myanmar: Dilemmas and Options: Challenges of Economic Transition in the 1990s , Singapore, ISSEAS Stadtner, Donald.M. 2011. Sacred Sites of Burma: Myth and Folklore in an evolving spiritual Realm. Bangkok: Rover Books. Steinberg, David I. Burma: A Socialist Nation of Southeast Asia. Boulder Colorado, West view Press Steinberg, David I.2010. Burma/Myanmar: What everyone needs to know. Oxford: Oxford University Press Taylor, Robert H. 2009. The State in Myanmar. London, HURST: London. 2009 Distributed by Foundation Book. Trager, Frank. 1966. From Kingdom to Republic. N. York: Friedrich A Praeger U Khin Maung Nyunt (Dr. Khin Maung Nyunt). 1994. ‘Balance between Tradition and Modernity in Myanmar History’ in Gaertner, Uta & Lorenz J eds Tradition and Modernity in Myanmar. Muenster: Lit Verlag ( Berliner Asien Afrika Studien, Humboldt Universitaet vol III/pt 1): 5-14 Conclusion: Myanmar is a country of various faiths and races. Like a few other countries from Asia such as Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, India, Myanmar too has a very strong base of nationhood and state bureaucracy. The country suffered most during the last World War, and on every occasion the people of Myanmar looked at India for help and guidance. It is fascinating to see that not only the Buddhists of Myanmar, the non-Buddhist religious communities, Hindus, Muslims and Christians have a strong India- link. This makes an Indian in Myanmar at home. The opportunities of all the openings that has made things easier than ever before, should be utilised by both the countries. Let me conclude by arguing that honouring India’s most ancient practice of “knowing the world”


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around to “know yourself”, the people from all sections of India should visit Myanmar. Only then they will be able to feel the true rhythm of a common History. Historians, indeed, social scientists in general from both the countries have a great role to play for the cause of mutual peace and prosperity. Acknowledgement: I am deeply indebted to the following institutions for valuable cooperation and support: Govt of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India, the University of Calcutta, the University of Yangon, the University of Dagon, University of Mandalay, and Maulana Abul Kalam Institute of Asian Studies, under Ministry of culture, Govt. of India. It is not possible to name individually those who helped me in course of last 20 years or so. The list will be too long. But, I must acknowledge the interest of Professor Mahendra Gaur in my contribution and warm invitation to write about my understanding of Myanmar. I dedicate this article for all the people of Myanmar, mentioned or otherwise, but due to whose Metta I could enjoy a spiritual pleasure whenever I went back.

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Myanmar‟s democracy, a work in progress

Col.R Hariharan

(Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence officer of the army, is a strategic analyst and commentator on South Asia and its neighbourhood as well as terrorism and insurgency. He is associated with Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. He has written over 180 analytical articles in national and international print and electronic media since 2004. He is also featured regularly as an expert commentator on strategic issues in Indian and international news channels. His writings have been included in over a dozen publications in his areas of interest. E-mail: [email protected];website:www.colhari.org Visit Hariharan's Intelligence blog at: www.colhariharan.org )

Myanmar surprised everyone with its early success in ushering in democracy – despite the

constraints of 2008 Constitution that legalised army‘s role in parliament and executive - within

two years of holding the first multiparty elections in two decades. President Thein Sein‘s far

sighted leadership has enabled the government to transform its image from a stodgy, insensitive

military dictatorship of yesteryears to an increasingly people-friendly one.

Theoretically this should make it easy for democracies like India to deal with Myanmar.

Americans have stepped in a big way in Myanmar. The successful visit of President Thein Sein

to the White House in May 2013 – the first ever by a Myanmar President in 47 years – with the

U.S. President Barak Obama‘s assuring American support to Myanmar's political and economic

reforms is a testimony to it.

The renewed U.S. presence in Myanmar brings an end to their skewed relations. The signing of a

bilateral trade and investment agreement with the U.S on the occasion of Thein‘s visit has

triggered the flow of international businessmen to Yangon. Greater U.S. presence in Myanmar,

considered for long as the pocket borough of China, is likely to create its own strategic ripples in

the region. And India would also considering these strategic changes in Myanmar in shaping its

overall Asia-Pacific policy.

International recognition for President Thein has come the hard way. He has brought in radical

changes in the approach to politics and governance. He has freed most of the political prisoners.

Restrictions on the media have been lifted.

Above all, he managed to bring into politics Mrs Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for

Democracy (NLD), who had boycotted the 2010 general elections. They are now back into

mainstream politics despite their objections to the continued role of army, legitimized by the

2008 Constitution. So there is an air of positive vibrations in the country about its future; and

there are greater expectations among the international community about Mynamar‘s future role.

This was evident at the first ever summit of the World Economic Forum on East Asia hosted by

Myanmar on June 6-7, 2013 with the participation of 10 heads of state and 550 business leaders

from more than 60 global companies.


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http://www.colhariharan.org/


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However, these welcome developments should not cloud the fact that democracy in Myanmar is

still in the half-way house. It is a work in progress. The military now lurking in the backdrop still

has a say in deciding the survival of the government both in the legislature and executive. There

are political prisoners still in prison. The economy lacks fiscal discipline and structures for

monetary control and investment conforming to international norms are not yet in place. And

Kyat, the national currency, is yet to be stabilized.

Though President Thein has been addressing most of these issues, he has a long way go. He has

the daunting task of overcoming traditional animosities and prejudices to evolve democratic

solutions. Unless, the country has a period of social and political stability free from ethnic and

sectarian strife it would be difficult for him to carry through the economic reforms and energise

development activities. And he needs the support of all stakeholders – the army, political parties,

youth, and the international community – in this task.

In a nut shell, the future of democracy is very much dependent upon rebuilding Myanmar‘s

national identity to galvanise the people to take them on the road to prosperity. It is not a simple

narrative because the nation‘s democratic experience since early years of independence in 1948

was marred by lack of strong leadership, political infighting, factionalism and rampant

corruption resulting in chaos, poor governance. The country was in with itself fighting ethnic

insurgents without respite. Democracy failed to deliver what it promised – improve the quality of

life of the people. In fact it provided the opportunity for General Ne Win and the army to take

over power in 1962.

After four decades of army rule the country had no political assets when it went for elections in

2010, except for the idiom of controlled political activity approved by the army. People have

had no exposure to multiparty democracy except for its short but disastrous debut in the 1990

parliamentary election which was disowned by the military rulers. As a result Myanmar has now

woken up to democracy without the tools to manage peoples‘ power.

And in Myanmar it translates into 40 percent of the population in productive age. The youth of

the country, who had historically spearheaded the struggles for independence against the British

and Japanese and the military junta in 1988, suddenly find they have a small say in deciding their

fate. Internet freedom has given them access to socially networked world where they find youth

power on the rise. They are becoming more conscious of their democratic rights than ever

before. It is logical that their aspirations for fundamental freedoms, rights to livelihood,

education, health and articulation of their voice would continuously rise and they would expect

the democratic government to deliver them now.

Unless the government and political parties manage to constructively channelize youth power to

build a national identity, we might see it morphing into an extra constitutional pressure group.

This phenomenon is already taking place in the streets of Cairo, Delhi, Athens, Paris, and

Istanbul. Can the disparate political parties, with their own private and public agendas, lacking

charismatic leadership – perhaps barring Aung San Suu Kyi - manage this?


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If they cannot, it would provide an opportunity for yesteryears‘ military predators to stage a

comeback to power to ―bring back order and stability‖ as they did in 1962. So far, President

Thein appears to have managed the situation quite well, evidently with the blessing of military

leaders. Though Ms Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have extended their support to President

Thein, they have not given up their opposition to the participation of army in the legislature and

executive. They have only deferred it after talks between Ms Suu Kyi and President Thein Sein

to enable him to go ahead with the democratic reformation process.

However, this issue could come back to haunt when the country goes to polls in 2015 to elect a

new parliament with the NLD as the strongest player. It is unlikely the military would allow any

threat to its favoured status to go unchallenged. And that could cramp the progress of democratic

reforms. There are two other intractable issues that could threaten the onward progress of

democracy – ethnic insurgency and the rising tide of Theravada Buddhist activism.

Ethnic insurgencies have been a perennial problem of Myanmar since independence. After going

through a cycle of demand for independence and armed struggle, ethnic communities of

Myanmar were hopeful of finding a satisfactory solution to their demands. However, their hopes

were belied when their armed cadres were required to come under the Myanmar army under the

2008 constitution even before a political solution to their demands for autonomy in terms of the

Panglong Agreement signed at the time of independence was found. This has led to sporadic

clashes between the army and ethnic insurgent groups between spurts of ceasefire.

Though there is an uneasy ceasefire in force with major ethnic insurgencies of Kachins, Karens,

and Shans, they have not been brought to a logical conclusion with a win-win solution. The

reason for this is the trust deficit existing between the ethnic communities and the government

that had been sustained by years of armed struggle and exploitation at the hands of the army.

Even the ceasefires effected after a number of rounds of talks are short lived. The most recent

example is the ceasefire agreement the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) entered into

with the government in May 2013. According to news reports, KIO spokesman had confirmed

that 21 separate armed clashes between government troops and the KIO have taken place since

both sides reached a 7-point agreement, under which they pledged to decrease military tensions

and work towards a future agreement. The reports claim that most of the 100,000 refugees

displaced by the conflict are yet to return home.

Though a lot of goodwill exists on both sides to live amicably, President Thein faces the difficult

task of selling his solution to the majority Burmans (Bamar) who form 70 percent of the

population – a sizeable ―vote bank‖ in the elections. And to add to the problem is the economic

exploitation of minority areas rich in natural resources. A lot of foreign investment particularly

from China, is being made to develop energy and mineral resources in these regions. And they

would like to have a say in resolving issues in ethnic regions. For instance the Shwe gas pipeline

being developed by the Chinese runs through the KIO controlled area; so Chinese want to be

present in the peace talks between the government and KIO representatives.


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Myanmar‘s Citizenship Law 1982 has a xenophobic character, weighted against people of

foreign origin, even third generation descendents, living in the country. Because of its

discriminative clauses thousands of people of Indian origin were deprived of their citizenship. It

also denied citizenship to Rohingyas – Muslims of mixed Indian and Arakanese origin – though

they had been living in Myanmar for hundreds of years. Periodically, violence unleashed by

Buddhist majority against them had resulted in driving over 200,000 of them to seek refuge

overseas, particularly in neighbouring Bangladesh. The 2012 anti-Rohingya riots left about 140

killed and rendered 100,000 homeless.

Perhaps emboldened by the passive state response to anti-Rohingya riots in 2012, anti-Muslim

violence is staging a comeback. In March 2013, Buddhist activists killed a total 43 people and

injured 93 in Meikhtila in Central Myanmar. In all 1227 homes, 77 shops and 37 mosques were

destroyed. The riots quickly spread to six other townships in Thayawady district in Bago Region

in Lower Myanma and to 11 townships in Mandalay and Pegu divisions, where Muslim

neighbourhoods were ransacked.And the army had to be called to restore order rather belatedly.

The anti-Muslim sentiments have some political and social support which has helped stoke

Therawada Buddhist vigilantism. These elements are heading for a showdown with the

government after senior Buddhist leaders expressed their support a controversial draft Law for

the Protection of Race and Religion. The draft law also requires any Buddhist woman seeking to

marry a Muslim man to get the permission of her parents and local government officials. Any

Muslim man who marries a Buddhist woman is required to convert to Buddhism.

As these are socio-political issues both President Thein and Mrs Suu Kyi will be finding it

difficult to resolve. They would need to combine their energies to evolve a game plan to keep

these issues within manageable levels to ensure the progress of democratic reforms. In the

coming months, we can expect only slow progress in the reform process, facing challenges at

every step from divisive political and social forces. It will be a true test of national leadership‘s

ability to deal with these challenges.

India‘s relations with Myanmar are likely to become more broad-based as Myanmar‘s

investment and business environment enlarges and becomes structured. A closer relationship

with India enables Myanmar to balance China‘s overwhelming influence better, particularly as it

complements India-U.S. strategic relationship. Indian leadership of all political hues is aware of

the importance of Myanmar in India‘s overall strategic spectrum.

Myanmar's historical cultural and religious experience and shared colonial history with India

makes dealings between the two countries easier. A number of projects to improve infrastructure

connectivity among BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar) and Indo-ASEAN connectivity

are in the offing. India‘s Sittwe multi-modal project is also making progress. However, their

success would depend upon democracy firmly establishing itself in Myanmar. It is essential that

India shows a lot of understanding and paly an active role in helping Myanmar achieve success

in its journey to become a vibrant democracy.

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India-Myanmar Relations - Wuthering Heights

Syed Ali Mujtaba

(Syed Ali Mujtaba ,Ph.D, is a senior journalist based in Chennai,India. His career has spanned over 20 years in different facets of journalism. He taught media studies for six years in institutions in Chennai. He was Chennai Correspondent for an Australian Radio.He was a Jefferson fellowship at the East West Center, Hawaii in fall 2003. As part of this fellowship programme he visited US, South Korea, Vietnam and Singapore. He visited Thailand twice to present paper atthe media conferences. Mujtabacontinues to write for several newspapers, news syndicates and websites.He is a member of International Federation of Environmental Journalist Association (IFEJA).He has shot two documentary films “Beyond Empires” and Making a Difference.”He has taken doctoral degree from School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He was on India’s grant to pursue doctoral research in England.He has authored two books and contributed a chapter each to four edited volumes.He has qualified National Education Test (NET). Mujtaba was in the AMU Aligarh Muslim University’s Football team from where he has taken the Bachelors and Master’s Degree. He is the founder and moderator of South Asia Contact Group. He can be contacted at [email protected] He has a blog Mujtabas-Musings: URL: http://mujtabas-musings.blogspot.com

____________________________________________ Introduction India Myanmar relation is steeped in history. The moment we talk about Myanmar, it's all history that comes to our mind. Whether it's being the mortal abode of the last Mughal King, Bhadur Shah Zafar, or the stories of the splendour of Rangoon where Indians once flourished, or the hazardous trek of many Indians from Burma after its occupation by the Japanese during Second World War, all these forms the part of our folklore. The last powerful memory that remains encrypted in our mind is the 1962 coup in Burma following which Indians were ordered to leave that country empty handed. History seems to have frozen after that; there is hardly any news what's happening on the Burma front. The endeavour of this paper is to update the audience on the contemporary developments of India - Myanmar relations and the effort is to bring out the nuances of India's foreign policy towards Myanmar. This paper begins with a peep into Myanmar's land and people, goes on to trace its political history since independence and analyses the problems faced by Myanmar. It highlights the history of India-Myanmar relations and talks about gas pipeline and issues that surrounds Indo - Myanmar relations. The paper updates on the developmental activities going on between the two countries and touches upon India- Myanmar Naval Cooperation and the China factor. It finally wraps up with a summery and a conclusion.


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Burma since Independence The post-independence history of Burma can be divided into three phases. First phase from 1948 to 1962, second from 1962 to 1988 and third phase from 1988 till date. After the Word War II, General Aung San, architect of Burma's independence and revered as the leader of the independence struggle, was able to win the trust of the ethnic nationalities and unified them with the Burmans at the Panglong Conference in February 1947. All the nationalities participated in that conference and demanded independence of Burma from the colonial rule. The British Government acceded to their demand and a Constitution was drafted in 1947 and Burma was granted independence on January 4, 1948. However, before the Constitution could be put into effect, General Aung San was assassinated along with most of his cabinet members on July 19, 1947. The period from 1948-62 was marred by widespread conflict and internal struggle emanating out of constitutional disputes. There was persistent division among political and social groups that undermined any democratic system of governance to strike roots in Burma. A strong leadership at this stage could have checked fissiparous tendencies but weak constitutional authority contributed to the erosion of trust among the nationalities. The military was called on several occasions to assume the role of caretaker government and through military campaigns the control of the central authority was reinforced. The military took over power in 1949 and 1958 but handed it back to the civilian government after restoring law and order. In 1958 it stepped down after remaining in power for almost 18 months. This trend however was halted in 1962 when General Ne Win staged a coup on the pretext of saving the country from the break up and displaced Prime Minister U Nu. The military General assumed absolute power and abolished the 1947constitution and established a military government with socialist economic priorities. Like any other military ruler, Ne Win too sought to dominate every aspect of the Burmese life. He crushed all the parties except his own the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) and hobnobbed with socialism. This meant tight control over the economy, denial of liberty, and enforced isolation from the rest of the world. This hardly provided any relief to the economically bedraggled country. The year 1962 saw the first demonstration against the Ne Win regime. Henceforth, things did not move on a happy pace and the mismanagement of the economy added up to the people's woes. General New Win tried to address these issues by nationalizing banks, demonetizing currency but could not improve the situation. There was a wide spread demonstrations in 1964, 1974, 1987 and 1988. In March 1988 economic situation worsened and student unrest broke out in Rangoon. The demonstration increased in size, despite repeated military crackdowns. On August 8, 1988, military supposedly killed more than 1,000 agitators, mostly students. However, this did not dampen their spirits and in September 1988, the agitation reached a point that General Ne Win had to resign.


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A military junta called State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) took over the power from General Ne Win and in a bid to restore order sent the army to suppress the on-going agitation. It's estimated that more than 3,000 people were killed during the military crackdown from 1988 to 1990. It was during this time that Aung San SuuKyi, daughter of General Aung San, made her first political speech at a public rally in Rangoon and assumed the role of the opposition leader in Myanmar. The SLOARC around this time ruled Myanmar through martial law. It abolished Ne Win's constitution abandoned his socialist practices and also deposed his Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). In 1989, the SOLARC changed the English name, Burma to Burmese name, Myanmar. It also changed Rangoon to its Burmese name Yangon. The SOLARC finally announced national parliamentary elections on May 27, 1990. The successor to the BSPP and military patronized party called the National Union Party (NUP), and the Aung San Suki led National League for Democracy (NLD) was the main contender for the election. The NLD routed the junta supported NUP party and registered a landslide victory, winning 392 of the total 485 seats.However, belying all fair play and justice, the SOLARC refused to call the Parliament and quashed the electoral verdict on the ground that Aung San-Suukican not hold power since she was married to an English man. The SOLARC also disapproved her idea to make Myanmar a federal state, reasoning that it would lead to the disintegration of the country. The military rulers defended their action calling national interest to be higher than an individual and reminded the people of military's role in saving the country from breaking up in 1949, 1958 and 1962. The SLORC also started propaganda through state controlled media. It launched a campaign against the civilian government alleging it to be conspiring with the insurgents. To gain legitimacy, history was rewritten denying any role of the military in the civilian massacre of 1988. The SOLRC further tried to gain legitimacy by extending state support to the Buddhist Sangha. Since 1990's Myanmar under SOLARC has been moving away from socialism and started limitedly opening up the economy. As a result India, Thailand, South Korea, has entered into Myanmar in a big way. The new trend was given legitimacy in 1997 when SOLARC changed its name to SPDC (State Peace and Development Council). In the same year, Myanmar was admitted to the grouping ASEAN or Association of South East Asian Nation. Myanmar 1990 was series of cease-fire pacts singed between the insurgent groups and the military Junta. It's reported that out more than 17 insurgents groups signed the ceasefire agreement. However, some major groups refused to give up their armed resistance. In 1993, General ThanShwe announced establishment of a National Convention or a reconciliation process aimed at drawing up a new constitution for Myanmar. He also outlined a seven-point plan to restore democracy in Myanmar. The drafting of such constitution is going on since then and all democratic process has been put on hold till its completion. Recent developments have seen a general election in 2010 and by-elections in 2012 which were contested by some opposition parties.The main opposition party National League for Democracy was re-registered for the by-elections on 13 December 2011 as part of the


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reforms in Burma since 2010. NLD leader Aung San SuuKyi ran in the seat of Kawhmu, which she won and her party won in 43 of the 44 seats they contested. The 2011–2012 Burmese democratic reforms are an ongoing series of political, economic and administrative reforms in Burma undertaken by the military-backed government. These reforms include the release of pro-democracy leader Aung San SuuKyi from house arrest and subsequent dialogues with her, establishment of the National Human Rights Commission, general amnesties of more than 200 political prisoners, institution of new labour laws that allow labour unions and strikes, relaxation of press censorship, and regulations of currency practices. India- Burma Relations India enjoyed friendly relations with Burma from 1948 to 1962. Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and Prime Minister U Nu were instrumental in cementing initial political and diplomatic ties between two countries. India provided Burma with military and economic assistance during this period. India's relations with Burma totally froze after its military takeover in 1962. General Ne Win who seized power, nationalized all private enterprise in Burma and ordered expulsion of the Indians. This created a bad blood in India-Burma relations. India had to arrange ferries and aircrafts to lift its citizens out of Burma. India's war with China in 1962 and military regime siding with the Chinese too had repercussions on India -Burma relations. General Ne Win's idea of cocooning Burma from the rest of the world further distanced India from Burma. During Indira Gandhi's rule, India avoided any contact with Burma and was critical of its suppression of democratic movement and maintaining a poor human rights record. There was no change in India's policy towards Burma during Rajiv Gandhi's regime. Rajiv Gandhi criticized the SOLARC for assuming power in 1988 and extended moral support to the pro-democracy movement in Burma. His government also provided thousands of Burmese citizens with "refugee status" in India after they fled Myanmar in wake of military repression. India's policy of engaging Myanmar However, due to changing realities, Indo - Myanmar relations saw a major shift during NarshimaRao's regime. There were three stated reasons for the shift in India's policy towards Myanmar. One was to contain China. Second was to check insurgency, drug trafficking, and smuggling in India's northeastern states. Third was the Look East policy, where Myanmar played a central role if India had to reach out to the South East Asian countries. So it's with these stated objectives, India started to cultivate friendly relationship with Myanmar. In the ensuing dialogue, India assured Myanmar that it would not interfere in its domestic affairs and Yangon assured New Delhi that Myanmar's proximity with China would not be directed against India.


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India- Myanmar relations once again deteriorated in 1995, when New Delhi conferred Jawaharlal Nehru Award for promoting international understanding on Aung San SuuKyi. Myanmar's military junta protested New Delhi's move but despite such irritants, India kept open the political and diplomatic channels with Myanmar. During Gujaral period, India slipped back to its old policy of supporting the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. The National Front government laid emphasis on human rights and restoration for democracy for improving India- Myanmar relations. The real shift in India Myanmar relations came when the BJP led government assumed power in 1998. Since then a new momentum was infused in the dormant Indo-Myanmar relations. Fresh diplomatic engagement with Myanmar was made to achieve India's stated objective outlined during NarshimaRao's regime. The two countries signed a protocol to establish regular bilateral ministerial consultations and agreed cooperation in projects related to infrastructure, energy and information technology. Several agreements like setting up cultural exchanges, cooperation in non-traditional security issues, Tamanthi hydroelectric project in Myanmar were signed in further course of time. The two sides are exploring how to expand cooperation in areas like, industry, energy, rail transportation, communications, science and technology and health. India's pressure to curb insurgency bore results when India Myanmar jointly held military operation to flush out the rebels inside Myanmar's territory in January 2006. After that the two sides took stock of the common security challenges posed by the insurgents in the northeast region. Reconstruction of the Settwe port in Myanmar, Kaladan Multi-Nodal transport project and Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo road project are currently underway and strengthening the bilateral relationship. India and Myanmar Gas pipeline controversy Myanmar supposedly has world's tenth-biggest gas reserves estimated to be more than 90 trillion cubic feet. India has evinced keen desire to procure gas from Myanmar to meet it energy needs. India's ONGC Videsh Ltd and Gas Authority of India Limited together hold 30 per cent stakes in the exploration and production of gas in Myanmar's A1 and A3 off -shore blocks located in Sitwe area of the Arakan state. India however faced the problem of the transportation of the gas from Myanmar. A Bangladeshi company Mohona Holdings Limited mooted the idea of tri-nation pipeline project involving Myanmar, Bangladesh and India way back in 1997. Under this proposal, the 290 Kilometer pipeline would run through the Arakan state in Burma, via Indian state of Mizoram and Tripura and to cross over to Bangladesh, before entering back into Indian state of West Bengal. The three countries signed an agreement on this project estimated to be $ 1 billion plus in Yangon on February 2005. The construction of the India- Myanmar pipeline was scheduled to start in 2006 and the delivery of the gas was to commence from 2009.


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However, this project got entangled in political row after Bangladesh sought other concessions from India to allow the passage of the pipeline through its territory. India rejected Bangladesh's demands that bilateral issues cannot become part of a trilateral agreement and decided for an alternative route to bypass Bangladesh. A technical consultant company SUZTractebel from Brussels (Belgium) was engaged by the Gas Authority of India to prepare a detailed feasibility report for an alternative pipeline route to Myanmar. The European company has come up with the new route that would link Myanmar's Sitwe area with Jagdishpur-Haldia pipeline line at Gaya in Bihar. The 1,400-km pipeline would pass via Mizoram, Tripura, Assam, and West Bengal to enter Bihar. This route is almost three times the distance of the tri nation pipeline and may cost India $ 3 billion plus. India's decision to bypass Bangladesh was taken after Myanmar started raising doubts over India's seriousness to transport gas from its gas fields. Myanmar gave ultimatum to India that if it does not decide fast, it might consider selling gas to some other countries. Even as the pipeline project is still in its finalization stage, India has offered hard cash to buy Myanmar gas and import it through ship. India has invited bids for long-term chartering service of a CNG ship for the transportation of the Myanmar gas. Such ship when operational may become first of its kind to ferry such huge amount of gas in the Bay of Bengal. However, to the utter surprise of India, Myanmar allotted the gas blocks to China, saying that India has not taken the call and was delaying the commitment. Indo-Myanmar relations - major issues India - Myanmar shares 1,643 kilometer-long common border along the Potkai Hills. India's four states; Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh share international border with Myanmar. Issues that surround Indo-Myanmar relations are; cross border insurgency, narcotics trade, border posts, border fencing border trade etc. Cross border militancy: India faces insurgency problem in its states of Nagaland, Manipur and parts of Mizoram across the Myanmar borders, whereas Myanmar faces insurgency from Naga (Khaplang group) from the Indian side. India-Myanmar Army has agreed to strengthen the mechanism to exchange intelligence along the international border to check cross border crimes. In January 2006, Myanmar and Indian Army conducted joint operation to flush out NSCN-K rebels where helicopter gun-ships were reportedly used. Narcotics Trade: India faces the problem of narco-terrorism through the porous Myanmar border wherein drugs are smuggled to India and exchanged for arms and ammunition. According to a report, the Indian army last year alone, seized drugs worth over 30 crore rupees in the international market from the Myanmar border. Myanmar remains the primary source of drugs problem in Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland. Number of agreements has been signed between India and Myanmar since 1993 to collaborate to fight the drugs menace along their common border. Border post: India- Myanmar army is currently holding border post meetings at regular intervals at Moreh-Tamu in Manipur. The two countries have recently agreed to open four


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more border posts to facilitate army meetings. They are at Lungwa in Nagaland's Mon district, Bihang in Manipur's Churachandpur district and at Sapi and Zokawathar in Mizoram. Among the border posts, Zokwathar, Moreh and Lungwa are also international trade centers. Border Fencing: Border fencing is important to check narco-terrorism along India-Myanmar border. Recently, India has sanctioned to raise the iron fencing, along Mizoram's 404-km border with Myanmar. It has also ordered the fencing of the 14 kilometers of the porous international boundary at Moreh in Manipur. Infrastructure Development There has been flurry of activity going on in the field of infrastructure, development between India and Myanmar. India has offered $35million as financial assistance to Myanmar for its various development projects. This includes multi-modal transport system, road, railways and telephone network. Road: India is exploring a transport corridor through Myanmar, a potential gateway to East Asian countries to form a free-trade region. The 'trilateral highway' connecting India, Myanmar and Thailand is being discussed. The National Highway-39 that connects Manipur with Myanmar is considered as gateway to ASEAN nations. Currently a road from the border town of Moreh in Manipur to Kangla that's 110-kms-long is operational. With plans to build another road via Mizoram, another gateway for bilateral and regional trade promotion is in the offing. Another road connecting Zakhaotar in Mizoram with the Chin state of Myanmar is being talked about. India's Border Roads Organization has started the survey work of the 225 km stretch road that would connect Mizoram to Tidium in Myanmar. Rail: India is playing a big part in helping Myanmar to augment its rail infrastructure needs, supplying rails and rolling stock and assisting in upgrading its rail network. This assistance is part of the ambitious Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) project that would link New Delhi with Hanoi. India has made available a line of credit of US $ 56 million to Myanmar to build a modern railway utility along the northwestern and central flanks of its neighbor. India is also assisting in upgrading the Yangon-Mandalay sector of Myanmar railways. Indian Railways has initiated the preliminary tasks to extend the broad-gauge track from Jiribam in southwest Manipur to Moreh that's scheduled to be complete by March 2010. Waterways: The Kaladan multi model transport project between India and Myanmar is a combination of rivers, transport, building of highway and natural gas pipeline projects. It's commissioned in the southern part of Mizoram with total outlay of $ 100 million. As a part of this project, India is planning to rebuild Myanmar's Sittwe port, situated on the mouth of the Kaladan River. The port is intended to link Mizoram to the Bengal Sea via Arakan'sKaladan River that connects to Assam's river in India. India is keen to rebuild this port for the transportation of gas and other natural resources from Arrakan to its northeastern states. India Myanmar Naval Cooperation The strategic importance of Myanmar in the Indian Ocean has made India initiate naval cooperation with Myanmar. A number of Indian naval personal have been visiting


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Myanmar off late. Indian Navy chief Admiral ArunPrakash first visited Myanmar in 2003 and then again in January 2006 where he presented a consignment of communication equipment to his counterparts. His visit became controversial when it was reported that he discussed the sale BN-2 Islander aircraft to Myanmar. This was objected by Britain that originally supplied it to India. The British High Commissioner to India, Sir Michael Arthur issued stern warning that if New Delhi went ahead with the sale, Britain would stop the supply of spares for Indian Navy's Islander aircraft. He added that Britain was bound by EU guidelines that no military dealings have to be done with Myanmar either directly or through third party. In spite of such hiccups India and Myanmar naval cooperation is forging ahead. Two Indian warships, INS Ranjit and ISN Kuthar did joint naval maneuvers with Mayanmar's navy in December 2005. Since then India and Myanmar are regularly naval exchanges and joint naval cooperation is gaining strength to strength. The China Factor China has always been the key element in India-Myanmar relations due to strategic location of Myanmar. As a result, security and strategic interests of India and China seem to clash with each other over Myanmar. While China has gained a lot by siding with the military regime since 1962, India has lost all its leverage supporting the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. China taking advantage of Myanmar's splendid isolation with rest of the world has developed a deep involvement in Burma. Much to India's strategic nightmare, China on Myanmar's Coco Island has built its naval listening and weather posts. Also, China and Myanmar have agreed to establish a 30,000-square-mile offshore economic zone to facilitate exploitation of natural resources. This may have bearing on India's maritime and economic interests in the Indian Ocean. India's strategic thinking towards Myanmar is also guided by Sino-Pakistan, Sino-Myanmar relations. India's warming up relation with Myanmar is to check Chinese free run in that country. Although China and Myanmar have drawn closer for various reasons, Myanmar is keen to develop ties with India since it does not want to remain isolated with the rest of world. Myanmar is aware of its strategic importance to both India and China and but when it comes to selling of its natural resources it has preferred China over India and this is something New Delhi needs to take into account in dealing with Myanmar. Conclusion There are few salient features in the India-Myanmar relations. There are three key factors that are compelling India to develop a proactive relation with Myanmar. First 'Look East Policy' to reach out to the ASEAN, second coordinated effort with Myanmar to develop its northeast region and third strategic policy to contain Chinese influence over Myanmar.


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In India's look east policy, the trilateral highway between India, Myanmar and Thailand plays a major role to reach the South East Asian countries. So is the Trans Asian railway that is to connect New Delhi with Hanoi. A deep economic relationship with Myanmar in India's view would give a tremendous boost to the development of its northeast region. The planned infrastructure development of road, rail and waterways are all steps in this direction. India sees China's involvement in Myanmar having geo- strategic implications for the region and does not want to give it a free hand. It therefore would like to engage Myanmar through greater economic strategic cooperation. Apart from bilateral relations India is also engaging Myanmar through ASEAN and BIMSTEC. India's engagement with Myanmar through ASEAN began in 1997, when it was admitted as its full dialogue partner and in the same year Myanmar became its full member. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) set up in 1997 is another forum through which India is engaging Myanmar. It’s not only India that is after Myanmar, it’s also Myanmar that's after India. Facing sanctions from European Union and America, Myanmar wants to develop deep relations with India for economic reasons. India is one of Myanmar's major trading partners and fourth largest market for its goods. The most startling fact is bilateral trade between India and Myanmar has grown nearly eight-fold in recent years. In 2004-05 bilateral trade has reached over $500 million and two sides have set target of $1 billion for the year 2006-2007. India's policy of engaging Myanmar has definitely paying dividends.

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Indo Myanmar Relations: Looking East from the North east

Prof.E.Bijoykumar Singh

Economics Department ,Manipur University [email protected]

An alumnus of Delhi School of Economics he has been actively engaged in research for the last thirty years on various aspects of the economy of the North Eastern region of India. He has completed a number of projects from the Planning Commission, the UGC and the ICSSR. He was consultant to NEC sponsored RIS study on Indo Myanmar Border trade and Government of Manipur sponsored NIPFP study on Fiscal Reforms in Manipur. He was a member of Manipur State Planning Board. Currently he is co-ordinating the UGC-Special Assistance Programme in Economics department and conducting an ICSSR sponsored study both on Indo Myanmar Border trade. He is the Deanof Social Science,Manipur university and director of the Internal Quality Assurance Cell, Manipur University. He was the vice president of the North East Economic Association, president of Manipur Economic Association and is currently an executive member of the Indian Econometric Society.

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Myanmar is emerging from five decades of economic and political isolation. India‘s North east

,yet to recover from the massive dislocation in its connectivity at the time of independence, and

also on the lookout for a developmental paradigm , is seeking a place in India‘s Look East

policy. Ambassador RajivSikri had admitted in a recent seminar that the north east indeed was

not in the picture when India‘s Look East Policy (LEP) was initiated in the early 90s.1Myanmar

was a closed economy boycotted by the international communityfor her undemocratic practices.

Now the boycott has been withdrawn and every country is competing to develop good relations

with Myanmar.2Has the right time for India‘s north east arrived ? of the eight states in the north

east, only four i.e. Arunachalpradesh, Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland have common border

with Myanmar extending over 1640 km. though each of them has an approved land customs

station, most of the trade is happening at Moreh in Manipurxxvi

. Fig 1 shows the LCSs on the

Indian side along Indo-Myanmar border.The scriptures of Manipur , a key player in Indo

Myanmar relation through the north east, had prophesied the return of prosperity once the

eastern gates were opened. Myanmar is considered the eastern gate which will usher in an era of

prosperity. For Manipur there is also nostalgia for a period when this kingdom had engaged

Myanmar on equal terms.This essay tries to identify the parameters of Indo Myanmar

relationship taking into account the history of the region and expected changes in Myanmar.

Predicting the future of Myanmar which is literally on a roller coaster ride to reforms is indeed a

challenge. Some of the significant economic reforms undertaken since the elections in

November 2010 are as follows:

i. An overvalued peg of 8.51 kyat/SDR has been replaced by a managed float and

steps are being taken to unify the remaining exchange rates. Since 1977 an official

peg to the SDR at 8.50 kyats per SDR (5.35 kyats per US $) has been in place.

ii. A central bank has been approved by the cabinet and awaits passage in the

parliament.


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iii. Deposit rates have been made more flexible and some administrative curbs on credit

extension relaxed

iv. The budget began to be debated in parliament for approval.

v. Legislation aimed at strengthening the agricultural sector and the business climate

has been adopted.3

.

Fig.1 : Indo Myanmar Border

Source: RIS(2011) Expansion of North east India‘s Trade and Investment with Bangladesh and

Myanmar: An Assessment of the opportunities and constraints ;Delhi (p-38).

NER and Myanmar in History:

The interactions among the kingdoms in this region are not studied in depth. Even the four

waves of LEP described by Muni(2013) donot mention this interaction . According to Muni

(2013) the first wave of LEP( first to twelfth century) was characterised by cultural and

commercial engagements, second phase( twelfth century to colonial period)by strategic and

commercial interests ,third phase( post independence period)by decolonisation and Asian

resurgence and finally the fourth phase ( early 90s onwards) was driven by economic and post

cold war imperatives of India‘s foreign policy.


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The north east used to be connected with Myanmar for centuries in many ways. The Manipuris

used to refer to the Myanmarese as Awa, a corruption of Ava, the capital of Myanmar for a long

time. From 1648 onwards CheitharolKumbaba, the chronicle of the royal court of Manipur

referred to Myanmar as Awa.Stressing that Manipur was already a gateway even in the eighth

century, Hall (1981) wrote:

―His ( Kolopheng of the kingdom of Nanchao 748-79) campaigns opened an old road to India

across Upper Burma . one of the routes passed through the Pyu capital…whence it proceeded up

the Chindwin to the borders of Manipur .‖4

About the relation between Manipur and Myanmar Grant (1960) wrote

― during the reign of Tarokpyemin in the thirteenth century, when Burmese kingdom lost many

of its outposts, it was subdued by the Manipuris and it seems to have paid tribute to Manipur

until the conquest of that state by Alaungpaya(1753-60)‖5

Hall (1981) further wrote

‗…the little mountain state of Manipur began a series of raids upon upper Burma which the

enfeebled rulers ofAva were quite unable to check. In the sixteenth century Bayin-naung had

forced Manipur to recognize his suzerainty, but later it reasserted its independence and … in the

reign of Minrekyawdin succeeded in encroaching upon the kabaw valley running alongside the

upper Chindwin. Under GharibNewaz(1717-54) its expert horseman became the terror of upper

Burma. .. in 1738 they camped near Sagaing‖6

In 1702 a Burmese mission arrived in Manipur to ask for the hands of some Manipuri princesses

for the king of Myanmar7. This matrimonial alliance was one of the many reasons behind the

deterioration in Manipur-.Myanmar relation. GaribNewaj who ruled Manipur during 1717 -49

repeatedly invaded Samjok(Thangdut) during 1717-1748.Irrawady was the eastern boundary of

the dominion of Manipur. In 1738 king GaribNawaj crossed the Irrawadyriver and attacked the

stockades around the ancient capital of Sagaing. He occupied Sagaing in 1738 when the

Toungoo dynasty was ruling from Ava. Alaungpayaof the konbaung dynasty changed

everything.He had been a great leader who had restored the self respect of the Burmese after the

disasters they had suffered at the hands of the Manipuris, the shans and the Mons8. Writing

about the reverses Manipur suffered in the hands of Alaungpaya Hall wrote ― Alaungpaya‘s

expedition against Manipur[1758-59] , from which he had been recalled by the Mon rising ,

inflicted upon that country [Manipur]one of the worst disasters in its history. Thousand of people

were deported and settled in the Sagaing and Amarapura districts of upper Burma. From this

time the astrologers at the court of Ava were Manipuri Brahmans, while Manipuris formed a

cavalry regiment in the Burmese army‖9

Manipur occupied the Kabawvalley , the region between the current Indo Myanmar border and

Irrawady river ,known as the Ningthee river to the Manipuris off and on. There were two routes

connecting Manipur valley with the Kabaw valley. One was from Heirok, a Manipuri village in

south –eastern extremity of Manipur valley. The second was from Pallel.10

Bagyidaw who

became king of Myanmar in 1819 pursued a forward policy and occupied both Assam and

Manipur . During 1819-26 Manipur had to suffer ignomity of the seven year devastation in the

hand of MahaBandula, the myanmarese general. The treaty of Yandabobetween Myanmar and

the East India Company signed in 1826 ushered in an era of stability in the relation between


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Myanmar and a region that was to become india‘s north east.However subsequent to the treaty

of yandaboo in 1826, the disputed land of Kabaw valley was handed over to Myanmar on

payment of an annual payment Rs 6000 to the Rajah of Manipur till it was reverted back to

Manipur .Now Kabaw valley has been ceded to Myanmar permanently.

Manipur thus was a key player in the power struggle among the Mons, the Burmese and the

Shans in the region. The pong kings also allied with Manipur king to counter Myanmar. The

French and the British were also entering the scenario. The repeated Myanmarese incursions

made Manipur look west resulting in contact with the people of India. Manipur also contacted

the British in 1762 at Chittagong in search of firearms to counter the Myanmarese superiority in

firearms. What is to be stressed at this point is that engagement with Myanmar is not going to be

a new experience. When we frame the policy for this region, the history of the region may

provide useful insights

Opportunities in Myanmar and beyond :

It is estimated that Myanmar exploited only15% of its(gravity) potential on average during

2006-10.11

Thailand,India and the people‘s republic of China account for more than three

quarters of myanmar‘sexports.PRC,Thailand and Singapore together account for nearly three

quarters of Myanmar‘s imports. Myanmar‘s export basket is dominated by fuels(natural

gas),food and other primary commodities ( including precious stones and gems). Exports to India

are mostly vegetable and timber.Its import basket is dominated by manufactured goods which

account for more than 70% of Myanmar‘s imports.12

Manufactured goods constitute more than

90% of its imports from PRC, the Republic of Koreaand Japan. India is Myanmar‘s main source

of medicaments and bovine meat. India can import the following items from Myanmar:timber

especially teak wood, cane bamboo, Tin, Zinc, Gold and silver, Coal ,Bauxite, Dolomite,

Precious stone ,Burmese rubby, Sapphire and jade etc. India can export the following items to

Myanmar :medicine, medicinal equipment ,consumer goods, textiles and various types of yarn.

machinery equipments for industries including spare parts, building materials like cement, CGI

sheets and electrical items, various types of motor vehicle, motor cycle and bicycle and its spare

parts, stationery and printing materials, agriculture and horticulture, tractor, fertilizer and

chemical and trained manpower.

Table 1 shows the top ten items Myanmar exported to and imported from India during 2006-10.

Export to India Import from India

1 Vegetables,fresh,chilled,frozen

Medicaments

2 Wood in the rough or roughly squared

Flat rolled products of iron or non alloys

3 Veneers,plywood,particle board

Meat of bovine animals, fresh , chilled

4 Crude animal materials

Rubber tyre,interchangeabletyre trade

5 Sugar,molasses and honey

Electrical apparatus for switching

6 Hides and skins( except furskins)

Textile yarn

7 Spices Feeding stuff for animals


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8 Natural rubber,guttapercha

Other plastics in primary form

9 Fruits and nuts

Petroleum oils

10 Wood simply worked and railway sleeper

Household equipment of bell metal

Source :Ferrarini (2013)

The share of manufactured items in Myanmar‘s import is very high. The import basket will

become more diversified and bigger as the economy gradually opens up. Some major

investment opportunities coming up in Myanmar are consumer goods,Education and health care,

low cost manufacturing, construction, banking and financial services,retail sector,telecoms and

travel & tourism13

.Thus NER also needs to examine the feasibility of producing goods and

services which will be in demand . The size of local market has been a major constraint in any

attempt to industrialization in this region. Producing for the bigger and dynamic south east Asian

market will enable the region to reap economies of scale.

What exactly constitutes the Look East policy ?

It is often said that activating the land route with Myanmar can make the ―Look East‖

policy to start from the North-eastern region. It can provide a transit route to Southeast Asian

countries and end the NER‘s disadvantageous land-locked condition. It can also help to initiate

joint venture enterprises and bring cross-border investments for the development of

infrastructure, manufacturing, and services. Cross-country initiatives for economic cooperation

such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation

(BIMSTEC) and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) should supplement LEP. The important

infrastructure initiatives to promote NER trade with Southeast Asian countries through Myanmar

include, the Asian Highway link and Asian Railway network. While the NER will have access

to the Asian Highway through the Imphal- Tamu feeder road, the railway systems of India and

Myanmar are planned to be linked at the Dibrugarh railhead, which will give the region access to

Asian Railway Network. India already constructed a Friendship road in 2001 in Myanmar

linking the township of Tamu with the railhead at Kalemyo which connects Mandalay, the

commercial hub of Myanmar. There is also a time bound proposal to construct a 1,360 km

Trilateral Highway from Moreh (India) to Mae Sot (Thailand) through Bagan (Myanmar). With

the signing of India-Thailand Free Trade Agreement (2003), the steady rise in two-way trade

with Myanmar and spectacular growth in Sino-Indian trade, this region can become a hub for

transit trade. Arguing for the need to see the region as an asset rather than a liability Madhav

argued ―its hydropower potential, oil and gas resources, its forest wealth, if prudently used with


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linkages with South east Asia can benefit the whole country‖

14 Hope in the region resurged with

the thrust on new Asia and Sarma wrote ―the underlying thrust on ‗A new Asia‘ makes one think

of ‗A new North East, too‖15

. As we talk of the Asian century, we start looking where we fit in

the emerging power equation. It was the change in international relations that prompted a

reconsideration of India‘s erstwhile view of the region .Jairam Ramesh (2005) opined that

political integration with the rest of India and economic integration with East and Southeast Asia

is certainly one direction that the NER should be looking to, as a new way of development.

Ability to access a new market is not the only spin off. That looking east meant much more is

aptly summed by the following quote ―…looking east wasn‘t only about economic policy and

political strategy, but related as well to issues of identity and a search for fresh connection16

More and more studies are beginning to find the similarities between the social practices of the

region and the countries like Myanmar and Thailand. Such findings will help policy makers

understand the region better and further help in identifying policy measures acceptable to the

people. Regaining faith in the self is equally important for a people who have lost faith in the

self. The work culture too will change. Sarma argues that ―…long run gains from integrating the

Northeast with east and South East Asia heavily outweigh the risks involved‖ . The advantage of

being trapped in a vicious cycle is that once a break is initiated anywhere in the cycle, it will

build cumulatively. Thus India‘s LEP has several dimensions : being a new way of development,

issues of identity and connection and creation of an enabling environment.

Does the LEP exist in amanner as concrete as the Industrial policy or the Export

Import policy ?

According to Rao (2009) ―From the early 1990s, there has been an emphasis on forging closer

commercial and economic links with markets in the Southeast Asian countries and beyond

through the Look East policy .‖17

This emphasis constituted LEP. LEP might have had little

impact on North Eastern region(NER) for three reasons: first there is not much for the NER in

LEP and therefore the little impact is expected. Second there is much for the NER but

inadequacies of infrastructure and institutions deprive of the region of its benefits. Third the

policies about the NER are based on outdated understanding of the region.

Commenting on the impact of LEP on NER . Rao (2009) wrote


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―Given the geographical contiguity, cultural ties, and proximity to the countries in Southeast

Asia, the policy should have helped to break the economic isolation of the NER states. However,

even though the Look East policy has been in existence for more than a decade and a half and

even as it has benefited other parts of India, its benefits to the NER have been negligible. For the

region, the policy has remained a slogan and has never evolved into a harmonious and productive

economic relationship with Southeast Asia.‖18

While Indo Myanmar trade grew substantially , the share of NER both in import and export

stagnated around 1-2%. This is in contrast with the close to 50% share of China‘s border trade in

China-Myanmar trade.

The economic progress of the NER would require a radical change in the relationship with the

neighbouring countries as part of a Govt. of India initiative for developing economic links with

neighbouring countries on mutually beneficial terms and strengthening historical ties. Indeed, in

economic terms, the LEP should go beyond the immediate neighbourhood of Myanmar and

reach out to markets in East Asian and Southeast Asian countries. This calls for significant

initiatives to strengthen connectivity and infrastructure within the region and open the natural

transportation networks through the sea, inland waterways and land routes. No less important is

the improvement in quality of governance without which even the most ambitious schemes are

likely to fail. Central funding with good governance only can do it otherwise it will degenerate

into another quicksand of vested interests. Otherwise it will remain mere slogan.

Rao (2009) outlining the strategy for LEP to enable the region grow writes

―Accelerating growth based on the resources of the region, however, requires massive increases

in investment and opening up the region for trade with neighbours and beyond. Much of the

increase in investment will have to be made by the private sector. Similarly, opening up the

region for trade with neighbours requires a paradigm shift in the relationship with these

countries. It requires Increases in investment and trade with neighbours, creation of enabling

conditions which, among other things, entail, improvement in the governance, diplomatic

initiatives, creation of market oriented policies and institutions and, most of all, creation of state

of the art infrastructure—particularly for internal transportation and connectivity and border

trade.‖19

The Vision 2020 document, in NER, has identified the tremendous potential to

develop horticulture, floriculture, organic food items including tea, spices, forest-based and


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environmentally sound wood-processed goods, handloom, including sericulture and handicrafts,

as well as mineral-based products such as coal and limestone and industries such as cement, oil

and gas. With an enabling policy environment, connectivity and infrastructure, it should be

possible to move up the value chain in these products and export the processed products to

several markets in East and Southeast Asia, Europe and the United States. Moving up the value

chain and expanding exports requires opening up for trade. The question is – should we

concentrate in activities where we have comparative advantage due to natural endowments

?should we go for activities where we have comparative advantage due to economies of scale ?

Industrial activities in this region have been constrained by the size of the local markets. Once

the opening up process removes this constraint by enabling us to access the vibrant markets of

east and south east Asia, economies of scale can become a driving force. One need not be

constrained in the choice of activity by local availability of raw materials. Such activities can be

nurtured even if the raw materials are not locally available and hence have to be imported. The

initiation of such activities will usher in a development friendly environment which will ,in turn,

take care of issues like poverty ,unemployment and social unrest. Such investment is justified in

this region where nation building is yet to be completed..

ASEAN connectivity is expected to emerge as an external driver of economic growth and vision

of its integration with Southeast Asia is going to be realized. According to Kimura et al ―taking

this into strategic consideration, development strategies for Myanmar and Northeast India can be

the core of the regional strategy to enhance ASEAN-India connectivity‖ .Dey (2010) reflecting

on India‘s hope in this regard writes:

―development of the ASEAN-India Connectivity would throw up significant opportunities to

industrial development in India and its trade potential with South and East Asian countries‖ 20

In the long run ASEAN-India connectivity would help to unlock the tremendous potential of the

region by removing constraints and bottlenecks to growth. Trade and connectivity between India

and ASEAN may be seen as ushering in enormous opportunities generated by the dynamic

growth centres which otherwise would have stopped at the border. Dey commenting on the

locational advantage of the region wrote


178

―North Eastern region‘s locational advantage and rich natural resources provide a backdrop to its

development as a base for cooperation not only with ASEAN, but also with neighbouring

countries such as Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal and through Myanmar, regional cooperation

centring the NER can be extended to Mekong region, comprising Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand

and Vietnam‖ 21

ASEAN-India connectivity is an important theme of the Comprehensive Asia Development Plan

(CADP) which provides a master plan of economic infrastructure and industrial placement in

Asia to deepen regional integration, stimulate economic growth and narrowing the development

gap.It provides immediate policy guidance for industrialization through the development of

logistics and other economic infrastructure. The growing importance of connectivity amidst the

on-going restructuring of economic activities has been rightly recognised. With the strong

support of the government and the business activities of the private sector, China has been

aggressively penetrating into ASEAN. In comparison, the exposure of India in ASEAN is rather

limited despite the Free Trade Agreement. The CADP applies a conceptual framework that is

widely different from traditional development theories and proposes a novel program based on

new development strategies. To take advantage of the globalizing forces, one should not depend

on trade protection, but rather on free trade, proceed not only with tariff removal but also

progressive trade liberalization and facilitation, and not limit to selective acceptance of FDI but

engage in the aggressive attraction of all sorts of FDI. The plan provides a clear picture of an

evolutionary process from simple, slow, and low frequency fragmentation to sophisticated,

quick, and high frequency fragmentation; from thin slices of a value chain without tight local

linkage to industrial agglomerations with active vertical links of production; and from

industrialization heavily depending on MNEs to innovative industrial agglomerations consisting

of both MNEs and local firms. East Asia has become the most advanced region in the

development of international production networks.

The novelty of the conceptual framework is that it is based on new waves of international trade

theory: the fragmentation theory and new economic geography. Both have immense potential for


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influencing our foreign trade policy in general and for the NER in particular. It calls for a rethink

on our comparative advantage. ASEAN connectivity is going to give the region a chance for a

type of planning with which the people can identify themselves with.How the region benefits

depends on its competitiveness arising out of comparative advantage stemming from available

resources and government policy. It is also closely associated with the demand and supply

conditions in Myanmar and beyond which are changing fast.

To ensure that the benefits of LEP accrue to the region, enhanced trade between India and SE

Asia should also flow through the Northeast India–Myanmar corridor. Such trade through

forward and backward linkages can boost growth in this region. Though India‘s trade with its

Northeastern neighbours rose, the bulk of the increased trade has been shipped through

traditional maritime routes. The booming trade seemed to have bypassed Northeast. Share of

Indo-Myanmar border trade through the NER was dismally low due to inadequacy of physical

connectivity. The beneficiaries were the hinterlands of Chennai, Vizag and Kolkata. Sarma went

to the extent of declaring that with closed borders and open ports and absence of proper

infrastructure and connectivity, Northeast India was yet to become a part of India‘s trade

expansion strategy . Questioning the centrality of the region in India‘s look east policy he writes

―India‘s participation in the Asian Highway doesnot reflect the centrality of Northeast in its

scheme of integration of India with Southeast Asia and beyond….the government of India has

shown greater interest in building a 1360km trilateral highway from Moreh in Manipur to Mae

Soi[Mae Sot] in Thailand via Bajan[Bagan] in Myanmar taking a more southern route away from

the emerging Yunnan-Northern Myanmar-South east Asia corridor‖ 22

Transport cost has not always been a major deterrent in the choice of activity and trade. Workers

and other requirements for the tea plantation sector in Assam were procured from outside the

state. Migrant workers from Bihar and West Bengal had played an important role in the growth

of tea industry in Assam. Migrant workers have an important role, not only in Assam but in all

Northeastern states where recent development work would have stalled without them. This

indicates the possibility of initiating an activity matrix based on inputs from outside the region.

Despite the availability of lime stone in Assam, Meghalaya and Manipur there are no large

cement factory in the region. Despite Assam having the largest non off shore deposit of oil in

India there was no petrochemical industry in Assam. Though there are no known reserves of

copper, industries for insulated wires and cables have come up. This has huge implications for

the possibilities freeing us from the natural resource based trap of industrialisation. The

existence of other disabling factors is further endorsed by the failure of industries whose

products are highly demanded in neighbouring countries.Export of bicycles and bicycle parts to

Bangladesh and Myanmar is met from factories outside the region at high transport cost. Local

bicycle factories both in Guwahati in Assam and Imphal in Manipur could not survive

competition despite higher transport cost. The possibility of importing inputs from outside and

neutralising the handicap of higher transport costs are highly encouraging.

Not much of the manufacturing exports from the NER originate in the region. The inadequacies

of infrastructure and law and order situation have led to persistent underinvestment in the region


180

and retailing of commodities from outside the region. Commodities from outside the region

have, despite the high transaction cost managed to establish their footholds in this region. Local

traders find themselves outcompeted. This is yet another example of transport cost not being the

most important factor. In most of the states Marwaris have significant trading interest which they

have protected at any cost.

The binding constraints epitomized by five I‘s i.e. Initial conditions, Infrastructure lag,

Insurgency, Imperfection/distortions in factor and product market, Indifferent governance have

to be addressed internally by vigilant citizens. The need for competition with better prepared

ones in the post ASEAN connectivity scenario should best be met with comprehensive

preparation. Apart from removing these constraints NER must aim at unifying as a common

market with an efficient transport and communication network as well as with policy

harmonization among the Northeastern states . Entering into the new scenario in this form will be

a better option than doing it as distinct states with separate rules and regulations which will make

trade much more complex. Economies of scale, attained by operating in such unified market, will

make manufacturing units in the region more competitive.

The strength of the ASEAN and East Asian economies is derived from the unprecedented

development of international production network. The international division of labour is not

industry-wise but production-process-wise, which differs from a standard setting of comparative

advantage models. What we observe is fragmentation of production and the formation of

industrial agglomerations. Such production networks have developed particularly in machinery

industries. This pattern of international division of labour and international trade requires a novel

analytical framework. The theory of fragmentation points out fundamental differences between

intermediate goods trade and finished products trade, particularly in the flexibility of firm‘s

decision making in carving out production blocks and the existence of service link costs.The

fragmentation theory argues that a reduction in service link costs may be a trigger for developing

countries/regions to attract FDI and participate in production networks. According to new

economic geography, a reduction in trade cost generates two countervailing forces:

agglomeration forces and dispersion forces. Agglomeration forces attract more and more

economic activities to agglomerations. External economies of scale within a geographical

boundary are generated in agglomerations due to vertical inter-firm production linkages for

assemblers and parts and components producers, proximity to market for final goods producers,

wholesalers, and retailers, and easy access to capital and human capital by firms. On the other

hand, dispersion forces make some economic activities move from agglomerations to

peripheries. As agglomerations become bigger, ―congestion‖ occurs in the form of wage hikes,

land price rises, traffic jams, and pollution problems so that certain kinds of economic activity

start considering moving out of agglomerations. Differences in location advantages such as low

labour costs in peripheral locations would provide more incentive for firms to relocate their

production sites. Controlling these two countervailing forces properly is the key for pursuing

both rapid economic growth and narrowing development gaps. To achieve this goal, policies to

enhance location advantages, which would work supplementary to a reduction in service link

costs, are often required in order to attract economic activities to countries/regions at lower

stages of development.


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ASEAN-Indian connectivity will change the economic geography. Examples of changing

geography are the commissioning of the Suez Canal joining the Mediterranean and the Indian

Ocean and laying of the first transcontinental railways across North America. The dramatic

savings in transport cost brought about profound changes.With India‘s LEP, successive

governments have sought to revive and strengthen age-old ties with the far east, across the sea

and overland across Myanmar. The latter has never been pursued seriously. However there is no

doubt about its potential to change the region. The geography of Asia is changing. This may

change the matrix of comparative advantage drastically- with the region gaining comparative

advantage in entirely new activities.Commenting on the implication for such a change in

geography Thant Myint(2011) writes:

―when geography changes, old patterns of contact may disappear and new ones take hold,

turning strangers into neighbours, and transforming backwaters into zones of strategic

significance. Entire peoples face decline or vanish, others rise in importance‖ 23

Conclusion :

ASEAN-India connectivity over land through the NER holds out promises for a resurgent

Northeast. The connectivity is necessary but not sufficient. There are many challenges both

internal and external, the region has to tackle before the promises are realised. Helping the region

to prepare itself for the imminent contact with the ASEAN market and beyond will pay rich

dividends on both sides. Can we overcome the challenges? There is ample room for regional

cooperation and policy dialogues. Sharing experiences and information among policymakers and

stakeholders will be useful. There is a need to address behind-the-border barriers to market

access by looking beyond ―on paper‖ ratification of these commitments. A developed and

peaceful NER will enable the central and state governments to focus their efforts in

development programmes by cutting down the snowballing law & order expenses. A more

developed NER will generate a train of events that will launch the region on an ever growing

trajectory and will also enable the ASEAN countries to contribute towards the realisation of the

Asian century alongwith the NER.

Notes 1. ISAS workshop: Connecting India to ASEAN:Opportunities and Challenges in India‘s Northeast, NUS,

Singapore 20 March 2013

2. Union of Burma became Union of Myanmar in 1989.

3. IMF(2013) Myanmar: Staff-monitored Program p-7

4. Hall (1981):p-155

5. Grant(1960):pp10-11

6. Hall (1981):pp407-408

7. R.K.jhaljit Singh (1965)p -116

8. Hall (1981)p-434

9. Hall(1981) p-433 10. R.K.Jhaljit Singh(1965) p-3

11. Ferrarini (2013) p-10

12. Ferrarini (2013) p-5

13. The Economist (2012) pp-7-10

14. Madhav(1999) p-323

15. Sarma (2013) p-33

16. Thant Myint-U (2011) p. 312


182

17. Rao(2009) p-18

18. Rao (2009) p-18

19. Rao(2009) p-3

20. Dey (2010) p-144

21. Dey (2010) p-110

22. Sarma (2013) p-44

23. Thant Myint-U(2011) P- 3

References :

1. M.P. Bezbaruah&AmiyaSarma, ‗India‘s ‗Look East Policy: An opening to Asian prosperity or a false Hope for

the Northeast‘ in M.C. Behera (ed) Northeast and Globalisation Issues betwixt and between. Guwahati: DVS

Publishers.

2. P. Dey, ‗ASEAN-India Connectivity: An Indian perspective‘ in Kimura,F. & So Umezaki (ed). ASEAN-India

connectivity: The Comprehensive Asia development Plan, Phase II ERIA research project Report 2010, No.7.

3. Ferrarini,B. (2013) Myanmar‘s Trade and Its potential ADB Working paper series no.325;Jan.

4. Grant,B. 1960: MyanmarGazeteer,upper Chindwin district vol A,Rangoon

5. Hall,D.G.E.(1981) A History of South-east Asia Macmillan Asian Histories series Fourth Edn.

6. Kimura, F.& So Umezaki (ed) ASEAN-India Connectivity: The Comprehensive Asia Development Plan, Phase

II ERIA Research Project Report 2010. (2011) No.7. Pg 11

7. Lall,Marie(2008) India Myanmar relations –geopolitics and energy in light of the new balance of power in Asia

ISAS working paper no.29; Jan.

8. Madhav,J. (1999) North East: Crisis of Identity, Security and Underdevelopment. Economic and Political

Weekly Feb.6. P- 321

9. Muni,S.D. (2013) India‘s ―Look East‘ policy: the strategic dimension in

D‘Souza,ShanthieMariet&RajshreeJetlyed Perspectives on South Asian security ; World Scientific

10. North Eastern Council (2008) ―North Eastern Region Vision 2020‖

11. Rao,M. Govinda (2009) ―Promoting Trade and investment in India‘s North eastern Region‖ ADB WPS on

regional Economic Integration No.30

12. RIS (2011) Expansion of North east India‘s Trade and Investment with Bangladesh and Myanmar: An

Assessment of the opportunities and constraints ;Delhi

13. Sachdev,G.(2012) Preparing the North east for ASEAN Linkage in Lianzela,R.S.Ratna&Vanlalchhawnaed

India-ASEAN Economic Integration: Opportunities and Challenges for India‘s North east Macmillan

14. Sarma, A. ‗The North east as gateway to South-East Asia: Big Dream and Home truths‘ in M.C. Behera (ed)

Northeast and Globalisation Issues betwixt and between. Guwahati: DVS Publishers

15. Singh,R.K. Jhaljit(1965) A Short History of Manipur (From 33 A.D. to the present) The O.K. Store

16. Thant Myint-U(2011) Where China meets India: Burma and the new crossroads of Asia Faber & Faber. Pg 3

17. The Economist (2012) ―Myanmar: White elephant or new tiger economy? Executive summary‖ Economist

Intelligence unit

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India - Myanmar Economic Relations

C. S. Kuppuswamy

C. S. Kuppuswamy, Consultant with the South Asia analysis Group (SAAG) is a retired officer of the Indian Army and former Director of the Cabinet Secretariat. The SAAG is a group consisting of scholars and strategic analysts involved in advancing strategic analysis, promoting public understanding and highlighting the geo-political issues concerning India. Though his area of interest is South-East Asia, Kuppuswamy has specialised on Myanmar and India’s Look-East Policy and has been writing regularly on these subjects. He is a regular and an active participant in the discussions on Burma held by various think-tanks in India’s capital, Delhi.

__________________________________________

Introduction

There are many reasons for India‘s flourishing relations and increasing economic interaction

with Myanmar. India has a land border of 1643 Km with Myanmar and a long maritime

boundary in the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal. Myanmar is the lynchpin in the furtherance of

India‘s Look East Policy. The economic well being of the land locked North Eastern States of

India will be significantly enhanced by improving trade ties with Myanmar. The availability of

natural gas in abundance in Myanmar in close proximity to India‘s eastern borders is also an

important factor as India imports 70% of its oil and 50% of its gas requirements.

India has diversified its commercial interests in Myanmar in different sectors such as

infrastructure, hydro electric power, oil and gas, automobiles, banking, information technology,

agriculture and pharmaceuticals. The major projects completed or in progress are discussed

below.

Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project

The project will connect Eastern Indian seaports particularly Kolkata with the sea port Sittwe in

the Rakhine State in Western Myanmar – a total distance of 593 km. It will then link Sittwe to

the land locked area of Mizoram in North East India via river and road transport. This project in

three phases involves the development of Sittwe port, dredging of Kaladan river in Chin state

and construction of a 62 Km Highway up to the Indian border. The Indian Government will bear

the full cost of the project estimated at US $ 134 million.

On completion of the project (expected in 2014-2015) the bilateral trade will grow manifold and

the overall development of the North Eastern states especially Mizoram will take place.


184

Roads

The 160 km long Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo road also known as the India-Myanmar Friendship

Road constructed by Border Roads Organisation was handed over in 2001. Now India has taken

up the task of upgrading and resurfacing of this road.

India will also be constructing the 80 km Rhi-Tiddim road in Myanmar expected to cost $ 60

million and to be completed by 2014. The project has been undertaken by IRCON. This project

will help bolster trade at the Rhi-Zowkhatahar border trading point on the Mizoram border.

In February 2013 India agreed to construct a 120 km road from Kalewa to Yagyi in Myanmar at

an approximate cost of Rs. 1000 Crore. They survey for the road has been completed and

tenders are to be called for.

India and Myanmar have also agreed to work towards an early completion of India-Myanmar-

Thai Highway by linking existing roads and construction of bridges etc. with plans to extend the

highway to Laos and Cambodia. In August 2012 India granted a US $ 500 million loan to

Myanmar, part of which will be used to finance construction of this trilateral highway.

Proposals are also under consideration for renovation of the Ledo road otherwise known as the

Stilwell road connecting Assam with Kunming in China through Myanmar. The Chinese portion

of the road is functional and in use.

It is of relevance to note that all these roads except the tri-lateral (India-Myanmar-Thai) Highway

are close to India‘s North Eastern States.

Tamanthi and Shwezaye Hydro-Electric Power Project

Though an MOU for this project was signed as early as in 2004, it was only in September 2008

the National Hydro-Electric Power Corporation signed an agreement with the Myanmar

Government (Ministry of Electric Power-1) for development of the Tamanthi (1200 mw) and

Shwezaye (660 mw) Hydro Electric Power Project in Chindwin river valley, A detailed Project

Report on Tamanthi has been submitted by the NHPC while it is still working on the Shwezaye

project. Approximately 80% the electricity generated was meant for India‘s North-Eastern

States while the rest was to power the Monywa mining corporation.

Agriculture

In 2012, India assisted Myanmar with US $ 10 million for supply of agricultural machinery and

implements. A total of 300 tractors, 150 combine harvesters, 288 power tillers and 775

implements have been gifted to Myanmar. Apart from supply of this machinery and implements,

support is being extended by way of education and training in the agricultural as well as live

stock and fisheries sector. India had also assisted in setting up 10 disaster proof rice silos in the

cyclone prone delta region.


185

Banking

United Bank is India‘s first bank to open a representative office in Myanmar in December 2012.

Though the representative office will not handle any financial transactions, officials will

maintain liaison with the government, banks and traders and will extend help and cooperation

toward resolving all issues relating to settlement of trade-related transactions between both the

countries.

Automobile

By an agreement with Myanmar Automobile & Diesel Industries limited (MADI) in 2010, Tata

Motors has established a heavy truck assembly plant in Magwe with financial assistance from the

Government of India. The plant has a capacity of producing 1000 vehicles per annum initially

with the capacity to augment the production to 5000 vehicles each year.

In June 2012 Tata Motors have signed a distribution agreement with Apex Greatest Industrial

Co. Ltd. (AGI) for supplying its passenger and commercial vehicles in Myanmar. AGI will be

distributing the Tata Trucks assembled in Magwe as well as the cars imported from India.

TATA Motors has opened an office and showroom in Yangon on 07 April 2013.

Energy

ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL), GAIL and ESSAR have made investments in the oil and energy

sector of Myanmar. India‘s plans to have a pipeline for oil and gas from Myanmar to India

through Bangladesh had to be aborted due to lack of cooperation from Bangladesh. Though

India holds 30% stakes in the exploration and production of Gas in Myanmar‘s A-1 and A-3

offshore gas blocks, the gas produced have been sold to China to be sent through the dual

pipelines being constructed by China from Kyakphyu to Kunming.

ONGC and GAIL have also invested in the pipe lines being constructed by China. ESSAR has a

production sharing contract with the Myanmar Government for two contiguous offshore blocks

(A-2) and an adjoining land block (Block-L) since 2005.

India‘s Jubilant Energy signed a contract with Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise for the PSC-1 oil

and gas block in May 2012. The PSC-1 block is located about 125 km northwest of Yangon.

Paper

JK paper signed on MOU with the Myanmar Government in July 2012 to pick up equity and

revive the state-owned Thar Paung Paper and Pulp Mill. JK‘s plans are to use part of the

production in Myanmar and ship the rest to India.


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Health

Appollo Group of Hospitals launched a tele-medicine service in Myanmar capital Yangon in

December 2012. Apollo tele-medicine network will facilitate ready access to specialists and

super-specialists for referrals, consultation, second opinion, reviews, post-treatment follow-ups

besides facilitating tele-continuing medical education for the medial fraternity in Yangon.

India has upgraded the Yangon Children‘s Hospital and Sittwe General Hospital.

Railways

M/s Rail India Technical and Economic Services (RITES) is involved in development of the rail

transportation system in Myanmar and in supply of railway coaches, locos and parts.

Bilateral Trade

Bilateral trade has expanded significantly from US $ 12.4 million in 1980-81 to US $ 1371.02

million in 2011-2012. For the period April-October in 2013 the volume of trade was worth US $

773.31 million (Central Statistical Organisation, Myanmar).

India‘s imports from Myanmar are dominated by agricultural items (beans, pulses and forest

based products). India‘s main exports to Myanmar are primary and semi finished steel and

pharmaceuticals.

The trade balance is very much in favour of Myanmar (for e.g. in 2011-12 India‘s export was US

$ 333.9 million while India‘s import was US $ 1037.12 million). The Myanmar-India trade has

been steadily increasing. Presently India stands as the fourth largest trading partner with

Myanmar. India is aiming to step up the trade volume to US $ 3 billion by 2014-15.

Institutional Arrangements

An agreement on setting up a Joint Task Force between Union of Myanmar Federation of

Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI) and Confederation of Indian Industries (CII)

was signed in 2004.

There has been regular interaction between CII, FICCI and other important chambers of

commerce from India and the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and

Industry (UMFCCI). The Joint Trade Committee (JTC) chaired by the respective Commerce

Ministers was set up in 2003 and has been effective in reviewing and setting policy objectives for

bilateral trade between the two countries. The Joint Trade Committee has met four times so far

(the last being in September 2011) and has successfully directed the rapid growth of commercial

relations between the two countries and agreed to double the bilateral trade to US $ 3 billion by

2015.

A Bilateral Investment Promotion Agreement (BIPA) and a Double Taxation Avoidance

Agreement (DTAA) were also signed in 2008. India and Myanmar are both signatory to India-


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ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, which was signed in August 2009. Myanmar is also a

beneficiary country under India‘s Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme for LDCs.

(Source: Ministry of External Affairs).

It is significant to note that President Thein Sein during his visit to India for attending the

ASEAN-India summit had a closed door session with CII on 21 December 2012. He invited the

Indian Industry to invest in agriculture and energy sector in Myanmar.

Border Trade

India and Myanmar signed a border trade agreement in 1994 and have two operational border

trade points: Moreh-Tamu and Zokhatar-Rhi on the 1643 km long border. A third border trade

point is proposed to be opened at Avakhung-Pansat/ Somrai. The estimated border trade

amounts to US $ 12.8mn in 2010-11. During the 3rd

India-Myanmar Joint Trade Committee in

October 2008, it was agreed that Border Trade at the existing points would be upgraded to

normal trade so as to promote bilateral trade between the two countries. First meeting of the

India-Myanmar Border Trade Committee was held in Moreh (Manipur) on November 8, 2012.

The meeting reviewed the current status of border trade and discussed border trade points/LCSs

along with the proposed expansion of items under border trade. The meeting also discussed

problems/ obstacles in smooth flow of border trade (Source: Ministry of External Affairs).

Presently there is a tacit agreement between India and Myanmar for the local population

belonging to the same ethnic groups to be allowed free passage within 40 km on both sides of the

international border for the purpose of local trade and social visits.

In December 2012 Indian Government announced that it will allow import of Burmese rice

through the border trade points on the Myanmar border.

Trade Fair & Market Promotion

The Following are the recent events:

January 2010 - Visits by the Indo-Myanmar, Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IMCCI)

Mumbai to Myanmar

September 2010 - North East India Connclave held in Yangon and Mandalay by the Indian

Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta and the UMFCCI.

2011- India Pharmaceutical Expo 2011 held in Yangon with the help of PHARMAXC1L and the

Myanmar Medical Association.

November 2011 – Enterprise India Show organised by CII in November 2011 in which over 60

Indian Companies participated.

March 2012 – India Product Show 2012 representing 19 companies.


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October 2012 – Entrepreneurs from India and Myanmar met at the UMFCCI in Yangon to

discuss ways to promote bilateral trade and investment.

March 2013 – India-Myanmar Business Seminar followed by B2B meeting was held in Yangon

on 4th

March. Another Business Seminar was held in Sittwe on 7th

March. About 40 business

persons from ICC and FCCI attended these meetings.

April 2013—B2B meeting between Calcutta Chamber of Commerce and UMFCCI was held in

Yangon at the UMFCCI Headquarters on 04 April 2013.

The China Factor

In response to a query in an interview to a magazine, Rajiv Bhatia, a former ambassador to

Myanmar replied ―China has been able to leverage its strengths in Myanmar better than we were

able to do, and this really needs to change.‖

Even though India is expanding its economic footprints in Myanmar rapidly, it is no match to

China‘s standing in Myanmar. China is Myanmar‘s second largest trading partner, the biggest

investor and the top provider of the foreign direct investment. India-Myanmar trade is worth US

$ 1.3 billion (2011-12) as compared to China-Myanmar trade of US$ 4.4 billion. China‘s

investment in the energy sector alone is around US $ 8 billion which covers hydroelectricity,

coal mining, oil and gas.

―China‘s position is very strong in economic trade in Myanmar and South Asia. China

welcomes competition from India‖ – Jia Xiudong of China Institute of International Studies told

a group of visiting Indian journalists (New York Daily News – 02 July 2012). India has time and

again reiterated that it is not competing with China in Myanmar.

In view of India‘s rising economic potential and mutual strategic and security interests, Myanmar

has encouraged Indian economic involvement primarily to wean itself away from its near total

economic dependence on China. India has an opportunity and must embark on a broader agenda

of economic cooperation. It has to ensure timely implementation of projects and fulfil its

commitments at a much faster pace.

Conclusion

Consequent to the formation of a civilian government in March 2011 and with the introduction

of more and more political and economic reforms, the transition towards a democracy in

Myanmar is gaining momentum. India can be a catalyst towards this process.

India-Myanmar trade remains much below the potential more due to domestic reasons such as

the insurgency situation and lack of infrastructure in the North-East and lack of coordination

between the centre and the states.


189

There is lack of awareness about Myanmar in the Indian Industry. Thanks to the visits of Prime

Minister Manmohan Singh to Myanmar in May 2012 and President Thein Sein‘s and Suu Kyi‘s

visits to India in the later half of 2012, this has improved. Exchange of visits from institutions

such as CII, FICCI and NE agencies and their counter parts in Myanmar sponsored by GOI

through trade fairs and expositions will alleviate this weakness to a certain extent.

With abundance of natural gas in Myanmar, India may have to rethink on a pipeline either

through Bangladesh, or through the sea or through the North Eastern states to meet its energy

needs for the future. For this to fructify a stronger collaboration between the state owned and

private enterprises is essential.

With the removal of economic sanctions by the western nations, and the global companies lining

up for economic stakes in Myanmar, the economic climate in Myanmar has become all the more

competitive for India to expand its interests.

There is an urgent need for India to plan a concerted, broad based and long term economic policy

towards Myanmar and to review it periodically to ensure its effective implementation.

(C. S. Kuppuswamy is a consultant with the South Asia Analysis Group)

***************************


190

US PENETRATION IN ASIA-PACIFIC, RISE OF CHINA AND THE PAWN CALLED

MYANMAR: THE INDIAN RESPONSE

Dr. SANTISHREE DHULIPUDI PANDIT PROFESSOR

Dept.of Politics and Public Administration University of Pune,India

[email protected]

&

Dr. RIMLI BASU RESEARCH FELLOW

Dept. of Politics and Public Administration University of Pune

[email protected]

DDrr.. [[MMss..]] SSAANNTTIISSHHRREEEE..DDHHUULLIIPPUUDDII PPAANNDDIITT

Projects : Completed and Ongoing- Minor project on the “Politics of language and the medium of Instruction in Goa”, Goa University, 1988-89. Major project at the Centre for a New International Economic Order, Madras {NGO}, on “Caste and Power in Andhra Pradesh- A study of the intermediate castes and Dalit”, 1990-94. RCSS [Colombo], project on Non Traditional Security- [A South Asian Regional Initiative] – 1999 October to December 2000. I am working on the sub theme of Globalization, Security and Conflict in South Asia. Funded by Ford Foundation. Minor project on the “ Ideological roots of India’s Nuclear Policy”, CreNIEO, Madras. 1999-00. Non-Traditional Sources of Security- 1999-2001, RCSS and Ford Foundation. International project- “ Asian Security in the 21st century- Globalisation, Governance and Environment, 2001-2004 RCSS, Colombo and United Nations University, Tokyo and IDSS, Singapore . UGC- Major Research Project- “ Human Rights and Democracy- An Indo- Centric view”, 2002-2005. Women and International Security in South Asia- collaborative research with Nilofer Qazi, at John Hopkins University.2002-2007 Religious extremism and violence and South Asian Security- collaborative research with BIISS, Dhaka- 2004-06. ICSSR fellowship for a Ph.D scholar working under my supervision 2002-2005 Restructuring South Asia- collaborative research with Centre of Security Dialogue, Hyderabad, 2004-06. European Union –Asialink project [2004-2007] on “ Comparaing Asian and European Studies”, partnering with University of Murcia, Spain; University of Foggia, Apulia, Italy; and University of Changsa, Hunnan, China. Center for Inquiry,Amherst, USA and Hyderabad- A joint research project on “Religion and Child Abuse in India”. Capacity building in Post conflict states- USAID project, 2006-2008. Drugs and Security in the Golden Triangle, 2007-2008 Cultural Diplomacy in South East Asia: The role of Buddhism as an Ideology in foreign policy- UGC Major Research Project. 2009-2011. Migration and its impact on the Indian State and Democracy, under the Department of Politics and Public- Administration, University of Pune’s UGC-CAS, 2009-2014. Centre on the Asian Studies { Dept. of Politics and Public- Administration}- Initial thrust area South East Asia 2011-2016 under the UGC, Govt. Of India. Migration and its impact on the Indian State and Democracy- UGC- MRP 2012-2014. PUBLICATIONS:

- Parliament and Foreign Policy in India, New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, 1990. - “Restructuring Environmental governance in Asia-Ethics and Policy”, [Sole editor] [Hongkong: City

University Press,2003]. - Cultural Diplomacy: Buddhism and India’s Look East Policy[ co-author Dr.Rimli Basu] [2012] Lambert

Academic Pub. [978-3-8465-8021-9]. - Retreat of the State: Implications of Drug Trafficking in Asia [ co-author Dr.Rimli Basu] [2012][978-3-

659-12896-7]. - Ethnicity and Nationalism in search of Nation-building, Yeravan: Armenia University Press, 1996 - Globalization, Security Technology and Conflicts in South Asia, Colombo, RCSS, 2000.


191

- Special Issue of Vimarsha Jul-Sept 2009 on India and her turbulent neighbourhood, in Marathi and

English. CHAPTERS IN EDITED BOOKS :

- “Processes in Goan Politics- the role of Caste, Language and Religion in Adi.H.Doctor [Ed.], Processes in Goan Politics, Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 1991.

- ”Caste and Fundamentalism” and “ Hindutva as a Political Ideology”, in Andreas Nehring [Ed.] Fundamentalism and Secularism: The Indian Predicament, Madras: Gurukul Publishers, 1995.

- “The Neo-Marxist era and the Efflorescence of Activism and Development”, in John.S.Augustine [Ed.] Rethinking Activism in the Post-Marxist era, New Delhi: Sage, 1996.

- “Indo-Sri Lanka relations in the 1990s” in A.K.Triparthy [Ed.] India’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s, New Delhi: National, 1996.

- “ Religion and Politics in South Asia- The Hindu Right”, in Stanley Jay Kumar and B.Muralidhar [Ed.] Communal Harmony and National Integration, New Delhi: M.D. Publishers, 1996.

- “Question of Peaceful settlement- Emerging paradigms” in R.C.Sharma [Ed.] Cyprus, United Nations and Conflict Resolution, New-Delhi:

- “The Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India”, in Mukesh Kayathwal [Ed.], Political Processes in South Asia, Jaipur: Rawat, 1995.

- “The Dravidian Movement and Women’s Emancipation: E.V.R.’s thought in the Post Modern Perspective” in R.Thandavan [Ed.] The Dravidian Movement: A reformulation, Madras: Poompuhar Publishers, 1996.

- “D.M.K. and Indian Federalism”, in B.Raghavan [Ed.], Reorienting Indian Federalism New Delhi: M.D.Publishers, 1997.

- “Ecology, Economy and Hinduism” in R.Pushparajan [Ed.] Economy, Ecology and Religion, Madurai, 1998. - “Identity, Ideology and Interest-The Dravidian Parties and Education in Tamilnadu –1967 –1997 ”, in

Swati Shirwadkar [Ed.] Education in India in fifty years- A Critical Review”. 1999]. - “ The Security Dilemmas of India’s Security Policy” in Abdur Rob Khan [Ed.] Globalization and Security in

South Asia [Colombo: RCSS, 1999]. - “ Geo-Politics to Geo-Economics- A Need for a Human Security Policy” in Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg [Ed.],

“Geo-Economic World Order” [Islamabad: Friends, 2000]. - Roberta Cohen and Omprakash Mishra [Ed.], “ Forced Migration in the South Asian Region”, a chapter on

“ The Construction of Identity and the outsider by the Shiv Sena”. [Brookings and Seagull, 2000]. - S.M.Rehman[ed], a chapter on “India and the SAARC”, in the book “SAARC in the New Millenium”, Friends,

Islamabad, 2001. - Abdul Rob Khan {Ed], Nontraditional Sources of Security- Globalisation [Dhaka, 2001] - Radhika Seshan {Ed}, Indian Diaspora in Canada [Jaipur: Rawat Publishers, 2003], a chapter on “ Tamil

diaspora in Canada- Some Reflections”. - Nilofer Afridi Qazi (Ed) Human Security. (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2003). My paper is on

“International Security and women in South Asia”. - Subrahmanyam Raju.A., [Ed] South Asia: Vision and Mission [New-Delhi: Konarak, 2004] My paper is on

“ Democracy and Political Structures in South Asia”. - Sleebhoom, Margaret [Ed.] Genomics in Asia [ London: Kegan Paul, 2004] My paper on “ Hindu Bioethics-

Dharma and Female Infanticide”. - Subrahmanyam Raju.A., [Ed] India –Srilanka Partnership for the 21st century. My paper is on “ India and

Humanitarian Intervention in South Asia”[New-delhi:Manohar,2006] - Gautam Sen [Ed] Impediments to National Security- My paper is on “ Regional Identity Politics and

Security in South Asia”. [ Pune:NISDA,2007]. - Subrahmanyam Raju .A.,[Ed]., Reconstructing South Asia-An Agenda. My paper is on “Can Democracy be

designed in South Asia-The Politics of Instititutional Choices” [New-Delhi: Gyan Publishing House,2007] - Gautam Sen [Ed]., Conceptualizing Security for India in the 21st Century. My paper is on “ Beyond

Bananas, Beaches and Bases-Feminist Interpretation of Security and a Paradigm shift in South Asia”.[New-Delhi:Atlantic Publishers,2007]

- Madhu Bhalla [Ed] chapter on “ Identity and Conflict in International Politics”. { New-Delhi: Kalinga, 2010]

- Two Units for the University of Madras and Annamalai University Distance Education Centres, [ August 2010]

- Amulya Triparty and Jayanta Mohanty [Ed] US Non-Proliferation policy in South Asia, my chapter on [Aug-Sept2012]

Dr. [MS.] RIMLI BASU RESEARCH WORKS COMPLETED:


192

- Completed UGC research project work title “CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN ASIA: A CASE STUDY OF BUDDHISM AS AN IDEOLOGY OF FOREIGN POLICY IN SRI LANKA,THAILAND, MYANMAR, LAO PDR, AND VIETNAM” (20/4/2009 - 31/1/2011) - Completed European Union Asia-Link Project of “Curriculum Development and Comparing between Asian and European post-graduate programmes”. (June 2005 - December 2008). - Completed assisting publication of the book titled “Forced Migration In the South Asian Region-Displacement, Human Rights and Conflict Management”, editor, Prof. Omprakash Mishra, Former Director, Centre for Refugee Studies, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, West Bengal, in collaboration with the Brookings Institution – SAIS Project On Internal Displacement, USA. (2004). (2000-2001) CURRENT AND ON GOING RESEARCH WORK : - “Policy Issues: Migration and refugees and Its Impact on the Indian State and Democracy: A case study of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in Tamilnadu and refugees from Bangladesh in West Bengal” (November, 2012 - 2014)

__________________________

Abstract

The onset of democracy , or in layman‘s language ‗opening up‘ seems to be the hallmark of 2000. The decade saw

the Arab Spring, and the subsequent quiet opening up of Myanmar. Although Arab Spring was accompanied with

bloodbath, the onset of freedom in Myanmar has been quite bloodless.

With several years of isolation, Myanmar indeed is in requirement of development and the core of development is

indeed investment. Two simultaneous international events also took place in the Asia-Pacific region. They are the

so-called peaceful economic and military rise of the People‘s Republic of China [PRC], and the shift of focus of US

from Middle-East to Asia-Pacific. With the rising concern of US related to her dominance in the region, countries ,

which intend to develop in this region peacefully will have to really juggle with all the finest diplomatic rhetoric to

balance both US and China , and march ahead with their development programmes. Security concerns , the neo-

realist stag and lion approach will all be interplayed in this region in the near future, the starting of which is the

closure of Myitsone Dam Project, jointly being built by Burmese government contractors (Asia World) and the China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) in the Kachin district of Myanmar.

While developments of countries of Asia was an age-old concern for India, as can be referred to the 1948 Indian

Constituent Assembly speech by Pandit Nehru ji, India is still viewed as one of the country for cooperation and

development in Asia, thanks to its long tradition of democracy.

As an ‗emerging power‘1 of the Asian region, India thus must concentrate on the immediate human problems facing

both India and Myanmar, in order to overcome all these. As understood, in order to comprehensively rebuild the

whole region, incorporation and cooperation with various nations, whether large and small is not only essential, but

also indispensable. In order to achieve this goal, concentrating constructively, with an effort to reduce the imminent

problems of the countries should be made the prime focus of India. By pursuing such policy, India could, under the

masquerade of ‗sustainable development‘, can pursue ‗strategic interests‘ too. To quote Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

from his speech in the Constituent Assembly of independent India way back in March 8, 1948, “… When we talk of

Asia, remember that India, not because of any ambition of hers, but because of the force of circumstances,

because of geography, because of history and because of so many other things, inevitably has to play a very

important role in Asia. And not only that; India becomes a kind of meeting ground between what might roughly

be called the East and the West…”

This paper thus, seeks to explore as to whether the opening up of Myanmar will transform her as a mere pawn in the

great big game of the regional and external powers, or whether Myanmar will be able to curve her niche in her way

to stability, economic and human development.

____________________________________

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asia_World

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Power_Investment_Corporation




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Introduction

Perhaps the most referred academic deliberation of 2011-2012 is the opening up of Myanmar in

the Asia-Pacific region in a peaceful manner unlike the ‗Arab Spring‘, where violence has been a

counterpart of the whole process. Since the new government took power in 2011, the citizens of

Myanmar have enjoyed a greater degree of freedom than at any time since the military seized

power in 1962. It is a fact that in the absence of a rigid paramount leader who can opposes and

reconcile with the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the challenges posed by serious

economic problems, the rise of influence and imminent control of China over Myanmar and the

positive responses from Western countries and pro-democracy leaders in Myanmar have all

played a vital role on this process. However, Myanmar still has a long way to go before it can

become a full-fledged democracy, or perhaps it may never become so, given the political history

of ‗exchange of military and civilian uniforms‘ , and the ongoing resistance by the various rebel

groups of the country. Hardliners from both the camps seems unsatisfied with the pace of

reforms, and President Thein Sein is doing his best. Both groups could still generate instability in

the country, prompting a military coup again. Thus, Myanmar is certainly at the crossroads and

the cooperation of the major powers, along with India is quite vital. It has all the potential to

become the ‗pawn‘ in the bargaining of the major external powers, and India-China.

From the year 1963 military generals have been ruling Myanmar with rigid authority. However,

it was only in the year 2010 that they adopted a new constitution and formed a new government.

During the Junta rule, the United Nations and several other organizations have reported

consistent and systematic human rights violations in the country, including genocide, the use of

child soldiers, systematic rape, child labour, slavery, human trafficking and a lack of freedom of

speech. Myanmar was a closed country for almost full second half of the twentieth century and it

did not had major contact with the outside world. To some extent, it had some trade relationship

between its immediate neighbours but with minimal interaction. With the beginning of the

twenty first century, Myanmar government realised that they also need to open their economy,

build relationship with other countries, and interact with western countries and especially United

States of America. However, this was not liked by Chinese government, since it had by that time

confirmed her control over Myanmar, thanks to the ‗Western sanction‘ and the Indian reluctant

response. On the other hand United States of America claims that, their two important guiding

factors of foreign policy are Human Rights and Democracy. With establishing relations with the

United States and China, Myanmar had also developed its relations with India and Thailand.

Way back in 1948, under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Asian Relations conference

was held, where there was a vision of an Asian community in cooperation, coexistence and co-

prosperity. India has played an active role in strengthening the movement and making it an

effective voice in representing the collective aspirations and interests of the developing countries

on such vital issues as ‗development‘, ‗ peace‘ and ‗ stability‘. Indian foreign policy with her

evolution is still adhering to the same principles although with greater focus on redefining its

priorities in keeping with the changing times; ‗economic diplomacy‘; ‗cultural diplomacy‘; Look

East Policy [LEP], etc. The ideological and political shift of Indian foreign policy to the ‗geo-

economic‘ and the ‗pragmatic‘ is thought to be the brainstorming of political observers and


194

researchers. From this point of view, India ought to play a differential role to transform

Myanmar into a stable country of the region.

Commensurate with national interests and security, the improvement of bilateral relations is an

important component of any foreign policy, and India has succeeded in establishing a network of

mutually beneficial relations with all countries of the world. In particular, the improvement of

relations with its neighbours has always been one of the pillars of Indian foreign policy. India

played a historic and unique role in the liberation of Bangladesh, which emerged as a sovereign

nation in 1971. Through the implementation of the 1964 and 1974 agreements, the issues of the

stateless people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka were resolved. In 1988, India helped preserve the

integrity of Maldives by coming to the assistance of that country and preventing an attempted

takeover by armed mercenaries. The Indian government has taken recent initiatives to further

strengthen ties with its neighbours, which have won international appreciation. These initiatives

are based on five clear principles: First, with neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives,

Nepal and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity but gives all that it can in good faith and

trust; Second, no South Asian country should allow its territory to be used against the interests of

another country of the region; Third, none will interfere in the internal affairs of another; Fourth,

all South Asian countries must respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; and

Finally, they should settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations.

These tenets have paid rich dividends. A landmark treaty has been signed with Bangladesh on

the sharing of waters of the Ganga. With Bhutan and Nepal, major projects of economic

collaboration have been advanced. Our relations with Sri Lanka have shown steady

improvement. With Pakistan, India has consistently pursued a policy seeking to improve

relations under the framework of the Shimla Agreement signed in 1972, which provided for the

resolution of outstanding issues peacefully and bilaterally and for establishing durable peace in

the subcontinent. Bilateral discussions with Pakistan have resumed recently and India would

continue to have good neighbourly relations with Pakistan. An important achievement of India's

foreign policy has been the strengthening of regional cooperation. India is an active member of

the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which was launched in

December 1985. With the full support of India, SAARC has recently taken significant steps in

accelerating the pace of economic cooperation. The South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement

(SAPTA) became operational in December 1995. At the ninth SAARC Summit in Male in May

1997, which was chaired by India, a historical decision has also been taken to strive for a South

Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) latest by the year 2001. The emergence of the Indian Ocean

Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (IORARC) in March 1997, as a major instrument of

cooperation in the larger region, has also had the active support of India. Indian foreign policy

has always regarded the concept of neighbourhood as one of widening concentric circles, around

a central axis of historical and cultural commonalties. From this point of view, it has always

given due priority to the development of relations with South East Asia.

Today, India is implementing the 'Look East' policy, which is underpinned by important

economic considerations. Some significant steps in the pursuance of this policy have been taken

with the admission of India as a full dialogue partner of ASEAN and a member of the ASEAN

Regional Forum [ARF] in 1996. It has been observed that the strength of any foreign policy


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depends also on the professional abilities of those who implement it, both at headquarters and in

the field. With a view to ensuring this, the Foreign Service Institute was established to undertake

specialist training for entrants into the Indian Foreign Service, and conduct several other

specialist courses for Indian and foreign diplomats. Nevertheless, it is indeed difficult to

enumerate the achievements of a country's foreign policy in exactly quantifiable terms. With this

as a qualification, it would be a fair assessment to make that Indian foreign policy has sought to

preserve, with conviction and consistency, the principles that were enunciated by the founding

fathers of the Republic, both in the development of bilateral relations, and in international

forums, where our views have won recognition and respect. A significant factor underlying this

achievement has been the consensus, cutting across political divides, within the country, on what

the basic aims and objectives of Indian foreign policy should be.

The rising concern of the region is the growing influence of the ‗external big powers‘ [may read

USA] and the rise of China, although officially termed as peaceful. While USA is holding

Myanmar against China, India seems to be trying to negotiate her place in this square game,

since till today, there has been no clear signal from the Obama Administration about a ‗full

support‘ of India against China. That can be attributed to the vast economic stake of China over

USA.

From a ‗benign neglect‘2 to ‗full concentration‘, USA is now seriously pursuing her political and

military hold on the Asia-pacific with favourable countries like Australia, Japan, Philippines on

her side. The stranglehold on Southeast Asia will not be complete unless Myanmar is brought in

the core. That in itself brings in the subsistence question as to whether Myanmar will become a

pawn in this big-game. It is thus, to be seen as to whether Myanmar will be able to curve her

niche , and bargain for her development.

Theoretical framework

At its best, theory identifies patterns of relations between actors; be they state or non-state that

takes place over ‗time‘ and ‗space‘. ‗Theory‘ is thus, founded upon ‗description‘, ‗analysis‘ and

ultimately ‗prescription‘. Theory claims that it is apolitical, but of course theorists cannot annul

themselves from their social, cultural or political background. All theory, therefore, is political.

Indeed, the dominance of Realism in the Anglo-Saxon dominated world of the twentieth century

was not just a reflection of a perceived reality but also the way the policy-makers of that time

had thought in their mind. Theory therefore, contributed to shaping the world that it was charged

with analysing. However, good theory minimises the corrupting influences of prejudice, thus

helping objectivity in policy-making. For much of the twentieth century, two schools of thought,

viz., Realism and Liberalism, dominated IR Theory. More recently, with the end of the Cold

War, Constructivism has become the third key approach or method of studying social

phenomenon. However, Realism is currently the dominant perspective in international relations,

but it is hardly a single theory. It is based on a set of assumptions according to which states are

rational and unitary actors; and as the central actors in international relations, they are inherently

‗selfish‘ in nature. The goal of a state is to ‗maximize its national interest‘ and the ‗accumulation

and exercise of power‘ is the key to understanding international behaviour and state motivation.


196

The response of Myanmar today to the external actors can be analysed through the precinct of

‗maximize its national interest‘.

Today it is a fact that the main aim of the Indian foreign policy is incorporating Myanmar as a

country in a pragmatic way, by using the various precincts of neorealism. Arguably, the three

main pillars of interstate relationship are: 'problem'; 'compulsion' and 'prospect'. As evident

today, the by-product of globalization process is an overall global movement. Thus, today,

'isolation' is evidently antagonistic to the survival of any independent sovereign nation state,

which was proved by the opening up of Myanmar. The advent of globalization, and global

interdependence, therefore, is not only a 'compulsion', but also 'essential' for every state. Relation

with other states spans from economic, cultural to political. Like individuals, every country

pursues a distinct course in her relations with her external environment. However, the country‘s

response to external environment is conditioned by a variety of 'domestic variables'. The

domestic, political and economic compulsion of the individual state gets reflected in the

'decision-makers' approach of continuity and change in 'foreign policy'. In this regard, Padelford,

Lincoln and Olvey state: ―Policy is the overall result of the processes by which a state translates

its broadly conceived goals and interest into specific courses of action in order to achieve its

objectives and preserve its interests.‖ 3 The reality of the Second World War simply shattered the

confidence in idealistic, utopian views of international politics. Thus, after the war, there still

were the 'World Federalists' and other organizations that believed that orderly international

affairs could be achieved by bringing people together and educating them to their common

interest. Contrary to idealistic viewpoint, which dominated pre-war scholarship on international

security, the post-war years witnessed a renaissance of efforts at positive, rather than normative

analysis. Principal among the early efforts to direct research in a more ―realist‖ way, were

studies by Hans Morgenthau (1948)4, Kenneth Waltz (1979)

5, Morton Kaplan (1962)

6,Kenneth

Organski (1958) 7 , George Modelski (1972)

8 and many others. Each of them sought to identify

the central factors that govern how nations interact with each other. In doing so, each subscribed

to certain common principles that continue to dominate thinking about international relations.

Thus, realism is an approach to international relations that has emerged gradually through the

work of a series of analysts who have situated themselves within, thus, delimited a distinctive but

still diverse style or tradition of analysis.9 Realism, thus, emphasizes the constraints on politics

imposed by human nature and the absence of international government. Together, they make

international relations largely a realm of ‗power‘ and ‗interest‘.10

On identifying variables

through this hypothesis, the external and regional powers[may read USA, China, India] may be

termed as the ‗power‘, and Myanmar, as the current ‗interest‘. Nonetheless, realists

characteristically give primary emphasis to egoistic passions and the tragic presence of evils in

all political action.11

Wo rld politics, thus, today, as rightly stated by Robert Keohane is a matter

of ‗…life and death‘12

not only for the soldiers and citizens caught in between themselves but for

the whole human race as such. At the present juncture, issues concerning security are reviewed

on the principles of the long established tradition of realism. Thus, according to Kenneth Waltz,

insecurity may give rise to ‗permissive‘ causes of war which is quite expected and evident in an

‗ungoverned international system‘13

. Examples of the same hypothesis are conflict in Iraq,

former Gulf War, and so on. By ascertaining this fact Waltz has reinstated the ideas earlier

propounded by Jean Jacques Rousseau, where it is stated that states are like hungry predators,

which loosely compose themselves under an international umbrella to get the share of the same


197

‗stag‘

14. It is to be seen whether Myanmar become the ‗stag‘, as inscribed by the above

hypothesis. Certainly, it reasserts the fact that states are supreme and the interests of the state are

of immense importance.

While this is true, in determining the nature of bilateral relations, states must keep in mind the

above mentioned basic principles, in this case India – Myanmar relation, which is to be

aggressively pursued keeping in mind the fact that the share of ‗stag‘ (in this case hypothetically

we can assume Myanmar, to be shared by predators like US, China) is important from the

security and strategic point of view. The dominant theoretical sway of realism has resulted in a

frequent and unproblematized invocation of ‗national interest‘, ‗balance of power‘ and an

emphasis on the ‗anarchical‘ nature of the international system. 15

While this discipline in part

owes the conceptual legacy to its Anglo-American origins16

, realism has often served

uninhibitedly as an instrument to rationalize state action.17

E.H.Carr is credited with providing

the early theoretical underpinnings for political realism in the more recent discipline of

International Relations18

Kenneth Waltz followed this with a harder version of ‗structural

realism‘, which further endorsed a special autonomy to the international structure, often to the

determent of the domestic linkage in international relations.19

The Realist lineage dates back to

seminal political thinkers in Western civilization, such as Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli,

Thomas Hobbes, and Jean Jacques Rousseau.20

From a Realist perspective, the combination of

anarchy and relative power leads to a behavioural pattern called ‗balance of power‘21

in which

power is sought by the relatively weak in order to counter the relatively strong. After the fall of

Soviet Union, the world seems to be heading for uni-polarity. Unusually, the complicated

historical events unfolding through the interactions of various power-sharers brought into focus a

sort of multi-polarity in the international scenario. However, according to some scholars, with

the presence of United States of America in almost allover the world, (presence in Iraq, presence

in Afghanistan, now presence in Asia-Pacific ) the world is truly uni-polar, though contradictions

and debates are on among international scholars about the legitimacy of the US presence.

Whatsoever is the debate, of late various regions of the world have become quite prominent in

deciding the world order of the future. One of such region is the Asian region. The rigid division

of Asia into Asia Minor, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Far East, etc., seems to have diluted into

one major hub called ‗Asia‘, today. Within this major arena, two major players emerged as

holding the balance of power-strategy. One of them is China, the other being India. Going by this

realist paradigm, thus, the future of this region or the behaviour of the various actor states of this

region is going to be shaped by both these two powerful determinants. It seems that the realists

assumption of ‗…might makes right‘22

will be the enduring feature of the global politics, though

sounding quite unfortunate. Simultaneously to this feature, there will be an absence of higher

authority, which is to protect and dispense global justice equitably. This absence or condition is

called ‗anarchy‘. This combination of ‗anarchy‘ and ‗relative power‘ leads to a behavioural

pattern called ‗balance of power‘, in which at present power is sought by an external big power

[read USA] through a relatively weak state [read Myanmar], in order to counter another

relatively strong regional power [read China]. The act of balancing is to be done by India.

Although, it is evident in the later stage of world development that when there is a high degree of

interdependence, states will often set up international institutions to deal with common problems


198

through institutions which promotes cooperation across international boundaries by providing

information and by reducing cost.23

From this point of view, the state of Myanmar as a basic unit

needs to be understood rather than her current rulers, military or otherwise. Regardless the state

of the internal politics, the steady rise of Myanmar as a strategic power, using her geo-strategic

position is remarkable. Today it is termed as the ‗pivot‘ by US political analysts. The harp

distinction of ‗domestic and international politics, as envisaged by the neo-realists is evident in

Myanmar, where the so-called failure in ‗domestic politics‘ did not corroborate to her failure in

‗international politics‘.

By the 1980‘s, the leading contender among competing realist theories clearly was Kenneth

Waltz‘s theory of neorealism. Waltz set out a seemingly elegant theory with both explicit

assumptions and criteria for evaluating the theory‘s performance. His theory, by focusing on

'security maximization' rather than 'power maximization', appeared to fix the fundamental

problem of Morgenthau‘s realism, namely the existence of the security dilemma.24

It has come

into focus that the world is following the anarchic reality propounded by Waltz, which is

evidently, ‗security maximization‘. From this point of view, the transformation of India and the

paradigm shift of the Indian Foreign Policy from ‗Idealism‘ to ‗Realism‘ can be analysed. In the

process of this transformation, India was forced to accept the reality that she is one of the powers

in this region to be reckoned with. Reflecting this reality, India has transformed her policy of

bilateral relations in favour of security maximization.

Interestingly the concept of security is as old as centuries and gains various shapes with different

ages. While the traditional concept can be clearly understood from the below mentioned quote,

the modern one contains many an unknown variables which is quite unheard of a few years back.

―Territorial integrity without full sovereignty or sovereignty without full territorial integrity can

never be considered to be true security‖. 25

Therefore, traditionally, ‗security‘, sovereignty and

territorial integrity has been observed as two sides of a single coin, where each simply does not ,

or cannot exist without the other. Assumingly, here, the concept of ‗security‘ is very much bound

or is rooted to the land , population, government and sovereignty; all these qualities are the basic

and essential quality of a state only. Therefore, it is the state only, which can ask for security, act

for security or even demise for security if the security threat is imminent and overpowers the

latter.

A new concept called ‗comprehensive security‘26

came into being. From the traditional

retrospective of security of nation-states, ideally ‗security‘ derives from ‗insecurity‘, which is

essentially faced by smaller states, due to their vulnerability, weak military strength, as well as

lack of resources. This insecurity gives birth to a ‗dilemma of how to find security guarantees for

their existence27

‖. From a broader perspective and context, Arnold Wolfers described the concept

of national security as ‗an ambiguous symbol‖ 28

As Steinbach suggested, ―the concept of

‗nation‘, introduced by colonial powers or by small elites who saw in it the prerequisite for the

fulfilment of their own political aspirations, materialized in a way which went against territorial,

ethnic, religious, geographical or culto-historical traditions‖ 29

. To quote Mohammed Ayoob,

most Third World states emerged without a ―capacity to ensure the habitual identification of their

inhabitants with the post-colonial structures that have emerged within colonially-dictated

boundaries‖30

. The most common outcome of this was, and continues to be, conflict about


199

national identity. The Asian nation-states [read China, India, Thailand, Malaysia] show

symptoms of these theoretical aspects. In this regard, Robert Jervis points out that states usually

try to increase their security by building-up their arms31

. According to Buzan, thus most states

hope to use those arms both defensive purposes and offensive purposes in order to eradicate

insecurity situation.32

Buzan further emphasizes that ‗for perhaps a majority of the world‘s

people threats from the state are among the major source of insecurity in their lives‘33

Thus

Buzan reveals that the state is not simply a provider of security but also a source of insecurity.

To Barry Buzan, the individual citizen faces threats ether directly or indirectly from the state 34

, a

seminal idea amply applicable for Asia. In the context of Asia this seminal idea metamorphosed

today and became a reality, with altercation in the referent object of security. However, with

‗territoriality‘, ‗civilization‘, ‗culture‘ still as dominant variable, control of a particular country

becomes a matter of immense importance in the final agenda of control of a region.

The security scenario and the power equation in the Asian region are changing rapidly. It is

generating many ‗power pockets‘, potential to hold many future-destabilizing effects. Needles to

say, that India is reckoned as a power in this region. India has also failed in exerting the same.

Certainly , ‗exerting power‘ is anti-thesis to the basic core of the ancient Hindu philosophy upon

which the basic tenets of Indian foreign policy relies on. In all form , given the current situation ,

the outlook of Indian foreign policy needs to be revamped. It should match the current order and

the current status of the region. As Brahma Chellaney puts it very correctly, that since a long

time India has been pursuing a foreign policy, by which she is ‗liked‘ by the international

audience and not ‗respected‘.35

Indian Foreign Policy Response to her Easterly neighbour „Myanmar:

While there are strong voices of dissent against the on-going violation of Human Rights within

Myanmar, on the other, major powers of the area, viz., China, Thailand , Lao PDR, etc., are

working with close proximity with Myanmar in order to ensure economic progress and security.

The following factors send the ultimate message to the policy makers of India to take some

drastic positive steps to resolve all these:

- Along with borders with Myanmar, the north-east sector of India is also surrounded by 4

other nations, viz., Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and China;

- geo-strategically this region is exclusive , and can be called the –epi-centre for South

Asia‘;

- The majority of the population of this region have ‗ethnic-tribes origin‘;

- The tribal origin of this region spreads across the international borders, for example,

Kachins of Myanmar is ethnically closer to the Nagas of India;

- The economy of this sector is neglected till date;

- No major boost to the development efforts related to infrastructure;

- No initiative to preserve the environment to boost tourism to supplement the economy;

- The rise of Muslim fundamentalism in Bangladesh;

- Huge flow of money and arms;

- Slow transformation of the ‗insurgent organizations‘ into a ‗terrorist one‘;

- Unholy nexus of the ‗Maoists of Nepal‘, the ULFA s of Assam, the NSCN of Nagaland,

‗HUJI s of Bangladesh‘, and the ultimately with the ISI of Pakistan; and


200

- last but not the least the strategic encirclement of this region;

The Government of India never explored all these factors realistically, thereby allowing many of

these factors to take a mammoth shape. Even if slowly, and quite lately , India is trying to

reestablish a cooperative relationship, emphasizing on steady building with a core commitment

to stabilize the area , cooperate in economic projects and create a multi-model alternative

development plan extending to Thailand and prospectively beyond. The basic interest, however,

for India is ‗security maximization‘. With the rise of a politico-military strong China, and its

obvious spread in the whole region, India cannot only go ahead with his military and economic

cooperation projects. She must accept and go forward to accomplish some ‗alternative

development project‘ in order to sustain her ultimate aim. Thus, the internal politics of Myanmar

is certainly largely irrelevant, to the international politics. The geopolitical position of Myanmar

which affects the distribution of power among states, in turn has made the makeover of Myanmar

today. In the case of Myanmar, the impact of the on-going non-violent, non-cooperation

movement by the leader of the NLD ( National Democratic Party) Ms. Dwe Aung San Suu Kyi

did made a negative impact, however, the U-turn of President Thein Sein, and her geopolitical

location with immense natural resources has forced her neighbours to take into account those

factors , and go ahead with cooperation in order to involve the country in a positive , pragmatic

way.

It is evident that any noticeable increase in the power of one state in a given region can actually

make the state weaker in the long run, if the increase in power alarms rivals and mobilizes them

to form an opposition alliance. Going by this hypothesis, if the rise of China has caused enough

alarm, the rise of Myanmar has not. It never created any awe to her neighbours, neither her giant

neighbours , like China or India , nor her comparatively smaller neighbours like Bangladesh,

Laos , Thailand etc., Further, a sense of coalition or alliance of states can be presumed in the

context of rise of China. Certainly, it is security-dilemma, which bedeviled earlier realist

theories, and can be understood by the following quote of Morgenthau, that, ―Since the desire to

attain a maximum of power is universal, all nations must always be afraid that their own

miscalculations and power increases the other nations and might add power to an inferior nation,

and for themselves which they must at all costs try to avoid.‖ 36

India embarked on various confidence-building measures vis-à-vis China through expansion of

cultural exchanges, trade, and foreign investments. Finally, in the early 1990s, India initiated the

Look East Policy( precisely in 1991). The Look East Policy was mainly designed in order to

gain an access to the markets and capital of the rapidly growing Southeast Asian states and also

as a means of countering the growth of Chinese political and military influence in the region. It

can be noted here that the countries of South and South East Asia were covertly undermined by

India throughout the Cold War Phase as ‗squalid, authoritarian regimes abjectly reliant on

American security assistance‘.37

As a result of this new outlook , India , although not a full

member of the ASEAN ( Association of South East Asian Nations), today, has become a ― full

dialogue partner‖ 38

of the organization. ―This step elevated the interactions between ASEAN

and India‖ 39

, as quoted by H.E. Ong Keng Yong, the then Secretary – General of ASEAN while

addressing the ‗India-ASEAN Eminent Persons Lecture Series‘ on 18 October 2004 at New

Delhi. According to him, ―… the elevation of interaction went beyond mere senior official

interaction to the ministerial level interaction, and enabled cooperation in the political and


201

security field, including India‘s participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the only

such security forum in the Asia-Pacific‖ 40

. The Indian leaders also agreed in tune with the

ASEAN leaders to their annual summit, which redefined the India – ASEAN relation a- la India -

Southeast Asia relations. However, the new paradigm shift in the Indian foreign policy had never

been devoid of the fear of the excesses of Americanism. Hence, while France apprehended over

the American ―hyper-power‖, India was quick in calculations and actively sought to cultivate the

Indo-French connections with engagements in military contacts, high-level bilateral exchange of

senior policymakers, and weapon deals.( purchase of Mirage 2000, etc) 41

.

Renewed US engagement in Asia-Pacific:

The concept of security and security related issues changed dramatically with September 9/11

attack on United States of America, the repercussion of which is felt worldwide. India also

responded positively, taking the opportunity to woo America by offering ‗full-intelligence

cooperation‘, aimed at combating the ‗world-wide war on terrorism‘, since India suffered from

the same for a long time. Surprisingly, much to India‘s dismay, Washington sought cooperation

from Pakistan in combating Taliban and Afghanistan – based Al-Queda. It is interesting to note

however, that unlike the 80‘s, India also sought other avenues like, military-to-military

cooperation to interact with USA. After keeping the U.S. military at an arm‘s length throughout

the Cold War period, (that is, shielding its own military from any significant contacts with its

American counterpart), at present India finds ‗military cooperation‘ as one of the means of

enhancing the training, readiness, and skills of its own troops.42

All these Indo-US ventures are

certainly and primarily viewed as an outgrowth of the concern of the regional security of India

with respect to China, and to a lesser extent vis-a-vis Pakistan. It is certain that the given

situation is complicated; the only compliment is that it is certainly favourable for India.

The rise of China rise has caused Washington to initiate a set of strategy centered on Beijing‘s

potential challenge to its strategic interests in Asia, which is reflected in the transformation in the

focus of US foreign policy 43

. The US National Security Strategy 2002 report 44

clearly states

that Washington‘s goals in Southeast Asia are to strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism

and to work to prevent attacks; to work with others to defuse regional conflicts; to prevent

enemies from threatening the US, allies and friends with weapons of mass destruction; and to

expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of

democracy 45

. In addition, the report also points out that Thailand, Philippines and Singapore are

important in assisting the US to develop a mix of regional and bilateral strategies to manage

change in Southeast Asia. In NSS 200646

released in the second term of the Bush administration,

even though Washington‘s security aims in Southeast Asia remain unchanged for the most part,

the report admits of the requirement of US building upon a foundation of sound bilateral

relations with key states in the region in order to forge new international initiatives and

institutions that can assist in the spread of freedom, prosperity and regional security47

.

Strategically, the US policy aim of anti-terrorism has been translated into a search for closer

relations with Southeast Asia. In September 2005, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of

East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Eric John 48

, points out that the US actively seeks improved

relationships with the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore (traditional allies) and opportunities


202

to advance cooperation with Indonesia and Malaysia and promote closer ties with Vietnam,

Cambodia, Laos, Brunei and East Timor (non-traditional allies). In addition, Eric John 49

also

emphasized that the US continues to look for ways to help regional states that have sovereign

responsibilities over sea lanes in Southeast Asia to ensure security of the vital Strait of Malacca

trade route. Aspiring to security cooperation under the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

(APEC) framework, the US seeks the significant degradation of terrorist capabilities, elimination

of sanctuaries for terrorism and institutionalized regional cooperation. In the following year,

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill 50

continues to

point out that US ties with ASEAN is an extension of very dynamic bilateral ties with partners in

the Southeast Asia region. Hill 51

also asserts that being a founding member of ARF and APEC,

USA remains deeply involved in multilateral mechanisms of the region to promote peace and

development, expand economic opportunity, fight corruption, provide security and ensure the

health of citizenry.

Set against the goals of combating terrorist networks and preventing Southeast Asia from

becoming a breeding ground for terrorist operations, the US has enhanced military cooperation

and held joint military exercises with the countries of Southeast Asia. US military cooperation is

reinforced with the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore after 9/11. Succeeding the Visiting

Forces Agreement that provides a legal framework for US-Philippine joint military actions,

Manila agreed to re-open Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base for US use in the fight

against terrorism and both sides currently hold large scale annual military exercises52

. Since

2002, the US has held several large scale joint anti-terrorist military exercises titled ―Cobra

Gold‖ with Thailand and Singapore. Washington and Singapore furthered their relationship by

agreeing to the establishment of ―Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security‖ in

2005, which includes cooperation in counter terrorism, anti-proliferation, joint military exercise,

joint military training, policy dialogue and exchange in defense technology53

.

Since the victory of Barak Obama through the slogan of ―change‖ in the 2008 US presidential

election, US politics entered a new era. Faced with limited success in overtures in Afghanistan

and Iraq, domestic economic and financial difficulties and a rising China, the Obama

administration has adopted the approach of ―change‖ towards its strategy in Southeast Asia and

overall foreign policy. In her first official visit abroad in February 2009, Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton visited Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and China54

. In most cases, newly

inaugurated secretaries in the past travel to Europe or the Middle East in their first state visit

abroad and in traditional trips to East Asia, stops are made only in China, Japan and South

Korea. Inclusion of visits to the ASEAN secretary office and Indonesia not only reveals the US

new foreign policy focus on the establishment of tighter relationships with countries in Asia, it

also reveals the importance of Southeast Asia for US national interest 55

.

The Hilary Clinton trip to Asia can be thus defined as the ‗deciding factor‘ of the determination

of the Obama administration to return and pay more attention to the region. In the Suntory Hall

speech made on his state visit to Japan in 2009, Obama56

confirmed the new foreign policy focus

on Asia by stating that ―as a Asia Pacific nation, the US expects to be involved in the discussions

that shape the future of this region, and to participate fully in appropriate organizations as they

are established and evolve.‖ By declaring the US as an Asia Pacific nation57

, Obama aimed to


203

assert US legitimacy in Asia and the right of Washington to participate in the regional affairs.

According to Damian Grammaticas58

, the BBC News Asia Pacific , China Correspondent, the

message is that America is ensuring that it is strategically poised to project power over the vital

trade routes that pass through the South China Sea, and it wants to reassure its partners in Asia

and it is cementing that position. Since the first state visit to Asia in 2009, Clinton visited the

Asia Pacific at least eight times by the end of 2010, while Obama visited the region again in

2010, attended the leader meetings between US and ASEAN and then only planned to attend the

East Asia summit in 2011. In contrast to the US absence from two out of three ARF meetings

under the Bush administration and the US absence from the US-ASEAN Summit in 2007 (which

marks the thirtieth anniversary of US-ASEAN relations)59

, the Obama administration has

demonstrated strong initiative towards Southeast Asia. Moreover, the official state visit of

Clinton also reveals the new divergence in administrative policy orientation. In contrast to the

previous administration‘s stronger approach that rests on the use of power, the Obama

administration emphasizes dialogue, cooperation and development with other countries in the

world. The main goal of the Obama administration‘s foreign policy is thus an emphasis on the

maintenance of US diplomatic influence and military power, reconstruction of the US image, and

maintenance of national security and global leadership60

. Since inauguration, Obama has

expressed the US will return to Southeast Asia and more voluntarily and actively seek the

reinforcement of bilateral relations with ASEAN states in joint response to global financial

crises, climate change, terrorism and other issues61

.

Even though some observers62

have pointed out that the Bush administration had adjusted the

policy of benign neglect before 9/11 and slowly returned to Southeast Asia through increased

contact and cooperation, while others63

have emphasized Southeast Asia‘s important role in the

Bush administration‘s strategic arrangement, many scholars think otherwise, holding the view

that the US has always lacked a clear and coordinated policy in Southeast Asia. As the US

Council of Foreign Relation‘s report in May 2001 points out, Washington has chronically

neglected the strategic region of Southeast Asia and lacks a clear and coherent strategy towards

the region64

. Tommy Koh65

also points out that many countries in Southeast Asia are anxious

over US strategy and feel that China may replace US influence in the region. Therefore, it is

clear that US foreign policy has taken on a new course under the Obama administration and Asia

has increased in priority in Washington‘s strategic agenda. Along with observers across the

world, the US policy circle and experts continue to debate Beijing‘s intention with its new found

power and status in the international system and counter strategies Washington should adopt in

light of the development 66

. China remains a riddle for the US, as Washington needs Beijing‘s

support and cooperation on issues such as North Korea, anti-terrorism and climate change, yet

Washington continues to be anxious and remains watchful over China‘s intention to establish a

new world order67

. A new world order entails the decline of US political and economic influence

in the world, possible changes to the Bretton Woods system and the sharing of power with at

least another great power (China). As the so called G-2 proposal fell short due to the reluctance

of China to enter into the partnership, the US has reasons to speculate over Beijing‘s intentions 68

.

Thus, Southeast Asia is the first testing ground of Sino-US relations in the new century as the

impact of China‘s rise is most profoundly demonstrated in the region. Coupled with ASEAN‘s

great power balancing strategy, competition between Beijing and Washington is likely to be

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204

unavoidable. The Obama administration‘s return to Asia may be seen as the initial step towards a

clear set of US foreign policy in Southeast Asia with China as the central concern. The US and

China are currently engaged in growing economic and strategic competition in Southeast Asia.

The following picture of the key US bases in the Asia-pacific region is a clear signal of her

renewed stronger presence in this region.

Key US bases around the Asia-Pacific region

The making of the pawn called Myanmar:

US President, Barack Obama, after the resounding second term victory declared his desire to

visit Myanmar as a part of his travel to Asia in order to offer ‗the hand of friendship‘ in return for

more reforms. The visit is observed by political observers as a reward for Myanmar, which was

earlier termed as a pariah state and where democratic reforms were still under process. The most

coveted visit of the US President to Myanmar took place on Monday, 19, 2012. President Barack

Obama became the first American president to visit Myanmar, using a six-hour trip to balance

U.S. praise for the government's progress in shaking off military rule with pressure to complete

the process of democratic reform.

Speaking to a national audience from the University of Yangon, Obama offered a "hand of

friendship"69

and a lasting U.S. commitment, yet a warning as well. He said the new civilian

government must nurture democracy or watch it, and U.S. support, disappear. President Obama

was an early champion of the sudden transformation to the civilian rule in Myanmar, following

almost a half-century of military dictatorship. He has thus, rewarded Myanmar with eased

economic penalties, increased U.S. investment and lastly a presidential visit, in part to show

other nations the benefits of pursuing similar reforms. "You're taking a journey that has the

http://www.reuters.com/people/barack-obama?lc=int_mb_1001

http://www.reuters.com/people/barack-obama?lc=int_mb_1001

http://www.reuters.com/places/myanmar?lc=int_mb_1001


205

potential to inspire so many people,

70 Obama said during a speech at Myanmar's University of

Yangon. "I shared with President Thein Sein our belief that the process of reform that he is

taking is one that will move this country forward," Obama told reporters, with Thein Sein at his

side71

. Myanmar President Thein Sein, speaking in Burmese with an interpreter translating his

remarks, responded that the two sides would move forward, "based on mutual trust, respect and

understanding"72

. "We also reached agreement for the development of democracy in Myanmar

and for promotion of human rights to be aligned with international standards,"73

he added. In a

show as to just how far Myanmar has come, President Thein Sein was in Washington to meet

President Barack Obama at the White House on May, 201374

. The last time such a visit occurred

was nearly 50 years ago during the Lyndon Johnson administration.

Analytically speaking, US involvement in regime change mission, particularly in Iraq and

Afghanistan, is clearly aimed at pushing and using through democracy for a highly strategic

agenda. A probability is the US desire to establish a geopolitical control over the strategically

located sea lanes, stretching from the Persian Gulf right up to the South China Sea. This strategic

desire has led the US to restart its engagement with Myanmar, as it is well known that the

coastline of Myanmar can provide easy naval access to one of the most strategic water routes,

i.e., the Strait of Malacca, lying between Malaysia and Indonesia. The Strait of Malacca, which

is the link between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, is the most widely known shortest

sea route between the Persian Gulf and China, through which more than eighty percent of the oil

imports passing through oil tankers of China takes place. In the other narrowest point, i.e. the

Phillips Channel in the Singapore Strait, more than 12 million barrels of oil in super tankers are

carried through, mostly en route to the fastest-growing energy markets of the world, i.e., China

and Japan. The region from Myanmar to Banda Aceh in Indonesia is known now as one of the

world‘s most strategic chokepoints. Controlling these routes would give access to the energy

supplies of China, and will determine the economic fortune.

US President Barack Obama wants the United States to be the country that shows all other

countries of Asia their way to development, clearly sending a signal to the whole region that

America is ready not just to stand up for but spread its ideals in Asia. That is exactly why

Obama's six hours in Myanmar can be termed as the turning torso for Asia. Certainly, there is the

China factor. Interestingly, going by the three hundred fifty pages highly classified documents,

which was prepared by the Defence Services Academy in 2004 under the title ―Myanmar and

American Relations‖75

, it was clearly mentioned that China was slowly trying to takeover

Myanmar and that it was falling under the Chinese government. Myanmar intended to build and

improve its relationship with the western countries especially the United States. It was also noted

that in order to create a balance of power in relations with China, Myanmar had to build

relationship with India, and that Myanmar needed the required assistance of the Indian diplomats

to talk to Americans and build relationship with them. Thus, China factor can be termed as a

common factor for both US and Myanmar, and in the process India played the desired role.

China , however, is a longtime ally of Myanmar and has sent it a good amount of military aid

over the years. "But some in Myanmar fear that China is taking advantage of its wealth of natural

resources, so the country is looking for other partners to help build its nascent economy," as

explained by Julie Pace from the Associated Press. Indeed, the assertiveness of Obama in

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206

Myanmar is part of a larger effort to put Asia front and center in the foreign policy plan for his

second term.

Thus, Myanmar has curved her desired place as a pivot in the US foreign policy radar for Asia.

In a nutshell, Obama is realigning that the American foreign policy is not pointed only at the

Middle East but also towards Asia. The administration even has a name for the shift:

"rebalancing‖. As Thomas E. Donilon, the President's National Security Adviser, explained the

idea in a speech recently. "The president's trip marks the beginning of the next phase of our

rebalancing effort. When the president says the United States will play a larger and long-term

role in the region, we intend to execute on that commitment."76

However, it is to be seen as to

whether US will make use of Myanmar, or whether there will be a zero-sum game played at this

juncture.

Divergence and convergence of interest of US, China, India and Myanmar:

After the terrorist attack of 9/11, the US has been engaged in militarization of the region on the

plea of defending itself against all possible terrorist attacks. In pursuit of this policy, the US has

come to control the airbase on Banda Aceh, the Sultan Iskandar Muda Air Force Base, located on

the northernmost tip of Indonesia, despite vehement opposition from the various governments in

the region, including Myanmar. Due to the stiff opposition by these governments, the US quickly

followed up with its policy of engaging Myanmar in a diplomatic move to break down the

adamant refusal to its efforts to militarize the region and to be the first to take advantage of the

growing importance of Myanmar, taking the advantage of the growing demands of Myanmar

herself to open up to the West for economic reasons. The idea of United States using Myanmar

as a pawn may be not at all strategic and may not be directed towards the larger interests of the

country in pursuit of her democratic governance and economic justice. However, there is no

denial of the fact that to serve her strategic and economic interest, US will be using the Myanmar

regime.

The key strategic aims of China in Southeast Asia appear to be two-fold: a] to ensure that there

are no conflicts in the region that would compromise Chinese security or territorial integrity; and

b] to ensure that no external power wields influence greater than that of China. The long term

objective of Beijing seems not to be the hegemon of Southeast Asia but that of an covert

supremacy guarding the national interest. Simply speaking, the ASEAN states may remain

sovereign, but their respective foreign policies should not challenge the national interest of

China. During the Cold War, China viewed the Indochina region and mainland Southeast Asia

more generally as its ―strategic backyard.‖ With the claim of the South China Sea , and its

increasing dependence on the sea lanes of communication through maritime Southeast Asia, this

concept of a ―strategic backyard‖ is likely to grow to encompass the whole Southeast Asian

region.

Specifically and precisely, the Chinese involvement in Myanmar is related to investment. China

is the largest investor in Myanmar, because the Western world has closed the doors to Myanmar

citing military junta atrocities, and thereby forcing Myanmar to get investment from China only.

Some of the major Chinese investments in Myanmar are-

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207

- In August, 2012 direct investment of China amounted to US $ 14.1 billion. Bilateral

trade in the first half of the year reached US $ 3.5 billion.77

- In the month of December 2012 alone bilateral trade at the Muse border trade point was

US $ 280 million (the imported trade from China was more than 105 million and

exported trade from Myanmar was more than $ 173 million)78

.

- China‘s Power Investment Corporation Yunnan (CPI) is the main contractor and financial

backer for all the seven dams on the Upper Irrawaddy Project of which the main site is

the Myitsone Dam. Work has been suspended at all seven dams in September

2011. However media reports indicate possible revival of this project in 2015 when

President Thein Sein‘s tenure expires79

.

- The trans-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines are expected to be completed by May 30, 2013.

The 1100 km long oil and natural gas pipelines run from the port of Kyaukphyu in

Rakhine State across the country to enter China at Ruili in Yunnan province.80

They will

transfer shipments of crude oil from the Middle East to Southern China. The oil pipeline

has a designed annual transport capacity of 22 million tonnes, while the natural gas

pipeline has a designed annual transport capacity of 12 billion cubic meters81

.

- There are 47 oil and gas production blocks in inland Burma. China is extracting oil and

gas in 23 of the 47 inland blocks82

.

- The Myanmar copper mine, where protests were held in end November 201283

is also a

joint venture between Union of Myanmar Economic holdings Limited and China‘s

Wanbao Mining company – a subsidiary of Norinco.

- China had supplied Myanmar US $ 1.4 million worth of military hardware in the 1990s84

and has since then been fulfilling most of the military hardware needs.

- The Democratic Voice of Burma has published a report (21 January 2013) that China has

carried out the transfer of PTL02 Wheeled Tank Destroyers along with man-portable air-

defence systems (MANPADS) to United Wa State Army (UWSA) in what may be a bid

by Beijing to use the powerful group as a source of leverage in Burma. ―By facilitating

the reinforcement of Wa they are sending a clear message to the Tatmadaw that there are

limits to their patience‖. 85

- By sending a special envoy (Fu Ying) to Myanmar along with a military delegation on 19

January 201386

, to Yangon the Chinese government has conveyed its concerns on the

Kachin conflict resulting in some shells landing in Chinese territory and a large influx of

refugees. Reports indicate that the Myanmar government declared a unilateral cease fire

on 19 January 2013 at the behest of the Chinese delegation.

Though officially China has welcomed the opening up of Myanmar to the US and other Western

nations, its concerns are being voiced through its mouthpieces in the form of various articles. At

present the main concerns of China are:

- Security and stability on its long border with Myanmar, particularly because of the

ongoing conflict with the Kachins.

- The future of its high value projects in Myanmar consequent to the suspension of the

Myitsone project and protests in the Monywa copper mine endangering its closure.

- The commissioning of and smooth functioning of the dual oil and gas pipeline running

across Myanmar.

- The ever increasing migrant Chinese population in Myanmar and their assets.


208

- The growing anti-China sentiment in Myanmar now gaining momentum because of the

liberalisation measures undertaken by the Myanmar government.

Interestingly, there has also been a flurry of visits of officials at various levels from both China

and Myanmar , most likely due to fear of a backlash from China.

However, certainly from the point of Myanmar, things have started taking a U-turn. According to

analysts, the anti-China sentiment in Myanmar which has been there at the people‘s level for a

long time, has now pervaded into the Tatmadaw (armed forces) as well as the government. With

the past record of Chinese support to the erstwhile Communist Party of Burma and the current

supply of arms to the UWSA[United Wa State Army]87

and the KIA [Kachin Independence

Army]88

(though through the back door), Myanmar government and particularly the army is

becoming increasingly wary of China, more so after opening up to the Western nations. The

direct visible result is the quiet suspension of the controversial Myitsone Dam project 89 being

built by China in the Kachin State of Myanmar in September 2011. According to Mr. Bertil

Lintner, a long time Burma watcher, ―Academic-style journals in China have run several articles

analyzing what went wrong with Beijing‘s Myanmar policy and what could and should be done

to rectify it. One proposed measure was to launch a public relations campaign inside Myanmar

aimed at overhauling China‘s current negative image in the country‖. 90

Myanmar, however, is

taking precautionary steps and is making an all out effort to keep the Chinese on their side,

though at times risking to test the so-called ―paukphaw‖ (fraternal) relations with China.

From the Indian perspective, the ―Look-East Policy‖ [LEP]91

of India is finally showing some

signs of being put into practice, instead of languishing at the formulation or planning level. As of

today, India‘s Look-East Policy has yielded a rich dividend. India-ASEAN trade has increased

from US$ 7billion in 2000 to US$ 58 billion in 2011. India-ASEAN trade constitutes about 9 per

cent of India‘s total global trade. Indian investments in ASEAN as well as ASEAN investments

in India have also registered a significant growth. The Free Trade Agreement between India and

ASEAN as well as India and the ASEAN member countries have created an enabling

environment for the smooth development of multilateral as well as bilateral economic

cooperation. Thus, Look-East Policy has proved to be a win win situation for both India and

ASEAN. But India-ASEAN trade mainly flows through sea routes. As a result coastal states like

Tamilnadu Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal are the principal beneficiaries and Look-East

Policy has propelled growth in them. The continental route to ASEAN that passes through

India‘s North East has failed to attract the attention of the trading entities. As a result, in spite of

having land border with the ASEAN, the states in India‘s North East have failed to reap any

dividend. In fact, Look-East Policy has bypassed the India‘s North East.

There is much is left undone on connectivity, cultural and civilizational linkages of India and

Southeast Asia. Strategically speaking with the favourable Sheikh Hasina government in

Bangladesh, and at present Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan, India can play a more major and vital role.

The main interest of India in Myanmar is her natural resources and the development of north-

eastern India. The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit of Myanmar in 2012 did cause

ripples in Beijing, which has been sending a stream of high-level visitors to Myanmar too. The

junta rushed a team to China, perhaps to show its loyalty. The Chinese foreign ministry

spokesman Liu Weimin told the Times of India: "China is happy to see the development of

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209

relations between them [India and Myanmar]." Prime Minister Dr. Singh is the first senior Indian

leader to visit Myanmar in 25 years. Myanmar President Thein Sein did visit India in October

2011, partly for a pilgrimage of Buddhist shrines, and the Indian PM visit was in reciprocity.

However, it also signaled that India was not about to give up on Myanmar as a source for its

natural resource needs. As an indicator of priorities, Singh was accompanied by a team of senior

businessmen and industrialists. Unfortunately, President Thein Sein could not find their

counterparts; there are no senior businessmen in Myanmar. The country has seen almost all its

industry nationalized. The Indian team included telecom czar like Sunil Bharti Mittal, who has

already spread his wings to Africa and Bangladesh, Ravi Ruia of the Essar Group, B.

Muthuraman of the Tatas, and Naveen Jindal of Jindal Steel.

Conclusion

It is often argued that if India is destabilized, then the whole region of Asia will be in disarray.

The argument does hold well in the wake of the regional disbursement of power, as envisaged

today. In a recently concluded seminar related to India‘s Security Calculas, India is termed as a

‗middle power‘ aspiring to become a ‗major power‘. If this is true, then the Indian foreign policy

in certainly undergoing a sea-change in this direction. Whether India can be considered as a

‗middle power‘ aspiring to become a ‗major power‘ is debatable, but it is for sure that India is

aspiring to follow an assertive foreign policy following certain principles of the Gujral Doctrine.

The prudence and caution shown by the Ministry of External Affairs on the recent demonstration

staged against the military leadership of Myanmar proves the same. The MEA, India clearly

states: ―We are concerned at the situation in Myanmar and are monitoring it closely. It is our

hope that all sides will resolve their issues peacefully through dialogue. As a close and friendly

neighbour, India hopes to see a peaceful , stable and prosperous Myanmar, where all sections of

the people will be included in a broad-based process of national reconciliation and political

reform. Myanmar‘s process of national reconciliation initiated by the authorities should be

expedited‖92

The above statement clearly defines the agenda of foreign policy denominations

between India and Myanmar. While it reasserts the basic course of the future foreign policy by

holding Myanmar as a ―close and friendly neighbour‖, it also sanctifies the fact that there are

certain aspects, which fall within the domestic jurisdiction of a country, thereby attesting the fact

that Myanmar is a ―sovereign nation‖, and India respects it as it is. Interestingly, the last phase

of the statement shows India‘s concern and the expressed hope of a ‗peaceful Myanmar‘ with the

participation of ‗all sections of the population‘. A close analysis of the last part leads to the fact

that India accepts Myanmar as a nation under ‗military dictatorship‘, and as a democratic nation

wishes Myanmar to somehow follow the same political path. Certainly it shows the courage and

the wistfulness of India, and to some extent shows the potential of India as a ‗middle power.

It is also often debated that India is overwhelmed with Indo-Pak relations, which has lead many

times to the failure of India to look beyond and look towards other directions. Whether fallacy or

not, Pakistan today is a reality, which is going to exist. The exigencies of Indo – Pak relations

and the subsequent energy lost in the same did cost India a lot. The modern exponents of

International Relations, especially from India feel that there is ‗exaggeration‘, ‗hyper-sensation‘

and ‗redundancy‘ in this bilateral relation. Some of them also go beyond to argue that this

bilateral relation is exaggerated in order to somehow bind India to the South Asian region, while


210

in the global scenario South Asia may not exist anymore. One of the basic confrontations

between India and Pakistan is about Kashmir. As the ideological moorings of both states have

frayed, they now claim Kashmir on the basis of statecraft, which is somehow absurd. The

deadlock arises since both India and Pakistan is not willing to show concessions. Neither India

nor Pakistan is willing to make any territorial concessions with respect to Kashmir. India can ill

afford to cede ground for fear of encouraging other secessionist movements elsewhere in the

country. Pakistan has been equally intransigent, its unwillingness to abandon this cause

stemming from a desire to take revenge for India‘s substantial role in the civil war of 1971,

which contributed to the breakup of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh out of East

Pakistan.

From the Treaty of Westphalia till the process of globalization, the world is following a

structural readjustment, where there is a seeming assimilation and dissimilation too. New waves

of changes compelled many regimes to alter their policies, perspectives, whereas the latent

intensions remained the same – viz., ‗maximization of national security‘. Bary Buzan provided

the concept of comprehensive definition of security, which is but national security revolves

around, the ability of that state and societies to maintain the independence of their life and their

identity; that there is a constant interplay of the ‗threats‘ and ‗vulnerabilities‘, which acts as the

dynamics of foreign policy goals; that the bottom line is nothing less than ‗survival‘; and that

security also includes to a substantial extent ‗ range of concerns about the conditions of

existence‘. Extending it further, Buzan identified five basic factors, which affect national

security, namely, military; political; economic; societal; and environment 93

.

With the attention of the US in the Asia-Pacific region, Myanmar has gained a pivotal position.

While US will be more eager to trade with Myanmar due to strategic reasons, and to counter

China, India will be required in this big game to play the role of the ‗middleman‘. Geo-

strategically, Myanmar lies at the crossroad of three regions within Asia, East Asia, Southeast

Asia, and South Asia. This unique geo-strategic position of Myanmar, where she is situated

between the two Asian giants, China and India, makes itself critical in any thinking related to

‗regional security‘. Observantly, the other neighbouring countries of Myanmar are an Islamic

state, Bangladesh, on the western front and Thailand, which is generally termed as a ‗soft state‘94

and Lao PDR in the east. It has an extensive coastline along the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman

Sea, which facilitates a comprehensive access to the Indian Ocean. It is also situated in a region,

which has witnessed fabulous economic growth over the past two decades. During the leadership

of Ne Win, Myanmar followed the policy of ‗isolationism‘ and the ‗Burmese Way to Socialism‘.

That in fact drove Myanmar into the ‗Burmese Way to a ruin‘, since the economy experienced

several currency devaluations and a staggering rise of a ‗black-market‘ mainly supplemented

through the illegal produce and sell of opium. Effectively, thus, Myanmar became a pawn in the

hands of the Chinese leaders, who agreed to support the military generals in a quid-pro-quo to

‗border solvency‘ and ‗non-cooperation to the Burmese communists‘. Certainly, India also

wanted Burma to act as a ‗buffer‘ between India and China, but her effort was unsuccessful. The

neutrality and nonalignment stance of foreign policy of Myanmar almost cease to exist,

especially after the landslide victory of the NLD , led by Ms. Dwe Aung Saan Suu Kyi in 1988.

The rejection of neutral policy by the military regime paved the way for Chinese military and

economic influence over Myanmar in early 1990s and Myanmar seemed to become a ‗client


211

state‘ or a ‗satellite state‘ of China. In order to diminish the Chinese influence over Myanmar,

India, ASEAN, and Japan are now giving priority to improving security, diplomatic, and

economic relations with Myanmar, which is quite constructive and pragmatic.

From the perspective of ‗energy security‘, it is a fact that the basic reason and prerequisite for

rising oil demands and imports in Asia are the high economic growth, which is likely to continue

even if there are visible ‗structural imbalances‘ and ‗institutional imperfections‘95

. Even if there

was a visible financial setback around 1997-98, the basic conditions of economic growth, namely

high savings rate and an increasingly skilled population were not basically affected.96

Realistically speaking, thus, Asia is representing a steadily increasing economic growth with two

economic giants, viz., India and China, and as a corollary the demand for the share of world

energy resources will also rise steadily. Predictions also state that the rising economic growth

will not be distorted or affected by immediate risks like, fragile financial institutions, physical

bottlenecks, social unrest, corruption, bureaucratic red-tapism, ethnic conflicts, etc.

Consequently, security of energy supply to supplement the economic growth appears to be the

prime and serious issue for the newly growing nations of Asia. Various agreements of both

China and India prove this fact, and it has been showing steady rise since 2004, with agreements

like, China-Iran, China-Canada, China-Venezuela, China–Saudi Aramco / US ExxonMobil, etc.

Thus, through these long-term comprehensive deals, China and India are changing the

international oil and natural gas game.97

It is a fact that bilateral relations undermine

transparency and globalization.98

Asian nations, which are strictly Westphalia in nature,

embraces bilateralism, since it protects ‗confidentiality‘ and ‗secrecy‘, even while being a part of

the greater process of globalization. As an immediate neighbour of India, Myanmar is an

excellent example, where the energy reserve is plenty, but the infrastructure is weak to utilize it,

which should be taken into account seriously by India, as a major power of the region. It is

estimated that Myanmar has the tenth largest and Southeast Asia largest gas reserves, around 90

tcf, with experts saying that Myanmar has sufficient reserves for more than 30 years.99

The loss

of India at the tri-national deal, when Myanmar declined gas supply to the Myanmar-

Bangladesh-India pipeline in 2006 to the Hong Kong listed – PetroChina, under which the

Myanmar‘s Ministry of Energy agreed to sell 6.5 tcf from A-1 block (Rakhine coastline) reserve

via an overland pipeline to China for a period of 30 years100

proves the fact that ‗energy‘ is one

of the prime factor in determining bilateral relations, in this case, ‗India-Myanmar‘ or ‗Sino-

Myanmar‘ relations.

The Myanmar military (Tatmadaw)101

is factually the only stable and established political

institutions in Myanmar, other than Buddhism and the Buddhist pongyis (monks). The

composition and the working of the military (Tatmadaw) of Myanmar are significantly different

from all the military establishments of South East Asia. With its nationalist origin the Burmese

Army is more rudimentary in nature than its counterparts in almost all the countries of South

East Asia. Given this fact, if that institution is destabilized the whole country will certainly

collapse. Military is also one of the highly respected organizations of Myanmar, which consists

of the highland population of Burma. It also constitutes of people whose forefathers served as

‗freedom fighters‘ for the independence of Burma. It is a fact that the secessionist insurgents of

the northern frontiers of Myanmar are only bound to the Yangon government because of the

military. If it falls, then they will first declare independence and will sever away from the Union


212

of Burma, and will create serious question in terms of ‗law and order‘. It is thus important for the

external players to take into account the significance of stabilization of Myanmar, by providing

‗security‘ to the people, and to further nation-building process. No doubt, the bodypolitik of

Myanmar is based on the Tatmadaw, and currently it is headed by a wise Tatmadaw General. If

the Western forces are thinking in the light of ‗changing the present regime of Myanmar

completely‘, they must take into consideration all these questions, and in order to reiterate its

stand, India must upheld a comprehensive and not contradicting ‗policy-approach‘ towards

Myanmar, to arrest her fall in the ongoing big game between US and China. Further, Ms. Dwe

Aung San Syu Kyi, certainly is having no political control beyond the Burmese valley. She has

not initiated any major ‗formal dialogue‘ regarding ‗democratic nation-building‘ with any of the

rebel groups operating in the northern parts of the country. Her political capability is only tested

through the 1990 elections, when her party win thumping majority. It must be kept in mind that

winning an election and running a government is two totally different ball game altogether. Her

win was indeed sweeping, but it should not be forgotten that she won out of ‗sympathy‘, ‗love‘,

and ‗emotion‘. Today, surely she is an icon for democracy like Nelson Mandela of South Africa,

unfortunately her party NLD is almost in disarray and is negligible. All these aspects have been

taken into consideration by the big external powers, while penetrating into the region.

As an ‗emerging power‘102

of the Asian region, India , thus must concentrate on not allowing to

slip Myanmar in the US-China rivalry, but to slowly and steadily address the problems faced by

Myanmar in cooperation with US. As understood, in order to comprehensively rebuild the whole

region, incorporation and cooperation with various nations, whether large and small is not only

essential, but also indispensable. In order to achieve this goal, concentrating constructively, with

an effort to reduce the imminent problems of the countries should be made the prime focus of

India. By pursuing such policy, India could, under the masquerade of ‗sustainable development‘,

pursue ‗strategic interests‘ too. To quote Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru from his speech in the

Constituent Assembly of independent India way back in March 8, 1948, ―… Asia today is

primarily concerned with what may be called the immediate human problem…main problem is

the problem of food, of clothing, of education, of health. We are concerned with these

problems…‖

End Notes

1. India is referred as a ‗middle power‘ by some international relation theorists.

2. Mauzy, Diane and Brian Job. 2007. ―U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited Re-engagement after

Years of Benign Neglect,‖ Asian Survey 47(4): pp. 626-630.

3. Norman J Padelford, George A Lincoln and Lee D. Olvey, ‗The Dynamics of International Politics‘,

(Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 3rd ed. 1976) p.201.

4. Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, (5th ed. Revised. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1978)

5. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

6. Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, (New York: Wiley, 1962)

7. Kenneth Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958)

8. George Modelski, Principles of World Politics (New York, 1972)

9. Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Themes in International Relations), (Cambridge

University Press, United Kingdom, 2000) p. 6

10. Ibid., p. 9

11. Ibid., p.10


213

12. Robert Keohane (ed), Neorealism and Its Critic,(Columbia University Press, New York, 1986).p.1

13. John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, Colin S. Gray, Strategy in the Contemporary World, An

Introduction to Strategic Studies (Oxford University Press, New York, 2005) p. 72.

14. Ibid.,

15. See Richard k. Ashley, ‗The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward A Critical Social Theory of

International Politics‘, Alternatives, Vol.12, no. 4, October 1987, pp. 403 – 34.

16. Kanti Bajpai and Siddharth Mallavarapu (eds), International Relations in India Bringing Theory Back

Home,(Orient Longman Pvt Ltd, New Delhi , 2004), p. 42.

17. See Stanley Hoffman, ‗An American Social Science‘ first published in Deadalus 106(3) and

subsequently reproduced in James Der Derian (ed.) International Theory: Critical Investigations

(New York: SUNNY Press, 1995).

18. Carr.E.H. Twenty Years of Crisis 1919-1939,(Macmillan, 1939)

19. Waltz Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979)

20. Ibid, p.15

21. Ibid, p.14.

22. Ibid,

23. Jackson Robert , Sorensen Georg ., International Relations Theories and Approaches ,(Oxford

University Press , second edition, 2003.) p.50

24. Ibid.

25. Jayantanuja Bandopadhyaya, ‗The Making of India‘s Foreign Policy‘, (Calcutta: Allied Publishers,

1991) p. 10.

26. http://hei.unige.ch/ped/docs/Human-security.doc.

27. For more details see, Kristian Stokke, ―Crafting Liberal Peace?, International Peace Promotion and

the Contextual Politics of Peace in Sri Lanka‖, Annals of the Association of American Geographers,

99(5), 2009. p. 933

28. Arnold Wolfers, ―National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol‖, Political Science Quarterly, 67,

1952, pp. 481-502.

29. Udo Steinbach , ―Sources of Third World Conflict‖, Third World Conflict and International Security,

London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981, p. 21.

30. Mohammed Ayoob , ―Regional Security and Third World‖, in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), Regional

Security in the Third World: Case Studies from Southeast Asian and the Middle East, London: Croom

Helm, 1986, pp. 9-10.

31. Robert Jervis , ―Cooperation under the Security Dilemma‖, World Politics, 30(2): 1978, p 182.

32. Barry Buzan and Ole Wǽver and Jaap de Wilde , Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder:

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 51.

33. Barry Buzan , People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations,

Great Britain: Wheatsheaf Books,1983, p. 26.

34. Ibid., p. 24.

35. Brahma Chellany, (ed), Securing India‘s Future in the New Millennium‘, (Orient Longman, New

Delhi, 1999)p. xviii. 36. Ibid.,

37. Ibid.

38. India became ― full-dialogue partner‖ of the ASEAN in December, 1995.

39. ― Advancing The ASEAN-India Partnership in the new Millennium‖, India-ASEAN Eminent Persons

Lecture Series, Address By H.E. Ong Keng Yong, Secretary-General of ASEAN , 18 October , 2004,

New Delhi.

40. Ibid.

41. Jean-Luc Racine , ― The Indo-French Strategic Dialogue : Bilateralism and Strategic Perceptions‖, in

India as an Emerging Power, ed., Sumit Ganguly, (London , Frank Cass and Company, 2003).

42. Josy Joseph, ― India, US Special Forces in Joint Exercise‖, India Abroad, September, 19, 2003.

43. Limaye, Satu. 2004. ―Minding the Gaps: The Bush Administration and U.S.-Southeast Asia

Relations,‖ Contemporary Southeast Asia 26 (1): pp. 87-89.

44. U.S. White House. 2002. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

Washington DC: U.S. Washington House.


214

45. Ibid.


Washington DC: U.S. White House.


Washington DC: U.S. White House. p. 40.

48. John, Eric. 2005. ―The United States and Southeast Asia: Developments, Trends, and Policy

Choices,‖

http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2005/53683.htm+The+United+States+and+Southeast+Asia:+Devel

opments,+Trends,+and+Policy&hl=zh-TW&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=tw.

49. Ibid.,

50. Hill, Christopher. 2006. ―The U.S. and Southeast Asia,‖

http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uscn_state_2006052201.html. 51. Ibid.,

52. De Castro, Renato Cruz. 2003. ―The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations: A Ghost from

the Cold War or an Alliance for the 21st Century?‖ Asian Survey 43 (6): 971-988.

53. Tan, Andrew. 2010. ―The US and China in the Malay Archipelago,‖ Asia-Pacific Review 17 (2): pp.

30-33.

54. Liao, Shun-Yo. 2011. ―Yatai Zhuyi yu Dongya Zhuyi Duizhi Xia de Dongxiejiaba‖ (Confrontation

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55. Sutter, Robert. 2009. ―The Obama Administration and U.S. Policy in Asia,‖ Contemporary Southeast

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http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15715446

58. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/correspondents/damiangrammaticas/

59. Shen, Shinshun. 2009. ―Back to Southeast Asia,‖ http://www.bjreview.com.cn/expert/txt/2009-

08/22/content_213431.htm.

60. Obama, Barack. 2008. ―Remarks of President-elect Barack Obama: Announcement of National

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suntory-hall. .

61. Marciel, Scot. 2009. ―U.S. Policy Toward ASEAN,‖

http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/02/119967.htm. [Accessed May 30, 2013].

62. Mauzy, Diane and Brian Job. 2007. ―U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited Re-engagement after

Years of Benign Neglect,‖ Asian Survey 47(4): 622-41.

63. Nawawi, Ahmad. 2005. China-ASEAN Future Relations – An Analysis. Pennsylvania: U.S. Army

War College. P. 11.

64. Kerrey, Robert, and Robert Manning. 2001. The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda

for the New Administration. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Pp. 20-21, 48-49, 53-54.

65. Koh, Tommy. 2004. ―America‘s Role in Asia: What does Southeast Asia Want from Washington?‖

PacNet, 53: 1-2.

66. Lum, Thomas. 2010. U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Senate Committee

on Foreign Relations. P. 3; Mearsheimer, John. 2010. ―The Gathering Storm: China‘s Challenge to

US Power in Asia,‖ The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3: 381-396.; Shi, Yinhong. 2010.

―Zhongguo de Hepingfazhan han Zhongmeiguanxi de Zhanlue Xinshi ji Tiaozhan‖ (China‘s Peaceful

Development and the Strategic Situation and Challenge of Sino-US Relations), in Dahui Huang ed.,

Bianhuazhong De Dongya Yu Meiguo (Changing East Asia and the United States), pp.67-71. Beijing:

Social Sciences Academic Press.; Zhao, Quansheng. 2005. ―America‘s Response to the Rise of China

and Sino-US Relations,‖ Asian Journal of Political Science 14 (1): 1-27..

67. Art, Robert. 2010. ―The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul,‖

Political Science Quarterly 125 (3): 359-391.

68. Lu, Jianren. 2010. ―Yataigongtongti de Tichu yu Zhanlue Beijin‖ (Proposal of the Asia Pacific

Community and its Strategic Background), in Yunling Zhang and Minghui Sheng eds, Dongya Yatai

http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uscn_state_2006052201.html

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15715446


215

Quyu Hezuomoshi Yu Liyi Boyi (Approaches and Interests in the Regional Cooperation of East Asia

and the Asia-Pacific), pp. 291-313. Beijing: Economy & Management Publishing House. p. 299.

69. http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_22025176/obama-myanmar-visit-about-

sustaining-momentum

70. US President Barack Obama, speech at Yangon University Convocation Hall, Nov. 19, 2012.

71. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/19/us-asia-obama-myanmar-

idUSBRE8AI04320121119

72. Ibid.,

73. Ibid.,

74. http://asiasoceitty.org/blog/asia/white-house-visit-myanmars-thein-sein-historic-and-earned

75. Some pages of this document is shown by the Swedish award winning Journalist and author and a

long time Myanmar expert Mr. Bertil Lintner while delivering a lecture in the National Institute of

Advance Studies, Bangalore, on 14 february, 2013.

76. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2012/11/why-president-obamas-visiting-myanmar-

big-deal/59122/ 77. The Irrawaddy, 24 September, 2012.

78. Mizzima News, 23 January, 2013.


80. http://www.naturalgasasia.com/china-myanmar-pipeline-to-bring-down-chinas-energy-cost

81. http://www.naturalgasasia.com/china-myanmar-pipelines-to-be-ready-by-may


83. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/mine-03132013191753.html

84. http://www.narinjara.com/Reports/BReport.ASP

85. The Democratic Voice of Burma, Report, 21 January, 2013.

86. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1007192.shtml

87. http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/33348

88. www.kachinnews.com

89. http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/irrawaddy-myitsone-dam-0

90. Asia Times Online, 6 October, 2012.

91. http://www.mea.gov.in/articles-in-indian-media.htm?dtl/13365/Our+lookEast+policy

92. Statement by the Hon‘ble Minister, Ministry of External Affairs , Shri. Pranab Mukherjee, New York,

26th

September, 2007. ( http://meaindia.nic.in)

93. Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elebieta Tromer and Ole Waever, The European

Security Order Recast : Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (Pinter : London, 1990) p. 3-4.

94. Peter Burnell and Vicky Randall (ed)., Politics in the Developing World, (Oxford University Press,

2005) p. 156.

95. Oystein Noreng, Crude Power Politics And the Oil Market., (I.B. Tauris Publishers, London :New

York, 2006) p. xxvi.

96. Robert Manning., ― The Asian Energy Market: a new geopolitics‖, in Asian Energy Markets –

Dynamics and Trends, (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research., 2004) pp. 21-54.

97. Amy Jaffe Myers and Kenneth B. Medlock III, ―Energy trade in Asia: an overview‖, in Asian Energy

Markets, pp. 113-42.

98. Niall Ferguson., ― Sinking Globalization‖, Foreign Affairs, March-April 2005, pp. 64 – 77.

99. United States Geological Survey, ― 2005 Minerals Yearbook: Burma‖, June 2007, p. 7.1, available at

http:// minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2005/bmmyb05.pdf ; ―Year 2007: MPRL and China

Heighten Burma‘s Energy Sector, ― The Shwe Gas Bulletin‖, Vol. 2, Issue 7, February 2007,

available at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/SGB02-07.pdf,

100. Anand Kumar, ―Myanmar-PetroChina Agreement: A Setback to India‘s Quest for Energy Security‖,

Paper No. 1681, South Asia Analysis Group, 19 January 2006,

http://www.saag.org/papers17/papers1681.htm.

http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_22025176/obama-myanmar-visit-about-sustaining-momentum

http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_22025176/obama-myanmar-visit-about-sustaining-momentum

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/19/us-asia-obama-myanmar-idUSBRE8AI04320121119

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/19/us-asia-obama-myanmar-idUSBRE8AI04320121119

http://asiasoceitty.org/blog/asia/white-house-visit-myanmars-thein-sein-historic-and-earned

http://asiasoceitty.org/blog/asia/white-house-visit-myanmars-thein-sein-historic-and-earned

http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2012/11/why-president-obamas-visiting-myanmar-big-deal/59122/

http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2012/11/why-president-obamas-visiting-myanmar-big-deal/59122/

http://www.mea.gov.in/articles-in-indian-media.htm?dtl/13365/Our+lookEast+policy

http://meaindia.nic.in/

http://www.saag.org/papers17/papers1681.htm


216

101. Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since 1948, Singapore, ISEAS,

2009; Selth Andrew, Burma‘s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory, Norwalk, Conn.: EastBridge,

2002

102. India is referred as a ‗middle power‘ by some international relation theorists.

Select References

- Buzan, Barry , Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elebieta Tromer and Ole Waever, The European Security

Order Recast : Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (Pinter : London, 1990)

- Brown, Chris , Understanding International Politics, (St. Martin Press, New York , 1997).

- Bandopadhyaya, Jayantanuja , ‗The Making of India‘s Foreign Policy‘, (Calcutta: Allied Publishers, 1991)

- Baylis, John , James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen , Colin.S.Gray, Strategy in Contemporary World, An Introduction

to Strategic Studies, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2005).

- Bajpai, Kanti and Siddharth Mallavarapu (eds,), International Relations in India Bringing Theory Back

Home, (Orient Longman Pvt Ltd, New Delhi, 2004).

- Burchill, Scott ,Richard Devetak, Andrew Linklater, Matthew Peterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui

True (eds), Theories of International Relations, ( Palgrave, New York, second edition, 2005)

- Chellany, Brahma (ed), Securing India‘s Future in the New Millennium‘, (Orient Longman, New Delhi,

1999).

- Foot, Rosemary, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell, (eds.)., Order and Justice in International

Relations., (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003)

- Hoffman, Stanley, ‗ An American Social Science‘ first published in Deadalus 106(3) and subsequently

reproduced in James Der Derian (ed.), International Theory : Critical Investigations (New York: SUNNY

Press, 1995).

- Jackson Robert , Sorensen Georg ., International Relations Theories and Approaches ,(Oxford University

Press , second edition, 2003.)

- Keohane , Robert (ed)., Neorealism and Its Critic , (Columbia University Press, New York, 1986).

- Lintner, Bertil. Outrage: Burma's Struggle for Democracy. ( London: White Lotus UK, 1990).

- Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, (5th ed. Revised. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1978).

- Martin, Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity.(London: Zed Press, 1991).

- Noreng, Oystein, Crude Power Politics And the Oil Market., (I.B. Tauris Publishers, London: New York,

2006) .

- Sumit Ganguly, India‘s Foreign Policy Grows Up, World Political Journal, Vol. 20, No.4, Winter 2003/04.

- Baldev Raj Nayyar, ―Globalization and India‘s National Autonomy‖, Journal of Commonwealth and

Comparative Politics, Vol. 41. No. 2, 2003, pp. 1-34.

- Josy Joseph, ― India, US Special Forces in Joint Exercise‖, India Abroad, September, 19, 2003

- Amy Jaffe Myers and Kenneth B. Medlock III, ―Energy trade in Asia: an overview‖, in Asian Energy

Markets, pp. 113-42. Mapping the Global Future, (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2004).

- John W. Garver., China &Iran. Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World, (University of Washington

Press, Seattle, 2006)

- Alyson J.K.Bailes, Pal Dunay, Pan Guang and Mikhail Troitskiy, ―Shanghai Cooperation Organization‖,

SIPRI, Policy Paper No. 17 (May 2007.)

- Banjamin Schwarz., ― Managing China‘s Rise‖, The Atlantic Monthly, June , 2005.

- Robert Manning., ―The Asian Energy Market: a new geopolitics‖, in Asian Energy Markets – Dynamics

and Trends, (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research., 2004).

- Niall Ferguson., ―Sinking Globalization‖, Foreign Affairs, March-April 2005.

- United States Geological Survey, ― 2005 Minerals Yearbook: Burma‖, June 2007., available at http://

minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2005/bmmyb05.pdf ; ―Year 2007: MPRL and China Heighten

Burma‘s Energy Sector, ― The Shwe Gas Bulletin‖, Vol. 2, Issue 7, February 2007, available at

http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/SGB02-07.pdf. - Anand Kumar, ―Myanmar-PetroChina Agreement: A Setback to India‘s Quest for Energy Security‖, Paper

No. 1681, South Asia Analysis Group, 19 January 2006, http://www.saag.org/papers17/papers1681.htm.

http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/SGB02-07.pdf

http://www.saag.org/papers17/papers1681.htm


217

- World Economic Outlook, (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2005), p. 164.―Dhaka to resume

talks on tri-nation gas pipeline‖, New Age, May 1, 2007,

http://www.newagebd.com/2007/may/01/front.html - ―Gas and Oil from Africa and the Middle East will pass through Myanmar‖, Asia News.it, 4 May, 2007,

http:// www.asianews.it/index.php?1=en &art=9167&theme=1&size=A.

- Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since 1948, Singapore, ISEAS,

2009;

- Selth Andrew, Burma‘s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory, Norwalk, Conn.: EastBridge, 2002

*************************

http://www.newagebd.com/2007/may/01/front.html

http://www.asianews.it/index.php?1=en


218

Positioning Myanmar in India‟s Look East Policy

Dr. (Mrs) Munmun Majumdar

Associate Prof, Dept of Political Science North-Eastern Hill University,

Shillong, Meghalaya,India Email: [email protected]

Dr. Munmun Majumdar has three books, contributed chapters in edited books and a number of research articles in national and International Journals. She has been a visiting faculty to the South and Southeast Asian Centre, Calcutta University, & visting Prof, to the ASEAN Centre, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.

___________________________

“Positioning Myanmar in India‟s Look East Policy”

The evolving dynamics of the Cold War led India and the countries of Southeast Asia to take

sharply divergent paths. Pragmatic considerations and even realpolitik saw India‘s calibrated

shift in its foreign policy orientation when it pronounced the Look East Policy (LEP). This

ushered in a renewed effort at re-engagement with the Southeast Asian region in a climate of the

new wave of economic reforms and liberalization in the context of new parameters, which

witnessed a systemic shift in the overall geo-political international order. The LEP marked the

first time since independence that the Government of India turned its attention towards the

ASEAN region with economics in mind.1 An integral part of the policy was to develop trade

linkages and integration with the ASEAN region, greater connectivity through establishment of

air and land links. India became a sectoral dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1992 and a full

dialogue partner in 1995. A new dimension indicative of the economic drivers to India‘s strategic

considerations emerged in its Look-East policy2 when India became a Summit level partner of

ASEAN in 2002 and a member of the East Asia Summit in December 2005. Within recent years,

India has increased its interaction with the Southeast Asian region through political dialogues in

multilateral organizations, such as ASEAN, and through the growth of trade with Southeast

Asian nations. Although India‘s look east policy was premised more on economic rather than

strategic considerations the look east policy has expanded over the years to include political,

defense, maritime, strategic and hitherto unexplored areas of economic cooperation with the

Pacific Asia as well.3Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated: ―We are engaged in a process



219

of dialogue and consultation… to help shape a new security environment…the security dialogue

between India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is of utmost

importance…Our region lies alongside sea lanes of great strategic importance, which need to be

protected.‖ 4

The LEP has gradually acquired a strategic dimension making India an inalienable part of the

Asia-Pacific strategic discourse. This can be viewed as the second phase of the engagement

which began in 2003 as a more comprehensive phase involving players extending from Australia

to East Asia with ASEAN as its core.5 Significantly, this approach received unanimous support

from all governments that came to power in New Delhi regardless of their political persuasion.

What is interesting is that the Indian presence is appreciated and welcome by ASEAN.

India and Southeast Asia have no history of wars between them and through India‘s accession in

October 2003 of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), India has reaffirmed

ASEAN‘s territorial integrity and sovereignty and also non-interference in ASEAN‘s internal

affairs.The absence of conflict on vital issues, and the presence of common challenges make it

less complicated to expand constructive ties between India and Southeast Asia. The ASEAN

Regional forum (ARF), regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed

Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and the MILAN exercises that India holds every

alternate year are reflective of the steady cooperation between them.

In this framework it is pertinent to study the positioning of Myanmar which shares its border

with the northeastern states6of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram.

And

Myanmar‘s states that border India are Kachin, Sagaing and Chin.7 India also shares strategic

waters of Bay of Bengal, including the area of strategically important Andaman and Nicobar

Islands where the two closest Indian and Myanmar‘s islands are barely 30 Km apart. Myanmar‘s

ports also provide India the shortest approach route to several of India‘s northeastern states.

Myanmar‘s strategic position functions as a bridge between India and Southeast Asia is

important not only to the security of India‘s northeast and in curbing the rising influence of

China but also because northeast is the point of linkage where there is indelible similarities in

cultural and social systems between India‘s northeast and Southeast Asia. And this can be used


220

as a soft power

8 resource including the revival of the ―shared historical, ethnic, cultural and

religious ties‖9 between the people of the two regions.

The geographic contiguity of Myanmar is important since it is the land bridge that connects India

with the ASEAN countries with which it has established engagement models. The strategic

importance of Myanmar has made India, China, and the Southeast Asian nations take note of

Myanmar's critical role when shaping their bilateral relations as well as Indian Ocean policies.10

Factoring Myanmar in India‟s LEP.

For the past three decades, India‘s interest in Myanmar has understandably concentrated on the

problems of democracy and human rights. Factional conflicts within the military and violent

conflicts with insurgent groups have been the hallmark of politics in Myanmar since 1962

coup.11

The central issue facing the state since independence in 1948 has been finding a solution

to the problem of governance of this profoundly multi-cultural society. After the Ne Win regime

collapsed in 1988, the country was ruled by the military junta, initially called the State Law and

Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and then, after a reorganization in 1997, the State Peace and

Development Council (SPDC). The 2011 elections saw Thein Sein elected to the position of

President.12

Presently Myanmar is in the midst of wide ranging reforms launched since 2011.

The first phase focussed on the political process, including political reconciliation, which led to

the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), rejoining the political

process through a land mark by-election. The second phase of reforms was announced in June

2012, and was aimed at opening up the economy and improving practices to support economic

liberalization. The government announced in December 2012 a third phase of reforms, aimed to

tackle graft and corruption, attract greater foreign direct investment, and strengthen Myanmar‘s

participation in regional economic integration process. Myanmar‘s reforms continue in 2013

with several high profile events lined up. In June 2013 the World Economic Forum on East Asia

will be held in Nay Pyi Taw, and the 27th

South East Asian games in December. In 2014

Myanmar will take up the responsibility of the ASEAN chair for that year including ASEAN‘s

Summit meetings with global leaders. Undoubtedly Myanmar‘s ongoing democratization and

normalization of relations with the outside world could affect the geopolitics in Asia. These


221

moves are welcome to India as they reduce its unease in dealing with the autocratic military

regime in the past. Although, there are a number of outstanding issues to be resolved to make

Myanmar a reasonably credible democracy, President Thein President Thein Sein‘s moves to

take Myanmar on the road to democracy needs India‘s support and encouragement. So long as

the reform process continues and is irreversible, the prospects for India-Myanmar relations seem

bright. Here it is important to understand that the sequence of India-Myanmar relation is not just

with the ruling government, but with the opposition as well. Suu Kyi‘s recent visit to India must

be seen not just against the background of her being conferred the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for

International Understanding in 1992, as much as it is about continuity in that direction.

New Delhi‘s rationale in engaging with Nay pyi Taw has been convincingly logical. Internal and

external considerations make it hard for India to avoid dealing with neighboring, resource rich

Myanmar with which India‘s northeast shares a porous 1643 Km long border. The primary

rationale of engaging Myanmar in India‘s Look-East policy may be seen against the background

of the dragon intensifying its relationship with Myanmar since the late 1980s,13

together with the

increased isolation of Myanmar during the early 90s which helped to raise the consciousness of

China‘s growing regional influence. India was uneasy with China‘s policy in Myanmar serving

as the key to circumvent the Malacca dilemma as it were, China‘s assistance in constructing

military bases close to India, rebuilding roads, bridges and other infrastructure throughout

Myanmar, and thereby making inroads into Myanmar to gain credible access to its natural

resources and market in Myanmar. Myanmar with its abundance in oil, natural gas, coal, zinc,

copper, precious stones, timber and hydropower, with some amount of uranium deposits as well

makes it a very attractive destination. Myanmar was closed to the outside world when China has

been slowly but consistently stripping Myanmar of its natural resources. India perceived these

developments inside Myanmar as a threat since it feared that China would in the process gain

easy access to India‘s northeast. Consequently, India felt it necessary to take a realist assessment

of the geopolitical and economic circumastance and decided to place security and economic

objectives ahead of political and human-rights considerations when dealing with Myanmar.14

Geographically Myanmar dominates the Bay of Bengal. It is here the sphere of influence of

China and India overlap. It makes sense therefore, for India to engage Myanmar irrespective of


222

issues of human rights, suppression of democratic aspirations. By engaging Myanmar India

could maximize its security and national interest. However, the lack of synchronization of

India‘s policies with China, ASEAN and Myanmar has impacted the pace of engaging Myanmar

to a large extent and the balancing act of maintaining ties with both the military junta and the

pro-democracy forces15

within Myanmar has proved to be a difficult act.16

These ties have

strategic implications for India, more so against the background of the Sino-Indian border

dispute still eluding resolution.

In Myanmar, as elsewhere, India China strategic interests and most pressing concerns are

characterized by growing uncertainty about each other‘s future role in the region. Myanmar is

the only Southeast Asian country that shares a boundary with India and therefore, it serves as a

gateway to the other 10 member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

More often than not India-Myanmar relations tend to be assessed through the strategic security

prism of China-Myanmar relations. Such comparison is inevitable so long as China continues to

aggressively assert its political, economic and military strength in the region.

Myanmar shares a boundary with China in the Northeast without any insurmountable geographic

barriers except the Hengduan Shan range to separate the two lands. This also provides India a

transit route to Southern China. China has exerted considerable influence in Myanmar ever since

China's Yuan (ethnic Mongol) dynasty invaded Myanmar in the 13th century. Myanmar was one

of the countries that recognized PRC in 1949 and has been supporting ‗one China‘ principle for a

long time.17

The isolation faced by both Myanmar and China in the wake of the Yangon

massacre of 1988 and the cruel suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 clubbed

them together in the same bludgeon. China grabbed the opportunity by establishing closer

relationship after Myanmar uprising of 1988. The relationship blossomed when internal stability

in Myanmar was in great turmoil and China aided the country with massive arms supply, signed

trade agreement in 1994.18

In 1992, Myanmar agreed that China would modernize Myanmar‘s

naval facilities and since then, Chinese technical experts have prominently improved and

militarized Myanmar‘s port facilities in the Bay of Bengal at Akyab (Sittwe), Kyaukpyu and

Mergui, constructed a major naval base on Hainggyi Island near the Irrawaddy river delta, and

upgraded the naval base on Great Coco Island.19

And by the mid 1990s northern Myanmar was


223

opened up to Chinese trade in a big way.

20 At present between Myanmar and Yunnan province

(China), there are 16 border gates where four of them are first class and 12 under second class

(Provincial).21

China is also engaged in construction of waterways through Irrawaddy River,

railways, oil and gas pipeline in order to connect Yunnan province to Bay of Bengal via

Myanmar. In late 2009, the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation started

construction of more than 1,000-kilometer pipeline to transport oil and natural gas from

Kyaukpyu Port, on the Bay of Bengal, to Kunming in China‘s Yunnan province.22

The oil

pipeline would carry oil from the Middle East and Africa, enabling bypassing of the bottlenecked

sea lane of the Malacca Strait, which currently delivers 80 percent of China‘s oil imports.23

Proponents of the pipeline argue that it would reduce China‘s reliance on the Malacca Strait for

oil transportation by at least one-third.24

Much of the infrastructure is already underway where

river and rail routes from Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam would converge in Kunming, in China's

southern Yunnan province. At Ramree Island off Myanmar's northwestern Arakan coast, China

is constructing pipelines to take oil and natural gas from Africa, the Persian Gulf and the Bay of

Bengal across the heart of Myanmar to Kunming.25

The purpose was to alleviate China's

dependence on the Strait of Malacca, through which four-fifths of its crude oil imports pass at

present. There will also be a high-speed rail line roughly along this route by 2015. So, when

China completes its ongoing communication projects in Myanmar, increased strategic

cooperation between Myanmar and China would significantly enhance security threat to India‘s

weak eastern flanks.

Another major concern for India is that Myanmar gives China access to the Indian Ocean, not

only for imports of oil and gas and exports from landlocked south-western Chinese provinces,

but also potentially for military bases or listening post.26

India has also been extremely

concerned with China upgrading its key air and naval facilities that strengthen the line of

communication between the Chinese border and the Bay of Bengal.27

While India cannot afford

to ignore the emerging strategic equation on its eastern borders especially when Myanmar‘s

civilian President is talking of multi strategic cooperation28

in partnership with China, at the same

time India also has to take note of the decision of the Myanmar government to suspend the China

sponsored dam project at the confluence of the two rivers forming the Irrawadi. This action not

only indicated a strategic move adopted by the Thein Sein administration that reflects the


224

growing anti-Chinese sentiment in the country, and at the same time a reinvention of the regime

itself as a responsible government which listens more to the opposition, civil society

organizations and environmentalists. In a way it also confirmed that the assumption of China

having excessive control over Myanmar may have been exaggerated. However, the harsh

crackdown on protesters — including monks — over the Letpadaung copper project (a joint

venture between the military-owned Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings and China) in

November 2012 has caused uneasy reminders of the past military junta‘s attitude towards

protests and demonstrations. The silver lining is that independent inquiry commissions have been

appointed for both situations, to probe into the causes and main actors responsible. Daw Aung

San Suu Kyi heads the inquiry commission for the Letpadaung case, in her capacity as

chairperson of the parliamentary committee on the rule of law.29

At the same time it is important

to comprehend accurately the implication of what Thein Sein conceded when he told the

Financial Times that there were ‗still many differences . . . [with Suu Kyi and others]‘.30

Clearly India‘s national interest is best served when there is a strong stable government in

Myanmar that adopts equidistant relations with China and India and is able to fight against

insurgencies that beleaguer both sides of the border. More broadly an open democratic Myanmar

will draw India deeper into Asia, so that India can more effectively balance against China.

Sanctions by the US and EU were hardly effective at bringing about change or even at seriously

handicapping the regime.31

The economy continued to stagnate because of inept policy making

and insecure property rights that had worsened with the sanctions. During this time Myanmar has

been able to draw advantage of the security and geostrategic interest of both China and India to

achieve its developmental and security goals. Typically its pursuit has taken the form of bringing

in two huge neighbors to automatically balance the region and in one that allows Myanmar to

adjust to the strategic balance. Myanmar despite its problematic human-rights record has been

able to take advantage of the economic, security and geostrategic interests of both China and

India in the country to achieve developmental and security goals. Its relations with Beijing in

particular have assumed ever greater significance as Western capitals have sought to place

Myanmar under the scrutiny of the UN Security Council on the grounds that its domestic

circumstances have regional security implications. If Myanmar continues with its reforms and

opens up its links with its neighbors it will in a matter of time develope into an energy and


225

natural resource hub, with potential to reap the benefits from connecting the Northeastern India

through Myanmar to the rest of South East Asia. Using the Myanmar option to enter Southeast

Asia will provide opportunities to India‘s landlocked northeast to be opened up to the outside.

Northeast India is cut off from the rest of India by Bangladesh to the west and by Myanmar to

the east. The 22Km Siliguri strategic neck controls access to the seven sisters of the Northeast

and represents a developmental hurdle as much as it acts as a psychological barrier to the

integration of the region with the rest of India. Therefore Myanmar's political opening and

economic development will amends this geopolitical fact, because India's northeast will benefit

from Myanmar's political and economic revitalization. As a result the shift to transnational

cooperation through the LEP will allow the assistance for the growth of the North-East region to

come out of its state of remoteness, underdevelopment, and instability. And a prosperous

Northeast India could act as a shield against threats to the security of the country emanating from

the eastern sector. Here special mention may be made to developing relations with Thailand

which has been looking for greater engagement with this region with its look west policy. This in

turn could have a bearing on reducing China‘s influence in Myanmar in relative terms.

Another stimulus to positioning Myanmar within the Look-East Policy came in the form of the

Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral technical and Economic Cooperation, the Kunming

Initiative, and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC).32

These projects underlie cooperation in

tourism, education, emphasize links between Indian traditional culture and ASEAN‘s culture,

and could also become important measures for promoting relations with Myanmar. Additionally

they are aimed at enhancing trade, encourage the development of an appropriate socio-economic

strategy through infrastructure construction programms like the Trans- Asia Highway Project etc,

so that the region would be transformed to a base for domestic and foreign investors, to tap the

contiguous markets of China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia,

Malaysia, Indonesia, and beyond. India is already engaged in constructing linkages with

Myanmar and recognizes that since road and communication constitute important elements of

infrastructure in any country‘s economy, therefore, physically connecting the northeast to the

business centres of Southeast Asia was extremely important. An important step was taken when

the 160 Kilometer long road provided linking the border town of Tamu to Kalemyo and Kalewa,

to the Indian border town of Moreh and the 225km Rih-Tiddim –Falem road was built to connect


226

Champai in Mizoram to Rhi in Myanmar. India is also constructing an energy terminal at Sittwe

that will carry offshore natural gas to the Indian state of West Bengal. The Indian pipeline would

actually split into two directions, with another proposed route going to the north around

Bangladesh. This link from Mizoram to Sittwe either by land or an inter-modal road water

transfer holds out the prospect of an alternate outlet to the Bay of Bengal for India‘s northeast

which will help to boost trade ties.33

For more than a decade now India and Myanmar have tried to broad base their relations

focusing on five areas: capacity building of Myanmar in developmental areas, mutual trade,

improving communication infrastructure for land and sea links between India‘s landlocked

regions and Myanmar, defence cooperation and coordination, and regional cooperation.

Officially both countries have avoided making public reference to strategic security aspects

beyond the denial of sanctuaries for Indian insurgent groups in Myanmar soil and goodwill visits

of military chiefs of both countries. This has now been broadened (in the context of the current

Myanmar‘s military confrontation with the Kachin Independence Army –KIA) to include denial

of sanctuaries to Myanmar‘s insurgents on Indian soil. Contacts between the armies of both

countries have been limited to exchange of visits of senior officers, border meetings of sector

commanders and limited cooperation at the ground level in trans- border operations against

insurgents.

During his visit to Myanmar Dr Manmohan Singh, extended a $500-million line credit and inked

12 pacts. He also signed various memorandums focusing on the areas such as border area

development, transportation, connectivity, agriculture, trade and investment, promotion of

friendly exchanges and human resource development. 34

These included an air service agreement

providing for Fifth Freedom rights which will allow Indian Carriers, private included, combining

flights to Myanmar with other destinations in Southeast Asia and beyond. A joint working group

will examine the feasibility of rail connectivity between the two countries and movement of

freight from India to the ASEAN region. Dr. Manmohan Sing‘s visit may also see the

finalization of the Imphal –Mandalay bus service aimed at promoting trade as well as people to

people contact. It is an important component of development in the region that India sees crucial

to its security and the Look East policy.


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Although India has been engaging Myanmar to open up the geographic space between the two

the ground realities is that both in terms of quality as well as quantity China is at an advantage.

India has failed to capitalize on its relations with Myanmar whether economic or strategic or in

ensuring energy security. Infrastructure bottlenecks remain in all of the India-initiated rail, road,

power and energy related projects. The delay in the progress as a result generates comparison

between the sluggish Indian performances with the promptness of Chinese companies to

complete projects that they undertake. Overall India lacks in skilled manpower, which is a

glaring shortcoming. India needs to do a lot more to catch up China‘s strides in Myanmar which

is far ahead and its projects are well planned and executed.

While the future beckons with opportunities, the present is still not assured. There is then good

reason to be cautiously optimistic on the recent developments in Myanmar. Myanmar can attain

some form of stability only when it is able to successfully address the ethnic question35

and bring

about immediate national reconciliation and democratization. It is important to understand what

has compelled ethnic minorities to take up arms against the central government. This

fundamental question needs to be addressed for Myanmar to achieve peace and stability. In other

words, simply holding elections is not enough if all elections do is bring ethnic Bamar or

Burman‘s to power. As an alternative the Constitution will have to be amended to give generous

powers to the minorities accordingly so that the aspirations of the ethnic nationalities are fully

met that will make diversity the strength of Myanmar instead of its weakness. This aspect is

important especially in the context of India‘s northeast which houses more than 200 ethnic and

tribal groups, who are ethnically, linguistically and culturally distinct. The region has been

battling insurgency movements with demands ranging from independence, autonomy, tribal

rights etc. Since the beginning of these movements ethnic ties and tribal linkages between the

people on either side of the border has facilitated their movements and in finding safe haven36

and often these groups take refuge in Myanmar‘s soil.37

Myanmar faces similar problems of

ethnic conflict which also has a consequence for India.

Then again India being located between the ―Golden Crescent‖ in the west and Golden triangle

in the east faces also the challenge of arm-drugs nexus. There is a strong connection between the

conflicts in the country and the most immediate sources of revenue to purchase weapons and in


228

many instances this is both opium and heroin and metamphetamine pills. Production of opium is

closely linked to ethnic insurgencies inside Myanmar. The areas of highest cultivation intensity

are also the areas of ongoing or suspended conflicts. The emergence of peace and security is

therefore an essential ingredient in tackling the poppy problem in Myanmar. Myanmar is also the

largest centre for the manufacture of ATS, notably metamphetamine38

while parts of India‘s

northeast act as transit points for drug traffickers to carry on their lucrative trade.39

As expected

there will be a spill over of the problems to the Indian states that Myanmar faces.

So far India‘s policy towards Myanmar has been predominantly responsive, dictated by China‘s

activism in Myanmar. With China‘s well equipped navy, its growing economic might, its

growing aggressive policy in the South China Sea, and the string of Pearls, all of it put together40

is certainly causing an alrming situation for New Delhi. New Delhi in the present circumstance

needs to manage its LEP to effectively articulate and react to the developing scenario. How it

responds to these challenges will be the real test of Indian diplomatic maturity. It would be in

India‘s interest to read Myanmar in transition correctly (regime reform and regime change) as the

political processes in Myanmar gathers momentum triggered by domestic and international

factors.41

And under the changed circumstance India will have to take into account all these

factors and carve out a role for itself which is more proactive rather than simply being reactive to

what China does in Myanmar.

In the light of the changes taking place in Myanmar it is time yet again to analyze India‘s policy

towards its eastern neighbor. India can be a useful counterpoise for Myanmar in handling China,

particularly when China‘s strategic ambitions override its acceptance of the civilian regime in

Myanmar. A good beginning would be to persuade the new government in Myanmar to allow

greater people to people contacts between the two countries at the level of students, scholars and

academic exchange. While India‘s policy of engagement will need recalibration to an extent

depending on the degree to which Myanmar will transform and the transformation is irreversible.

Interestingly, at a time when US policy toward Southeast Asia is widely seen to be underpinned

by concerns regarding the People‘s Republic of China, the Obama administration suggested that

it‘s more pragmatic policy toward Myanmar was fundamentally about supporting democracy and

human rights as well as stability and greater prosperity in Myanmar, rather than being about

China.42

As the US stepped up its pragmatic engagement with Myanmar, China responded with


229

enhanced military, political and economic commitments.

43 The Chinese Global Times voiced

China‘s concern and held said that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton‘s visit had ―undermined the

Chinese wall in Myanmar‖. US has been keen to stress that the improvement in the bilateral

relationship between US and Myanmar was not intended to replace China‘s influence in

Myanmar and nor is at the expense of Sino-Myanmar ties. Hillary Clinton has stated that the

United States ―does not expect any country to give up relationships with their neighbor‖, noting

that in the case of Myanmar and China there are ―longstanding ties that certainly are deep in the

soils of both nations‖.44

Yet it has to be recognized that opening up of Myanmar has jeopardised

China‘s sole privileged position in Myanmar.

The nascent military-to-military relation between the United States and Myanmar is another

issue which throws up questions on how China will view such developments. Will it see it as a

part of the Obama administration‘s pivot from Middle East to Asia followed up with several

major investment-diplomatic, economic, and strategic. Or will the policy be viewed as

rebalancing of military forces towards Asia? Particularly the stationing of US Marines in

Darwin, the forward deployment of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore, greater US presence in

Asia‘s maritime domain, especially in the South China Sea, the release of an air-sea battle

concept that requires strikes on the Chinese mainland that could escalate into a dangerous

confrontation, and the frequent training and capacity building exercises with Southeast Asian

countries. The drift in US China relations towards strategic rivalry has severe consequence that

will undermine the envirnment that has been important for the Asian miracle.

The truth is that in Myanmar, The US and the EU are driven by their own strategic and business

interests45

rather than by Myanmar‘s needs. Nonetheless the realist rationale is that Myanmar‘s

geography dictates that it cannot get too close to the United States without raising concerns from

its giant neighbour to the north. This is where India again figures very prominently.

Responding to the needs of time is therfore the call of the hour when India should work out a

concrete policy vision, such as strengthening the hands of democracy that would ensure that

Myanmar is less reliant on China. India needs to go ahead with its Look East Policy even more

vigorously than ever before. Since Myanmar is an important factor in the Look-East policy it is

high time for India to reassess and reinvigorate its policy towards Myanmar with a definite

proactive roadmap to include plans to promote soft power in the region, devise concrete strategy


230

with actionable goals to open up its eastern frontiers to Myanmar. Ethnic relations are likely to

be one of the key drivers of change in Myanmar along with the development of human capital,

democratic gridlock and the triangle between China, India and the US. In this it is important for

India to understand and appreciate the unique dynamics of that society taking into account all

eventualities in Myanmar‘s political future. In conclusion India and Myanmar are likely to

continue to find their mutual coordination more so since pragmatic engagement will serve a

useful purpose to both.

NOTES :

1. See Annual Report: 1992-93, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 1993, p.27.

2. See Sudhir Devare., India and Southeast Asia Towards Security Convergence, Institute of Southeast

Asian studies, Singapore 2006.

3. Yashwant Sinha, ―Resurgent India in Asia‖, Speech at Harvard University in 29th

September 2003,

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, http: //mea.gov.in/speech/2003/09/29ss09

html. Accessed on September 1, 2007.

4. Address by former Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee at the Institute of Diplomatic and Foreign

relations, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 16 May, 2001.

5. Yashwant Sinha, ―Resurgent India in Asia‖, Speech at Harvard University on 29 September 2003, Ministry

of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi,

http/www.meaindia.nic.in/speech/2003/9/harvardlecture29ss01.htm

6. Just 2% of the borders in the North-East Indian States are national borders (Between Assam and West

Bengal)- almost all the borders being international borders: Assam-Bhutan and Bangladesh, Arunachal-

China and Myanmar, Nagaland-Myanmar, Manipur-Myanmar, Mizoram-Myanmar and Bangladesh,

Tripura-Bangladesh, Meghalaya-Bangladesh, Sikkim-Nepal.

7. Land border between Northeast states and neighbors are with Myanmar 1450 km, China 1000 Km,

Bangladesh 1500Km, Bhutan 650 Km, Source; DRI Shillong.

8. Joseph Nye espoused soft power as the use of attraction persuasion in foreign policy and the appeal of a

country based on its culture, values, beliefs, practices, policies and way of life.

9. ―Indo-Myanmar Relations‖, Ministry of External affairs, Government of India,

<http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=50044503>

10. For a discussion of the Chinese involvement in Burma see Bertil Lintner, ―Myanmar‘s Chinese

Connection,‖ International Defence Review 27:11 (November 1994), William Ashton, ―Chinese Naval

Base: Many Rumors, Few Facts,‖ Asia Pacific Defence Reporter (June-July 1993) , William Ashton,

―Chinese Bases in Burma: Fact or Fiction?‖ Janes Intelligence Review 7:2 (February 1995) and Andrew

Selth, Chinese Military Bases in Burma: The Explosion of a Myth, Griffith Asia Institute Regional

Outlook, 10 (Griffith University, 2007) available at

<http://www.griffith.edu.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0018/18225/regional-outlook-andrew-selth.pdf>

11. See kyaw Yin Hlaing., ―Power and Factional Struggles in Post Independence Burmese Governments,‖

Journal of South East Asian Studies, 39:1 February 2008.

12. See Htet Aung, ―Questioning the EC Definition of ‗Free and Fair‘,‖ Irrawady, September 17, 2011.

13. For a discussion of the Chinese involvement in Myanmar see Bertil Lintner, ―Myanmar‘s Chinese

Connection,‖ International Defence Review 27:11 (November 1994), William Ashton, ―Chinese Naval

Base: Many Rumors, Few Facts,‖ Asia Pacific Defence Reporter (June-July 1993) , William Ashton,

―Chinese Bases in Burma: Fact or Fiction?‖ Janes Intelligence Review 7:2 (February 1995) and Andrew

Selth, Chinese Military Bases in Burma: The Explosion of a Myth, Griffith Asia Institute Regional

Outlook, 10 (Griffith University, 2007) available at

<http://www.griffith.edu.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0018/18225/regional-outlook-andrew-selth.pdf>


231

14. Jürgen Haacke, 2006, Myanmar's foreign policy towards China and India, Adelphi Series, 46:381, Pp. 34.

15. Thin Thin Aung and Soe Myint, ―India-Burma Relations‖, in Aung Zaw, David Arnot, Kavi

Chongkittavorn, Zunetta Liddel, Kaiser Morshed (et.al), Challenges to Democratisation in Burma:

Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral

Assistance, Stockholm, 2001, p.110. Daniel Twining, India's Relations with Iran and Myanmar: ―Rogue

State‖ or Responsible Democratic Stakeholder?, 2008, India Review, 7:1, p. 17.

16. See Renaud Egreteau, Wooing the Generals, India‘s new Burma Policy (New Delhi, 2003).

17. C. S. Kuppuswamy, 2008, ―Myanmar, Sandwiched between China and India and gaining from both‖, South

Asia Analysis Group, No. 2574

18. Renaud Egreteau, ―India‘s Ambition in Burma: More Frustration than Success‖, Asian Survey, vol.58

(XLVII), No.6, Nov/Dec, 2009, pp043-944.

19. Gurpreet S. Khurana, ―China‘s String of Pearls in the India Ocean and its Implications‖, Strategic Analysis,

vol.32, No.1 January 2008, pp.13-14. Yossef Bodansky, ‗Beijing‘s Surge for the Strait of Malacca‘ at

http://www. freeman.org/monline/bodansky/beijing.htm (Accessed May 3, 2007). Cited from Kolås,

Åshild. 2007 ―Burma in the Balance: The Geopolitics of Gas‖, Strategic Analysis, 31:4, pp. 635.

20. John Cherian, ―Coming closer‖, Frontline (Chennai), vol 27, no.17, pp.24-27, August 2010.

21. See Toshihiro Kudo (2012): ‗Myanmar‘s Border Trade with China: Situation, Challenge and Prospects,‘ in

Japan and korea with Mekong River Basin Countries (ed.) Mitsuhiro Kagami, BRC Research Report No.3,

Bangkok Research Centre, IDE-JETRO, Bangkok, Thailand.

22. AnindyaBatabyal (2006): ‗Balancing China in Asia: A Realistic Assessment of India‘s Look East Policy

Strategy‘, China Report, Vol.42, No.2, pp.79-197. See Wan Zhihong (2008): ‗Yunnan to build new gas

pipeline,‘ China Daily, 19 November 2008.

23. Gurpreet S. Khurana (2008): ‗China's 'String of Pearls' in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications,‘

Strategic Analysis, Vol.32, No.1, pp.1-39

24. Marie Lall (2006): ‗Indo-Myanmar relations in the era of pipeline diplomacy,‘ Contemporary Southeast

Asia, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp.424-46

25. See Fink, Christina, Living Silence: Burma under Military Rule. London: Zed Books 2001. See also Susan

L. Shirk, China Fragile Superpower, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

26. ―Five facts about China-Myanmar relations‖, Reuters, 1 June 2010, http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-

48959920100601.

27. See Jane‘s Intelligence Review February 2009

28. President Thein Sein visited China in May 2011, within three months of coming to power. The Joint

Statement between the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and The Peoples‘ Republic of China on :

Establishing a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership.

29.

30. Financial Times, 12 July 2012.

31. Morton B. Pedersen., A Cririque of western Sanctions Policy New York: Rowman and Littlefield‘s, 2008.

32. BIMST-EC became Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation when

Bhutan and Nepal joined in 2004.

33. Ministry of development of North East Region.

<http://mdoner.gov.in/writeaddata/sublink2images/kaladanmultimodal12172726384.htm>

34. See The Joint Statement by India and Myanmar on the State Visit of Prime Minister of India to Myanmar

(2012): Nay Pyi Taw, May 28.

35. See David I Steinberg., ―Myanmar‘s Perpetual Dilemma : Ethnicity in a ―Discipline-Flourishing

Democracy‖, Politics, Governance and Security Series, No 22, April 2011 East West Centre Working

Paper.

36. Subir Bhoumik, ― Guns, drugs and rebels,‖ Seminar (New Delhi), no.550, June 2005, http://www.india-

seminar.com/2005/550/550%20subir%20bhaumik.htm#top See Oken Jeet Sandham, ― Myanmar based

militant activities on rise in Indian side‖, 26 April 2010,< http://www.e-

pao.net/GP.asp?SRC=11.260410.APR10 >

37. B.Raman, The Kao Boys of R&AW. New Delhi lancer 2007. See Renaud Egreteau, Instability at the Gate:

India‘s Troubled Northeast and its External Connections. CSH Occasional Paper 16. pp.120-34.

38. World Drug Report 2011, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations, New

York, 2011.

http://www.india-seminar.com/2005/550/550%20subir%20bhaumik.htm#top

http://www.india-seminar.com/2005/550/550%20subir%20bhaumik.htm#top


232

39. See Seven Sisters Post 25 February 2013.

40. Jane Perlez., ―Continuing Buildup, China Boosts Military Spending More Than 11 Percent,‖ New York

Times, March 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/world/asia/china-boosts-military-spending-

more-than-11-percent.html. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI

Yearbook 2011(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

41. Refer, Ashley South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, Routledge, London &

New York, 2008. His earlier writings include: Ashley South, ‗Political Transition in Burma‘,

Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26(2), August 2004, pp. 233–55.

42. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Press Availability in Nay Pyi Taw, 1 December 2011,

www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/12/177994.htm54.

43. On 28 November 2011, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping met Myanmar C-in-C Gen Min Aung Hlaing in

Beijing to ‗bolster comprehensive strategic partnership.‖ An MoU on military cooperation was also signed.

44. Remarks with Foreign Minister of Burma U Wanna Maung Lwin After Their Meeting, US Department of

State, 17 May 2012 < http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/05/190260.htm>.

45. The latest Asian Development Bank (ADB) report predicts that Myanmar could be the next rising star, as

long as steps for reform proceed in the right direction. See Asian Development Bank, Myanmar in

Transition: Opportunities and Challenges, Mandaluyong City, Philippines, Asian Development Bank,

2012.

****************

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/world/asia/china-boosts-military-spending-more-than-11-percent.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/world/asia/china-boosts-military-spending-more-than-11-percent.html


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Stilwell Road – the Road to Hope for Northeast India

Rakhee Bhattacharya

Fellow at Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies, New Delhi

Changing Myanmar

As Myanmar is undergoing a gradual political and economic transition, the world eagerly awaits for future

engagement. Due to her extremely strategic location, India, one of her closest neighbours is currently keen on

shifting her role from being an observant to a proactive partner. After twenty long years in November 7,

2010, Myanmar had undergone an electoral process, which signifies a path towards pro-democracy. The

release of Aung San Suu Kyi, immediately after the election on November 12, 2010 by the pro-military party

Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and her eventual historic victory has given her entry to

Myanmar parliament in 2012. This has opened a space for political democracy, and optimism now abounds in

Myanmar. The current president of Myanmar Thein Sein needs to be extensively acknowledged for initiating

such transition and bringing a new face who is now being hailed as country’s ‘Gorbachev’.1 Along such

internal political transition, the country is trying to break its prolonged economic isolation through

resurgence and reform measures. The recent initiative of the World Bank on the idea of ‘Open Development’

having people-centric reforms may help the nation to rebuild her shattered infrastructure and investment. It

needs transparency and credible data and information system. According to Kanthan Shankar, the Bank’s

Country Manager for Myanmar, ‘greater access to data and information will enable everyone to make better

informed choices and decisions, to improve the lives of the people’2

India’s attempt towards economic engagement with such a country at this moment is undoubtedly most

important. To do this, India needs a very skilled diplomatic persuasion with her active support towards

democratisation of polity and society along with effective, attractive and trustworthy trade and economic

policies. As many countries are now thriving for economic relations with Myanmar, India can compete by

ensuring trust, both by supporting her internal causes and by retrieving the historical link and relations. Aung

San Suu Kyi’s India visit after four decades in December 2012 is one such remarkable step towards

strengthening such mutual relation. Thanking the people of India for supporting the cause of democracy in

Burma, Suu Kyi while delivering the Nehru Memorial Lecture at New Delhi spoke about the ‘influence of

Indian leaders, including Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, the principles that guided India’s freedom

struggle and how they inspired her as she continues to strive for a democratic Myanmar’3 This is indeed

remarkable for enhancing India-Myanmar relation. If such efforts on engagements become successful, an


234

understanding between the nations would evolve, which would help to create congenial space for India’s

Northeast. Keeping a causal linkage in mind, one can hopefully say that economic relations would improve

deep-rooted security problems in both India and Myanmar and can create space for Northeast India even as

the inevitable tug of war between the call of conscience and real politik continues. Similar such historic

transition has already taken place in political democracy in India’s other close neighbour Bangladesh, which

has given boost in economic and constructive engagement with India in general and Northeast in particular.

So as her two most important neighbours Bangladesh and Myanmar are in transition, the states of Northeast

now await with opportunities and optimism. This is almost a right time for India to re-define her Northeast

policy with such changing neighbouring nations.

Contemporary Northeast: Changing Waves

It is not only the neighbouring nations but also the states of Northeast are showing the signs of peace and

political stability, giving rise to hope and optimism among the people. Northeast India has long been a sore

trouble spot for India. Alienated from all sides due to historical and other causes, it has been plugged by

underdevelopment, ethnic conflicts and separatist movements. Ages of disconnect has forced the region to

breed with several such puzzles. To move beyond, the region on prima face needs to focus on connectivity,

which now for the first time is intensely realised by the people of this part of the country. The region needs to

get rid of her age-old isolation from both mainland India, which is presently connected through 27 km land

corridor of Siliguri, but more essentially from her close-door neighbours, who share almost 98% boundary

with Northeast. In volatile states like Tripura and Assam, a decisive political vision and leadership has

gradually started transforming the pains of past into the hopes of present, ushering in trust and confidence to

its people. The recent state assembly election in these two states and in Nagaland has mandated the existing

systems, which largely reflect the trust of the citizens. As pointed out by Pukhrem, the State Assembly

Elections held in Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura in February 2013 threw up a clear mandate favouring the

ruling (coalition) parties in Tripura and Nagaland, although a fractured one in Meghalaya. Political analysts

suggest that these results stand testimony to the people’s desire to maintain the status quo. The so-called

anti-incumbency factor did not work in these elections.4 Political institutes therefore deserve applause for

their efforts to bring back the rule of law through better governance, development and counter insurgency

measures. So along the changing neighbours, Northeast India is trying to create a space for reaping the

benefits through development engagement. It is therefore time for India’s visionary Look East Policy to be

implemented and translated into action. While engaging with various Southeast Asian partners through both

bilateral and multilateral fora, India is currently paying attention to Northeast and her benefits in this process

through both commerce and connectivity. Tripura, one of the most isolated and landlocked states has already

made tremendous efforts to restore relations and to open several border routes for trade and cultural

relation with Bangladesh and more efforts are on the way through opening of Chittagong port. The historic

visit of Sheik Hasina to the state in January this year, and her assurance on such issue is an open gesture to it.


235

Similarly states like Sikkim has reopened the trade passage with China through Nathula. Manipur is thriving

now for better border trade and economic exchange by improving Moreh-Tamu border trade point. Assam

has resolved her border disputes and its enclave issue with Bangladesh, and Mizoram is keenly waiting for

Kaladan multi-model project to begin through Sittway of Myanmar. These are the attempts that have been

initiated for finding linkages with neighbouring nations. Arunachal Pradesh, another most isolated state now

awaits an opening, which the historic route like Stilwell can provide with such opportunity with Myanmar. In

this pretext of opening opportunities through various routes, both new and old, attempts at reopening

Stilwell Road has gained enormous importance in the recent past. Debates and dialogues have been on

surface to understand the pros and cons of reopening such historic route on both economic and security

paradigms.

Reviving the Stilwell Road: People’s Hope versus State’s Threat

The historic 1,739 km Stilwell Road fascinatingly connects three backward regions of Northeast India,

Northern Myanmar and southwest China. It starts from Assam and links Kunming in Yunnan Province of

South China through Pangsau Pass on India-Myanmar border. This land route was in use for cross regional

movement in this contiguous region of India, Myanmar and China for a long time for various purposes. It was

known by many names like Ledo Road, Bhamo Road, Assam-Burma Route, Old Bisa Road, Burma Road, Old

opium tract and also as the famous southern silk route, and was extensively used for several trans-regional

movements. This route was used by king Sui-Ka-Pha, the founder of Ahom kingdom of Assam in early 13th

century and he made use of this route for movement of people, culture, trade and for maintenance of political

and diplomatic relations between Assam and Burma till early 19th century. With the decline of Ahom

kingdom, and advent of British rule in the region, the route lost its importance. The natural link and

connectivity between Assam and its neighbouring areas was truncated due to strategic interests, which

continued for more than a century. The road was rebuilt once again in 1942 during the World War II, as the

Western Allies had to supply the Chinese as an alternative to the Burma Road which was cut by the Japanese

forces. So this route also carries the history of the World War II and tells the story of American General Joseph

W Stilwell, the man who was behind the construction of the road along with at least 30,000 Indian, Chinese

and Myamaries work-forces with the approximate cost of 173 million US dollar. The road was in full use for

one and half year for emergency and military transport. But in the aftermath of independence in both India

and Burma in 1947 and 1949, this border road became permanently closed for security reasons, though

unofficial movement continued. This meandering path which connected these three close neighbours of this

region with 61 kms lying within Indian territory, 1033 kms with Myanmar and the rest 632 km with China

was lost due to changed geopolitical realities and it became the proud moment of the past.

A fresh thought is now given to reopen this route as potential passage for socio-economic development of the

future generation of this contiguous region. The Kunming Initiative born out of the Conference at Kunming,


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the capital of the Yunnan province of China, in August 1999 was the outcome of the desire of the four

participating members, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and China towards facilitating trade between them and

the development of regional resources. The reconstruction of the Burma Road was one of the main projects

under this initiative. The revival of the ancient Burmese trade route linking south-west China with the Indian

subcontinent through Myanmar was seen as a key connectivity project in the trans-region economic

development.5 This strategic road network can provide a base for future economic and cultural cooperation

between India’s Northeast and South-east Asia.6 The border region of Patkai range is still inhabited by over a

dozen of ethnic communities like Singphos (known as Kachin in Myanmar), Lisus, Tangsas, Noctes, Wanchos,

Khamtis, Tai Phakes, Ahoms, Deoris and others, and opening of this route would help these communities to

connect themselves and restore their lost ethnic and cultural relations across the border. They have same

blood, culture, having same clothing style, ornaments, food habits, language and scripts, and agricultural

pattern.7 For a large section of the population from the region cutting across academia, political figures,

common people and even administrators reflect that re-opening of Stilwell Road is like a dream coming true

for them. As attempts are also being made to make Northeast India a trans-regional economic and cultural

space through better connectivity, the chief ministers of all Northeastern states came to a consensus that

reopening of such historic route may help the region. As argued by Mukherjee, there are now increasing

demands around the region to reopen the Stilwell road as it would offer opportunity to Assam and Arunachal

Pradesh to get connected to the economically flourishing parts of Yunnan and Southeast Asia via Myanmar

and provide an additional land link for the growing economies of India and China. This according to him

would also facilitate India’s Look East Policy and greatly assist in rapid development of India’s Northeast. This

road could easily handle a substantial part of India's growing bilateral trade with China because of cost and

time benefits, and both sides would save much in transport costs in exporting and importing goods meant for

India's eastern and north-eastern regions and China's remote southwest. This road if renovated, would be

capable of handling between 15% and 20% of the Sino-Indian bilateral trade and would encourage Indian

industry to invest in production hubs in India’s under-developed north-eastern states to make goods meant

for export to China.8 Chief Minister of Assam, Mr. Tarun Gogoi mentions once that the gateway of India in

Bombay facing west. It is time to build another gateway at Ledo, facing east, symbolising a reunion with the

past yet heralding the future and a great new beginning. He further says that there is no second opinion

among the regional heads of Northeast now to allow this legendary road to reopen and thus central

government needs to take steps to make this dream of the people turn into a reality, which in long run can

boost trade and commerce.9Among the three nations, through which this road runs, China has already

pursued the idea of reopening with diligence and has repaired and reconstructed its stretch of the road with

six-lane expressway. But on the contrary, Myanmar was so long indecisive, as it passes through its jungle-

covered mountains and swampy valleys of Kachin state, the most insurgency prone area, and thus India was

at fix about it. But finally the ray of hope was seen, as Myanmar had agreed to honour a long standing need of

the region by re-opening the Stilwell Road to facilitate trade among China, India and Myanmar. In the Indian


237

Chamber of Commerce (ICC) at the 5th North East Business Summit at Kolkata in January 2010, Myanmar

Foreign Minister, Nyan Win gave his assurance of reopening the Stilwell Road. He said that China has already

constructed the road upto Tanai of Kachin district and “there is a balance portion from Tanai to the Indian

border upto Ledo via Pangsau Pass, a stress of 230 km., which can now be completed with the support of the

Government of India,”10 So with Myanmar’s assurance for repairing this stress, it was thought that the last

obstacle was removed to catch up with trans-border business and economic activities. But two years have

past, and no concrete measure was taken. Ministry of external affairs is still not keen on opening it for the

security reason, though Ministry of Home Affairs has agreed in-principle to allow border trade between India

and Myanmar for economic development of the Northeast.

Economic Possibilities: Expected Gains

It is expected that reopening of this route can be a win-win situation in terms of economic and trade relations

in this sub-region of India’s Northeast, China’s Southwest and Myanmar’s North, which is plugged by the

issues of underdeveloped and insurgency. India can possibly make her Northeast a vibrant region by

Reopening of the Stilwell road and making the distance between India and China shortest by

reducing it from about 6000 kms to less than 1750 kms. This could cut 30% transportation cost

between India and China, providing a boost to Sino-Indian overland trade. Today it takes seven days

for cargo to move by road from the Northeast to Kolkata, then around three to four weeks to move by

sea to China. But cargo from the Northeast transported along the Stilwell Road could reach Yunnan in

less than two days.

Making use of Myanmar for channeling exports to the ASEAN region using the trans-ASEAN network

linking Myanmar to Thailand and Laos, and through countries like Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam.

Connecting Assam to Yunnan of China and Southeast Asia via Myanmar. But most importantly the

other most isolated state Arunachal Pradesh also will be connected with Myanmar for trade and

commerce. Arunachal Pradesh therefore has submitted proposals to the Centre for beginning border

trade with China and Myanmar at various locations like Bumla (Tawang district), Kibitho (Anjaw),

Taksing (Upper Subansiri), Mechuka (West Siang) and Geling (East Siang). It has taken up

construction of border haat, immigration office and bank facilities with foreign exchange services,

besides posting security forces to assist all departments for operation of border trade. With

reopening of border trade with Myanmar, a total of 34 villages in Arunachal Pradesh would

immediately be benefited. Former governor of Arunachal Pradesh P General J J Singh also

emphasized that Nampong of Chanlang district near Pangsau Pass needs to be operational for the

opening of Arunachal Pradesh.

Reviving border trade with Myanmar through Pangsau Pass can which transform the economy of

Northeast by reducing time, cost and distance involved in trade with China and South-East Asia. This


238

road therefore is expected to make Northeast a major hub for almost all its neighbours to obtain

Indian automobile components, fruits, grains, vegetables, textiles, timber and cotton yarn. On the

other hand, the Indian traders will have easy access to electronic gadgets, synthetic blankets, teak,

gold and semi-precious stones from its South-east Asian neighbours.

Improving other untapped potentials like horticulture, floriculture, biodiversity and tourism. This

lost trail can regenerate the lost links of culture and contacts amongst the people, so that it can again

become a mingling place for people, products and ideas by a large number of ethnic groups living

across the border of northeast of India, Myanmar and South-west China and triggering new era of

travel, trade, tourism, pilgrimage and of course peace.11It can trace the historical/cultural/religious

roots to strengthen mutual trust and ‘friendship network.

Emphasising the needs of creating local resource based production network with local skills. This

would preserve the production of traditional items and the traditional form of markets and also

would increase local participation.

Conclusion: Desirable Cautions

Such a dream can become a reality only when enough cautions are being undertaken in the security front.

Also, while aiming to boost economy and trade, it is important to see that the markets of Northeast should not

be the dumping ground for Chinese consumer durables, as is presently happening in Namphalong market in

Sikkim and in Moreh area of Manipur. Northeast therefore needs to develop its own production hub on one

hand and have a very good intra-regional understanding on the other hand to take advantage of such opening

with better terms of trade. Reopening of this route needs to have appropriate measures on trade rules,

regulations, customs and border security forces. If youths of Northeast get involved productively, the role of

state, market and civil society as the three pillars for development need to be ensured more pronouncedly.

Along such cautions, India needs to take careful steps as Myanmar is presently confronted with Rohingya

Muslims issue and India’s Northeast is facing an influx of Rohingya refugees. The conflict between Rohingya

Muslims and Buddhist Rakhines in western Myanmar has killed many and displaced tens of thousands. Such

an issue can freshly sensitise security scenario in the region and Northeast India can become a hub for it.

There needs to be a persistent dialogue process between India, Myanmar and Bangladesh on this issue, so

that no fresh security threat can subdue her ongoing development and connectivity initiatives like reopening

of historic Stilwell Road. In words of Hussain ‘Stilwell Road underscores the importance of the north-east

India as the possible centre of economic resurgence. Reopening of the Stilwell Road will go a long way in

opening up trans-border trade and solving insurgency problems of the north-east, though there is little doubt

that it will need serious concerted efforts by all concerned. Reopening of this route will revive the close

cultural, emotional and spiritual ties of a large number of ethnic groups living in north-east of India, Myanmar

and South-western China triggering new era of travel, trade, tourism, pilgrimage and of course peace.’12The


239

people of the region now hope to explore such possibility of progress by opening this route, as Chinese author

Lu Xun once rightly said, ‘Hope cannot be said to exist, nor can it be said not to exist. It is just like roads across

the earth. For actually the earth has no roads to begin with….but when many people pass one way, a road is

made.’13

Notes 1. Economic and Political Weekly. 2012. Editorial, ‘Burma’s Beginning’, 19 May, XLVII (20): 9.

2. Feature Story. 2013. ‗How can Open Development Help Myanmar? Workshop Stimulates Discussion on Using Data to

Improve Lives‘, World Bank

3. Ramachandran, Kak Smriti. 2012. ‗Indian Freedom Struggle is My Inspiration: Suu Kyi‘. The Hindu, 14 November

2012.

4. Shristi Pukhrem. 2013. ‗The 2013 Assembly Election in Northeast‘, IDSA Comment

5. Dai, Mamang. 2009. ‗Butterflies over the Stilwell Road,‘ Internet Edition.

6. The Statesman, Jun. 1, 2009.

7. S. N. Barua. 2004. ‗Restoration of the Stilwell Road: The Socio-Cultural Implications‘, in D Nath (ed) Reopening of

the Stilwell Road: Prospects and Problems, New Delhi: Anamika Publishers and Distributors (P) Ltd: 66-67

8. Mukherjee

9. The Myanmar Times. 2007. ‗India Moves to Reopen Stilwell Road by 2011‘, 10-16 December,

http://www.mmtimes.com/no396/n005.html

10. The Assam Tribune. 2010. ‗Myanmar Okays Reopening of Stilwell Road‘, 11 January.

11. T. A Hussain. 2004. ‗Reopening of the Stilwell Road – Prospects of Solving Insurgency in the North-East‘, in D Nath

(ed) Reopening of the Stilwell Road: Prospects and Problems. New Delhi: Anamika Publishers and Distributors (P)

Ltd.: 248

12. ibid

13. Lu Xun ‗My Old Home‘, cited in Rob Gifford China Road: One Man‘s Journey into the Heart of Modern China. UK:

Bloomsbury, UK: 314

***********************

http://www.mmtimes.com/no396/n005.html


240

India‟s Struggle for Myanmar‟s Energy

Varigonda Kesava Chandra Research Associate,

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy,

National University of Singapore List of Publications:

Varigonda, Kesava Chandra (Forthcoming). "An Assessment of the Impact of Energy Insecurity on State Stability in India." Energy Policy. Varigonda, Kesava Chandra (2012). "India's Myanmar Fascination." Journal of Energy Security. July 2012.

http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=381:indias-myanmar-

fascination&catid=128:issue-content&Itemid=402

Varigonda, Kesava Chandra (2012). “The Pipeline That Wasn’t: Myanmar-Bangladesh-India Natural Gas

Pipeline.” Journal of Energy Security. April 2012.

http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=348:india-bangladesh-and-the-

myanmar-bangladesh-india-natural-gas-pipeline-how-not-to-achieve-energy-

s&catid=123:content&Itemid=389

V.K. Chandra (2012, advance). “Policy Brief: Prospects of Indonesia-India Collaboration in Energy Security.”

April 2012, www.ogel.org (OGEL, ISSN 1875-418X)

He holds Master of Science (Asian Studies),S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

______________________________________________

Since the mid-1990s when India abandoned its Nehruvian-based stance of supporting the

Burmese democratic movement and had instead sought to actively improve on bilateral relations

with the Junta, India and Myanmar have collaborated in various fields, from counter-insurgency,

trade,defense as well as energy. A positive relationship with Myanmar – a country that borders

India‘s restive Northeast and marks the beginning of Southeast Asia –was viewed as an

imperative aspectof the ‗Look East policy‘ that India put forward in the early 1990s as part of a

concerted effort to improve economic and diplomatic relations with Southeast and East Asia.

Myanmar likewise saw India as the other major emerging Asian power – and neighbour to boot

,next to China. A good relationship with India thus acquired greaterimportant as a means of

balancing outChina‘s already substantial influence within the country. This overview looks at

some ofIndia‘s attempts to import energy from Myanmar in what is a major aspect of their

http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=381:indias-myanmar-fascination&catid=128:issue-content&Itemid=402

http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=381:indias-myanmar-fascination&catid=128:issue-content&Itemid=402

http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=348:india-bangladesh-and-the-myanmar-bangladesh-india-natural-gas-pipeline-how-not-to-achieve-energy-s&catid=123:content&Itemid=389



http://www.ogel.org/journal-advance-publication-article.asp?key=335

http://www.ogel.org/


241

energy collaboration, concentrating particularly on import ofnatural gas reserves in the Rakhine

region and potential hydroelectricity import from the Tamanthi dam.

Despite being one of the fastest growing economies, a prime impediment to India‘s growth

remains its large-scale energy deficiency. Throughout the 2000s a quarter of its population did

not have access to electricity, and electricity supply itself was accompanied by large-scale power

outages. Indian electricity, which relies heavily on coal-based generation and very limited

quantities of indigenously available natural gas, did not cater adequately to the required demand;

on the other hand hydroelectricity was highly underutilised due to large-scale public opposition

stemming from the adverse impacts of large dams on the surrounding environment and societies.

India was thus in need of alternative energy resources to bolster its power generation capacity.

Myanmar, whose policies tilted strongly towards energy export, seemed a particularly viable

option.

On the other hand, Myanmar, which had throughout the 1990s and 2000s remained a closed

economy under the Junta, viewed energy export as a particularly viable revenue-generator. The

possibility of substantial revenue that could be obtained through export of exploitable natural gas

afforded an attractive option. Such large-scale energy export however has come at a cost of

widespread indigenous energy insecurity; large parts – over three-quarters of the country – have

remained without electricity while entrepreneurship and local business opportunities that heavily

would be reliant on energy remained on the fringes.1It also came at the cost of substantial

indigenous population resettlement and environmental damage.With the military state nearly

completely cut off from international trade however, energy resources were primarily seen as a

precious trading commodity.

India‘s foray into Myanmar‘s energy industry began relatively later however, in the early 2000s

after the discovery of considerable natural gas fields off the Rakhinecoast.Myanmar had already

begun exportingnatural gas extracted from the Yadana and Yetagun gas fields in Southern

Myanmar off to Thailand. The newly discovered gas fields in Northern Myanmar, in the Rakhine

region, was especially attractiveto India due to their relatively close proximity to the Indian

border, and the possibility of long-term gas import that this potentially afforded. For China, the

Rakhine gas fields – while not as close to the China-Myanmar border presented the possibility of


242

a Myanmar-China gas pipeline that would traverse northern Myanmar and into China‘s Yunnan

province.

Concurrently India also began looking at opportunities for importing electricity generated from

hydropower in Myanmar.The substantial potential for constructing hydroelectric dams over the

many rivers that crisscross the country – particularlyon rivers that are closer to the Myanmar-

India border and hence enabled potential transfer of power generated through cross-border

transmission lines, made Myanmar particularly attractive. The other major economies that

bordered Myanmar: China and Thailand, also were exploring the potential for hydropower

imports on rivers that were relativelycloser to their respective borders. Hydroelectric dams were

however highly unpopular with the local population. Aside from the adverseimpact that the

construction of such a dam was expected to create on the surrounding environmentit would also

entail population resettlement on a large-scale, particularly in the case of mega hydropower

projects.

India‘s foray into Myanmar‘s energy sector, while having begun in earnest only in the early

2000s, came with the risk of competition from countries that surrounded Myanmar, and that were

also high energy-demand economies such as China and Thailand. The competition offered by

China would prove particularly decisive in India‘s failure to import gas extracted fromthe

Rakhine gas fields.

The Fate of Natural Gas off the Rakhine Coast

The discovery of exploitable natural gas offshore in theRakhine region in the early 2000

sattracted considerable attention from several countries over time that were looking to import

natural gas to bolster their own energy needs, including India, China, Bangladesh, Thailand and

South Korea.India however was among the first to not only elicit considerable interest but also

invest substantially into developing the fields and extracting gas, as well as to envision a viable

mechanism of import.In 2003 India‘s state owned oil and gas organisations, GAIL and ONGC-

Videsh each acquired minority shares of around 30 per cent in the gas blocks off the Rakhine

coast.


243

India did possess some natural gas of its own, bolstered particularly by the discovery of gas

fields in the Krishna Godavari basin in early 2000s. However its indigenous sources were too

limited to serve the demand. India therefore began gas imports, and reached a successful import

agreement with Oman in this regard to import gas in its liquefied form (LNG gas). Concurrently

India also considered gas import through pipelines from its neighbouring regions – among them

Iran and Central Asia. In this regard, Myanmar‘s gas fields were particularly attractive

considering their close proximity and the possibility of a relatively easier, cost-effective, and

longer-term import of gas.

The gas extracted from the Rakhine regionwas planned to be bought by India and transported

back – generating considerable long-term revenue to Myanmar and assuring a long-term supply

of gas to India. The gas was envisioned as being transported back via a gas pipeline that would

traverse through Bangladesh and into India. Dubbed the Myanmar-Bangladesh-India pipeline, its

eventual implementation was agreed in principle by the representatives of theMyanmar,

Bangladesh and India governments through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in

2004. The cost of construction was expected to be a minimum of US $1 billion, and most of it

would be undertaken by the Indian government. In addition India reached an agreement with

Bangladesh for a yearly recompense of around US $ 125 million for allowing the pipeline to

transit through its territory as well as giving Bangladesh the option to utilise some of the gas

being transported.2

Soon after the MoU was signed between the three countries however, the agreement between

Bangladesh and India fell apart due to mutual disagreements over certain conditions; Bangladesh

wanted concessions on bilateral trade, access to hydropower sources in Nepal as well as

favourable resolution of their river water sharing agreements as precondition for acting as a

transit state for the gas pipeline–conditions to which India did not acquiesce. Essentially the

protracted negotiations between the two countries stalled any further proceedings on the trilateral

pipeline. The prospects of a Myanmar-Bangladesh-India pipeline began to look bleak. India

explored the option of a Myanmar-India pipeline bypassing Bangladesh – this however was

found to be highly expensive and technically challenging to implement.


244

Meanwhile China through its state-owned oil and gas company, China National Petroleum

Corporation (CNPC) had concurrently come up with a proposal for oil and gas pipelines

beginning at the Rakhine coast and entering China through the Yunnan province. Of these twin

pipelines, the gas pipeline was slated to transport gas extracted from the blocks off the Rakhine

coastwhile the oil pipeline was slated to transport oil from the Middle East overland into China.

China always had been wary of the dangers that potentially could emerge from a blockage of the

Straits of Malacca, through which ships had transported Middle Eastern oil to China by sea. The

new overland route through Myanmar therefore was strategically significant in that it presented

the possibility of altogether avoiding the Straits of Malacca in the near future.

Negotiations for the China-Myanmar pipeline were concurrently carried out by China and

Myanmar just as India was attempting to salvage the Myanmar-Bangladesh-India pipeline. By

2007 however Myanmar and China had both signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in

regards to the Myanmar-China pipeline. Once it seemed clear that the Myanmar-Bangladesh-

India pipeline was unsalvageable, the various stakeholders of the gas blocks in Rakhine –

including the Indian companies, agreed to sell the gas extracted to China; indeed both the Indian

companies,ONGC and GAIL,have obtained a 12 per cent stake in the Myanmar-China pipeline.3

Construction on both the gas and oil pipelines began in 2009.While there existed substantial

opposition to the pipeline from among the local population communities in Myanmar –

particularly concerned with the adverse environmental impact on the surroundings, as well as the

fact that none of the gas extracted was being utilised to improve indigenous energy security, the

protests were not taken into account by the Myanmar government. The pipelines were completed

in 2013, and the transportation of oil and gas to China is expected to begin soon – nearly 12

billion cubic metres of gas yearly.4 While India had taken the initiative to invest into the

development of the gas fields, it was, ultimately not able to provide Myanmar with a concrete

agreement on the Myanmar-Bangladesh-India pipeline even though Myanmar was willing to sell

the gas en mass – largely because it could not reach an agreement with Bangladesh in time.

China was able to provide a concrete road map as well as investments into its oil and gas

pipelines. That Myanmar was prepared to disregard any protests from the local population in

regards to the pipeline implementation only served as an additional advantage to China.


245

The Tamanthi Dam Failure

In early 2000s India also explored the possibility of importing electricity through the

transmission of electricity generated from hydroelectric dams in Myanmar. India already had

been importing hydroelectricity from Nepal and Bhutan; it hoped to utilise Myanmar‘s extensive

hydropower potential in this regard as well. Of particular interest was the potential of a dam at

the Tamanthi region on the Chindwin River; this was relatively closer to the India-Myanmar

border allowing for easier transmission so that the dam could serve as a potential long-term

hydropower generator.

India and Myanmar signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2004 with the intent of

jointly constructing the Tamanthi hydroelectric dam on the Chindwin. In 2008the agreement was

further expanded whereby India‘s National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) and

Myanmar‘s Department of Hydropower Implementation (DHPI) would jointly develop the

Tamanthi dam as well as a corresponding Shwezaye dam, both on the Chindwin. The

Tamanthiwould have a capacity of 1200 MW while the Shwezaye would have a 600 MW

capacity.Nearly 80 per cent of the electricity generated would be transmitted to India while 20

per cent would be utilised by the Myanmar government for indigenous transmission and

distribution.5The project therefore was seen both as a revenue generator through energy export as

well as a potential addition to Myanmar‘s indigenous energy security. Considering that both

China and Myanmar were developing their own hydropower projects on rivers close to their

borders with Myanmar, in collaboration with the Myanmar government, the Tamanthi was seen

as representing India‘s share in Myanmar‘s hydropower sector. It was touted as a symbol of a

successful India-Myanmar collaboration, particularly as an answer to the already extensive

China-Myanmar and Thailand-Myanmar energy collaboration.

However in spite of the considerable optimism at the beginning, the project slowly began to stall

due to both internal and external pressures. Internal pressures were brought about mainly through

fissures in the working relations between NHPC and DHPI and the Myanmar government, as

well as due to the considerable technical and financial challenges that a dam of such a stature

presented. Finally in 2011, the Shwezaye dam was considered technically infeasible and was

shelved. India and Myanmar then concentrated exclusively on the Tamanthi dam alone.


246

Meanwhile the political situation in Myanmar changed dramatically; the Junta slowly made way

for democratic processes and following elections in 2010, a post-Junta, ‗quasi-democratic‘

government came into power. The post-Junta period however also gave way to a greater

participation of the civil society in policymaking – something that was virtually unheard of in the

past. This phenomenon had a lasting impact on the fate of energy infrastructure – particularly

large hydropower damsthat were deemed to have a catastrophic impact on the local environment

and population. That these dams were viewed as generators of power that were exported and not

utilised for Myanmar‘s internal energy security improvement further antagonised local

population and spurred greater protests.

Most of the local population at the Chindwin comprised of Naga and Kuki tribals whose

livelihoods depended extensively on the land and river water. The adverse impact that the

Tamanthi dam would potentially have – from environmental destruction to large-scale

population displacement in their thousands – galvanised the tribals to engage in large-scale

protests against the implementation of the dam.6 In 2011, almost as a symbol for what was to

come, the Myanmar government, in a move that surprised analysts, suspended construction of

the mega Myitsone hydroelectric dam projectfollowing concerted protests by the local

population against the dam due to its perceived impact on the environment and the resultant

population displacement;7 the Myitsone was slated to be built in collaboration with China and

whose electricity was slated to be exported to China. Likewise in 2012 Myanmar also decided to

cut down on its natural gas exports to Thailand following public protests over electricity

deficiency and grievances over the fact that most of the energy resources were not being used to

improve indigenous energy security.8

In 2013 therefore the surprise was not too great when the Myanmar government slowly leaned

towards suspending the construction of the Tamanthi dam as well. Aside from being faced with

large-scale public opposition, the technical and financial cost was also expected to be

considerably high. Most importantly however the post-Junta era and the desire of the new

government to accommodate civil society concern at a much larger scale than previously

done,did not prove to be as feasible for hydropower dam projects in general, and to India in


247

terms of implementing its mega hydropower Tamanthidam in particular. All things considered,

both Myanmar and India agreed to suspend the Tamanthi for now.9

Future Collaborations

The 2000 decade was, all things considered, not a very good year for India in terms of its energy

collaborations with Myanmar. The two major projects India had pursued–the ones that were

supposed to have been flagships of India-Myanmar collaboration, did not go through. India‘s bid

to import natural gas from Myanmar failed due partly to India‘s inability to reach a mutual

agreement with the transit state, Bangladesh and partly to competition from China. India‘s bid to

import hydropower through the Tamanthi damon the other hand already was in muddy waters

due to an inability for NHPC and DHPI to arrive at a workable relationship; it was compounded

by technical and financial challenges. The final straw however was Myanmar‘s changing internal

politics, which allowed for a greater voice to protestations over the mega dam and its adverse

impact on the local population. The Myanmar government inevitably buckled under all the

pressures combined; the Tamanthi was thus shelved.

India however continues to look for other avenues of potential energy collaboration with

Myanmar – one that hopefully would result in import of energy back to India. Indian companies

continue to invest extensively in Myanmar‘s energy sector – and particularly in other gas blocks

that have recently been discovered.10 Considering Bangladesh is once again open to a Myanmar-

Bangladesh-India pipeline, India‘s best bet at present seems to be in the discovery of further

reserves of natural gas in Myanmar. Once again however, any future success in energy

collaboration would depend on India‘s ability to successfully challenge stiff Chinese

competition.

End Notes

1. Asian Development Bank, ―Energy Sector Critical to Myanmar‘s Transformation,‖ June 6 2013,

http://www.adb.org/news/energy-sector-critical-myanmars-transformation-report.

2. V.K. Chandra, ―The Pipeline That Wasn‘t: Myanmar-Bangladesh-India Natural Gas Pipeline,‖Journal of

Energy Security,April 19, 2012,

http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=348:india-bangladesh-and-the-

myanmar-bangladesh-india-natural-gas-pipeline-how-not-to-achieve-energy-

s&catid=123:content&Itemid=389.

3. ibid.

http://www.adb.org/news/energy-sector-critical-myanmars-transformation-report





248

4. The Hindu Business Line, ―Myanmar Completes 800-kilometre Gas Pipeline to China,‖ June 3, 2013,

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/international/myanmar-completes-800kilometre-gas-pipeline-

to-china/article4778089.ece.

5. Shivananda H., ―TamanthiHydel Project: India‘s Eastern Foothold,‖ Institute for Defence Studies and

Analyses, June 6, 2011,

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TamanthiHydelProject%3AIndiasEasternFoothold_shivananda_060611#

footnote2_fz80e49.

6. Brennan O‘Conner, ―Thousands Displaced by Myanmar Dam,‖ Al Jazeera, March 31, 2013,

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/2013313165427804481.html.

7. BBC, ―Work Halted on Divisive Myitsone Project,‖ September 30, 2011,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15121801.

8. Reuters, ―Myanmar Seeks to Cut Gas Exports to Thailand to Meet Own Needs,‖ October 4, 2012,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/04/myanmar-thailand-gas-idUSL3E8L24ZM20121004.

9. The Nation, ―Dam Projects with India Scrapped,‖ June 11, 2013,

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/aec/Dam-projects-with-India-scrapped-30208005.html. 10. Animesh Singh, ―Indian Cos Checkmate China on Myanmar‘s Gas Blocks Bid,‖ Daily Pioneer, June 13,

2013, http://www.dailypioneer.com/business/indian-cos-checkmate-china-on-myanmars-gas-blocks-bid.html.

References :

Asian Development Bank, “Energy Sector Critical to Myanmar’s Transformation,” June 6 2013, http://www.adb.org/news/energy-sector-critical-myanmars-transformation-report. V.K. Chandra, “The Pipeline That Wasn’t: Myanmar-Bangladesh-India Natural Gas Pipeline,” Journal of Energy Security, April 19, 2012, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=348:india-bangladesh-and-the-myanmar-bangladesh-india-natural-gas-pipeline-how-not-to-achieve-energy-s&catid=123:content&Itemid=389. The Hindu Business Line, “Myanmar Completes 800-kilometre Gas Pipeline to China,” June 3, 2013, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/international/myanmar-completes-800kilometre-gas-pipeline-to-china/article4778089.ece. Shivananda H., “TamanthiHydel Project: India’s Eastern Foothold,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, June 6, 2011, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TamanthiHydelProject%3AIndiasEasternFoothold_shivananda_060611#footnote2_fz80e49. Brennan O’Conner, “Thousands Displaced by Myanmar Dam,” Al Jazeera, March 31, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/2013313165427804481.html. BBC, “Work Halted on Divisive Myitsone Project,” September 30, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15121801. Reuters, “Myanmar Seeks to Cut Gas Exports to Thailand to Meet Own Needs,” October 4, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/04/myanmar-thailand-gas-idUSL3E8L24ZM20121004. The Nation, “Dam Projects with India Scrapped,” June 11, 2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/aec/Dam-projects-with-India-scrapped-30208005.html. Animesh Singh, “Indian Cos Checkmate China on Myanmar’s Gas Blocks Bid,” Daily Pioneer, June 13, 2013, http://www.dailypioneer.com/business/indian-cos-checkmate-china-on-myanmars-gas-blocks-bid.html.

***************************

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/international/myanmar-completes-800kilometre-gas-pipeline-to-china/article4778089.ece


http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TamanthiHydelProject%3AIndiasEasternFoothold_shivananda_060611#footnote2_fz80e49


http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/2013313165427804481.html

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15121801

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/04/myanmar-thailand-gas-idUSL3E8L24ZM20121004

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/aec/Dam-projects-with-India-scrapped-30208005.html

http://www.dailypioneer.com/business/indian-cos-checkmate-china-on-myanmars-gas-blocks-bid.html


http://www.adb.org/news/energy-sector-critical-myanmars-transformation-report








http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/2013313165427804481.html



http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/04/myanmar-thailand-gas-idUSL3E8L24ZM20121004

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/aec/Dam-projects-with-India-scrapped-30208005.html



249

Principles, Pragmatism, and Pipelines:

The Evolution of India’s Myanmar Policy

Lindsay Hughes

Research Analyst at Future Directions International Perth, Australia

Lindsay Hughes is a Research Analyst at Future Directions International (www.futuredirections.org.au), an independent think-tank in Perth, Australia. He has a B.A. (Hons.) in Security, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies, and a Master of International Relations and National Security (MIntRelNatSec) post-graduate degree. While specialising in India-China competition in the Indian Ocean Region, he also focuses on security in South Asia. His papers and analyses may be read and downloaded at the Future Directions International web site.

_______________________________________

Realists generally tend to dismiss moral certitude or, for that matter, most degrees of

morality, when dealing with international relations. Even Morgenthau, the intellectual

father of realism in IR, appears to have difficulty reconciling the issue of state power with

the morality of acquiring and using that power. He described the “concept of interest

defined in terms of power”1as the underlying motivation for a state’s actions. He, however,

also writes of “the moral significance of political action” as one of the six principles of

political realism, which leads to the “ineluctable tension between the moral command and

the requirements of successful political action”.2 Put simply, morality and the success of a

state do not necessarily follow the same path.

National leaders, on the other hand, seek to reconcile this divergence. For instance, Jawahar

Lal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, spoke of a “One World” principle, a world

commonwealth, before India acquired its independence, “It is for this one world that free

India will work”. Despite this lofty idealism, though, he was forced to articulate a rider, “We

may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say. We may talk about peace and

freedom and mean what we say. … [But] the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a

country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country.”3


250

It is disappointing, therefore, that India’s subsequent leaders did not adhere to this

discourse in defining their relationship with Myanmar.4 They first took the high ground,

denouncing the military coup which brought the Generals to power there. India, they felt,

had to set moral guidelines; it had to stand by its principles. Relatively soon, however, this

attitude changed to one of pragmatism, brought about by the fear of being side-lined in

their own neighbourhood. Worse yet, it was China which led the process of making India

inconsequential in the region. Arguably more importantly, though, domestic security

concerns in the North-East region made it imperative that India begin talking once again to

Myanmar, no matter whether it was democratic or authoritarian. This attitude changed

again, however, when India realised it required energy products to fuel its growing

economy. Myanmar could provide part of India’s energy mix; so that extent, it had to be

courted so as to obtain some of those products.

Effectively, India’s attitude progressed from one where it believed Myanmar could assist in

its (India’s) localised security issues to another in which Myanmar could assist India

further grow its economy. Simultaneously, such a relationship could help India diminish

China’s hold on that state. This, in turn, would help India enhance its regional standing and

further its long-held ambition of becoming a major world power.

India has come full circle. It cast aside its idealised stand in favour of a more pragmatic

attitude based on its own requirements, and now sees Myanmar as a means of furthering

its own ambitions. It has,thus,returned to Nehru.

Genesis

There are broad, centuries-old cultural links between Myanmar and India. One tradition

has it that the Mauryan Emperor Ashoka sent two missionaries to spread Buddhism in

Myanmar in the third century BCE, while another claims they were sent by the Buddha.5 Pe

Maung Tin and Luce state that the kings of Myanmar were Kshatriyas who had their origins

in the Ganges Valley.6 These rulers ruled according to Hindu law, which was later modified

by the Konbaung dynasty. As Khosla narrates, the rulers of the seventeenth century Pyu

dynasty took for themselves Indian titles. Brahmin priests (ponna myo) officiated at

weddings, coronations, and marriages between members of Burmese and Indian royal

families were frequent.7It is ironical, therefore, that the last Konbaung king, Thibaw, was


251

forced to abdicate and was exiled to Ratnagiri by the British in 1885, while they exiled the

last Moghul Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, to Rangoon. 8

It is hardly surprising, given these antecedents and their commonalities, that when India

began its fight for freedom in earnest it sparked major interest in Myanmar. Thus, when

India became independent in 1947, the Union of Burma followed in January 1948 with U

Nu as its first Prime Minister. It was, however, not always smooth sailing.

In 1886 Great Britain placed Burma under the administration of the Government of India.

Thus, when separation was concluded in 1936, the most important issue Burma faced was

whether or not it should be separated from India.9 In 1927 the Indian National Congress

resolved that any separation of Burma from an independent India be rejected. Though later

reversed, this resolution caused a degree antipathy towards India among some members of

the Burmese independence movement. Again, in 1930, when rice prices fell at the start of

the Great Depression, violence broke out between Burmese farmers and Indian landlords

because the government refused to reduce taxes. Also, in July 1938, pre-echoing events in

2012 - 2013, Buddhist monks led a spate of rioting; “the ostensible cause of the riots was

the publication of an anti-Buddhist tract by a Burmese Muslim”. 10

These incidents notwithstanding, Nehru and U Nu shared a strong personal and political

relationship, holding as they did similar political views and interests. Indeed, so close was

their relationship that he writes that he “took a special delight in visiting India at least once

a year”.11 He would bypass official protocol, writing directly to Nehru to inform him of his

date of arrival.12 One consequence of this relationship was the growth of a close bilateral

relationship between the two states. In the wake of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship,

for instance, the Burmese press effused, “[y]et another brilliant chapter has been added to

the annals of Burmese history”, adding, “this treaty highlights the understanding and

mutual sympathy that has existed between the peoples of the two countries from time

immemorial … nearly twenty five centuries ago when Buddhism began to spread.”13

When in 1948 Burma passed the Land Nationalisation Act prohibiting non-cultivators from

holding more than fifty acres, the Indian Nattukottai Chettiyar community was the most

affected. For the most part money-lenders, the Chettiyars had over time come to hold

around three million of Burma’s 4.5 million acres of land which were held by non-


252

cultivators. Practicing the pragmatism of which he wrote (see page 1 of this paper), Nehru

emphasised the importance of friendly relations with Burma despite their differences. In

effect, Nehru refused to take the side of the Burma’s Chettiyars in the interests of the

greater relationship between the two states.

The situation changed, however, after U Nu was deposed in March 1962 in a military coup

led by General Ne Win, parliament dissolved and the constitution frozen.

Exodus

To best understand the deterioration of India’s standing in Burma, it is necessary to

examine some of Great Britain’s colonial practices there. The British moved Indian

labourersto Burma in the I830s, and more followed early in the last century. Labourers

aside, the railways, post and telegraph, the police and the civil service were dominated by

Indians.At the start of the Second World War, there were over a million Indians out of a

total population of about 16 million.

In order to best administer the state, Great Britain sought to dismantle and re-structure the

existing political and administrative constructs of Burma. British and Indian officials

replaced the Burmese royal family, the nobility, governors and even village headmen. The

Military Police, which organisation was used to carry out the punishment of individuals and

even entire villages, and numbered around 4,300 in 1941, was composed of Indians headed

by British and Indian officers. The Frontier Force, which numbered around 10,000, had

around 7,400 Indians and was again led by British and Indian officers. Indians almost

entirely made up the bureaucratic class in towns and cities and by 1900 almost the whole

of the Rangoon police department consisted of Indians. By the 1920s, Indians were the

majority in the Public Works Department, the railways, roads and ports departments, and

comprised half of Rangoon’s entire population.14Little wonder then, that Indians were seen

as the foreign rulers of Burma. Equally unsurprisingly, Indians were looked down upon and

referred to as kala, a pejorative term for “foreigner”.So animated was the resentment

against Indians that Caucasians were called kala pyu, or “White Indians.” 15

In the aftermath of the military takeover in 1962, many Indians had their property

confiscated. The nationalisation of the wholesale and retail trade left many Indian traders

and their Indian employees without livelihoods. No compensation was provided and the


253

Indians who decided to leave Burma were allowed to take only Kyats 75 per adult, Kyats 15

for each child, and Kyats 250 worth of jewellery.16 Indians lost their Burmese citizenship.

Between 1964 and 1968 it is estimated around 150,000 Indo-Burmese left Burma. These

were Burmese, not Indian, citizens. The Indian community in Burma turned to the Indian

government for help. New Delhi sent a representative to investigate but concluded that the

policy was an internal Burmese affair. 17 India’s concerns were genuine; any hint of a strong

stand against Burma’s military junta could have endangered the large –and vulnerable -

Indian community in Rangoon and other cities.

Despite previously-good relations, the ties between India and Burma began to deteriorate

after the 1962 coup. Engaged in its domestic security issues, including the growing China-

backed communist insurgency, the Ne Win junta de-emphasised relations with India; more

accurately, India became “more or less a non-entity in Burmese foreign policy”.18Trade

between the two countries diminished, as did the number of Burmese students who used to

study at schools in Assam and universities in New Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta.19 Burma

increasingly became self-isolated.

Despite this, India and Burma did come together in March 1967 to agree on a common

border. This was important from India’s perspective. In the 1970s, Mizo and Naga

insurgents in India’s north-eastern states would strike at Indian targets in India then

retreat to their bases in the hills of north-west Burma, where Indian troops could not

follow and Burmese troops had no intention of going.

This, though, was arguably the only coming together between the two states. With the

reduced trade and political ties, India had as little interest in Burma as that state had in

India. The degree of indifference may be gauged from the fact that between 1968 and 1978

China provided the Communist Party of Burma and ethnic insurgents such as the Kachin

with arms, ammunition and military training.20 China provided the same training and

materiel to Naga and Mizo insurgents from India who travelled to China via northern

Burma. Despite repeated requests from India to conduct joint operations against these

insurgents, Burma refused to do any such.21 Additionally, in 1982 the Burmese junta

legislated a new citizenship act, according to which only those people who could prove


254

their ancestors had lived in Burma prior to the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824 – 1826)

would be given full citizenship. Indo-Burmese citizens were automatically relegated to

second-class citizenry.

Things changed drastically in 1988. In September of that year, Burmese citizens marched

against the junta’s rule. The nascent uprising was quickly and violently quelled by the

Burmese army. Before that happened, though, India was quick to offer the budding

democratic movement its support, praising the “undaunted resolve of the Burmese people

to achieve their democracy”. In the aftermath of the bloody crack-down on the

demonstrators, thousands of Burmese fled to India. P.V. Narasimha Rao, then India’s

External Affairs Minister, stated that “strict instructions have been issued not to turn back

any genuine Burmese refugees seeking shelter in India”.22 Refugee camps were built in

Mizoram and Manipur. All India Radio was used by the Indian government to convey its

support for the democratic movement in Burma (now Myanmar) in 1989 and 1990.

Unsurprisingly, this was denounced by the junta as interference in Myanmar’s internal

affairs.23

In 1990, the ruling junta called for general elections to be held. Despite virtually every

opposition leader being imprisoned, the National League for Democracy won 392 out of

485 seats in the National Assembly. The junta ignored the results and arrested those NLD

candidates who had been elected. Some managed to escape to the Thai border where they

set up the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma. Soon, however, two

members of this group defected to Rangoon, where they held a press conference. One of the

two defectors, Than Kywe claimed India had given the NCGUB 300,000 Thai baht from its

embassy in Bangkok.24 The Indian authorities denied the charge but realised it really could

not support either side in Myanmar. Relations further deteriorated when two Myanmarese

students in Thailand hijacked a Thai International aircraft to Calcutta.25 After they

surrendered to the Indian authorities, the students were released by a court on bail,

leading General Than Shwe, Vice Chairman of the junta, the State Law and Order

Restoration Council, to cite India as a country that “encourages and supports internal

insurgents” and “interferes in [Burma’s] internal affairs, acts which are not compatible with

the expected behaviour of a friendly neighbour”.26


255

The Indian Government under Rajiv Gandhi had initiated the AIR campaign to give support

to Myanmar’s democratic movement. Though Rajiv Gandhi continued to give ex-Prime

Minister U Nu the same support he received from Indira Gandhi and Nehru, officials in

India’s Ministry of External Affairs who had no personal affiliations with U Nu decided to

shift their loyalties to other personages in the democracy movement in Myanmar. U Nu’s

party had failed to win a single seat in the 1990 general election whereas Aung San Suu Kyi,

daughter of General Aung San has won it.

Pragmatism, it would appear, had slowly begun to replace the principle of assisting old

friends in India’s foreign policy towards Myanmar.

Revelation

Apart from the issues noted previously several others played a part in the cooling ties

between India and Myanmar. At the political level, Myanmar refused to become a member

of the Non-Aligned Movement. Also, India’s ideological reservations about dealing with a

military junta overcame any economic benefits it could have accrued from a closer

relationship with Myanmar. In the late 1980s, Rajiv Gandhi’s government made a few

tentative approaches towards normalising its relationship with Rangoon, but suffered a

setback in the wake of the junta’s refusal to acknowledge the results of the 1990 election.

With the end of the Cold War, though, India had to re-evaluate its position in the

international system. Without the backing of the USSR, it had to stand on its own two feet.

Essentially, India had to open up its economy if it was to survive. This aside, as J.N. Dixit

relates, sheer pragmatism forced India to revive its relationship with Myanmar.27

First, Myanmar’s geo-strategic importance to India. Myanmar shares its northern and

north-western borders with India’s sensitive north-eastern states, Bangladesh and China.

Myanmar is also India’s immediate neighbour across the Bay of Bengal, close enough to

India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands as to turn domestic issues in Myanmar security

concerns in India. Secondly, Myanmar’s help was required to curtail drug smuggling,

insurgency and other security threats in the north-eastern states. Arguably more

importantly in India’s perspective, it was important to ensure Myanmar did not become a

part of China’s area of influence as that would have meant Chinese influence there, to


256

India’s north and in Pakistan. The third factor was pragmatism: just because India was

democratic it did not have to ensure other states were of the same persuasion, previous

relationships notwithstanding. As Dixit notes, India could not create democracies; that task

was best left to the states concerned.

This thinking soon bore fruit: the Vice Foreign Minister of Myanmar visited India in August

1992 and outlined three points to India. First, Myanmar respected India’s commitment to

democracy and hoped it would be patient while Myanmar moved in that direction. Second,

Myanmar recognised the common security issues both countries shared and would take the

necessary action to meet those goals. Finally, Myanmar wanted to increase its trade and

technological co-operation with India. Furthermore, when the issue of China’s

infrastructure-building activity in Myanmar was raised, the Myanmarese delegation

proposed India also take part in re-building its infrastructure in parallel with the Chinese.28

This led to enhanced trade and co-operation between the two states and deepening

relations. In 2000 the Myanmarese Vice President visited India, a visit reciprocated by

India’s Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, soon after in early 2001. India also recognised that

it needed access to Myanmar for its Look East Policy to be successful, the more so since

Myanmar was now a member of ASEAN. Left unstated were India’s concerns about growing

Chinese influence in the region. India recognised it had no option but to make inroads into

South-East Asia in order to counter China.

By now, however, India’s economy, growing at close to ten per cent per annum required

fuel in huge amounts to keep it going. Myanmar had the gas India required. Furthermore,

its proximity meant lower transportation costs by sea and, if India could indeed help build

Myanmar’s rail infrastructure, it could also be transported by rail and pipeline via its north-

eastern states. On the other hand, India’s enhanced energy requirements were linked to its

growing population. A population estimated at close to 1.6 billion by 2030 demands that

India securitise its energy sources. This could best be done with proximate sources such as

Myanmar. Furthermore, while India relies heavily on coal, which will continue to be the

mainstay of its energy mix in 2030, elevated environmental concerns are forcing it to

ensure cleaner energy sources such as natural gas, of which Myanmar has plenty. Also,


257

coal-generated power is not, by itself, sufficient to ensure India’s energy requirements.29

India’s energy requirements took centre stage in India’s diplomatic efforts abroad. This led

to its “pipeline diplomacy”.

Jaswant Singh began negotiations to purchase natural gas during his 2001 visit to

Myanmar. Also, onshore oil and gas exploration were discussed as part of the

infrastructure development there. The A1 Block to Myanmar’s north-west is estimated to

hold reserves of 32 trillion cubic feet (tcf) and recoverable gas reserves of 22 tcf. If these

estimates are correct, the block can provide a peak production of around 60 million cubic

meters of gas a day for at least 2 decades. India’s ONGC Videsh Limited has purchased 17.5

per cent of this block and the Gas Authority of India a further 8.5 per cent.30

Several pipeline routes to transport the gas from Myanmar to India have been discussed.

These are listed by the Shwe Gas Movement:31

Underwater from Shwe to Yechaungbyi village Sittwe township; following the

Kaladan River valley through Rakhine and Chin states; into Mizoram and Tripura

states; entering Bangladesh at Brahmanbaria through the Rajshahi border into West

Bengal to Kolkata. Construction cost approximately US$1 billion.

Underwater from Shwe to Palechaung village Sittwe township; through Rakhine

state into the district of southern Bangladesh; entering West Bengal into Kolkata.

Construction cost approximately US$1 billion.

Underwater from Shwe to West Bengal into Kolkata. No cost estimate made public.

Underwater from Shwe to a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal on the Rakhine

coastline, freezing the gas to 161 degrees Celsius and shipping the LNG to West

Bengal and Kolkata by LNG tanker. Estimated cost for the LNG terminal is US$3–5

billion.

As in the first but bypassing Bangladesh totally and travelling through the northeast.

Construction cost approximately US$3 billion.


258

Conclusion

No matter the route taken or the logistics or costs involved, one fact stands out: India’s

Myanmar foreign policy has come full circle, exactly in keeping with Nehru’s observation of

pragmatism trumping idealism. India started out with a deep friendship with Myanmar.

This friendship fell when idealism got in the way of politics but was revived through sheer

economic and political pragmatism.

Nehru, it would appear, was ahead of his time.

End Notes

1. Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th Revised Edition,

McGraw Hill Education - Europe, London, 2005, p. 5

2. Ibid. p. 10

3. Nehru, Jawahar Lal, India‘s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches September 1946 – April 1961, Publications

Division, Government of India, p. 2

4. It is to be noted that Myanmar, the present name of the state once known as Burma which derives from

1989, will be used interchangeably with the older name for historical reasons. Also note that ―Burma‖

derives from the largest ethnic group, the Barmar / Burman. Thus, the titles Burma and Burman are to be

read in their respective contexts throughout this paper.

5. Khosla, I.P., ―India and Myanmar‖, in Sinha, Atish, and Mohta, Madhup, (eds.), Indian Foreign Policy:

Challenges and Opportunities, Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2007, pp. 586-587

6. Pe Maung Tin and Luce, G.H., The Glass Palace Chronicles of the Kings of Burma, Rangoon University

Press, Rangoon, 1960

7. Khosla, op. cit. p. 587

8. Interestingly, it was Thibaw‘s ancestor, Bodawpaya, who annexed India‘s currently-held states of Manipur

in 1814 and Assam in 1817, leading to later border issues with Great Britain

9. Singh, Uma Shankar, Burma and India 1948-1962: A Study in the Foreign Policies of Burma and India and

Burma's Policy Towards India, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1979, p. 22

10. Taylor, Robert H., The State in Burma, University of Hawaii Press, Hawaii, 1988, p. 200

11. U Nu, U Nu: Saturday‘s Son, Yale University Press, CT, 1975, p. 255

12. Ibid., p. 236

13. Desai, W.S., India and Burma: A Study, Orient Longman, Calcutta, 1954, pp. 107 - 108

14. Khosla, I.P., op.cit. p. 594

15. Lintner, Bertil, ―Burma and its Neighbours‖, in Mansingh, Surjit, (ed.), Indian and Chinese Foreign

Policies in Comparative Perspective, Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1998, pp. 225 - 259

16. Donnison, F.S.V.,Burma, Ernest Benn, London:, 1970, p. 240.

17. Joseph Silverstein, Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation, Cornell University Press, New

York, 1977, n. 6, p. 182

18. Lintner, Bertil, op. cit. p. 235

19. Though these names have been changed to Mumbai and Kolkata, the older spellings are used in this paper

these were the names commonly used at the time

20. Lintner, Bertil, op. cit., p. 235

21. In 1980 Indian and Burmese troops conducted a joint operation against Naga insurgents in the Sagaing

Division of Burma; Indian troops unilaterally attacked the Naga headquarters in Mongkhwe, also in

Sagaing Division. This, though, was the exception rather than the rule

22. Lintner, Bertil, ―Different Strokes,‖ Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 February 1989


259

23. All India Radio‘s most important broadcaster in this context was Than Than Nu, daughter of former Prime

Minister U Nu

24. Kanewerayotin, Supapohn, ―Defectors Side with Burmese Junta in Public,‖ Bangkok Post, 1 February 1991

25. Zaw, Aung, Arnott, David, et. al., Challenges to Democratisation in Burma: Perspectives on multilateral

and bilateral responses, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, 2001

26. Westlake, Michael, (ed.), Asia Yearbook 1997: A Review of the Events of 1996, Review Publishing Co.,

Hong Kong 1992, p. 92

27. Dixit, J.N., India‘s Foreign Policy and its Neighbours, Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2001, pp. 325 -

333

28. Dixit, J.N., ibid.

29. For a more in-depth study of India‘s energy requirements in 2030 see Hughes, Lindsay, ―India‘s Energy

Concerns in 2030‖, 2013, available online at http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/indian-

ocean/1118-meeting-india-s-energy-requirements-in-2030-1.html; last visited 02.07.2013

30. Happymon, J. 2005, ―Indo-Myanmar Energy Cooperation‖, Observer Research Foundation,

http://www.observerindia.com/analysis/A022.htm

31. Shwe Gas Movement, available online at http://www.shwe.org/shwe-proect-basics/

**********************

http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/indian-ocean/1118-meeting-india-s-energy-requirements-in-2030-1.html

http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/indian-ocean/1118-meeting-india-s-energy-requirements-in-2030-1.html

http://www.observerindia.com/analysis/A022.htm

http://www.shwe.org/shwe-proect-basics/


260

US Policy towards Myanmar: The Big Shift and Regional Impact

Monish Tourangbam

Associate Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

(Monish Tourangbam is currently an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He is also a

Doctoral candidate at the US Studies Division, Centre for Canadian, US and Latin American Studies, School of

International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He has written extensively on American

Foreign Policy and other issue of International Politics and his articles and book reviews have appeared in different

journals and magazines such as India Quarterly, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, World Focus, Diplomatist and South

Asia Politics. He has also contributed a number of Op-ed articles on foreign policy issues in regional English

newspapers across the country. He has conducted field research in the United States of America including at the

Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library at Austin, Texas.)

_______________________________________________________

Myanmar‘s reform steps and the US diplomatic opening towards that country have signalled a

period of great consequence in international relations. An isolated country, hitherto compared to

the likes of North Korea, is now the centrepiece of prospective international investments and a

fundamental component of what is being called the ‗Great Game East‘.1Then US Secretary of

State Hillary Clinton‘s visit to Myanmar in late 2011 heralded a new beginning in US policy

towards Myanmar, hitherto hamstrung by sanctions. That the visit came more than half a century

after then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles visited in 1955, made it all the more

monumental, in terms of the shift in US-Myanmar relations. But, even as the Hillary visit was

largely welcomed internationally and in the United States, there was and still remains a cautious

optimism as to how fast the US should move in relaxing the restrictions, it has imposed in

engaging with Naypyidaw.

The decision to send the Secretary of State came after many discussions among the White House,

the State Department and members of Congress, following a series of exploratory visits to

Myanmar by the administration‘s special envoy, Derek Mitchell, who is currently serving as the

US ambassador there.2 Almost a year later in November 2012, President Obama made history

becoming the first sitting US president to ever visit this Southeast Asian country. Speaking at the

University of Yangon, Obama turned a new leaf in the relationship, saying, ―…We don‘t need to

be defined by the prisons of the past. We need to look forward to the future.‖ 3


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The question is: Why this move from Washington? While the ‗hows‘ and ‗whys‘ of

policymaking process cannot be ascertained quickly and authoritatively, some logical reasons

could be arrived at. First, as Myanmar‘s leadership continued to open up and seemed intent to

allow Aung San Suu Kyi relative political freedom, paving a nascent path to democratisation,

Washington needed to sit up and acknowledge. Since, Myanmar had been isolated and

continuously sanctioned primarily because of political repression and lack of freedom, the winds

of change had to be encouraged, albeit with conditions, which was and remains the prevalent

mood in Washington. Moreover, if US-Myanmar‘s new found relationship does manage to bring

in political and economic dividends for Myanmar, the pro-reform and pro-democracy elements

in the country would have a score card to show that democracy and engagement does pay.4

In fact, the Obama administration in September 2009 had initiated a policy change after seven

months of review, discussion, and consultation. This reassessment of the US policy towards

Myanmar led to a new pragmatic policy of engaging Naypyidaw, while continuing the sanctions

regime. For the first time, a dialogue was initiated with the military rulers, regarding Myanmar‘s

path to democratisation and greater respect for human rights. Besides talks on comprehensive

reform and national reconciliation, the new policy also entailed coordinating efforts with other

countries regarding Myanmar, and engaging Myanmar‘s leaders to sever its ties with North

Korea and abandon its alleged nuclear weapons ambitions.5 But, the policy shift and careful steps

towards a rapprochement began to see results only when former Prime Minister and military

leader U Thein Sein became Myanmar‘s President and the new civilian government began taking

steps towards political reforms and national reconciliation.

There are strategic factors as well, influencing policymakers in the United States. Just as the

Indian government reinvigorates its ‗Look East policy‘, the Obama administration has made the

rebalancing strategy towards the Asia-Pacific its signature foreign policy effort. President Obama

announced the significant shift in American relations with Myanmar during his Asia-Pacific trip

in November 2011, citing ―flickers of progress‖ that merited giving an extended hand of

friendship, if not an embrace. Acknowledging the progress and the challenges ahead for

Myanmar‘s path to reform, he said, ―…we want to seize what could be an historic opportunity

for progress, and make it clear that if Burma continues to travel down the road of democratic

reform, it can forge a new relationship with the United States of America.‖6 In both the policy


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outlooks, the unmistakable impact of China‘s rise and its economic footprints in the region is

quite discernible, even though official commentary might present more benign perceptions.

As Hillary Clinton commenting on US approach to Myanmar, said, ―…we welcome positive,

constructive relations between China and her neighbors… from our perspective; we are not

viewing this in light of any competition with China. We‘re viewing this on its merits as an

opportunity for us to reengage here.‖7 US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, addressing the

Shangri-La Dialogue this year also emphasised the rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific as

―…primarily a diplomatic, economic and cultural strategy.‖8 Giving a sneak peek on how

Washington‘s moves towards Myanmar is being seen in China, Sun Yun, an expert on China's

foreign relations at the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. said, ―Beijing understands

Myanmar's aspiration to diversify its international engagement and improve relations with the

United States. However, Beijing doesn't wish to see those goals achieved at the expense of

China.‖9

Till recently, western countries have largely stayed away from Myanmar, imposing a host of

stringent sanctions. Therefore, neighbouring China has had a windfall in terms of investment

opportunities in mineral-rich Myanmar, and Myanmar‘s military leaders, in absence of an

alternative, put their eggs in the Chinese basket. Being a bordering country and given long years

of engagements between Beijing and the erstwhile military junta, the economics in Myanmar, at

present, is highly tilted in favour of China.10

President Sein earlier suspended the $3.6 billion

Chinese-financed Myitsone hydro-electric power project in response to strong public opposition.

Many saw it as a defiant act against Beijing, a way to reach out to other international partners.

But, others saw the decision as specifically based on domestic opposition concerning

environmental damage, and hence not harming overall bilateral ties.11

Indeed, Myanmar‘s geographical proximity to the two Asian powers, India and China, inevitably

makes it a major part of their strategic calculations and now with, America‘s new overture

towards it, the Asian power game might see new dynamics. By opening up to the United States,

and increasing its ties with countries like India in the neighbourhood, Myanmar wants to increase

its zone of legitimacy and credibility in the international community. With the relative opening


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of the country, Naypyidaw has shown a balancing act, and a desire to restrict complete

dependence on the Chinese.

The rise of China has spawned continuing debates among policymakers and analysts around the

globe, and US rebalance policy is largely seen as a means to prevent the rise of a hegemonic

China, both in the economic and the political front. Despite the subdued tone in Washington

when it comes to the ‗China rationale‘ in its rebalancing strategy, Beijing is clearly

uncomfortable with increasing US engagements with countries in the region, that detest the

aggressive attitude of China regarding its boundary dispute with India, or sovereignty claims in

the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

And during his monumental visit to Myanmar last year, President Obama could not steer very far

away from the strategic calculations, involved in America‘s rebalancing policy, and the

significance of Myanmar therein, as he said, ―I came here because of the importance of your

country. You live at the crossroads of East and South Asia.‖ ―.... The United States of America

is a Pacific nation….And as our economy recovers, this is where we believe we will find

enormous growth. As we have ended the wars that have dominated our foreign policy for a

decade, this region will be a focus for our efforts to build a prosperous peace.... And as President,

I have embraced ASEAN,‖ he continued.12

According to Ernest Bower, senior adviser for

Southeast Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, improving relations with

Myanmar fits into the wider US policy of revitalising its Asia-Pacific relationships. ―Myanmar is

the keystone state that links China, Southeast Asia and India, and if we didn't get it right, we

wouldn't be able to play the chess game that is required in order to deal with China,‖ he said.13

The US, pursuant to official statements, has begun a ―targeted, carefully calibrated military-to-

military engagement‖ with Myanmar that included the recent participation of representatives of

Myanmar‘s armed forces as observers in the US-led ―Cobra Gold‖ military exercise in Thailand,

the largest multinational annual exercise held in Asia. These initiatives take place, amidst

selective sanctions, such as the one imposed on Lieutenant General Thein Htay, the head of

Myanmar‘s Directorate of Defense Industries for ignoring international requirements that he stop

buying military equipment from North Korea.14

Human Rights groups and some lawmakers in

the US want the Obama administration to tread cautiously when engaging Myanmar‘s Armed

Forces, officially known as Tatmadaw given the military‘s record of human rights abuses and


264

their heavy handed role in the country‘s economy. ―The Burmese military is the historic

perpetrator of human rights abuses, and, one may presume, also the current perpetrator, so

sanctions against them should be the last to go,‖ said US Congressman Rush Holt.15

Hence, even as countries increasingly make a beeline to engage resource-rich and strategically

located Myanmar,16

several challenges remain, both internal and external in nature. Visible

reform efforts like releasing Suu Kyi from house arrest and freeing political prisoners, abolishing

censorships, legalising trade unions and protests, have elicited policy changes and ease of

sanctions from the US and Europe. But, impediments remain on the path to democracy,

including the issue of national reconciliation amidst ethnic violence, and the role of the military

in the country‘s future. And, as Washington restructures Myanmar‘s role in its foreign policy

calculations, or more specifically in its new rebalancing strategy, Naypyidaw‘s own moves, and

what moves other stakeholders make in this ‗strategic chessboard‘ will be of great consequence.

END NOTES:

1. Bertil Lintner, Great Game East: India and China and the Struggle for Asia‘s Most Volatile Frontier,

(India: Harper Collins Publishers, 2012).

2. Steven Lee Myers, ―Clinton‘s Visit to Myanmar Raises Hopes and Concerns,‖ New York Times, November

29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/world/asia/clintons-visit-to-myanmar-raises-hopes-and-

concerns.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed June 25, 2013).

3. The White House (Office of the Press Secretary), ―Remarks by President Obama at the University of

Yangon,‖ November 19, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/19/remarks-president-

obama-university-yangon, (accessed July 1, 2013).

4. Peter A. Coclanis, ―The Myanmar Moment? Why Washington Made Its Move,‖ World Affairs,

January/February 2012, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/myanmar-moment-why-washington-

made-its-move, (accessed June 3, 2013).

5. Michael F. Martin, ―US Policy towards Burma: Issues for the 113th

Congress,‖ CRS Report for Congress,

March 12, 2013, 1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43035.pdf (accessed June 3, 2013).

6. The White House (Office of the Press Secretary), ―Statement by President Obama on Burma,‖ November

18, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/18/statement-president-obama-burma,

(accessed June 20, 2013).

7. Hillary Clinton, ―Press Availability in Nay Pyi Taw,‖ US Department of State, December 1, 2011,

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/12/177994.htm, (accessed on June 19, 2013).

8. Chuck Hagel, ―The US Approach to Regional Security,‖ First Plenary Session, Shangri-La Dialogue, June

1, 2013, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2013-

c890/first-plenary-session-ee9e/chuck-hagel-862d, (accessed July 3, 2013).

9. Charles Hutzler, ―As US-Myanmar Ties Warm, China Stands Conflicted,‖ Associated Press, December 1,

2011, http://sg.finance.yahoo.com/news/As-US-Myanmar-ties-warm-China-apf-2296883511.html,

(accessed July 3, 2013).

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/world/asia/clintons-visit-to-myanmar-raises-hopes-and-concerns.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/world/asia/clintons-visit-to-myanmar-raises-hopes-and-concerns.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/19/remarks-president-obama-university-yangon

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/19/remarks-president-obama-university-yangon

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/myanmar-moment-why-washington-made-its-move

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/myanmar-moment-why-washington-made-its-move

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43035.pdf

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/18/statement-president-obama-burma

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/12/177994.htm

http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2013-c890/first-plenary-session-ee9e/chuck-hagel-862d

http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2013-c890/first-plenary-session-ee9e/chuck-hagel-862d

http://sg.finance.yahoo.com/news/As-US-Myanmar-ties-warm-China-apf-2296883511.html


265

10. Toh Han Shih, ―China to Remain Influential in Myanmar Even as Western Firms Arrive,‖ South China

Morning Post, May 13, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1236409/china-

remain-influential-myanmar-even-western-firms-arrive, (accessed June 3, 2013).

11. Wall Street Journal, ―Myanmar Halts China Dam,‖ October 2, 2011,

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204138204576601980264218492.html, (accessed June 3,

2013); Ben Blanchard and Aung Hla Tun, ―Analysis: Myanmar Dam Suspension Tests Vital China Ties,‖

Reuters, October 4, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/04/us-china-myanmar-dam-

idUSTRE7926HU20111004 (accessed June 3, 2013).

12. The White House (Office of the Press Secretary), ―Remarks by President Obama at the University of

Yangon.‖

13. Paul Eckert, ―Obama Walks a Fine Line with Myanmar President‘s Landmark Visit,‖ Reuters, May 19,

2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/19/us-usa-myanmar-idUSBRE94I0E620130519, (accessed

June 28, 2013).

14. Chuck Hagel, ―The US Approach to Regional Security,‖; Daniel Schearf, ―Burma Observers Participate in

US-Led Military Exercises in Thailand,‖ Voice of America, February 11, 2013,

http://www.voanews.com/content/burma-observers-participate-in-us-led-military-exercies-in-

thailand/1601193.html, (accessed July 1, 2013); New York Times, ―Obama Administration Sanctions

Myanmar General for Dealings With North Korea,‖ July 2, 2013,

http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2013/07/02/world/asia/02reuters-usa-sanctions.html?ref=world&_r=1&,

(accessed July 3, 2013)

15. Paul Eckert, ―Obama Walks a Fine Line with Myanmar President‘s Landmark Visit.‖

16. The Economist, ―Geopolitical Consequences: Rite of Passage,‖ May 25, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/special-

report/21578174-opening-up-myanmar-could-transform-rest-asia-rite-passage, (accessed June 30, 2013).

**********************

http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1236409/china-remain-influential-myanmar-even-western-firms-arrive

http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1236409/china-remain-influential-myanmar-even-western-firms-arrive

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204138204576601980264218492.html

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/04/us-china-myanmar-dam-idUSTRE7926HU20111004

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/04/us-china-myanmar-dam-idUSTRE7926HU20111004

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/19/us-usa-myanmar-idUSBRE94I0E620130519

http://www.voanews.com/content/burma-observers-participate-in-us-led-military-exercies-in-thailand/1601193.html

http://www.voanews.com/content/burma-observers-participate-in-us-led-military-exercies-in-thailand/1601193.html

http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2013/07/02/world/asia/02reuters-usa-sanctions.html?ref=world&_r=1&

http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21578174-opening-up-myanmar-could-transform-rest-asia-rite-passage

http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21578174-opening-up-myanmar-could-transform-rest-asia-rite-passage


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Triangular Relationship of China, India and Myanmar after Democratic Reform of Myanmar

Hu Xiaowen

(Doctoral Candidate of Centre for East Asian Studies,

Jawaharlal Nehru University ,New Delh;

Research assistant of Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences)

Abstract: This paper focus on the development and Measurement of Trilateral Relations of

India, Myanmar and China after Democratic Reform of Myanmar from the perspectives of

economic, political, security and political perception by using Trilateral Relations Theory and

Method. It can be concluded that the cooperation among three countries is the best way to gain

maximum benefit, Sino-Indian relations in the trilateral relations are relatively low, the revenue

of rivalry for India will be low, and will also be unfavorable to China, so healthy competition

ought to be required for all three countries.

Keywords: Triangular Relationship, China, India and Myanmar, Competitive and cooperative game

_____________________

Myanmar has three tips for its identity: nation of Southeast Asia, coastal nation of Indian

Ocean and nation of neighboring South Asia, which give him great strategic importance.

Myanmar located in the east side of China is the gateway for China to connect Southeast

Asia, and is playing important role for China to safeguard the peace and stability of the

surrounding. Facing Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal in west side, it also is a node

that provides the land access for countries in Southeast Asia, East Asia and China to

Indian Ocean. On the other hand, Myanmar is an important player for India to solve the

separatist movement in northeast India and to check and balance China. Both China and

India attach great importance to develop relations with Myanmar. Research on three

bilateral relations has been made during the past years, which is bilateral relations of

Sino-India, Sino-Myanmar and Myanmar-India, the China-Myanmar-India trilateral

relations draws academic attention in recent years and has become a new topic.

Myanmar democratization began in 2003 has bring tremendous changes to internal and

external of Myanmar, this paper try to use refined Lowell Dittmer‘s theory to quantify

China-Myanmar-India trilateral relations after the democratic reform, and try to answer

the following questions: what is the relations of China, India and Myanmar, is it

cooperation or competition after Myanmar democratic reform? How will the

development of China-Myanmar-India trilateral relations affect the China‘s policy

towards India and Myanmar?

My paper‘s analysis based on following theoretical hypothesis:

1) Analysis is based on bilateral relations. There is no formal trilateral mechanism among

China-Myanmar-India, the triangular relations is actually the interactive between three

bilateral relations.

2) All three countries are interest-oriented.


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3) The triangular relation is far from zero-sum game.

Ⅰ The Development of Trilateral Relations Theory and Method of this Paper

The study of Trilateral Relations theory began in the 1960s. Theodore Caplow put

forward eight modes of trilateral relations and found that the situation tends to be two

players jointly against third player and interaction results usually will be the two weak

against the strong one according to the situation of tripartite distribution of power and

trilateral interaction.1

In 1980s Lowell Dittmer used Game theory to explore trilateral relations systematically

with a basic assumption that the national interests is the determine factor of the country‘s

foreign relations. He use game theory and put forward four different mode: the ―Ménage

a trois‖, consisting of symmetrical amities among all three players; the ―romantic

triangle,‖ consisting of amity between one ―pivot‖ player and two ―wing‖ players, but

enmity between each of the latter; and the ―stable marriage,‖ consisting of amity between

two of the players and enmity between each and the ―Unit-veto‖, consisting of enmity

among all three players.2 (See Figure 1)

Figure 1

(Source: Based on Lowell Dittmer, ―The Strategic Triangle: A Critical Review,‖ World

Politics, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1981, pp. 485-515.)

Based on Dittmer theory, the two Chinese scholars in Taiwan Bao zong and Wu Yu-shan

refine the four modes. They think that in the strategic triangle one player gain from the

cooperation with other two players and lose for the confrontation with the other player;

one player gains from the confrontation between the other two players, and lose for the

cooperation between the other two players. Quantifying this relationship, we give +1 for

cooperation or harmony relationship between the two players and -1 for the enmity

relationship between the two sides; in a competitive game, each player‘s total score is

equal to the score gained from its relationship with other two players minus the score that

refer to the other two players‘ cooperation. In a cooperative game, player A‘s total score

Figure 1

Unite-veto Stable Marriage

A A

B B C C

Negative Direction of symmetry

Ménage a trois Romantic Triangle

A A

B

B C C

Positive


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is equal to its score with player B and player C plus the score of B and C. So, after we

calculating each player‘s cooperative gains (the first number in the parentheses) and

competitive gains (brackets in the second figure), we can analyze the pattern of each

mode of income from a new perspective.3 Dittmer and Taiwan scholars‘ theory agrees

that the romantic triangle is the most stable mode with a ―pivot‖ player with two ―wing‖

player, and the ―pivot‖ one will benefit the most. Any country in trilateral relations

should strive to become the ―pivot‖.

But as time change, the country is no longer just exists only in absolute conflict and

discord, or amity, it is difficult to say the two players in the triangular cooperation will be

adverse to the third player. Therefore, Chinese scholar Chen Zhi-min, to make further

amendment for the above theory: do not calculate cooperation as +1 and confrontation as

-1, and give different values in accordance with the amity of the relationship; to view

bilateral relations as three different sub-sectors, namely economic relations, political

relations, strategic relations. He set the score range of economic relations and strategic

relations between -4 to 4, and the scores range of the political relationship between -2 and

2. In this way, it is possible to distinguish competitive game in cooperative game

according to the amity of three players.

Huang Dong provide additional indicator for measuring, she use the structural balance

theory of psychology, emphasizing cognitive structure‘s influence on interactive

relationship between countries and setting up a cognitive Triangle. When cognitive

structure is in a state of equilibrium, the countries feel psychologically soothing and less

pressure, cognitive structure is stable; conversely, if the countries feel psychological

pressure and tension, they will try to restore structural balance, the cognitive structure is

unstable.4 Her method include cognitive and psychological factors on the interactive

relationship between the state which formerly emphasizes on power and interests of the

country, while cognition is a very important factor in the trilateral relations of India,

Myanmar and China.

Therefore on the basis of the above studies, this paper will use the amended Dittmer

triangular relationship method and measure the trilateral relations from the political,

economic, security and cognitive perspectives valued from to -5 to 5, this paper measure

the gain and lose of competitive and cooperative relations, and describe the Dittmer

triangular relations of India, Myanmar and China.

There are also some Limitations in this method: 1) it will be relatively subjectivity on

scoring. 2) limited and univocal sub-sectors are made. In order to facilitate the scoring,

this paper‘s evaluation will rely on exclusive sectors while little analysis is on the

interactive of these sectors.

Ⅱ Measurement of Trilateral Political Relations

⒈ The Trend of Trilateral Political Relations after the Political Reform of Myanmar

India-Myanmar relations gradually become clear after democratic reform in Myanmar.

India continues to enhance the level of bilateral relations with the Myanmar and made

several breakthroughs in bilateral relations.


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Myanmar Foreign Minister Win Aung has visited India in January 2003, two courtiers

decided to establish diplomatic consultation mechanism and began military cooperation.

Senior General Than Shwe and Vice-Chairman Maung Aye of SPDC Myanmar‘s visited

to India in October 2004 was first of this kind since he took office in 1988 and become

the supreme leader of Myanmar. In March 2006, President Abdul Kalam of India visited

Myanmar and signed a number of bilateral agreements, including energy cooperation

agreement. In January 2007, India Foreign Minister Mu Jike‘s visited to Myanmar

brought positive respond to Myanmar proposed military equipment requirements in 2006.

Maung Aye visit India in April 2008 secondly, and the two sides exchanged views on

exploring oil and gas. President Thein Sein paid a State visit to India on October 12-15,

2011.The visit represented the first State visit from Myanmar to India following the

swearing in of a new Government in Myanmar in March 2011. President Thein Sein had

a meeting with the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, which was followed by

delegation level talks. The Indian side announced the extension of a new concessional

facility of US$500 million Line of Credit to Myanmar as well as technical and financial

support for three new projects.5 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh‘s visit

Myanmar in May 2012, which is the first time in 25 years, Singh said that the visit will

outline the India-Myanmar bilateral roadmap for future cooperation. During the visit,

India and Myanmar signed 12 cooperation agreements; Singh also said that India want to

share the experience of a democratic parliament with Myanmar and wish Myanmar to be

successful in the construction of a new system.

After the forming of Myanmar‘s new government, western countries began to relax or lift

the embargo against Myanmar and take a more active way to engage Myanmar, which

reduce blames of India on maintaining relations with Myanmar, compared with the

previous year, thus India policy toward Myanmar is even more clear and open at this

stage.6

China and Myanmar is famous for ―Paukphaw‖ friendship and become closer, it also

faces some uncertainty. From 2001 to 2009, former President Jiang Ze-ming is the only

member of Politburo Standing Committee of China who had visited Myanmar, but after

2009, both Premier Wen Jia-bao and Vice President Xi Jin-ping have visited Myanmar

which shows the upgrade of Sino-Myanmar relations. It is worth noting that the Sino-

Myanmar relations become closer rather than worse after the Kokang Conflict of 2009.

Premier Wen Jia-bao visited Myanmar in June 2010 and two sides signed a border

agreement to ensure stability of two thousand miles of border line. Senior General Than

Shwe of State Peace and Development Council of Myanmar visit China in September

2010 introduced national elections in Myanmar and visited Shenzhen to learn from

China‘s economic reforms. During his visit, Chinese President Hu Jin-tao and Wu Bang-

guo of National People‘s Congress Standing Committee Chairman stressed that the

consolidation and development of China-Myanmar good-neighbor friendship policy will

not change no matter how the international situation changes. After the general election

in 2010, the Sino-Myanmar relations maintain the trend of friendship and cooperation in

general, especially after Thein Sein first visit in May 2011. In this visit, China and

Myanmar signed a comprehensive cooperation Strategic Partnership Declaration which


270

shows countries‘ relations have entered into a new stage. In February 2012, Shwe Mann,

Myanmar Parliament Speaker visited China and hold talks with Wu Bang-guo. In

September 2012, the 9th China-ASEAN Expo held in Nanning, Guangxi, Myanmar

attaches great importance to this events and Thein Sein have met with Chinese Vice

President Xi Jin-ping. The frequent visits between the leaders of the two countries

enhance bilateral mutual trust, consolidate friendship foundation and expand mutually

beneficial cooperation.

Even so, the Myanmar government maintain a high degree of autonomy during this

period in dealing with its internal issue, such as taking over former prime minister Khin

Nyunt in October 2004, moving the capital in November 2005, attacking Kokang in

2009.The Myanmar government does not take the position of ―one-sided‖ policy,

Myanmar especially, does not want to conduct cooperation with China and always seeks

to improve relations with the West. In September 2011, the event of Myitsone power

station was a turning point of Sino-Myanmar relation. However, the leaders of Myanmar

said on several occasions that Myanmar‘s political reform is not aimed at China-

Myanmar relations, the Myanmar government will continue follow the principle of the

national interest for Sino-Myanmar relations in the future, rather than the principle of

ideology and political system differences.7

As for Sino-Indian relations, the Sino-Indian official visit to the other country has

reached eight times in the 21st century, showing a trend of recovery, breakthrough and

manifesto.8 Chinese President Hu Jin-tao‘s state visit to India in November 2006 and

sign the Sino-Indian Joint Declaration embodied in the idea of the two countries ―to

establish peace and prosperity-oriented strategic partnership relations‖ to achieve the 10

strategic objectives. Both parties agreed that the comprehensive Sino-Indian economic

and trade relations is the core component of the bilateral strategic partnership.9

Indian

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh paid an official visit to China in January 2008 and

signed a ―Common Vision on the Twenty-first Century‖. the President of India Patil paid

a state visit to China in December May, Premier Wen Jia-bao paid a official visit to India

in Oct 2010 and signed a ―Joint Communique of the People‘s Republic of China and the

Republic of India‖. The two sides believe that the world is big enough for common

development of China and India, and there are enough areas for Sino-Indian cooperation;

two sides also decide to set up regular exchange of visits and a telephone hotline with two

prime ministers; they also hope bilateral trade volume reached the new target of $ 100

billion in 2015 and declared 2011 as the ―China-India Exchange Year‖. Chinese State

Councilor and Defense Minister Liang Guang-lie visited to India in September 2012 and

held talks with Indian Defense Minister AK Antony. The two sides exchanged views on

bilateral military relations and international and regional security situation and other

issues of common concern and reached consensus in many aspects. The two sides

announced that the Sino-Indian joint military exercises will resume after interrupting of

four years. This is concrete results for the Chinese defense minister‘s visit after eight

years suspend. On May of 2013, Chinese premier Li Keqiang took India as his first visit

after he taking the office, and lead to a joint declaration in which the border and other


271

issues was mentioned, some comments said that this is a signal implied that China has

shifting its foreign policy focusing on neighboring countries.

However, due to the deep historical animosity and border issues, China-India relations is

facing great obstacles and mutual suspicion, distrust between China and India also added

doubt to the development of Sino-Indian relations.

2. Measuring Competitive and Cooperation of the Trilateral Political Relationship

Based on the aforementioned methods of measurement, I assume that India and Myanmar

gain 3 from India and Myanmar political exchanges separately, China and Myanmar gain

4 from the political exchanges between China and Myanmar separately, and China and

India gain 3 from and the political exchanges between India and China; the sum of gain

for the three parties is 10(3+4+3)and India gets 2(3+3-4=2),Myanmar gets 4(4+3-3=4)

and China gets 4(4+3-3=4)individually. The trilateral relation is showed in triangle in

Figure 2:

Figure 2

Therefore, trilateral political relationship after Myanmar political reform shows the

characteristics of a ―tripartite coexistence‖, the trilateral political relations tend to be

smooth. Tripartite gain is high in the state of cooperation, but if there is political

competition, the India-Myanmar relations and the China-Myanmar relationship will

reflect in different way.

Ⅲ Measurement of Trilateral Economic Relations

1. The Trend of Trilateral Economic Relations after the Political Reform of Myanmar

Bilateral trade of India-Myanmar has grown rapidly from 200 million in 1995 to about

1100 million in 2010 in the past 10 years. India is in deficit situation (see Table 1).

India and Myanmar start the construction of the mechanism firstly in order to promote

economic cooperation. Confederation of Indian Industry and the Myanmar Chamber of

Commerce and Industry signed a memorandum of understanding in 2001 to promote the

development of bilateral economic and the Joint Trade Commission was also established

in 2003, the committee has so far held four meetings. Both agreed to double the bilateral

Figure 2

India (10, 2)

China (10, 4) Myanmar (10, 4)

3 3

4

First number is cooperation revenue

Second number is competitive income


272

trade in 2015 reached $ 3 billion in the fourth meeting. In addition, the two countries also

signed Bilateral Investment Promotion Agreement in 2008 and Double Taxation

Avoidance Agreement; at the same time, both India and Myanmar are member of the

India- ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement signed in 2009, India also give Myanmar

treatment of the least developed countries duty-free provisions.

At the same time, India tries to advance border trade between two sides. India and

Myanmar signed a border trade agreement as early as in 1994, and has built two border

trade ports (Moreh-Tamu and Zowkhatar) the third one are also being planned

(Avakhung-Pansat/Somrai). In 2010, the India-Myanmar border trade amounted to $12.8

million. In the third meeting of India-Myanmar Joint Trade Commission, the two sides

reached an agreement to upgrade border trade port to conventional trade port in order to

enhance the bilateral trade. United Bank of India has signed memorandum of

understanding with several state-owned banks in Myanmar (Myanmar Foreign Trade

Bank, Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank, the Myanmar Economic Bank) to

promote trade. During Singh‘s visit of this year, he said that stronger trade and

investment links and jointly develop border areas need to be done.

As far as the infrastructure construction is concerned, the 160-km long India-Myanmar

Friendship Road was inaugurated in 2001. India‘s main objective was thus to be present

in Myanmar where the Chinese were not, particularly in Western Myanmar, so as to

avoid China building roads and starting to exploit at will the regions bordering the Indian

Northeastern states. But New Delhi has faced many difficulties in implementing its

infrastructure policy in Myanmar. The western parts of Myanmar remain politically

sensitive with the Naga and Chin insurgencies still fuelling instability, but the hilly and

remote region also offer very few geo-graphical assets to facilitate the east-west

continental connection. 10

Economic relations of India and Myanmar, however, still facing a lot of difficulties and

obstacles. The first one is single structure of India-Myanmar bilateral trade. India imports

two-thirds of Myanmar‘s beans and pulse production, as well as many timber and wood

products. Myanmar imports only $150 million worth of goods from India on the other

side, including pharmaceutical products, a sector which is almost entirely dominated by

Indian companies such as Dr. Reddy‘s Laboratories Limited and Ranbaxy. Indian

products are sparse in local Myanmar markets because they are unable to compete with

cheap Chinese and Thai goods. The second is the lack of India-Myanmar border transport

links. India has insisted on the construction road of Kali Wa to Mandalay of Tamu-

Kalewa-Mandalay road since 2001 which connected to the Myanmar border. However,

the Myanmar government inclined to establish economic ties in a more stable border

areas of China due to lack of funding support and instability of the India-Myanmar

border. Therefore, India has not been able to establish India-Myanmar trade routes which

also led to the India-Myanmar border trade can not reach expected higher level. Thirdly,

many investors in India worried about the investment in Myanmar. Because they believe

that Myanmar lacks of an effective financial system and a stable economy and also lacks

of effective laws and regulations to regulate and protect the commercial activities.11

Fourth, India‘s economic investment in Myanmar did not bring benefits to the local. In


273

2012, India starts the construction of the port of Sittwe in Myanmar and hope to establish

border road to the Myanmar. Myanmar Ministry of Industry said this project will be

beneficial for the two countries. Port construction is mostly done by Indian workers,

employed only 600 Myanmar workers. This project is presided over by the Essar Group,

India‘s fourth-largest private group, and it bring all skilled workers, engineers, and

engineering equipment from India.

Myanmar has enormous energy reserves with reviled natural gas reserves of 7.8 trillion

cubic feet and oil reserves of 21 billion barrels showed by BP oil 2012 data.12

The oil

and gas exports have become an important part of Myanmar‘s export income. Myanmar

also has a huge hydropower resources, hydroelectric power is the main source of

electricity in Myanmar. In addition, Myanmar is one of five major energy exporters in the

Southeast Asian.

India plans to expand energy cooperation with Myanmar as early as in 1993, but it was

able to implement this program until 2002. the two biggest Indian state-controlled oil

companies Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd (ONGC-Videsh) and Gas Authority of

India Ltd (GAIL), entered the Myanmar energy game only in January 2002 when both of

them joined a four-headed consortium with two Korean firms (Daewoo International and

Korea Gas)to exploit the A-1 block off the Arakan coast. Extended three years later for

the acquisition of the neighboring A-3 Block, the deal confirmed India‘s ambitions to

secure Myanmar gas reserves, despite all the difficulties it would have to face in

Myanmar. Apart from GAIL and ONGC-Videsh, in May 2005 Essar Oil, a third (private)

Indian oil firm, clinched a deal on the onshore L-Block and the offshore A-2 Block near

the Bangladesh border. Then, in September 2007, the Indian Minister for Petrol, Murli

Deora, signed a US$150 million investment deal with the Myanmar authorities for three

new exploration blocks in spite of the turmoil caused in Myanmar by five weeks of unrest

sparked off by the protests of Myanmar monks and prodemocracy activists. Government

of India has received 30% of the shares in the A1 in Myanmar offshore gas fields and is

ready to invest two billion U.S. dollars to build the 900 km-long gas pipeline through the

borders of Bangladesh (started in Myanmar‘s Rakhine State capital of Sittwe City,

Bangladesh the territory of the country‘s land to Calcutta, India). Myanmar, India and

Bangladesh Energy Minister reached a consensus on the construction of gas pipeline to

India via Bangladesh in early February 2005 in Yangon. In 2007, the oil minister of India

and Myanmar signed a $ 150 million contract; the contract was given to the development

three new oil blocks in Myanmar. It can be said that, during the blockade in the Western

countries of Myanmar, India has obtain a competitive advantage in Myanmar‘s oil and

gas fields. Nevertheless, a lot of commentators think India Myanmar energy cooperation

can not be achieved.

India experienced a lot of setbacks in energy cooperation with Myanmar since 2005. The

first setback is trilateral cooperation projects led by the South Korean company in

exploring Myanmar coastal gas resources progress slowly. Since the formation of the

Indo-Korean joint venture in 2002 (with the Myanmar authorities as the fifth local

partner), the question of who will buy the A-1 block‘s natural gas and how will it be


274

transported to its final destination has remained unresolved. In addition to build gas

pipeline from A-1 and A-3 gas fields to India drew domestic debate and also affect the

relationship between India and Myanmar and India and Bangladesh. In 2005, India was

awarded its first offshore block A-1, Bangladesh agreed to let India obtain pipeline access

to the gas through its territory. But it later became non-committal, imposing unrelated

conditions that were unacceptable for India. The delay in India‘s firming up an alternate

route/plan compelled Myanmar (or gave it an excuse) to decide in 2007 to supply the

entire gas to China through a pipeline to be laid from Sittwe to Kunming.13

China again

proved its ability to swiftly gain a strategic advantage in Myanmar while India had to

face more and more obvious setbacks to its tentative thrust.14

Trade development of

India and Myanmar still has a long way to go.

In contrast, the economic relation between China and Myanmar is more optimistic.

Before the election from May 2003 to November 2010, as the United States, the

European Union put sanctions on Myanmar and China‘s sustained and rapid economic

growth, capacity of foreign aid and investment is significantly enhanced, so the economic

cooperation of Myanmar and China reached unprecedented closer by the end of 2010

elections in Myanmar. At this time, China has been the largest source of foreign

investment and second largest trading partner of Myanmar. Data shows that bilateral

trade of China and Myanmar in 2011 reached $6.5 billion and 46.3% growth, China‘s

Investment in Myanmar reached 20.26 billion U.S. dollars at the end of 2011, ranks first

in Myanmar‘s foreign trade and foreign investment. China and Myanmar also signed a

number of economic agreements, covering areas of oil, gas, water, technology and

finance. In December 2009, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has

signed agreement with the Myanmar Ministry of Energy and started to build oil and gas

pipelines from Kyaukpyu to Kunming. This project is a solid endorsement of the long-

term strategy for economic cooperation between the two counties.15

China and India has been studying the feasibility of a comprehensive trade arrangement,

but does not sign any similar agreement. Nonetheless, trade between China and India has

grown greatly. China has become the largest trading partner of India; India is China‘s

10th largest trading partner, India and China trade grows faster than any counties. Trade

volume between China and India growth accelerated since 2000. Expanding trade

relations between China and India bring both common prosperity of the two countries

and also make significant reversal of the bilateral relations unlikely.

Table 1: Trade among China-India-Myanmar (2000～2011） Billion US$

Year China-India China-Myanmar India-Myanmar

2000 29.14 - 6.21 - 3.45

2001 35.96 23% 6.32 2% -

2002 49.46 38% 8.62 36% -

2003 75.95 54% 10.77 25%

2004 136.04 79% 11.45 6% -

2005 187.03 37% 12.9 13% -


275

2006 248.61 33% 14.6 13% -

2007 386.47 55% 20.57 41% 9.21

2008 517.8 34% 26.26 28% 9.95 8%

2009 433.81 -16% 29.07 11% 11.51 16%

2010 617.6 42% 44.44 53% 14.98 30%

2011 739.18 20% 65 46% 10.71 -30%

Source: Department of Trade & External Economic Relations Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics,

China External Economic Statistical Yearbook, 1990~2001; Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of

Commerce of PRC

Database online:http://yzs.mofcom.gov.cn/date/date.html; and Ministry of External Affairs: India-

Myanmar Relations 2011.

2. Measuring Competitive Cooperation of the Trilateral Economic Relationship

Based on the aforementioned measuring method, we assume that both India and

Myanmar gain 2 from India and Myanmar economic cooperation, China and Myanmar

gain 4 from the economic cooperation between China and Myanmar, China and India

gain 5 from the economic cooperation of China and India, thus the sum of tripartite

economic cooperation is 11(2 +4 +5): India‘s gain is 3(2+5-4), Myanmar is 1(2+4-5=1)

and China is 7(4+5-2=7). The trilateral economic relationship triangle listed as Figure 3:

Figure 3

Therefore, Myanmar-India-China trilateral economic relationship shows characteristics of

a Romantic Triangle which China is a hub, so the trilateral economic relations tend to be

solid and China‘s economic development is the most important driving force.

Ⅳ Measurement of Trilateral Security and Military Relations 1. The Trend of Trilateral Security Relations after the Political Reform of Myanmar

In terms of the military, India appears to be more active in setting up military advantage

in Myanmar, as China has significant economic role in Myanmar. New Delhi‘s policy

shift toward Myanmar in the mid-1990s openly challenged China‘s thrust southwards by

gaining more from military parts, then three main assets has been got by India: the right

to berth and refuel in Myanmar ports for Indian commercial vessels or warships (as China

India (11, 3)


5 2

4


Second number is competitive

income


276

had); conducting joint naval operations with the Myanmar Navy; and gleaning

intelligence on the Chinese presence along Myanmar‘s coast so as to checkmate it.

In December 2002, an Indian Navy flotilla was allowed for the first time to berth in

Thilawa, followed in May 2003 by two Indian Coast Guard vessels, and again in May

2004. Furthermore, the first Indo-Myanmar naval joint exercise was conducted in the

Andaman Sea in September 2003, after the Indian Navy Chief visited Rangoon‘s Monkey

Point base. Two other rounds of joint exercises involving the Indian and Myanmar navies

were then organized in December 2005 and January 2006 (Milan Meeting) while China is

still waiting to conduct its first joint operations with its Myanmar ally.16

In contrast, there are still many problems in the security cooperation between China and

India, India also holds the perception of ―China Threat‖ and embarked on some strategic

response, the first one is its policy of ―Go forward to the West and Defend in the North‖

and emphasize on actively defense and pre-emptive strike capability. With the superior

forces maintain to counter Pakistan, India deploys about 1/4 of its arm forces in the

northern and eastern border areas near China. Secondly, strengthen military cooperation

with other countries and focusing on the improvement of the overall combat capability so

as to counterbalance China. In addition, China‘s extending to the Indian Ocean caused

unease in India. But we also note that with the enhancement of China's international

influence, India's China policy obviously shows the friend side, it is believed that India‘s

action is just a kind of strategic precaution rather than a confrontation to China.17

In April 2005, Chinese Prime minister Wen Jiabao visited India, the two sides announced

the establishment of the strategic partnership for peace and prosperity. Wen Jiabao visited

India again in December 2010 and met with Singh and discussed some new challenges in

bilateral relations. Frequent meetings in recent years is positive for the development of

bilateral relations, they agreed not to argue the visa issues and believes that a new

mechanism should be established to better manage border military issues to avoid

unnecessary dispute and misperceptions. In 2012, Chinese Defense Minister Liang

Guanglie visited India with the hope that reducing India's misunderstanding of China's

strategic intentions. During his visit, he stated that Beijing‘s strengthening defense ties

with South Asian countries is not to against India. Liang Guanglie's visit has deepened

the political understanding of the high level military in China and India. The two sides

will soon to resume joint military exercises. India Defense Minister A.K. Antony

accepted the invitation of visiting China next year. During Li Keqiang‘s visit, the joint

statement emphasis on the stalled Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar initiative or the

cooperation in naval escort missions in the Indian Ocean region. 18

The border issue is another main factor to obstacle China-India-Myanmar security

relationship. In order to maintain close relations with Myanmar, India does not only

undertake pressure in domestic and foreign affairs, but also paid a huge cost on border

issues. India's anti-government organizations have a close relationship with Myanmar‘s

local army and intelligence officials. This separatist organization has become the best

chips for Myanmar to require assistance and arms from India. In addition, northeastern

India area is the paradise for Myanmar Criminals to do drug trafficking and arms


277

smuggling, plus the spread of AIDS, the border area became an extremely unstable place.

Myanmar is almost not taken any anti-smuggling operation except to close borders in the

event of a trade conflict. Furthermore, with Myanmar refugees flow into India, conflict

between refugees and local residents occurred frequently.

In October 2004, during General Than Shwe‘s landmark visit to New Delhi, India

presented the general with a model of effective counterinsurgency collaboration it had

formulated with Bhutan in confronting ULFA rebels during ―Operation All Clear‖ in

December 2003.19

General Than Shwe reassured India of his country‘s cooperation on

the issue. Since then, localized operations against insurgent groups based in Myanmar‘s

Kabaw Valley in the Naga Hills have been conducted by Myanmar security forces each

winter, with intelligence and material support from India.20

India also began sending arms shipments to Myanmar in 2002, after years of staunch

refusal to sell weapons to its ruling military junta.21

These shipments were at first limited

primarily to counterinsurgency weaponry, but they soon expanded to include a wide

range of equipment such as radar produced by India‘s state-owned Bharat Electronics,

105-mm light artillery guns, and airborne surveillance radios.22

Despite India‘s military

assistance to Myanmar, the counterinsurgency operations launched every winter against

Naga and Manipuri rebels by the Myanmar armed forces have not fulfilled New Delhi‘s

expectations. The Indian defense ministry, in fact, admits to the clear lack of progress in

the Northeast. 23

Ethnic military group is one of major issue in China-Myanmar border. Myanmar used to

think that China has used the issue to check and balance Myanmar, and China adheres to

the principle of no recognize politically, no support militarily, no assistance economically

and try to change the view of Myanmar‘s. The Kokang Conflict in August 2009 brought

more than 37,000 refugees into the China, a number of the casualties of Chinese citizens,

and great losses of the Chinese enterprises. In order to protect the security and stability of

the border areas, China and Myanmar have held many round talks on this issue. With

understanding of Myanmar government‘s position, China asked the central government

solve the problem through peaceful negotiations. After repeatedly talks between China

and Myanmar after Kokang Conflict, the Government of Myanmar believe that China

will not take advantage of this issue to counterbalance the central government in

Myanmar, so Myanmar central government start the military campaign against Kachin

Independence Army on June 9, 2011, the conflict still under going in this day. Fight again

bring tens of thousands of refugees, Chinese government show restrained attitude and

support actively peace talks and allows negotiations carried out in the territory of China's

Ruili. The new government of Myanmar has issued a new round of peace talks in August

18, 2011 and quickly achieved significant results. Northern Myanmar situation is

relatively stable. Security in China-Myanmar boarder is far from optimistic.

Sino-Indian border is the biggest uncertainty issue between China and India. Numbers of

high-level talks did not bring any results of China and India is in the ―security dilemma‖

Which also contributed to the mutual distrust between the two countries and mutual


278

checks and balances. Although the border issue has not been solved but the border trade

still brings much benefits for both sides which may be derived from the relative

independence of economic and political problems, but the boundary problem will be the

issue for the long term development of bilateral relations.

2. Measuring Competitive Cooperation of the Trilateral Security Relationship

Based on the aforementioned methods of measurement, we assume that India and

Myanmar gain 3.5 from India and Myanmar security cooperation separately, China and

Myanmar gain 3 from the security cooperation between China and Myanmar separately,

and China and India gain 1 from and the security cooperation between India and China;

the sum of gain for the three parties is 7.5(3.5+3+1=7.5)and India gets 1.5(3.5+1-

3=1.5),Myanmar gets 5.5(3.5+3-1=5.5) and China gets 0.5(3+1-3.5=0.5)individually. The

trilateral relation is showed in triangle in Figure 4:

Figure 4

Trilateral Security Relationship shows the characteristics of the ―romantic triangle‖.

Myanmar is ―pivot‖, China and India will eager to deepen security relations with

Myanmar to check and balance each other. However, in terms of military security, India

is in a more favorable position than China.

Ⅴ Measurement of Political Perception and Cognition of China-Myanmar-India

1. Political perception and cognition among China-India-Myanmar

Throughout history, Myanmar has often capitalized on strong and deep-seated

xenophobic tendencies within Myanmar society to resist external economic, cultural or

military influences. As Mya Maung and Mikael Gravers argued in their respective

academic works, the political use of a traditional xenophobic nationalism has indeed been

a crucial tool for successive Myanmar regimes, from the Myanmar monarchy to the

SLORC, including the paroxysmal experience of General Ne Win's paranoiac system of

―Burmanization.‖ More specifically, Myanmar has witnessed the cultivation of

underlying but constant ―Sinophobic‖ and ― Indophobic ―sentiments among its population

as well as within the military establishment, trends which appeared to have been revived

India (7.5, 1.5)

China (7.5, 0.5) Myanmar (7.5, 5.5)

1 3.5

3


Second number is competitive

income


279

since the Chinese thrust into Myanmar after 1988 and the gradual catching up India has

attempted since. As a consequence, modern India and its population could also be

perceived in Myanmar as a potential demographic, cultural, economic and political threat,

in spite of the strategic rapprochement initiated by the Indian and Myanmar governments

since the mid-1990s. The Chinese in Myanmar too have suffered from strong xenophobic

attitudes developed by the Myanmar since the colonial era, yet to a lesser extent

compared to the Indians. Two decades after the sudden economic and strategic

penetration of China into Myanmar, the Myanmar resentment against the Chinese is still

perceptible but appears to have been ―managed,‖ After all, in the Myanmar psyche, the

Chinese are the ―paukphaw‖ or the senior brother, ―not considered as ―kalas‖ like the

Indians. The phenomenon prevents India and China from using Myanmar as a mere

playground for their bilateral rivalry.24

The misperception between China and India emerged as a key obstacle for further

development of bilateral relations. As stated by Robert Jervis, perception of a threat is

enough to create the threat itself.25

As for India's perception on relationships between

Myanmar and China, deliberately or unconsciously has been exaggerated, the Chinese

military thrust toward the Indian Ocean via Myanmar led to a disproportionate reaction

by India's strategists. The setting up by New Delhi of one of the most advanced and well-

equipped naval bases in the region, just a few nautical miles away from Myanmar's Coco

Islands in the Andaman Islands, now enables India to block any tentative Chinese

maritime penetration of the region, without having to fear the ―satellization‖ of

Myanmar's coast by China. But the misperceptions remain, and the issue might be the

one in which China and India will find the most serious bone of contention able fuelling

their competition in the region, with the Myanmar military skillfully playing the

balance.26

2. Measurement of Political Perception and Cognition of India, Myanmar and China

Based on the aforementioned methods of measurement, we assume that India and

Myanmar gain 1 from India and Myanmar Political Perception and Cognition separately,

China and Myanmar gain 2 from the Political Perception and Cognition between China

and Myanmar separately, and China and India gain 0 from and the Political Perception

and Cognition between India and China; the sum of gain for the three parties is

3(1+2+0=3)and India gets -1(1+0-2=-1), Myanmar gets 3(1+2-0=3) and China gets

1(2+0-1=1) individually. The trilateral relation is showed in triangle in Figure 5:

Figure 5


280

Political and cognition relations in this triangle shows characteristics of stable marriage

and Myanmar is a hub, and Myanmar can take advantage of the Sino-Indian bilateral

concerns to get more revenue.

Ⅵ Assessment of the Trilateral Relations on China-India-Myanmar after the Political Reform of Myanmar

Based on above analyzing, we conclude a quantization table of the trilateral relations as

followed:

Table 2: Quantitative Assessment of the Trilateral Relations on China-India-Myanmar

Score for bilateral relations Sum of Each Player’s Score for Cooperation

Sum of Each Player’s Score for competition

India-Myanmar

China-Myanmar

China-India

India Myanmar China

Politics 3 4 3 10 2 4 4

Economic and Trade

2 4 5 11 3 1 7

Military and security

3.5 3 1 7.5 1.5 5.5 0.5

Perception and Cognition

1 2 0 3 -1 3 1

Total 9.5 13 9 31.5 5.5 13.5 12.5

Then the Dittmer Strategic Triangle generated as Figure 5:

According to the Dittmer Strategic Triangle on China-India-Myanmar, we can see the

weak ―Ménage a trios‖ (Tripartite coexistence) characteristics in it, and based on the

gains level, Myanmar appear to be the ―pivot‖ player in the Tripartite relations. Tripartite

coexistence is the relative stable system, but players tend to make alliance with another

India (3, -1)


0 1

2


Second number is Competitive

income

India (31.5, 5.5)

China (31.5, 12.5) Myanmar (31.5, 13.5)

9 9.5

13


Second number is Competitive

income


281

player, and the system turned to be the ―romantic triangle‖, which also explains why

Myanmar looks like the ―pivot‖ player existed in ―romantic triangle‖.

Ⅶ Refine the Summation technology of the above assessment

As relations among countries are influenced by complex factors, In order to avoid the

results deviating from the ―real fact‖, and take the current and potential strength of three

players into consideration, I will add weight for each country based on their

comprehensive strength current and predicted, the main indicators reported by

International analysis agency will be my reference, such as GDP,GNI27

, GCI 28

,HDI29

,

CPI 30

, IEF31

etc, the weight will be put into calculation on final evaluation, take a

example, on top of the previous indicator I assign 2.75 for China as its weight, 2 for India

and 0.5 for Myanmar, and put them into the final calculation as below:

Score for bilateral relations Sum of Each Player’s Score for Cooperation

Sum of Each Player’s Score for competition

India- Myanmar

China-Myanmar

China-India

India Myanmar China

Politics 3 4 3 (3+4+3)*3*2*0.5=30 2*2=4 4*0.5=2 4*2.75=11

Economic and Trade

2 4 5 (2+4+5)*3*2*0.5=33 3*2=6 1*0.5=0.5 7*2.75=19.3

Military and security

3.5 3 1 (3.5+3+1)*3*2*0.5=22.5 1.5*2=3 5.5*0.5= 2.75

0.5*2.75=1.38

Perception and Cognition

1 2 0 (1+2+0)*3*2*0.5=9 -1*2=-2 3*0.5=1.5 1*2.75=2.75

Total 9.5 13 9 (9.5+13+9) *3*2*0.5=94.5 5.5*2=11

13.5*0.5= 6.75

12.5*2.75= 34.4

So the revised triangular relations would be like:

That is to say, in an absolute triangular relation, the cooperation among three countries is

the best way to gain maximum benefit, but if in competitive situation, the revenue of

rivalry for three players would rank like: China (most), India (mid) and Myanmar (last).

Logically, the triangle relations among China-India-Myanmar will keep relatively stable

in the near future, however, with the further reform in Myanmar, the continuing influence

from America and potential national power, ―the Sino-Indian equation in Myanmar

India (94.5, 11)

China (94.5, 34.4) Myanmar (94.5, 6.75)

9 9.5

13


Second number is competitive income


282

remains a ―quiet rivalry,‖ far from the image of a new ―Great Game‖ between the two

giants.

It also can be seen from the figures that the cooperation among three countries is the best

way to gain maximum benefit, Sino-Indian relations in the trilateral relations are

relatively low, but the revenue of rivalry for India will be low, and is also unfavorable to

China, though it is impossible for three countries to avoid competition in real politics,

cooperation is the best solution to serve interests of them. 1Theodore Caplow，“A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad”, American, Sociological Review，Vol. 21，1956，pp. 489-493;

Theodore Caplow，Two against One，Englewood Cliffs，NJ: Prentice-Hall，Inc.,1968. 2 Lowell Dittmer, ―The Strategic Triangle: A Critical Review,‖ World Politics，Vol. 33，No. 4，1981，pp. 485-515.

3陈志敏：《中国、美国和欧洲——新三边关系中的合作与竞争》，《世界经济与政治》，2010 年第 1 期。

4黄栋: 《认知结构平衡理论视角下的三边关系研究》，《太平洋学报》，2012 年第 2 期。 5 Ministry of External Affairs: India-Myanmar Relations 2011.

6 In the past, Indian shifts its position of supporting Aung San Suu Kyi into contacting with the military government, and thus

develop to be a more comprehensive cooperation. This was accused by the Western countries, saying it will result in the failure

of the Western countries sanctions on Myanmar and hinder the path of democratization in Myanmar. Meanwhile, Aung San Suu

Kyi has repeatedly accused the Indian government for not playing its due role in advancing the democratic process in Myanmar.

Facing pressure, the Indian government policy on Myanmar is careful and wavering. India expressed limited support for Western

sanctions against Myanmar after Saffron Revolution occurred in Myanmar in September 2007. Manmohan Singh also meets with

opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in visit of 2012 which is considered as a clear signal of rapprochement of Myanmar

democracy activist.

7 李晨阳：《2010 年大选之后的中缅关系：挑战与前景》，《和平与发展》，2012 年第 2 期。

8陈宗海：《中印关系60 年的历史脉络与现实态势》，《国际论坛》，2012 年第 1 期。

9新华社：《中国和印度发表<联合宣言>》，《人民日报》，2006-11-22. 10

Renaud Egretean, India and China Vying for Influence in Myanmar---A New Assessment, India Review, Vol 7,

No.1, January~March, 2008, pp.50. 11

India‘s Ambitious in Burma. Asian Survey, Vol. XLVIII, NO. 6, Novernmber / December 2008. 12

ADB. Myanmar in Transition: Opportunities and Challenges. 2012 13

Gurpreet S Khurana , China-India Maritime Rivalry, Indian Defence Review, Vol. 23:4, October-December 2009,

pp.3. 14


No.1, January~March, 2008, pp.56

15汤先营：中缅关系步入发展新阶段.人民网 http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2012/0912/c136457-18985533.html

2012-09-12 16


No.1, January~March, 2008, pp.43

17 卫灵：《印度安全战略及中印安全关系》，《中国人民大学学报》，2005 年第 6 期。 18

Srikanth Kondapalli, China realigns India strategy, The Times of India, May 23, 2013. 19

Arijit Mazumdar, Bhutan‘s Military Action against Indian Insurgents, Asian Survey 45:4 (July-August 2005), pp. 566 –80. 20

Ministry of External Affairs (India), Joint Statement Issued on the Occasion of the State

Visit of H. E. Senior-General Than Shwe, Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council of the Union of

Myanmar to India (25–29 October 2004) (New Delhi), October 29, 2004. 21

Renaud Egreteau, India's Ambitions in Burma: More Frustration than Success? Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 6

(November/December 2008), pp.946 22

India Swaps Arms for Co-operation with Myanmar, Jane‘s Defense Weekly, October 11, 2006. 23

Renaud Egreteau, India's Ambitions in Burma: More Frustration than Success? Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 6

(November/December 2008), pp.945 24


No.1, January~March, 2008, pp.64-65


283

25

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton:Princeton University Press,

1976), Chapter 4. 26

Fleet Expansion in Mind, Myanmar Looks to India for Expertise, the Indian Express, January 13, 2006. 27

Database of the World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/ 28

The World Economic Forum. ―The Global Competitiveness Report‖. 29

See the United Nations Development Programme, ―human development reports‖. http://hdr.undp.org/ 30

Transparency International Annual Report 2003-2011 http://www.transparency.org/ 31

The Heritage Foundation & The Wall Street Journal, ―2007-2012 Index of Economic Freedom‖,

http://www.heritage.org/index/ *************************

https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/

http://hdr.undp.org/

http://www.transparency.org/

http://www.heritage.org/index/


284

Myanmar and The US: Tying Up The Loose Ends

Dr Rahul Mishra

Researcher, Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, New Delhi

Dr Rahul Mishra is a Researcher associated with Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, New Delhi. Dr Mishra earned his MA, M.Phil and Ph.D. from Jawaharlal Nehru University. His doctoral thesis was focused on role of China in India’s Look East Policy. In 2012-13, Dr Mishra was a Visiting Fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore), where he worked on ‘India-Southeast Asia Defence Relations’. In 2011, Dr Mishra was affiliated with National University of Singapore (Singapore) as a Visiting Fellow. He was awarded the Junior Research Fellowship (2005-09) of the University Grants Commission to pursue research in international relations. Dr Mishra was a Visiting Fellow, Australian National University (Canberra), Curtin University of Technology (Perth), Monash University (Melbourne) and University of New South Wales (Sydney) in 2007- 2008. During his fellowship at Australian universities, he worked on politics over nuclear issues in Australia. He has been a Research Associate at Centre for Air Power Studies on a Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India Project. He has published widely and contributes articles in India’s leading Journals, magazines and newspapers including The Indian Express, Deccan Herald and the Tribune.

_____________________________

Introduction

After decades of self-imposed isolation and defiance of international norms, Myanmar is

opening up to the world through a range of reforms with the aim to embrace the world

community. The incumbent government led by the President Thein Sein is not only paying heed

to the global voices of concern regarding miserable economic conditions of the people,

widespread poverty, huge regional disparity and dismal human rights situation in the country, it

is also acting upon them to bring Myanmar back to normalcy. Clearly, Myanmar is heading

towards a new era of politico-economic and diplomatic engagement with the world. Though the

‗green shoots of recovery‘ are yet to mature, signs thereof are quite prominent, which have

enthused the supporters of a democratic Myanmar. Release of National League of Democracy

(NLD) leader and Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, ceasefire

agreements with rebel ethnic groups and swift economic reforms have further substantiated

President Thien Sein‘s claim that Myanmar is on an irreversible reform path.


285

So far as the external factors are concerned, the US has been by far the most important of

them in bringing about the turn-around in Myanmar‘s political dynamics. A multitude of reasons

substantiate that point. In the past two decades following 8888 incident and overthrow of

democracy, the US has tried to pressurise Myanmar by all means necessary to ensure the reversal

to democracy and greater respect for human rights in Myanmar. Needless to say, that the West,

led by the US, has achieved its objectives to some extent though not without Myanmar‘s own

willingness to change.

This paper explores the contours of Myanmar‘s relations with the US. The paper argues

that the US has been the most significant external factor that has driven Myanmar towards

democracy. It further argues that the pace of Myanmar‘s integration with international

organisations and the world community will, to a great extent, depend on its ties with the US,

and Myanmar must not miss the opportunity on that count.

Historical Background

After moving away from the clutches of the British Empire on January 4, 1948, the

Union of Burma, as it was called then, decided to have a parliamentary democratic system. Like

many other countries of Asia, it had to struggle with issues of poverty, inter-regional disparities

within the country and religious and ethnic strife while making efforts to strengthen democratic

values and achieve economic development and rebuild the nation. The people hoped that under

the leadership of father of the nation, General Aung San, the country would reach great heights

of development. However, unfortunately, Aung San was assassinated on July 19, 1947- six

months before Myanmar achieved independence. The years that followed Burmese

independence, remained peaceful until 1962 when in a coup d‘état the military wrested power

from the civilian government.

The Cold War Years: Years Leading Up to 8888 and Its Aftermath

Under the leadership of U Nu, Myanmar moved along the path of development.

However, the nascent democracy couldn‘t survive for long, and within a decade-and-a-half since

independence; in 1962 a military coup led by General Ne Win altered the situation, which

continued for good 26 years. In 1974, Ne Win introduced the ‗Burmese way of socialism‘ and

further isolated the country from rest of the world. Interestingly, in the first two decades since

Myanmar‘s independence, only 3 top leaders visited the US: Prime Minister U Nu (June 29-July


286

3, 1955), President U Win Maung (private visit for medical treatment- December 16-28, 1957),

and Chairman Ne Win (September 8-10, 1966). It took Myanmar 47 years to witness its top

leader visiting the US when President Thein Sein visited the country on May 20, 2013.

In the years that followed Ne Win‘s coming to power, Myanmar‘s relationship with the

US slipped on a downward spiral. In that context, it is believed that ‗since the start of World War

II the United States has engaged Burma for strategic reasons. Thousands of American airmen

died while flying the Hump; indeed, the search for their remains continues today with the

cooperation of the Myanmar military. Hundreds of U.S. soldiers parachuted into northern Burma,

where they gained safe harbor and joined Kachin guerrillas fighting the Japanese.‘1

According to

Badgley, ‗the Burmese refused further American aid in 1963, and rebuffed a U.S. offer of

assistance to Rangoon in the late 1960s when the Chinese Cultural Revolution spilled into Burma

and re-ignited a communist insurgency. Ne Win viewed the aid offer as running counter to

Burma‘s security interests, as it meant abandoning non-alignment, the cornerstone of Burma‘s

foreign policy. The First Party Congress of the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) re-

affirmed this line in 1971. But at the Second Party Congress in 1973, a group of active army

officers from the field commands were elected to the Party‘s Central Committee, and they

brought a sense of the need to break out from Burma‘s isolation.‘2 Clearly, the Ne Win years

spoiled Myanmar‘s relations with the US, and both the sides were equally responsible for that.

At that time, US couldn‘t press Burma had enough for return to democracy owing to Cold War

politics.

The relationship received further jolt in the aftermath of the 1988 military coup. Brutal

suppression of democracy in the country left the US and the world community stunned. As a

retaliatory measure, the US started to diplomatically boycott Myanmar in the international

community. This was easier for the US in 1990s as the world had become ‗unipolar‘ with the

collapse of Soviet Union and global support to democratic movement in Myanmar. Over the

years, Myanmar found itself an outcast, at least in the Western world, with European Union also

taking tough posture on the military junta led Myanmar. Incidentally, the US never cut-off ties

with Myanmar as it did with countries such as Iran and North Korea; it had simply downgraded

relations with Myanmar in 1990.3 The highest-level US diplomat based in Myanmar has been a

charge d'affaires until Derek Mitchell was appointed as US ambassador to the country.


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Washington downgraded its representation in 1990, when opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi's

party swept elections but was barred from power by the military.4In the 1990s, the United States

regularly impressed on the military government the need to recognise and honour the results of

the 1990 elections with an attendant transfer of power to a civilian government. The US has co-

sponsored the annual resolutions concerning Myanmar at the UN General Assembly, and the

UNCHR. For a brief period, from 2002-03, the US offered to look seriously at measures to

support constructive political change in Myanmar.5

For more than two decades since then the Myanmar-US relations remained strained. For

years preceding the Thein Sein era, the regime consistently rejected Western and Japanese calls

to start a genuine and inclusive national dialogue, and not hesitated to defy other political

demands. Since the Depayin incident, Myanmar and the US, in particular, have been firmly

locked in a battle of wills, although relations with the EU and Japan have also deteriorated.6

The

US imposed sanctions on Myanmar in 2003 through the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act.

The Act, which had the approval of both the Congress and the US President, provided for a

complete ban on all imports from Myanmar. Export of financial services to Myanmar was also

put to a halt. The Act was renewed even in 2010.

The year 2007 came as another shock to the Myanmar-US ties when the military

crackdown on peaceful protestors led to killings of hundreds of innocent monks. Several

countries including the US imposed sanctions on Myanmar in support of the ‗saffron revolution‘.

Recent Trends in US-Myanmar Relations

For almost two decades, US-Myanmar remained mired with mutual suspicion and

hostility. While the US had rightfully pressed the junta to restore democracy, the military junta

found that idea at cross-purpose. As a result, the military junta of Myanmar started taking extra

care in safeguarding its interests. Subsequently, the capital was also shifted to Naypyidaw.

According to Bertil Lintner, ‗the Junta‘s apparent fear of a pre-emptive US invasion by sea or air

strikes was at the time seen by some as a major motivation for the for the junta‘s decision to

move the capital to what they perceived to be safer, central mountainous location away from the

coast. After all, the US government had publically lumped Burma together with other rogue

regimes and referred to it as an ‗outpost of tyranny‘.‘7


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2010 General Elections: Thein Sein in The Ascendant

The General Elections held in 2010 offered some hope to the country grappling with

repressive regime for decades. Though the elections were called rigged and couldn‘t achieve the

recognition of the West; nevertheless it was Myanmar‘s first step to democracy in several years.

The year is also significant because in 2010, Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest a

few days after the General Elections were held in Myanmar. Though Aung San Suu Kyi and her

party- the National League for Democracy (NLD) boycotted the elections, she contested in the

by-elections in April 2012. Suu Kyi won her seat by a huge majority. These developments

naturally invited a lot of appreciation from the world community.

Evidently, the Myanmar‘s relationship with the US started looking up with Thein Sein‘s

coming to power and a range of reforms that he introduced in the country. In fact, since 2010,

slow yet steady changes in bilateral relations started to emerge and in 2011, the US government

begun the process of improving ties with Myanmar.

As mentioned earlier, though the November 2010 elections were vehemently criticised by

the US and other Western countries, yet the formation of a military-backed ‗nominally‘ civilian

government proved to be a turning point with President Thein Sein initiating steps towards

providing greater freedom and rights to its people. Among other things, it allowed people to hold

peaceful protest marches. The strengthening of provincial legislatures also showcases the

piecemeal changes were also set in motion. In addition, workers were also granted the right to

form unions.8 In the meantime, the US has been active in networking with pro-democracy

Myanmarese leaders based in the West. The US seems to be working on the idea that given

Myanmar‘s lack of experience with democracy and its weak institutional mechanisms, any

sudden military intervention or people‘s movement supported by external powers might not yield

the desired results.9

Obama’s friendly gestures and Hillary Clinton’s visit

Though at a nascent stage, the signs of a rapprochement between Myanmar and the US

were apparent even during President Obama‘s November 2009 Tokyo visit. Obama had then said

that the US would welcome Myanmar government‘s initiatives to restore democracy and steps


289

such as the unconditional release of political prisoners.

10 Although the signs of a transformation

in Myanmar were missing at that time, the Sein government did subsequently release hundreds

of political prisoners and even the torchbearer of the democratic movement - Aung San Suu

Kyi.11

The watershed event in terms of Myanmar-US relations has been the visit of the US

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in November 2011, making it the first visit by a Secretary of

State since 1955. In fact, Hillary Clinton‘s visit had indicated the possibility of the US wooing

the military backed Thein Sein government and securing political maneuvering space for Suu

Kyi. It appears that the US has realised that sanctions were not effective in bringing Myanmar on

to the democratic path. Additionally, anxiety over a possible North Korea- Myanmar axis may

also have played a part in America‘s changed stance.12

Reforms in Myanmar and USA’s reciprocal measures

As Myanmar started agreeing to the US demands, particularly that of release of political

prisoners, things started to change towards a more cordial relationship. Consequently, it was

announced on January 13, 2012 that US would appoint its Ambassador to Myanmar again,

thereby elevating the diplomatic representation in Myanmar. Subsequently, in 2012, the White

House appointed Derek Mitchell as the first ever US Ambassador to the country after 1990. In

July 2012, the US eased sanctions on Myanmar. In fact, Hillary Clinton announced a plan

regarding ‗targeted easing‘ of sanctions. Later, after much debate and discussions, the US

‗suspended‘ the sanctions imposed on Myanmar.

Taking a step further to reconcile differences with Myanmar, the US on February 6, 2012

waived some sanctions. The most prominent among them is the provision to allow Myanmar to

work with the World Bank and other international financial organisations.13

The decision was

seen as another gesture to appreciate the reformist actions taken by the Thein Sein government.

Within a few weeks since Hillary Clinton‘s visit to the country, more than a dozen high profile

leaders from US and other Western countries paid visits to Naypyidaw. Moreover, within a few

weeks after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton‘s historic November 2011 visit, the first such high

profile visit in 54 years, the US restored diplomatic ties with Myanmar.


290

As a follow-up to Hillary Clinton‘s visit, a number of US officials went to Myanmar to

gauge the reform process in the country and encourage the Sein government to carry on with the

reform process. Congressman Joe Crowley, US special envoy for Burma Derek Mitchell and

Luis Cdebaca of the State Department are prominent names in the list. Incidentally, Joe Crowley

was the first member of the US House of Representatives in more than 12 years to visit

Myanmar. A pro-democracy advocate, Crowley has in the past sponsored bills authorizing

sanctions against Myanmar including a 2008 measure that stopped gems from Myanmar entering

the United States via third countries.14

Clearly, the US decision to restore ties came in response

to the Sein government‘s release of hundreds of political prisoners, a move that was hailed by

Barack Obama as ‗a substantial step forward for democratic reform.15

Frictions with China

One of the most important reasons for Myanmar‘s attempt to inch closer to the US and

open up to the international community has been its relations with China, which went on a

downward spiral with the Myitsone dam controversy.16

Many believe that the Myitsone dam

issue in Kachin state has created friction between China and Myanmar, though both countries

denied it at the official level. Thein Sein suspended the US $ 3.6 billion dam construction project

due to massive local protests. The project, deferred until 2015, was meant to supply cheap

electricity to southern China. According to a report published in the Economist:

‗The Myitsone was to be the largest, and at about 150 metres (458 feet), one of the

highest in the world. If completed, the dam‘s reservoir would flood an area the size of

Singapore and drive more than 10,000 people, mainly from the Kachin ethnic group,

from their ancestral lands. The area straddles territory controlled by the Kachin

Independence Organisation (KIO), one of Myanmar‘s myriad insurgencies. Last May the

KIO warned China that building the dam would lead to ―civil war‖.‘17


291

As expected, Thein Sein government suspended the projected the dam project, as it had invited

strong protests from local populace. Unwilling to ignore popular protests, the Sein government

suspended the project.18

According to reports, China tried to intervene in the matter citing

potential economic losses and damage to the robust bilateral ties between the two countries.

Chinese officials also registered their protest on the matter. Some even went to the extent of

saying that, ‗It is impossible that the investor move the hydropower projects out of Myanmar ...

If the Myanmar people are at risk, the investment by the investor is at risk as well. The investor

and the Myanmar people are both stakeholders in dam construction.‘19

Thein Sein, however,

refused to pay heed to such complaints and went ahead with his decision.

One may argue that over the years, Myanmar had become over-dependant on China, to

the extent of being labelled a ‗satellite state‘ of China.20

Indications are that Myanmar wants to

interact with the world on its own accord so as to lessen its dependence on China. According to a

study carried out within Myanmar, the country‘s ―reliance on China as a diplomatic ally and

economic patron has created a ‗national emergency‘ which threatens the country's

independence.21

In addition, China's close ties with the United Wa State Army, Myanmar's main

drug-trafficking militia, has not gone unnoticed by the authorities in Naypyidaw.22

China has

been monopolising Myanmar‘s markets to such an extent that local traders have been left high

and dry. Also, the Chinese hunger for natural resources has, to a certain extent, ignited resource

nationalism amongst common Myanmarese.23

It is also believed that China has kept Myanmar

insulated in order to reap the benefits of its resources alone. Cautioning China about its

shortsighted approach, Thant Myint-U, in his book Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia:

Where China Meets India, rightly points out that ‗Chinese interests are served in the short term

but in the longer term anti-Chinese sentiment increases; the opportunity for a friendly and

mutually beneficial relationship, so important to Burma, is lost‘.24

Myanmar‘s relations with ASEAN and India have proved beyond doubt that Naypyidaw

has been striving to craft a balanced foreign policy, which enables the country to not become

excessively dependent on a particular country. Inching closer to the US seems to be a part of that

strategy. The Sein government is taking all possible measures to acquire US support, the most


292

crucial being the release of Suu Kyi who has in turn agreed to contest the by-election scheduled

for April 2012. This is considered a step in granting legitimacy to the Sein government and the

election process in Myanmar.25

In another positive sign, even the ethnic minority leaders have

been reaching out to the US, India and members of the European Union for developmental

investment in remote areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. Hillary Clinton‘s meeting with Kachin

ethnic minority leader Daw Bauk Gyar and others indicates that. For its part, the Sein

government has shown signs of adopting a reconciliatory approach towards the country‘s ethnic

minorities. In order to end incessant ethnic clashes in various parts of the country, the Sein

government has signed 11 ceasefire agreements including the January 2012 agreement with the

Karens, and those signed with the Shan and Kachin rebel groups in December 2011, and that

with the New Mon State Party on February 1.26

For instance, the deal with the Mons permits

them to celebrate their national day, which had been prohibited for the past 15 years.27

These

moves clearly demonstrate that the Sein government is keen to make peace with the country‘s

ethnic minorities. Bringing ethnic minority leaders into the political mainstream is also likely to

strengthen the democratic process in Myanmar, even though Suu Kyi is likely to remain the main

reference point for the further development of democracy in the near future.28

The US has acknowledged these changes in swiftly changing Myanmar and has been

taking into account the suggestions made by Myanmar‘s neighbours including India and the

member countries of ASEAN. India has consistently conveyed to the US the fact that sanctions

had not worked in most cases and might not work in Myanmar as well and that therefore a policy

change was required. Driven by this belief, India has been building bridges with Myanmar

through trade, investment and regular high-level visits by political and military delegations.29

As far as the sanctions are concerned, the process of easing sanctions has begun and it is

being done through various means. Japan and France have expressed their willingness to provide

financial aid to Myanmar, as are the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Moreover,

Australia, a key US ally in the Asia-Pacific, announced on January 9, 2012, that it would remove

sanctions on former ministers to acknowledge Myanmar‘s recent steps towards reform.30


293

Obama and Thein Sein: Exchanging Visits to Improve Ties

Countries across the globe, including China, responded positively to US President Barack

Obama‘s re-election in November 2012, largely because of the hopes and expectations of Obama

and the US. Obama has realized that the real challenge for the US foreign policy lies in Asia,

which sufficiently explains his pivot to Asia policy as also the visit to Myanmar in November

2012. Evidently, Myanmar is one of the few success stories where Obama has made a difference

by trying to bring the country on to a democratic path through diplomatic means.31

With his

November 2012 visit, President Obama became the first sitting U.S. president to visit Myanmar,

providing a symbolic nod to initial reforms in a nation once notorious for political repression.

The president's trip, his first overseas since winning re-election, foreshadowed the focus his

administration will place on Asia in a second term as part of a strategy to blunt Chinese influence

in the region.32

During his visit Obama met with Aung San Suu Kyi, and called it a new chapter

between the two countries.33

As another gesture of support, Obama referred to the country by the

government's preferred name -- Myanmar -- rather than the colonial name of Burma used by Suu

Kyi and democracy activists.34

Before meeting Suu Kyi, Obama spent an hour with Myanmar

President Thein Sein, whose reform drive has seen the release of hundreds of political prisoners

and steps to open the country's economy. The democratic and economic reforms started by the

president could lead to "incredible development opportunities," Obama said.35

"The flickers of

progress that we have seen must not be extinguished," Obama said. "Reforms launched from the

top of society must meet the aspirations of citizens who form its foundation."36

Even critics in Congress of Obama's Myanmar policy support the U.S. strategic goal of

bringing Myanmar out of its isolation. The long U.S. -Myanmar estrangement was a drag on

America's relations with ASEAN, the 10 nations Southeast Asian regional grouping that looks to

Washington as a counterbalance to the more assertive China of recent years. Earlier in May

2013, Obama scrapped a ban on U.S. entry visas to Myanmar's military rulers and their

associates but kept sanctions on investing or doing business with figures involved in repression

since the mid-1990s.37

However, despite extending its support on several fronts, the Obama administration has

maintained that it will not allow investments in military entities that are owned by armed forces


294

of Myanmar or its Ministry if Defence. In addition, U.S. companies will be asked to report on

their activities in line with international corporate governance standards.38

Furthermore, ‗a new

Executive Order that expands the Secretary of the Treasury‘s existing sanctions authorities to

those who undermine the reform process, engage in human rights abuses, contribute to ethnic

conflict, or participate in military trade with North Korea‘.39

As per the press release of the White

House, the order is ‗a clear message to Burmese government and military officials: those

individuals who continue to engage in abusive, corrupt, or destabilising behavior going forward

will not reap the rewards of reform.‘40

Obama also devised a new clause empowering the US

government to impose ―blocking sanctions‖ on any individual threatening peace in Myanmar.41

Additionally, it has also been reported that businesses with more than US$ 500,000 in investment

in the country will need to file an annual report with the State Department, with details on

workers‘ rights, land acquisitions and any payments of more than US$ 10,000 to government

entities, including Myanmar‘s state-owned enterprises.42

Conclusion

Clearly, for the US, Myanmar has not only become a test case of its influence but also a

major opportunity to restore peace in the country and integrate it with the global economic

system. The US will naturally benefit from an open and peaceful Myanmar. Although a lot needs

to be done to ensure that Myanmar becomes a fully functioning democracy, the budding shoots

of democratic recovery are surely encouraging. The Sein government deserves a word of

appreciation on the count that its acceptability, both domestically and globally, has gone up by

leaps and bounds. The current trajectory of developments is likely to lead to the point where the

US and the Thein Sein led government find ways to resolve outstanding points of contention

between them, leading to Myanmar moving further along the path of greater political freedom,

better human rights and good governance. However, being the most important external factor

determining the future of Myanmar, the US has to ensure that ethnic unrest including the

ongoing ethnic riots against Rohingyas are stopped and their human rights are protected. On its

part Myanmar has to reconcile internal ethnic and economic issues before things start falling

apart and go beyond the government‘s control. This is important as both the domestic


295

constituency and international community are getting increasingly hopeful and demanding of the

government- and the Thein Sein government can‘t afford to disappoint them. Another tough

challenge for Myanmar, which further mounts the challenge on Myanmar, is that it has to take up

the ASEAN chair in 2014- the year when Myanmar has to be fully ready to showcase itself as a

country with democratic values and development at its core. Having the US by its side, which is

a likely situation so far, would only boost the image of these ‗new friends‘ and enhance their

image at the global stage.

Reference

1. John H. Badgley, ‗Strategic Interests in Myanmar‘ The National Bureau of Asian Research, Vol. 15, No. 1,

March 2004, http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=340

2. Ibid.

3. After the then ambassador Burton Levin‘s retirement in September 1990, the US never sent a new

ambassador.

4. ‗US and Burma to swap ambassadors in ‗substantial step for reform‘, The Guardian, January 13, 2012,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/13/us-burma-swap-ambassadors-reform

5. Jurgen Haacke, ‗Myanmar‘s foreign policy- domestic influences and international implications‘, Adelphi

Paper, no. 381,2006, pp. 60- 65.

6. Ibid. P. 61.

7. Bertil Lintner, Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma‘s Struggle for Democracy, Silkworm Books, Thailand, P.

107.

8. Rahul Mishra, ‗Road Ahead for Myanmar‘, The Indian Express, January 23, 2012

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/road-ahead-for-myanmar/902773/

9. Rahul Mishra, ‗Myanmar and the United States: On a Reconciliatory Path?‘ IDSA Comment, Institute for

Defence Studies and Analyses, February 14, 2012,

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MyanmarandtheUnitedStatesOnaReconciliatoryPath_rmishra_130212

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. ‗Key US lawmaker heads to Myanmar to assess reform pace‘, The Straits Times, January 11, 2012,

http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/SEAsia/Story/STIStory_754158.html

15. Op. Cit. No. 4.

16. OP. Cit. No. 9.

17. ‗Myanmar‘s surprising government: Dammed if they don‘t‘, The Economist, October 4, 2011.

18. Op. Cit. No. 9.

19. ‗China presses Myanmar on stalled dam‘, Asia Times Online, February 7, 2012,

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NB07Ae01.html

20. Op. Cit. No. 9.

21. Cited in Bertil Lintner, ‗The Master plan for Myanmar‘,

http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NB10Ae01.html, accessed February 10, 2012. The study,

published in 2004 under the title ‗A Study of Myanmar-U.S. Relations‘, was written by Lt. Col. Aung

Kyaw Hla. Hla, according to Bertil Lintner, can either be a researcher at the Myanmar's Defence Services

Academy or a codename used by a military think-tank.

22. Ibid.

23. Op. Cit. No. 9.

http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=340

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/road-ahead-for-myanmar/902773/

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MyanmarandtheUnitedStatesOnaReconciliatoryPath_rmishra_130212

http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/SEAsia/Story/STIStory_754158.html

http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NB10Ae01.html


296

24. Myint-U, Thant , Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia- Where China Meets India, Faber and Faber

Limited: London 2011, p. 325.

25. ‗Suu Kyi confirms bid for parliament seat‘, The Indian Express, January 11, 2012,

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/briefly-world-suu-kyi-confirms-bid-for-parliament-seat/898284/

26. ‗Myanmar Civil Society Delegation Visits Clinton‘, RTT News, February 9, 2012,

http://www.rttnews.com/1816415/myanmar-civil-society-delegation-visits-clinton.aspx

27. ‗Myanmar‘s Mons allowed to mark national day‘,Al Jazeera, February 8, 2012,

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/02/201228145322572206.html

28. Op. Cit. No. 9.

29. Ibid.

30. ‗Australia Relaxes Sanctions on Ex-Burmese Ministers‘, The Epoch Times, January 9, 2012,

http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/australia/australia-relaxes-sanctions-on-ex-burmese-ministers-

172384.html

31. Rahul Mishra, ‗Glow of success in Myanmar‘, The Indian Express, November 16, 2012,

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/glow-of-success-in-myanmar/1031603/

32. ‗Obama lauds Aung San Suu Kyi, gives a nod to Myanmar‘, CNN, November 19, 2012,

http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/19/politics/obama-asia-trip

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. ‗Obama walks a fine line with Myanmar President‘s landmark visit‘, Reuters, May 19, 2013,


38. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‗Statement by the President on the easing of sanctions on

Burma‘, July 11, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/11/statement-president-

easing-sanctions-burma

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. ‗US sanctions on Myanmar formally eased‘, The New York Times, July 11, 2012,

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/world/asia/us-sanctions-on-myanmar-formally-eased.html?_r=0

42. Ibid.

E*****************************N**********************************D

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/glow-of-success-in-myanmar/1031603/


http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/11/statement-president-easing-sanctions-burma

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/11/statement-president-easing-sanctions-burma

FPRC Journal Journal 2013(3) ... Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIAS)...

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