Fill In DA

The Top

1nc

Maintaining U.S. arms sales is crucial to retain power competition and avoid China or Russia fill-in. Immediately wrecks the economy and power projection while increasing sales in the long term to combat foreign offers. This link independently turns the case.Dave Majumdar (defense editor for the National Interest) 8/9/2018 [“The Trump Administration Has a Plan to Compete with Russia and China over Weapon Sales” online @ https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/trump-administration-has-plan-compete-russia-and-china-over-weapon-sales-28327, loghry]The Trump Administration is hoping to boost the export prospects for American weapons systems to allied countries by modifying policies and streamlining the bureaucratic process. The Trump Administration announced a revised conventional arms transfer policy in April, but that is just the first step. There are more policy changes coming down the line. “The new policy reflects the priorities of the president’s National Security Strategy,” Ambassador Tina Kaidanow, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, said on Aug. 8 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Which are, namely, to preserve peace through strength by reforming regulations to facilitate the exports of U.S. military equipment; to strengthen partners and allies; to facilitate U.S. economic security and innovation.” Under the new policy, the United States hopes to make its export bureaucracy more proactive and cut red tape in the process. “These steps are among the first in what we hope will be a series of efforts to streamline the arms transfer process,” Kaidanow said. “I can assure you that my colleagues and I at the State Department, but also again more broadly in the USG, will continue exploring ways to cut red tape and give U.S. industry every advantage in an increasingly competitive global marketplace, while continuing to ensure the responsible export of arms.” The United States is making these policy changes with great power competition with China and Russia in mind. “We’re trying to improve our ability to compete with our adversaries by providing our partners with viable alternatives to foreign products in order to maintain influence in key regions throughout the world,” Laura Cressey, Deputy Director for Regional Security and Arms Transfers at U.S. Department of State, said. “We’re going to be working with our partners and allies to identify critical capability requirements that they have and then trying to expedite transfers to support these essential foreign policy and national security objectives.” However, writing the policy guidance is the easy part. Implementing the policy will be far more challenging. “The release of the new policy was only the first step in a series of what we believe will be very practical results-focused initiatives to transform the way that the U.S. government works to support and grow our defense industrial base ,” Kaidanow said. “Through that memorandum, the president also directed the secretary of state, in coordination with the secretaries of defense, commerce, and energy, to submit an implementation plan within 60 days.” As part of the effort, the United States is looking at reforming export hurdles such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, which has been a vexing problem for the defense industry for decades. “We’ll look at streamlining the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, or ITAR, and also continuing to revise the U.S. Munitions List and the Commerce Control List,” Cressey said. Additionally, the State Department and Defense Department will try to speed up the bureaucratic processes involved in weapons exports. “We will also be looking at the day-to-day processes to ensure that we are as efficient, as streamlined, and as effective as possible,” Cressey said. “So some of the things that we’re looking at, and that folks in industry and associations have asked us to look at, is: establishing milestones and timelines for the foreign military sales process; improving and speeding up our contracting process – processes within the Defense Department; trying to increase the competitiveness of U.S. defense items and systems by

building in exportability to the design and development; and also by expanding support for what we call non-program-of-record systems. We’re looking into potential financing options that could make our systems more attainable for our foreign partners. And we’re also examining existing polices to ensure that they don’t unnecessarily detract from our ability to compete in international – in the international marketplace.” Without the changes , the United States is increasingly in danger of losing its market share as China, in particular, increasing develops and produces evermore-capable weapons for the export market. One example is the Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) market, which the United States dominates, but which is also threatened by Chinese competition and by Washington’s tight export regulations. “By removing some of the previous administration’s artificial barriers to the transfer of arms to critical partners, the UAS export policy being one example, this administration is both strengthening our hand in the ongoing strategic competition while also stimulating economic growth at home, as well as job creation,” Alex Gray, Special Assistant to the President for the Defense Industrial Base, said. “It should be noted that the U.S. aerospace and defense industries contribute almost $1 trillion annually to the U.S. economy and they support about 2.5 million American jobs. Just as one point, the international – UAS export market alone is estimated to be worth more than $50 billion a year within the next decade. Those are the stakes we’re competing for.” Those nations that are unable to purchase American weapons could find that China or Russia are more than willing to supply them with comparable systems . “We are witnessing China – as an example, not alone – but China filling voids the U.S. left with a denial to a friend or ally,” Keith Webster, president of the Defense and Aerospace Export Council at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said. “The consequence of a denial filled by China or others is as follows: The U.S. loses market share that is not easily recaptured, and in some cases will never be recaptured. The U.S. loses control of the capability. The U.S. loses the opportunity to train, influence, and maintain a military relationship with foreign forces, who now are introducing into their inventory a Chinese – Korean, Israeli, et cetera – capability.” There are some immediate examples that Webster said he could point to. “We never answered India’s request for ballistic missile defense capability.” “That ask of the U.S. went unanswered for a number of years. And now, India has been forced to consider and has – may potentially go buy, potentially, the Russian S-400 system. Similar to what Turkey’s buying—or said they were going to buy. Now we are rushing to put together a proposal for BMD for India to counter that situation.”

Failure to contain China and Russia sparks warfighting and nuclear proliferation that results in extinctionMichael Mandelbaum (Christian A. Herter Professor Emeritus of American Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies) March/April 2019 [“The New Containment” Foreign Affairs. Mar/Apr2019, Vol. 98 Issue 2, p123-131. 9p, loghry]The weakest link in the chain may be the most powerful country itself. There are reasons to expect the American public to support a leading role in the containment of Russia, China, and Iran. The United States has a long history with such a foreign policy. The approach has geopolitical logic behind it, promising to protect American interests in crucial parts of the world at a reasonable price. But there are also reasons for skepticism. Today’s threats appear less urgent, coping with them will be more complicated, and the country’s attitude toward foreign entanglements has understandably soured over the last two decades. The United States was pulled into both world wars by external attacks, and Americans gave their support to a foreign policy of global reach during the Cold War because they were persuaded it would head off yet another world war. After the Soviet collapse, many of the Cold War arrangements persisted through inertia and gained support because they seemed to entail little expense or risk. Now that the expenses and risks of such a policy have increased, many Americans may

reconsider their support. The skepticism has deepened because of the county’s recent misadventures abroad. The interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya turned out poorly, and the public has little taste for more. This view has much to recommend it. But it need not threaten the prospects of a new containment, because that course is quite different from the failed crusades of recent decades. Those involved efforts to transform the internal politics and economies of weak states. Containment involves the opposite, checking the external conduct of strong states. If national leaders can appreciate and explain the difference, they may be able to bring the public along. The resurgence of populism, finally, makes any such project more difficult. The essence of populism is hostility to elites, and the design and conduct of foreign policy are elite activities. The foreign policy establishment favors a robust American role in the world. That may be a good enough reason for antiestablishment rebels, including the populist in chief now residing in the White House, to oppose one. So the future direction of American foreign policy is unclear. Washington might forgo leading coalitions to contain the three revisionist powers, in which case their strength will increase . Emboldened by the American abdication, they may grow aggressive and try to coerce their neighbors . Those neighbors currently rely on the American nuclear arsenal to protect them; if they come to doubt the credibility of American security guarantees, they may follow Israel and opt to develop or acquire their own arsenals in order to protect themselves. An American retreat would thus make the world more dangerous and nuclear proliferation more likely . Thanks to the size, geography, and power of the United States, Americans for many generations have been able to pay less attention to American foreign policy than have the citizens of other countries, whose lives and fortunes that policy has more immediately and directly affected. Should the country turn decisively away from its global role and allow the revisionist challenges to advance unchecked, however, Americans’ happy detachment from the world beyond their borders may disappear. And by the time they realize what they need to protect, it may be too late to do so without great difficulty and high cost .©

Independently – US power is key to global securityRobert Kagan (Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Strategy) 1/24/2017 [“The twilight of the liberal world order” online @ https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-twilight-of-the-liberal-world-order/, loghry]The best way to avoid great power clashes is to make the U.S. position clear from the outset. That position should be that the United States welcomes competition of a certain kind. Great powers compete across multiple planes—economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order upheld by the liberal powers, even if it is not itself liberal. But security competition is different . The security situation undergirds everything else . It remains true today as it has since the Second World War that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide global security . There is no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And while we can talk about soft power and smart power, they have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest. Even in other great powers’ backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to use military power to establish balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers.

2nc – Both Link

Cessation of sales to Saudi Arabia wrecks relations and causes Russian and Chinese diversification, locking the United States out of the regionLt. Col. Ray Rounds (U.S. Air Force F-15E pilot and a Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University in International Relations. He is a U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies graduate and a former Mirage 2000 exchange pilot with the French Air Force.) 4/16/2019 [“THE CASE AGAINST ARMS EMBARGOS, EVEN FOR SAUDI ARABIA” online @ https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/the-case-against-arms-embargos-even-for-saudi-arabia/, loghry]In sum, more restrictive arms sales, delivery suspensions, or outright embargos are unlikely to succeed in policy coercion. While arms transfers provide an avenue of influence, embargos often lead to diversification , not desired policy changes. Additionally, fears of technology transfer and direct offsets creating a competitor out of every client are generally unfounded in the high-end market in which the United States generally deals. Finally, while the large domestic market provides the United States the luxury of sacrificing financial gains for political influence, sometimes economics do matter, particularly when it comes to saving a production line for future flexibility. These conclusions should therefore inform U.S. policy on Saudi Arabia. The intent here is not to argue the moral or ethical responsibility of U.S. leaders in responding to Saudi Arabia’s execution of journalists or tactics in the war in Yemen. It is natural to see the horror wrought in Yemen and want to take any actions necessary to stop it. However, I ultimately argue against a Saudi embargo. This is not because, as the president has argued, it might cost a few billion dollars and some hundreds of defense industry jobs. As others have pointed out, the economic impact of Saudi arms purchases on the U.S. defense industry is relatively small. Rather, embargoing Saudi Arabia is unlikely to fundamentally alter Saudi policies, but likely to further damage U.S. ties with Riyadh. In the near-term, Saudi Arabia can substitute other weapons, such as the Eurofighter and Tornado, and “dumb bombs” instead of U.S.-built “smart weapons.” The Saudis can also rely more heavily on their Emirati and Egyptian partners using non-U.S. produced arms. In the medium to long term, such an embargo is likely to push the Kingdom to greater arms diversification . If history is any guide, the United States will eventually lift any potential arms embargo with little change in Saudi behavior, but only after having provided an opportunity for adversary states such as Russia and China to gain a strategic foothold in Riyadh. Some might counter that it would be extremely difficult and costly, in both time and money, for the Saudis to significantly diversify their arms acquisitions away from the United States. This is absolutely the case. However, costly does not mean impossible. Less wealthy states have already done it. Egypt is one example above; but others such as Venezuela and even tiny Kuwait — frustrated at years of U.S. approval delays — have significantly diversified their arms acquisitions. In other words, with the money and options available to Saudi Arabia, and few other producers showing a stomach for a full embargo, it is not unreasonable to believe that the Saudis might significantly diversify their arms acquisitions over time in response to a U.S. embargo. Thus, while a U.S. embargo might be morally compelling and emotionally satisfying, it is unlikely to create meaningful change for those most at risk or be strategically beneficial to the United States. In the absence of a compelling, evidence-based case that an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia might produce desired changes in behavior, policymakers should look elsewhere for solutions to their Saudi problems.

2nc – Both Impact Pod

Losing power competition with China and Russia risks collapsing the global orderMichael Mandelbaum (Christian A. Herter Professor Emeritus of American Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies) March/April 2019 [“The New Containment” Foreign Affairs. Mar/Apr2019, Vol. 98 Issue 2, p123-131. 9p, loghry]The quarter century following the Cold War was the most peaceful in modern history. The world’s strongest powers did not fight one another or even think much about doing so. They did not, on the whole, prepare for war, anticipate war, or conduct negotiations and political maneuvers with the prospect of war looming in the background. As U.S. global military hegemony persisted, the possibility of developed nations fighting one another seemed ever more remote. Then history began to change course. In the last several years, three powers have launched active efforts to revise security arrangements in their respective regions. Russia has invaded Crimea and other parts of Ukraine and has tried covertly to destabilize European democracies. China has built artificial island fortresses in international waters, claimed vast swaths of the western Pacific, and moved to organize Eurasia economically in ways favorable to Beijing. And the Islamic Republic of Iran has expanded its influence over much of Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen and is pursuing nuclear weapons. This new world requires a new American foreign policy. Fortunately, the country’s own not-so-distant past can offer guidance. During the Cold War, the United States chose to contain the Soviet Union, successfully deterring its military aggression and limiting its political influence for decades. The United States should apply containment once again, now to Russia, China, and Iran. The contemporary world is similar enough to its mid-twentieth-century predecessor to make that old strategy relevant but different enough that it needs to be modified and updated. While success is not guaranteed, a new containment policy offers the best chance to defend American interests in the twenty-first century. Now as before, the possibility of armed conflict exerts a major influence on the foreign policies of the United States and countries throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The Cold War divided the world into rival camps, with regions and even countries split in two. Today, similar cleavages are developing, with each revisionist power seeking its own sphere of influence separate from the larger U.S.-backed global order. Now as before, the revisionist powers are dictatorships that challenge American values as well as American interests. They seek to overturn political, military, and economic arrangements the United States helped establish long ago and has supported ever since. Should Vladimir Putin’s Russia succeed in reasserting control over parts of the former Soviet Union, Xi Jinping’s China gain control over maritime commerce in the western Pacific, or Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s Iran dominate the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf, the United States, its allies, and the global order they uphold would suffer a major blow .

Strong global order solves every impactRobert Kagan (Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Strategy) 1/24/2017 [“The twilight of the liberal world order” online @ https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-twilight-of-the-liberal-world-order/, loghry]However, it is the two great powers, China and Russia, that pose the greatest challenge to the relatively peaceful and prosperous international order created and sustained by the United States. If they were to accomplish their aims of establishing hegemony in their desired spheres of influence, the world would return to the condition it was in at the end of the 19th century, with competing great powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres of interest. These were the unsettled, disordered conditions that produced the fertile ground for the two destructive world wars of the first

half of the 20th century. The collapse of the British-dominated world order on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on the European continent due to the rise of a powerful unified Germany, combined with the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all contributed to a highly competitive international environment in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. The result was an unprecedented global calamity. It has been the great accomplishment of the U.S.-led world order in the 70 years since the end of the Second World War that this kind of competition has been held in check and great power conflicts have been avoided. The role of the United States, however, has been critical . Until recently, the dissatisfied great and medium-size powers have faced considerable and indeed almost insuperable obstacles to achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the order itself and of its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” in their regions that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and in most respects to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has served as a check on their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. They have been participants in and for the most part beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helped sustain and, so long as that system was functioning, have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The same cannot be said of the political and strategic aspects of the order, both of which have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism have posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions, including especially the geographical advance close to their borders, as an existential threat—and with reason. The continual threat to the basis of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported order has made them hostile both to the order and to the United States. However, it has also been a source of weakness and vulnerability. Chinese rulers in particular have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their sources of legitimacy at home. And although Vladimir Putin has to some extent used a calculated foreign adventurism to maintain his hold on domestic power, he has taken a more cautious approach when met with determined U.S. and European opposition, as in the case of Ukraine, and pushed forward, as in Syria, only when invited to do so by U.S. and Western passivity. Autocratic rulers in a liberal democratic world have had to be careful. The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions, however, has come from the combined military power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful itself, has had to contemplate facing the combined military strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest, including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these military powers present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on no allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations. A weaker Russia would face an even greater challenge. Faced with these obstacles, the two great powers, as well as the lesser dissatisfied powers, have had to hope for or if possible engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within. This could come about either by separating the United States from its allies, raising doubts about the U.S. commitment to defend its allies militarily in the event of a conflict, or by various means wooing American allies out from within the liberal world order’s strategic structure. For most of the past decade, the reaction of American allies to greater aggressiveness on the part of China and Russia in their respective regions, and

to Iran in the Middle East, has been to seek more reassurance from the United States. Russian actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria; Chinese actions in the East and South China seas; Iranian actions in Syria, Iraq, and along the littoral of the Persian Gulf—all have led to calls by American allies and partners for a greater commitment. In this respect, the system has worked as it was supposed to. What the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order reflected this dynamic—as dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions. The system has depended, however, on will, capacity, and coherence at the heart of the liberal world order. The United States had to be willing and able to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm. The order’s ideological and economic core—the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific—had to remain relatively healthy and relatively confident. In such circumstances, the combined political, economic, and military power of the liberal world would be too great to be seriously challenged by the great powers, much less by the smaller dissatisfied powers.

2nc – China Link

Arms exports are zero-sum, China fills in any gap caused by the planKristin Huang (senior China reporter, who focuses on diplomacy and defence) 3/12/2018 [“China’s arms sales rise as it vies with US for influence on the world stage” online @ https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2136877/chinas-arms-sales-rise-it-vies-us-influence-world-stage, loghry]The rivalry between America and China has seen both sides step up international arms sales and transfers as they seek to strengthen military ties with key allies, according to a report published on Monday. The study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which examined the volume of international transfers of major weapons between 2008 and 2017, showed China’s arms exports represented 5.7 per cent of the world’s share of arms exports between 2013-17 – up by more than a third from the 4.6 per cent recorded between 2008-12. The report was published a week after China unveiled an 8.1 per cent increase in military spending over a three-year period, although China’s state media defended the rise as proportionate and low, adding that it would not lead to an arms race with the United States. The administration of US President Donald Trump has dubbed China as a “rival”, and the latest SIPRI report shows how the US has used arms transfers as a foreign policy tool to offset Beijing’s growing influence . For example, US arms deliveries to India grew by 557 per cent between 2008 and 2017, the year China and India became embroiled in a protracted border dispute over the Doklam region in the Himalayas. “This development is part of the growing strategic partnership between the two countries under which the USA has begun to supply India with advanced military equipment,” the report said. ‘No arms race with US’: China defends military spending rise as low The US has also started to increase its security cooperation with Vietnam, which is embroiled in a dispute with Beijing over the South China Sea. In 2017 it delivered one patrol ship, the USS Morgenthau, to Vietnam – the first major US arms transfer to that country. Tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea also saw Japan moving closer to the US, the report said. It said Tokyo turned to the US for several types of advanced weapons between 2013 and 2017, including the first batches of a total of 42 combat aircraft. Japan also ordered advanced air and missile defence systems from the US in the same period. But in cases where US relations with other countries had deteriorated the result was a fall in arms transfers. For example, the report said that Venezuela, which once relied on the US as its main arms supplier, had rebuilt its armed forces with weapons from China and Russia after ties with Washington soured following the Hugo Chavez’s election as president in 1999.

2nc – China Impact Pivot

China fill-in collapses U.S. hege, risks rampant authoritarianism and human rights abusesWendell Minnick (Taipei-based journalist who has spent two decades covering military and security issues in Asia) 11/17/2018 [“Why Is China Building So Many Different Types of Weapons?” online @ https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-china-building-so-many-different-types-weapons-36327, loghry]Even though the Chinese defense industry is “pretty monolithic” there is a “lot of competition inside each sector,” Bitzinger said. As an example, within AVIC, there are two major combat builders, Shenyang and Chengdu, and “they frequently compete with aircraft projects, such as the J-8 vs. J-10 and J-20 vs. J-31.” This is China’s traditional approach to reducing the technological risks caused by the weakness of the domestic industrial base, Kashin said, which has a history of simultaneously developing two systems. Kashin said that the first one would be a high-risk project, usually expensive, innovative and involving imported components. The second, a less ambitious low risk project suits the minimal requirements of the PLA, which can be accomplished without external help. As a result, the PLA would get the new systems even if the external supply chain is disrupted or the project fails. Even if the propagation of so many weapons is a calculated government strategy or evidence that the military-industrial complex has “run amok,” it has potential to cause chaos on the international scene, said Robert Haddick at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, Air Force Association. Top Chinese government leaders see themselves in competition with the United States for influence in key countries around the world. They see the large U.S. presence in arms exports to vital countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, as a form of U.S. global influence that China needs to counter, he said. If China displaces the United States as the preferred arms supplier that would shift economic and diplomatic influence from Washington to Beijing. China’s military industry might think it is “mature enough to take on the U.S. defense industry and prevail,” Haddick said. Chris Pocock, another Zhuhai Airshow veteran and UK-based aerospace specialist, said the Chinese have no moral scruples about exporting to renegade, corrupt and unstable states that the West will not supply. China is a dream for despots, as China provides “low acquisition costs and, of course, cheap loans.” Giarra believes that China is in a “race with the United States and the rest of the world.” In the past, this would have been known as an arms race, but it really does take some competition for it to be a race, he said.

Collapse of US hegemony causes a power vacuum which leads to terrorism, economic collapse, disease, and nuclear warsFerguson, Stanford University’s Hoover Foundation Senior Fellow, 4 [Niall, July 2004, Foreign Policy, “A World Without Power,” https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/afp/vac.htm, accessed 7-7-13, MSG]So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous—roughly 20 times more—so friction between the world's disparate “tribes” is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too,

so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization—the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization—which a new Dark Age would produce—would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony—its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier—its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity—a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

2nc – Russia Link

Failure to sell particular systems causes Russia fill-inJonathan Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 4/6/2018 [“AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME” online @ https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/, loghry]U.S. restraint also limits the spread of technology, which dampens global arms races and slows the spread of dangerous advanced weapons technology, which will eventually diffuse to American adversaries. And of course, it prevents the emergence of competitors, which makes good economic sense as well. Historically, the United States has practiced “unilateral restraint” by foregoing exporting its highest-capability weapons to a region until a viable competing product emerges; for example, refusing to deliver advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles to Asian states until China purchased the Russian equivalent R-77. More broadly, the United States, more than any other exporter, jealously guards against the spread of weapons know-how even to its closest allies (often arms exporters themselves). A case in point is Turkey’s effort to acquire foreign long-range air and anti-missile defense systems, hoping to acquire the underlying technology and eventually become a major arms exporter itself. The U.S.-made Patriot system was eliminated from consideration because most of its technology would not be given to Turkey. Announcing the ultimate deal with Russia, Turkey’s presidential spokesman was frank: “The price difference could have been manageable. But the issue of technology transfer was more important. On this issue, our allies, including the United States, caused a big disappointment.” The United States, again because of its market power, can afford this restraint in order to maintain its global technological dominance.

2nc – Russia Impact Pivot

Russia is revisionist, and only credible deterrence solvesSatter ‘16 - senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a fellow of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, visiting professor @ U of I-Champaign (David, “Trump and Russia,” National Review, https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/08/donald-trump-russia-policy-dangerously-na-ve-about-vladimir-putin/)Trump has indicated that he is open to lifting sanctions against Russia imposed after the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine and to cooperating with Russia in Syria, ostensibly against the Islamic State. He has suggested that the NATO alliance is passé and that, if elected, he would not necessary abide by the U.S. commitment under NATO to defend the Baltic republics. Trump’s Russia policy, however, has no chance of leading to an improvement in relations between the U.S. and Russia or to greater world stability. The reason is that although the U.S. wants Russia as a friend, Russia’s leaders need the U.S. as an enemy.

Only in this way, can the anger of the Russian people be directed against the West instead of against them. The leaders of post-Soviet Russia use wars to achieve internal political objectives . The first Chechen war was “a small victorious war” that was calculated to raise the popularity of President Boris

Yeltsin, which fell because of the suffering caused by market “reforms” in the 1990s. The second Chechen war was started to save the Yeltsin entourage from prison or worse and assure Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. Four apartment buildings in Buinaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk were blown up in 1999, killing 300 people; the attack was blamed on Chechen terrorists. In fact, there is overwhelming evidence that the bombings were carried out by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the Soviet-era KGB. This evidence includes the fact that FSB agents were caught after placing a bomb in a fifth building in Ryazan southeast of Moscow and that Gennady Seleznev, the speaker of the Russian Duma, announced the bombing in Volgodonsk on September 16, 1999 — three

days before it occurred. The bombings were used to justify a new invasion of Chechnya and success in that war brought Putin to power. In other words, there is overwhelming evidence that Putin rules as a result of an act of terror against his own people. The leaders of post-Soviet Russia use wars to achieve internal political objectives. The war in Ukraine was also a diversion. It was launched to distract the Russian people from the lessons of the Maidan revolt in Ukraine,

specifically that it is possible for a people to organize spontaneously and overthrow a kleptocratic regime. The war in Syria, in turn, was undertaken in order to distract attention from the lack of success in Ukraine. The ambitious plans to carve out a “New Russia” from sovereign Ukrainian territory

were at least temporarily frozen in the face of Western sanctions and stiff Ukrainian military resistance. Trump’s call for a grand bargain with Russia is therefore naïve and misguided. It will not inspire Russia to cooperate with the U.S. for the common good but instead serve as an open invitation to further aggression with potentially serious consequences. The following are a few of them: Ukraine : At the present time, Russian troops are massing in areas of occupied Crimea adjacent to

mainland Ukraine. The Ukrainians expect an offensive by the Russian Army at any time. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians report that the Russian-separatist forces in eastern Ukraine on August 8 attacked Ukrainian army positions 61 times in 24 hours. The Russian-separatist army, built up by Russia on Ukrainian territory, consists of an estimated 40,000 fighters — 12,000 of whom are regular Russian troops. Leadership and coordination are provided by Russia. This force is equipped with multiple rocket launchers, anti-aircraft systems, and more tanks than many members of NATO. It is supported by another 50,000 Russian troops stationed just over the border on the Russian side. There has been a lull in the fighting in recent months which removed Ukraine from

the world’s headlines. But statements by U.S. politicians that undermine faith in the American will to react to aggression will encourage the Putin regime to intensify its efforts to destabilize Ukraine with a new offensive

whether Trump is elected or not. The Baltics : Russia cannot defeat the U.S. or NATO in an all-out war but it has strategic superiority in the Baltics where it could provoke a conflict and then threaten to use nuclear weapons, presenting NATO with a choice of escalation or backing down . The Russians are clearly ready to take risks . On April 14, a Russian SU-27 fighter jet flew dangerously close to a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea. It came within 50 feet of the American plane and conducted a barrel roll starting from the left side of the aircraft, going over the aircraft, and ending up on the aircraft’s right. This incident came two days after a simulated Russian aerial assault against the guided-missile destroyer USS Donald Cook in the Baltic Sea.

One of the jets flew within 30 feet of the warship. This was the most reckless flyover of an American ship by a Russian jet since the Cold War . The Russians are clearly ready to take risks . The Russian leaders are not fanatics. The effort that they have

invested in amassing personal fortunes attests to this. They will not risk their hold on power on behalf of a conflict they know they will lose. But they could miscalculate, which is why statements such as Trump’s that question

U.S. treaty commitments are likely to invite a crisis rather than avoid one. Indiscriminate violence :

The Russian authorities act with a complete disregard for human life. In Syria, the Russian bombing is indiscriminate. According to the Violations Documentation Center, which seeks to document the attacks by all sides, the civilian death toll from Russian strikes in six months until mid-March was over 2,000. In January, according the Syria Network for Human Rights, another monitoring organization, Russian air strikes killed 679 civilians. This exceeded the number of

civilians killed during that period by the Syrian Army, which is also guilty of indiscriminate bombing, as well as by ISIS (98 killed) and the al-Nusra Front (42 killed). In light of the dangers that the present Russian regime represents, what matters is deterrence . The bombing of civilian targets in Syria,

including bakeries and hospitals, also increases the flow of refugees toward Turkey and Europe, exacerbating internal tensions in those regions and creating pressure to accept a resolution of the Syrian crisis on Russian terms. Americans have not been immune to Russian aggression. An American was among the victims when on July 17, 2014, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was shot down over eastern Ukraine killing all 298 persons on board. The Dutch Safety Board confirmed that MH17 was destroyed by a missile fired from a Russian made BUK anti-aircraft battery. The Putin regime, in complete disregard for the safety of innocent international air travelers, had transferred missiles capable of shooting down planes flying at over 30,000 feet to a quickly assembled army fighting in an area traversed by one of the busiest commercial air corridors in the world. There was also an American victim, Sandy Booker of Oklahoma, in the 2002 Moscow theater siege in which the Russian authorities flooded a theater with lethal gas. In all cases, the Russian leaders will respect civilian lives, including those of Americans, only to the degree that

they fear that they may be called to account. If an American leader like Trump responds to reports of Russian crimes by saying, “we kill plenty of people too,” he is removing what little restraint Russians are likely to exercise in military conflicts and increasing the risks to uninvolved Americans as well. COMMENTS Trump has expressed concern for Putin’s attitude for him. He said that he believes that Trump respects him and wonders if Putin likes him, as if this was in some way relevant. Carter Page, an adviser to Trump on Russia policy, blamed the tensions between the U.S. and Russia on the “often hypocritical focus on

ideas such as democratization, inequality, corruption, and regime change.” In light of the dangers that the present Russian regime represents, however, what matters is deterrence , which always has a strong psychological element. Restraining the behavior of the Putin regime requires creating the impression in both word and deed that violations will meet with a serious response. If Trump becomes president, he will, of course, have access to intelligence information that

may change some of his impressions. But if he persists in his shallow opinions, the consequences could be felt by everyone.

U.S.-Russian war causes extinction.Owen Cotton-Barratt et al, ‘17 - PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute; “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdfThe bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast , fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse : the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter .According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years . This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great . An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons , with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic .13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction , but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns.It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts,

the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.

Uniqueness

China

Chinese arms exports declining now due to lack of new client statesBOFIT (Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, monitors and analyses the economic development of Russia and China and conducts academic research.) 3/15/2019 [“Growth in Chinese and Russian arms exports lags growth of other major arms suppliers” online @ https://www.bofit.fi/en/monitoring/weekly/2019/vw201911_5/, loghry]The latest report on global arms transfers from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that, during the latest five-year study period (2014–2018), arms transfers rose 8 % from the previous period (2009–2013). Three-quarters of global arms transfers involved the United States (36 %), Russia (21 %), France (7 %), Germany (6 %) and China (5 %). The volume of China’s arms transfers in 2014–2018 rose by less than 3 % from the 2009–2013 period. The figures suggest growth in China’s arms exports has slowed radically from the boom years at the start of this decade. The number of customer countries, however, increased from the previous five-year period from 41 to 53 countries, even if arms supplies continued to focus on Pakistan (37 % share), Bangladesh (16 %) and Algeria (11 %). China’s arms export possibilities are limited by political reluctance in many countries to purchase Chinese arms. SIPRI notes that, among the world’s top 10 arms importers, India, Australia, South Korea and Vietnam do not buy any arms from China. Asia and Oceania account for 70 % of Chinese arms exports, Africa 20 % and the Middle East 6 %.

Squo exports pale in comparison to the U.S.CSIS (Center for Strategic & International Studies – China Power Project) 4/26/2018 [“How dominant is China in the global arms trade?” online @ https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/, loghry]According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China’s conventional arms sales surged from $650 million in 2008 to $1.13 billion in 2017.1 The lion’s share of these exports, around 74 percent, went to Asia. An additional 21 percent flowed into Africa. Although China has established itself as an arms export leader, the overall value of its trade still pales in comparison to the United States, whose exports averaged $9 billion annually over the last ten years. Selling Arms to its Neighbors Most of Beijing’s arms exports are sold to countries close to home. Despite low levels of arms exports throughout the mid-1990s and into the mid-2000s, most of what China did export (82.8 percent) were shipped to countries across Asia. This trend has continued as China has emerged as a leader in the global arms trade. A combined 62.4 percent of China’s conventional weapons sales since 2008 have found their way to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Other Asian countries have purchased an additional 11.8 percent of Chinese arms. Over the past decade, Chinese arms sales across South and Southeast Asia grew from $386 million in 2008 to $1.5 billion in 2016 before falling to $948 million in 2017. Notwithstanding this growth, China lags other traditional arms exporters to the region. Since 2008, the US has exported $27.2 billion worth of conventional weapons across Asia (not including the Middle East).2

Russia

Russia influence and arms sales massively declining, need new markets to shore up dominance

Stratfor Worldview (geopolitical intelligence and advisory firm.) 5/5/2019 [“Russia Makes Some of the Deadliest Weapons on Earth (But There Is a Problem)” online @ https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-makes-some-deadliest-weapons-earth-there-problem-55812, loghry]Russia's defense industry is face to face with a major foe, but it's not a foreign military power. The Kremlin has been striving to modernize all branches of the Russian military, but the country's defense industry is struggling thanks to decreasing volumes of orders, difficulties in attracting high-skilled talent and limits to its technological capabilities. According to recent figures, the performance of Russia's aerospace sector is declining precipitously. In 2018, for instance, Russian aircraft and spacecraft makers produced 13.5 percent less than in 2017. And there's been no letup in 2019 either: In the first two months of the year, aerospace output plummeted 48 percent year on year.The decline in Russia's defense output raises concerns about the competitive strength of Russia's defense industry in general, whose health is critical if the country is to project itself as a military power in the longer term. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov attributed the reduction in output to a slowdown of orders for military systems, but projections suggest the slowdown is not just a short-term fluctuation; in fact, it's expected to become even worse in the future. The downturn in oil prices has taken a bite out of Russia's bottom line, squeezing spending for the military — all at a time when the country's arms manufacturers have lost their competitive edge in the global arms market. Together, these factors ensure that Russia's defense industry will struggle to get out of its funk.Suffering From a Dearth of FundsThis dire picture stands in stark contrast to Russia's frequent presentation of sensational new platforms. In reality, however, just a few of the big-ticket weapon systems — such as the T-14 main battle tank or the Su-57 fighter aircraft — find buyers, as the rest remain mere prototypes. Russia has prioritized some hardware, such as the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, due to their strategic relevance to the country's overall military posture, but Moscow has failed to fully develop other programs or only introduced them on a limited scale.Under pressure from a limited government budget, the Kremlin even started reducing its military spending in 2017 — a strong indicator that, despite the modernization push, Russia's financial challenges are taking a toll on the country ambitions. Economically, the plunge in oil prices at the end of 2014 hurt Russia's bottom line, depriving the country of essential revenue and forcing it to dip into its reserves to bridge the gap. Today, more than four years on, Russian oil revenues are rising, yet the country is continuing to deal with the consequences of the lean years. Beyond that, low revenues from taxes, which have forced Russia to raise taxes and the retirement age, and Western sanctions over Moscow's activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, have shrunk the financial pool available to military planners.But the Kremlin's problems don't end there. In the past, Russia has benefited from its position as a major global arms exporter to fuel further military development. During the 1990s, for example, such sales were critical to the country as it faced severe economic hardship. While Russia remains the world's second-largest arms exporter (only the United States sells more), the actual value of those exports has been decreasing significantly . Between 2014 and 2018, their total value dropped by as

much as 17 percent. Again, budgetary limits are somewhat to blame: In the past, Russia frequently used arms exports as a political tool, offering weapons at a heavy discount, if not entirely free. But with Russia no longer able to offer customers a good deal on its fighter jets and other defense products, the country is losing business.And Russia's arms industry faces an even greater problem in the years to come: reduced competitiveness. Russia has long dominated some of the market by offering affordable military equipment without attaching any conditions regarding human rights, but the rise of China's military industry, as well as several smaller producers around the world, has made it much more difficult to compete for contracts.Ultimately, the loss of export opportunities not only complicates Russia's efforts to finance its defense industry, it also reduces the scale at which the defense industry produces, which, in turn, decreases scale-dependent savings that accompany higher levels of production. In effect, this means that the more Russia fails to find foreign customers for specific weapon systems, the more it will become burdened with a higher relative cost per unit as it seeks to meet its own needs. The conundrum, in turn, will further limit Russia's ability to competitively price weapons systems for export, thereby perpetuating the effect.

Links

Both – Generic

The economics of arms sales insures client nations forego sales with hostile regimesJonathan Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 4/6/2018 [“AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME” online @ https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/, loghry]U.S. arms exports rely on a simple bargain: Clients join an American-dominated global supply chain in return for better value weapons, larger orders of subcomponents from local firms, and access to leading-edge weapons technology. These smaller states, in turn, surrender to the United States large swathes of their foreign and defense policies, including foregoing sales to regimes that threaten U.S. interests . The process is characterized by hard bargaining and by a considerable degree of coercion by the United States, such as when it temporarily kicked Israel out of the Joint Strike Fighter program for selling unmanned aerial vehicle parts to China. Sovereign states are of course reluctant to hand over their foreign policy, but the United States can use financial incentives (thereby reducing the economic benefit at home) to convince countries to buy American. Consider the formidable missile defense complex the United States is trying to create in South Asia among itself, Japan, and South Korea. Trump has suggested that, contrary to current agreements, South Korea pay for the THAAD missile defense system, at a billion dollars a battery, deployed in North Gyeongsang province: “We’re going to protect them. But they should pay for that, and they understand that.” But South Korea has already paid a heavy price for deploying THAAD due to Chinese economic retaliation. And there are massive security spillovers if South Korea continues to participate. Japan and South Korea’s participation in the Aegis system, for example, pulls two states loath to cooperate with each other bilaterally into something resembling a collective-security network. If economic concessions on THAAD or a possible $1.7 billion Aegis missile purchase are necessary to bring South Korea into this network, that may be a price worth paying.

Both – Saudi Arabia

**Continued liberalized arms sales crucial to shoring up allies investments in the arms market and choking Russia and China out. The plan sets an international precedent and provides opportunities for hostile states to gain market strength and undermine U.S. interests.Jonathan Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 4/6/2018 [“AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME” online @ https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/, loghry]A smart arms transfer policy would strangle both Russia, the number two exporter, and China, which is trying to take its place. Russia in particular needs arms exports to fund its aggressive but underfunded military modernization plans (not to mention hard currency for its weak economy). It is in America’s interests to choke off as large a percentage of the Russian export market as possible in favor of the products of more closely aligned countries. In terms of both American influence and curbing proliferation, it is better for countries like Malaysia and Indonesia to buy German or South Korean submarines than Russian. This will have the added benefit of diminishing the quality and, eventually, raising the price of the products Russia will export to states, such as Syria, that cannot buy arms from anywhere else. In the spirit of bolstering potential partners and limiting the reach of Russian weapons, the United States can directly compete against Russia in one important market. India accounts for a stunning 39 percent of Russia’s recent arms exports (SIPRI). Indian orders might be big enough to provide some meaningful economic benefits to the United States, but more importantly, U.S. sales would cut into Russia’s market share. Tying India and the United States closer, even if it means allowing most production, jobs, and even some technology transfer to go abroad, should be a central goal of U.S. arms transfer policy. Lockheed Martin’s offer to transfer the F-16 production line to India appears a step in this direction. America should accept that Saudi Arabia is going to buy a lot of U.S. weapons, but avoid coddling the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia (and its Gulf State allies) will remain an important customer largely because the country is desperate to keep the United States involved in the region. The Saudi military is almost entirely American equipped and trained and most of its military capability requires continued American support to function for more than a couple of days. A few additional jobs may result from selling more arms to the Kingdom, but this may not justify giving up the leverage over Saudi and its allies’ policies towards Yemen, Syria, and Qatar that do not necessarily advance American interests. The United States should encourage, but steer, Europe. Since the Cold War the United States has used its economic and political clout to systematically inhibit an independent European defense production capability. This has certainly increased U.S. market share, but continued efforts come at the expense of more important political goals. It would be much easier to ask NATO allies to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense if more of this money would go into indigenous industries. The United States should recognize that European global competitiveness in the arms trade can serve American interests (and perhaps provide competition for its own sheltered defense industry). This will relieve pressure on Europe to export to countries embargoed by the United States, which undermines the influence of U.S. arms transfer policy. When the United States placed real restrictions on arms transfers to Egypt’s al-Sisi regime, other states quickly attempted to fill this gap. As one French policymaker cynically noted, “Obama was the [French fighter jet] Rafale’s best salesperson.” Overall, from 2012-2015 the export agreements of major European sellers to Egypt have gone up forty-seven-fold over the previous four-year period. That said, Europe has by and large cooperated with successful arms embargoes against Russia and China (although Europe does sell nearly $400 million of dual use equipment to China each

year). Maintaining and even tightening these key sanctions must be the highest priority of any defense cooperation policy with Europe. More broadly, fixation on “buying American” misses tremendous opportunities for leading coordinated action with like-minded states in Europe and elsewhere. This is feasible given that the United States, NATO members, South Korea, Israel, and a few other allies account for a whopping 62 percent of total global arms exports (SIPRI). To this end, the United States should liberalize its own market. Much as when “foreign” automotive firms build their cars in the United States, acquiring products from abroad may create more jobs than selling weapons internationally. The U.S. Air Force’s current $16 billion fighter-trainer contract has been largely narrowed down to three candidates with foreign connections: a Lockheed Martin-Korea Aerospace Industries version of Korea’s T-50; a new design from a Boeing-Saab team; and an entirely foreign offering from Leonardo. Winning such a contract will give one of three like-minded states (South Korea, Sweden, or Italy, respectively) a boost in other international competitions against less scrupulous dealers. And the United States can still shape these exports for its political interests, such as when it recently vetoed the T-50’s export to Uzbekistan. America is Like No Other Arms Exporter and Should Act Like It The United States — by dint of its huge military budget, massive defense R&D, and long dominance of the global arms market — can use arms transfers in ways beyond the dreams of its competitors. Indeed, many competitors recognize this, albeit grudgingly. I have interviewed officials in multiple countries (both clients and competitors of the United States) claiming they will defer to U.S. wishes on arms exports if they trust it is done for political rather than economic reasons. Many of America’s closest allies, who are also arms export competitors, look to the United States for leadership on controversial importers such as Saudi Arabia. And, the Trump administration should be given due credit for exercising discretion, given, for instance, its recent unilateral embargo on arms transfer to South Sudan. In fact, one administration official stated flatly that sales “will not come at the expense of human rights.” In no small part, U.S. domination of the global arms trade is based on the world’s belief that the United States uses its clout to advance its political ends, not economic gain. Destroying this reputation will do little to bring jobs to the United States, while doing much to damage American influence abroad.

Ending sales to Saudi Arabia backfires – forces them to seek outside sources, current regime locks out hostile statesLt. Col. Ray Rounds (U.S. Air Force F-15E pilot and a Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University in International Relations. He is a U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies graduate and a former Mirage 2000 exchange pilot with the French Air Force.) 4/16/2019 [“THE CASE AGAINST ARMS EMBARGOS, EVEN FOR SAUDI ARABIA” online @ https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/the-case-against-arms-embargos-even-for-saudi-arabia/, loghry]One area in which U.S. President Donald Trump does not need to worry about making America great again is international arms sales. The United States accounts for 34 percent of all global arms sales (second place Russia remains a distant 23 percent), and has more than 40 defense companies in the top 100 globally. However, with civilian deaths caused by the Saudi-led war in Yemen estimated at between 16,000 and 50,000 by the end of 2018, calls for the United States to suspend arms sales to its largest client — Saudi Arabia — have understandably gained traction in both Congress and the public. More generally, several authors have penned articles in these virtual pages calling for more selective U.S. arms export decisions or outright embargos, governed less by economic motivations and more by concern about blowback, human rights, dispersion, and reducing technology transfer. I respectfully disagree with all of these recommendations. Whether it is delayed approval, as in the recent Kuwaiti F-18 purchase, an outright embargo, like Egyptian F-16s in 2013, or denial of technology transfer, as in the 2016 Turkish Patriot missile request , using the withholding of arms sales as a blunt force instrument of

coercion is unlikely to produce desired strategic benefits and often backfires. Arms exports are best used for maintaining or strengthening relationships while limiting adversary access to client states ; a tool of nuanced influence, not outright coercion. In fact, threatening to withhold arms sales to coerce a state into changing its behavior often has the opposite effect, leading clients to diversify their arms sourcing instead of shifting course . Similarly, calls to restrict technology transfer and worries about demands for direct offsets mistake what is known as “design technology transfer” for the much more difficult “capacity” level of transfer. Both are explained in more detail below, but for now it is worth noting that design transfer, the level at which most of these offsets occur, does not lead to the creation of an independent defense industry, but instead provides the United States with a source of political power. The United States should not fear technology transfer, but with the appropriate end-user controls, encourage it. Additionally, while a large domestic market provides the United States the luxury of sacrificing financial gains for political influence, sometimes economics do matter; especially when it comes to preserving complex production lines for future flexibility. Finally, the United States should not look to use an arms embargo to coerce Saudi policy change, not for economic reasons, but simply because it is unlikely to work. Greasing the Skids, Not Twisting Arms Arms sales are useful tools for maintaining communication, strengthening relationships, and keeping potential adversary states at bay. Conversely, as a blunt instrument of coercion (i.e. if you do not do X, we will suspend Y), they are likely losers. Senior U.S. government officials involved in the arms transfer process that I interviewed over the past year during the course of my research have echoed similar sentiments. This is also borne out by previous research providing evidence that using arms transfers as situationally coercive tools is rarely successful. Interestingly, coercion attempts using arms transfers are least likely to be successful when used as a punishment or threat against an autocratic regime, such as Saudi Arabia. Instead, punishments in the form of an embargo can often push a client to diversify sourcing rather than to change behavior .

China – Generic

Decreasing arms sales opens a vacuum that China will fill in. Has the capability and will use increased exports to further challenge the U.S.Richard A. Bitzinger (Visiting Senior Fellow with the Military Transformations Program at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore) 4/16/2019 [“How China weaponizes overseas arms sales” online @ https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/04/opinion/how-china-weaponizes-overseas-arms-sales/, loghry]Admittedly, China remains a smallish arms exporter, compared to the United States, which dominates the global arms bazaar, typically capturing 35% to 40% of the market. Moreover, Beijing is still overwhelmingly dependent on sales to just a few countries, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. It also still relies on countries either too poor to buy Western armaments or who have been subjected to arms embargoes . Few big-spending arms importers – such as the oil-rich Gulf states – have ever been interested in Chinese arms (other than armed drones). Iran used to be a major consumer of Chinese arms, but it has not placed a new order with Beijing in several years. Nevertheless , China’s growing, cumulative political, economic, and military rise is reshaping global as well as regional geopolitics, including strategic alliances and balances of power – and arms exports are a critical ingredient in this remaking. While Chinese arms exports may have had their beginnings in mostly economic rationales – such as profits and support for the domestic arms industry – increasingly overseas arms sales are being used as a tool to advance Beijing’s strategic interests . This is self-evident in the growing range of Chinese arms sales – especially to Africa and Latin America – and in Beijing’s readiness to sell its most advanced weapons systems with no political strings attached and generally at prices below those of Western competitors. As such, arms exports will also increasingly figure in the growing strategic competition with the United States. The arms competition between these two countries – both in East Asia and increasingly globally as well – is synonymous with their emerging great-power rivalry. In this regard, China has a growing capability to shape the direction and character of this arms competition – not only through its military-technological development and diffusion of arms exports, but more importantly, through its strategic choices that influence the contours of alliances and military advantage in different geographic areas.

Ending sales spurs Chinese fill-inLucie Béraud-Sudreau & (Research Fellow for Defence Economics and Procurement) Meia Nouwens (Research Fellow for Chinese Defence Policy and Military Modernisation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) 7/7/2018 [“Are arms exports a tool of Chinese foreign policy?” online @ https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/07/07/are-arms-exports-a-tool-of-chinese-foreign-policy/, loghry]Chinese arms sales appear to be more transactional than an instrument of foreign policy. For instance, there has been no uptick in Chinese arms deliveries to core Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) partner countries since this initiative was announced in 2013. Indeed, out of the 74 countries that are directly linked to BRI projects, only 23 of them — 31 per cent — have received Chinese major weapon systems since 2013. Further evidence of China’s transactional arms exports is the arms diplomacy that China and Taiwan have tried to apply to woo allies on the world stage. While economic incentives have been widely used to influence changes in diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China, China has not, in the past five years, transferred any major conventional weapons systems to countries that recognise or used to recognise Taiwan. Both of these examples reflect the fact that arms sales are not a straightforward foreign policy tool to manoeuvre. Arms sales take place if and only if

recipient states have the need for new weapons systems and have a preference for Chinese products. China still traditionally sells to states where Western exporters will not sell due to sanctions (like Iran), states that cannot afford to purchase Western weapons systems (like Zambia) and states that fall into both categories (like Sudan and Venezuela). The only niche market where China has been able to make inroads into traditional Western export markets such as Gulf countries has been that of UAVs. This again was possible because Western exporters, in this case the United States, refused to sell their own systems.

China – Zero-Sum

Any decrease in arms sales by the U.S. will be filled in by ChinaLatifa A. Al Saud (graduate student in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. She specializes in International Relations and her research interests focus on the political and security factors of East Asia-Middle East relations) 12/3/2018 [“China’s Arms Sales Philosophy in the Arab World” online @ https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/chinas-arms-sales-philosophy-arab-world, loghry]The United States remains the largest arms dealer in the Middle East, but over the past four decades China has emerged as a “Plan B” to meet arms demand in the region. Al Saud discusses how China’s win-win approach to economic diplomacy has bolstered its arms trade and argues that the Arab World may have found a willing partner for years to come. China’s role as an arms exporter to the Arab world is among the many uncertainties tainting Chinese foreign policy, due to the secretive nature of arms deals. China is the world’s third largest exporter of arms, behind the United States and Russia, representing around 6.2% of global trade for conventional major arms. In the Middle East, China currently ranks fifteenth on the arms suppliers list, while the U.S. remains the largest provider. As China continues to foster its approach of economic diplomacy in the region, many states are becoming increasingly attracted to using China as a “Plan B” for arms supply, filling in any blockage of arms sales from the US or Europe. Unlike the US and Russia, Chinese arms deals have traditionally focused on commercial, rather than political purposes. Despite this, the growing influence of China on the world stage begs the question as to what strategic role Chinese arms sales will play in one of the world’s most volatile regions.

China – Egypt/Morocco/Other African Countries

China fills in decreases to countries in Africa (Egypt / Morocco) Dr. Nan Tian (Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers and Military Expenditure Programme, where he is responsible for monitoring and managing the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database) 9/17/2018 [“China’s Arms Trade: A Rival for Global Influence?” online @ https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/09/17/chinas_arms_trade_a_rival_for_global_influence__113806.html, loghry]Although the total volume of major arms flow from China to Africa is less than half of Russia’s, it sells to far more African countries than Russia. Between 2013–17, Russia sold major arms to 14 Africa countries, compared to the 23 of China. This “blanket” style of selling does not typically fit with the notion of linking targeted arms sales with foreign policy objectives. The diversity in the types of weapons and of arms recipients (e.g., from Algeria to South Africa and Kenya to Cote d'Ivoire) suggests a more demand and supply relationship . As China continues to develop its arms industry, any international buyer will help expand its network, offer important developmental feedback, and improve weapon quality and company profitability. The fall in export of Russian made weapons to Africa corresponded with the rise in Chinese exports, potentially due to the availability of more cost-effective options. This is especially the case in Algeria, where import of major Chinese arms increased by 46-fold between 2008-2012 and 2013-2017, while the transfer of Russian weapons fell by 35%.

Russia – General

U.S. just now gaining traction in Asia, ending sales now cedes markets to RussiaRichard Bitzinger (Visiting Senior Fellow with the Military Transformations Program at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore) 10/3/2018 [“Commentary: Asia's rising demand for arms will boost China and US defence markets” online @ https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/asia-arms-weapons-import-growing-market-for-china-united-states-10780264m loghry]Some of the world’s largest arms buyers are in Asia. According to SIPRI, during the period 2013 to 2017, five of the ten biggest arms importers were in the region: India, China, Indonesia, Australia and Pakistan. Vietnam, South Korea, and Taiwan were among the top 15 largest arms importers. India alone accounted for 12 per cent of all arms transfers during this period, maintaining its position as the world’s largest arms buyer for the past several years (just ahead of Saudi Arabia). Its arms imports increased by 24 per cent between the periods 2008 to 2012 and 2013 to 2017. All these arms purchases have been enabled by a continuing upward trend in military spending in the region. According to SIPRI, defence expenditures in Asia and Oceania in 2017 was up 3.6 per cent over 2016 and 59 per cent higher than a decade earlier. So there is plenty of money available for new weaponry. Two of the biggest beneficiaries of this rise in Asian arms imports are the United States and China. According to SIPRI data, the US captured 34 per cent of the global arms market for the period from 2013 to 2017, easily beating Russia, the world’s second largest arms exporter (which took only a 22 per cent share). US arms transfers in 2017 were the highest in nearly 20 years. Moreover, US exports of arms grew by one-quarter between 2008 to 2012 and 2013 to 2017, further widening the gap between it and all other arms exporters. Asia accounted for one-third of all US arms exports during the period from 2013 to 2017. Its biggest customers in the region were Australia and Taiwan. While Russia still leads the US in overall arms sales to Asia (accounting for 34 per cent of all transfers to the region), the US has stolen business from Russia’s traditional customers .

Russia is ready to fill in – they’re actively increasing dialogue and marketability as U.S. alternativeHashmi ’19 [Faizan Hashmi, senior News Editor at UrduPoint, 5/5/19, “Russia Does Not Set Extra Political, Economic Conditions For Arms' Sales – Official,” UrduPoint, https://www.urdupoint.com/en/world/russia-does-not-set-extra-political-economic-613358.html, cs]MOSCOW (UrduPoint News / Sputnik - 05th May, 2019) Russia is the only country on the arms' market which does not set additional political, or economic conditions for sales of weapons, Maria Vorobyeva, the spokeswoman of the Federal Service

for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC), said on Sunday. "In the dynamically developing countries of Asia and Latin America, the public now demands from its leadership transparency and independence in matters of military-technical cooperation and national security... [Russia is] the only [country] among the leaders of [the arms' sales] market

which does not set additional political or economic conditions when striking contracts," Vorobyova said. According to the official, Russia is ready for an open dialogue with all legitimate governments in all areas and formats.

Russia has the incentive to fill in – arms sales tied to Putin’s larger economic, foreign, and domestic strategyDenisentsey ’17 [Sergey Denisentsev is a visiting fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at CSIS. In 2007, he became a regular contributor to publications of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and

Technologies (CAST), August 2017, “Russia in the Global Arms Market: Stagnation in a Changing Market Landscape,” A Report of the CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170816_Denisentsev_RussiaGlobalArmsMarket_Web.pdf?VHDgCY.h54QWJm1lPCa2w1Lc.BjElJH_, cs]Russia remains a major player in the global defense market. Various estimates are available on the size of Russian arms exports (more on

that later)—but all leading market monitors agree that Russia is currently the world’s second-largest arms supplier after the United States. Arms exports are an important source of earnings for the Russian economy. In 2016, Russia exported $285.7 billion1 worth of goods and services; according to the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation (FSMTC), defense hardware and services accounted for 5.2 percent of that

figure ($15 billion in absolute terms).2 But Russia’s overall exports rely disproportionately on raw materials and minerals—

especially hydrocarbons, which account for 62 percent of the total.3 If we exclude energy from the tally, arms exports become even more important for the Russian economy. For example, they make up over 60 percent of Russian machinery exports ($15

billion of $24.4 billion).4 In other words, arms exports are one of the very few success stories in the Russian high-tech sector, along with the exports of nuclear technologies and materials. Arms exports are important to Russia not just economically, but also politically and militarily. President Vladimir Putin once famously said at a sitting of the Commission for Military and Technical Cooperation5 : “Effective military and technical cooperation is a

potent instrument of promoting our national interests, political as well as economic.”6 The Kremlin may also see major arms contracts as part and parcel of its long-standing and developing political and economic relationships, for instance with China, India, Algeria, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, and many other countries. Another notable development in this regard is the growing noncommercial arms deliveries to Russia’s allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), especially Belarus and Armenia, and to non-CSTO member Syria. These deliveries are a major instrument of Russian foreign policy. They help to strengthen Russia’s closest allies that serve as buffer states along its borders (Belarus, Armenia), and to suppress the terror

threat— mostly in Syria, but also in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Furthermore, arms exports are an important indirect factor contributing to domestic stability. This is because, according to the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade, the defense industry employs more than 1.3 million people.7 Since exports account for about a third of Russia’s defense output (more on that in the “Other factors of

stagnation” section), the livelihood of roughly 400,000 Russian engineers, scientists, and technicians, as well as members of their families, directly depends on defense exports. As a rule, these people form a conservative and patriotically minded electorate that is staunchly loyal to the Putin administration. As an election strategy, the Russian president and his United Russia party indirectly support this electorate through arms export stimulus packages (credit financing, government-issued guarantees, etc.). Russian arms exports

and defense relations with other countries also serve as important propaganda instruments. Russia’s state-owned and pro-government media outlets offer regular and generous coverage of the latest achievements of Russian defense suppliers in foreign markets. Such achievements include large contracts signed with foreign customers and

participation of Russian companies in international arms expos. The rapid growth of Russian defense exports in the 2000s is highlighted as a major achievement of the Putin era.8 The media often emphasize the personal role played in that success story by President Putin himself and by Sergey Chemezov, head of Rostec (the parent company of the Russian arms export intermediary Rosoboronexport), who has been a close friend of Putin since the latter’s days as a Soviet agent in East Germany.9 Until recently, the upbeat picture painted by Russian propaganda was backed by figures. For example, during the Putin presidency, Russian arms exports skyrocketed by 440 percent, from $3.4 billion in 1999 (when Vladimir Putin became acting prime minister) to a peak of $15.7 billion in 2013.10 In recent years, however, that growth has slowed and then stalled completely. The focus of this paper is on the current dynamics of Russian arms exports, the reasons for their steady growth in the 2000s and early 2010s, their current stagnation, and the outlook for the coming years.

Russia – Middle East

**Yes Russia will fill-in – they see arms control as key to regime survival**ME specific** Borshchevskaya ’17 [Anna Borshchevskaya is a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on Russia's policy toward the Middle East and is also a Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University; In addition, she is a fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy and was previously with the Atlantic Council and the Peterson Institute for International Economics,“The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East,” 12/13/17, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Borshchevskaya20171222-Jamestown.pdf]

Russia is one of the world’s top arms exporters, second only to the United States since at least 1999.1 In recent years, the Middle East and North

Africa (MENA) region emerged as Russia’s second most important arms market after Asia. From 2000 to 2016, almost a

fifth of Russia’s arms exports went to the MENA region.2 To put this in perspective, in 2009, Moscow sold approximately $9 billion worth of arms to this region. In 2016, it sold $21.4 billion.3 Many of these sales are upgrades to existing packages.4 Since 2000, Moscow also diversified from traditional Soviet-era regional clients. Since officially coming to power in May 2000, if not before, Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to restore Russia’s image as a Great Power in the context of zero-sum anti-Westernism— for Russia to win, the West had to lose. His approach to the Middle East is the extension of former Russian prime minister Evgeniy Primakov’s vision of a “multipolar world,” driven by desire to prevent the West from

dominating any region, and curb Western support for democratization efforts in other countries. For the last 17 years, Putin worked to regain political influence and raise Russia to the status of a competitor to the United States by increasing emphasis on Russia’s business interests—primarily arms, energy and high-tech goods such as nuclear reactors.5

Russia’s economy remains over-reliant on raw materials and natural resources, but the defense industry is one technology-intensive sector where Russia holds an international leadership position. Domestically, Russia’s defense industry is a major source of employment. Russian President Vladimir Putin renewed his emphasis on modernizing the armed forces, especially the navy, on May 7, 2012, on the

same day as he took office as president for a third time.6 Internationally, the Russian defense industry is a source of important revenue. Thus, Putin lamented in February 2012 about Iraq and countries undergoing the Arab Spring, “Russian companies are losing their decades-long positions in local commercial markets and are being deprived of large commercial contracts.”7 As Sergei Chemezov, chief of the powerful state industrial holding Rostec, said in February 2015, “As for the conflict situation in the Middle East, I do not conceal it, and everyone understands this, the more conflicts there are, the more they [clients] buy weapons from us. Volumes are continuing to grow despite

sanctions. Mainly, it is in Latin America and the Middle East.”8 Yet, arms sales entail far more to the Kremlin than mere financial gains. They are also Moscow’s tactical foreign policy tool for wielding political influence and changing power balance dynamics. Indeed, in July 2012, Putin said that arms exports are “an effective instrument for advancing [Moscow’s] national interests, both political and

economic.”9 In December 2013, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said that Russia’s arms sales are the most important element of Moscow’s relations with other countries.10 And Moscow’s chief goal—regime survival, which it hopes to achieve through reduction of Western influence—runs counter to Western interests and values. Thus, in the MENA region, Moscow courts virtually everyone, and competes with the West whenever an opportunity arises. Arms exports are a major component of these efforts.

****Russia can and will fill-in – they’ve solidified staying power in the Middle East***Cook ’18 [STEVEN A. COOK is the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 3/16/18, “Russia Is in the Middle East to Stay,” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/16/the-middle-east-needs-a-steady-boyfriend/]Since Moscow’s demonstration of strength (with Iran’s help) in Syria, the Russians have asserted themselves as a credible alternative to the Americans with traditional U.S. allies. With arms sales, economic deals, and diplomatic maneuvering, Russia has been effective in pulling Turkey and Egypt away from the United States, though not completely, and closer to Russia’s orbit. Saudi Arabia’s King Salman traveled to Moscow last October — the first ever visit by a Saudi king — to talk oil prices and hedge against American retrenchment. And now that

the United States is the world’s leading producer of petroleum, there is likely to be more cooperation

between the Russians and the Arab Gulf states in an effort to ensure that global oil prices are favorable to their interests. Even the Israelis have repeatedly beaten a path to Moscow over the last few years in hopes of persuading Putin to look after their interests in Syria. This is a solid record of achievement. In the span of less than a decade, the Middle East has gone from a region in which the United States was overwhelmingly predominant to one that Washington and Moscow contest. In Syria, the Russians have demonstrated political will and staying power. This is more important than, for example, the size of Russia’s economy, which has been used as an indicator of Moscow’s weakness. To believe that Russian power is ephemeral risks instilling ideas and assumptions about the world that breed complacency. Washington needs the exact opposite. So, what should the United States do about Russia in the Middle East? Before doing anything,

policymakers must recognize reality: The Russians are not going away, they have a strategy to weaken the West, and it starts in the Middle East. Moreover, Moscow no longer has the ideological baggage of communism, making it easier for it to make inroads in the region.

Russia – India

Continued sales to India crucial to lock out Russia over the long term, ending sales now risks Russian dominanceThe Economist (staff) 8/18/2018 [“The global arms trade is booming. Buyers are spoiled for choice” online @ https://www.economist.com/international/2018/08/18/the-global-arms-trade-is-booming-buyers-are-spoiled-for-choice, loghry]As for Russia, SIPRI calculates that its share of the global market has slipped (to about 22% in 2013-17). But it offers a blend of tried-and-tested hardware and, to a few customers, superb know-how, especially in air defence. That creates a dilemma for America, which hopes soon to sell weapons worth $6bn to India, but is dismayed by that country’s determination to acquire S-400 air-defence systems from Russia: missiles that could ward off potential threats from China or Pakistan. Other countries intent on continuing to buy Russian include Indonesia and Vietnam. Jim Mattis, America’s defence secretary, has implored Congress not to be too harsh with Russia’s customers, so long as they pledge gradually to reduce their reliance. In a letter leaked in July to Breaking Defense, a specialist news service, he told a congressman: “We are faced with a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to decrease Russia’s dominance in key regions.” But that could only happen if America were free to sell its own weapons. For customers, that means that for the foreseeable future they can keep both American and Russian weapons in their arsenals. It is telling that India has recently been admitted to the Missile Technology Control Regime, a group of countries which promises not to help pariah states obtain ballistic missiles. That will make it easier for both America and Russia to sell long-range rockets to India. The two arms-sales giants, who do not agree on much else, have welcomed India into the club.

Answers

China – A2: No Capacity

China poised and capable of massive arms exportsForecast International (Defence Web, defence news portal) 5/13/2019 [“China’s arms exports on the rise” online @ https://www.defenceweb.co.za/daily-news/international-news/chinas-arms-exports-on-the-rise/, loghry]Beijing continues to build its stature as a global arms exporter, according to the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress on the military and security developments of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Per Department of Defense research, China completed over $25 billion worth of arms sales between 2013 and 2017, thereby rising to the level of world’s fourth-largest arms supplier. This largely mirrors an earlier report released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in March which noted that China ranked among the world’s top-five largest exporters of defense-related hardware, behind the U.S., Russia, France and Germany, with 5.7 percent of the global total from 2013 to 2017. The rise of China’s defense budget, aided by decades of strong economic growth, has fed the development of military industrial capabilities. This, in turn, has elevated the profile of China as a regional and global arms supplier. For most of its history, the PRC has been a net importer of military materiel, relying on the former Soviet Union to help it develop its own military-industrial complex in its early years. As its defense industrial sector has matured, China has placed a premium on domestic innovation and production. Over time this has allowed the country to reduce its dependency on arms imports, the array of which remain limited due to bans enacted following the communist regime crackdown on Tiananmen Square pro-democracy protesters in 1989.

**China poised to fill in any gaps in the arms market – weapons more likely to enter third party conflictsCSIS (Center for Strategic & International Studies – China Power Project) 4/26/2018 [“How dominant is China in the global arms trade?” online @ https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/, loghry]That said, Chinese weaponry is becoming increasingly attractive due in part to its cost-effectiveness. Although Chinese arms are often less advanced than those sold by other countries, the DOD notes that “Chinese arms are less expensive than those offered by the top international arms suppliers… [but still] have advanced capabilities.” For example, the low-cost K-8 jet trainer is estimated to make up 80 percent of all jet trainer aircraft in Africa. China is actively working to strengthen its foothold in certain markets, such as Algeria. China’s exports to the North African country totaled $483 million between 2008 and 2014, but jumped to $247 million in 2015 alone and peaked at $499 million in 2016 as several weapon orders were fulfilled. These procurements included three C-28A frigates, which were ordered by Algeria in 2012. Although not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, a non-proliferation agreement targeted at missiles and systems capable of delivery weapons of mass destruction, Beijing is generally compliant with international protocols. The 2002 Regulations on the Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies, for instance, outlines measures to safeguard against proliferation. In June 2017, China published a draft of the Export Control Law, which if enacted will update existing legislation and establish a comprehensive export control regime. Beijing has been quick to adapt its domestic regulations to account for emerging technology. This has enabled it to fill the void left by other suppliers . The US, which has long been at the forefront of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development, has purposely restricted the export of its UAVs. Regulations that until recently characterized long-range unmanned aerial systems as cruise missiles, have also limited overseas access of American UAVs. These factors have created a ripe market opportunity for China , which has made its UAVs available to countries such as Nigeria and Egypt. It is worth noting that Chinese

weapons have found their way into various conflict zones. Reports indicate that Chinese arms have been used during conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, and Somalia. In July 2014, China North Industries Corporation delivered 100 guided missile systems, over 9,000 automatic rifles, and 24 million rounds of ammunition to the South Sudanese government, whose actions have been widely criticized by the international community.

China – A2: Exports Inevitable

Chinese exports not inevitableForecast International (Defence Web, defence news portal) 5/13/2019 [“China’s arms exports on the rise” online @ https://www.defenceweb.co.za/daily-news/international-news/chinas-arms-exports-on-the-rise/, loghry]That China should reach this level of global success may seem inevitable from a 21st century lens, but during the embryonic stage of its military-industrial development in the 1950s, such a leap would not have appeared foreordained. At that time, Chinese weapons exports were largely driven by ideological concerns. China delivered low-tech, largely obsolete weaponry to strategically aligned communist regimes and communist-inspired “national liberation” movements in the developing world. Because China’s defense-industrial base was still primitive and reliant upon Soviet technological assistance and weapons deliveries, communist China mainly acted as an intermediary for the Soviets in theaters of war such as Vietnam. By the late 1960s, China had forged a close strategic alliance with Pakistan, with massive Chinese arms sales and deliveries to Islamabad providing a crucial cornerstone for burgeoning Sino-Pakistani ties. Through these weapons exports, China was able to cultivate a crucial regional relationship that continues to this day (and Pakistan remains China’s largest weapons export market). The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) provided Beijing with yet another opening into new markets. With both sides requiring fresh influxes of weapons and ammunition, China’s no-strings-attached export policy suited both combatants as they increasingly found themselves marginalized on the international market. The war marked the rise of China as a large weapons supplier on the global market and secured Iran as a lucrative, long-term export market for Chinese defense products. Today China’s primary export market remains Asia (including Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, among others), but it has successfully and steadily penetrated parts of the developing world, including Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Russia – A2: Training Barrier

**Russia tech in Middle East won’t cause training barrierBorshchevskaya ’17 [Anna Borshchevskaya is a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on Russia's policy toward the Middle East and is also a Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University; In addition, she is a fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy and was previously with the Atlantic Council and the Peterson Institute for International Economics,“The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East,” 12/13/17, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Borshchevskaya20171222-Jamestown.pdf]

Another practical consideration is that many local military personnel in the MENA region have trained on Russian weaponry and feel comfortable operating it. As one American source familiar with the situation explained it, “If you have an AK-47, why change to an M-16?”16 For example, helicopters are especially crucial to Egypt’s anti-Islamist campaign; and according to first-hand pilot accounts, Russia’ less expensive helicopters fit Egypt’s needs well. Overall, Russian attack helicopters are not necessarily superior technologically, but they bring heavy

firepower to a fight. They may fare worse in a contested air space, but the Sinai airspace is not contested. The Russian MiG-29 is a highly advanced aircraft, easier to maintain than an American one, and cheaper than an F-2217 (which the US is currently not even exporting).

Russia – A2: No Demand

There will be demand for robust, innovative, and cost-effective Russian techBorshchevskaya ’17 [Anna Borshchevskaya is a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on Russia's policy toward the Middle East and is also a Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University; In addition, she is a fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy and was previously with the Atlantic Council and the Peterson Institute for International Economics,“The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East,” 12/13/17, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Borshchevskaya20171222-Jamestown.pdf]

When countries prefer Russian weaponry over American systems, it is usually for evident reasons. The US will not sell weapons to many of Russia’s clients for a variety of reasons. Russian weaponry is relatively inexpensive and, generally speaking, often more robust than comparable American systems. In some areas, Moscow’s systems lag severely behind the US in terms of quality

and capabilities, but in others, it is a near-peer competitor. For instance, Moscow is quite good at building anti-aircraft missiles, such as the S-300 and S-400 systems, based on lessonslearned from the Kosovo Air War. The American F-35 joint strike fighter can likely currently beat

an S-400 (although there is no way to know for sure unless they engage in direct combat). However, Moscow is developing the next generation, the S-500, whose full capabilities are unknown. Russian current-generation aircraft and ballistic missile defenses are on par with those of the US in terms of defense technology. Some Russian missiles have as long a range as American missiles, a few of them even longer. 14 In addition, the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system is very slow, bureaucratic and cumbersome, while Moscow takes less time to deliver after a contract is signed. Moscow is weak when it comes to follow-up support of sales, and Russian weaponry is not always as technically advanced

as America’s, but it is good enough for the needs of many markets, and is often far better than what the purchasing countries can build themselves. Russian weaponry is also a good choice for states on a budget. Moscow advertises this fact. For example, in early October 2015, days after Russia’s Syria intervention, Moscow fired 26 cruise missiles from primarily small corvettes in the Caspian Sea to hit targets in Syria.15 Moscow made a public display of the event, not only to demonstrate Russia’s own might but also to show other countries they need not purchase a large expensive warship to achieve strong naval capabilities, and that Moscow would be happy to help them achieve this goal.

Even if the tech is less desirable, demand will be high because Russia places far fewer regulations and preconditions on its saleBorshchevskaya ’17 [Anna Borshchevskaya is a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on Russia's policy toward the Middle East and is also a Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University; In addition, she is a fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy and was previously with the Atlantic Council and the Peterson Institute for International Economics,“The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East,” 12/13/17, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Borshchevskaya20171222-Jamestown.pdf]

Beyond these advantages, Russian weaponry comes with few strings attached, in contrast to arms sales from Washington. Moscow, unlike the US, does not prohibit secondary arms sales. This means, for example, that when the

US sells weapons to Egypt, the weapon must stay in Egypt.18 But in Egypt’s context, buying a Russian weapon it can easily resell to someone else for profit may be a preferable option. Moscow also does not burden arms sales with preconditions, such as mandated improvements of human rights. In addition, many in the MENA find Russia easier to

deal with—no one needs to worry about falling afoul of a theoretical Russian equivalent of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, for example. Thus, countries turn to Moscow when they wish to signal to Washington that they have other options if they do not like the United States’ pre-conditions. At the same time, some Arab states are genuinely interested in diversifying supplies away from the US. Indeed, after the 1991 Gulf War, several GCC states bought Russian systems. The West should not discount Arab countries making such decisions. Russia, unlike the America, invests effort across the MENA region to sell weapons systems. Western analysts tend to point out Russia could never replace the United States. Nevertheless, such views discount another option:

Moscow does not have to replace the US. Other authoritarian leaders can choose to move closer to Russia because the Kremlim offers Arab states different advantages including quicker delivery and better negotiating terms. When it comes to arms sales in the MENA region, Moscow has made major inroads during the Putin era with Iran, Syria, Egypt, Libya and Algeria, and to a lesser extent with Turkey, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Arab Persian Gulf. It is also making small inroads with Tunisia and Morocco.

Russia – A2: Sanctions Prevent Sales

Sanctions won’t hamper Russian fill-inTlis ’19 [Fatima Tlis, “Russian Prime Minister Claims Country’s Arms Exports Not Affected by Sanctions,” 4/23/19, Polygraph – Partially True, https://www.polygraph.info/a/fact-check-russia-arms-trade/29899196.html, cs]

Speaking to the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, on April 17, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said the international sanctions imposed on Moscow beginning in 2012 had no negative effect on the country’s arms trade. He claimed Russia’s military exports totaled $54.5 billion and went to more than 100 countries. Medvedev is correct in stating that the arms industry is the sector of the Russian economy least affected by sanctions , including the U.S. restrictions targeting Russia's Defense industry and EU arms embargo imposed in 2014. Russia remains second largest seller of arms globally, with a 21 percent share of the international market, behind the United States. Russia’s arms exports apparently benefited from a horrific act --the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) in July 2014, which killed all 298 civilians aboard the jetliner. The Joint Investigation Team said Russia was responsible, and identified the Russian Buk missile, and the Russian military unit to which the individual missile was assigned. In the years following the 2014 downing, the maker of the Russian Buk TELAR surface-to-air missile, enjoyed a boost in global sales. A Defense News ranking in 2018 found the maker of the missile, JSC Almaz-Antey,

scored a 39% increase from $6.58 billion in 2016 to $9.1 billion in 2018. Still, the numbers cited by Medvedev are not verifiable independently. The $ 54.5 billion, Medvedev cited as the value of Russia’s military exports -- is not confirmed by independent sources.

Impacts & Internals

China – Internal – Human Rights

Chinese arms exports net worse for human rightsSteven Aftergood (directs the FAS Project on Government Secrecy) 5/3/2019 [“Rising China Sells More Weapons” online @ https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2019/05/china-weapons/, loghry]“In 2018, China’s arms sales increased, continuing a trend that enabled China to become the world’s fastest-growing arms supplier during the past 15 years,” according to the 2019 China Military Power report published by the Department of Defense. “From 2013 through 2017, China was the world’s fourth-largest arms supplier, completing more than $25 billion worth of arms sales.” “Arms transfers also are a component of China’s foreign policy, used in conjunction with other types of military, economic aid, and development assistance to support broader foreign policy goals,” the Pentagon report said. “These include securing access to natural resources and export markets, promoting political influence among host country elites, and building support in international forums.” Needless to say, the United States and other countries have long done the same thing, using arms exports as an instrument of foreign policy and political influence. Up to a point, however, US arms sales are regulated by laws that include human rights and other considerations. See U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions, CRS In Focus, May 2, 2019.

China – Internal – Heg

Chinese exports to the middle east undermine U.S. power projectionLatifa A. Al Saud (graduate student in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. She specializes in International Relations and her research interests focus on the political and security factors of East Asia-Middle East relations) 12/3/2018 [“China’s Arms Sales Philosophy in the Arab World” online @ https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/chinas-arms-sales-philosophy-arab-world, loghry]China’s commercial motives do not suggest a complete lack of interest in influencing the region and maintaining political stability. China is the world’s largest oil importer of Saudi oil, and as such, stability in the Middle East is critical to China. Chinese arms sales to the region is arguably motivated to maintain oil flows from friendly leaders from Arab oil exporting states and a necessary tool for China to foster and enhance energy ties. It is no coincidence that the major oil exporting countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iran, are all purchasing weapons from China. The commercial nature of Chinese arms sales gives it short-term and long-term advantages. Commercially, arms sales not only foster stronger economic ties with Arab states, to which China remains dependent on their oil exports, but also give China a chance to ask for a decrease in the cost of importing energy from the region. China has the ability to use arms sales as leverage to receive low oil prices and/or concessions, an important tool given its significant growth in oil demand and dependency on imports. U.S. and Western policymakers and scholars view increased Chinese arms sales to the region as not merely economically motivated, but also intended for China’s own power projection and mitigation of U.S. power in the region. China often criticizes U.S. interference in Middle East affairs, including the strong presence of U.S. forces in the Gulf (and beyond). The primary objectives for the US, from China’s view, are to maintain, control, and ensure access to energy resources in the region. Chinese actions to cooperate with both U.S. and non-U.S. allies, like Iran and Syria, are intended to, at least in part, exert its own influence. In 1991, the Chinese provided Iran with sophisticated dual use nuclear technology and natural uranium under the umbrella of nuclear “cooperation.” This, among other factors, allowed China to build up its image as an attractive and easy to deal with arms provider, serving an entry point to its long-term strategic presence without appearing to have an interest in picking sides. Arms sales are part of China’s win-win cooperation and strategy-based foreign policy. Doing so is a rather unconventional approach to international arms sales, as they have traditionally been used as a political tool, with the United States as the top player. China’s approach can help its long-term strategic posture in the region by promoting stronger ties with the Arab states, ensuring oil flows, and opening a door to economic expansion in the Middle East through investments and Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs). Although there are no recent instances of China using arms sales to exert influence in the Middle East, this does not mean that the commercial nature of Chinese arms sales is not also linked to national security interests. The Chinese government’s arms exports philosophy stems from its interest to maintain strategic relations with the Arab states in order to best increase its prospects for securing its business and energy interests in the region, regardless of the recipients’ country’s intensions. It can therefore be said that PRC arms sales are exemplified in Xi Jinping’s overall win-win, cooperation-based foreign policy and can in turn have key implications to understanding the global arms trade of this century.

Russia – Impact – Baltics

If U.S. Leadership declines, Putin invades the BalticsWilson ‘15 – MPA @ Princeton, American foreign policy advisor and the current executive vice president at the Atlantic Council of the United States, Deputy Director of the Private Office of the NATO Secretary General, decorated by the Presidents of Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Poland for his efforts to advance transatlantic relations (Damon, “A Transatlantic Strategy to Deter Putin’s Aggression,” US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation, Lexis) This crisis began long before Crimea. Indeed, Russia's annexation of Crimea was the natural outcome of a clear, consistent policy dating back years. I detail this record in my full testimony. Second, Putin will not stop until he encounters serious pushback. Third, only the United States can galvanize Europe and the international community around an effective strategy to deter Putin for the long term. Fourth, any strategy should urgently and decisively back Ukraine, as well as other vulnerable states with significant economic and military assistance in the short term, while keeping the door open to the European Union or NATO. And fifth, we should neither abandon the Russian people nor the vision that a democratic Russia one day can find its peaceful place within

a Europe whole and free. Putin's strategy has been to use this crisis to consolidate his own hold at home through greater oppression of civil society and independent media even as he fuels nationalist fervor. He has created an environment of fear and intimidation fostering the circumstances that led to the assassination of Boris Nemtsov. Putin, of course, is also seeking to dominate his neighbors, to drain them of resources to fuel his

kleptocracy, and to restore a sense of Russia's greatness in the only way a bully knows. He aims to prevent his neighbors from joining either NATO or the EU, achieving this through coercion when possible and by dismemberment and occupation when necessary. Ultimately Putin knows that the best check on his power is a united transatlantic community, and he has sought to divide Europe, undermining the resolve for sustained sanctions. But the most tempting objective for Putin is to call into question the credibility of NATO's Article 5 mutual defense commitment as doing so would effectively end NATO. A Russian move against an ally, such as a Baltic State , cannot be ruled out. Putin has demonstrated time and again that if he senses an opportunity to act he will , convinced that the West lacks the will or the ability to take decisive action .

That is why today's situation is dangerous. We have seen repeatedly that Putin's objectives expand with success and contract with failure. This means that the best determinant of his action is Western action . There is a tendency, however, to argue that the Europeans should take the lead on Ukraine. After all, we have our hands full with ISIS and other global responsibilities. But the Ukraine crisis is a Russia crisis, and

Russia is too big, too strong, and too scary for Europe to resolve this without us. Without U.S. leadership , Europe may feel forced to accommodate a revanchist Russia, and we have seen throughout history this is a dangerous formula .

The United States has the ability to rally its allies and international partners around a comprehensive strategy that not only deters Putin's aggression, but avoids an unstable gray zone in Europe East . To do so, we should begin by articulating what we want to achieve. We should more decisively increase the cost to Russia, including by enacting sectorial sanctions and targeting Gazprom and Putin directly.

EU-Russia war escalates and goes nuclear Drury ‘17 – journalist for VICE, citing Ian Shield, associate lecturer in international relations at Anglia Ruskin University, Vladimir Zhirinovsky who is a Russian lawmaker, Keri Giles, associate fellow with the UK foreign-policy think tank Chatham House, a RAND study (Colin, “What Would Happen if Russia and Europe Went to War?,” VICE, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4xe5a3/what-would-happen-if-russia-and-europe-went-to-war)But peace is not inevitable. If you think Europe can't descend into a bar fight like drunks at closing time again, know you're not the first to believe it. Some people dreamed something similar during the Concert of Europe—a system put in place to uphold the balance of power in the mid-19th century—and again in the four decades of calm that followed the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian conflict. The second period ended with WWI. So they misjudged that. Could we also have misjudged the proximity of mass conflict in the 21st century? Some say so. Security experts are increasingly investigating scenarios where a

stronger Russia on one side and Europe's NATO allies on the other go from diplomatic tensions to full on slapping each other. This, they stress, is unlikely. But if global events have taught us anything, it's that unlikely doesn't mean impossible . In fact, the above could happen in three simple steps. One: Donald Trump makes good on his hints and pulls the US out of NATO. Two: An emboldened Vladimir Putin decides to help himself to the Baltic states—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia—he has long believed should be part of Russia. Three: Given these states have been NATO members since 2004, the rest of the alliance—the UK, Germany, France, and others—go to their aid. The result? " Hiroshimas and Nagasakis everywhere ," reckoned the Russian lawmaker Vladimir Zhirinovsky when discussing the possibility last year. So that's not ideal. But could Russia and Europe really go to war? And if they did, how would that work out? Be warned: As Keir Giles, associate fellow with the UK foreign-policy think tank Chatham House, that is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization based in London tells me, "There's not much good news." WATCH: The Special Ops Olympics—War Games 1. Tensions Rise Tensions between Russia and Europe are always high. Even so, the present unease is ominous. On one hand, Russia has been holding major nuclear drills for 40 million citizens, sending submarines into the territorial waters of other nations and running mock bombing missions on the edge of British airspace. Forcibly annexing part of another country, This behavior isn't generally viewed as good neighborliness, either. Yet NATO isn't entirely averse to mucking things up. The alliance has almost 10,000 troops in countries that border Russia, while a two-week war game featuring thousands of personnel and 50 aircrafts is being held in Scotland right now. The enemy state in such rehearsals is often given a somewhat unambiguous name: the Reds. 2. The Flash Point It's not wildly anti-Russian to say the current administration favors the countries that border the Baltic Sea—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Putin believes these former Soviet states should never have become independent: Each has a large Russian population and strategically excellent sea ports. He's certainly not keen on them being NATO members and sees the alliance—not without rationale—as encircling Russia. "If you compress a spring," he warned in 2014, "eventually it will snap back." With America gone, that snap back could happen instantly. "They would move on the Baltic states more or less immediately," says Giles, who is also director of the Conflict Studies Research Center in Oxfordshire. "Putin believes Russian security requires the Baltic states under its domain. But you need to look further. It's hard to put a definitive border on how far ambitious Russians think the frontier should expand. But certainly you're looking at Poland and Finland too." 3. Internet Down! Shots Fired! Photo by Sean MacEntee via Flickr In 2015, a study by research institute the RAND Corporation concluded it would take just 60 hours for Russia to overrun Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Giles, however, believes the signs would be there sometime in advance. "There would be a noticeable rise in Russian diplomacy and media focusing on issues that could give rationale for an armed intervention," he says. On some pretense, such as a peacekeeping mission, thousands of troops would gather on the border. In the days before any invasion or attack, the target's internet would be shut down or disrupted by specialist telecommunications soldiers. Power supplies would fail, and ATMs would stop functioning. Cellphones and TV signals would be jammed. Perhaps most ominously, personalized texts would be sent direct to opposition officials, soldiers, and citizens, creating confusion and panic. In some cases, these texts would appear to come from someone already in the recipient's phone book. "In the right circumstances, this could be enough," says Giles. "Russia doesn't need to roll tanks across a border. They can stage an attack without a military presence. Misinformation and civil disorder could lead to regime change with a client government of Moscow taking charge. That would meet Russia's security and economic objectives." And if no such regime change happened? Think hybrid warfare: all the above combined with the sudden movement of troops into the country. "We don't know how exactly an occupation would look, but Russia does practice this scenario ," says Giles. "What we do know is it would be over pretty swiftly." 4. NATO: Fight or Fall Once diplomacy fails, the hard fact is that a US-less NATO almost certainly doesn't have the firepower to win a war with Russia. We'll ignore nuclear

weapons for now and keep things conventional. Russia has more men (the reserves alone are 2.5 million strong) and hardware. As a single country, its chain of command is better streamlined. Soldiers are battle-hardened from Ukraine and Syria. After a decade of $40 billion-a-year military upgrades, its weaponry—such as the Pantsir-S1, a tank that can literally destroy cruise missiles—is superior too. It's also possible some NATO members would withdraw—in particular Turkey, given the warm relationship between President Putin and President Recep Erdoğan. That's 600,000 men—the second-biggest contingent after the US—gone. The result would be the last of NATO facing an existential decision: Fight and probably lose, or, in this scenario, cut the Baltic states loose. Or, as Ian Shield, associate lecturer in international relations at Anglia Ruskin University, puts it: "The choice would be between reneging on the treaty—which would certainly lead to the disintegration of NATO and probably, by extension, the whole European order—or participating in a cataclysmic war extending up to nuclear weapons." Rock and a hard place, basically. 5. War on the Ground Ballistic short range missiles. Photo via Wikimedia Let's carry on gaming, though, and say NATO engages Russia. How does that go? Not well for either side, says Shields: "On any battlefield, there would be annihilation—although these wouldn't be battlefields like we have previously known. Missiles and artillery have far greater range and precision, meaning enemy posts, infrastructure, armories, and even entire towns could be destroyed from within home territory. What you have is fewer individual battles but far greater destruction. If neither side backed down, entire swathes of Europe—it's impossible to know where—would be reduced to rubble. The death tolls would be unimaginable." Britain wouldn't be safe; the English Channel has become a hopelessly outdated moat. "Russian aircrafts wouldn't need to even enter British airspace," says Shields. "They could land precision strikes from well outside." Both sides would wrestle for control of the seas around Scandinavia. Cyber attacks, meanwhile, could shut down transport infrastructure, hospitals, media, and utilities. Russia's main advantage amid the carnage would be two-fold. First, because it has more weaponry and men, it can, essentially, keep blasting away longer. Second, its sheer landmass means it could better absorb the devastation: NATO could wipe out every single structure hundreds of miles into its adversary's territory, and Moscow wouldn't even be scratched. 6. Going Nuclear As any history student knows, it doesn't matter if you have 7,000 nuclear weapons (Russia) or 200 (Britain and France); their cataclysmic qualities level things up. The thought goes that the pressing of the red button means MAD: mutually assured destruction. If one side starts throwing warheads about, the other responds in kind. Both adversaries are wiped out. Right? Wrong. "What Russia has in its arsenal that the West doesn't is tactical nuclear weapons," explains Giles. "These are not big city-leveling nukes, but ones that can destroy battlefields or neighborhoods. The West had these weapons but got rid of them. So its only response to a tactical nuclear strike would be a full nuclear attack. Which is self-defeating because it would also ensure their own destruction. The West is missing several rungs on the escalation ladder that Russia has built into its strategy." Nonetheless, once things go nuclear, it all becomes unpredictable: cities wiped out, millions dead. At this point, even the most advanced strategists tend to stop plotting possible paths. 7. But Cheer Up If the US leaving NATO is a gateway to Armageddon, the good news is it seems increasingly unlikely. Trump probably won't ditch the alliance. That's because it doesn't only keep the US secure; it's also politically and economically advantageous. It gives Washington influence in Europe and protects a vast and prosperous continent that—and this is important—spends much of its wealth with American companies. That said, maybe it's still worth remembering peace here really does hang by threads . Maybe go out and play more.

AFF Answers

Both – Link Answers

The U.S.’s commanding lead of arms exports means there’s an extremely low risk of a linkJonathan Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 4/6/2018 [“AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME” online @ https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/, loghry]By any estimate, the United States already dominates this industry. The State Department’s own estimates for 2015 credit the United States with a whopping 80 percent of the financial value of all global arms deliveries from 2013 to 2017. The most authoritative source of data, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, gives the United States a more conservative, but still commanding, lead of 34 percent of arms deliveries (measured according to an index of military, rather than financial, value) for the same time period. Russia comes in at second place with 22 percent, with the next four leading states scrapping for 5 to 7 percent each. Easing regulations on sales to existing American customers is unlikely to have a huge effect on the size of these transactions, and even with relaxed rules, finding new state customers will be hard. Much of the remaining market is essentially closed to the United States. With the crucial exception of India, there is little opportunity to encroach upon the market share of the number two weapons exporter — Russia — since the United States restricts or bans sales of weapons to important Russian customers like China, Venezuela, Syria, and Vietnam.

Both – No Fill-in

Zero risk of competitor fill-in, the U.S. position is just too strongJonathan Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 4/6/2018 [“AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME” online @ https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/, loghry]The United States has the most diverse export portfolio in the world. In the past five years, it has delivered weapons to nearly 100 countries. Its best customer over this period, Saudi Arabia, only bought 13 percent of all U.S. arms exports (all data from SIPRI). By contrast, 58 percent of Russia exports go to just three countries (India, China, and Vietnam). For China, it’s 64 percent (Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Algeria). Strong domestic demand also mitigates the pressure on a country to export. From 2010 to 2015 the United Kingdom, France, and Germany all exported about half of their defense production, while Russia exported 39 percent. The United States on average exports only a quarter of the arms produced by its firms. This combination of strong domestic demand and a diverse portfolio of client states makes America’s market power stronger than that of any other exporter. The United States is so economically advantaged in making and selling weapons that it can limit conventional-weapons proliferation, technology diffusion, and corruption in contracting arrangements (and maintain a robust defense industrial base) while retaining its commanding market position. Less powerful exporting states are generally too constrained by the economics of production to pursue any goals besides increased sales. There are a number of ways in which America’s leverage in the area of arms sales — and, therefore, its ability to exercise restraint — can further its foreign policy goals .

No risk of Russia or China catching up with the U.S. – ending sales to one country doesn’t result in enough fill-in to trigger the impactsRFE (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL journalists report the news in 26 languages in 22 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established. We provide what many people cannot get locally: uncensored news, responsible discussion, and open debate.) 3/11/2019 [“U.S. Remains World’s Top Arms Exporter, With Russia A Distant Second” online @ https://www.rferl.org/a/us-russia-lead-world-global-arms-exports/29814176.html, loghry]WASHINGTON -- The United States remained far and above the rest of the world as the globe’s leading arms exporter, with Russia a distant second , a leading research group says. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) said in a March 11 report that the gap between the United States and the rest of the world widened further in the most recent five-year period of 2014-18, with American exports rising to 36 percent of the global total from 30 percent in the previous period. "The U.S.A. has further solidified its position as the world’s leading arms supplier,” said Aude Fleurant, director of the SIPRI Arms and Military Expenditure Program. "[It] exported arms to at least 98 countries in the past five years; these deliveries often included advanced weapons such as combat aircraft, short-range cruise and ballistic missiles, and large numbers of guided bombs." The report highlighted the widening gap between Washington and Moscow in arms exports. “U.S. exports of major arms were 75 percent higher than Russia’s in the 2014–18 period, while they were only 12 percent higher in 2009-13,” SIPRI said in its report of global arms transfers. “More than half (52 percent) of U.S. arms exports went to the Middle East in 2014-18,” it added. SIPRI said Russia’s arms exports fell 17 percent in the 2014-18 period, with a reduction in arms imports by India and Venezuela the major

factors in the decline. The report said France (6.8 percent of the world total) was the third-highest arms exporter, followed by Germany (6.4 percent), and China (5.2 percent).

Both – Feasibility

Countries can’t just switch to new arms suppliers – transition costs in training and materiel just too highTerrence Guay (Clinical Professor of International Business, Pennsylvania State University) 10/19/2018 [“Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in Khashoggi affair” online @ http://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998, loghry]While it’s true that Russia and China are indeed major exporters of armaments, the claim that U.S. weapons can easily be replaced by other suppliers is not – at least not in the short term. First, once a country is “locked in” to a specific kind of weapons system, such as planes, tanks or naval vessels, the cost to switch to a different supplier can be huge. Military personnel must be retrained on new equipment, spare parts need to be replaced, and operational changes may be necessary. After being so reliant on U.S. weapons systems for decades, the transition costs to buy from another country could be prohibitive even for oil-rich Saudi Arabia. The second problem with Trump’s argument is that armaments from Russia, China or elsewhere are simply not as sophisticated as U.S. weapons, which is why they are usually cheaper – though the quality gap is quickly decreasing. To maintain its military superiority in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has opted to purchase virtually all of its weapons from American and European companies.

Both – No Econ Impact

No economic impact to arms salesJonathan Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 4/6/2018 [“AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME” online @ https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/, loghry]However, the Trump administration’s new initiative threatens to disrupt this balance and undermine the often useful role that arms sales have played in U.S. foreign policy. Tina Kaidanow, head of the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, recently testified that the Arms Transfer Initiative not only “bolsters our ability to protect the United States by being a force multiplier for the U.S. warfighter” but “ultimately benefits U.S. industry by driving new innovation and creating high-quality American jobs.” But simultaneously linking U.S. security and American jobs through arms sales, while it may seem intuitive, rarely works . Indeed, such a policy will carry few economic benefits , and, if done indiscriminately, undermine what should be the central goal of the nation’s arms transfer policy: advancing the national security of the United States and its partners. Many deals that advance U.S. goals will create few jobs in the United States, while some of the most lucrative, job-creating arms deals can undermine U.S. interests.

China – Post Brink

The U.S. has squandered its arms sales lead – China already cornering the market for most sought after exports: drones.Jakob Reinmann (contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus) 2/18/2019 [“China is Flooding the Middle East With Cheap Drones” online @ 2, loghry]The last great revolution on the world’s battlefields began with the advent of the drone era. Particularly in the Middle East, the drone became the symbol of the U.S. empire operating in a legal vacuum. In the first decade and a half of the “War on Terror,” the U.S. still had a virtual monopoly on the risk-free execution from thousands of meters above — but once the genie is out of the bottle, every attempt to squeeze it back in is notoriously doomed to failure. And so, quickly other countries in the region aspired after the financially — and politically — cheap execution by drone. The number of armies with their own drone fleet is growing rapidly. A multi-billion-dollar market with astronomical growth rates opened up — demand that’s essentially served only by one actor: China. The U.S. has squandered its lead The appearance of the Rainbow CH-4 — the driving force of Chinese combat drones — is almost identical to the notorious Reaper drone of the U.S. arms manufacturer General Atomics. While the CH-4 lags behind the Reaper in most performance parameters, it can keep up with or even outperform its competitor in some of them. Also, the CH-4’s weaponry, the AKD-10 warhead, is almost identical to the Reaper’s Hellfire missiles. The striking similarity follows a strategy of Chinese engineering well-known from cell phones or cars: the look of a world-famous Western branded product is copied with an inferior but sufficiently good quality compared to that of the original — but at significantly less cost. Chinese drones are 50 to 75 percent cheaper than the originals from the U.S. A late 2015 article published in the Asia Times suggests that this copying of U.S. technology is likely rooted in Beijing’s data theft. According to records by world-famous NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, by 2010 alone “Chinese hackers had conducted more than 30,000 cyber attacks” on Pentagon computer networks and other U.S. military agencies in order to “exfiltrate [data on] sensitive military technology.” Although there is no final proof that data on drones were skimmed off too, Asia Times quotes then NSA director Gen. Keith Alexander, who suggests that it is highly likely that the Reaper blueprints were part of the Chinese data hack, while military experts and analysts largely share this view. With the latest model — the CH-7, which is still in the development phase — China could possibly pull ahead the U.S. for the first time, military journal Defense One explains. The CH-7 “will be the sole option for buyers wanting to field stealth combat drones,” it predicts. “The United States had a decade-plus head start on [drone] technology,” says military expert Paul Scharre, “and has unfortunately squandered that lead .”

China – Alt Cause – Drones

China is the leader in armed drone sales already, which is sufficient to trigger the DA’s impactsJakob Reinmann (contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus) 2/18/2019 [“China is Flooding the Middle East With Cheap Drones” online @ 2, loghry]China captures the market For a long time, it was only the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel that had combat drones and used them to execute alleged terrorists — something that has changed dramatically in recent years. Meanwhile, the number of countries with combat drones has swelled to at least 29, as research organization New America identifies. And 10 countries have demonstrably used them to kill suspected enemies; in addition to the three mentioned, there is Iran, Azerbaijan, the UAE, as well as Nigeria, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey (the last four countries drone-killed people on their own soil). Historically, Israel is the largest drone exporter, with a market share of over 60 percent in the last three decades. More recently, from 2008-2017, China exported a total of 88 drones to at least 12 countries, ranking third among the world’s drone exporters behind the United States (351) and Israel (186). However, while the vast majority of U.S. and Israeli exports are made up of unarmed reconnaissance drones, China’s sales focus on armed drones. During the mentioned period, China exported 68 combat drones, putting it ahead of the U.S. (62) and Israel (56). Foreign Policy thus recently titled rightly: “China Has Already Won the Drone Wars.” All of the armed forces of the Chinese military have large fleets of various drones, but Beijing has used them so far only for disaster relief, surveillance of domestic critics, and military reconnaissance — not to kill. (In 2013, Beijing considered executing by drone a Myanmar drug baron wanted in the murders of 13 Chinese sailors, but eventually caught and tried him.) Rather, Beijing appears to be establishing a norm permanently prohibiting lethal drone strikes in East and South Asia. However, this no-shoot dogma does not prevent the Chinese arms industry from exporting their drones to states that are patently using them for killing elsewhere.

Russia – Uniqueness Answers

UQ Overwhelms – Russia arms sales high globally nowKruglov ’19 [ALEXANDER KRUGLOV, 4/21/19, “Business booming for Russia’s arms traders,” Asia Times, https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/04/article/business-booming-for-russias-arms-traders/, cs]

In a high-profile spat, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has acknowledged he is buying S-400 missile defense systems, a deal that has put Ankara on a collision course with Nato and Washington and complicated the country’s deal to buy F35 stealth jets from the United States.

This Ankara-Washington stand-off over the sale of Russian missiles and Erdogan’s obvious commitment to go ahead with the deal make clear how Moscow’s aggressive arms trade is offering the Kremlin new opportunities to strengthen its position, influence and foothold the world over. Turkey is only one of the markets for Moscow’s arms traders. According to the latest

annual report by The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for 2018, Russia has surpassed Britain as the number two arms producer and trader in the world, behind perennial number one, the US. Combined sales of Russia’s arms and

military services rose 8.5% from a year earlier, reaching an unprecedented US$37.7 billion. Also, according to SIRPI, the largest arms-producing

company in Russia, state-owned Almaz-Antey, for the first time entered the top 10 in the global arms sales ranking. ‘Arsenal of communism’ Russia’s leading export is energy, its second is weaponry. The USSR, as the “arsenal of communism,” was long a maker of classic weapons, from the T34 – the outstanding tank of World War II – and the Katyusha multiple rocket launcher to the Kalashnikov assault rifle and MIG and Sukhoi warplanes. Following the break-up of the USSR, Russia’s military budget shrank six-fold. Potentially catastrophically, arms makers lost many of their top customers – the Eastern European member states of the Warsaw Pact. That forced producers to refocus on global sales. Even so, old partnerships in other parts of the world endured. Russia’s manufacturers of effective and reliable arms have been given a powerful shot in the arm by President Vladimir Putin. The macho national leader’s injection blends industrial policy, R&D policy and foreign policy with personal testosterone. With Putin an arms fetishist himself – he has been filmed watching tanks going through their paces at proving grounds, firing pistols, visiting the Kalashnikov factory, interacting with fully geared-up special forces, even cruising in a

jet fighter in full paraphernalia – Russian arms manufacturers benefit from a highly prominent global marketer like no other. The main focus is on Asia and the Middle East. Russia sells 43.1% of its weapons to Asia and more than 20% to the Middle East. Chinese market The top priority is China. While Chinese troops used Russian arms as early as the Korean War in the 1950s, the roots of current Moscow-Beijing cooperation in the sector date back to the turbulent early 1990s. China was

Russia’s largest client between 1999 and 2006, accounting annually for 34% to 60% of Russia’s weapon exports, according to Russia’s Far East Institute. In 2015, after years of

negotiations, Beijing-Moscow cooperation ramped up a level when Russia finally agreed to sell China some of its most advanced arms: 24 Sukhoi Su 35 combat aircraft and four S-400 SAM systems for approximately $7 billion within the next five years. Then there’s Asia’s other rising demographic superpower, India, which acquires 62% of all its arms from Russia. Russia is providing a range of equipment, from tanks to fighter aircraft to frigates. India has now overtaken China as the largest buyer

of Russian weapons in the world, having purchased more than $4 billion worth of arms in 2017, according to Russia’s Oriental Studies Institute. But the emerging Asian

market for Russian hardware is Southeast Asia, where, from 2006 to 2015, military spending rose by an average of 57%, according to Aseantoday website. Arms for Asean As soon as Air Marshall Yuyu Sutisna was sworn in as Indonesia’s new Air Force Chief of Staff last year, he announced the purchase of 11 new SU-35s. And that’s just the beginning. The Russians are anticipating future great deals. Vietnam, Indonesia and Cambodia more than doubled their military purchases. Vietnam increased spending on arms seven-fold from 2006 to 2016. Now Hanoi is the eighth biggest arms importer globally. “All that is a response to national security threats of countries in the region,” explained Petr Brigin, a Vietnam expert at Vostochnaya Politika, a Moscow think tank. “Vietnam, for example, is

spending heavily on naval weaponry – in response to China’s moves in the South China Sea. “In Thailand, dealing with an insurgency in the south of the country, there’s a strong demand for land-based arms – so the Royal Thai Armed Forces placed an order for new AK rifles.” Between 2000 and 2016, Vietnam imported more than 80% of its arms from Russia, rejuvenating an old partnership – the country deployed Warsaw Pact weapons in its struggle against the United States. The Vietnamese military, facing off against China in the South China Sea, recently purchased 12 SU-35 fighter-jets and boosted its navy with highly advanced Russian-

Indian Brahmos cruise missiles and six diesel submarines. Myanmar and Laos bought between 60% and 80% of their weapons from Russia. Why buy Russian? Because not only are these weapons technologically advanced, they are cheaper and don’t require the political sign off that arms from Moscow’s main rival do. Human rights criteria must

be met before the US Congress approves arms sales, but Russian weapons come with no such baggage. In 2016, the Philippines placed an order for 26,000 automatic rifles from the US. Those rifles never arrived , as Congress refused to approve the sale over suspicions that President

Rodrigo Duterte might use the weapons against his own people in his war on drugs. As a result, Moscow stepped in and supplied the Philippines with 5,000 AK-74M rifles, one million items of ammunition and 20 trucks. “Selling weapons to Asian

countries perfectly fits Putin’s foreign policy objectives,” said Alexei Sidorov, an independent Moscow-based analyst who specializes in Southeast Asia. “Putin is trading weaponry with rivals in

the South China Sea,” he added, a reference to the fact that both Hanoi and Beijing were customers of Moscow’s armorers. “This gives Moscow more leverage and political influence in the

region.” The Syrian showcase The ever-troubled, oil-rich Middle East is also high on Moscow’s agenda. It is a promising market – arms imports by Middle Eastern states rose 87% over the last four years, accounting for 35% of global arms imports, according to SIPRI. Russia has been trying to make inroads into the prosperous Gulf states, a market dominated for decades by US arms producers. More than half of all US weapons sold go to the Middle East.

To win over new customers from the Gulf, Russian companies in recent years have boosted their presence at the major airshows and defense exhibitions in the Middle East, like IDEX in Abu Dhabi and the Dubai Airshow. In the region, Moscow deploys a special sales pitch. The Russian military has showcased the best it has to offer in its largely successful military intervention in Syria, a theater that has provided a proving ground for the weaponry. Between 60 and 200 weapons have been tested in Syria in real combat. These include the supersonic strategic bomber the Tu-160, the Su-34 fighter-jet and

the first Russian stealth fighter, the Su-57. Older generation T-90 tanks and Ka-52 attack helicopters have also proven their worth. Egypt is traditionally a leading buyer of Russian arms. Moscow has actively sought to upgrade relations with Cairo, through subtle diplomacy and high-profile official visits – in 2015, Putin was the first major leader to meet with President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi after he assumed office. During Putin’s second visit in 2017, several landmark agreements were signed. Nowadays, Cairo is the leading Russian arms buyer in Africa, with annual weapons purchases estimated at more than $1.3 billion, according to data from Moscow University’s Asian-African Institute. Long-range arms sales

Moscow arms players also boast a strong foothold in Latin America. Many regional nations – particularly those aligned against the

United States – are familiar with Soviet weapons from the Cold War days and are drawn by low price tags. Cuba, Peru, Venezuela and Nicaragua are at the top of the list for Russian arms sales companies. According to SIPRI, between 2000 and 2017, the Russian share of arms sales to Latin America was about 20%, on par with the US share. Nicaragua is central. Since 2000, Russia has supplied 100% of Nicaraguan weapons’ needs. Venezuela is also heavily dependent on Russian arms supplies, which make up about 69% of Venezuela’s arms purchases – aircraft, transport and

combat helicopters, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft systems, rocket artillery and mortars. Russia also has a foothold in Brazil, where about 7% of arms sales are Russian. Since 2010, Russia has delivered Mi-35M combat helicopters and SA-24 portable surface-to-air missiles. Sometimes Russian arms sales are found in unexpected places. Recently, following the ouster of Sudanese dictator Al-Bashir, it was reported in Moscow press that Russia had been selling arms to the regime for more than 20 years.

UQ o/w– Despite sanctions, Russia gaining massive arms sales ground in SQ – especially in Asian marketsOgawa ’19 [TOMOYO OGAWA is a Nikkei staff writer, 2/3/19, “Russia vies with US as it steps up arms exports to Southeast Asia,” https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Russia-vies-with-US-as-it-steps-up-arms-exports-to-Southeast-Asia, cs]

MOSCOW -- Russia is ramping up its weapons sales to Southeast and South Asia , with Moscow overtaking Britain as the world's second-largest exporter. The Kremlin's aggressive sales campaign has raised fears of an arms race in Canberra and Washington, where the Trump administration has unveiled its own "buy American" effort to sell more U.S. weapons systems worldwide. The Asia-Pacific is a theater of intensifying rivalry between the two military superpowers , partly fueled by countries

buying arms to counter security threats from Chinese naval expansion in the South China Sea but also from international terrorist groups. Russia -- the largest arms exporter to the region -- is supplying missile defense systems, tanks and fighter jets to countries ranging from India to Laos and Vietnam. Russia was the largest supplier of arms for the region from 2013 to 2017, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. In January, Russia delivered four Yak-130 fighter jets to Laos based on a contract signed in 2017. In addition, Laos is being supplied with tanks, lightly armored vehicles

and other types of weapons, the Russian defense ministry said. Russia was home to 10 of the world's 100 largest weapons manufacturers in terms of sales in 2017, according to data released in December by SIPRI. Moscow's combined sales amounted to $37.7 billion, an 8.5% rise from the previous year and representing 9.5% of overall global arms sales, which totaled $398.2 billion. Russia's weapons shipments surpassed Britain's $35.7 billion, making it the second-largest arms seller, after the U.S. Russia sold $19 billion worth of weapons in 2018, according to Sergey Chemezov, CEO of Rostec, the government-owned industrial group that includes Russia's monopoly arms exporter in its vast portfolio. "Today Russia confidently holds second place in the world by volume of military and technical cooperation," Chemezov was quoted by Russia's Tass news agency as saying. He

said that in 2018 the country sold nearly 25% more in arms than the year before. Russian military experts say the country's weapons carry lower price tags than those from their Western counterparts. It is believed that Russia's military intervention in the civil war in Syria was

partly motivated by Moscow's desire to test and demonstrate the performance of Russian arms. Even after international economic sanctions were imposed on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine in 2014, arms exports have remained a steady revenue source for Moscow.

Russia is prioritizing Asia in its arms export expansion drive. The region absorbs over 60% of Russia's arms shipments, with most of them going to Southeast Asia. Nguyen Phu Trong, the general secretary of Vietnam's Communist Party, visited Russia in September and struck a $1 billion arms deal with Moscow. President Vladimir Putin met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India in October and agreed to sell the sophisticated S-400 surface-to-air missile defense system to the South Asian country in a deal worth $5 billion.

Washington is concerned that sales of Russian weapons systems, like the S-400 to India and other countries in the region, could lead to U.S. military secrets being leaked to the Kremlin. The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act was introduced in 2017, aimed at punishing Russia for its alleged meddling in the 2016 U.S. elections and its actions in Ukraine. It prohibits any country from signing "significant" defense deals with Russia. In September 2018, the U.S. imposed secondary sanctions on the Chinese military for buying fighter jets and S-400 system-related equipment from Russia. The Trump administration's "buy American" policy aims to boost arms exports worldwide. American arms sales to foreign governments rose 13% to $192 billion in fiscal 2018 ended Sept. 30, according to the State Department. Alexey Muraviev, associate professor of national security and strategic studies at Curtin University in Australia, discussed regional tensions in a

commentary published in The Conversation, an independent source of news and views sourced from academic and research communities. "After years of decline and neglect, Russian military power in the Asia-Pacific region is making a major leap forward," Muraviev

wrote. "Russia is making its presence felt in the region for the benefit of its regional allies and clients, and as a form of deterrent to its geopolitical rivals," he said. "The time has come for us to appreciate a power north of the Great Wall," Muraviev wrote.

Russia – Link Answers – Middle East

No risk of country fill-in in the middle east – too locked into particular systemsBershidsky ’19 [Leonid Bershidsky is the founding editor of the Russian business daily Vedomosti and founded the opinion website Slon.ru., 3/12/19, “Trump Is Winning, Putin's Losing in Global Arms Sales,” Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-12/u-s-is-no-1-in-arms-sales-as-russia-loses-market-share, cs]Global arms sales are on the increase, consistent with the growing number of conflicts and deaths brought about by them. The U.S. and its allies have been the main beneficiaries. Russia, by contrast, is on the decline, a sign that Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical bets aren’t turning into long-term influence. The world has grown significantly less violent since 1950, but there has been an marked uptick in the number of armed conflicts in recent years. The emergence of Islamic State, hostilities in eastern Ukraine, and the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar are just some examples. The number of fatalities has increased even more dramatically, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data

Program. Between 2011 and 2017, the average annual death toll from conflict neared 97,000, three times more than in the previous seven-year period. That helps to explain the 7.8 percent increase in international arms transfers from 2014 to 2018 compared with the previous five-year period seen in the latest data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the global authority on the weapons trade. The Middle East has been absorbing weapons at an alarming pace: The flow of armaments to the region rocketed by 87 percent in the last five years. Russia took an active part in the bloodiest of the conflicts, but it doesn’t appear to have been able to convert this into more sales . It was the only one of the world’s top five exporters, which together account for 75 percent of the business, to suffer a major loss in market share. It remains the world’s second-biggest arms exporter. SIPRI has its own, rather complicated, system for calculating transfer volumes based on the military value of the equipment traded rather than on its market price. But

in dollar terms, too, Russia trails the U.S. Yury Borisov, Russia’s deputy prime minister in charge of the defense industry, said last month that Russia “steadily reaches” $15 billion in arms exports a year and hopes to retain that amount. This suggests officials believe sales have hit a ceiling. By contrast, the U.S. closed $55.6 billion of arms deals in 2018, 33 percent

more than in 2017, thanks to the Trump administration’s liberalization of weapons exports. According to the SIPRI figures, U.S. exports were 75 percent higher than Russia’s in 2014 through 2018 – a far wider gap than in the previous five-year period. For the U.S., Middle Eastern countries have been especially important – particularly Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest arms importer, and its major irritant, Qatar. Some 52 percent of U.S. weapons sales were to the Middle East in the last five years . Under President Donald Trump, the relationship

with Saudi Arabia became even more lucrative for the defense industry. For Russia, the Middle East accounted only for 16 percent of its weapons exports over the same period, with most going to Egypt and Iraq. Its major trade partners were India, China and Algeria – but sales to India dropped

significantly as its government sought to diversify suppliers and bought more from the U.S., South Korea and, most painfully for the Kremlin, Ukraine. Russia has been losing key aircraft tenders in India to the U.S. This, along with the economic collapse of another major client, Venezuela, and the current potential for regime change in Algeria, all makes a rebound in Russian sales look unlikely. Arms sales are perhaps the best reflection of a major military power’s international influence. The market isn’t all about price and quality competition; it’s about permanent and situational alliances. The growing gap between the U.S. and Russia in exports shows that Putin’s forays into areas such as the Middle East are failing to translate into Russian influence in the region. Although Putin’s warm relations with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi and his alliance with Iran , which has a lot of

influence over Iraq, are paying off to some extent, they can’t quite compensate for ground lost elsewhere. The U.S.’s allies, France, Germany and the U.K. among them, have been rapidly increasing their market share, too . That’s a rarely mentioned way in which the security alliance with Washington is paying off for the Europeans. All the ethical objections to selling arms to countries such as Saudi Arabia notwithstanding, European Union member states need markets for their defense industries, which employ about 500,000 people. Being under the U.S. umbrella opens doors where Russia and China are less

desirable partners – that is, in most of the world. Many tears have been shed in the U.S. about the collapse of the American-led global order. But if you take arms sales as a proxy for influence, the U.S.’s global dominance looks to be resilient. In a more conflict-prone, competitive world, America is doing rather well while its longstanding geopolitical rivals stumble.

Zero risk of Russia fill-in to Saudi ArabiaThalif Deen (Inter Press Service, Staff) 4/28/2019 [“US and Western arms in Yemen conflict signal potential war crime charges” online @ https://www.manilatimes.net/us-and-western-arms-in-yemen-conflict-signal-potential-war-crime-charges/546239/, loghry]Asked for a response, Pieter Wezeman, senior researcher, Arms and Military Expenditure Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri), told IPS: “If, [very hypothetical] the USA and the UK would stop supplying arms to Saudi Arabia, this would be a major problem for Saudi Arabia, in military and financial terms.” He pointed out that Saudi Arabia would find it very hard to maintain the US and UK weapons its armed forces largely rely on without the support of the large numbers of US and UK service personnel in the country right now. The Saudi military might be able to keep the weapons going for a while, but presumably at a much lower operational level. He said it will not only be very costly for Saudi Arabia to replace the expensive existing equipment — which is supposed to be in service for decades — but it also means that Chinese and Russian weapons will not be of as high quality as what Saudis now receive from the US and Western Europe. And New York Times roving correspondent Nicholas Kristof says, “some Saudis kept trying to suggest to me that if we block weapons sales to Riyadh, the kingdom will turn to Moscow.” “That’s absurd . It needs our spare parts and, more important, it buys our weapons because they come with an implicit guarantee that we will bail the Saudis out militarily if they get into trouble with Iran.”

Russia – Impact Defence

Baltic Adventurism Defense – No WWIIIStangl ’19 [Maxwell Stang is a research assistant in the Department of Military & Strategic Studies at the U.S. Air Force Academy, 5/13/19, “Russia Won't Start a (Conventional) War in the Baltics,” National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-wont-start-conventional-war-baltics-57317]

Russia is simply not prepared or properly positioned to execute a well-coordinated, conventional attack on the Baltics. The amount of Russian units in close proximity to make a rapid assault is limited, and most of these formations would take significant time and resources to mobilize . It would require a large and complex movement of troops, vehicles, and equipment to successfully plan and execute such an operation. Such activity would surely catch the eye of NATO members, alerting them to a likely invasion. Instead, Russian posture is best suited for hybrid warfare against these neighboring countries. A Glimpse of the Bear With the Baltic States on Russia’s Western border, the Western Military District (WMD) [Западный военный округ] would be ultimately responsible for Russian military operations in that region. These districts are similar to the United States geographical combatant commands such as European Command (EUCOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM), which have separate units and command structures from multiple branches across specific regions. Russia’s WMD contains all units permanently present in the western-most part of the country while also including the enclave of Kaliningrad bordering Poland and Lithuania. Although it is comprised of naval, air, ground, cyber, electronic, and nuclear capabilities, the number of assets in the region and their locations simply do not lend themselves to making a surprise, conventional assault on the Baltics. For instance, 2017 figures show that there are twenty-two combat

brigades and over 1,200 aircraft within the vicinity of the Baltics, making it a very capable force. However, these numbers do not tell the full story. Hypothetically, if Russia were to conduct a combined-arms invasion of the Baltic States tomorrow, only a small number of forces would be properly positioned to attack. There are plenty of armored and mechanized units nearby, however, the only truly capable and quick reaction military unit available for a surprise assault would be the 76th Guards Air Assault Division (GAAD). Based in Pskov only twenty miles from the border of Estonia, they could utilize cargo aircraft (e.g. Il-76), and helicopters (e.g. Mi-8, Mi-17, and Mi-24) for airborne operations, striking the Baltics with little warning. Additionally, it is reported that the GAAD has recent combat experience in Ukraine. This is an overlooked aspect when talking about the effectiveness of armed forces. Size and equipment is not the only thing that determines a unit’s effectiveness. Recent tactical combat experience can also increase lethality, something the

GAAD now excels in. Although speed and experience is great, especially in a hypothetical Baltic campaign, these air assault units simply do not have the heavy weaponry, equipment, or logistics to maintain an offensive posture against NATO combat units . They are outfitted for quick and rapid deployments rather than sustained fighting with a superior force such as a U.S. Army Armored Brigade Combat Team. To counter this, Russia would have to mobilize their armored and mechanized forces, turning the conflict into an even bigger conventional conflict, something Putin knows would not fare well against American/NATO airpower.