***CONSULT CONGRESS – FFPSV – MICHIGAN 2019

notesBrought to you by Ethan, Jordan, Sahar, Saif, Sarwa, Soper, Jaya, and Zidao.

This is not a process counterplan. This is an advantage counterplan that bans the plan to generate uniqueness for an arms sales good to build Congressional expertise net benefit. Tests the sales key warrant. For example, there’s a solvency debate to be had about whether suspending delivery solves the entrapment advantage on the Saudi aff.

Template:

The United States federal government ought to require [affs arms sales] be approved by Congress

The United States legislative branch ought to

offer to guarantee fast-track consideration of [affs arms sales] if, and only if, the executive engages in prior consultation with Congress over [affs arms sales], and,

approve negotiations to sell [affs arms] and any resulting arms sale

The United States executive branch ought to not allow delivery of [affs arms]

Sample Plan text:

The United States federal government should bar foreign military sales and suspend direct commercial sales licenses relating to air-to-ground strike capabilities for operations in Yemen.

Sample counterplan text:

The United States federal government ought to require foreign military sales relating to air-to-ground strike capabilities for operations in Yemen be approved by Congress

The United States legislative branch ought to

offer to guarantee fast-track consideration of foreign military sales relating to air-to-ground strike capabilities for operations in Yemen if, and only if, the executive engages in prior consultation with Congress over foreign military sales relating to air-to-ground strike capabilities for operations Yemen and,

approve negotiations over foreign military sales relating to air-to-ground strike capabilities for operations in Yemen and any resulting foreign military sale relating to air-to-ground strike capabilities for operations in Yemen

The United States executive branch ought to not allow delivery under foreign military sales and direct commercial sales licenses relating to air-to-ground strike capabilities for operations in Yemen

AT: Why are you not including the part of the plan that’s about DCS? It’s not necessary to establish competition and it lets you avoid the entire debate about what that part of the plan means.

sales of arms are the agreement, not the delivery, aff has to cancel current agreements or prevent new agreements- the aff has to terminate the contract, they can’t just not fulfill it- counterplan has Congress require the sales of arms agreements get approved by Congress- offers fast-track approval if Congress consults prior to negotiating sales of arms- President will consult, Congress says yes, president negotiates an agreement, Congress approves the agreement- then has President stop delivery- net benefit is it demonstrates the efficacy because Congress approves the contract, which is part of arms sales- aff has to reduce both, so has Congress say no to the contract- that’s bad, means no spillover- counterplan is key to building trust between executive and legislative for further fast-track agreements

this cp stops delivery forever but doesn’t cancel the contracts

**top level

Counterplan – 1NC

The United States federal government ought to require [affs arms sales] be approved by CongressThe United States legislative branch ought to

offer to guarantee fast-track consideration of [affs arms sales] if, and only if, the executive engages in prior consultation with Congress over [affs arms sales], and,

approve negotiations to sell [affs arms] and any resulting arms sale The United States executive branch ought to not allow delivery of [affs arms]

First two planks solve the net benefit and are mutually exclusive- approval is key to Congressional participation in negotiations over the aff which resolves broader arms control disputesSciarra ’88 (Vanessa Patton - DOJ Trial Attorney. JD Yale, BA Yale “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure,” 97 Yale L.J. (1988). LexisNexus. JJN)

As soon as executive branch officials decide to initiate negotiations with a foreign buyer, they should be required to consult with appropriate congress ional committees, most likely the Senate Foreign Relations Committee [*1455] and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The committees could then approve the sale and guarantee that the final letter of offer would receive fast-track consideration, or they could deny the guarantee , thereby subjecting a submitted letter of offer to consideration under normal legislative procedure. Legislators should consider requiring a joint resolution of approval for large negotiated sales and

commercial export licenses. The requirement of positive approval for large sales would make denial of a fast-track guarantee at the pre-negotiation stage potentially devastating for the negotiations because executive branch negotiators would then have no way to ensure the buyer that the sale would in fact be approved by Congress. However, executive branch officials, willing to adjust their perspective agenda for the sale, might be able to convince the committees to give a guarantee to modified proposed arms package. A fast-track guarantee procedure for arms sales will allow the values of congressional oversight and participation to be met while still allowing executive branch flexibility in arranging and implementing arms deals . Debate over specific sales should also allow both branches to address the broader policy question of how the United States government should approach the growing demand for arms among developing countries . For

example, increased congressional participation in regulating arms transfers [*1456] may allow Congress to force executive compliance with the mandate of sales restraint set out in the AECA.

Third plank solves the aff but ISN’T the affGrimmet 5 (Richard, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. "U.S. Defense Articles and Services Supplied to Foreign Recipients: Restrictions on Their Use" March 14. Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30982.pdf)

Section 3(c)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act requires the President to report promptly to the Congress upon the receipt of information that a “substantial violation” described in section 3(c)(1) of the AECA “may have occurred.” This Presidential report need not reach any conclusion regarding the possible violation or provide any particular data other than that necessary to illustrate that the President has received information indicating a specific country may have engaged in a “substantial violation” of an applicable agreement with the United States that governs the sale of U.S. defense articles or services. Should the President determine and report in writing to Congress or if Congress determines through enactment of a joint resolution pursuant to section 3(c)(3)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act that a “substantial violation” by a foreign country of an applicable agreement governing an arms sale has occurred, then that country becomes ineligible for further U.S. military sales under the AECA. This action would terminate provision of credits, loan guarantees, cash sales, and deliveries pursuant to previous sales. Since the major revision of U.S. arms export law in 1976, neither the President nor the Congress have actually determined that a violation did occur thus necessitating the termination of deliveries or sales or other penalties set out in section 3 of

the Arms Export Control Act. The U nited S tates Government has other options under the A rms E xport C ontrol A ct to prevent transfer of defense articles and services for which valid contracts exist short of finding a foreign country in violation of an applicable agreement with the United States. These options include suspension of deliveries of defense items already ordered and refusal to allow new arms orders. The United States has utilized at least one such option against Argentina, Israel, Indonesia, and Turkey.

Introduction In accordance with United States law, the U.S. Government places conditions on the use of defense articles and defense services transferred by it to foreign recipients. Violation of these conditions can lead to the suspension of deliveries or termination of the contracts for such defense items, among other things. On occasion, the President has indicated that such

violations by foreign countries “may” have occurred, raising the prospect that termination of deliveries to or imposition of other penalties on such nations might take place. However, since the major revision of U.S. arms export law in 1976, neither the President nor the Congress have actually determined that a “substantial violation” did occur thus necessitating the termination of deliveries or sales or other penalties set out in section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act. This report reviews the pertinent sections of U.S. law governing permissible uses of U.S.-origin defense equipment and services by foreign nations, Presidential and congressional options for dealing with such violations, and illustrative actions previously taken by the United States in response to possible violations.

Arms Export Control Act (AECA): Basic Conditions on Use of U.S.-Supplied Defense Articles and Services The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, authorizes the transfer by sale or lease of United States origin defense articles and services through the government-to-government foreign military sales (FMS) program or through the licensed commercial sales process.1 Section 3(a) of the Arms Export Control Act sets the general standards for countries or international organizations to be eligible to receive United States defense articles and defense services provided under this act. It also sets express conditions on the uses to which these defense items may be put. Section 3(a)(2) of the AECA specifically provides that to be eligible to purchase defense articles and services from the United States: ...[a] country or international organization shall have agreed not ... to use or permit the use of [a defense] article or related training or other defense service for purposes other than those for which furnished, unless the consent of the President has first been obtained.... Section 3(c) of the Arms Export Control Act further sets out the circumstances under which a nation may lose (a) its U.S. Foreign Military Financing, (b) its loan guarantees for purchases of U.S. defense articles and services, (c) its rights to have previously purchased U.S. defense articles or services delivered, (d) its rights to have previously made agreements for the sale of U.S. defense articles or services carried out. Section 3(c)(1)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act stipulates, in part, that: No credits (including participations in credits) may be issued and no guarantees may be extended for any foreign country under this Act as hereinafter provided, if such country uses defense articles or defense services furnished under this Act, or any predecessor Act, in substantial violation (either in terms of the quantities or in terms of the gravity of the consequences regardless of the quantities involved) of any agreement entered into pursuant to any such Act2 ...by using such articles or services for a purpose not authorized under section 4 or, if such agreement provides that such articles and services may only be used for purposes more limited than those authorized under section 4 for a purpose not authorized under such agreement.... Section 3(c)(1)(B) of the AECA adds that, under the above conditions: “[n]o cash sales or deliveries pursuant to previous sales may be made....” Section 3(g) of the Arms Export Control Act, enacted in November 1999, further requires that: Any agreement for the sale or lease of any article on the United States Munitions List entered into by the United States Government after the date of enactment of this subsection [November 29, 19993 ] shall state that the United States Government retains the right to verify credible reports that such article has been used for a purpose not authorized under section 4 or, if such agreement provides that such article may only be used for purposes more limited than those authorized under section 4, for a purpose not authorized under such agreement.

Purposes for Which Military Sales by the United States Are Authorized (Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act). The purposes for which sales of defense articles and services by the United States are authorized are detailed in section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act. This section of the act states that defense articles and defense services shall be sold to friendly countries “solely for”: ! “internal security” ! “legitimate self-defense” ! enabling the recipient to participate in “regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations” enabling the recipient to participate in “collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security” ! enabling the foreign military forces “in less developed countries to construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries.”

It should be stressed that the Arms Export Control Act as amended, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, and predecessor acts do not define such critical terms as “internal security” and “legitimate self-defense.” It remains for the President or the Congress, as the case may be, to define the meaning of such terms as they may apply to the question of a possible violation by a foreign country of an applicable agreement governing the sale of U.S. defense articles or defense services.

Presidential Report to Congress on Possible Violations. Section 3(c)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act requires the President to report promptly to the Congress upon the receipt of information that a “substantial violation” described in section 3(c)(1) of the AECA “may have occurred.” This Presidential report need not reach any conclusion regarding the possible violation or provide any particular data other than that necessary to illustrate that the President has received information indicating a specific country may have engaged in a “substantial violation” of an applicable agreement with the United States that governs the sale of U.S. defense articles or services.

Procedures for Making Foreign Countries Ineligible for Receipt of U.S. Defense Articles and Services. Should the President determine and report in writing to Congress or if Congress determines by joint resolution pursuant to section 3(c)(3)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act that a “substantial violation” by a foreign country of an applicable agreement governing an arms sale has occurred, then that country becomes ineligible for further U.S. military sales under the AECA. This action would terminate provision of credits, loan guarantees, cash sales, and deliveries pursuant to previous sales. The President could, under section 3(c)(3)(B) of the AECA, continue to permit “cash sales and deliveries pursuant to previous sales” by certifying in writing to Congress that termination of such sales and deliveries would have a “significant adverse impact on United States security.” Such a Presidential waiver could not be invoked, however, if Congress, under section 3(c)(3)(A), had adopted or were to adopt a joint resolution finding that country ineligible. The President retains the prerogative of vetoing any such joint resolution. Congress would then have to override the veto in order to impose its will. Congress also has the option of adopting regular legislation imposing varying degrees of penalties upon any country for violations of the conditions of an applicable agreement regarding use of U.S.-supplied defense equipment. Such legislation would also be subject to the veto process.4

Restoration of Eligibility. Once a country is made ineligible for sales or deliveries under the Arms Export Control Act provisions, it can regain its eligibility only when: (1) Under section 3(c)(4) of the act, the President “determines that the violation has ceased” (the violation which led to the status of ineligibility in the first place), and (2) the country involved “has given assurances satisfactory to the President that such violation will not recur.” Alternatively, Congress could pass regular legislation that would exempt the particular country from specific sanctions imposed through AECA procedures, although that legislation would be subject to a Presidential veto.

Suspension or Cancellation of Contracts and/or Deliveries by the United States. It should be noted that the U nited S tates has additional options to prevent transfer of defense articles and services for which valid contracts exist short of finding a foreign country in violation of an applicable agreement with the United States. Authority for suspension of deliveries or defense items or cancellation of military sales contracts is found in sections 2(b), 42(e)(1) and 42(e)(2) of the AECA. Section 2(b) of the Arms Export Control Act permits the Secretary of State, under the President’s direction, to, among other things, determine

“whether there shall be delivery or other performance” regarding sales or exports under the AECA in order that “the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.”

Section 42(e)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act states that: Each contract for sale entered into under sections 21, 22, 29 and 30 of this Act, and each contract entered into under section 27(d) of the Act, shall

provide that such contract may be canceled in whole or in part, or its execution suspended , by the United States at any time under unusual or compelling circumstances if the national interest so requires . Section 42(e)(2)(A) of the Arms

Export Control Act further states that: Each export license issued under section 38 of this Act shall provide that such license may be revoked, suspended, or

amended by the Secretary of State, without prior notice, whenever the Secretary deems such action to be advisable. Thus, all government-to-government agreements or licensed commercial contracts for the transfer of defense articles or defense services may be halted, modified, or terminated by the Executive branch should it determine it is appropriate to do so.

The counterplan prompts the fast-track guarantee procedure to be adopted in other areas of foreign affairs- resolves interbranch foreign policy conflicts more broadly- key to boosting Executive credibility when negotiating agreements- demonstrating efficacy of the process is key which is why the perm fails- Congressional approval guarantees participation in the negotiation process Sciarra ’88 (Vanessa Patton - DOJ Trial Attorney. JD Yale, BA Yale “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure,” 97 Yale L.J. (1988). LexisNexus. JJN)

IV. CONCLUSION Without the legislative veto, the statutory framework for congressional regulation of arms sales provides little incentive for the executive branch to consult with Congress before a sale becomes final. The fast-track guarantee procedure, which has been used for over a decade in trade legislation to guarantee congressional participation in trade negotiations, can be adapted to the arms sales area. The procedure will allow Congress to register its approval or disapproval of any potentially controversial sale before a foreign government has been promised the

arms. Further, it will also allow Congress to better monitor executive branch compliance with the mandate of AECA, requiring the United States government to exercise restraint in its arms sales policy. More generally, application of the procedure to the arms sales area will demonstrate its efficacy outside the trade area and may prompt adoption of the procedure in other foreign affairs legislation where Congress seeks to recalibrate the balance between congressional participation and executive flexibility .

Otherwise, extinction. David Gray Adler 8, 2008, Professor of Political Science at Idaho State University, “The Judiciary and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs: A Critique”, http://www.freerangethought.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=6&Itemid=41//ZidaoW

{11} The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter abuse of power, misguided policies, irrational action , and unaccountable behavior . [31] As a fundamental matter, emphasis on joint policymaking permits the airing of sundry political, social, and economic values and concerns. Such a structure wisely ensures that the ultimate policies will not merely reflect the private preferences or the short-term political interests of the President.[32] {12} Of course, this arrangement has come under fire in the postwar period on a number of policy grounds. Some have argued, for example, that fundamental political and technological changes in the character of international relations and the position of the United States in the world have rendered obsolete an eighteenth century document designed for a peripheral, small state in the European system of diplomatic relations. Moreover, it has been asserted that quick action and a single, authoritative voice are necessary to deal with an increasingly complex, interdependent, and technologically linked world capable of almost instantaneous massive destruction. Extollers of presidential dominance also have contended that only the President has the qualitative information, the expertise, and the capacity to act with the necessary dispatch to conduct U.S. foreign policy.[33] {13} These policy arguments have been reviewed, and discredited, elsewhere; space limitations here permit only a brief commentary.[34] Above all else, the implications of U.S. power and action in the twentieth century have brought about an even greater need for institutional accountability and collective

judgment than existed two hundred years ago. The devastating, incomprehensible destruction of nuclear war and

the possible extermination of the human race demonstrate the need for joint participation in any decision to initiate war. Moreover, most of the disputes at stake between the executive and legislative branches in foreign affairs have virtually nothing to do with the need for rapid response to crisis. Rather, they are concerned only with routine policy formulation and execution, a classic example of the authority exercised under the separation of

powers doctrine.[35] {14} Nevertheless, these joint functions have been fused by the executive branch and have become increasingly unilateral , secretive , insulated from public debate, and hence unaccountable . [36] In the wake of Vietnam , Watergate , and the Iran -contra scandal, unilateral executive behavior has become ever more difficult to defend. Scholarly appraisals have destroyed arguments about intrinsic executive expertise and wisdom in foreign affairs and the alleged superiority of information available to the President.[37] Moreover, the inattentiveness of presidents

to important details and the effects of " groupthink " that have dramatized and exacerbated the relative inexperience of various presidents in international relations have also devalued the extollers' arguments . Finally, foreign policies, like domestic policies, are reflections of values. Against the strength of democratic principles, recent occupants of the White House have failed to demonstrate the superiority of their values in comparison to those of the American people and their representatives in Congress. {15} The assumption of foreign affairs powers by recent presidents represents a fundamental alteration of the Constitution that is both imprudent and dangerous. We turn now to an examination of the judiciary's contribution to executive hegemony in foreign affairs.

AT: Perm Do Both – 2NC**If they don’t read perm do the counterplan, make sure you read the perm do the counterplan cards here- they help to establish that the counterplan bans the plan

Counterplan is anti-topical- it increases arms sales, literally does the opposite of the aff- reducing arms sales means no new agreements, NOT no deliveries- sales mean agreement, not delivery, which means the counterplan increases sales BUT it stops delivery of current and future contracts- solves the case but is a pic out of salesLangvandslien, 4 – Cand. Philol. Thesis Department of History University of Oslo (Martin, “Promising Restraint: The Carter Administration’s Arms Transfer Policy” https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/23399/1/17315.pdf

In order not to disrupt arms sales commitments already made, or cause friction in bilateral relations with arms recipients, the ceiling would relate to agreements rather than to actual deliveries . This also made sense because arms were often not shipped until years after the sales agreements had been made. Thus, using statistics on deliveries would not necessarily reflect the volume of sale for that particular year.

Perm doesn’t solve the net benefit- negotiating the agreement is critical to Congressional participationSciarra ’88 (Vanessa Patton - DOJ Trial Attorney. JD Yale, BA Yale. “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure.” The Yale Law Journal Vol 97. 1988. HeinOnline. JJN)

FOOTNOTE 15

15. In foreign affairs, policymaking cannot be separated from the negotiation of international agreements ; the initiation of discussions with foreign governments and the negotiation of formal and informal agreements all constitute policy in the making. Rather than limit presidential use of unilateral executive agreements , a Congress that seeks active involvement in foreign affairs should create legislative procedures for mandatory involvement in the agreement-making process. Cf. Henkin, supra note 7, at 306 (Congress should react to growing use of executive agreements by careful scrutiny and use of "political weapons").

Participation is critical- any legitimate perm might consult but say no means there’s no opportunity to participate in negotiating an agreement, which is critical to building Congressional expertiseSciarra ’88 (Vanessa Patton - DOJ Trial Attorney. JD Yale, BA Yale “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure,” 97 Yale L.J. (1988). LexisNexus. JJN)

The 1986 sale of arms to Saudi Arabia dramatically demonstrated this point. Although a majority in both Houses of

Congress voted for a resolution disapproving the sale negotiated by the executive branch, the President was ultimately able to convince 34 Senators not to oppose his veto of the resolution, leaving the Senate one vote short of overriding his veto. In response to the Saudi sale, Senator Joseph Biden and Representative Mel Levine recently proposed legislation which would require the executive branch to submit all major sales of sensitive weapons and equipment, except sales to American allies, to Congress for a joint resolution of approval. This proposal, while overcoming the most obvious flaw in the report and wait system, the difficulty

of overriding a veto, does not address the remaining problem -- the lack of early congressional participation in the decisionmaking process. Presentation of a sale after the negotiations [*1449] have been completed, whether for positive approval or negative challenge, does not allow for a full congressional role in policymaking . If members of Congress are willing to take their constitutional responsibility to participate in this process seriously, then they should look for procedures that require their participation in approving the initiation as well as the conclusion of negotiations, while preserving executive flexibility and credibility. This balance has been managed with great success in the trade area and the mechanisms employed can inform a re-evaluation of the arms sales statutory regime.

Process key to solve the net benefit – perm is non-genuine and doesn’t solve

Non-binding doesn’t demonstrate efficacy for a good model that spills over to other areas

AT: Perm do the CP – 2NC

1. The counterplan is competitive- it bans the plan and uses that as an opportunity to generate uniqueness for a net benefit based on negotiating arms sales good- consultation over sales while suspending delivery is a legitimate alternative to ending arms sales- we have advocates for all planks of the counterplan- we have a net benefit to arms sales good, which is Congressional participation in foreign policy making, proves it’s a germane opportunity cost to the aff

a. It’s not a trick- the government explicitly distinguishes between arms sales and arms delivery- Dunphy 2 (Harry, AP Writer. "Study Finds Arms Sales Down" August 8. nexis)

Developing countries, hit by the global economic slowdown, curtailed arms purchases in 2001 as they reached their lowest level in eight years, a congressional study found.

Arms sales to developing and developed countries declined to a level not reached since 1997, the report said.

The United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing countries in 2001 with nearly $7 billion in sales, followed by Russia with $5.7 billion,

said the report by the Congressional Research Service , an arm of the Library of Congress .

The report, released this week, said the Middle East generally has been the largest arms market in the developing world. Israel was the leading buyer of weapons in the region last year.

Richard F. Grimmett, a defense specialist who prepared the report, said in the summary that it is prepared annually to provide unclassified data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the U nited S tates and other countries. The report does contain some information on worldwide arms flows.

"Despite global changes since the Cold War's end, the developing world continues to be the primary focus of arms sales activities by conventional weapons suppliers," the report said.

Many of those countries recently have reduced expenditures on weapons due mainly to limited financial resources, the report said. The result has been intensified competition among major arms suppliers for contracts.

"Given the tenuous state of the global economy, even some prospective arms purchasers with significant financial resources have been cautious in making major new weapons purchases, the report said.

These countries instead are placing greater emphasis on upgrading existing weapons systems to meet their military requirements, Grimmett wrote.

The 83-page report distinguishes between contracts for arms sales and delivery of the weapons. Because of

production times, deliveries do not correspond to agreements signed in a given year.

b. Deliveries aren’t sales- this is reflected in stats on what counts as an arms sale- the aff has the same misunderstanding as Trump- he’s touting deliveries as sales, which are obviously differentHartung & Arabia 19 (William, director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy.[1] He has also served as a Senior Research Fellow in the New America Foundation's American Strategy Program, and is former director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute. He specializes in issues of weapons proliferation, the economics of military spending, and alternative approaches to national security strategy. Hartung was the director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation. Prior to that, he served as the director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute. Christina, Director of the Security Assistance Monitor (SAM) at at the Center for International Policy. Prior to joining SAM, Arabia was a consultant for a joint peace project with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) where she co-created and populated an online database of Arms Trade Treaty-related cooperation and assistance activities in sub-Saharan Africa. She also co-authored with Mark Bromley the SIPRI background paper, "ATT- Related Outreach Assistance in sub-Saharan Africa: Identifying Gaps and Improving Coordination." Her previous work has focused on arms control mechanisms in sub-Saharan Africa and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in Kosovo. Arabia holds a Master's degree in International Affairs with a concentration in International Conflict and Security from the New School in New York City and a Bachelor's degree from Seton Hall University. Security Assistance Monitor. "Trends in Major U.S. Arms Sales in 2018: The Trump Record - Rhetoric Versus Reality" https://securityassistance.org/sites/default/files/USArmsTrends2018_Report_190404_letter.pdf)

The drop in new arms offers to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) over the past few years undercuts President Trump’s claims of record arms sales to the region under his tenure. But the U nited S tates remains a major supplier to the region based on weapons deliveries – accounting for 68% of Saudi Arabia’s arms imports from 2014 to 2018, 64% of the UAE’s imports, and 65% of Qatar’s weapons imports over the same time period.7

Part of the reason for the decline in sales to MENA states is cyclical. Major deals for fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, combat ships, missile defense systems and other equipment concluded under the Obama administration are still working their way through the system as they move from offer to agreement to delivery. To some extent, there are fewer new deals to be made due to the accumulation of sales from prior years. Major purchases of fighter planes, missile defense systems, and combat ships by a given nation do not happen every year, or even every few years. So, to some degree, the MENA market has been saturated by deals made during the Obama years.

Statistics from the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency suggest that there are tens of billions of dollars in past deals still working their way through the pipeline. For example, during the eight years of the Obama administration, from Fiscal Year 2009 to Fiscal Year 2017, there were $76 billion in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, by far the largest recipient of U.S. arms in the MENA region. Over that same time period there were only $22 billion in FMS deliveries. This suggests that there are tens of billions worth of contracts and deliveries yet to come, even before any new offers are made.8

c. Federal law proves that they’re confusing arms SALES with arms DELIVERY- they have different authoritiesUS Code No Date (22 U.S. Code § 2752. Coordination with foreign policy)

Responsibility for supervision and direction of sales , leases, financing, cooperative projects, and exports Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State (taking into account other United States activities abroad, such as military assistance, economic assistance, and the food for peace program) shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of sales , leases,

financing, cooperative projects, and exports under this chapter, including, but not limited to, determining—

(1) whether there will be a sale to or financing for a country and the amount thereof;

(2) whether there will be a lease to a country;

(3) whether there will be a cooperative project and the scope thereof; and

(4) whether there will be delivery or other performance under such sale, lease, cooperative project, or export,

to the end that sales, financing, leases, cooperative projects, and exports will be integrated with other United States activities and to the end that the foreign policy of the United States would be best served thereby.

2. Our offense on theory is a reason the counterplan should be competitive- if we win debates over the counterplan are uniquely educational and make debate better, that’s a reason to vote against the perm- only our interpretation of competition accesses these debates

3. Severs the plan---the counterplan bans the plan ---the result of the counterplan is more arms sales, just not delivery---this doesnt consult over the aff---excluding this based on an arbitrary theoretical argument undermines the core purpose of debate

4. Severs textually---the CP doesn’t use the word should---voting issue since the plan is the locus of all ground

5. Perm severs certainty and immediacy–a. Resolved

OED 89 (Oxford English Dictionary, “Resolved,” Volume 13, p. 725)

Of the mind, etc.: Freed from doubt or uncertainty , fixed, settled. Obs.

b. shouldSummers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid

phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 13 "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the

Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation

to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In praesenti means literally

"at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is

presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

c. SubstantialWords and Phrases 64 (40 W&P 759) (this edition of W&P is out of print; the page number no longer matches up to the current edition and I was unable to find the card in the new edition. However, this card is also available on google books, Judicial and statutory definitions of words and phrases, Volume 8, p. 7329)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially

the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full

existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential , apparent, constructive, and imaginary;

veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v. Pease, 79 Ill. App. 308, 318.

d. Reduce is unconditionalReynolds 59---Judge (In the Matter of Doris A. Montesani, Petitioner, v. Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al., Respondents [NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department 9 A.D.2d 51; 189 N.Y.S.2d 695; 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7391 August 13, 1959)

Section 83's counterpart with regard to nondisability pensioners, section 84, prescribes a reduction only if the pensioner should again take a public job. The disability pensioner is penalized if he takes any type of employment. The reason for the difference, of course, is that in one case the only reason pension benefits are available is because the pensioner is considered incapable of gainful employment, while in the other he has fully completed his "tour" and is considered as having earned his reward with almost no strings attached. It would be manifestly unfair to the ordinary retiree to accord the disability retiree the benefits of the System to which they both belong when the latter is otherwise capable of earning a living and had not fulfilled his service obligation. If it were to be held that withholdings under section 83 were payable whenever the pensioner died or stopped his other employment the whole purpose of the provision would be defeated, i.e., the System might just as well

have continued payments during the other employment since it must later pay it anyway. [***13] The section says "reduced", does not say that monthly payments shall be temporarily suspended; it says that the pension itself shall be reduced. The plain dictionary meaning of the word is to diminish , lower or degrade. The word "reduce" seems adequately to indicate permanency.

e. Fiat must be certain and immediate---just because they’ve found an out of context definition that means the counterplan isn’t competitive doesn’t make any of those interpretations any good---kills every disad---politics, DIB, fill-in, etc. rely on implementation---no counterplan or kritik alternative would be competitive ----allows aff conditionality which means the Aff can shift to avoid our best case arguments---makes them a moving target---their interpretation literally makes debate impossible because the aff never has to defend anything, ever---you wouldn’t allow this versus a kritik, don’t allow it for a counterplan

6. If they win any of their interpretations, vote neg on presumption- Trump will circumvent the plan- counterplan solves by suspending all new and pending deliveries- we have evidence that’s more clear than saying “reduce arms sales” and doesn’t allow the same loopholes

7. CP is a PIC out of their agent- we only have the executive suspendBlack’s Law 90 (Dictionary, p. 695)

“[Government] In the United States, government consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in addition to

administrative agencies. In a broader sense, includes the federal government and all its agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments.

8. Severance is a voting issue for deterrence

Theory – 2NC

1. Counterinterp – this counterplan is good

2. Process debates are goodGluck et al 15 (Abbe, Prof of Law, Yale. Anne O’Connell, Prof of Law, Berkeley. Rosa Po, J.D. Candidate, Yale. November. “Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking” Columbia Law Review. 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1789. l/n)

And so it seems that the Schoolhouse Rock! n13 cartoon version of the conventional legislative process is dead. It may never have accurately described the lawmaking process in the first place. This is not news to anyone in the halls of Congress or the executive branch. But it may be news for law. The Court's first opinion directly confronting these modern developments--King v. Burwell, n14 the

recent challenge to the ACA--was issued just before this Essay went to press. Until then, most of the doctrines, theories, and casebooks had overlooked--or perhaps intentionally ignored--the fact that the textbook understandings that form the basic assumptions underlying the doctrines and theories of both fields are woefully outdated. Just as the now-textbook 1970s model was once itself revolutionary, ours is again a world of both "unorthodox lawmaking" n15 and "unorthodox rulemaking." These unorthodoxies are everywhere and they are not exceptions. n16 They are the new textbook process .

The "law crowd"--a group in whom the value of process is deeply instilled--tends to view these changes as disconcerting, as the Court did in King. But evaluating them is quite complex. Arguably, some of these modern unorthodoxies are beneficial to democracy, particularly insofar as they enable the enactment of policy that otherwise could not occur in an age of gridlock or under considerable fiscal constraints. n17 What is more, what is [*1795] orthodox today may have been unorthodox yesterday. The Administrative Procedure Act n18 (APA) and Chevron deference n19--two core modern institutions of administrative lawmaking--were considered unorthodox when first proposed. n20 Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) review, one of the unorthodoxies we discuss, may now be close to orthodox status, despite its lack of statutory and judicial recognition. n21

Another question is who are we--the lawyers--to judge? The Constitution gives to Congress the power over its own procedures. n22 Congress organized itself into committees and passed rules such as the filibuster, the fast-track budget process , and the rules that govern the omnibus bills that give rise to many of the unorthodoxies we see today . n23 Congress also passed the APA, which explicitly permits agencies to regulate without notice and comment--a practice today viewed as

unorthodox because of its increased use and de facto binding effect on regulated entities. n24

This Essay develops a modern account of unorthodox lawmaking and unorthodox rulemaking and, in the Strauss tradition, substantiates [*1796] the link between them. For example, both lawmaking and rulemaking often now bypass the hurdles of transparency that have become familiar. Both use outside delegates for many controversial issues. Both also have generated significant jurisdictional overlap: The "deal making" required to surmount political division leads to bundling unrelated bills, drafted by multiple congressional committees, which in turn creates overlap across administrators and gives a more prominent role to the White House because it takes on the role as coordinator-in-chief. n25

Who wins and who loses from these deviations? Power inures to party leaders and the President--who wears two different, but equally powerful, hats as legislator and chief administrator. On the other hand, policy experts in committees and agencies, as well as those who favor decentralized power, may get the short end of the stick. From a democracy perspective, the process loses transparency and public input and sometimes obfuscates accountability. But it may also gain in efficiency and productivity.

"Unorthodox lawmaking" was first brought to the attention of the academy by political scientist Barbara Sinclair, in her eponymous book. n26 Subsequent editions empirically documented the increase in legislative-process deviations , n27 a phenomenon elaborated on in a coauthored empirical study of congressional drafters by one of us . n28 On the administrative law side, separate work by two of us has begun to develop the modern unorthodox rulemaking account. n29

Until now, these two accounts mostly have been discussed in isolation and have themselves relied on fairly simplified description. n30 In contrast, [*1797] we argue here that the legislative and rulemaking processes are inextricably linked, and that each set of unorthodoxies feeds into and illuminates the other. We also argue that it would be a return to the Schoolhouse Rock! fiction to fail to appreciate the sheer variety of deviations from the textbook process that fall under the general umbrella of unorthodox policymaking . Omnibus bills and rules are different from emergency bills and rules; both are different from unorthodox delegations; and so on.

Part I expands the preexisting descriptive account by developing a new typology of these deviations and roughly surveying their scope empirically. Part II explores these connections as well as other ways in which common motivations, such as gridlock, institutional complexity, and fiscal constraints, give rise to the deviations in both branches. The final two Parts investigate the normative and legal implications of our descriptive account. As Part III

explains, these unconventional practices allow certain institutional actors to gain and lose power and offer benefits and drawbacks for social welfare and democratic legitimacy. Part IV looks to doctrine and details how, in the contexts of both statutory interpretation and administrative law, these unorthodoxies have been largely invisible, even as the courts seem obsessed with ensuring that judicial decisions in statutory cases reflect how Congress legislates or that agencies otherwise faithfully execute Congress's commands.

Two brief examples will illustrate our direction. On the legislation side, take the simple example of one of the Court's favorite interpretive rules--that a term used in one part of a statute means the same thing when used in another part. n31 While this "presumption of consistent usage" may make sense for very short statutes, or statutes involving a single subject matter drafted by a single congressional committee, it makes little sense for omnibus deals that put together diverse statutes, drafted at different times, by different institutional actors. On the administrative law side, to take another basic example, the Supreme Court has yet to decide how its central deference doctrine--Chevron--applies when multiple agencies share authority. n32

[*1798] One goal of the Essay is simply to set the record straight . Given that so much scholarship and legal doctrine at least purports to rely on an understanding of how Congress and the executive branch actually function, an accurate account of the modern policymaking process seems vital . At a broader level, the Essay's

goal is to question the capacity of and role for courts in taking this amount of process variation into account. Part of this inquiry is motivated by an interest in the jurisprudential foundations of statutory law.

When it comes to legislation, the Court has never been consistent in its articulation of what the role of interpretive doctrine is supposed to be in the first place . Sometimes the Court tells us that its doctrines aim to reflect how Congress drafts--for instance, the rule

that Congress does not write with redundancies. Other times, the Court tells us that legislation doctrine helps Congress draft "better" or encourages legislative deliberation. Still other applications of interpretive doctrine aim to impose on legislation external values, like federalism, that Congress might not have considered. n33 These potential normative frameworks are often in tension in any given case.

On the administrative law side, the Court has been less interested in engaging in a shared interpretive con-versation with agencies and more interested in questions of accountability. n34 But even there, the theoretical basis has been fuzzy, since the Court seems to measure accountability against the APA, and not against actual agency and White House practices. n35 Obviously, all of these different norms have different implications for a theory that would take unorthodox processes into account.

One caveat at the outset is that we do not engage judicial unorthodoxies, or unorthodoxies related to agency enforcement and agency adjudications. A comprehensive study of unorthodox mechanisms in law might well include these, for instance, examining court innovations such as the increasing use of unpublished and thus nonprecedential opinions n36 and the rise of specialty courts. n37 These developments, while fascinating, are outside the scope of this Essay, which trains its focus on the public law-making processes. Even with respect to Congress and the executive branch, [*1799] one Essay cannot possibly tackle all unorthodox practices and we recognize omissions: For instance, we do not discuss foreign affairs. In addition, we focus mostly on action by policymakers. One could also develop an account of unorthodox inaction in lawmaking and rulemaking. n38

Our efforts, as noted, build on Strauss's contributions. Strauss has always written with both modern legislation and administration--and their connections--front and center. n39 He was an early identifier of the varied unorthodox roles played by the President and the potential doctrinal implications of those different roles. n40 He was one of the first scholars to consider the question of Chevron deference for presidential interpretations, and also the link between agency statutory interpretation and the legislative history debate raging on the statutory side. n41 And his pathbreaking work on Chevron as a judicial management tool is a rare realist analysis of doctrinal development in response to the sprawl of regulation. n42 He has been a consistent voice in pushing back against those who turn a blind eye toward the political and legislative context of statutes, and we aim to follow his example here. n43

I. THEMANY FORMS OF UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING AND RULEMAKING

Unorthodox policymaking is now often the norm rather than the exception. But not all unorthodox policymaking is the same . This Part focuses on these two themes, documenting the modern prevalence of unorthodox policymaking and resisting the way in which the limited accounts that do exist tend to lump together all deviations from conventional process as a single phenomenon . n44 Omnibus actions are different from emergency

actions, not only in motivation and in how the final product looks, but also in the distinct challenges each poses for courts. Outsourcing difficult legislative and regulatory questions to special processes, commissions, and unconventional delegates raises its own set of [*1800]

questions for law, as do the simultaneously regulatory and legislative roles of the modern President, and the increasing use of nonformal means, such as guidance, for regulation. Direct democracy is yet

another type of lawmaking whose differences from the norm courts seem to prefer to ignore.

3. Uniquely true for our counterplan on this topic- using increased legislative oversight to deter executive actions while approving the policy is necessary for understanding arms sales

Aspin 78 (Les, United States Representative from 1971 to 1993, and the United States Secretary of Defense under President Bill Clinton from January 21, 1993 to February 3, 1994. graduated summa cum laude from Yale University in 1960 with a degree in history. He was a Rhodes scholar at Oxford University where he earned an M.A. in economics in 1962. He then studied at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, from which he received a Ph.D. in economics in 1965. Congress and Arms Contro. "The Power of Procedure" p. 43- )

If there one word that describes the essence of Congress, that word is “procedure.” Congressmen love procedure, perhaps because many of them are lawyers. “Closed rules,” “open rules,” “motions to table,” “consent calendars,” “union calendars”—this is the stuff of which congressional decisions are made.

To understand the congressman’s penchant for procedure, one must understand how it benefits him. In the first place, procedure allows Congress to construct a

majority and to make progress. In an institution with many factions, at times one of the few things members can agree on is the procedure for resolving an issue. So, very often procedure becomes a substitute for substance .

Second, procedure allows congressmen to mask many of their votes from their constituents. The first end-the-Vietnam-War vote in the House of Representatives, for example, came on a motion to table a motion to instruct the conferees to insist on the House version of the Defense Authorization Bill in the light of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. A congressman could vote as he chose and leave his constituents scratching their heads.

Every profession has devices to keep kibitzers and amateurs at arm’s length. Procedure does that for Congress. When confronted by a constituent demanding explanation of a vote against funding for the B. 1 bomber, the congressman can always say, “Well, it was brought up under a closed rule and that, of course, is just intolerable because it prevented a full and fair debate. We couldn’t vote for it under those circumstances.” He has the advantage, for although the constituent may know more about the bombers—the congressman knows more about closed rules.

Third. procedure allows Congress to defy the executive without confronting executive branch expertise . In 1972, for example, after the SALT agreement was signed, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laud presented to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees recommendations for budget additions resulting from SALT. One of the items in Laird’s budget was more money for the Hard-Target Re-entry Vehicle (HTRV), which faced heavy opposition in the Senate. The House Armed Services Committee was reconvened and the SALT additions approved. The Senate Armed Services Committee, however, decreed that the request had arrived too late for hearings and dropped the HTRV from the bill. When the conference committee met to iron out the differences between the two versions, the HTRV was rejected—not on the merits of the case (even though the principal people involved under stood the issue), but on the procedural ground that only one house had considered the matter.

An incident described by David Halberstam in The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1978, pp. 140.141) illustrates the congressional instinct to avoid direct confrontation with the executive and achieve objectives through procedure . The incident concerned the American decision not to intervene in Indochina on behalf of the French in 19M.

On April 3, 1954, at Eisenhower’s suggestion, Dulles met with the Congressional leadership, a group which included Minority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson and the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, Richard Russell. The purpose of the meeting soon became clear: the Admininstration wanted a congressional resolution to permit the President to use naval and air power in Indochina, particularly a massive air strike to save the garrison at Dienbienphu. . . .

The senators began to question Radford. Would this be an act of war? Yes, we would be in the war. What would happen if the first air strike did not succeed in relieving the garrison? We would follow it up. What about ground forces? Radford gave an ambivalent answer. . . .

At this point Johnson took over.. . . Johnson was disturbed by the implications of the Radford appeal for a variety of reasons. He doubted that the necessary resources misted in a war-weary country which had just come out of Korea, and he did not want the blame for refusing to go to war placed on him and the Democratic leadership in Congress. If Eisenhower went for a congressional resolution, then Johnson would be right smack on the spot, which was exactly where he did not want to be....

The Democrats, he told Dulles, had been blamed for the Korean War and for having gone in virtually alone without significant allies. . . . The patriotism of Democratic officials had been questioned. He was touched now to be considered so worthy and so good a patriot as to be requested to get on board. But first he

had some questions… What allies did they have who would put up sizeable amounts of men for Indochina? Had Dulles consulted with any allies? No, said the Secretary, he bad not.

By the time the two-hour meeting was over, Johnson had exposed the frailty of the Administration’s position. ... Dulles was told to sign up allies. . . Thus the burden, which the Administration had ever so gently been trying to shift to the Congress, had now been ever so gently shifted back, if not to the Administration, at least to the British, who were known to be unenthusiastic.

Procedure, then, can be and is used by Congress to avoid direct responsibility. Congressmen have recourse to procedure not only to mask their votes and achieve objectives without confronting the executive, but also to protect themselves politically. Congress as an institution does not like to be out front.

The decisive votes on a multibillion-dollar defense budget. which contains money for such diverse items as Safeguard missile sites, a naval base at Diego

Garcia, and military support for the government of South Vietnam, will most likely be held on nominally procedural questions, such

as thresholds, ceilings, and cut-off dates. The most capable legislators understand this, perhaps instinctively. Congress establishes thresholds which require, for example, that when x happens, then y must happen; when a

certain point is reached, then the president must report to Congress (the War Powers Bill is an example). Congress establishes ceilings requiring, for instance, that spending for certain functions cannot exceed a specified amount ($2.5 billion for Military Assistance Service Funded, or $500 million for Transfer Authority). And Congress establishes cut-off dates (e. g., the flight pay for colonels and generals who do not fly stops May 31, or the

bombing of Cambodia ends August 15). Congressmen are most comfortable dealing with national security matters in procedural terms; there they are the experts.

All this may be discouraging to those who look to Congress as a source of leadership. Very often such people think that if Congress could get more information or reform in some way, it would assume a leadership role. But the problem is not information. In many ways Congress now has more information than it can digest. In any congressional office reams of documents arrive every day and most are thrown in the round file. Only to a limited extent does Congress digest information and decide issues on a rational basis. It is primarily a political arena, a place where issues are debated in a political, not academic or rational context.

Focusing on procedure tells us a good deal about what Congress will not do; we must also look at what it can and will do. As I see it, Congress performs three basic roles fairly well. The first and most obvious is as a conduit for constituent views. It is, in fact, the only federal institution where the peoples wishes are fed directly into the system. For example, it is an important sounding board, revealing how effectively federal programs function or how a proposed course of action will be received. As a sounding board it is not perfect; special interests are overrepresented, and its votes do not always indicate the general will. Still, what is debated on the floor of Congress is important, and the mood of Congress, reflected in these debates, is rarely very far from the mood of the country at large.

The second role of Congress is general overseer of government policies and resource allocation. In this role its actions are not unlike those of a board of trustees. With very few exceptions Congress is not where policy is initiated. Most congressional committees or subcommittees have no overall plan or policy to attempt to implement in their area of concern. The Compenstation Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, for example, has no guiding policy about the structure of pay and allowances in the armed forces. The subcommittee rarely initiates legislation; it reviews, questions, and periodically modifies what the executive proposes. In performing this role, subcommittee members enjoy certain advantages. Often they have years of experience and know what has been tried before. They have communication lines to branches of the armed forces that provide them with information the executive may not have; and they are more sensitive than a Pentagon manager to conflicting pressures that build up around any policy change.

Congress’s third role is to act as guardian of the processes of government—i.e. to establish and protect procedure . In many ways this is the most intriguing of the three roles. By establishing new procedures, which are, of course, ostensibly neutral, Congress often is able to effect substantive changes. A good example is the National

Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). Congress required that for any major federal project which would significantly affect the quality of the environment an environmental impact statement had to be written by the agency

undertaking the project. This provision would force federal agencies to consider the environmental impact of a project before it was carried out. What happened, of course, was much more fundamental. Environmental groups around the country found they could use NEPA to bring suit against any federal agency that did not comply fully with its procedures . Once an environmental impact statement is written, environmentalists can use the statement as a source of objections to the proposed project. The impact statement forced federal agencies into discussions with environmentalists, and where the environmentalists were able to make a convincing case, it became politically difficult to ignore them.

As a result, NEPA brought a new group, environmentalists, into a decision-making process from which they previously had been excluded. A long series of projects regarded as dangerous to the environment—from nuclear reactors to public works (one of the most famous being the Cross-Florida Barge Canal)—were halted.

By establishing this new procedure, Congress wrought changes more significant than any it might have voted in dealing with each project individually .

New procedures established by Congress produce substantive change by changing the decision-making process or bringing new people into it. Sometimes the direct impact of such legislation proves less important than the indirect results . For example, Congress in 1961 passed the Symington Amendment, which required that in allocating

foreign economic aid, consideration be given to the resources that a recipient country assigns to defense. If a country’s defense spending were excessive, the president should withhold aid. The direct impact of that amendment was nil; no country’s aid was withdrawn for spending too much on the military. But the indirect impact was considerable. A committee chaired by the Agency for International Development (AID) now had to be included in policy decisions that until then had been managed solely by the Pentagon. It was included because should Congress wish to investigate compliance with this amendment, AID would then be asked if they had been consulted. As an indirect result of the Symington Amendment, a new group of people with a wholly different outlook was brought into the decision-making process.

Historically, Congress has used a vast number of procedural devices to alter the decision-making process. Structural change is one. Congress has established organizations and abolished them; it has increased their influence by having them report directly to the president, or decreased it by having them report to a third-ranking official. If Congress does not think that arms control is being given sufficient

consideration by the executive branch, it can create an agency with independent access to the White House, as it did with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

A second procedural device is to require certain findings before specific programs may be carried out. The

Walsh Act of 1935 required that before the administration could transfer destroyers to another country, the Navy first had to certify they were not needed. Senator David I, Walsh, the author of the act, feared that President Roosevelt was about to give

destroyers to Britain and thus drag the United States into another European war. While the senator’s purpose was to prevent President

Roosevelt from giving destroyers to Britain, he assumed Congress would be reluctant to give that order directly. He thus decided on a procedural device that would be acceptable to Congress. As Senator Walsh no doubt anticipated, the Navy was not willing to declare it had too many destroyers.

A third procedural device is for Congress to designate a specific official to make certain decisions . Placing responsibility for a decision in an office with predictable political or organizational interests naturally influences the decision. The act that established the Naval Petroleum Reserve, for example, requires that any decision to release petroleum from the reserves must be approved by the secretary of the Navy. Any Navy secretary will be reluctant to make such a determination.

Finally, Congress can involve already existing groups in government decisions by making them part of a new procedure. This might be a citizen group (such as the environmentalists in the NEPA case), it might be an agency of government, or perhaps even Congress itself. Sometimes the people brought into a decision do not belong to an identifiable group. For instance, under the provisions of the War Powers Act, if the president commits American forces to hostilities abroad, he must report to Congress within forty-eight hours his reasons for doing so, and at the end of sixty days he must withdraw those forces unless Congress votes to continue the commitment. By establishing this procedure, Congress had made itself the final arbiter on whether troops should be used. But, as we have seen, Congress is never happy in such a role and is most unlikely to challenge a president in such a foreign-policy decision. Indeed, liberals objected that the War Powers Act was too weak: bringing Congress into the decision would not change anything because Congress would simply rubber- stamp whatever the president had already decided to do.

But the liberal objection overlooks the effect of this bill on decision making in the executive branch. When the president considers sending troops somewhere, he and his advisers now know that the decision will provoke an intense debate for up to sixty days. Congressional committees will hold hearings, newspapers will write editorials, “Meet the Press” and “Face the Nation” will cross-examine government spokesmen; there will be network specials, demonstrations, and letters from constituents. The predictability of all this commotion is bound to strengthen the hand of those in the president’s council who oppose military intervention. They can now object not with their own arguments but with the kind the president will inevitably have to face, Congress’s ultimate verdict is not the most important factor; what is important is that the president and his advisers know their policy will receive intense public scrutiny. They will be much less inclined to embark upon a military adventure without a very strong case for it.

The ways in which Congress has used procedure in the past suggest that procedural changes offer the best hope of attacking many of today’s problems, including arms control and weapons procurement.

One of the major problems in controlling procurement of new weapons is the “requirements” syndrome, under which every weapon requested by the military services is quickly defined as essential to fulfilling their military mission, Weapons systems become “requirements” very early in the process—well before Congress ever sees them as specific budget items. By the time Congress comes face to face with a new weapon, service and bureaucratic momentum is already behind it. contractors and unions are interested, and it is probably too late to stop it, What is needed is a vehicle for bringing other decision makers into the process sooner, perhaps a procedure requiring the president to act on major weapons in the early stages of development. Legislation could also mandate that advice be submitted to the president from experts who do not have a parochial interest in a follow-on system for every weapon in the inventory.

One procedure for dealing with the weapons-requirement syndrome might be the following: the president is required by Congress to give his approval before any research and development money is spent, and any weapons system to cost more than x billion dollars. Before making his decision, the president receives the

independent views of the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, each of the service chiefs, the head of ACDA, and the president’s science advisor. Each would be required to: (1) estimate the long-term cost of the weapons system; (2) estimate costs of alternative ways of accomplishing the same mission; and (3) evaluate the new system’s impact on future arms control agreements. 1f this procedure, or some thing like it, were established, some of the most expensive and most destabilizing weapons proposed might be stopped before they gathered irresistible bureaucratic momentum.

Of course, new procedures do not guarantee correct decisions. All one can seek to guarantee is that more critical minds will have some influence before crucial decisions are made. It is also possible that the executive branch will subvert a procedure once it is established, although doing so would have its political risks and

costs. Influencing decision making through procedural change may seem to be influencing it at the margins; certainly it operates one degree removed from the actual issues. But since Congress works that way, when it works at all, it seems to me the best hope for affecting the substance of decisions .

Congress is essentially a political institution and responds primarily to political stimuli. Rational arguments in such an institution carry little weight unless they are supported by political organization. Political organization can be mobilized around a national issue, but only with a great deal of effort. Usually, congressmen deal substantively and directly only with issues that are noncontroversial or with which they feel comfortable—those within their expertise or with which they have dealt

previously. If an issue is controversial and unfamiliar, as most important issues are, Congress will instinctively begin groping toward a procedural resolution.

Congress as an institution is conservative, cautious and reluctant to initiate change. It responds to old stimuli more quickly than to new ones. When it opposes the executive, it is usually to protect some interest group or some aspect of the status quo. New initiatives on the federal scene rarely are a product of Congress. An individual member or a group of members may take the initiative; but Congress as an institution rarely does.

In earlier days when the executive was smaller and the issues Congress dealt with were fewer and less intricate, there was more balance between the two branches. That balance exists no more. The executive has grown and its agencies have become highly specialized. Congress must deal with all the issues. It has remained (except for some increase in staff) roughly the same size, even though the number of yea and nay votes House members confronted rose from 159 in 1947-48 to 810 in 1975-76. Apart from the workload, Congress is much the same as Congress was; the executive is not as the executive was.

On arms control , as on many other subjects, the direct role that Congress can be expected to play is limited. In the jockeying that goes on within the government over our defense policies, the actions Congress can take will be either too broad or too narrow to be very constructive—either lopping 5 percent off the top of the entire defense budget or cutting the number of enlisted men working as servants for generals. The defense committees in Congress could be more effective, but because of their composition and outlook they will not be. Nor will Congress play a direct role in such traditional areas of arms control as negotiating with the Russians. SALT is too complicated, too much a field for experts.

Congress, however, cannot be ignored. Even if the SALT treaties did not have to be ratified by the Senate, the mood of Congress, reflecting the mood of the country, would define the limits within which an acceptable treaty must fall. But Congress’s ideas about future arms control initiatives will be limited to such conceptually simple items as a comprehensive test ban, and even then only a minority will delve into the subject.

The failure of Congress to assume leadership in this and other areas is one reason for the great interest, and limited progress, in congressional reform. But reform, while a worthy goal, not likely to result in congressional leadership. The problem with Congress is its members: how they regard their job and how they make their decisions. It is possible, of course, that in time new people elected to Congress will bring with them new attitudes, and Congress will reassert itself. But that should not be counted on; the new members will find themselves in the same position as the old. They, too, will want to be reelected. They, too, will be subjected to conflicting pressures, will feel a lack of expertise, and will have little time to devote to any single issue.

Rather than try to make Congress into something it is not (that is, an alternative to the executive branch as an initiator of new ideas), we should look realistically at what Congress is and see if there are ways to improve its performance . Congress is a channel for

constituent concerns; this role could be improved by lessening the influence of special interests. Congress is a board of trustees over government programs and

policies; this function also, could be strengthened by an increasing emphasis on oversight and investigation. Congress guards the procedures of government; and while it prefers procedure over policy, it could do better in this area if it consciously chose to use procedures rather than to hide behind them to avoid directly confronting an issue .

This may seem a pessimistic assessment of Congress’s capacities, and perhaps it is. But, as the NEPA case demonstrates, manipulation of procedure can be a very powerful weapon. Right now it is a weapon that is understood instinctively by some members of Congress and not at all by many.

Those who want to change U.S. arms control policy through Congress must consider not only what they want to do but also how it can be done . One way is to organize sufficient political muscle to effect the change. But issues on which this can be done are relatively rare. The other way is to devise some

means of accomplishing the change procedurally. Congress feels more comfortable dealing with issues this way. More important, using procedure makes it possible to gain enough votes to win.

4. Process debates are key to neg arms sales ground- a. uniquely true under Trump, he’s massively expanding arms sales, many of

which are not substantively defensible- b. but link uniqueness is impossible to generate- reductions to specific countries

means links need to be aff specific-c. how arms sales limitations gets done has contextual literature- process is a

critical question in Saudi arms sales, proves questions of implementation and coordination and consultation are the core of arms sales literature right now-

d. they serve as a functional limit on the topic because the topic is huge, with 98 countries and infinite subset of weapons- there is no disad that applies to every possible aff which means a counterplan that generates its own net benefit through mutual exclusivity is a necessity against new affs- our only chance at the camp tournament is because we know every aff, this is obviously not sustainable during the year

5. Negation theory – if we win competition the counterplan’s legitimate because we’ve disproved the resolution

6. Critical thinking – hard debate is good debate – forces strategic thinking and makes it more fun

7. No abuse – they get to leverage any reason why their process or even why contracts are key – delay, circumvention, certainty, signaling and perms all could beat the cp

8. Reject the arg not the team

9. Incentivizes better research- forces the aff to go beyond news articles and blog posts and interrogate specific legal questions on the topic- Congressional versus executive authority over arms sales is a relevant question but affs will strategically try to avoid linking to as little as possible

CP SolvesSecond plank solves the aff but doesn’t cancel the agreement- DISCS (Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies) January 2019 “The Management of Security Cooperation”, otherwise known as the “Green Book”, the textbook used to educate personnel, https://www.discs.dsca.mil/_pages/resources/default.aspx?section=publications&type=greenbook

Security Cooperation Program Suspensions

Security cooperation programs may be suspended by the Department of State (DoS) for various reasons, as described in Chapter 2 of this textbook and the SAMM C6.6. If the DoS determines that it is necessary to suspend security cooperation to a particular country, it issues guidance for execution. Upon receipt of this guidance, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) issues appropriate instructions to the implementing agency informing the Combatant Commander and the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The DoS may direct that all deliveries of defense articles to the suspended country be stopped immediately. Materiel is not released to the country’s freight forwarder or to the country. In the absence of such direction, materiel support cases implemented prior to the effective date of sanctions are allowed to continue regardless of term. New LOAs are not signed. If procurements have started but contracts have not been awarded, the IA provides details to DSCA and requests guidance. Contracts that have been awarded should continue. However, when items are ready for delivery, DSCA issues guidance on possible diversion of the materiel to another country, to the DoD itself, or to storage consistent with DoS guidance.

If the DoS so directs, shipments of defense articles, where the materiel is under USG control, are not loaded at the ports of embarkation. Materiel already in route to the country is not delivered; it is retained under USG control. These articles are stored by the appropriate DoD component until DSCA issues further direction.

Materiel ready for shipment from a contractor may be shipped to a DoD facility for segregated storage to await DSCA disposition instructions. If economical, the materiel may be stored at the contractor’s facility. The purchaser is responsible for any storage fees if the title has passed. Any requisitions submitted against either a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement (CLSSA) or a blanket order FMS case may be required to be held by the IA and not be filled. The DoS may extend a suspension to become a cancellation in accordance with AECA, Sections 2(b) and 42(e). DSCA directs case cancellation and appropriate contract actions to include termination. DSCA provides guidance on the disposition of items, funding, etc., after a case-by-case review.

AT: Enforcement FailsCongress revokes executive authority to conduct the arms sales without consultation- Sciarra ’88 (Vanessa Patton - DOJ Trial Attorney. JD Yale, BA Yale “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure,” 97 Yale L.J. (1988). LexisNexus. JJN)

When the President agrees to sell arms to a foreign government, he is acting in an area where he shares constitutional authority to act with Congress. The nature of arms sales requires Congress to delegate broad authority to the executive branch to negotiate the sales arrangements. Acting under this delegated authority and

any independent authority he may claim, the President then makes executive agreements in the form of offers to sell arms packages. Thus, arms sales meet the first two criteria discussed above. Further, since the passage of the AECA in 1976, Congress has required that arms sales be subject to some further congressional action. Although the two procedures tried --

the legislative veto and the report and wait period -- have provided only the threat of disapproval (with the latter

procedure subject to a presidential veto), the fact that negotiated sales have been consistently brought before Congress provides the type of legislative involvement the fast-track guarantee requires.

AT: Court Strike Down

Courts agree Congress has authority over arms sales – its just a question of how muchSciarra ’88 (Vanessa Patton - DOJ Trial Attorney. JD Yale, BA Yale “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure,” 97 Yale L.J. (1988). LexisNexus. JJN)

But ironically, given that dicta in Curtiss-Wright suggests an independent role for the President in foreign affairs generally, the holding in the case supports a less expansive view of the President's power in the arms sales area. The Supreme Court found that the statute at issue in that case, granting to the President the power to prohibit the sale of arms to certain countries, did not contain an unconstitutional delegation of

legislative power. 24 The holding thus concedes that Congress has a role to play in arms sales. The Court would have been hard pressed to argue for executive independence in the making of arms sales given the strong congressional claims to participate in arms sales. Congressional claims are derived from the foreign commerce clause, 25 the "spending power," 26 the power to dispose of U.S. property, 27 the necessary and proper clause 28 and Congress' general foreign affairs power. 29

**Spillover Top-Level

UQ – Relations Low

Fights coming now *NB: middle schoolers

*NB: exec powers

De Luce ‘7/10 (Dan is a reporter for the NBC News Investigative Unit. “Senators warn Trump admin not to bypass Congress again on arms sales.” 7/10/19. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/amp/ncna1028566 JJN)

WASHINGTON — Senators from both parties on Wednesday accused the Trump administration of overstepping its authority by pushing through arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Arab allies in May without congressional approval, and vowed to reassert the role of Congress in reviewing weapons deals.

Lawmakers vented their frustration at a hearing with the State Department official overseeing arms sales, C. Clarke Cooper, telling him the administration had failed to make the case why $8 billion in weapons sales had to be expedited without time for congressional oversight.

"For whatever reason, the administration — in what seems to me a not fully baked decision-making process — decided to circumvent the law, decided to circumvent the constitutional responsibility of Congress and act unilaterally," said Republican Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas.

Cruz added: "And don't make the mistake of thinking that it is simply Democrats who are concerned about this."

If the administration attempted to bypass Congress again, Cruz said he would oppose the move and predicted other Republicans would as well.

Several Republicans have joined Democrats in supporting bills disapproving of the arms sales, but President Donald Trump has promised to veto the measures. Opponents would need to secure more Republican votes to overturn a Trump veto.

Congress usually has 30 days to review all arms sales. But on May 28, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo invoked a rarely used provision in arms control law to bypass Congress and declare an emergency to expedite the weapons deals, which he said were justified due to the threat posed by Iran.

Although the administration portrayed the arms sales as a matter of urgency to help Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan counter Iran, Cooper acknowledged after repeated questioning that the military hardware had yet to be delivered 47 days later.

Under questioning by Democratic Sen. Bob Menendez of New Jersey, Cooper also acknowledged that many of the necessary contracts between the U.S. and the Arab governments buying the weapons had not been wrapped up.

"What's the sense of the emergency?" asked Menendez.

The Democrat accused Cooper and the State Department of failing to treat Congress as a co-equal branch of government as enshrined in law. Menendez said that "since you began your tenure, the [State] Department has shown only disdain for Congress and the laws that govern our arms export programs."

Cooper defended the fast-tracked arms sales, saying it was a "one-time event." He said intelligence had indicated a growing threat from Iran and that events since the May 28 announcement had confirmed the danger, including the downing of an unmanned American surveillance aircraft by Iranian forces.

He also said Washington needed to ensure it was a reliable supplier of arms to its allies. Otherwise, Cooper said, U.S. adversaries such as Russia or China could usurp the U.S. as a security partner.

"In such an environment it is crucial that the United States remain the partner of choice and be trusted as a dependable provider of defense capabilities — including materiel — to our partners," Cooper said.

Sen. Chris Coons, D-Del., said that lawmakers on both sides of the aisle would not allow congressional oversight to be undercut and are prepared to vote to scale back the president's power to declare an emergency for arms packages.

If the administration fails to consult Congress, "I suspect this body will act and restrict or remove that ability for future emergency waivers altogether," Coons said.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently backed a bill sponsored by Menendez and other lawmakers that would restrict the president's authority to invoke an emergency to skip congressional approval for arms deals. Under the bill, an emergency waiver could only be used for top-tier security treaty allies, including NATO countries, Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.

UQ – Oversight Low

Unilateral executive action over arms sales destroys Congressional oversight – sets a dangerous precedent for foreign policy. Mehta ‘5/24 (Aaron is Deputy Editor and Senior Pentagon Correspondent for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and acquisition at the highest levels of the Department of Defense and its international partners. “Despite Congress, Trump pushes through weapon sales to Saudi Arabia, UAE and Jordan.” 5/24/19. Defense News. https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/05/24/trump-pushes-through-bomb-sales-over-congress-objections-dems-warn-of-repercussions-for-industry/ JJN)

WASHINGTON — The Trump administration has formally invoked an exemption that allows the White House to clear $8.1 billion in weapon sales for Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates over congressional objections, in a move that could create trouble for the defense industry.

For the last year, Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has held up the sale of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, over concerns of how they will be used as part of the Saudi-led actions against Iranian-backed fighters in Yemen, an operation that has led to a humanitarian crisis in that country.

Now, the administration is pushing through those weapons, as well as a mix of unmanned aerial vehicles and aircraft maintenance, using an obscure exemption to circumvent Congress’ ability to say no to foreign weapon deals.

The Arms Export Control Act contains an exemption to sell weapons to partners in case of an emergency, something designed to speed up the process amid a crisis. In this case, Trump appears to be using the tense situation with Iran — based on intelligence reports that have been widely questioned by Democrats, but supported by the Pentagon — as a reason to push through the weapons.

Around noon on Friday, Menendez said the administration officially informed the Senate it will use what his office called an “unprecedented and legally dubious” move to push the weapon sales through, breaking years of tradition where the Senate has a say over whether other nations can buy American defense goods.

“In trying to explain this move, the Administration failed to even identify which legal mechanism it thinks it is using, described years of malign Iranian behavior but failed to identify what actually constitutes an emergency today, and critically, failed to explain how these systems, many of which will take years to come online, would immediately benefit either the United States or our allies and thus merit such hasty action,” the New Jersey legislator wrote.

On that last point, it could in fact take years for the weapons to go under contract, be produced and then sold. However, there are alternatives the White House could use, particularly for munitions, including giving weapons from U.S. stockpiles to those nations or having governments cut ahead of others on the wait list.

Later in the afternoon, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo released a statement saying that 22 individual sales would be cleared through the exemption, saying the sales would help the countries “deter and defend themselves from the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

“I intend for this determination to be a one-time event,” Pompeo wrote, saying the exemption has been used “by at least" four previous administrations. “This specific measure does not alter our long-standing arms transfer review process with Congress.”

Sen. Chris Murphy, the Connecticut Democrat who first raised the possibility Trump would use a “loophole” to push the sales through this week, said the move “sets an incredibly dangerous precedent that future presidents can use to sell weapons without a check from Congress."

“We have the constitutional duty to declare war and the responsibility to oversee arm sales that contravene our national security interests. If we don’t stand up to this abuse of authority, we will permanently box ourselves out of deciding who we should sell weapons to,” Murphy added.

Justin Amash, a Michigan Republican who in recent weeks has become a vocal critic of Trump, joined the criticism, tweeting that Trump"is (again) going around Congress—this time to unilaterally approve billions in arms sales, including to the brutal Saudi regime. Congress must reclaim its powers. When will the legislative branch stand up to the executive branch?"

arms sales precedent key- Trump is setting a dangerous precedent over sole executive authority in determining how to deal with allies – now is the time to pushback.Weisgerber ‘5/24 (Marcus is the global business editor for Defense One, previously was a Pentagon correspondent for Defense News and chief editor of Inside the Air Force. He often travels with the defense secretary and other senior military officials abroad. “Trump Bypasses Congress to Sell Arms to Saudis, UAE.” 5/24/19. DefenseOne. https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2019/05/trump-bypasses-congress-sell-arms-saudis-uae/157271/ JJN)

Trump administration officials told lawmakers they would bypass Congressional approval and invoke a rarely used provision in the Arms Export Control Act to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s top Democrat said Friday.

The move would green-light 22 arms deals currently blocked by Congress. The weapons under scrutiny include helicopters and other aircraft, precision-guided munitions, and intelligence equipment , a U.S. official said Friday afternoon. Those include RQ-21 Blackjack surveillance drones and Javelin anti-tank missiles, CNN reported.

Training for Saudi and UAE military personnel is also part of the 22 deals, the U.S. official said. Collectively, the sales and training are worth about $8 billion, according to the Wall Street Journal.

The administration told lawmakers that threats from Iran prompted it to use emergency measures to advance the stalled arms sales, said Sen, Robert Menendez, D-N.J., ranking member of committee.

Lawmakers have opposed the deals amid reports of widespread civilian deaths from the U.S.-assisted Saudi and UAE bombing campaign in Yemen against Iran-backed insurgents, and the Saudi regime’s role in the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

“I have kept the Trump administration from selling tens of thousands of precision-guided bombs to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates until they could prove that U.S. assistance and arms sales were improving Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s respect for human rights in Yemen and were in line with U.S. national security interests and values,” Menendez said.

The State Department, which approves the executive branch’s foreign military sales, did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

Since Trump took office, his administration has approved more than $20 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia and nearly $5 billion to UAE. The State-approved sales include munitions, missile interceptors, surveillance aerostats, maintenance, spare parts and training.

This is not the first time the executive branch has sidestepped Congress’ attempt to block a foreign arms sale. The Carter administration used the provision in 1979 to sell arms to Yemen and the Reagan administration in 1984 sold Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia, said Rachel Stohl, head of the Conventional Defense Program at the Stimson Center. It’s difficult for lawmakers to block foreign arms sales, but often they can slow them, much like they’ve done with recent sales to Saudi and UAE.

“[Congress] might have the votes for a resolution of disapproval for the Saudi sale, [but] they probably would not for a UAE sale,” Stohl said.

Politically, the Trump administration going around lawmakers “is bigger than the arms sales,” she said, and represents the policy power struggle between the White House and Congress over two key Middle East allies.

“There is no new ‘emergency’ reason to sell bombs to the Saudis to drop in Yemen, and doing so only perpetuates the humanitarian crisis there,” Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., said Friday. “This sets an incredibly dangerous precedent that future presidents can use to sell weapons without a check from Congress.”

L – Spillover

Fast-track guarantee guarantees consultation but the plan short-circuits executive participation by prohibiting the plan from the start – efficacy creates a mechanism for meaningful congressional oversight through consultation- compliance with norms is key- counterplan sets a precedent for norms that spillsoverSciarra ’88 (Vanessa Patton - DOJ Trial Attorney. JD Yale, BA Yale “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure,” 97 Yale L.J. (1988). LexisNexus. JJN)

B. The Fast-Track Guarantee in Practice The fast-track guarantee procedure allows Congress to delegate general negotiating authority while retaining some power to influence what is to be conceded in negotiations.

The procedure represents a bargain struck with the executive branch: If the negotiated results meet with congressional approval during a ninety-day period prior to the formal signing of an agreement, then both Houses guarantee that any implementing legislation needed to activate the agreements will be sent through Congress on an expedited schedule. Put another way, in order to secure a guarantee of expedited treatment, the executive branch must consult with the appropriate congressional committees before the agreements are finalized. Expedited treatment is assured by modifications in existing House and Senate rules, specifically, automatic

committee discharge after 45 days, no floor amendments, and limited floor debate. The procedure may best be [*1451] described as a "bargain" because it is primarily a power-sharing mechanism that is not likely to be enforced in court, but rather represents a norm of expected conduct . Additionally, unlike the legislative veto, it allows Congress to exert pressure on the executive branch while still meeting the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment. The procedure has worked because it meets the executive branch's need for credibility through the promise of quick consideration of implementing legislation; it does so in exchange for effective and ongoing consultation with Congress, which meets the congressional goals of oversight and participation. An additional reason for its success may be that there are substantial incentives to work within the guarantee framework at all phases of the negotiations. For example, if the President decides to negotiate a trade agreement on his sole authority or has concluded negotiations on an agreement that was initially denied expedited treatment, his only choice

would be to submit the legislation on the normal, unexpedited track, or seek "ad hoc" fast track consideration. In essence, by negotiating without receiving congressional approval for his initiatives, he takes the risk that he will not be able to deliver an implementable deal. Further, Congress not only enhances the likelihood of effective consultation by offering fast track consideration during negotiations, but it can continue to exert pressure for consultation by raising the threat of a revoked guarantee. If Congress feels the executive branch is not complying [*1452] with the procedural requirements of the guarantee or is not giving adequate weight to congressional suggestions, dissatisfied legislators can "derail" the fast track, revoking the guarantee at a later date for the same reasons. Alternatively, a later Congress can always countermand the rules adopted by an

earlier Congress. C. Further Refinements While Congress was attempting to cope with the loss of the legislative veto in the arms sales area,

it was concurrently refining the guarantee procedure in the trade area to force executive consultation with congressional committees earlier in the negotiation process. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 allows Congress to withhold a guarantee of fast-track treatment for trade agreements before formal negotiations have begun. Earlier fast-track legislation did not require consultation

with congressional committees until the negotiations were entering their final stages. Under this pre-negotiation procedure, if the President decides to initiate formal negotiations with a trading partner and if the executive branch seeks a fast-track guarantee for the negotiated agreement, then consultation with the appropriate committees is required. Members of these committees can force the President to take congressional concerns seriously by threatening to withhold the fast-track guarantee unless certain congressional

concerns are addressed in the agenda for negotiation. Further, the [*1453] procedure provides incentives for the executive branch to continue effective consultation with the committees because Congress retains two chances to disapprove the results at the post-negotiation stage: The committee in either House can recommend disapproval of the implementing legislation and, even if it receives approval of both committees, either House can vote it down. Denial of a fast-track guarantee at this stage allows Congress significant impact on policy formulation. Disapproval by either of the two congressional committees may destroy executive branch credibility before negotiations have even begun . The pre-negotiation procedure clearly makes the decision of whether to proceed with negotiations one that is shared by the two branches. It allows Congress to participate in setting the negotiating agenda while still preserving executive flexibility at the bargaining table. Further, it enhances executive credibility overall because

negotiators know, broadly speaking, what concessions are acceptable to Congress. III. A PROPOSAL FOR ARMS SALES LEGISLATION The fast-track guarantee provides expedited legislative treatment in exchange for meaningful congressional input into negotiations. Generalizing from experience in the trade area, the procedure may prove effective in ensuring congressional input in other foreign policy areas where three conditions exist. First, the procedure will be most successful politically in areas where, because of a constitutional claim to competence, Congress can exact some price in the form of consultation in exchange for its broad grants of authority to the executive branch. Second, the procedure can be applied in any area where the executive branch acts through agreements with foreign nations. Third, the executive agreements amenable to the fast-track procedure must require some legislative action, in the form of implementing legislation or some approval or disapproval procedure, to take effect. The procedure thus provides a way for Congress to police the use of executive agreements in certain foreign affairs

situations. It provides the added benefit of assuring the President that, when he makes such executive agreements, his actions will have the support of Congress. Though a number of foreign policy areas meet the three criteria outlined above, 77 [*1454] congressional regulation of arms sales seems a particularly appropriate area for experimentation.

L – Spillover – ExecutiveThere’s more power over foreign affairs.Sciarra ’88 (Vanessa Patton - DOJ Trial Attorney. JD Yale, BA Yale. “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure.” The Yale Law Journal Vol 97. 1988. HeinOnline. JJN)

Against this backdrop of repeated failure to find a meaningful substitute for the legislative veto, this Note examines a procedure-developed to ensure more extensive congressional participation in the negotiation of trade agreements-that may strengthen Congress' ability to regulate arms transfers. The procedure, the "fast-track guarantee," allows the executive and legislative branches to strike a bargain: If the executive branch seeks congressional approval of its negotiating agenda early in the negotiation process, Congress will guarantee expedited treatment of any legislation necessary to validate the agreement. 14 In the future, the procedure may enable Congress to exert greater control over executive action in other foreign affairs areas , specifically those areas where negotiation of executive agreements remains a crucial and unregulated part of policy implementation. 5 This Note argues that Congress cannot play a meaningful role in affecting executive branch negotiations unless the President is forced to consult with congressional committees early in the process. Experience from the trade area indicates that the fast-track guarantee

procedure, used at the pre-negotiation stage, will provide the executive branch with the necessary incentives to ensure

such consultation. It provides both a legal constraint and a means of power-sharing that balances the policy needs of both branches.

AT: Fast Track FailsFast-track guarantee works – Tokyo Round agreements prove.Sciarra ’88 (Vanessa Patton - DOJ Trial Attorney. JD Yale, BA Yale “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure,” 97 Yale L.J. (1988). LexisNexus. JJN)

FOOTNOTE 68

The procedure worked well to facilitate implementation of the most recent multilateral trade negotiations, the Tokyo Round agreements, and ensured that congressional concerns were considered by American negotiators before negotiations were concluded. After President Carter gave Congress 90-day notice of his intent to sign the Tokyo Round agreements, the executive branch negotiators consulted with the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees during that period and received congressional approval on the pending agreements. A novel procedure was adopted during the 90 days. Executive branch officials participated with committee representatives in sessions similar to the "mark-up" and "conference" stages that characterize the normal legislative procedure for the drafting of bills. Thus, the drafting of the legislation became an "interbranch process." I.

DESTLER, supra note 59, at 65; J. JACKSON, J. LOUIS & M. MATSUSHITA, supra note 63, at 162-63. As a result of this new procedure, Congress passed legislation necessary to implement the nine multilateral agreements reached during the Tokyo Round negotiations in 34 legislative days. Koh, supra note 7, at 1203; see also J. JACKSON, J. LOUIS & M. MATSUSHITA, supra note 63, at 166 (congressional praise for procedure clear from committee reports, legislative history and fact that it was extended by 1979 Act for eight years).

AT: Pres Powers Good

Stricter oversight is coming- Congress is on the brink of severely restricting the President’s authority- creating a mechanism to encourage cooperation is necessary to preempt a worse overreaction that decks executive authorityAllan & Anderson 19 (Elizabeth, first-year student at Yale Law School. She holds Bachelor’s degrees in International Affairs and Arabic from the University of Georgia and an MPhil in Modern Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Oxford, where she studied as a Rhodes Scholar. She has also worked as a consultant in the Middle East and West Africa. Scott, fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. He previously served as an Attorney-Adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State and as the legal advisor for the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq. https://www.lawfareblog.com/where-congress-stands-yemen)

Not all legislation, however, is so easy for the president to veto. Each year, Congress enacts omnibus legislation that bundles together various provisions into packages. These bills often include “must-pass” legislation that directly affects certain key federal functions or activities and is thus highly valued by the president. The classic example is the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) process, which Congress engages in each year to authorize salaries for armed service members as well as a range of military activities. Presidents are often reluctant to veto NDAAs, which can make the legislation popular vehicles for defense-related provisions that restrain or are otherwise disfavored by the president.

Congress has used the last two NDAAs for precisely this purpose when it comes to Yemen. The NDAA for fiscal 2018 obligated the executive branch to submit a report on the conduct and ramifications of the Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen as well as a strategy on Yemen for the United States. Congress ultimately omitted a provision in the original House version that would have prohibited the use of Defense Department funds for certain activities in Yemen, but included wording in the associated joint explanatory report noting Congress’s concern and discouraging the United States from entering the conflict there as a co-belligerent. The subsequent 2019 NDAA went even further by directing the Defense Department to conduct a review of U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and their involvement in possible legal violations. More important, Section 1290 threatened to withhold funding for in-air refueling services unless the secretary of state could certify that certain conditions had been met—namely, that Saudi Arabia had undertaken an “urgent and good faith” effort to negotiate an end to the conflict, acted to alleviate humanitarian suffering and reduced the harm to civilians resulting from military operations—or issued a waiver claiming that these activities were in the U.S. national interest and explaining why he could not issue the certification. And while Trump objected to both provisions in his signing statement, he did not veto the NDAA over them.

What happened next, however, underscores both the limits and the potential of these sorts of provisions. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo initially issued the required certification in September 2018, despite bipartisan skepticism that Saudi Arabia had actually satisfied the relevant requirements. The Wall Street Journal later reported that Pompeo had acted against the almost unanimous recommendation of his State Department staff, who had urged him to issue a waiver instead. This contributed to growing congressional frustration with the Trump administration’s policy toward Saudi Arabia and the Yemen conflict, ultimately leading the Trump administration to voluntarily cease

providing the Saudi-led coalition with in-air refueling. As a result, the Trump administration has refused to issue another certification or waiver under Section 1290 despite bipartisan requests, on the apparent logic that Section 1290 no longer imposes any meaningful penalties for doing so.

If Congress wishes to put concrete legal restrictions on the executive branch’s actions in Yemen, the next NDAA—which will be drafted over the coming year and brought to a vote sometime in the fall—is the most likely vehicle. Presidential allies in the House and the Senate may seek to limit or avoid these provisions, but Democratic control of the House, combined with Republican reservations about Yemen policy in the Senate, make this a realistic possibility. The restrictions proposed in S. 398 are a likely model for such restrictions, though other formulations are also possible. And while the experience with Section 1290 underscores just how willing the Trump administration is to put its credibility on the line to preserve its close relationship with Saudi Arabia, Congress can make the requisite certifications and waivers narrower and more difficult to circumvent—or just remove them altogether in favor of hard legal restrictions, such as prohibitions on the types of support the United States is currently providing.

Prior and genuine consultation is key to prevent conflict in foreign policy more generally.Franck and Bob ’85 (Thomas Martin - the Murry and Ida Becker Professor of Law at New York University and advised many nations on legal matters, even helping some to write their constitutions. Clifford A. - Professor and Chair of Political Science at McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts, J.D., Law, New York University School of Law. “THE RETURN OF HUMPTY-DUMPTY: FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW AFTER THE CHADHA CASE.” American Journal of International Law, Volume 79, Issue 4 October 1985 , pp. 912-960. Lexis. JJN)

As a result, Congress may now return to the "short-leash" approach -- in many instances an alternative counterproductive to Congress, the Presidency and, above all, the national interest. After examining various other options, this article concludes that meaningful consultation between the branches prior to case-by-case implementation affords the best way to avoid damaging disputes over statutory meaning and encourages delegation broad enough to permit essential flexibility in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations by the President. The authors also propose the adoption of clearly defined standards to guide the process of implementation and urge the courts to rethink their traditional reluctance to serve as umpires in interpreting foreign relations laws where consultation and compromise have failed to reconcile differences that undermine the capacity of the nation to speak with a single, effective voice.

Consultation is the only way to allow for legislative input while maintaining executive flexibility.Sciarra ’88 (Vanessa Patton - DOJ Trial Attorney. JD Yale, BA Yale “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure,” 97 Yale L.J. (1988). LexisNexus. JJN)

FOOTNOTE 31

The concerns that led the Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright to praise the use of broad delegation in foreign affairs statutes are often referred to

by the executive branch: speed, flexibility and efficiency. 299 U.S. at 319-21. The assumption underlying this argument is that

Congress cannot and should not micromanage policy because it cannot respond quickly and efficiently to diplomatic developments. But to say that Congress only has power to "set general policy guidelines and to disapprove particular presidential actions as inconsistent with those guidelines ," Meyer, supra note 7, at 96, is to oversimplify. This Note argues that Congress can play a more meaningful role in shaping policy, while still preserving the ability of the executive branch to function, by putting teeth in the concept of consultation. See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.

AT: Spillover Impact Turn

The scope of the counterplan stays limited based on what is constitutional – there’s no spillover into their impact.Carrier ’96 (MICHAEL A. CARRIER - Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., JD from Michigan. “ALL ABOARD THE CONGRESSIONAL FAST TRACK. FROM TRADE TO BEYOND.” George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, vol. 29, no. 3, 1996. HeinOnline. JJN)

A. Limiting the Scope of Potential Agreements The fast track anticipates substantial roles for both the executive and the legislature in its

application. Moreover, it is only a rule of congressional procedure-that is, a means of working within constitutionally prescribed powers, rather than a creation of constitutional authority. Consequently, for an agreement to be subject

to the fast track, both the President and Congress must have constitutional authority to act in the area in question. International trade agreements conform to this paradigm, as the President has the authority to meet with foreign nations and to negotiate treaties,240 and Congress has spending and appropriation powers and can regulate foreign commerce. 241 Other activities do not. The President, for example,

possesses the sole authority to recognize foreign states; to commence, maintain, and sever diplomatic relations with foreign governments; to settle claims; to meet with foreign leaders; to decide to negotiate treaties; and to conduct campaigns in wars authorized by Congress. 242 Any activities in these spheres would not be subject to the fast track because Congress has no constitutional authority to act. Similarly,

only Congress has the power to make laws relating to foreign affairs, to appropriate funds, or to declare war,2 43 thus precluding executive involvement in these activities through the fast track. To invoke the fast track, both branches not only must be involved but also must undertake actions of a certain type: the President must "act[ ] through agreements with foreign nations,"244 and such agreements "must require some legislative action, in the form of implementing legislation or some approval or disapproval procedure, to take effect."245 The former requirement-agreements with foreign nations-is necessary so that Congress may receive information in a form that it can consider; verbal declarations and negotiations, for example, are not subject to legislative review. The latter requirement-implementing legislation or an approval/disapproval procedure-ensures that the legislature can play a role in the process. Having narrowed the realm of potential activities somewhat, this Article next differentiates among the remaining engagements.

The counterplan’s precedent doesn’t spillover to constrain presidential decision-making in areas where unilateral action is necessary.Sciarra ’88 (Vanessa Patton - DOJ Trial Attorney. JD Yale, BA Yale “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure,” 97 Yale L.J. (1988). LexisNexus. JJN)

Although a thorough review of all the potential applications of the fast-track guarantee procedure is beyond the scope of this

Note, a few comments can be made. The procedure should not be used to condition executive action in areas in which the President's power to act independently is strong, such as the recognition of governments or the settlement of claims, because the constitutional authority that supports it as a power-sharing mechanism is lacking in these cases. Additionally, it is not likely to be effective in those situations where the President must respond to emergency situations either by making military decisions regarding troop deployments or by exercising his "emergency economic powers." Finally, certain areas, notably foreign assistance, may be ill-suited to the type of give and take the guarantee procedure requires. Aid decisions can not be considered negotiated; they are highly discretionary once Congress has set [*1457] funding levels and objective standards. Consultation in this area is probably better handled by resort to a variety of other mechanisms, such as shortened authorization periods combined with expedited procedures for termination of aid. 87Link to the text of the note

AT: War Powers spill-over

Doesn’t spill-over to affect war-powers since that’s only the President’s domain.Carrier ’96 (MICHAEL A. CARRIER - Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., JD from Michigan. “ALL ABOARD THE CONGRESSIONAL FAST TRACK. FROM TRADE TO BEYOND.” George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, vol. 29, no. 3, 1996. HeinOnline. JJN)

G. Application 5: War Powers

Unlike the preliminary inquiries as to the scope of the fast track in the previous four applications, the analysis as applied to war powers reveals a much closer debate. As commander-in-chief, the President has unilateral authority to initiate the use of armed forces to repel a direct attack.353 This authority, at times, has encompassed the commitment of troops for rescue, evacuation, and protection of U.S. nationals. 354 Indeed, of roughly 200 instances of the use of U.S. armed forces abroad between 1798 and 1983, only four were preceded by a formal declaration of war and only one was authorized by a joint resolution of Congress. 355 Recent invocations of unilateral executive power include the Mayaguez capture in 1975,356 Grenada in 1983,3 57 Libya in 1986,358 and, at least initially, Iraq in 1991.359 Yet this unilateral executive authority is not without limits. As the duration of the hostilities lengthens, there comes a point at which the President must obtain Congress's authorization, pursuant to the legislature's power to declare war. The unsettled question is the point at which Congress gains this authority.360

Determinations such as these do not plague the previous areas discussed. For example, although a "minor" environmental or trade accord must be confirmed by Congress, 61 a quick strike need not-not only because of historical practice but also because of the Constitution. Thus, a conclusion that Congress needs fast-track authority in this sphere begs the question of whether the legislature has any authority in the invocation of force at issue. At a certain point, the legislature does have authority. But the point of the fast track is not to resolve constitutional ambiguities; it is to facilitate coordination when both branches clearly have constitutional authority to act. For the fast track is solely a rule of congressional procedure. It is not a constitutional grant of power. Thus, even if presidential actions in this sphere weaken Congress,362 the fast track cannot rectify this imbalance. Since particular invocations of war powers authority may not contemplate roles for both branches, the two-part test cannot be applied.

AT: Foreign Aid Spill-Over

Doesn’t spill-over into foreign assistance – there’s no need.Carrier ’96 (MICHAEL A. CARRIER - Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., JD from Michigan. “ALL ABOARD THE CONGRESSIONAL FAST TRACK. FROM TRADE TO BEYOND.” George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, vol. 29, no. 3, 1996. HeinOnline. JJN)

Foreign assistance includes aid to other countries in the form of grants, loans, private transfers, or sales of items such as money, property, training, or serviceY91 As in the sphere of arms control agreements, both branches have a role to play in the granting of foreign assistance. The President is empowered by his position as commander-in-chief and from general Article II powers. 29 2 Congress derives its authority from its power of the purse:29 3 through the Appropriations and Spending Clauses, the legislature can determine which nations will receive funds and the extent of such support. The form of such agreements often conforms to fast-track consideration as well: even though the branches frequently decide on funding through annual appropriations bills, the President often meets with foreign leaders who seek aid packages. 294 These aid packages are then brought back for Congress to implement.

The first factor counsels against fast-track treatment. Foreign aid typically is targeted to one country at a time. Although several nations may be linked together in one agreement (i.e., in appropri ations bills), foreign assistance grants between the United States and a country generally do not depend on the assent of other countries. Moreover, the problem of incentives is minimal; where countries are receiving assistance, the incentives not to leave the negotiations are at their peak. It is in a nation's economic selfinterest to remain at the bargaining table; countries receiving assistance likely will tolerate legislative delay and obstruction if the end result includes receiving money or other aid. 295 Thus, the United States does not need the fast track to deal with foreign nations.

The second factor accords with the first in counseling against fast-track treatment for foreign assistance measures. Congress has perhaps its most influential authority in foreign assistance agreements. Not only is Congress's constitutional mandate clear in its largely undisputed powers of the purse, but post-World War II congressional-executive relations reveal substantial legislative input in this sphere. The United States emerged from World War II by offering assistance programs such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.2 9 6 Because the legislature likely would question presidential initiatives such as these, the executive branch engaged in an "unprecedented policy of consultation and cooperation with Congress."29 7 This consultation brought Congress into the forefront of decisionmaking.

The history of foreign assistance "provides a record not merely of congressional participation but, indeed, of congressional dominance."298 Subsequent examples confirm such dominance: Congress was successful, for example, in eliminating funds for the bombing of Cambodia in 1973,29 prohibiting foreign assistance to the Angolan rebels in 1975,300 and limiting aid to the Nicaraguan contras in 1985.301 The Iran-Contra affair provided a stark instance of congressional power in revealing the difficulty that actors in the executive branch had in circumventing the legislative ban on aid to the Contras.302

Compared to areas such as trade and arms control, the foreign assistance arena is less saturated with special-interest groups. Although such groups exist, both on the domestic level30 3 (e.g., churches and

commercial beneficiaries of aid) and the international level (e.g., the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and United Nations) ,304 they do not have excessive power.30 5 Congress generally can pass foreign assistance legislation free from paralyzing input from interest groups, which often are not organized, are not interested in programs in which they have no stake, and which symbolize the lack of a "general public constituency for foreign aid."30 6

In addition, foreign aid legislation is more often filled with inconsistent provisions than other bills: because the President "is more concerned about having a foreign aid bill than the specific form it takes, foreign aid legislation is a fragmented 'grab-bag' of initiatives that are often contradictory in content and intended result."307 Special-interest groups, consequently, to the extent that they have influence, can lobby for divergent provisions without the legislation unraveling. Both factors thus counsel against application of the fast track. Accordingly, Congress should not consider foreign assistance measures under the fast track.

AT: squo = consultation

Squo fails – report and wait doesn’t give an actual advisory role.Sciarra ’88 (Vanessa Patton - DOJ Trial Attorney. JD Yale, BA Yale “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure,” 97 Yale L.J. (1988). LexisNexus. JJN)

These provisions, referred to as "report and wait" requirements, simply require the President to report an arms sale and then give Congress a period during which it can disapprove his action by the passage of a joint resolution, which, of course, is subject to a presidential veto. The report and wait procedure does not result in a blocked sale if one-third plus one of the members in either House can be convinced of its value. Thus, under this third legislative regime, the potential for last-minute scuttling of negotiations, which made the legislative veto so

powerful, is significantly diminished; so too are the incentives for meaningful executive consultation with Congress. The values served somewhat effectively under the second regime are served even less well by the third regime.

NB – DIB – 2NC

Prior consultation is key to generating legitimacy for arms sales- our mechanism is key to solveSciarra ’88 (Vanessa Patton - DOJ Trial Attorney. JD Yale, BA Yale “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure,” 97 Yale L.J. (1988). LexisNexus. JJN)

Under current legislation, by the time congressional acquiescence is sought, agreement with a foreign buyer has been reached and severe diplomatic repercussions may result from an ex post congressional challenge. Further, an ex post procedure, whether it involves necessary approval or discretionary disapproval, does not directly force the executive branch to consult with Congress during negotiations.

Thus, if legislators are willing to take their constitutional role seriously, they should consider adopting a pre-negotiation fast-track guarantee procedure to regulate such transfers. Increased exercise of this

responsibility may in fact redound to the benefit of the executive branch by creating a broader legitimacy for the arms sales that are negotiated.

Trump’s recent move decks the DIB – makes them subject to lawsuits that take time and money- resolving Congressional and Executive fights over arms sales broadly is key to expediting the process and ensuring liability protectionsMehta ‘5/24 (Aaron is Deputy Editor and Senior Pentagon Correspondent for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and acquisition at the highest levels of the Department of Defense and its international partners. “Despite Congress, Trump pushes through weapon sales to Saudi Arabia, UAE and Jordan.” 5/24/19. Defense News. https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/05/24/trump-pushes-through-bomb-sales-over-congress-objections-dems-warn-of-repercussions-for-industry/ JJN)

Industrial concerns Both Menendez and Murphy hinted at introducing legislation to make sure Trump cannot use the emergency procedure for future sales, but gave no details on how that might work. And in his statement, Menendez specifically warned that U.S. industry may regret Trump’s latest move “With this move, the President is destroying the productive and decades-long working relationship on arms sales between the Congress and the Executive Branch. The possible consequences of this decision will ultimately threaten the ability of the U.S. defense industry to export arms in a manner that is both expeditious and responsible,” according to Menendez. Speaking to Defense News late Thursday, the senator expanded on that idea, saying that “any attempt to export under [the emergency] provision would be a violation of the Export Control Act. And so, [does industry] want to subject themselves to the liability of that? They understand that, and why have the industry break the protocol for something

that’s really not of value to the industry?" Analysts contacted about that statement expressed confusion about what legal liabilities industry could suffer, as under a foreign military sale the U.S. government makes a decision on whether a licence is legal or not. One analyst, who asked not to be named given the unknowns around the Trump situation, pointed out that industry can’t be liable for the government telling them something is legal, even if it is later decided the government was wrong. However, Brittany Benowitz, a lawyer and former adviser to a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, says getting clearance from the White House, especially for systems like precision guided munitions which have been shown to be used against civilian populations in Yemen, is a risky proposition for American arms manufacturers. “It’s possible they could face civil liability or criminal liability for proceeding with the sale of weapons that have been previously used in violations of international law, including PGMs," Benowitz said. "Whether or not they would be entitled to any immunity would depend on if they knew their weapons had been misused. The mere fact they got a licence would not necessarily immunize them from liability.” And legal questions aside, should this move by Trump result in new legislation that slows down the arms sale process, it could impact American defense firms that have been happy to see attempts over the past several years to speed up the process.

**Arms Control

Weapons Agreements NB – 1NC

That spills-over into export of other weapons allowing for more careful decision-making- solves international agreements on arms sales and exports of nuclear material and advanced tech- counterplan spills over to arms sales broadlySciarra ’88 (Vanessa Patton - DOJ Trial Attorney. JD Yale, BA Yale “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure,” 97 Yale L.J. (1988). LexisNexus. JJN)

However, statutes involving the export of weapons, nuclear materials and sensitive tech nologies all typically involve agreements made with foreign governments and could be subject to a fast-track guarantee procedure. Other agreements to participate in bilateral or multilateral undertakings, such as agreements to establish or renew foreign military bases, could also be handled under the procedure . In

each case, Congress will have to assess whether the balance established under broad delegation is preferable to the balance established with a power-sharing mechanism like the fast-track guarantee procedure.

Effective inter-branch cooperation on nuclear agreements solves nuclear warWilliam Courtney and Greg Thielmann 18. *Adjunct senior fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, and former U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Georgia and a U.S.-Soviet commission to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. **Member of the Arms Control Association, former office director in the Department of State's intelligence and Research Bureau (INR), and former senior staffer on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 11-27-2018. Congress Can Save Arms Control.” RAND. https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/11/congress-can-save-arms-control.html. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

Obtaining a two-thirds margin for Senate advice and consent on a new nuclear treaty could prove infeasible. But narrow control of the Senate by Republicans and the House by Democrats could facilitate

cross-over voting required to secure a majority vote in both chambers for an executive agreement .

There is precedent . Pacts with foreign countries on civilian nuclear cooperation (PDF)are approved this way on a bipartisan basis. There are early indications

that the new Congress will assert itself on nuclear arms control . The likely chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , Sen. Jim Risch (R-Idaho), has secured assurances that a senatorial observer will be included in nuclear negotiations with North Korea . The likely chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), has signaled that he will push for constraints on the development of new nuclear weapons . Pragmatic cooperation between the Trump administration and

Congress could pave the way for negotiated arrangements that, while not easy to achieve, hold the potential to reduce nuclear risks .

Nuke Terror Impact – 2NCCongressional involvement in securing nuclear materials is key since the White House isn’t concerned in addressing nuke terror.Brosnan et al ’18 (Jack is a Program Associate for nuclear initiatives at Partnership for a Secure America. Kingston Reif is the Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association. Dr. Andrew Semmel is Chairman of the Board of Directors at Partnership for a Secure America and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Nonproliferation. Nathan Sermonis is the Executive Director of Partnership for a Secure America. “Congress needs to wake up to nuclear security threat.” 11/14/18. The Hill. https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/416481-congress-needs-to-wake-up-to-nuclear-security-threat JJN)

With much of the world’s attention trained on nuclear risks from North Korea, Iran, and Russia, the unfinished work of keeping nuclear materials and know-how from criminals and terrorists cannot be ignored. As the White House emphasizes state-based threats, Congress must take up a greater leadership role to prevent a nuclear or radiological 9/11.

Effective congressional oversight of this issue has been constrained in recent years by numerous obstacles, including limited institutional knowledge, misunderstanding of the subject, skepticism of mission need, competing priorities, and funding constraints. A first-ever study assessing congressional attitudes on nuclear security, published in July by the Arms Control Association and Partnership for a Secure America, found a worrying erosion of engagement, expertise, and interest.

This study revealed a pervasive doubt among congressional staff in Congress’s ability to lead on global nuclear security. Yet, our research also showed that staff believe Congress should do more. So there is hope.

At a recent UN Security Council meeting in New York, President Trump reasserted America’s commitment to global counter-proliferation efforts, stating “The nations of the world have long recognized that certain weapons are so dangerous, and can inflict so much suffering, that all of us have a vital interest in preventing their further development, spread, and use.”

Unfortunately, these remarks focused only on state-based concerns and missed an opportunity to discuss the more shadowy threat of nuclear terrorism. Highlighting this threat in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Pentagon argued that “Preventing the illicit acquisition of a nuclear weapon, nuclear materials, or related technology and expertise by a violent extremist organization is a significant U.S. national security priority."

Historically, bipartisan congressional support has been the lifeblood of U.S. leadership on global nuclear security. It can happen again. Senators Sam Nunn, D-Ga., and Richard Lugar, R-Ind., embodied this reality as the architects of U.S. programs to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and materials after the fall of the Soviet Union. In recent years, bipartisan leaders like Sens. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., and Lamar Alexander, R-Tenn., have championed sizable funding increases for nuclear security programs, including an additional $150 million for the Department of Energy in fiscal year 2019.

But there is a growing need for creative policies to anticipate and counter the nuclear security risks from both traditional threats and emerging technologies such as additive manufacturing, offensive cyber

tools, artificial intelligence, and machine learning. Despite progress through the four Nuclear Security Summits held between 2010 and 2016, a new report from the Nuclear Threat Initiative has warned that continuing to prevent nuclear terrorism is “jeopardized by a deterioration of political stability and governance, an increase in corruption, and the expanding presence of terrorist groups around the world.”

As nuclear security challenges facing the nation expand and grow more complex, there is a need for Congress to play a more active role. Despite recognition by both Republicans and Democrats that nuclear terrorism remains a critical concern, congressional attention has declined, and few new ideas have been put forward to advance the mission.

Today, there remains a significant need for further U.S. resources, ideas, and initiatives. Our congressional study showed there was virtual unanimity that more should be done to shore up the global nuclear security architecture, but there were few ideas on how to do that. To reignite congressional leadership on securing and eliminating nuclear materials around the world, we recommend three actionable ideas for Capitol Hill.

In the near term, Congress should require the Office of Management and Budget to prepare an annual report summarizing the aggregate U.S. budget for nuclear security and nonproliferation programs. As it now stands, programs to prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism are spread throughout the government. A consolidated summary would offer a clear picture of gaps and overlaps.

Looking ahead, a blue ribbon, bipartisan congressional commission should be established to develop by 2020 a comprehensive strategy to prevent, counter, and respond to nuclear and radiological terrorism. This commission, modeled after the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, should identify and offer solutions for the most serious nuclear and radiological terrorism risks and critical emerging threats. This expert group should consider the resources needed for implementing their recommendations and outline a progress assessment.

Congress should also establish a program of activities exploring options to strengthen nuclear security in North Korea as part of the future phased and verifiable dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and supporting infrastructure.

Laying the groundwork for such efforts must begin now.

Congress should provide no less than $100 million to be divided between the Defense Department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the Energy Department’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program. This initiative would model the verification and security requirements associated with different denuclearization steps and scenarios, identify gaps, and provide recommendations for needed capabilities.

In addition to pursuing these recommendations, lawmakers should invite expert presentations at hearings and briefings. While more pressing headline issues will continue to dominate Capitol Hill, Congress must not ignore or diminish this evolving threat.

Nuclear technologies are spreading, the world is growing more unpredictable, and terrorists will not hesitate to use nuclear and radiological materials if they get them. It is time for Congress to re-engage.

Saudi Prolif Impact – 2NC

Trump’s going to give Saudi Arabia nuclear weapons – only Congressional oversight prevents it Lemon ‘4/3 (Jason– Writer for Newsweek. “TRUMP OFFICIALS ARE 'BENDING OVER BACKWARDS' TO GIVE SAUDI ARABIA ACCESS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL, SENATOR WARNS.” 4/3/19. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/trump-saudi-arabia-nuclear-material-1384779 JJN)

Lawmakers have raised concerns about the efforts of the Trump administration to give Saudi Arabia nuclear materials without consultation with Congress and without properly notifying regulators.

Senator Chris Van Hollen, the Democrat from Maryland, told The Washington Post that Trump officials "appear willing to short-circuit the process to achieve their political goal of continuing to cozy up to the Saudi regime," following a hearing of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee on Tuesday.

"At the very least [the Trump administration] is clearly unwilling to stand up to the Saudis on human rights while at the same time bending over backwards to give the Saudis access to nuclear material and technology," Van Hollen said.

During the Tuesday hearing, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairwoman Kristine Svinicki told senators on the committee that she did not know if anyone at her agency had raised concerns about "Part 810 authorizations." Those authorizations allow for sharing of technological information but not equipment, and the administration admitted last week that it had made seven such approvals without telling Congress. Energy Secretary Rick Perry defended the move by saying involved companies had requested confidentiality.

"I fully understand and respect the need for U.S. companies to protect their proprietary information from competitors," Representative Brad Sherman, a California Democrat, wrote in a letter sent to Perry this week, according to the Post. "At the same time, however, Congress must be given sufficient information to fulfill its constitutional oversight responsibilities."

President Donald Trump has drawn significant criticism from many Democrats and Republicans for his continued support of Saudi Arabia despite its human rights abuses. Following the murder of U.S. resident and journalist Jamal Khashoggi by a team of Saudi agents in the kingdom's Istanbul consulate, the president's support for the kingdom drew intense backlash. The Senate, which is controlled by Republicans, also voted last month to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen that had resulted in thousands of civilian deaths and a massive humanitarian crisis.

But George Friedman, founder and chairman of Geopolitical Futures, pointed out to Newsweek that past Democratic and Republican presidents have stuck by the Saudi regime despite its poor record on human rights. Washington has long seen the alliance as necessary to maintain regional stability and counter Russian influence, he said.

"The U.S. can, of course, limit cooperation with the Saudis. The Russians would be happy to step in to the extent they can, and Iran would be delighted by a weakened Saudi Arabia," Friedman said. "The U.S. has tolerated the Saudi regime because breaking with it would carry a high geopolitical cost, and

strengthen two regimes with equally dubious human rights records. There is a reason Obama and Bush did not choose to break with the Saudis. That same reason holds now."

Some lawmakers in Washington believe there needs to be a fundamental change, however. Representative Ilhan Omar, a Minnesota Democrat, penned an op-ed for the Post in March, arguing that the U.S. does "not have the credibility" to condemn adversarial governments, such as Iran, while ignoring the abuses of friendly regimes like Saudi Arabia. "We cannot continue to turn a blind eye to repression in Saudi Arabia—a country that is consistently ranked among the worst of the worst human rights offenders," she wrote.

L – Spillover – Arms ControlSpills-over into arms control agreements writ largeCarrier ’96 (MICHAEL A. CARRIER - Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., JD from Michigan. “ALL ABOARD THE CONGRESSIONAL FAST TRACK. FROM TRADE TO BEYOND.” George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, vol. 29, no. 3, 1996. HeinOnline. JJN)

D. Application 2: Arms Control Agreements

Arms control agreements are subject to the domain of both the President and Congress. 263 The President may rely on the accoutre ments of his commander-in-chief authority and power to negotiate treaties.264 Congress can look to its commerce power and authority to enact implementing agreements. 265 The Senate, moreover, has the power to provide its consent to treaties.2 66 In its form, the arms control agreement also suffices for fast-track treatment: the President reaches an agreement with foreign nations, which Congress (but for treaties, only the Senate) may then consider.

The initial factor of the test supports consideration under the fast track. Arms control agreements often are concluded between many nations. For example, 157 nations convened for the second U.N. Special Session on Disarmament; 267 19 countries began the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) negotiations;2 6 35 countries participated in the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; 269 19 nations participated in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Conference (MBFR);270 and 66 countries took part in the Vienna International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference. 271 Moreover, arms control accords gain the adherence of many nations through the course of time. As of January 1, 1994, for example, 132 nations implemented the 1925 Geneva Protocol, 272 123 entered into the Partial Test Ban Treaty, 2 73 163 entered the Non-Proliferation Treaty,2 74 92 imple mented the Seabed Treaty,2 75 and 131 joined the Biological Weapons (BW) Convention.2 76 Particularly now, as the threat of nuclear proliferation among many nations replaces the Soviet Union as the world's greatest arms control danger, it is necessary to enter into agreements with many nations.

Yet even if only two nations enter into such agreements, the countries often have minimal incentives to sign accords by which they agree to give up portions of their arsenals of weapons. Although arms control agreements may be in a nation's long-term interests (by minimizing the possibility of, for example, the accidental discharge of nuclear weapons), sacrificing part of a stockpile of weapons is an action that may consume substantial amounts of political capital. In such a setting, application of the fast track makes sense: legislative stalling or modification of the agreement would provide easy cover for nations to leave the negotiating table. The window of opportunity is open so infrequently for arms reduction that the fast track is needed to take advantage of the few occasions for negotiation that present themselves.

The second factor supports application of the fast track as well. The Senate has found itself increasingly disadvantaged vis-a-vis the President, who frequently takes advantage of his political strength in this arena. Several examples reveal executive dominance in the field. First, Presidents often attempt to link the procurement of weapons systems to arms control negotiations 277 since some representatives defer to the executive branch in examining controversial weapons systems. 278 The executive thus argues that it needs particular systems to succeed at the bargaining table, and the legislature is too weak to deny the request.2 79

A second example of the Senate's inferior position can be gleaned from the "conditions" the legislature has resorted to attaching to agreements. As the "advice" function of "advice and consent" has disappeared, the Senate has sought to resurrect this role for itself by giving consent to an agreement only on particular conditions.28 ° While the Senate traditionally has imposed conditions directly amending treaties, such activity recently has expanded to encompass modifications that do not directly affect the treaty.281 Of all types of agreements, arms control accords most frequently have been subject to such "nonamending" conditions.28 2 The SALT II agreement and the Panama Canal Treaty28 3 serve as examples of treaties containing such conditions.

Finally, the executive's "reinterpretation" of treaties threatens further to curtail Congress's role. The President is responsible for interpreting the words of treaties.28 4 Yet occasionally, the executive seeks to interpret a treaty differently from how the parties originally intended for it to apply. President Ronald Reagan, for example, attempted to interpret the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty28 5 to allow the deployment of antimissile technology known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).286 This position was contrary to the executive's original view of the treaty, which prohibited the development and testing of space-based ABM systems based on physical principles not in use at the time of the treaty.287 Treaty reinterpretations, along with the attachment of conditions and linkage of weapons systems, reveal executive dominance in the field. Congress would benefit from application of the fast track to arms control agreements.

Special-interest groups are not omnipresent in the field. Although some watchdog groups monitor the accords, 288 the chances for political paralysis are diminished, compared with, for example, the spheres of trade or the environment. 89 But even if interest groups do not threaten paralysis, the other factors-the large numbers of nations involved, the low incentives to sign arms control agreements, and Congress's institutionally weak position vis-A-vis the executive-counsel in favor of application of the fast track to arms control agreements. 2 90 This Article thus recommends application of the fast track to arms control agreements.

Uniqueness---AT: INFINF is sensationalist and wrong---blows over and is good for deals in the long run Ian Williams 18. Fellow with the International Security Program and associate director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. 10-24-2018. “Leaving the INF Treaty Now Is the Right Call.” CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/leaving-inf-treaty-now-right-call. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

To be sure, the timing of President Trump’s withdrawal announcement was abrupt, and the rollout could have been smoothed by greater consultation with allies. The United States would certainly have benefited from a presenting a more united front

among NATO allies to accompany the announcement. Yet these ruffled feathers will probably smooth over quickly . Few today , for instance, still lament the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, despite opposition from

Europe. Since then , missile defense has been adopted as a core mission of the NATO alliance . For INF , there is still time to garner greater support among the allies and coordinate a cohesive strategy for NATO post-INF Treaty. Despite these near-term challenges , walking away from the treaty now will, in the long run, enable the U nited S tates to more affordably strengthen the defense of its allies and overseas forces and demonstrate that it takes arms control obligations seriously.

Withdrawing from the INF solves U.S. arms control---new treaty solves and no arms race Colin S. Gray and Matthew R. Costlow 18. *European Director and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, and Professor Emeritus of Strategic Studies, University of Reading. **Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy and a PhD student in Political Science at George Mason University. 8-29-2018. “Time to Withdraw from the INF Treaty.” Real Clear Defense. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/08/29/time_to_withdraw_from_the_inf_treaty_113753.html. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

Third, it is in the long-term supreme national interests of the U nited S tates to maintain the value of arms control and

signal its commitment to compliance , not just to Russia, but to all potential future arms control partners .

Withdrawing from the INF Treaty in response to Russian violations would signal to Russia, and future potential

partners, that the U nited S tates takes arms control violations seriously . Remaining in a treaty that Russia continues to violate sends precisely the opposite signal . Withdrawal would also allow the U nited S tates to work with NATO allies on a broader range of strategic options to keep arms control relevant for the future – whether that is working toward a new and strengthened INF agreement immediately after withdrawal or waiting until such a time as Russia is

willing to sincerely negotiate. Russia’s serious violation of the INF Treaty – taking into account its severity, non-technical nature, continuation, and obvious hostile intent – requires an equally

serious U.S. response. Objections “If the treaty unravels, it will open the door to an arms race in production and deployment of these missiles, which would weaken security in Europe and Asia.” [xxvi] It cannot be that by withdrawing from the INF Treaty the U nited S tates will begin an “ arms race ,” as Russia has been racing for a decade, with the

United States not even having tied its shoes. In addition, China likely already has the largest medium and intermediate-range missile force in Asia, and probably the world. [xxvii] Withdrawing

from the INF Treaty would do nothing to change these current realities. The choice between “ arms control” and “arms racing” is not binary – as if those were the only two options. The United States may very well decide that producing a GLCM to be stationed in Europe will be too politically complicated and instead

shift to a mixture of penetrating bombers and sea-based assets. The United States has free will and is not irredeemably bound to an “action-reaction” cycle it does not wish to participate in. In

fact, the most recent Nuclear Posture Review says as much, stating: “U.S. strategy does not require non-strategic nuclear capabilities that quantitatively match or mimic Russia’s more expansive arsenal.”[xxviii] The same applies to GLCMs or other responses.

Uniqueness---AT: Bolton Trump won’t listen to Bolton on arms control Michael Hirsh 18. Senior correspondent for Foreign Policy. 9-28-2019. “John Bolton Is Living the Dream—for Now.” Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/28/john-bolton-living-the-dream-for-now-trump-un-unga/. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

Still, there could soon be trouble in Bolton’s ideological paradise . He and Trump may agree for the moment , but the two also differ in serious ways that go far beyond Trump’s stated distaste for Bolton’s walrus mustache . This clash of views caused trouble for the national security advisor once before and could do so again . Bolton’s unilateralism is purely ideological; Trump’s is more transactional . While Bolton’s hawkishness has led

him to reject any compromise with rogue states deemed dangerous to U.S. national interests, Trump’s unilateralism springs more from his belief that

the U nited S tates should use its economic and military dominance to secure better deals from recalcitrant countries. While

Trump believes, as Bolton does, that multilateral institutions such as NATO and the G-7 only curtail U.S. power, the president is more willing to work with them if they take up more of the burden of international security. Trump also has shown himself far more willing than Bolton to negotiate with hostile governments, including Russia . Bolton found this out ahead of the talks with North Korea earlier this year. After he aggressively invoked the

“Libya model” as a blueprint for North Korea—which would have involved giving Kim Jong Un effectively nothing in return for denuclearization up front— Trump sidelined his national security advisor and negotiated directly with Kim. Not only would Kim get something in return and survive (unlike the eventual fate of

Libyan strongman Muammar al-Qaddafi), but Trump promised that Kim’s North Korea “would be rich” as a result of the deal. It was hardly the first time Bolton overstepped a president by refusing to compromise. In 2003, the Bush administration was seeking to get Libya to abandon its development of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Qaddafi demanded that Washington drop its goal of regime change in exchange for giving up his weapons. According to U.S. and British officials, Bolton nearly sabotaged the talks by refusing to concede that point. After the British insisted that Bolton be kept out of the loop, the Bush White House finally agreed. It was only after Bolton was benched as a negotiator that Qaddafi agreed to surrender

his covert WMD program. Trump clearly relishes his image as a supreme deal-maker —the idea that, as in his days as a real estate mogul, he can make big things happen one-on-one. And it is when he goes off script that he sounds least like Bolton . For example, before his fiery anti-Iran speech this week, Trump sent out an olive-branch tweet, saying of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, “I am

sure he is an absolutely lovely man!” The next day, Trump praised the U.N. for its fight against drug trafficking and, in unscripted remarks, declared that the international body has “tremendous potential.” Bolton, in all his years in office, never said anything so conciliatory about the United Nations. Thus, it’s entirely possible that despite promising much harsher sanctions against Iran this week—which Rouhani called nothing less than an attempt at regime change—Trump would happily deploy that leverage to orchestrate a Singapore-style bilateral summit with the Iranian leader. (In July, the U.S. president said he would meet Iran’s leaders “anytime they want,” and without preconditions.) Though Tehran is currently rejecting this option, insisting that Washington return to the multilateral nuclear deal negotiated in 2015, such a development would frustrate the agenda that Bolton laid out in his speech in New York this week, when the national security advisor suggested, as he has in the past, that the United States might attack Iran. “We are watching, and we will come after you,” Bolton told Tehran. And as far as taking on Mattis, who insists that U.S. troops are only in Syria to defeat the Islamic State—while Bolton said they should remain to deter Iran—that policy could also fail if Trump abruptly changes course

with Tehran as he did with Pyongyang. As one long-serving former U.S. diplomat put it: “ Bolton provides an intellectual structure for the gut impulses of

the president, but Trump’s erratic qualities are going to disappoint him .”

Solvency---Arms Control Works Arms control agreements on emerging tech work and are possible Bell and Futter 18 (Alexandra Bell, senior policy director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, Dr. Andrew Futter is an associate professor of international politics at the University of Leicester, United Kingdom, October 4, 2018. “REPORTS OF THE DEATH OF ARMS CONTROL HAVE BEEN GREATLY EXAGGERATED.” https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/reports-of-the-death-of-arms-control-have-been-greatly-exaggerated/)

Amid these developments, warnings abound from nuclear policy experts and government officials that the entire span of treaties that currently reduce nuclear risks are in danger of collapse . Indeed, fatalism is taking over and the

statement that arms control is dead is becoming commonplace . Fortunately , the reports of the death of nuclear arms control are not only premature , they seem to miss the point . Arms control has been used to varying degrees of success for over 50 years. Even during the darkest days of the Cold War, Americans and Russians managed to continue strategic stability discussions (the late 1960s and the mid-1980s being good examples). Leaders in Washington and Moscow knew they had no other choice and understood the magnitude of what was at stake. That sober wisdom seems lost on today’s leaders, who have spent far more time on dangerous posturing and rhetoric than on productive discussions. To be sure, previous

methods of arms control, such as the intensive verification and counting systems of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), might be less relevant today for some issues, but what is needed is an updated approach to arms control that accounts for today’s emerging technologies and threats , not a rejection of the concept entirely. Where many in the old guard of arms control experts see a dead end, we see an opportunity to reinvigorate the concept and tailor it to modern challenges . Arms control is a

tool and it is adaptable, flexible, and resilient . New, successful arms control agreements will require new thinking, new frameworks and without a doubt, new people . To begin, it is important to look at how the global security environment is being reshaped by emerging technologies such as drones , precision strike weapons , hypersonic weapons , improved ballistic missile defenses, lethal autonomous systems , and artificial intelligence [AI] . All of these technologies have the potential to undermine decades of nuclear orthodoxy – that is, the rules of the nuclear game based on the condition of mutually assured destruction and deterrence through punishment that have endured since the earliest days of the Cold War. Expertise on nuclear deterrence is not a requirement to see the danger of nuclear weapons that can be delivered without human control. Policymakers must also consider the potential impact of new domains of military conflict, such as cyber space and outer space , on

the nuclear order, as well as the relationship between nuclear and advanced conventional weapons and offensive and defensive systems. These challenges will not and cannot

be ignored . New technologies could re-introduce the temptation of disarming first strikes and arms racing . Without dialogue, these advances will muddy the nuclear information space, increasing fear and uncertainty in nuclear relations. The good news is that we have the ability to get ahead of this trend and manage the threats before they fully materialize . Governments can actually prevent potential nuclear crises before they start. Indeed, given that arms control efforts related to nuclear reduction are currently stalled, perhaps the time has come for pre-emptive arms control . The work could begin among the P5 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) and focus on common concerns about emerging technologies and their relationship to nuclear weapons. Conversations can then shift to points of agreement on dangers that can be avoided altogether. For example, it is hard to imagine any state objecting to the assertion that cyber attacks against their nuclear command and control systems are a bad idea, given the possibility

of causing accidental or unauthorized nuclear use. By starting from a point of mutual agreement , countries can build a framework of norms and confidence-building measures . That progress, in turn, can be used to create

space for discussions on more concrete understandings and binding agreements that would limit, control, or monitor new technologies . Beyond expanding the scope of work, new arms control agreements will require thinking outside the box. Old methods

of monitoring, verification, and symmetry may no longer match the realities of today’s world, especially in the far less tangible realms of cyberspace or artificial intelligence. U.S. START inspectors used to ski around Russian facilities looking for anomalies. You cannot exactly ski around the entire internet. With all the capabilities the modern digital age affords, the potential for neutral, but intrusive, verification technology is unprecedented. All countries should be supporting initiatives like the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (a group of 25 nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states working to identify potential procedures and technologies to address the challenges associated with nuclear disarmament) and encouraging

academics and the private sector to aid in these efforts. It is the height of hubris to think that we have exhausted our ability to achieve verifiable arms control agreements simply because the traditional ways no longer seem viable.

It is also shortsighted to dismiss initiatives that focus more on norm development , such as non-binding commitments to refrain from testing or specific

targeting plans or from declaratory policies (No First Use or Sole Purpose). Furthermore, it is also worth reviewing asymmetric bargains in which countries agree on certain ratios between particular weapons systems, or agreements that simply dictate a ceiling on weapons whether nuclear or non-nuclear, offensive or defensive, strategic or tactical. For example, countries could collectively agree to an overall number of certain delivery vehicles, but leave specifics up to individual parties. The third necessary task for the reinvigoration of arms control is the integration of fresh thinking. Ideally these new perspectives would come from those who entered the field at the end of or after the Cold War. People who had no role in creating the current nuclear infrastructure or who have not been burned by previous unsuccessful negotiations are less attached to the status quo. They have yet to develop bad relationships with their counterparts which have often derailed derail negotiations. New thinkers are also less burdened by longstanding ideas about insurmountable challenges, like agreements on ballistic missile defense or non-strategic nuclear weapons. Younger people are also more likely to be comfortable talking about and dealing with the new technological environment. In addition to including new voices, it is also time to foster new inter-personal relations across both generational and geographical divides. No matter what, young people will inherit a global nuclear arsenal of 15,000+ weapons and they need to learn from and interact with established experts. Such connections may well act as a confidence-building measure and help to generate new ideas. In the longer run, these efforts could even serve as the driver of a more institutionalized multinational community for sharing nuclear knowledge. It took decades to put together the nuclear arms control structures of the

Cold War, and no matter the focus, we should not assume that the next generation of arms control agreements will be created quickly or easily. But we are not doomed to

repeat the expensive and destabilizing arms competition of the Cold War. We can we find new ways to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. The people who say arms control is dead largely fall into two categories: those who have never supported arms control and those who have simply run out of ideas or energy . When it comes to the 21st century’s unique nuclear challenges,

the answer is not to abandon arms control, but to allow a new generation of thinkers to have a go.

Arms control on emerging tech works and there is momentum---even if a ban fails, norms and regulation regimes can prevent conflict Piccone 18 (Ted Piccone, senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy and Latin America Initiative in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings and holds the Charles W. Robinson Chair, served eight years as a senior foreign policy advisor in the Clinton administration, April 10, 2018. “How can international law regulate autonomous weapons?” https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/04/10/how-can-international-law-regulate-autonomous-weapons/)

CAN GOVERNMENTS BUILD CONSENSUS IN GENEVA? This week, governmental experts and officials are meeting in Geneva

under the auspices of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)to continue trying to find consensus on next steps in regulating the next class of automated weapons. Unfortunately, intensifying geopolitical competition makes this harder. Many experts believe states like China and Russia would never abide by

treaty obligations regulating AI and, therefore, the U nited S tates should aim instead for soft norms that would, at best, deter rather than outright prohibit weaponization of AI. Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell, who delivered the keynote Breyer lecture, argued strongly that AI is leading us toward a new revolution in military and civilian affairs that makes it nearly impossible to determine the battlefield and, consequently, the applicability of the laws of armed conflict. Such a hybrid situation demands application of binding customary international law against actions that would violate “the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience,” otherwise known as the Martens Clause.Charles Dunlap, former deputy judge advocate general of the Air Force, argued for a more incremental approach that would lead toward new protocols under CCW for testing and evaluating new autonomous weaponry under its provisions for Article 36 reviews. Jeroen van den Hoven, professor of ethics and technology at Delft University, offered a European

perspective in which ethical and legal precepts would be baked into the development of autonomous weapons throughout the design and development stages. In light of the rapid pace of technological developments, in which substantive rules regulating specific innovations may become outdated too quickly to have effect, the priority should be to strengthen ongoing processes of review, testing, verification , inspections ,

transparency , and confidence-building . Many of these elements have proven effective in other fields of arms control . Formal and informal talks should proceed quickly at bilateral and multilateral levels to determine whether mutual, strategic restraint might help avert

unintended, worst-case scenarios , and serve the interest of the key players.

AT: Turn---War Powers---UniquenessLatest defense bill thumps flexibility Catie Edmondson 7/12. Reporter in the Washington bureau of The New York Times, covering Congress. 7-12-2019. "House Passes $733 Billion Defense Bill Checking Trump’s War Powers." New York Times. https://search-proquest-com.proxy.library.emory.edu/docview/2256177753/1FAB2F182A064EFEPQ/1?accountid=10747. accessed 7-21-2019//JDi

WASHINGTON — The House gave final approval Friday to a defense bill that would put a liberal stamp on military policy by shackling President Trump’s ability to wage war in Iran and Yemen, restricting the use of military funds at the

southwestern border and returning transgender troops to the armed forces. The $733 billion National Defense Authorization Act was passed along stark party lines — 220 to 197 — with Republicans uniting to oppose the legislation . The defense policy bill

has traditionally been a bipartisan exercise, but House Republicans have come out strongly against this year’s version. The bill still must be reconciled with a Senate version that is considerably

less confrontational with the Trump administration. And it is likely Senate negotiators will try to strip out many of the House’s provisions. In amendment after amendment, lawmakers flexed their oversight muscles , reflecting a growing desire to take back long-ceded authority over matters of war and peace from the executive branch , a reclamation that legislators in both parties contend has grown more urgent amid escalating tensions with Iran. Passage of the measure with support from liberal Democrats — and no Republicans — could set up another difficult showdown between Speaker Nancy Pelosi of California and her left flank. Negotiations with the Senate will almost certainly result in a compromise measure that jettisons many, if not most, of the amendments secured by House liberals. That could

set up a final vote that liberals will oppose, leaving Democratic leaders to appeal for Republican votes. For now, though, the House bill bears the stamp of the resurgent left . The House passed a bipartisan amendment on Friday that would curb Mr. Trump’s ability to authorize a military strike on Iran unless he obtained Congress’s explicit approval. The 251-to-170 vote reflected general war weariness after almost two decades of conflict in the Middle East; 27

Republicans joined all but seven Democrats to approve it.

AT: Turn---War Powers---Spillover No spillover---Congress refuses to enforce additional oversight Jasmine Farrier 14. Professor of Political Science at the University of Louisville. 2014. "Thermonuclear Monarchy: Choosing Between Democracy and Doom." Law and Politics Book Review. http://www.lpbr.net/2014/07/thermonuclear-monarchy-choosing-between.html. accessed 7-21-2019//JDi

The Congress angle of Scarry’s book will, unfortunately, get less attention from scholars and practitioners. Conventional wisdom says Washington is paralyzed from toxic partisan differences

(Mann and Ornstein 2013). There is less attention paid to the extraordinary consensus behind Congress’s support of presidential war under a variety of partisan landscapes and policy environments . It is true that Democrats and Republicans subject opposition presidents to tongue lashings on foreign policy, but legislation to direct US foreign policy does not always follow the rhetoric . But Congress’s capacity to judge the national interest is a complex and open question. Looking back at the 2002 floor debates on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force against Iraq (Public Law 107-243), Representatives and Senators who voted against the bill (or advocated a more diplomacy-centered alternative) were savaged, but many of them made more accu rate predictions of the war’s trajectory than its proponents. Without citing this point directly, THERMONUCLEAR MONARCHY supplements a scholarly debate among those who see Congress flexing its muscles before war (Howell and Pevehouse 2009), afterward in oversight (Kriner 2013), or ambivalently, with cycles of delegation and regret (Farrier 2010). The judicial aspects of this book are likely to be the most intriguing, but also frustrating, to law and courts scholars. Scarry says vaguely that a legal case should be formulated “that shows how nuclear weapons disenfranchise the entire

population and thereby violate the Second Amendment … If the United States population comes to hold a strong view on this matter, the court will eventually act” (p.87). If Congress

and the public are not willing to pick up their constitutional tools “lying unused on the ground” (p.404) to abolish nuclear weapons, and it is

unlikely that any [*346] future president will pare back the executive branch’s national security infrastructure, can and should courts fix these constitutional wrongs? Scarry hits a nerve here. It is an underappreciated fact that federal court precedents on war predate MARBURY V. MADISON and are usually more Congress-centered than suggested by the oft-quoted dicta from US V. CURTISS-WRIGHT (1936) (Glennon 1990; Silverstein 1997; Fisher 2005, 2013b). In the wake of the bodily and institutional devastation wrought by the Vietnam War, some were skeptical about whether the War Powers Resolution would be sufficient to re-balance power without federal court support (Keynes 1982; Koh 1990; Ely 1993). Instead, federal courts built a wall of justiciability barriers to punt foreign policy cases (such as Congress members’ lawsuits) back to the political process. Scarry does not explain why courts would choose to take up cases on nuclear weapons when they have spent decades developing strategies to avoid direct war powers questions (as advocated by Bickel 1962 and Choper 1980). As recently as 2002, a federal district court dismissed a lawsuit against President G.W. Bush for withdrawing unilaterally in December, 2001 from the thirty year-old Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia (Adler 2004). Here

lies the central tension of THERMONUCLEAR MONARCHY. After a scathing examination of inter-branch power imbalance , Elaine

Scarry still places a lot of faith in constitutions generally, and the US Constitution specifically, to seek peace over war. But if her main criticism of institutional developments on nuclear weapons is convincing, it seems a remote hope that popular apathy, congressional abdication , and court disinterest will all reverse to force the executive branch into a more modest institutional posture. Ironically, the current poisonous political environment has given the president even more cover to push unilateral executive action on domestic and foreign policy, including nuclear weapons reductions. In a speech in Prague early in his presidency, and more recently in a State of the Union Address (White House 2009 and 2013), Obama did not say that his hands were tied by Congress on this issue. Nor have executive branch officials pledged to the Senate that they will go through formal treaty processes when negotiating with Russia on nuclear reductions (Woolf 2014). A quick search on https://beta.congress.gov/ for “nuclear weapons reduction” or “abolition” shows only one bill that targets the US nuclear weapons arsenal in the 113th Congress. H.R. 1650 was proposed by the at-large Representative of Washington DC, Eleanor Holmes Norton, and died in committee. The separation of powers system was designed to inspire and sustain the branches’ different perspectives on the national interest through (relative) electoral diversity and competition for power. Excessive aggressiveness and delegation both undermine this carefully designed web of institutional virtues that aim to balance deliberation with energy, and majority rule with minority viewpoints

(Tulis 1987). For example, congressional critics of the Obama administration today look at Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, and fault him for “taking a nap” through these crises while offering few serious specifics of their own

(Office of Speaker 2014). The Supreme Court ruled recently against certain executive [*347] orders and recess appointments, but has little interest in taking up foreign and military policy outside of detainees’ constitutional rights. Elaine Scarry’s book is a call for the country to reject these habits and renew its original constitutional vows. Even the most sympathetic readers will sigh at this oddly hopeful ending.

No spillover---polarization and broader powers James M. Goldgeier and Elizabeth N. Saunders 18. *Visiting senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and professor of international relations at the School of International Service at American University. **Associate Professor in the School of Foreign Service and a core faculty member in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. 8-14-2018. "The Unconstrained Presidency: Checks and Balances Eroded Long Before Trump." Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/article/unconstrained-presidency-checks-and-balances-eroded-long-trump. accessed 7-21-2019//JDi

In Congress, the combination of declining foreign policy expertise among members and increasing political polarization has reduced the ability of legislators to supervise the executive branch even if they had the appetite to do so. The bureaucracy, meanwhile, has lost its incentive to cultivate and wield expertise as decision-making has become centralized in the White House and congressional action and oversight on foreign policy have declined. And U.S. allies, for their part, have become less able to check the president’s foreign policies as the alliances have become ensnared in U.S.

partisan politics. Similarly, the post–Cold War era has frequently seen presidents circumvent international institutions.¶ Going forward, any attempts to stem the growth of presidential power will have to confront not just the damage done by Trump but also the deeper problem that damage has exposed: that the bodies charged with constraining presidential power have been steadily losing both their willingness and their capacity to rein in presidents . Many have written eloquently, particularly since 9/11, about the need for checks on presidential power . But the reality is that Congress is in no shape to reclaim its role in foreign policy —and neither are the other traditional sources of constraint on U.S. presidents. It may take a major shock, such as the rise of China, to reboot the system.

Double-bind---either the GOP prevents meaningful checks OR other issues thump Jeremy Herb 17. National security reporter covering Congress for CNN Politics. 7-1-2017. "How Congress is taking back power from Trump on national security." CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/01/politics/congress-trump-war-power/index.html. accessed 7-21-2019//JDi

(CNN) – In ways big and small, Congress is taking back power from President Donald Trump on national security

matters. From Russia to the Pentagon budget, Republicans in Congress are proposing new checks to curb the White House's power and in some cases simply ignoring the Trump administration's desires on national security and foreign policy. Wary of favorable comments

Trump has previously made about Russia, the Senate has passed a significant Russia sanctions package that gives Congress the ability to review any administration effort to roll back

sanctions against the Kremlin. Congressional committees approved three defense bills this week boosting Pentagon spending by about $30 billion more than the Trump administration

proposed after Republicans complained that Trump's budget failed to rebuild the military as he promised. And in a surprise vote this week, a House panel approved an amendment to repeal the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force [ AUMF ], which provides legal authority for the US wars in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. "I think it's

sinking in , especially with Republican members of Congress, that they are not getting the kind of adult leadership out of the White house that would allow you to give deference to the White House," said Mieke Eoyang, a national security analyst at Third Way and former congressional aide. "So you see Congress stepping up to take a much more aggressive role on national security for the first time in a very long time ." Legislative vs. Executive For years, a small chorus in Congress has bemoaned the legislative branch giving back its national security powers to the executive,

from war-making to the budget caps imposed by the sequestration law. Congress certainly hasn't taken back those authorities in full, and some experts argue most of the steps taken thus far are mostly symbolic. There are still major hurdles to passing a new ISIS war authorization, the new Russia sanctions have stalled with the House, and sequestration spending caps are still looming over the spending process. "I'm cautiously optimistic that Congress is looking to assert some structure on a chaotic national security process ... but at the moment these don't yet strike me as significant checks -- yet," said Loren DeJonge Schulman, a defense analyst at the Center for a New American Security. "I'll be willing to say Congress is offering a real check to this

administration when it refuses to fund one of its initiatives, or halts war funding until a clear strategy is provided." There were also similar efforts to curb President

Barack Obama's national security powers, including blocking the closure of the US military prison in Guantanamo Bay and

rolling back surveillance authorities. At the start of the Trump administration, Republican congressional leaders on national security were hopeful that the national

security team -- Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, national security adviser H.R. McMaster and Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats -- would steer Trump in what they consider the right direction. Trump was praised for his decision to strike Syria in response to a chemical weapons attack. But in many cases, Trump has ignored or overruled his national security team, and the President's actions and statements -- or lack of action -- has sparked a more robust response on Capitol Hill than during the Obama years. "I think we are seeing a growing dose of skepticism by members of Congress -- notably in the President's own party -- about Trump's ability and willingness to grasp the complexities of key national security problems and his unique

responsibilities as commander in chief," said John Kirby, a CNN diplomatic and military analyst a former Pentagon and State Department spokesman under Obama. Rebukes of Trump The Senate's Russia sanctions bill may be the most significant fight thus far over the balance of national security power. The bill, which passed 98-2, would give Congress the ability to block Trump from rolling back sanctions on Moscow and comes amid concerns from lawmakers following a Washington

Post report in May that said Trump was considering returning two Russian compounds that the US seized in December sanctions on Russia. Senators are now pressing the House to pass the bill

without weakening it. While the House Appropriations Committee's vote to repeal the 2001 war authorization is unlikely to be signed into law, it is another implicit rebuke to Trump and a sign of growing congressional discontent with an unchecked war on terror. The proposed amendment received support from both Democrats and Republicans during debate, but the vote caught

House leaders in both parties off guard. In other cases, Congress has taken symbolic gestures to rebuke the President .

Impact---AW Weapons New arms control agreements are key to check autonomous, hypersonic, and cyber-weapons---causes nuclear war Michael T. Klare 18. Professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association. 12-1-2018. "The Challenges of Emerging Technologies." Arms Control Today. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-12/features/challenges-emerging-technologies. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi *thanks Mr. Rice

Today, a whole new array of technologies —artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, hypersonics, and cybertechnology, among others— is being applied to military use , with potentially far-ranging consequences . Although the risks and ramifications of these weapons are not yet widely recognized,

policymakers will be compelled to address the dangers posed by innovative weapons technologies and to devise international arrangements to regulate or curb their use . Although some early efforts have been undertaken in this direction, most notably, in attempting to

prohibit the deployment of fully autonomous weapons systems, far more work is needed to gauge the impacts of these technologies and to forge new or revised control mechanisms as deemed appropriate. Tackling the arms control implications of emerging technologies now is becoming a matter of ever-increasing urgency as the pace of their development is accelerating and their potential applications to warfare are multiplying. Many analysts believe that the utilization of AI and robotics will utterly revolutionize warfare , much as the introduction of tanks, airplanes, and nuclear weapons transformed the battlefields of each world war. “We are in the midst of an ever accelerating and

expanding global revolution in [AI] and machine learning, with enormous implications for future economic and military competitiveness,” declared former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, a prominent advocate for Pentagon utilization of the new technologies.1 The Department of Defense is spending billions of dollars on AI, robotics, and other cutting-edge technologies, contending that the United States must maintain leadership in the

development and utilization of those technologies lest its rivals use them to secure a future military advantage. China and Russia are assumed to be spending equivalent sums, indicating the initiation of a vigorous arms race in emerging technologies . “Our adversaries are presenting us today with a renewed challenge of a sophisticated,

evolving threat,” Michael Griffin, U.S. undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, told Congress in April. “We are in turn preparing to meet that challenge and to restore the technical overmatch of the United States

armed forces that we have traditionally held.”2 In accordance with this dynamic, the United States and its rivals are pursuing multiple weapons systems employing various combinations of AI, autonomy, and other emerging technologies . These include, for example, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned surface and subsurface naval vessels capable of being assembled in swarms, or “wolfpacks,” to locate enemy assets such as tanks, missile launchers, submarines and, if communications are lost with their human operators, decide to strike them on their own. The Defense Department also has funded the development of two advanced weapons systems employing hypersonic technology: a hypersonic air-launched cruise missile and the Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) system, encompassing a hypersonic rocket for initial momentum and an unpowered payload that glides to its destination. In the cyberspace realm, a variety of offensive and retaliatory

cyberweapons are being developed by the U.S. Cyber Command for use against hostile states found to be using cyberspace to endanger U.S. national security. The introduction of these and other such weapons on future battlefields will transform every aspect of combat and raise a host of challenges for advocates of responsible arms control . The use of fully autonomous weapons in combat, for example, automatically raises questions about the military’s ability to

comply with the laws of war and international humanitarian law, which require belligerents to distinguish between enemy combatants and civilian bystanders. It is on this basis that opponents of such systems are seeking to negotiate a binding international ban on their deployment. Even more worrisome, some of the weapons now in development, such as unmanned anti-submarine wolfpacks and the TBG system, could theoretically endanger the current equilibrium in nuclear relations among the major powers, which rests on the threat of assured retaliation by invulnerable second-strike forces, by opening or seeming to open various first-strike options. Warfare in cyberspace could also threaten nuclear stability by exposing critical early-warning and communications systems to paralyzing attacks and prompting anxious leaders to authorize the early launch of nuclear weapons. These are only

some of the challenges to global security and arms control that are likely to be posed by the weaponization of new technologies. Observers of these developments, including many who have studied them closely, warn that the development and weaponization of AI and other emerging technologies is occurring faster than efforts to understand their impacts or devise appropriate safeguards. “Unfortunately,” said former U.S. Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig, “the uncertainties surrounding the use and interaction

of new military technologies are not subject to confident calculation or control.”3 Given the enormity of the risks involved, this lack of attention and oversight must be overcome. Mapping out the implications of the new technologies for warfare and arms control and devising effective mechanisms for their control are a mammoth undertaking that requires the efforts of many analysts and policymakers around the world. This piece, an overview of the issues, is the first in a series for Arms Control Today (ACT) that will assess some of the most disruptive emerging technologies and their war-fighting and arms

control implications. Future installments will look in greater depth at four especially problematic technologies: AI, autonomous weaponry, hypersonics, and cyberwarfare . These four have been chosen for close examination because, at this time, they appear to be the furthest along in terms of conversion into military systems and pose immediate challenges for international peace and stability .

Artificial Intelligence AI is a generic term used to describe a variety of techniques for investing machines with an ability to monitor their surroundings in the physical world or cyberspace and to take independent action in response to various stimuli. To invest machines with these capacities, engineers have developed complex algorithms, or computer-based sets of rules, to govern their operations. An AI-equipped aerial drone, for example, could be equipped with sensors to distinguish enemy tanks from other vehicles on a crowded battlefield and, when some are spotted, choose on its own to fire at them with its onboard missiles. AI can also be employed in cyberspace, for example to watch for enemy cyberattacks and counter them with a barrage of counterstrikes. In the future, AI-invested machines may be empowered to determine if a nuclear attack is underway and, if so, initiate a retaliatory strike. 4In this sense, AI is an “omni-use” technology, with multiple implications for war-fighting and arms control.5 Many analysts believe that AI will revolutionize warfare by allowing military commanders to bolster or, in some cases, replace their personnel with a wide variety of “smart” machines. Intelligent systems are prized for the speed with which they can detect a potential threat and their ability to calculate the best course of action to neutralize that peril. As warfare among the major powers grows increasingly rapid and multidimensional, including in the cyberspace and outer space domains, commanders may choose to place ever-greater reliance on intelligent machines for monitoring enemy actions and initiating appropriate countermeasures. This could provide an advantage on the battlefield, where rapid and informed action could prove the key to success, but also raises numerous concerns,

especially regarding nuclear “crisis stability.” Analysts worry that machines will accelerate the pace of fighting beyond human comprehension and possibly take actions that result in the unintended escalation of hostilities, even leading to use of nuclear weapons . Not only are AI-equipped machines vulnerable to error and sabotage , they lack an

ability to assess the context of events and may initiate inappropriate or unjustified escalatory steps that occur too rapidly for humans to correct . “Even if everything functioned properly, policymakers could nevertheless effectively lose the ability to control escalation as the speed of action on the battlefield begins to eclipse their speed of decision-making,” writes Paul Scharre, who is director of the technology and national security program at the Center for a New American Security.6 As AI-

equipped machines assume an ever-growing number and range of military functions, policymakers will have to determine what safeguards are needed to prevent unintended, possibly catastrophic consequences of the sort suggested by Scharre and many others. Conceivably, AI could bolster nuclear stability by providing enhanced intelligence about enemy intentions and reducing the risk of misperception and miscalculation; such options also deserve attention. In the near term, however, control efforts will largely be focused on one particular application of AI: fully autonomous weapons systems. Autonomous Weapons Systems Autonomous weapons systems, sometimes called lethal autonomous weapons systems, or “killer robots,” combine AI and drone technology in machines equipped to identify, track, and attack enemy assets on their own. As defined by the U.S. Defense Department, such a device is “a weapons system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.”7 Some such systems have already been put to military use. The Navy’s Aegis air defense system, for example, is empowered to track enemy planes and missiles within a certain radius of a ship at sea and, if it identifies an imminent threat, to fire missiles against it. Similarly, Israel’s Harpy UAV can search for enemy radar systems over a designated area and, when it locates one, strike it on its own. Many other such munitions are now in development, including undersea drones intended for anti-submarine warfare and entire fleets of UAVs designed for use in “swarms,” or flocks of armed drones that twist and turn above the battlefield in coordinated maneuvers that are difficult to follow.8 The deployment of fully autonomous weapons systems poses numerous challenges to international security and arms control, beginning with a potentially insuperable threat to the laws of war and international humanitarian law. Under these norms, armed belligerents are obligated to distinguish between enemy combatants and civilians on the battlefield and to avoid unnecessary harm to the latter. In addition, any civilian casualties that do occur in battle should not be disproportionate to the military necessity of attacking that position. Opponents of lethal autonomous weapons systems argue that only humans possess the necessary judgment to make such fine distinctions in the heat of battle and that machines will never be made intelligent enough to do so and thus should be banned from deployment.9 At this point, some 25 countries have endorsed steps to enact such a ban in the form of a protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Several other nations, including the United States and

Russia, oppose a ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems, saying they can be made compliant with international humanitarian law.10 Looking further into the future, autonomous weapons systems could pose a potential threat to nuclear stability by investing their owners with a capacity to detect, track, and destroy enemy submarines and mobile missile launchers . Today’s stability, which can be seen as an uneasy nuclear balance of terror, rests on the belief that each major power possesses at least some devastating second-strike, or retaliatory, capability, whether mobile launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), or both, that are immune to real-time detection and safe from a first strike . Yet, a nuclear-armed belligerent might someday undermine the deterrence equation by

employing undersea drones to pursue and destroy enemy ballistic missile submarines along with swarms of UAVs to hunt and attack enemy mobile ICBM launchers. Even the mere existence of such weapons could jeopardize stability by encouraging an opponent in a crisis to launch a nuclear first strike rather than risk losing its deterrent capability to an enemy attack. Such an environment would erode the underlying logic of today’s strategic nuclear arms control measures , that is, the preservation of deterrence and stability with ever-diminishing numbers of warheads and launchers, and would require new or revised approaches to war prevention and disarmament .11

Hypersonic Weapons Proposed hypersonic weapons, which can travel at a speed of more than five time the speed of sound, or more than 5,000 kilometers per hour, generally fall into two categories:

hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles, either of which could be armed with nuclear or conventional warheads. With hypersonic glide vehicle systems, a rocket carries the unpowered glide vehicle into space,

where it detaches and flies to its target by gliding along the upper atmosphere. Hypersonic cruise missiles are self-powered missiles, utilizing advanced rocket technology to achieve extraordinary

speed and maneuverability. No such munitions currently exist, but China, Russia, and the United States are developing hypersonic weapons of various types . The U.S. Defense Department, for example, is testing the components of a hypersonic glide vehicle system under its

Tactical Boost Glide project and recently awarded a $928 million contract to Lockheed Martin Corp. for the full-scale development of a hypersonic air-launched cruise missile, tentatively called the Hypersonic Conventional Strike

Weapon.12 Russia, for its part, is developing a hypersonic glide vehicle it calls the Avangard, which it claims will be ready for deployment by the end of 2019, and China in August announced a successful test of the Starry Sky-2 hypersonic glide vehicle described as capable of carrying a nuclear weapon .13 Whether armed with conventional or nuclear warheads, hypersonic weapons pose a variety of challenges to international stability and arms control. At the heart of such concerns is these weapons’ exceptional speed and agility. Anti-missile systems that may work

against existing threats might not be able to track and engage hypersonic vehicles, potentially allowing an aggressor to contemplate first-strike disarming attacks on nuclear or conventional forces while impelling

vulnerable defenders to adopt a launch-on-warning policy.14 Some analysts warn that the mere acquisition of such weapons could “ increase the expectation of a disarming attack .” Such expectations “encourage the threatened nations to take such actions as devolution of command-and-control of strategic forces, wider dispersion of such forces, a launch-on-warning posture, or a policy of preemption during a crisis .” In short, “ hypersonic threats encourage hair-trigger tactics that would increase crisis instability .”15 The development of hypersonic weaponry poses a significant threat to the core principle of assured retaliation, on which today’s nuclear strategies and arms control measures largely rest. Overcoming that danger will require commitments on the part of the major powers jointly to consider the risks posed by such weapons and what steps might be necessary to curb their destabilizing effects. The development of hypersonic munitions also introduces added problems of proliferation. Although the bulk of research on such weapons is now being conducted by China, Russia, and the United States, other nations are exploring the technologies involved and eventually could produce such munitions on their own eventually. In a world of widely disseminated hypersonic weapons, vulnerable states would fear being attacked with little or no warning time, possibly impelling them to conduct pre-emptive strikes on enemy capabilities or to commence hostilities at the earliest

indication of an incoming missile. Accordingly, the adoption of fresh nonproliferation measures also belongs on the agenda of major world leaders.16 Cyberattack Secure operations in cyberspace, the global web of

information streams tied to the internet, has become essential for the continued functioning of the international economy and much else besides. An extraordinary tool for many purposes, the internet is also vulnerable to attack by hostile intruders, whether to spread misinformation, disrupt vital infrastructure, or steal valuable data. Most of those malicious activities are conducted by individuals or groups of individuals seeking to enrich themselves or sway public opinion. It is increasingly evident, however, that

governmental bodies, often working in conjunction with some of those individuals, are employing cyberweapons to weaken their enemies by sowing distrust or sabotaging key institutions or to bolster their own defenses by stealing militarily relevant technological know-how . Moreover, in the event of a crisis or approaching hostilities,

cyberattacks could be launched on an adversary’s early-warning, communications, and command and control systems , significantly impairing its response capabilities .17 For all these reasons, cybersecurity, or the protection of cyberspace from malicious attack, has become a major national security priority .18 Cybersecurity, as

perceived by U.S. leaders, can take two forms: defensive action aimed at protecting one’s own information infrastructure against attack; and offensive action intended to punish, or retaliate against, an attacker by severely disrupting its systems, or to deter such attack by holding out the prospect of such punishment. The U.S. Cyber Command, elevated by President Donald Trump in August 2017 to a full-fledged Unified Combatant Command, is empowered to conduct both types of operations. In many respects then, the cyber domain is coming to resemble the strategic nuclear realm, with notions of defense, deterrence, and assured retaliation initially devised for nuclear scenarios now being applied to conflict in cyberspace. Although battles in this domain are said to fall below the threshold of armed combat (so long, of course, as no one is killed as a result), it is not difficult to conceive of

skirmishes in cyberspace that erupt into violent conflict , for example if cyberattacks result in the collapse of critical infrastructure , such as the electric grid or the banking system. Considered solely as a domain of its own, cyberspace is a fertile area

for the introduction of regulatory measures that might be said to resemble arms control , although referring to cyberweapons rather than nuclear or conventional munitions. This is not a new challenge but one

that has grown more pressing as the technology advances.19 At what point, for example, might it be worthwhile to impose formal impediments to the cyber equivalent of a disarming first strike, a digital attack that would paralyze a rival’s key information systems? A group of governmental experts was convened by the UN General Assembly to investigate the adoption of norms and rules for international behavior in cyberspace, but failed to reach agreement

on measures that would satisfy all major powers.20 More importantly, it is essential to consider how combat in cyberspace might spill over into the physical world, triggering armed combat and possibly hastening the pace of escalation . This danger was brought into bold relief in February 2018, when the

Defense Department released its latest Nuclear Posture Review report, spelling out the Trump administration’s approach to nuclear weapons and their use. Stating that an enemy cyberattack on U.S. strategic command and control systems could pose a critical threat to U.S. national security, the new policy holds out the prospect of a nuclear response to such attacks . The United States, it affirmed, would only consider using nuclear weapons in “extreme circumstances,” which could include attacks “on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or

warning and attack assessment capabilities.”21 The policy of other states in this regard is not so clearly stated, but similar protocols undoubtedly exist. Accordingly, management of this spillover effect from cyber- to conventional or even nuclear conflict will become a major concern of international policymakers in the years to come. The Evolving Arms Control Agenda To be sure, policymakers and arms control advocates will have their hands full in the coming months and years just preserving existing accords and patching them up where needed. At present, several key agreements, including the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 2015 Iran nuclear accord are at significant risk, and there are serious doubts as to whether the United States and Russia will extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty before it expires in February 2021. Addressing these and other critical

concerns will occupy much of the energy of key figures in the field for some time to come. As time goes on, however, policymakers will be compelled to devote ever-increasing attention to the military and arms control implications of the technologies identified above and others that may emerge in the years ahead . Diplomatically, these issues logically could be addressed bilaterally, such as through the currently stalled

U.S.-Russian nuclear stability talks, and when appropriate in various multilateral forums. Developing all the needed responses to the new technologies will take time and considerable effort, involving the contributions of many individuals and organizations. Some of this is already underway, in part due to a special grant program on new threats to nuclear security initiated by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.22 Far more attention to these challenges will be needed in the years ahead. More detailed discussions of possible approaches for regulating the military use of these four technologies will be explored subsequently in ACT, but here are some preliminary thoughts on what will be needed. To begin, it will be essential to consider how the new technologies affect existing arms control and nonproliferation measures and ask what modifications, if any, are needed to ensure their continued validity in the face of unforeseen challenges. The introduction of hypersonic delivery systems, for example, could alter the mutual force calculations underlying existing strategic nuclear arms limitation agreements and require additional protocols to any future iteration of those accords. At the same time, research should be conducted on the possible contribution of AI technologies to the strengthening of existing measures, such as the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which rely on the constant monitoring of participating states’ military and military-related activities. As the weaponization of the pivotal technologies proceeds, it will also be useful to consider how existing agreements might be used as the basis for added measures intended to control entirely novel types of munitions. As indicated earlier, the CCW can be used as a framework on which to adopt additional measures in the form of protocols controlling or banning the use of armaments, such as autonomous weapons systems, not imagined at the time of the treaty’s initial signing in 1980. Some analysts have suggested that the Missile Technology Control Regime could

be used as a model for a mechanism intended to prevent the proliferation of hypersonic weapons technology.23 Finally, as the above discussion suggests, it will be necessary to devise entirely

new approaches to arms control that are designed to overcome dangers of an unprecedented sort . Addressing the weaponization of AI, for

example, will prove exceedingly difficult because regulating something as inherently insubstantial as algorithms will defy the precise labeling and stockpile oversight features of most existing control measures. Many of the other systems described above, including autonomous and hypersonic weapons, span the divide between conventional and nuclear munitions and raise a whole other set of regulatory problems. Addressing these challenges will not be

easy, but just as previous generations of policymakers found ways of controlling new and dangerous technologies, so too will current and future generations contrive novel solutions to new perils.

Impact---Nanotech Military nanotech causes extinctionClunan and Rodine-Hardy 14 [Anne, Associate Professor of National Security at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, Kirsten, associate professor of political science at Northeastern University, “Nanotechnology in a Globalized World: Strategic Assessments of an Emerging Technology,” accessible online at https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43101/2014%20006%20Nanotechnology%20Strategic%20Assessments.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, published 2014] // BBM

There is considerable ongoing research and development into military applications of nanotechnology .

Some of these applications include: Nano-electronics. Nanotechnology combines with information and communications technology (ICT) to yield smaller,

lighter, faster, and much more energy-efficient and easily deployable devices that enable real-time situational and information dominance that integrates the battlefield and strategic command . Nano-electronics are substantially enhancing everything from information operations (IO), data processing and flow, precision guidance of munitions , manned

and unmanned vehicles, to individual human cognition and motor control. Nano-coatings. Applications of nano-coatings are used to stabilize highly explosive materials , making it much safer to handle nuclear and other warheads.

Nano-coatings can also stabilize biological and chemical agents , making them longer lasting and diversifying their means of delivery . Radio-frequency shield coatings could provide privacy and security to shield buildings and wireless networks from radio

waves. Nano-optics. Nano-engineered negative index metamaterials are moving stealth technology toward cloaking

and invisibility, based on their ability to deflect light away from around an object rather than reflect it. Optical fibers married with nanowires portend

the advent of solar-rechargeable, portable and wearable electronic devices. Nano-sensors and nano-monitors. Quantum dots allow for tagging any object and monitoring its location and use. U.S. researchers have developed a chemical weapons sensor chip that is powered by a smart phone; others are developing chemical weapons sensors based on the chemical-sensing capability of nanoparticles in the wings of Morpho

butterflies. Similar detectors for improvised explosive devices are in development . These tools will greatly enhance the detection of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CNBRNE) materials. For example, “As part of a fielded sensor or diagnostic system, a nanoenabled bio-IO weapon could exploit indigenous agricultural or bacterial systems as a means for surveillance, making use of plant, insect, or animal sentinels as part of a larger sensor network. The sensor network may also include nanoenabled motes or advanced nanosatellites and leverage handheld personal devices such as cell phones, iPods, or PDAs.” These tools

may also be reversed to serve as activators of such devices as well. Nano-textiles. A tremendous amount of R&D is being devoted to develop nano- textiles that improve the performance and health of the individual soldier . Nanofabrics are being developed to enhance soldier armor and uniforms so as to reduce weight , provide ballistic protection , temperature modulation, trap germs, deliver real-time diagnosis and treatment of soldier health and detect exposure to electro-

magnetic, radiological, biological and chemical weapons in situ. These textiles would be self-diagnosing and self-preparing. China, among others, has indigenously developed and deployed a nano-enabled space suit. The United States has invested $50 million in the Institute for Soldier Technologies at the Massachusetts Institute

of Technology. Nano-unmanned devices. Nanorobots, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, offset and allow for manpower reductions , and enhance surveillance and allow for control of nuclear weapons and CBRNE. The Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA) has demonstrated a nano-hummingbird capable

of infiltrating buildings for indoor as well as outdoor surveillance. The United Kingdom introduced a tiny nano-helicopter for reconnaissance patrol in Afghanistan. Microsatellites are made possible through nanotechnology. Increased miniaturization will enable virtually invisible nano-motes to provide real-time monitoring. Nano-weapons. Nanotechnology is being studied for its impact on energetics and in the life and medical sciences for new media for delivering therapeutic agents; the U.S. and Indian militaries are

researching nanotech for defense against chemical and biological warfare. Nano-engineered explosives increase destructive force with a decrease in weight, allowing for lighter , more energetic payloads that may rival nuclear weapons for weight-to-energetic force ratios. The Russian government in 2007 exploded what it claimed was a nanotechnology-enabled thermobaric air-fuel bomb, although it is disputed whether this “father of

all bombs” contained novel nanotechnologies or relied on well-known naturally occurring energetic properties of metals. The most likely offensive application of nanotechnology in the chemical and biological realm, according to a recent study, arises from combining nano-engineered structures and materials with biological agents to create novel nano-enabled biochemical weapons, potentially ones that are not affected by existing countermeasures . “Nanotechnology’s primary role in transforming today’s benign research advances into the future [biological] threats envisioned may be in providing structures at the molecular level that aid in the dissemination and stabilization of novel agents and the design of those agents to achieve the desired negative

outcome…. A nanomaterial … may enhance the stability of a threat agent to facilitate weaponization , improve delivery efficacy, or modify the pathway of infection .” Additionally, nano-enabled weapons may be developed

that allow for disruption of the immune system , effectively defeating countermeasures and potentially creating new agents. Another potential nano-weapon would be the deployment of toxic nanoparticles in means similar to biological or radiological weapons. Currently, the toxicity of nanoparticles is the subject of intense research and debate. Current production of common nanomaterials, such as nanosilver and carbon nanotubes, is still quite limited, in the range of hundreds to thousands of tons, while production of nano-

titanium dioxide (widely used in cosmetics and paint) is in the millions of tons. Large-scale commercial production of nanoparticles is expected to increase rapidly over the next fifteen years. Should results confirm the toxicity of such nanoparticles, future ease of access and low cost may make them attractive as “conventional” weapons of mass destruction or effect. The specter of automated molecular manufacturing based on self-replicating systems and artificial intelligence has led some to forecast a dismal future. Nanotechnology, in this view, will lead to a new global and extraordinarily expensive arms race for technological dominance, a dramatic increase in military instability , and reduced threshold for war . It will also augur the collapse of international trade , as nanotechnology allows the local production of goods once requiring foreign components.

Impact---SSBNsShreds SSBN survivability---collapses broader deterrenceMishra 19 [Sylvia, 2019 India-U.S. Fellow at New America, “Could unmanned underwater vehicles undermine nuclear deterrence?” accessible online at https://policy.dfns.net/2019/05/08/could-unmanned-underwater-vehicles-undermine-nuclear-deterrence, published May 2019] // BBM

Nuclear deterrence rests on the ability of strategic assets to survive an enemy’s first strike and to retaliate, ensuring mutually assured destruction. Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) are considered to be the most survivable of all nuclear platforms due to their stealth capabilities, mobility and discretion . Placing nuclear assets underwater puts them at a safer distance from a crippling first strike. But as technology improves and the ocean battlefield becomes more

complex, these advances could undermine the survivability of strategic forces around the world and make them far more vulnerable. Emerging technologies like unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) add to the complexity of the battle space and disrupt the status quo. Swarms of autonomous underwater drones could be deployed to hunt ballistic-missile submarines, targeting a cornerstone of nuclear deterrence . In their 2017 article ‘The new era of counterforce’, Keir

A. Lieber and Daryl Press argue that for most of the nuclear age, the survivability of retaliatory forces seemed straightforward. However, improvements in counterforce technology have eroded this cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. As new technology continues to raise the potential for major shifts in the military realm , the rapid advent of these drones may reduce the credibility and effectiveness of SSBNs . UUVs can function without the direction of a human operator and have wide dual-use (that is, civilian and military) applications. Some are used for commercial purposes, hydrography and oceanographic research. Lockheed Martin’s yellow Marlin drone submarine inspects offshore rigs and underwater

pipelines, a task that’s worth around a billion dollars a year in the Gulf of Mexico. But UUV technologies have been evolving from defensive to more offensive roles . UUVs increasingly play a critical role in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and perform missions such as placing and monitoring

sensors on the sea floor to track enemy submarines. They can gather intelligence on opponents , detect and neutralize mines,

hunt submarines and chart the ocean floor. They could, potentially, detonate warheads. And they could take part in a coordinated attack on an enemy submarine in conjunction with ‘friendly’ submarines and surface vessels. The United States, Russia and China are investing in this technology to bolster their ASW capability and it’s evident that UUVs will be deployed in the near future in combat operations. The U.S. Navy released a UUV masterplan in 2004 that set out nine priority areas for future UUV capabilities. In 2015, Brigadier General Frank Kelly became the first deputy assistant secretary of the U.S. Navy for unmanned systems. In 2016, the Department of Defense reportedly spent U.S.$232.9 million on procuring UUVs (U.S.$86.7 million more than in 2015). In 2018, the U.S. Office of Naval Research awarded Raytheon a U.S.$29.7 million contract for developing a naval prototype of a ‘low-cost UAV swarming technology’, or LOCUST,

system that can overwhelm an adversary. Russia and China aren’t far behind. Several reports indicate that Russia has been working on a ‘killer underwater drone’ since 2015. The ‘Cephalopod’ is designed for the underwater battlefield. Undersea warfare expert H.I. Sutton says that

it can target shipping but its torpedoes are intended to destroy submarines . In a March 2018 speech to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, President Vladimir Putin highlighted Russian military development of an underwater drone aimed at transforming underwater warfare. A RAND

Corporation report, Emerging trends in China’s development of unmanned systems, said Beijing had been funding 15 different universities for research programs for UUVs. Reports indicate that China is also developing low-cost unmanned UUVs for a variety of military applications , including ‘suicide’ attacks on enemy vessels. These trends indicate that the proliferation of UUVs will have an impact on the stability of the undersea warfighting domain . Emerging capabilities suggest that the sea -

based leg of the triad of missile submarines, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and crewed bombers will increasingly become vulnerable . However, some experts argue that underwater drone technology is still in a nascent stage of development and faces challenges in autonomous operations and communication. The density of seawater makes it difficult for UUVs to complete complex tasks that require real-time decision-making. Former Chief of U.S. Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert noted that one of the biggest obstacles for underwater drones is that they run on batteries that last only a few hours and communication is difficult because data passes very slowly through water. It will take time for

underwater drone technology to mature and pose a serious threat to well-hidden SSBNs, but when drones swarm in packs, it will become harder for submarines to escape detection. Advances in UUV technology will undermine the stability of deterrence and usher in a new underwater arms race that will increase the risks of escalation in a crisis .

As countries expand their underwater drone inventories, managing and controlling them could become challenging. It’s vital that operating nations develop a global code of conduct for their use .

Credible nuclear deterrence is key to sustaining U.S. hegemony---it’s a conflict filterMontgomery 16 [Evan Braden, Senior Fellow and the Director of Research and Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “Extended Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age: Geopolitics, Proliferation, and the Future of U.S. Security Commitments,” accessible online at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA6183-ExtendedDeterrence_PRINT.pdf, published 2016] // BBM

Extended deterrence can help the United States uphold the status quo in several ways. Specifically, it can discourage revisionist powers from provoking crises or launching wars because there is a high probability that Washington will intervene to deny their aims and punish them for acts of aggression; it can dissuade friendly nations from developing controversial military capabilities that might heighten local tensions or trigger regional conflicts because those nations can rely on the United States instead; and it can offer a source of leverage over security partners , one that helps the United States to discourage other courses of action that might prove destabilizing and encourage positive steps on a variety of issues. Despite its importance, extended deterrence is one of the most challenging aspects of American strategy. While persuading adversaries that the United States would retaliate for a direct attack is relatively easy, convincing them that it would retaliate for an attack against other nations is a much more difficult proposition. Furthermore, convincing allies that the United States will actually fight on their behalf—even if that means putting its own troops and territory at risk—can be even harder. As Thomas Schelling famously wrote, when it comes to

deterrence, “The difference between the national homeland and everything ‘abroad’ is the difference between threats that are inherently credible, even if unspoken, and the threats that have to be made credible .” Not surprisingly, efforts to make extended deterrence credible in the eyes of adversaries and

allies alike have shaped virtually every aspect of American military power . For instance, the United States has adhered to a conventional military strategy that emphasizes countering threats when and where they emerge rather than

depending on local nations to prevent aggression or roll back expansion; it has fielded combined-arms forces capable of resisting distant rivals, even those with quantitative

advantages in men and materiel; and it has built a global network of military bases to deploy, operate, and sustain those forces overseas. Finally, but equally important, it has relied on its nuclear arsenal for the purpose of extending deterrence to its allies and partners . Throughout the Cold War, strategic nuclear weapons provided Washington with the capacity to conduct a devastating reprisal against the Soviet Union if Moscow ever launched a nuclear strike against the U.S. homeland or the Red Army attempted to overrun Europe. At the same time, theater and battlefield nuclear weapons, many of which were permanently stationed on allied territory, could be used to blunt an offensive by numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces if NATO’s conventional units were not up to the task. These weapons were also used to “couple” the United States to its vulnerable frontline partners, who had doubts that Washington would truly employ its strategic nuclear forces on their behalf. By raising the prospect of early nuclear use against Soviet troops and territory, the presence of non-strategic weapons signaled a U.S. willingness to escalate in defense of its allies rather than withdrawal to North America in the face of a successful Soviet invasion. Over the past twenty-five years, however, many of the extended deterrence dilemmas that occupied U.S. policymakers in the past—especially the dilemmas associated with extended nuclear deterrence—ceased to be a major source of concern. With Russia in decline and China focused on sustaining its economic rise, treaty allies in Europe and Asia have been relatively safe

from serious threats. Meanwhile, as the world’s sole superpower , the United States has enjoyed enormous military advantages over potential rivals and has been able to rely on its conventional forces to discourage aggression. This favorable situation appears to be changing , though, putting extended nuclear deterrence back on the agenda . For example,

although the unipolar moment appeared to herald the waning of geopolitics and the end of major power security competitions, at least

according to some observers, revisionist actors are once again challenging the status quo in multiple regions . Russia’s invasion of Georgia, annexation of Crimea, and support for rebel groups in eastern Ukraine all indicate that Moscow does not respect the political order of post-Cold War Europe. At the same time, China’s conventional military buildup has shifted the balance of power in Asia , while its “creeping expansion” in the South China Sea could enable Beijing to assert greater control over one of the world’s most vital waterways . And despite the recent agreement to constrain its nuclear program, Iran continues to build offensive missile forces and support violent extremist groups. In short, Russia’s piecemeal efforts to restore its lost continental empire, China’s military expansion in its near seas and beyond, and Iran’s willingness to both create and fill power vacuums throughout its neighborhood all suggest that

“geopolitical rivalries have stormed back to center stage .” Compounding this trend, the world is now in the midst of what many analysts refer to

as a “second nuclear age,” one that is arguably more complex and potentially more volatile than the bipolar U.S.–Soviet struggle that characterized the Cold War. Not only does the United States still need to worry about maintaining strategic stability with a nuclear peer , albeit one

possessing far fewer weapons than it did in the past, but it must also manage a number of other existing and emerging challenges: the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to fragile nations, the expansion of nuclear arsenals by minor powers and

aspiring major powers, and the pursuit of capabilities that are lowering the barriers to nuclear use and eroding the “firebreak”

between conventional and nuclear conflict. What does all of this mean for the United States? Looking ahead, there is little reason to doubt that extended nuclear deterrence will remain a key feature of U.S. grand strategy and a major factor when it comes to military planning and procurement decisions. According to the

Pentagon’s most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), “Our nuclear deterrent is the ultimate protection against a nuclear attack on the United States, and through extended deterrence, it also serves to reassure our distant allies of their security against regional aggression.” Moreover, the

latest National Security Strategy declared that the United States “will protect our investment in foundational capabilities like the nuclear deterrent,” and current modernization programs are making good on that promise, even in a period of relative resource scarcity.

Impact---AT: No Autonomous Weapons Autonomous weapons being developed now Truffer 18 (Patrick, has been working in the Swiss Armed Forces for more than 15 years, holds a bachelor’s degree in public affairs from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zürich (ETH Zurich), and a master’s degree in international relations from the Free University of Berlin, “Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems and Artificial Intelligence in Future Conflicts,” June 19th, 2018, https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=33801)

More or less unnoticed by the public, systems with weak AI are evolving: they improve the results of search queries on the Internet, are used in speech recognition or machine translation, and such systems will also be used to control drones and vehicles, to increase efficiency in logistics, in medicine and in many other areas in the near future. Through the

use of “deep learning neural networks“, the progress in the field of AI has been remarkable in recent years. Put simply, this approach first extracts abstract solution strategies from an extensive data collection on a specific problem. The solution strategies are then supplemented, expanded and improved using data known and unknown to the system –

comparable to training. Finally, the perfected solution strategies are applied to specific problems. [1] This approach can also be found in systems used in the field of security. For example, there are pilot projects for the autonomous evaluation by surveillance cameras that strike an alarm in the event of “conspicuous behaviour” (Jefferson Chase, “Facial Recognition Surveillance Test Extended at Berlin Train

Station“, Deutsche Welle, 15.12.2017). Therefore it is not surprising that armed forces are also interested in these new technologies. Automatic weapons systems have been in use in the armed forces for decades, but with operators always involved in the detection, identification and selection of targets or in the final decision on the use of (lethal) force. In autonomous systems, on the other hand, these processes take place almost without human interference . Such systems do not have “free will”, but they are able to carry out certain tasks independently, without human interaction, under unforeseeable conditions, on the basis of their rules of engagement (Paul Scharre, “Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War“, W. W. Norton & Company, 2018, 27ff). Theoretically, this is already the case with some defence systems, such as the Aegis

Combat System, the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System CIWS, and modern air defence systems [2]. Currently, more than 30 states have such autonomous defence systems. However, this excludes drones that are still used operationally, because they are remote-controlled and not autonomous, at least in the

decisive phase of the use of force (Scharre, “Army of None”, 4). The defence industry is advancing research in the field of LAWS in which AI systems will play a decisive role. Test flights conducted in 2013-2015 demonstrated the capabilities of Northrop Grumman X-47B to take off and

land autonomously from an aircraft carrier and to carry out air refuelling autonomously. Autonomous systems play an important role in the U.S. Third Offset Strategy, which aims to secure the technological lead of the U.S. armed forces in the long term. Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Office of Naval Research and the U.S. Air Force have been experimenting for years with the use of swarms of low-cost autonomous microdrones . Initial approaches to such systems have already been tested, even if they have not yet been given a kill order. In 2016, the U.S. Air Force released 103 Perdix micro-drones from an airplane, which then went autonomously into formation and independently carried out various small missions; the associated video was released in early 2017. According to Stuart J. Russell, a British AI scientist at the University of California, the U.S. Armed Forces would be able to cost-effectively produce swarms of such drones within 18 months. When produced serially, micro-drones are expected to cost between 30 and 100 U.S. dollars apiece (Andreas Mink, “Wie Roboter uns töten werden“, NZZ am Sonntag, 02.12.2017). Loitering Munition also has a high degree of autonomy. It is a type of guided weapon that is initially launched without a specific target, can orbit over a target area for a long time, and then uses its sensors to attack the target. This includes, for example, the IAI Harop, which comes in the form of a stealth drone. It can autonomously eliminate radar sources from its waiting position above the target area, in which it can stay for 6 hours. Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) had exported the Harop to Azerbaijan, where it was used in the Nagorno-Karabakh region for the first time – albeit not as originally planned. The device hit an Armenian bus with militia soldiers who were being transported to the contested region. Seven soldiers were killed (Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Israeli-Made Kamikaze Drone Spotted in Nagorno-

Karabakh Conflict“, Washington Post, 05.04.2016). This shows that the U.S. is not the only one conducting research in the field of LAWS. With the Taranis, an autonomous combat drone from BAE Systems, the UK pursues a similar demonstrator program. The findings will be incorporated into the Franco-British Future Combat Air System together with the equivalent French project nEUROn, also involving the Swiss RUAG Aerospace . In February 2017, the French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian announced that AI systems will play an increasingly important role for France in the development of new military technologies. France will to ensure that the connection to the U.S. and the UK will not be lost in this area (Jean-Yves Le Drian, “L’intelligence artificielle: un enjeu se souveraineté nationale’, in Intelligence

artificielle: des libertés individuelles à la sécurité nationale, Eurogroup Consulting, 2017, 11–24). Chinese President Xi Jinping , for his part, wants to transform China into a “superpower of artificial intelligence” by 2030, with massive investments (Mink, “Wie

Roboter uns töten werden”). Similar to the UK and France, but still lagging behind technologically, China is researching an autonomous reconnaissance and combat drone , the AVIC 601-S Sharp Sword. Russian President Vladimir Putin has also recognised the importance of AI systems. In September 2017, he said that whoever would become the leading nation in AI would achieve world domination

(“‘Whoever Leads in AI Will Rule the World’: Putin to Russian Children on Knowledge Day“, RT International, 01.07.2017). Despite lagging significant behind the USA and China, Russia has intensified its development of autonomous systems (Vincent Boulanin and Maaike Verbruggem, “Mapping the Development of Autonomy

in Weapon Systems“, SIPRI, November 2017, 97f).

Impact---Bioweapons Current governance framework fails---new agreements are key to check development Kolja Brockmann et al. 19., Sibylle Bauer and Vincent Boulanin. *Researcher in the SIPRI Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control program. **Director of Studies of Armament and Disarmament at SIPRI. ***Senior Researcher on emerging military and security technologies. 3-1-2019. "Bio Plus X: Arms Control and the Convergence of Biology and Emerging Technologies." SIPRI Publications. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/other-publications/bio-plus-x-arms-control-and-convergence-biology-and-emerging-technologies. accessed 7-21-2019//JDi

Existing governance frameworks exhibit a number of shortcomings that make them ill-equipped to comprehensively and effectively review and address the risks posed by the convergence of innovation in biotechnology and other areas of science and technology. First, the frameworks either have not used, or cannot fully use, their potential to explore connections between biotechnology and other emerging technologies. Several governance frameworks

capture, or are designed to capture, developments in science and technology, in particular the BTWC and the Australia Group. However, their mandates, political differences, working practices and levels of stakeholder engagement can affect their ability to review and ensure adequate coverage of relevant technologies. They might not be able to tackle risks deriving from the

interaction with other technologies of the technology that they are meant to address. In the realm of export control, for instance,

components or certain applications may be covered incidentally due to other proliferation risks (e.g. lasers used in

AM machines may be subject to controls based on potential uses in conventional weapons), but their coverage in control lists may not be sufficiently informed by risks related to biological weapons or delivery systems, resulting in the possibility of inadvertent gaps in control. Second, treaty regimes and other governance instruments typically interact with each other much less

than the respective technologies that they cover. An overarching question when viewing governance in the field of biosecurity through the lens of technological development and convergence is therefore how to better connect the relevant governance mechanisms —including the BTWC, the CWC, the export control regimes and the UN investigation mechanism—where discussions on this are ongoing at different levels of intensity. Third, governance institutions and frameworks, including the states involved in their discussions and decision-making processes, also struggle to develop a sufficient understanding of a technology, the associated risks and its potential impact on the activities,

transfers or behaviour that they govern. It is therefore a significant challenge to allocate appropriate resources, leverage institutional linkages, develop novel instruments within existing structures or identify the need for, let alone establish,

entirely new governance mechanisms. Fourth, many emerging technologies with various degrees of convergence with biotechnology that pose potential biological weapon proliferation risks are not developed through dedicated state-controlled programmes, but instead in a competitive commercial environment .

It is therefore indispensable to not only maintain and strengthen norms in research and state contexts, but to broaden and build more inclusive approaches . Norm-building in the private sector and in less formalized contexts, such as the DIY

community, forms a major component of such efforts. While dealing with developments in science and technology is far from a new issue, measures to address their impact must keep up with the dynamics of these developments. Thus, improvements to governance instruments need to address the structural factors and new characteristics of

new technologies that have a possibly significant impact through convergence with biotechnology. To address these limitations, the above analysis shows that efforts to improve the capability of existing governance frameworks to address technological change will require serious rethinking and have to be supported by a range of complementary measures , in particular such soft measures as codes of conduct, education and outreach. These efforts, in particular those that are bottom-up and involve the next generation of scientists and engineers, need to transcend any artificial divisions that the traditional scientific

communities still impose on those working in these fields. It is thus a positive sign that multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary initiatives involving biotechnology experts are on the rise .

Emerging tech spurs development and incentivizes use of bioterror Kolja Brockmann et al. 19., Sibylle Bauer and Vincent Boulanin. *Researcher in the SIPRI Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control program. **Director of Studies of Armament and Disarmament at SIPRI. ***Senior Researcher on emerging military and

security technologies. 3-1-2019. "Bio Plus X: Arms Control and the Convergence of Biology and Emerging Technologies." SIPRI Publications. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/other-publications/bio-plus-x-arms-control-and-convergence-biology-and-emerging-technologies. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

The convergence of modern biotechnology with technologies such as additive manufacturing , artificial intelligence and robotics is bound to have an impact on the landscape of risk in biological arms control and biosecurity. While the applications and possibilities offered by the convergence of biotechnology with these other areas of technology may vary greatly, they raise a common set of risks and challenges as far as the development, production and use of biological weapons is concerned. First, they have in common the ability to facilitate steps in the development or production of biological weapons and their delivery systems. Each emerging technology could, in its own way,

enable the automation of specific operations that previously required manual manipulation or analysis by a human. AI could facilitate the analysis of genetic information that identifies the genetic markers or base pairs that need to be edited or mutated in order to alter the transmissibility of a pathogen, while a cloud laboratory could be used to automate certain laboratory tasks

and thereby reduce the need for facilities and trained laboratory staff. AM could make the production of drone components for the delivery of biological weapon more accessible. Fortunately, some tacit knowledge barriers remain in place. However, the steps that can be simplified by automation could enable many of the development, production and delivery processes for biological weapons. Moreover, further technological advances in AM, AI, robotics and other emerging technologies such as nanotechnology

could decisively amplify this simplification. Second, AM, AI and robotics could enable more targeted delivery of biological weapons. Recent advances in AI could enable the design of a pathogen that would affect only specific individuals or groups of people. Meanwhile, progress in AM and robotics have made new and more advanced delivery mechanisms available to an

increasing number of actors—including terrorist organizations. While these technologies may not pose an imminent risk at this stage, the gathering of and access to the necessary genomic data, for example, has already become a field of competition for some companies , which also poses ethical and privacy risks. Although this may prove to be the first step towards the development of genetically targeted weapons, such data has not yet been successfully used in this way. Meanwhile, although drones have already become more common in asymmetric warfare, there are no known cases of their use to disperse weaponized biological agents. Third, each of

these emerging technologies is vulnerable to cyberattacks due to increased digitization . This means that their systems or the data that they require could be stolen, misused or manipulated , including for activities that could facilitate the developments, production or delivery of biological weapons or cause critical malfunctions in related equipment. Fourth, none of these emerging technologies is easy to control, notably because their development is mainly driven by the civilian and private sectors and is therefore beyond

direct governmental control. Governments are trying to exert control, for instance by funding R&D directly or by controlling the funding of and foreign

investment in key firms, but they may not have the influence that they previously held in strategic industries . This

problem of control is further complicated by the fact that a large portion of these technologies is digital information that can be easily transferred. Traditional export and customs controls and visa screening may no longer pose sufficient barriers . Verifying and controlling digital or other types of intangible transfer of technology are more difficult than controlling traditional transfers of goods, as measures such as digital forensics, recordkeeping requirements and audit procedures are

often weaker and less commonly applied. Moreover, the speed of development of most of these technologies makes the definition of long-lasting technical parameters for possible export controls or transparency measures elusive. This not only inhibits effective regulation but also creates considerable difficulties for scientists and developers when classifying and handling any risks created by transferring or making their technology available—and thus inhibits effective compliance practices . Existing frameworks for the governance of

biological weapons currently only provide limited coverage of the direct and indirect risks and challenges associated with the convergence of biotechnology with these emerging technologies. Chapter 3 discusses the governance frameworks and their efforts to address these risks in more detail. In addition to

increasing understanding of ongoing developments in science and technology, each of these frameworks needs to raise awareness among a growing number of actors and develop measures to address issues that they may have only just started to consider in the biosecurity context. For example, establishing standards for genomic data security and privacy would be critical to reducing the risk of misuse of data for biological weapon development. However, companies and governments involved in collection and analysis of genomics data have barely started considering this issue for personal data protection, let alone biosecurity.

Extinction---it’s a prior risk Piers Millett and Andrew Snyder-Beattie 17. *Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. **Director of Research, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. 8-1-2017. "Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity." Health Security. https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/hs.2017.0028. accessed 3-28-2019//JDi

In the decades to come, advanced bioweapons could threaten human existence. Although the probability of human extinction from bioweapons may

be low, the expected value of reducing the risk could still be large, since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future generations . We

provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-

level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios . The authors provide an overview of biotechnological extinction

risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. They find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates suggesting that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The

risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity . The 1918 flu was responsible for

more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was

responsible for killing over 25% of the European population ,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are

thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in

outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely . Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—

primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease , especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into

a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 In the modern context, no single disease currently

exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently . For example, some diseases exhibit

nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of

transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits . Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have

shown that other disease traits , such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well .19-21 Although

these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is

especially true given that there is also a long historical track record of state-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge

science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature . The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced

virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes. 22

Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development , with Canadian, US, and UK

bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25 The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars,

bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27 Non-state actors may also pose a risk, especially those with explicitly omnicidal aims . While rare, there are examples. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in

Japan sought biological weapons for the express purpose of causing extinction.28 Environmental groups, such as the Gaia Liberation Front, have argued that “we can ensure Gaia's survival only through the extinction of the Humans as a species … we now have the specific technology for doing the job … several different [genetically engineered] viruses could be released”(quoted in ref.

29). Groups such as R.I.S.E. also sought to protect nature by destroying most of humanity with bioweapons.30 Fortunately, to date,

non-state actors have lacked the capabilities needed to pose a catastrophic bioweapons threat, but this

could change in future decades as biotechnology becomes more accessible and the pool of experienced users grows .31,32 What is the appropriate response to these speculative extinction threats? A balanced biosecurity portfolio might include investments that reduce a mix of proven and speculative risks , but striking this balance is still difficult given the massive uncertainties around the low-probability, high-consequence risks. In this article, we examine the traditional spectrum of biosecurity risks (ie, biocrimes, bioterrorism, and biowarfare) to categorize biothreats by likelihood and impact, expanding the historical analysis to consider even lower-probability, higher-consequence events (catastrophic risks and existential risks). In order to produce reasoned estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreats, we bring together relevant data and theory and produce some first-guess estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreat, and we use these initial estimates to compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing existential risks with more traditional biosecurity measures. We emphasize

that these models are highly uncertain, and their utility lies more in enabling order-of-magnitude comparisons rather than as a precise measure of the true risk. However, even with the most conservative models, we find that reduction of low-probability, high-consequence risks can be more cost-effective , as measured by quality-adjusted life year per dollar, especially when we account for the lives of future generations .

This suggests that despite the low probability of such events, society still ought to invest more in preventing the most

extreme possible biosecurity catastrophes.

Impact---Hegemony Arms control locks in U.S. competitive edge over revisionist powers on emerging tech Maurer 18 (John, Henry A. Kissinger Postdoctoral Fellow at International Security Studies and the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale University, "THE FORGOTTEN SIDE OF ARMS CONTROL: ENHANCING U.S. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, OFFSETTING ENEMY STRENGTHS," https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/the-forgotten-side-of-arms-control-enhancing-u-s-competitive-advantage-offsetting-enemy-strengths/)

In the spring of 1988, President Ronald Reagan described the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty as an agreement that would, “for the first time, eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles.” Reagan’s description of the INF Treaty as a historic and mutually beneficial reduction of nuclear arms remains the conventional wisdom. This narrative is not wrong, of

course, but it is incomplete: Arms control has never been purely cooperative. Rather, the United States employed arms control negotiations to build military-technological advantages over the Soviet Union. From the 1940s

onwards, U.S. leaders sought to “ offset ” the Soviet Union’s advantage in conventional weapons by developing advanced military technologies that their Cold War opponent did not have. Arms control played an important role in advancing this offset strategy . American leaders raced the Soviets in military technologies where the United

States was perceived to enjoy significant advantages, while simultaneously entangling the Soviet Union in an arms control regime that would limit areas of Soviet strength. By combining arms

racing and arms control, the United States pursued a holistic offset strategy. The relationship between arms control and offset strategies has been obscured because most accounts of U.S. arms control policy ignore its competitive dimensions. The traditional scholarly accounts emphasize the incredible dangers of nuclear weapons , the mutual U.S.-Soviet

interest in limiting nuclear competition, and the importance of this dialogue to stabilizing U.S.-Soviet relations more generally. These accounts, however, only tell half of the story. More recent historical accounts have called into question this benign interpretation, noting instead America’s long-term strategy to employ negotiations to promote its own advantages. Some of this newer scholarship has focused on the self-serving motives behind U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, but as more and more documents are

declassified, historians are increasingly noting that the United States also employed superpower arms limitation to promote American advantages. Today, U.S. policymakers would do well to consider how arms control can contribute to sustaining America’s military-technological competitiveness. The First Offset: Seeking Quantitative Parity The

United States began seeking competitive advantage over the Soviet Union through arms control from the very beginning of the Cold War. The First Offset strategy depended on maintaining overwhelming nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. To support this objective, U.S. leaders sought to entrap the Soviets in arms control agreements that would preserve America’s lead in nuclear weapons. Because the United States enjoyed a head start in the arms race, efforts to freeze that race at any given point would have frozen U.S. nuclear advantages, sustaining the First Offset indefinitely. Indeed, America’s first major nuclear arms control proposal, the 1946 Baruch Plan, would have allowed the United States to retain its own nuclear arsenal in exchange for a promise of eventual disarmament while banning any other country (especially the Soviets) from procuring its own nuclear weapons. Negotiations over a nuclear test ban were similarly loaded, with the Eisenhower administration seeking to prevent the Soviets from catching up to the United States in testing data, especially important for developing smaller, missile-capable warheads. The initial impetus for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) also involved an effort to freeze Soviet deployments of ballistic missiles and anti-ballistic missiles while the United States still retained the lead in nuclear weapons. The Soviets rejected early American arms control proposals as nonstarters. Soviet leaders quickly concluded that nuclear weapons were essential to their national security, and rejected any framework that would deny them the same nuclear rights as the United States. Especially after their perceived humiliation during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet leaders were unwilling to conclude an arms control agreement that would enshrine American advantage in number of weapons. The single major arms control success of the era, the 1963 Limited Test-Ban Treaty, was only concluded after the Soviets had caught up to the United States in atmospheric testing. In this regard, early U.S. efforts at competitive arms control were simply too transparent. Furthermore, America’s disastrous intervention in Vietnam undermined both the financial and political capital necessary to sustain the arms race. By the early 1970s, the Soviets were approaching numerical parity in nuclear weapons and the First Offset was coming to an end. Perceiving the correlation of forces to be in their favor, Soviet leaders were unwilling to make serious arms control concessions to the United States. The Second Offset: Qualitative Advantages The end of U.S. numerical nuclear superiority required a new strategy for military-technological competition. American leaders embarked on a Second Offset that leveraged American advantages in electronics, precision manufacturing, and digital computing to generate sustainable qualitative military-technological advantages. As Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote to Congress in January 1981, “Technology can be a force multiplier, a resource that can be used to help offset numerical advantages of an adversary.” Even as it necessitated a new offset strategy, nuclear parity with the Soviets allowed for greater progress in arms control negotiations, in part because it allowed American leaders to claim that the resulting agreements were “fair,” even when they were promoting U.S. military-technological advantages. Within

this framework of rough numerical equivalence, U.S. arms control policy advanced American advantages in three main ways: dictating the pace of key military-technological developments; promoting competition in environments more conducive to U.S. organizational and cultural advantages; and denying the Soviets the ability to respond to U.S. qualitative improvements by increasing their numerical strength. First, arms control agreements allowed the U nited S tates to slow (but not halt) military-technological competition until more favorable political, economic, and technical circumstances emerged . The best example of manipulating the pace of competition in this way was the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. By the late 1960s, the Soviets were making rapid progress on anti-ballistic missile technology. On the U.S. side, Congress would not fund a comparable American anti-ballistic missile system, which was both too expensive and insufficiently technologically mature. In effect, the ABM Treaty limited the Soviet Union to anti-ballistic missile levels comparable to those that the U.S. Congress would allow, preventing the Soviets from pulling ahead in large-scale anti-ballistic missile deployments – an echo of earlier attempts at quantitative arms control. At the same time, the treaty promoted American qualitative advantages by allowing continued testing of new anti-ballistic missile concepts at Kwajalein Test Facility, buying time until superior American anti-ballistic missile technology matured. As Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird stated in his June 1972 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, even under the treaty the United States would “vigorously pursue a comprehensive ABM technology program…[to] examine ABM deployment options that might be exercised if permitted by future agreements, or otherwise necessary.” By limiting both deployments and testing, the ABM Treaty allowed American leaders to postpone a key area of military-technological competition for nearly a decade. It also provided some flexibility to

re-escalate that competition under more favorable political and technological circumstances in the 1980s, when the Reagan administration proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative, the

distant predecessor of America’s current ballistic missile defense technology. Second, arms control agreements allowed the United States to promote competition in environments more conducive to its organizational and cultural advantages . For instance, the INF treaty emerged as a response to the Soviet deployment of new SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which posed a direct threat to America’s NATO allies. NATO responded by adopting the Dual-Track Decision, in which the United States deployed its own next-generation intermediate-range capabilities in Europe while also seeking an arms control agreement to eliminate the SS-20. The resulting negotiations eventually culminated in the INF Treaty. The agreement is widely hailed as a major arms control achievement, but it is very specific in the types of weapons it limits: not all intermediate range weapons, but only land-based intermediate range weapons. Air- and sea-launched cruise missiles of any range were still allowed. Secretary of State George Shultz explained, “[The INF Treaty] eliminates the SS-20 threat which directly led to the dual track decision. It does not limit U.S. aircraft, which make a critical contribution to NATO’s defense. It strengthens deterrence by significantly complicating Soviet attack planning.” As a result, even as both sides dismantled their land-based intermediate-range missiles, the United States made rapid progress on its air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. The Soviet Union was free to compete with the United States in the naval and aerial domains, but in practice these were areas in which the United States enjoyed significant geographic, organizational, and alliance advantages. In fact, the United States repeatedly proposed arms control agreements that would incentivize the Soviets to compete against American strengths in the aerial and naval domains, whether by insisting that tactical aircraft be excluded from strategic arms negotiations, allowing replacement of land-based missiles with sea-based ones, or by insisting on permissive “counting rules” for missile-armed bombers. While on paper these proposals

seemed neutral, in practice they shaped competition in ways that favored the United States. The INF Treaty was the most successful instance of this general approach. Finally, arms control agreements denied the Soviets the ability to respond to American qualitative improvements by increasing the size of their forces. From the early 1970s onwards, American leaders pushed the Soviets to consider not just limitation but reduction of both missile numbers and size. Reduction had an obvious public motive in making the world safer from nuclear weapons. In private, however, American leaders emphasized that reducing the number and size of both sides’ nuclear weapons would prevent the Soviets from offsetting U.S. advances in weapons accuracy and reliability by doubling down on the scale of their own missile deployments. To this end, the SALT process placed absolute limits on the number of launchers, while allowing the United States to proliferate increasingly accurate warheads through technologies like multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles and air-launched cruise missiles (which did not add to the overall number of launchers). In private conversation with President Richard Nixon, Laird emphasized that under the SALT I agreement: [The United States] can still keep ahead of [the Soviet Union]. There is a lot more we can even do with the Minuteman at the site as far as getting it even more accurate…and we can do it at a very small price, because we have the technological capability that far outstrips the Soviet Union. This is important to maintain this leadership. However, the Soviets were reluctant to accept limits on missile size, so for a time U.S. improvements were generally offset by Soviet advantages in sheer scale, as their larger missiles could carry more warheads. The SALT II Treaty ultimately foundered in the Senate amid conservative criticism that it failed to limit the size of the Soviet missile force. Following SALT II’s failure, the Reagan administration focused once again on limiting both the number and size of missiles, the better to emphasize American advantages in smaller and more accurate weapons. In 1983 the Scowcroft Commission endorsed the deployment of a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as a means of incentivizing the Soviets to accept limitations on missile throw weight. Driven in part by this expanding U.S. missile force, the Soviets agreed to the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in 1991. START I was consistent with America’s longtime approach to arms reduction, requiring the Soviets to dismantle half of their heavy ICBMs and reduce their missile throw weight by nearly 50 percent. The treaty required no similar reductions by the United States, which had no “heavy” ICBMs and whose light and accurate missile forces were already below the agreed-upon weight limit. As with the ABM and INF Treaties, START I’s seemingly neutral language in fact promoted American military-technological advantages. START I was one of the high points of the Second Offset strategy in the nuclear realm. By preventing the Russians from matching U.S. qualitative force improvements with quantitative offsets of their own, the treaty kicked off a “New Era of Counterforce,” in which the United States enjoyed superior nuclear capabilities over its Russian rival. The Second Offset was also bolstered by conventional force reductions, about which the Soviets were similarly intransigent during the 1970s, before eventually agreeing to large-scale downsizing in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. By equalizing the sizes of the two sides’ nuclear and conventional forces while permitting the United States to retain a qualitative edge in practice, START I and CFE supported the Second Offset Strategy of building qualitative military-technological advantage over the Soviet Union. Opportunities and Challenges From the perspective of the competitive offset, arms control has a mixed track record, but one worth pondering. While the Soviets rejected obvious early efforts to hem them in via arms control negotiations, American strategy in the second half of the Cold War bore greater fruit, as “equal” and “fair” quantitative restrictions allowed the United States to pursue qualitative force advantages with greater success and at less cost. Today, arms control is viewed solely as a tool for promoting

international cooperation, lauded by doves and disdained by hawks. Contemporary policymakers would do well to also recognize the competitive dimension that has historically undergirded arms control , for three reasons. First, this perspective can help sustain the arms control process by building a broader base of support for legacy arms control achievements. The United States retains a significant competitive incentive to uphold arms control successes like the INF Treaty, which continues to shape U.S.-Russian nuclear competition in ways beneficial to U.S. interests. While Russia cannot be allowed to cheat, critics of the agreement should consider how the treaty, properly observed, enables the United States to exploit its advantages in aerial and naval forces to the full. Similarly, defenders of the treaty ought to make the case for the agreement on its significant competitive merits, not solely on the basis of mutual interest with the Russians. Recognizing both the cooperative and the competitive elements of the INF Treaty creates a much stronger case for why the United States should seek to sustain, and perhaps even expand, the ban on land-based intermediate-range missiles.

Second, the strong association of “arms control” with “peace and cooperation” often distorts our understanding of real arms control successes. For example, some defenders of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have argued that Iran’s willingness to participate in an arms control agreement is indicative of a broader desire for cooperation with the United States. At the same time, some critics of the agreement have pointed to Iran’s continued military competition with the United States as evidence that the Iranians are not serious about arms control. Because they conflate arms control with cooperation,

both defenders and critics often miss one of the JCPOA’s major strengths: It promotes U.S. military advantage over Iran by limiting Iran’s access to nuclear weapons, while requiring no similar changes in American military capability. And the agreement accomplishes this objective whether or not the Iranians are truly interested in expanding cooperation. Arms control does not need to end military competition entirely for it to be an effective tool of American foreign policy. Finally,

U.S. leaders ought to think about how arms control might promote competitive advantage in the area of emerging technologies like cyber weapons, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology . Proponents of arms control

for these fields have recently staked out maximalist positions that would prohibit all countries from pursuing military applications of emerging technologies. For U.S. policymakers considering

the Third Offset, however, the appropriate questions are how these technologies can be used to enhance American military-technological competitiveness and how arms control restrictions can be tailored to further that competitive advantage . In an era labeled as a return to great power competition, American leaders can take a page out of the history of the Cold War to devise strategies that keep the United States ahead of its rivals.

Impact---AT: U.S. Lead Inevitable U.S. advantage won’t last---establishing rules of the road are key Eilstrup-Sangiovanni Mette 17. Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK. 2017. “Why the World Needs an International Cyberwar Convention.” Philos. Technol. (2018) 31:379–407 DOI 10.1007/s13347-017-0271-5. NAR

The arguments presented in this article should not be read as a statement of ingenuous optimism. Negotiating an ICWC will be fraught with difficulty given the diverse interests at stake, and the task will not be accomplished overnight. Nonetheless, I argue, most standard objections to embarking on a process of international negotiation (including difficulties of verifying compliance and problems of rapid

technological change) fail on closer inspection . In the end, the main barrier to an international agreement on governing cyberconflict may be opposition by powerful (mainly) western states, whose desire to exploit current strategic advantages in

the cyber-domain leads them to reject a treaty. For example, many observers judge that America’s enduring hostility towards binding international rules for cyberspace is driven largely by its technological superiority in the realm of tactical electronic warfare, which provides a strong incentive to maintain maximum freedom of action in this domain (see Baruah 2013; Clarke and Knake 2010; Sanger 2015; Lindsay 2015, 46, 61–62; Sanger 2015; Goldsmith 2011). Not only would America be reluctant

to bargain away its ability to exploit current tactical advantages, but as the world’s strongest cyber power, American decision-makers may fear that by accepting binding international constraints on the conduct of cyber warfare, they would be trying their own hands while allowing other nations to rapidly catch up (see Singer and Friedman 2014). Such reservations are too shortsighted . Given the current global rush to invest in offensive cyber power, America’s unrivaled position in the cyber domain may well be temporary . For now, however, America’s leading position provides a unique opportunity to shape international rules and norms for cyber conflict . By assuming a global leadership role, Washington might succeed in encouraging other states to accept constraints on the use of cyber offensive power before these states acquire significant offensive capabilities of their own .39 During the 1950s and 1960s, American leaders were sufficiently foresighted to see that they could exploit US superiority in the realm of nuclear technology to shape international rules regarding nuclear arms control. By promising self-restraint and by offering to share civilian nuclear technology, Washington succeeded in persuading other states to accept the norm of an international nuclear hierarchy and thereby prevented an uncontrolled global nuclear

arms race. A similar opportunity is currently spurned in the cyber domain. The arguments presented in this article suggest it is time US policy-makers change course and give their support to negotiating an ICWC.

Impact---AT: Arms Race Victory We can’t win the arms race---Russia and China are ahead, and ANY efforts to bulk up our forces will spark conflict Lamrani 19 – Senior Military Analyst, Stratfor(Omar, An Arms Race Toward Global Instability Feb 20th 2019, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/arms-race-toward-global-instability)

A Shift in Focus Even before the latest string of U.S. defense and policy reviews, the emerging power competition with China and Russia was on Washington's radar. The United States pursued a "pivot to the Pacific" during President Barack Obama's administration, mostly in an effort to counter China's growing dominance in the region. Similarly, since Russia's intervention in Ukraine, the United States has bolstered its military deployments in Europe, reversing its drawdown on the Continent. The Pentagon also touted the "Third Offset" strategy — an initiative to encourage the development of promising military technologies such as robotics and artificial intelligence — during the previous administration in an effort to stay ahead of its mounting competition. Yet counterterrorism was the true focus of the U.S. security strategy, not only under the last president but also under his predecessor. Enduring conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia

continue to draw the lion's share of military deployments, resources and focus to this day. China and Russia , meanwhile, have taken advantage of the

U nited S tates' diverted attention , making great strides in building arsenals and honing their military capabilities . In a few areas — such as anti-ship missiles, rocket artillery and ground-based air defense — the two Eurasian countries may even have surpassed the U nited S tates. In light of these trends, Washington has every reason to be worried about a great power rivalry. But trying to stay ahead in the competition will only accelerate it . As the U nited S tates works to fortify its defenses , China and Russia will redouble their efforts to strengthen their own capabilities. The two countries — revisionist powers that want to alter the

current geopolitical balance, whether in the South and East China seas or in the former Soviet Union — won't give up their geopolitical ambitions just because the United States tries to foil

them. Raising the Stakes As the power competition between Russia, China and the United States intensifies, the emergence of disruptive weapons technologies will drive them deeper into a destabilizing arms race .

Increasingly capable missile defense systems, for example, will play a central role in the struggle going forward, though the technology is still evolving to better address ballistic missiles. To appreciate the disruptive effect of ballistic missile defense, one must consider the limited inventory of ballistic missiles available to the United States, Russia and China. The fear among these countries is that as missile defense technology improves and becomes more prevalent, it will render their modest arsenals ineffective. A disarming nuclear strike from one power would further reduce the number of viable missiles in the target state's holdings, and the remaining weapons may not be powerful enough to overcome the aggressor country's missile defenses in a

retaliatory strike. Consequently, while the U nited S tates' early lead on missile defense technology will spur Russia and China to keep working on their own missile defenses, it will also push them to beef up their offensive weapons . Nuclear weapons will be another point of contention. According to the

U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is preparing to shift its stance on the use of nuclear weapons and to introduce new ones, including a low-yield warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Low-yield nuclear weapons aren't a new development for the United States, but putting them on a ballistic missile submarine is. The move is intended to address the growing concern that a potential enemy — be it a great power such as Russia or a rogue state like North Korea — would resort to an "escalate to de-escalate" strategy. Under that strategy, the inferior military power would use a low-yield or "tactical" nuclear weapon to discourage continued attacks from the United States on the assumption that Washington wouldn't strike back with its strategic nuclear arsenal for fear of starting a devastating war. Positioning low-yield nuclear weapons on ballistic missile submarines will give the United States greater speed and flexibility in their use. The decision is not without its risks, however. For one thing, a single strike with a low-yield nuclear warhead may well escalate to a full-blown war with strategic weapons. For another, since the U.S. ballistic submarine fleet carries a large portion of the country's strategic nuclear weapons arsenal, adding low-yield nuclear weapons to the mix could create a discrimination problem for adversary states in the event of a launch. An enemy would detect an incoming ballistic missile fired from a submarine without being able to tell whether it carried a low-yield warhead or it was the opening salvo in a massive first strike with strategic nuclear weapons. The advent of super-fuze warheads will compound the risk. Super-fuze technology dramatically enhances the effectiveness of weapons against hardened targets, such as nuclear missile silos, by optimizing a warhead's ability to home in on and detonate directly on top of its mark. Although it's currently in use only on U.S. W76 strategic nuclear warheads, the super-fuze could conceivably work for low-yield nuclear weapons as well. And because low-yield nuclear weapons are not subject to the same arms treaty restrictions that limit the number of strategic nuclear weapons a country may hold, improving their accuracy with super-fuze technology could upend the current nuclear balance. The more countries acquire low-yield nuclear weapons — much less super-fuzed warheads — the greater the potential for their use. Further complicating matters are hypersonic missiles. The missiles' high speed — at least five times the speed of sound — facilitates their rapid use and boosts their rate of survival by making them difficult to intercept. In addition, some hypersonic weapons come equipped with a glide vehicle that extends their range, enabling forces to launch the weapons from beyond an enemy's reach. These factors offer militaries great incentive to incorporate hypersonic missiles into their arsenals. As more and more countries adopt hypersonic missiles, the weapons' offensive abilities may prove destablizing. States may opt to strike first — perhaps with nuclear weapons — to take out an adversary's hypersonic missile caches before the enemy has a chance to use them. Losing Control While weapons technology is developing at a rapid clip, arms control treaties are deteriorating just as quickly. Key agreements between the United States and Russia were foundering well before Washington shifted its focus back to great power competition. The United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, and the critical Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is showing signs of considerable strain, which is bound to increase as Washington bolsters its defenses. Alarmed by the United States' growing investment in missile defense and super-fuze technology, Russia and China will try to enhance their offensive capabilities in kind. The resulting arms race would probably drive the last nail into the INF's coffin and perhaps even

jeopardize the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Beijing, meanwhile, will strive to keep its competitive edge in hypersonic weapons development in an effort to get ahead of Washington's advancing missile defense capabilities. Though the countries will try to craft new arms control agreements to accommodate their changing world, the challenges of striking a deal among three great powers with disparate strengths will get

in the way. Coupled with the fall of critical arms control regimes and the rise of disruptive weapons technology , the next great power competition could erode global stability . Tightening arms races and moribund arms control agreements

will undermine the trust between the great global powers and discourage cooperation. Instead, more discord and conflict will erupt between the United States on one side and

Russia and China on the other.

Impact---Hypersonic Weapons Hypersonic weapons are a growing threat- R. Jeffrey Smith 6/28. Pulitzer Prize and National Magazine Award-winning journalist and former foreign and national correspondent at The Washington Post. He is managing editor for national security at the Center for Public Integrity. 6-28-2019. "The Growing Threat of Hypersonic Missiles: At war." New York Times. https://search-proquest-com.proxy.library.emory.edu/docview/2248361563/8C5000EBB8CF4A7DPQ/1?accountid=10747. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

Several decades ago, when I first saw “Ran,” a 1985 film by the Japanese director Akira Kurosawa, one of its most colorful and dramatic scenes made such a deep impression on me that it crept back into my thoughts as I reported on the consequences of a new global arms race in hypersonic missiles, a competition that I described in a New York Times Magazine article published on June 23.

I became interested in learning about hypersonics, which are now under accelerating development in at least five countries, because they are unlike other weapons. Designed to fly at 10 to 20 times the speed of sound before hitting their targets with the force of tons of TNT, they are also maneuverable — two characteristics that make them hard to spot and virtually impossible to block. That means they can be used to attack quickly and early, before potential enemies can try any meaningful retaliation.

But there’s a drawback. Creating a sizable new arsenal of superfast weapons can make other nations jittery — fearful that they might be robbed of an ability to respond effectively to a major attack. If countries are armed with missiles that arrive in minutes, their leaders’ trigger fingers could become itchy, and accidental war might ensue if one or both sides see only risk from waiting to try to resolve a dispute peacefully.

This isn’t a new problem but an acceleration of one. Weapons analysts have long worried about the “use it or lose it” pressures on political leaders early in a crisis to launch ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, because an opponent’s missiles could wipe out some of those weapons in just 30 minutes. But what if the time needed to complete a pre-emptive strike on opposing forces is cut in half? Hypersonics are being designed to be launched from planes, submarines or ships and arrive at their targets in less than 15 minutes. Is that so fast that it might outstrip the ability of humans to act wisely and prevent a conflict that they would prefer to avoid?

In “Ran” — which Kurosawa once told an interviewer was partly meant to warn his audience of the dangers in a nuclear world — thesecond great battle scene graphically depicts how an accidental war might begin. Two rival sons of a warlord, each hungry for title and land, initially agree to settle their dispute. But neither is convinced that the other will remain peaceful, and they each see the other as postured to strike first. So, beneath brightly colored blue and red flags on a vast battlefield, they stumble, even against the wishes of their advisers, into a gruesome conflict.

No one knows for sure what will happen once the United States, Russia and China — or nations entangled in a regional rivalry, like India — equip themselves with sizable destructive arsenals of fast-flying missiles. The United Nations’ disarmament office has warned of heightened risks to peace. Congress last year ordered the Pentagon to produce a report by Jan. 31 on the threat ofaccidental war once hypersonics are deployed, but it hasn’t been turned over. So far, it seems, those in

charge of hypersonics have been focused on building them, not imagining the reactions they might inspire in others.

Hypersonic weapons are starting a new global arms raceR. Jeffrey Smith. Pulitzer Prize and a National Magazine Award and is managing editor for national security at the Center for Public Integrity, . 6-19-2019. "Hypersonic Missiles Are Unstoppable. And They’re Starting a New Global Arms Race.: Feature." New York Times. https://search-proquest-com.proxy.library.emory.edu/docview/2242716351/B4E98C3EEDA94C30PQ/1?accountid=10747. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

On March 6, 2018, the grand ballroom at the Sphinx Club in Washington was packed with aerospace-industry executives waiting to hear from Michael D. Griffin. Weeks earlier, Secretary of Defense James Mattis named the 69-year-old Maryland native the Pentagon’s under secretary for research and engineering, a job that comes with an annual budget of more than $17 billion. The dark-suited attendees at the McAleese/Credit Suisse Defense Programs Conference were eager to learn what type of work he would favor.

The audience was already familiar with Griffin, an unabashed defender of American military and political supremacy who has bragged about being labeled an “unreconstructed cold warrior.” With five master’s degrees and a doctorate in aerospace engineering, he was the chief technology officer for President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (popularly known as Star Wars), which was supposed to shield the United States against a potential Russian attack by ballistic missiles looping over the North Pole. Over the course of his career that followed, he wrote a book on space vehicle design, ran a technology incubator funded by the C.I.A., directed NASA for four years and was employed as a senior executive at a handful of aerospace firms.

Griffin was known as a scientific optimist who regularly called for “disruptive innovation” and who prized speed above all. He had repeatedly complained about the Pentagon’s sluggish bureaucracy, which he saw as mired in legacy thinking. “This is a country that produced an atom bomb under the stress of wartime in three years from the day we decided to do it,” he told a congressional panel last year. “This is a country that can do anything we need to do that physics allows. We just need to get on with it.”

In recent decades, Griffin’s predecessors had prioritized broad research into topics such as human-computer interaction, space communication and undersea warfare. But Griffin signaled an important shift, one that would have major financial consequences for the executives in attendance. “I’m sorry for everybody out there who champions some other high priority, some technical thing; it’s not that I disagree with those,” he told the room. “But there has to be a first, and hypersonics is my first.”

Griffin was referring to a revolutionary new type of weapon, one that would have the unprecedented ability to maneuver and then to strike almost any target in the world within a matter of minutes. Capable of traveling at more than 15 times the speed of sound, hypersonic missiles arrive at their targets in a blinding, destructive flash, before any sonic booms or other meaningful warning. So far, there are no surefire defenses. Fast, effective, precise and unstoppable — these are rare but highly desired characteristics on the modern battlefield. And the missiles are being developed not only by the United States but also by China, Russia and other countries.

Griffin is now the chief evangelist in Washington for hypersonics, and so far he has run into few political or financial roadblocks. Lawmakers have supported a significant expansion of federal spending to accelerate the delivery of what they call a “game-changing technology,” a buzz phrase often repeated in discussions on hypersonics. America needs to act quickly, says James Inhofe, the Republican senator from Oklahoma who is chairman of the Armed Services Committee, or else the nation might fall behind Russia and China. Democratic leaders in the House and Senate are largely in agreement, though recently they’ve pressed the Pentagon for more information. (The Senate Armed Services Committee ranking member Jack Reed, a Democrat from Rhode Island, and House Chairman Adam Smith, the Democratic representative for Washington’s ninth district, told me it might make sense to question the weapons’ global impact or talk with Russia about the risks they create, but the priority in Washington right now is to get our versions built.)

In 2018, Congress expressed its consensus in a law requiring that an American hypersonic weapon be operational by October 2022. This year, the Trump administration’s proposed defense budget included $2.6 billion for hypersonics, and national security industry experts project that the annual budget will reach $5 billion by the middle of the next decade. The immediate aim is to create two deployable systems within three years. Key funding is likely to be approved this summer.

The enthusiasm has spread to military contractors, especially after the Pentagon awarded the largest one, Lockheed Martin, more than $1.4 billion in 2018 to build missile prototypes that can be launched by Air Force fighter jets and B-52 bombers. These programs were just the beginning of what the acting defense secretary, Patrick M. Shanahan, described in December as the Trump administration’s goal of “industrializing” hypersonic missile production. Several months later, he and Griffin created a new Space Development Agency of some 225 people, tasked with putting a network of sensors in low-earth orbit that would track incoming hypersonic missiles and direct American hypersonic attacks. This isn’t the network’s only purpose, but it will have “a war-fighting capability, should it come to that,” Griffin said in March.

Development of hypersonics is moving so quickly, however, that it threatens to outpace any real discussion about the potential perils of such weapons, including how they may disrupt efforts to avoid accidental conflict, especially during crises. There are currently no international agreements on how or when hypersonic missiles can be used, nor are there any plans between any countries to start those discussions. Instead, the rush to possess weapons of incredible speed and maneuverability has pushed the United States into a new arms race with Russia and China — one that could, some experts worry, upend existing norms of deterrence and renew Cold War-era tensions.

Although hypersonic missiles can in theory carry nuclear warheads, those being developed by the United States will only be equipped with small conventional explosives. With a length between just five and 10 feet, weighing about 500 pounds and encased in materials like ceramic and carbon fiber composites or nickel-chromium superalloys, the missiles function like nearly invisible power drills that smash holes in their targets, to catastrophic effect. After their launch — whether from the ground, from airplanes or from submarines — they are pulled by gravity as they descend from a powered ascent, or propelled by highly advanced engines. The missiles’ kinetic energy at the time of impact, at speeds of at least 1,150 miles per hour, makes them powerful enough to penetrate any building material or armored plating with the force of three to four tons of TNT.

They could be aimed, in theory, at Russian nuclear-armed ballistic missiles being carried on trucks or rails. Or the Chinese could use their own versions of these missiles to target American bombers and other aircraft at bases in Japan or Guam. Or the missiles could attack vital land- or sea-based radars anywhere, or military headquarters in Asian ports or near European cities. The weapons could even suddenly pierce the steel decks of one of America’s 11 multibillion-dollar aircraft carriers, instantly stopping flight operations, a vulnerability that might eventually render the floating behemoths obsolete. Hypersonic missiles are also ideal for waging a decapitation strike — assassinating a country’s top military or political officials. “Instant leader-killers,” a former Obama administration White House official, who asked not to be named, said in an interview.

Within the next decade, these new weapons could undertake a task long imagined for nuclear arms: a first strike against another nation’s government or arsenals, interrupting key chains of communication and disabling some of its retaliatory forces, all without the radioactive fallout and special condemnation that might accompany the detonation of nuclear warheads. That’s why a National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine report said in 2016 that hypersonics aren’t “simply evolutionary threats” to the United States but could in the hands of enemies “challenge this nation’s tenets of global vigilance, reach and power.”

The arrival of such fast weaponry will dangerously compress the time during which military officials and their political leaders — in any country — can figure out the nature of an attack and make reasoned decisions about the wisdom and scope of defensive steps or retaliation. And the threat that hypersonics pose to retaliatory weapons creates what scholars call “use it or lose it” pressures on countries to strike first during a crisis. Experts say that the missiles could upend the grim psychology of Mutual Assured Destruction, the bedrock military doctrine of the nuclear age that argued globe-altering wars would be deterred if the potential combatants always felt certain of their opponents’ devastating response.

And yet decision makers seem to be ignoring these risks. Unlike with previous leaps in military technology — such as the creation of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with multiple nuclear warheads — that ignited international debate and eventually were controlled through superpower treaty negotiations, officials in Washington, Moscow and Beijing haven’t seriously considered any sort of accord limiting the development or deployment of hypersonic technology. In the United States, the State Department’s arms-control bureau has an office devoted to emerging security challenges, but hypersonic missiles aren’t one of its core concerns. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s deputies say they primarily support making the military’s arsenal more robust, an unusual stance for a department tasked with finding diplomatic solutions to global problems.

This position worries arms-control experts like Thomas M. Countryman, a career diplomat for 35 years and former assistant secretary of state in the Obama administration. “This is not the first case of a new technology proceeding through research, development and deployment far faster than the policy apparatus can keep up,” says Countryman, who is now chairman of the Arms Control Association. He cites examples of similarly “destabilizing technologies” in the 1960s and 1970s, when billions of dollars in frenzied spending on nuclear and chemical arms was unaccompanied by discussion of how the resulting dangers could be minimized. Countryman wants to see limitations placed on the number of hypersonic missiles that a country can build or on the type of warheads that they can carry. He and others worry that failing to regulate these weapons at the international level could have irreversible consequences.

“It is possible,” the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs said in a February report, that “in response [to] the deployment of hypersonic weapons,” nations fearing the destruction of their retaliatory-strike capability might either decide to use nuclear weapons under a wider set of conditions or simply place “nuclear forces on higher alert levels” as a matter of routine. The report lamented that these “ramifications remain largely unexamined and almost wholly undiscussed.”

So why haven’t the potential risks of this revolution attracted more attention? One reason is that for years the big powers have cared mostly about numerical measures of power — who has more warheads, bombers and missiles — and negotiations have focused heavily on those metrics. Only occasionally has their conversation widened to include the issue of strategic stability, a topic that encompasses whether specific weaponry poses risks of inadvertent war.

An aerospace engineer for the military for more than three decades, Daniel Marren runs one of the world’s fastest wind tunnels — and thanks to hypersonics research, his lab is in high demand. But finding it takes some time: When I arrived at the Air Force’s White Oak testing facility, just north of Silver Spring, Md., the private security guards only vaguely gestured toward some World War II-era military research buildings down the road, at the edge of the Food and Drug Administration’s main campus. The low-slung structure that houses Marren’s tunnel looks as if it could pass for an aged elementary school, except that it has a seven-story silver sphere sticking out of its east side, like a World’s Fair exhibit in the spot where an auditorium should be. The tunnel itself, some 40 feet in length and five feet in diameter, looks like a water main; it narrows at one end before emptying into the silver sphere. A column of costly high-tech sensors is grafted onto the piping where a thick window has been cut into its midsection.

Marren seemed both thrilled and harried by the rising tempo at his laboratory in recent months. A jovial 55-year-old who speaks carefully but excitedly about his work, he showed me a red brick structure on the property with some broken windows. It was built, he said, to house the first of nine wind tunnels that have operated at the test site, one that was painstakingly recovered in 1948 from Peenemünde, the coastal German village where Wernher von Braun worked on the V-2 rocket used to kill thousands of Londoners in World War II. American military researchers had a hard time figuring out how to reassemble and operate it, so they recruited some German scientists stateside.

As we entered the control room of the building that houses the active tunnel, Marren mentioned casually that the roof was specially designed to blow off easily if anything goes explosively awry. Any debris would head skyward, and the engineers, analysts and visiting Air Force generals monitoring the wind tests could survive behind the control room’s reinforced-concrete walls.

Inside the main room, Marren — dressed in a technologist’s polo shirt — explained that during the tests, the tunnel is first rolled into place on a trolley over steel rails in the floor. Then an enormous electric burner is ignited beneath it, heating the air inside to more than 3,000 degrees, hot enough to melt steel. The air is then punched by pressures 1,000 times greater than normal at one end of the tunnel and sucked at the other end by a vacuum deliberately created in the enormous sphere.

That sends the air roaring down the tunnel at up to 18 times the speed of sound — fast enough to traverse more than 30 football fields in the time it takes to blink. Smack in the middle of the tunnel during a test, attached to a pole capable of changing its angle in fractions of a second, is a scale model of the hypersonics prototype. That is, instead of testing the missiles by flying them through the air outdoors, the tunnel effectively makes the air fly past them at the same incredible pace.

For the tests, the models are coated with a paint that absorbs ultraviolet laser light as it warms, marking the spots on their ceramic skin where frictional heat may threaten the structure of the missile; engineers will then need to tweak the designs either to resist that heat or shunt it elsewhere. The aim, Marren explains, is to see what will happen when the missiles plow through the earth’s dense atmosphere on their way to their targets.

It’s challenging work, replicating the stresses these missiles would endure while whizzing by at 30 times the speed of a civilian airliner, miles above the clouds. Their sleek, synthetic skin expands and deforms and kicks off a plasma like the ionized gas formed by superheated stars, as they smash the air and try to shed all that intense heat. The tests are fleeting, lasting 15 seconds at most, which require the sensors to record their data in thousandths of a nanosecond. That’s the best any such test facility can do, according to Marren, and it partly accounts for the difficulty that defense researchers have had in producing hypersonics, even after about $2 billion-worth of federal investment before this year.

Nonetheless, Marren, who has worked at the tunnel since 1984, is optimistic that researchers will be able to deliver a working missilesoon. He and his team are operating at full capacity, with hundreds of test runs scheduled this year to measure the ability of various prototype missiles to withstand the punishing friction and heat of such rapid flight. “We have been prepared for this moment for some time, and it’s great to lean forward,” Marren says. The faster that weapons systems can operate, he adds, the better.

Last year, the nation was confronted with a brief reminder of how Cold War-era nuclear panic played out, after a state employee in Hawaii mistakenly sent out an emergency alert declaring that a “ballistic missile threat” was “inbound.” The message didn’t specify what kind of missile — and, in fact, the United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command at two sites in Alaska and California may have some capability to shoot down a few incoming ballistic missiles — but panicked Hawaii residents didn’t feel protected. They reacted by careening cars into one another on highways, pushing their children into storm drains for protection and phoning their loved ones to say goodbye — until a second message, 38 minutes later, acknowledged it was an error.

Hypersonics pose a different threat from ballistic missiles, according to those who have studied and worked on them, because they could be maneuvered in ways that confound existing methods of defense and detection. Not to mention, unlike most ballistic missiles, they would arrive in under 15 minutes — less time than anyone in Hawaii or elsewhere would need to meaningfully react.

How fast is that, really? An object moving through the air produces an audible shock wave — a sonic boom — when it reaches about 760 miles per hour. This speed of sound is also called Mach 1, after the Austrian physicist Ernst Mach. When a projectile flies faster than Mach’s number, it travels at supersonic speed — a speed faster than sound. Mach 2 is twice the speed of sound; Mach 3 is three times the speed of sound, and so on. When a projectile reaches a speed faster than Mach 5, it’s said to travel at hypersonic speed.

One of the two main hypersonic prototypes now under development in the United States is meant to fly at speeds between Mach 15 and Mach 20, or more than 11,400 miles per hour. This means that when fired by the U.S. submarines or bombers stationed at Guam, they could in theory hit China’s important inland missile bases, like Delingha, in less than 15 minutes. President Vladimir Putin has likewise claimed that one of Russia’s new hypersonic missiles will travel at Mach 10, while the other will travel at Mach

20. If true, that would mean a Russian aircraft or ship firing one of them near Bermuda could strike the Pentagon, some 800 miles away, in five minutes. China, meanwhile, has flight-tested its own hypersonic missiles at speeds fast enough to reach Guam from the Chinese coastline within minutes.

One concept now being pursued by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency uses a conventional missile launched from air platforms to loft a smaller, hypersonic glider on its journey, even before the missile reaches its apex. The glider then flies unpowered toward its target. The deadly projectile might ricochet downward, nose tilted up, on layers of atmosphere — the mesosphere, then the stratosphere and troposphere — like an oblate stone on water, in smaller and shallower skips, or it might be directed to pass smoothly through these layers. In either instance, the friction of the lower atmosphere would finally slow it enough to allow a steering system to maneuver it precisely toward its target. The weapon, known as Tactical Boost Glide, is scheduled to be dropped from military planes during testing next year.

Under an alternative approach, a hypersonic missile would fly mostly horizontally under the power of a “scramjet,” a highly advanced, fanless engine that uses shock waves created by its speed to compress incoming air in a short funnel and ignite it while passing by (in roughly one two-thousandths of a second, according to some accounts). With its skin heated by friction to as much as 5,400 degrees, its engine walls would be protected from burning up by routing the fuel through them, an idea pioneered by the German designers of the V-2 rocket.

The unusual trajectories of these missiles would allow them to approach their targets at roughly 12 to 50 miles above the earth’s surface. That’s below the altitude at which ballistic missile interceptors — such as the costly American Aegis ship-based system and the Thaad ground-based system — are now designed to typically operate, yet above the altitude that simpler air defense missiles, like the Patriot system, can reach.

Officials will have trouble even knowing where a strike would land. Although the missiles’ launch would probably be picked up by infrared-sensing satellites in its first few moments of flight, Griffin says they would be roughly 10 to 20 times harder to detect than incoming ballistic missiles as they near their targets. They would zoom along in the defensive void, maneuvering unpredictably, and then, in just a few final seconds of blindingly fast, mile-per-second flight, dive and strike a target such as an aircraft carrier from an altitude of 100,000 feet.

During their flight, the perimeter of their potential landing zone could be about as big as Rhode Island. Officials might sound a general alarm, but they’d be clueless about exactly where the missiles were headed. “We don’t have any defense that could deny the employment of such a weapon against us,” Gen. John E. Hyten, commander of United States Strategic Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2018. The Pentagon is just now studying what a hypersonic attack might look like and imagining how a defensive system might be created; it has no architecture for it, and no firm sense of the costs.

Developing these new weapons hasn’t been easy. A 2012 test was terminated when the skin peeled off a hypersonic prototype, and another self-destructed when it lost control. A third hypersonic test vehicle was deliberately destroyed when its boosting missilefailed in 2014. Officials at Darpa acknowledge

they are still struggling with the composite ceramics they need to protect the missiles’ electronics from intense heating; the Pentagon decided last July to ladle an extra $34.5 million into this effort this year.

The task of conducting realistic flight tests also poses a challenge. The military’s principal land-based site for open-air prototype flights — a 3,200-square-mile site stretching across multiple counties in New Mexico — isn’t big enough to accommodate hypersonicweapons. So fresh testing corridors are being negotiated in Utah that will require a new regional political agreement about the noise of trailing sonic booms. Scientists still aren’t sure how to accumulate all the data they need, given the speed of the flights. The open-air flight tests can cost up to $100 million.

The most recent open-air hypersonic-weapon test was completed by the Army and the Navy in October 2017, using a 36,000-pound missile to launch a glider from a rocky beach on the western shores of Kauai, Hawaii, toward Kwajalein Atoll, 2,300 miles to the southwest. The 9 p.m. flight created a trailing sonic boom over the Pacific, which topped out at an estimated 175 decibels, well above the threshold of causing physical pain. The effort cost $160 million, or 6 percent of the total hypersonics budget proposed for 2020.

In March 2018, Vladimir Putin, in the first of several speeches designed to rekindle American anxieties about a foreign missile threat, boasted that Russia had two operational hypersonic weapons: the Kinzhal, a fast, air-launched missile capable of striking targets up to 1,200 miles away; and the Avangard, designed to be attached to a new Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile before maneuvering toward its targets. Russian media have claimed that nuclear warheads for the weapons are already being produced and that the Sarmat missile itself has been flight-tested roughly 3,000 miles across Siberia. (Russia has also said it is working on a third hypersonic missile system, designed to be launched from submarines.) American experts aren’t buying all of Putin’s claims. “Their test record is more like ours,” said an engineer working on the American program. “It’s had a small number of flight-test successes.” But Pentagon officials are convinced that Moscow’s weapons will soon be a real threat.

Analysts say the Chinese are even further along than the Russians, partly because Beijing has sought to create hypersonic missileswith shorter ranges that don’t have to endure high temperatures as long. Many of their tests have involved a glide vehicle. Last August, a contractor for the Chinese space program claimed that it successfully flight-tested a gliding hypersonic missile for slightly more than six minutes. It supposedly reached a speed exceeding Mach 5 before landing in its target zone. Other Chinese hypersonicmissile tests have reached speeds almost twice as fast.

And it’s not just Russia, China and the United States that are interested in fast-flying military power drills. France and India have active hypersonics development programs, and each is working in partnership with Russia, according to a 2017 report by the Rand Corp., a nonpartisan research organization. Australia, Japan and the European Union have either civilian or military hypersonics research underway, the report said, partly because they are still tantalized by the prospect of making super-speedy airplanes large enough to carry passengers across the globe in mere hours. But Japan’s immediate effort is aimed at making a weapon that will be ready for testing by 2025.

This is not the first time the United States or others have ignored risks while rushing toward a new, apparently magical solution to a military threat or shortcoming. During the Cold War, America and Russia competed fiercely to threaten each other’s vital assets with bombers that took hours to cross oceans and with ballistic missiles that could reach their targets in 30 minutes. Ultimately, each side

accumulated more than 31,000 warheads (even though the detonations of just 100 weapons would have sparked a severe global famine and stripped away significant protections against ultraviolet radiation). Eventually the fever broke, partly because of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, and the two nations reduced their arsenals through negotiations to about 6,500 nuclear warheads apiece.

Since then, cycles of intense arms racing have restarted whenever one side has felt acutely disadvantaged or spied a potential exit from what the political scientist Robert Jervis once described as the “overwhelming nature” of nuclear destruction, a circumstance that we’ve been involuntarily and resentfully hostage to for the past 70 years.

Trump officials in particular have resisted policies that support Mutual Assured Destruction, the idea that shared risk can lead to stability and peace. John Bolton, the national security adviser, was a key architect in 2002 of America’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia, which limited both nations’ ability to try to block ballistic missiles. He asserted that freeing the United States of those restrictions would enhance American security, and if the rest of the world was static, his prediction might have come true. But Russia started its hypersonics program to ensure it could get around any American ballistic missile defenses. “Nobody wanted to listen to us” about the strategic dangers of abandoning the treaty, Putin said last year with an aggressive flourish as he displayed videos and animations of his nation’s hypersonic missiles. “So listen now.”

But not much listening is going on in either country. In January, the Trump administration released an updated missile-defense strategy that explicitly calls for limiting mutual vulnerability by defeating enemy “offensive missiles prior to launch.” The administration also continues to eschew any new limits on its own missiles, arguing that past agreements lulled America into a dangerous post-Cold War “holiday,” as a senior State Department official described it.

The current administration’s lack of interest in regulating hypersonics isn’t that different from its predecessor’s. Around 2010, President Obama privately “made it clear that he wanted better options to hold North Korean missiles” at risk, a former senior adviser said, and some military officials said hypersonic weapons might be suitable for this. About that same time, the most recent nuclear arms reduction agreement with Russia deliberately excluded any constraints on hypersonic weapons. Then, three years ago, a New York-based group called the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, acting in conjunction with other nonprofits committed to disarmament, called on the president to head off a hypersonic competition and its anticipated drain on future federal budgets by exploring a joint moratorium with China and Russia on testing. The idea was never taken up.

The Obama administration’s inaction helped open the door to the 21st-century hypersonic contest America finds itself in today. “We always do these things in isolation, without thinking about what it means for the big powers — for Russia and China — who are batshit paranoid” about a potential quick, pre-emptive American attack, the adviser said, expressing regret about how the issue was handled during Obama’s tenure.

While it might not be too late to change course, history shows that stopping an arms race is much harder than igniting one. And Washington at the moment is still principally focused on “putting a weapon on a target,” as a longtime congressional staff member put it, rather than the reaction this capability inspires in an adversary. Griffin even projects an eventual American victory in this race: In April 2018, he said the best answer to the Chinese and Russian hypersonic programs is “to hold their

assets at risk with systems similar to but better than what they have fielded.” Invoking the mantra of military scientists throughout time, Griffin added that the country must “see their hand and raise them one.” The world will soon find out what happens now that the military superpowers have decided to go all in.

Hypersonic weapons risk global destabilization---future arms control agreements are key to prevent global conflict Kingston Reif 18. Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association, where his work focuses on nuclear disarmament, deterrence, and arms control, preventing nuclear terrorism, missile defense, and the defense budget. 2018. "Hypersonic Advances Spark Concern." Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-01/news/hypersonic-advances-spark-concern. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

The Defense Department in the fall conducted its latest test of a hypersonic missile, a new type of high-speed weapon that potentially holds great military promise but also great peril as the United States and other nations seeking to exploit the dizzying pace of technological advances . Although it could be a decade before hypersonic weapons are ready for use, U.S.

military planners and contractors salivate over the prospect they could provide a game-changing military advantage. But other nations, including other nuclear-armed powers, are developing similar capabilities as they seek to counter more than 25 years of U.S. post-Cold War military dominance. The pursuit of this emerging technology is drawing warnings that it could lead to new escalation dangers in a conflict, including to the nuclear level , and

that interested countries are not giving enough attention to the potential for a dangerous arms race and increased risks of instability . To further complicate matters, hypersonic missiles could provide a new means of delivery for nuclear warheads. Unique capabilities make hypersonic weapons more difficult to defend against than legacy missiles and “further compress the timelines for a response by a nation under attack,” according to a major 2017 Rand Corp. report, “Hypersonic Missile

Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons.” There is “probably less than a decade available to hinder the proliferation process ,” the report says. Hypersonic missiles can travel at approximately 5,000 to 25,000 kilometers per hour, or 1 to 5 miles per second. They can change

their trajectories during flight and fly at odd altitudes. The flight altitude and maneuverability result in less warning time than in the case of higher-flying ballistic missiles. Any effort to thwart such systems would be “challenging to the best missile defenses now envisioned,” according to the Rand report. Two types of hypersonic missiles are currently under development. A hypersonic boost-glide vehicle is fired by rockets into space and then released to fly to its target along the upper atmosphere. Unlike ballistic missiles, a boost-glide vehicle flies at a lower altitude and can change its intended target and trajectory repeatedly during its flight. The second type, a hypersonic cruise missile, is powered through its entire flight by advanced rockets or

high-speed jet engines. It is a faster version of existing cruise missiles. The United States, China, and Russia are leading the emerging race in the development of hypersonic weapons, but they are not the only countries engaged in research and development on the technology or that might seek to acquire it. In 2003, Washington began formally pursuing options to quickly strike high-value targets with conventional weapons anywhere on the globe at the outset of or during a conflict. The effort has become known as conventional prompt strike. Supporters inside and outside of government put forward several rationales for this mission, including countering increasingly sophisticated air and missile defense systems, destroying rogue-state nuclear forces, and targeting terrorists. The United States conducted its first successful flight test of a boost-glide weapon in 2011, when the Army’s Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) flew for 2,400 miles from Hawaii to the Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. On Oct. 30, 2017, the Navy conducted a $160 million test in the Pacific of a modified version of the AHW that could be deployed atop missiles on Virginia- or Ohio-class submarines. Additional program flight tests are planned in 2020 and 2022. The Defense Department has spent a total of $1.2 billion on its prompt-strike program. It requested $202 million for the program in its fiscal year 2018 budget request published in May, including $197 million for the AHW. China and Russia have not sat idle. The two countries appear to be developing the technology in part to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. Since 2014, China has conducted at least seven tests of a hypersonic glide vehicle, which U.S defense officials call the WU-14. It is believed to have conducted one or two tests of a hypersonic cruise missile. In addition, The Diplomat reported in December that China in November conducted two flight tests of a new, medium-range glide vehicle, dubbed the DF-17, that is intended for operational deployment as early as 2020. Russia has repeatedly expressed concern that U.S. prompt-strike efforts could threaten the survivability of Moscow’s nuclear deterrent. Russia is engaged in its own work on hypersonic missiles, notably the Tsirkon, or Zircon,

hypersonic cruise missile. It is uncertain whether China and Russia are developing hypersonic weapons to deliver nuclear or conventional weapons. After the United States, China, and Russia, the two governments that have made the most progress on hypersonic technology are France and India. Both are pursuing hypersonic cruise missile options. Australia, Japan, and the European Union are also pursuing research and development programs in

hypersonic technology. The most highlighted risk to strategic stability posed by hypersonic or other prompt-strike weapons armed with conventional warheads is that they

could be mistaken for nuclear weapons. This could trigger a nuclear-armed country, targeted by such a conventional attack, to launch its nuclear weapons in response. But there are arguably more significant stability concerns. For example, the deployment by nuclear-armed states

of conventional hypersonic missiles could pose a threat to the survivability of their nuclear forces and potentially reduce the available response time. By increasing fears of

a disarming attack, a threatened state could take steps that would increase crisis instability, such as increasing the readiness of its nuclear forces or adopting a policy of pre-emption. Chinese and Russian officials and analysts

have expressed concerns about this type of scenario. Further, the advent of hypersonic weapons could increase the growing risks of inadvertent escalation related to the “entanglement” of non-nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons and their supporting capabilities, such as command-and-control functions. Given that the actual targets of a hypersonic

missile attack might not be apparent until the last minutes of flight, a state could misattribute an attack aimed at its conventional forces as an attack against its nuclear forces nearby. The proliferation of hypersonic weapons beyond the United States, China, and Russia could exacerbate stability concerns . The Rand study noted that the spread of the weapons “could result in lesser powers setting their strategic forces on hair-trigger states of readiness and

more credibly being able to threaten attacks on major powers.” Experts concerned about the risks to stability have proposed ideas to mitigate them. For instance, as a unilateral step, countries developing these missiles could make escalation risks a key factor in the decision about whether to acquire and deploy the weapons. James Acton, co-director of the nuclear policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told Arms Control Today in a Dec. 21 interview that the U.S. hypersonic program is technology driven and the Pentagon has not adequately

explained why it needs such a capability or assessed the benefits, risks, and costs. Cooperative steps also could be pursued, although progress does not appear likely in the near term given tensions among the major powers. As one idea, the United States could initiate separate dialogues with China and Russia on stability and escalation

concerns and on developing confidence-building measures. Such measures could include data exchanges on hypersonic deployment and acquisition plans. In addition, the three countries could agree to multilateral export controls to restrain the proliferation of hypersonic technology. More far-reaching measures could also be contemplated. In a report published last November by the Carnegie Endowment, Russian scholars Alexey Arbatov, Vladimir

Dvorkin, and Petr Topychkanov urged the inclusion of intercontinental boost-glide systems under the central limits of a successor to the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New

START). Some analysts have called for enacting a moratorium on hypersonic testing and eventually establishing a test ban treaty. Mark Gubrud, a physicist and adjunct assistant professor in the peace, war, and defense curriculum at the University of North Carolina, has written that a test ban would be “a simple, risk-free, and highly verifiable way” to avoid “a new round of an old arms race.”

New arms control agreements are key to solve threat escalation and nuclear first strike Omar Lamrani 18. Senior Military Analyst. 2-20-2018. "An Arms Race Toward Global Instability." Stratfor. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/arms-race-toward-global-instability. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

Further complicating matters are hypersonic missiles. The missiles' high speed — at least five times the speed of sound — facilitates their rapid use and

boosts their rate of survival by making them difficult to intercept. In addition, some hypersonic weapons come equipped with a glide vehicle that extends their range, enabling forces to launch the weapons from beyond an enemy's reach. These factors offer militaries great incentive to incorporate hypersonic missiles into their arsenals. As more and more countries adopt hypersonic missiles, the weapons' offensive abilities may prove destablizing . States may opt to strike first — perhaps with nuclear weapons — to take out an adversary's hypersonic missile caches before the enemy has a chance to use them. Losing Control While weapons technology is developing at a rapid clip,

arms control treaties are deteriorating just as quickly. Key agreements between the United States and Russia were foundering well

before Washington shifted its focus back to great power competition. The United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, and the critical Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is showing signs of considerable strain, which is bound to increase as Washington bolsters its defenses. Alarmed by the United States' growing investment in missile defense

and super-fuze technology, Russia and China will try to enhance their offensive capabilities in kind. The resulting arms race would probably

drive the last nail into the INF's coffin and perhaps even jeopardize the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Beijing, meanwhile, will strive to keep its competitive edge in hypersonic weapons development in an effort to get ahead of Washington's advancing missile defense capabilities. Though the countries will try to craft new arms control agreements to accommodate their changing world , the challenges of striking a deal among three great powers with disparate strengths will get in the way. Coupled with the fall of critical arms control regimes and the rise of disruptive weapons technology, the next great power competition could erode global stability . Tightening arms races and moribund arms

control agreements will undermine the trust between the great global powers and discourage cooperation. Instead, more discord and conflict will erupt between the United States on one side and Russia and China on the other.

Hypersonic weapons cause nuclear war---arms control are key to reduce tensions Lyle J. Goldstein 19. Research professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the Naval War College. The founding director of CMSI and author of dozens of articles on Chinese security policy, he focuses on Chinese undersea warfare. 3-3-2019. "Hypersonics Are Speeding up Great Power Competition." National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/hypersonics-are-speeding-great-power-competition-45887. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

Almost every day now, the New York Times comes out with a new front page article about China. The Middle Kingdom is simultaneously plundering the developing world, oppressing internal minorities, and hacking American companies. The Chinese economy is said to be in dire straits due to vast mismanagement , and the country is generally portrayed as on the brink of total meltdown. The editorial staff is fascinated by China’s shortcomings and appears to be intent on stoking the “New Cold War” by painting Beijing as the capital of the new “Evil Empire.” Such a torrent of reproach may have the impact of making the American public burn red hot with Sino-phobic zeal or alternatively causing its readership to chortle derisively at China’s pathetic plight. Yet the paper “of record” is remarkably oblivious to the actual nature of the shifting military balance in the Asia-Pacific. Is it not highly irresponsible of journalists to promote grave tensions between Washington and Beijing without any knowledge of the ghastly consequences that might well flow from those frictions? Any student of U.S. history knows that the scourge of “yellow journalism” played a major role in setting off the Spanish-American War just over a century ago (giving America possession of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, Hawaii and Cuba in the rather unseemly process). The consequences of a war between China and America would, after all, look nothing like Washington’s long-forgotten adventure with Madrid, and might instead mark the end of life on Earth. Keeping that stark fact in mind, one wonders why the New York Times has never bothered to look into China’s rapid development of hypersonic weaponry. At a minimum,

there should be an acknowledgment in that paper and similarly influential media that China is deploying or on the cusp of deploying a hypersonic weapon

( DF-17), joining Russia in possessing that novel capability. It is worth emphasizing that, despite ample research in this area, the United States is yet to field any equivalent military capability. It may be true that “Hypersonic threats do not require hypersonic responses,” but the argument that

these weapons are not significant is not persuasive. This article seeks to make a small contribution against this evident paucity of focus in China defense coverage by summarizing a couple of recent pieces from the Chinese defense press. It is no exaggeration to say that the Chinese-language defense press publishes hundreds of articles (and likely more) per year on the subject of hypersonic weapons development, so there is really no excuse for ignorance on this matter. The first Chinese article to examine is a piece from the Chinese Navy’s official magazine Navy Today [当代海军] from late 2018 (October). While its focus is on the new Russian Kinzhal [匕首] air-launched hypersonic weapon, the piece is potentially revealing regarding China’s ambition to employ hypersonic weapons within the context of naval warfare. Indeed, the headline suggests a certain admiration for Moscow’s determination to wield such weapons against U.S. Navy aircraft carrier groups. The Chinese Navy analyst notes that Russian naval aviation was looking to upgrade since current strike weapons could “only” attain speeds of Mach 3, “affording the US Navy 12-15 seconds of time to prepare the defense [留给美海军 12至 15分种的防御准备时间].” Kinzhal is assessed to provide Russian strike aviation with a Mach 10 weapon out to a range of 2000km. It is noted that certain Russian aircraft (e.g., the Mig-29 and Su-57) are likely not able to heft this weapon at the requisite launch speeds. But, in addition to the Mig-31 used in the Russian tests of Kinzhal, this analysis suggests that the Russian Tu-22M3 bomber will be capable of slinging four of these missiles. The Chinese analysis concludes that the U.S. Navy carrier group’s standard F-18 interceptors will be “outsticked” by the combination of Tu-22 together with the Kinzhal weapon. Similarly, this article suggests that Kinzhal will not be stopped by either SM-6 missile interceptors or close-in weapons systems, noting that the fire control radar simply does not have adequate time to acquire the target. Even if one Kinzhal cannot sink a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, the Chinese Navy author assesses, the carrier would “undoubtedly lose combat capability [失去战斗力是毫无问题的].” And it’s quite clear, moreover, that Beijing is working toward a similar capability if it does not already exist. Indeed, a late fall 2018 issue (no. 18) of Modern Ships [现代舰船] reporting on one of China’s most recent successful hypersonic

tests, concluded that China’s development process with hypersonics now enables Beijing to plan for, not only long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles, but also hypersonics launched from submarines and bombers. These weapons would include both nuclear and “conventional warheads for sea attack [对海攻击常规斗部].” According to this analysis, such weapons will enable ranges well beyond what was previously conceivable. Most critically, this Chinese analysis notes that hypersonic weapons will allow for literally “change-fire-area attack [变射面打击].” That is to say that a warhead “‘riding’ the shock wave [‘骑’在激波]” can not only hit a vast domain of targets, but will also be “much harder to intercept [更难拦截].” The vehicle test platform photo was widely exhibited in the Chinese press, and its parameters were also published openly. Yet, there was hardly any coverage in the major Western news outlets, which remain infinitely more interested in the activities of Confucius Institutes on American campuses than Chinese weaponry innovations that could kill thousands of young Americans in seconds on the modern battlefield. Upon news of this test, one Chinese commentator is quoted as offering: “… the day that such a thing is used is likely when humanity has already embarked on the contest of the apocalypse [这东西使用的那天,人类大概已经过上未日生存游戏了].” It’s actually somewhat reassuring to conceptualize these

weapons in that way, of course. They are so terrible that they could never be used, right? Maybe. Unfortunately, there is the troubling side branch of nuclear strategy that

dwells on the so-called “ stability instability paradox .” In a word, that means that nuclear powers might still fight nasty conventional wars that come just up to the line of nuclear conflict (even though nobody knows where that line actually is).

Such circumstances raise the troubling possibility that China and Russia are exploring capabilities that go well beyond the much-discussed “gray zone,” but rather seek to dominate in the potentially decisive middle rungs of military conflict. Such steps will keep U.S. strategists plenty busy in the coming decades, but also suggest the need for new paradigms in arms control to reign in this high-tech military competition that is

gaining momentum each day in the “New Cold War.” Journalists, including especially colleagues at the New York Times, should reflect on their own responsibility for raising great power tensions to exceedingly high levels without reporting the other side of the story in a balanced way. Most importantly, Washington decision-makers need to exercise studied restraint in a

variety of tense situations, for example with respect to both Ukraine and also Taiwan. Both scenarios could quite easily detonate a third world war in the anxious era of hypersonic weaponry.

Impact---AT: U.S. Wins Hypersonic weapons development is inevitable BUT arms control solves John L. Dolan et al. 19., Richard K. Gallagher, and David L. Mann. Stellar Advisors at Stellar Solutions, Inc. *Former Lt. General, U.S. Air Force (Retired) is the former Director for Operations (DJ-3), the Joint Staff, Pentagon. **VADM, U.S. Navy (Retired) is the former Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command and the US Military Representative to NATO. ***Former Lt. General, U.S. Army (Retired), is the former Commanding General, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. 5-15-2019. "Hypersonic Weapons Are Literally Unstoppable (As in America Can't Stop Them)." National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-literally-unstoppable-america-cant-stop-them-57642. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

As evidenced by numerous media accounts and Department of Defense (DoD) senior leaders’ comments, the impact and challenges posed by hypersonic missile systems are a growing and extremely complex threat to our national interests. Hypersonic weapons are highly maneuverable, travel many times the speed of sound, and allow for the destruction of targets anywhere in the world in less than an hour. Potential targets range from leaders of terrorist organizations to a nation’s critical command and control facilities. In March 2018, General John Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “We [U.S.] don’t have any defense that could deny the employment of such a weapon [hypersonic missiles] against us.”

During a recent Hypersonics Senior Leader Executive Forum, Dr. Michael Griffin, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering further stated…“In the last year, China has tested more hypersonic weapons than we have in a decade…If Russia were to invade Estonia or China were to attack Taiwan tomorrow, it would be difficult to defend against their strike assets”. The recently released Missile Defense Review acknowledges the threat associated with hypersonic technology and highlights the need for a space sensor layer to track weapons through all phases of flight. Currently, 23 Nations have demonstrated varying degrees of expertise in hypersonic technology…a number that continues to grow daily.

Current Activities

In response to this evolving technology, DoD and specifically, the Services are developing various programs under an effort known as Prompt Global Strike. According to Acting Secretary of Defense, Patrick Shanahan, “This is really about industrialization, not about science." Dr. Griffin further expands on this point stating, “It is an effort to get these systems into the field in the thousands…we are going to have to create a new industrial base for these systems.” The Pentagon's 2019 budget reflects the department's growing interest and concern, with approximately $2 billion expected to be allocated during the current fiscal year. In addition, the funding for key hypersonic programs has also increased from $201 million in 2018 to $278 million in 2019.

The Services are approaching Prompt Global Strike in a variety of ways. The Navy conducted its own hypersonic test during a summer 2018 wargame near Hawaii. In the test, a destroyer fired hypervelocity projectiles featuring fins and a radar guidance system to address targets traveling at hypersonic speeds. In theory, these hypervelocity projectiles could potentially target ships, ground targets, aircraft, and even incoming missiles. In April 2018, the Air Force awarded work on the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon under a contract valued at $928 million. This was followed by a successful bid to develop the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon. Army efforts are focused on the Alternate Re-Entry System, which is essentially a maneuverable warhead that could be launched from Air Force bombers, Navy

vessels, and Army launchers. The Army has been involved in hypersonic technology for several years. In November 2011, the Army's Space and Missile Defense Command successfully launched an Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) from the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Kauai, Hawaii to the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site at the Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands.

In addition, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in conjunction with industry partners is working on a hypersonic tactical boost-glide weapon. The defense industry is also involved in DARPA's Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept competition and possibly developing a sea-launched boost-glide capability for the Navy.

It is also important to highlight the offensive and defensive aspects of hypersonic weapons. On the one hand, this technology provides a nation with the ability to quickly strike time-sensitive targets at great range. On the other hand, it presents many challenges defending critical assets from incoming hypersonic weapons. From a deterrence standpoint, hypersonic weapons have value when incorporating both offensive and defensive capabilities. Potential adversaries will likely think twice before employing hypersonic weapons against a nation that possesses both a credible defense and the ability to respond offensively.

Currently, much of DoD's funding for hypersonic weapons is going toward precision strike or offensive weapons, as opposed to missile defense programs. According to Mike White, the Pentagon's assistant director for hypersonics, "If you look at the portfolio and the time phasing on the portfolio, we are stepping out first on the offensive side as we study and assess the path forward to get a robust defensive strategy." Part of the reason is that offensive systems are technically easier and cheaper to develop. According to Bill LaPlante, senior vice president at MITRE, "The defense, in general, is getting harder and more expensive than the offense."

Hypersonic Imperatives

The challenges of defending against hypersonic weapons have been discussed in many academic and defense industry forums, as well as in media coverage. The impact of speed, extreme altitude changes, and maneuverability especially during the final phase of flight, present both offensive opportunities and defensive obstacles. From a missile defense perspective, the lack of a "universal" interceptor to address the myriad flight profiles highlights the challenges associated with hypersonic weapons. To address this threat in a sustained and cost-informed manner, agreement on hypersonic imperatives must be achieved. To meet the services' multi-domain requirements, the following imperatives must be considered from a joint missile defense perspective.

The need for a "space sensor layer," now known as the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS), is viewed by many as one of the most immediate and critical requirements to address hypersonic threats. Given the limitations of line-of-sight terrestrial sensors, defense department leaders have frequently lamented the challenges of tracking threat vehicles through all phases of flight. Currently, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and other organizations are actively engaged in HBTSS's concept design phase to detect and track emerging (and evolving) threats using persistent infrared sensors. On-orbit sensor options, like HBTSS, will significantly enhance our engagement opportunities and probabilities of success. Additionally, future architectures must include the integration of both space-based and terrestrial sensors to permit on-orbit track processing, while reducing reliance on

ground stations and the associated time implications. Finally, the timely "reseeding" of on-orbit assets will be critical to achieving the necessary levels of resilience and redundancy.

Our current fleet of joint interceptors are limited in range, altitude, and the ability to defeat evolving threat systems. In fact, the majority of our current interceptors are primarily focused on the terminal phase of flight. Only the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Interceptor (GBI) and to a limited degree, the AEGIS Standard Missile interceptor provide mid-course defense opportunities. Although a “universal interceptor” may be cost prohibitive or currently technologically unfeasible, two or three interceptor classes could be upgraded to cover potential gaps as an interim solution. In addition, DOD must leverage promising kinetic and non-kinetic options to address the ever-creasing advances in hypersonic technology. For example, the linking or “talking” of future interceptors to on-orbit sensors (and other interceptors) will significantly enhance our ability to defeat new and sophisticated threat systems. This expanded capability will also assist in addressing many of the services’ multi-domain challenges.

The development of an effective and responsive Battle Management Command, Control, and Communication and Intelligence (BMC3I) system has long been the goal of the air and missile defense community. BMC3I allows the warfighter to plan, execute, control, and sustain combat operations, especially in response to complex environments (e.g., raids of threat missile systems). Given the speed, maneuverability, and the unpredictable nature of hypersonic weapons, current BMC3I systems are likely to be quickly overwhelmed. In response to these challenges, changes are required to shorten response times by exploiting autonomous BMC3I activities. Again, our BMC3I systems must be capable of processing and directing engagements more quickly than our current C2 ground station construct. Ideally, the goal is to achieve an effective layered defense while minimizing gaps in coverage and providing opportunities for re-tasking of incoming targets (e.g., Shoot, Assess, Shoot).

Related to BMC3I is the issue of integration or the assimilation of sensors and shooters to optimize the capabilities of individual AMD systems. The introduction of hypersonic weapons further accentuates the need to fully exploit the capabilities of our current and future missile defense systems. Any discussion of integration must also include non-kinetic options like directed energy (DE), cyber, and electronic warfare (EW) that expand our ability to attack threat systems in all phases of flight, especially during the boost phase. In addition to potential cost savings, non-kinetic options have been successfully tested at White Sands Missile Range against unmanned aerial vehicles and indirect fire munitions. The Navy has incorporated DE capabilities in its ship defense operations. In addition to extreme speeds and maneuverability, hypersonic weapons operate in a wide spectrum of altitude regimes, ranging from very low to exo-atmospheric. As mentioned, the lack of a “universal” interceptor capable of operating in multiple altitude regimes and over extended ranges, both at sea and over land, highlights the need for integrated missile defense. Unfortunately, many of our AMD systems were developed without stringent (and enforced) standards to fully integrate with other systems. Future efforts must address this lack of oversight.

As we all know, there are many claimants for finite DoD resources. The continuing challenge for the department is to balance readiness requirements with the need to The challenge is further exacerbated when dealing with highly complex weapon systems and the issue of obsolescence. The introduction of hypersonics from both an offensive and defensive perspective, stresses the importance of modernization and the development of new technologies in response to emerging threats. For AMD

operations, the cost-per-intercept continues to be an area of concern, especially when dealing with threats requiring multiple interceptors to achieve an acceptable probability of success (e.g., probability of kill). In response to this dilemma, senior leaders are appropriately considering both doctrinal and technology solutions. From left of launch discussions to materiel solutions addressing all phases of flight, DoD is evaluating many options to address the threat of hypersonic weapons. Bottom line: future AMD systems must provide warfighters with responsive, flexible, and integrated systems in a sustainable manner.

Way Ahead

Hypersonic weapons are a real threat to our nation. They provide a vexing challenge for our missile defense systems that without immediate action, will give our enemy the ability to hold our national interests at risk. However, there are possible actions and imperatives that are available to address many of the defense challenges. First, as stated previously, there exists a disparity in funding and level of attention regarding the development of defensive capabilities, relative to offensive weapons, that must be addressed. According to the Missile Defense Agency’s recent budget request, “that discrepancy between offense and defense shows up in the dollar values in the FY20 request; while overall hypersonic investments come in around $2.6 billion, defensive developments take up only $157.4 million.” It's important to note that Congress has expressed its concerns with our current defensive capabilities during hearings with senior DoD officials.

Secondly, the lack of stablished program(s) of record that adequately addresses "hypersonic defense" across all warfighting domains illustrates the need for a more robust and integrated joint solution. Unfortunately, there are numerous examples where system integration has been treated as an afterthought. Future missile defense systems must be developed with an eye on integration and the ability to operate seamlessly while permitting system modifications as technology evolves. Active oversight of service-led missile defense programs is required to support future integration efforts and compliance with recognized standards.

Finally, DoD must work closely with Congress to maintain sustainment of critically needed programs to meet operational requirements as quickly as possible. Additionally, it's important for the department and industry partners to be transparent regarding capabilities and the associated production timelines. It also essential to address the need for additional upgrades, sustainment costs, as well as potential doctrinal and training impacts. Our immediate involvement in hypersonic technologies is not a question of "if," but rather when, and to what degree. Our national interests are at stake.

The U.S. would need a impossible amount of effort to catch up Keith Button 18. Written for C4ISR Journal and Hedge Fund Alert. 6-1-2018. "Hypersonic weapons race." Aerospace America. https://aerospaceamerica.aiaa.org/features/hypersonic-weapons-race/. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

To catch up with China, the U.S. will have to do more , starting with its spending on fundamental hypersonics research, Boyd says. “There has to be more investment , because at the end of the day, China is

investing more people and newer facilities than we have. We don’t have any really secret

sauce , I don’t think, to any great extent that’s going to allow us to catch up without increasing our effort here.” If the U.S. decides that hypersonics is going to be an important element of its national security strategy, then it’s going to have to develop a workforce. Boosting fundamental research spending would help accomplish that: educating and training engineers in the details of a challenging field, as well as germinating the next generation of ideas for new technologies, Boyd says. At U.S. universities, 60 percent to 70 percent of the hypersonics research is focused on aerodynamics and aerothermodynamics: looking at how gases flow around the hypersonic vehicle in flight, Boyd says. In China, the research described in journal articles shows a more even distribution of efforts across aerodynamics, propulsion, materials and controls. The U.S. needs to take a more balanced, multidisciplinary approach to hypersonics research to field operational systems, because

every aspect of a hypersonic vehicle affects every other aspect. The U.S. also needs better coordination, through centers of excellence or a similar centralized approach that promotes cross-over between disciplines, Boyd says. On the applied research side, the key change for the U.S. needs to be increasing the number of test flights, Boyd says. Demonstration flight programs that fly only one or four test flights aren’t doing enough to make any real progress in developing operational systems, especially when compared to other U.S.

missile programs. “It’s expensive, and it’s difficult, but it’s like anything — you’ve got to try it out,” he says. “It’s like self-driving cars — you’ve got to put them out there in the actual environment, and learn some hard lessons, probably, to get where you want to go.” Because rocket technology is more advanced relative to the state of scramjet development, probably the easiest gains in hypersonics will initially come with boost-glide concepts, Sponable says. Over the longer term, the best hypersonic propulsion model will be whichever can fly at high speed at the lowest recurring operating costs, and with acceptable environmental impacts. “If you can implement this stuff operationally, there’s merit to it. If you

can’t, it’s just endless hobby shop,” he says. “We’ve got to figure out how to take the low-hanging fruit and pursue those hypersonic systems that we can do. Successes in those areas will justify the investment in the longer term, more difficult aspects of hypersonics.” Based on the current state of hypersonics research , it’s still an open question whether the U.S. should pursue both boost-glide and air-breathing concepts, Boyd says. “The motivation for continuing to study both is that they may

provide, in the end different, unique and important capabilities. At some point if it’s determined that one system just doesn’t provide enough of an added value over the other, then it probably will be dropped.”

China already has hypersonic weapons Keith Button 18. Written for C4ISR Journal and Hedge Fund Alert. 6-1-2018. "Hypersonic weapons race." Aerospace America. https://aerospaceamerica.aiaa.org/features/hypersonic-weapons-race/. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

Over the last 10 years, China has given experts in other nations glimpses of its hypersonics work by allowing

its researchers to publish papers in the same technical journals where researchers from the U.S., Germany, France, Australia, Japan, Italy, Russia and the United Kingdom publish. Boyd, the

Michigan professor, says the papers 10 years ago were viewed as poor quality. “They were really just copying what other people had done; really

just catching up,” he says. Today, that’s no longer the case. Boyd says China has caught up, and then some . The Chinese researchers

are respected as peers in the community of hypersonics researchers who share unclassified findings. In Boyd’s view, China’s spending on modern research facilities and staffing has started to pay off, both with air-breathing and boost-glide concepts and with related subtopics, such as aerodynamics, propulsion,

structures, materials, guidance, navigation and controls. Boyd says China appears to be ahead of the U.S. in the race to create Mach 5-plus missiles. China’s

testing of those missiles seems to indicate a boost glide concept, but not definitively, Lewis says.

Russia already has hypersonic weapons Amy Mackinnon 18. Staff writer at Foreign policy. 5-9-2018. "Russia's New Missiles Are Aimed at the U.S." Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/05/russias-new-missiles-are-aimed-at-you-weapons-hypersonic-putin-united-states-inf/. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

Normally inured to the fire and brimstone of Russian state TV, international audiences perked up their ears last month when a Sunday evening news show singled out a handful of locations in the United States that c ould be targets for annihilation by Russia’s new hypersonic weapons. “For now, we’re not threatening anyone,” said the TV host Dmitry Kiselyov, who some label

Russia’s chief propagandist. However, Russia worries that the United States, after having withdrawn from an important arms control treaty that regulated missile deployment, the

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, might again station intermediate-range missiles in Europe. “But if such a deployment takes place, our response will be instant,” Kiselyov said. The segment came days after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annual address to the nation on Feb. 20, in which he

warned that Russia would be forced to deploy hypersonic weapons that can travel over five times the speed of sound. Given their speed and agility, the United States is currently unable to defend against

them. On Feb. 26, Gen. John Hyten, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, which oversees the U.S. nuclear missile arsenal, sounded the alarm, telling Congress that Russia’s

coveted hypersonic weapons aren’t covered by any nuclear arms treaty. Nuclear winter is awful to contemplate, but experts caution against buying too much into Russia’s hype. For one thing, two of the locations Russia singled out as targets for these missiles—Fort Ritchie in Maryland and Fort McClellan in California—have been closed for about 20 years. And while hypersonic weapons sound like a breakthrough, the reality is more complex. “Fundamentally, I don’t think they change much in terms of strategic balance and military capability,” said Pavel Podvig, a nuclear weapons expert and senior research fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. While designed to fly at Mach 5 or higher, hypersonic missiles are worrisome not so much for their speed as for their moves. Hypersonic weapons currently in development are not necessarily faster than ballistic missiles that already exist, said Ian Williams, the deputy director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “It’s how they fly which is more the concern,” he said. Unlike conventional ballistic missiles, hypersonics have a much greater ability to maneuver as they hurtle toward their target, which could help them foil current missile defenses and slam shut an already very tight response window. “Their speed, accuracy, maneuverability, and unusual altitude can decrease warning and decision time, and increase the ability to strike nuclear-related targets with conventional weapons,” said Kingston Reif, the director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association. There are two basic

types: a hypersonic cruise missile powered by a high-speed engine and a hypersonic glide vehicle, which is launched high by a rocket before

uncoupling and sailing down toward its target. Russia is developing two types of missiles and one glider, all capable of deploying both conventional and nuclear

warheads. Putin said last year the glider is already in production, and Williams, citing the fact that it has been given a NATO designation,

suggested that Russia’s Zircon missile may already be deployed.

Solvency---Arms ControlArms control key---multiple models that solve and states are willing participants Izumi Nakamitsu 19. Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 2-1-2019. “Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic Arms Control, A Study Prepared on the Recommendation of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters.” United Nations. https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/hypersonic-weapons-study.pdf. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

50. The preceding two sections have laid out various challenges associated with the pursuit of the technology under discussion, in particular hypersonic boost-glide systems.

Arms control measures can address some of those problems, directly or indirectly. Given the anticipated deployments of HGVs, it

is particularly timely for States to identify and consider possible arms control measures. Arms control can have various objectives, including to: reduce risks through increased transparency and predictability; reduce incentives to launch surprise attacks; reduce incentives to engage in arms racing; reduce the risk of miscalculation and accidents during crises; and reduce escalatory potential.79 Arms control also contributes to ultimate disarmament objectives. 51. It should also be noted that there are various challenges complicating any prospective arms control efforts today, including challenges specific to HGVs. These include the prevailing climate of political mistrust coupled with a diminished sense that arms control can be mutually beneficial, particularly given the perception within some States that HGVs can provide real military advantage. This political mistrust is compounded by a growing perception that (some) States cannot guarantee future governments will abide by agreements entered into today. The multipolar strategic environment is a further complicating factor, much more so than when current and previous arms control agreements were negotiated. In the case of HGVs, the added complexity of the involvement of more than two key players is demonstrated by the very distinct motivations those key players have for pursuing these technologies (i.e. evading missile defence versus attaining a prompt long-range conventional strike capability). 52. This section will describe international instruments or bodies that deal with or have historically dealt with the issue of missiles in general. It will then survey various different arms control initiatives, as well transparency and confidence-building measures, that could be applied specifically to hypersonic boost-glide systems and possibly manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles, including by drawing upon a track 1.5 meeting on the topic convened by UNODA and UNIDIR in November 2018. Finally, it will consider possible forums and strategies for taking consideration of these issues forward. Relevant existing international instruments or bodies 53. The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly has maintained an agenda item on missiles since its 55th session in 2000.80 The Assembly has established three Panels of Governmental Experts on the issue of missiles in all its aspects, meeting in 2001-02, 2004 and 2007-08.81 None of the Panels discussed boost-glide systems. While the issue remains on the agenda of the First Committee, there has been no

resolution on the topic since 2008 (A/RES/63/55). 54. Missiles are covered in various legally binding bilateral strategic arms reduction regimes between the Russian Federation and United States, including the INF Treaty and New START. The former requires its two parties to eliminate all ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km, while the latter places limits on the number of their deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers. The Soviet Union and United States also agreed to limit missile defences in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty, however the United States pulled out of that arrangement in 2002. Furthermore, on 1 February 2019, the United States announced it would suspend its obligations under the INF Treaty for six months effective 2 February 2019, and complete its withdrawal at the end of those six months unless Russia came “back into compliance by destroying all of its violating missiles, launchers, and associated equipment”. 55. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a 35-member voluntary export control regime that aims to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and other uncrewed delivery vehicles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It covers WMD delivery systems and components with ranges of at least 300 km and treats systems capable of delivering payloads of 500 kg or more (Category I) more stringently than those with smaller capacities (Category II). Payload is defined within MTCR as the mass that can be delivered that is not used to maintain flight, so even if an HGV delivered force kinetically, it would not itself be defined as the payload but as part of the delivery vehicle. As a result, while all systems discussed in this study would likely be covered by the MTCR by virtue of their range, it is conceivable that some could fall within its less restrictive Category II. Boost-glide systems have not been discussed to date at annual MTCR meetings. 56. Under the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) States have made a politically binding commitment to exercise maximum restraint in developing, testing and deploying ballistic missiles, and to transparency measures on policies and launches of ballistic missiles and civilian space vehicles. 139 States subscribe to HCoC. The ballistic missile boosters used in boost-glide systems, as well as the ballistic missiles delivering MaRVs, would be subject to the commitments made by HCoC subscribers. While boost-glide systems have not been explicitly discussed within the regime, it is likely that some flight tests of relevant systems have been reported on under the Code. 57. Forty-two States participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement, which seeks to promote transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. Participating States apply export controls to items set forth in the arrangement’s control lists. Ballistic missile systems and components are covered in the arrangement’s dual-use list category 9 (aerospace and propulsion). Re-entry vehicles are included in the munitions list (ML4). HGVs could also fall under the “high velocity kinetic energy weapon systems” category in the arrangement’s munitions list (ML12), although that category seems designed primarily with rail gun technology in mind. 58. The United Nations Register of Convention Arms includes missiles and missile launchers as a category. Ballistic or cruise missiles “capable of delivering a warhead or weapon of mass destruction” to a range of at least 25 km are covered.82 The Group of Governmental Experts on the Register has not considered the implications of HGVs, which are not explicitly included in the missiles category (in contrast, remotely piloted vehicles and MANPADS are explicitly included). Only 36 Member States submitted reports to the Register for 2017.83 Of those, 17 States reported on imports and/or exports of missiles and 13 States reported on their missile holdings. 59. In resolution 1540 (2004), the Security Council decided that all States shall adopt and enforce laws prohibiting nonState actors from the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction or their means of

delivery. Possible arms control approaches 60. Arms control can take various forms. Arrangements can be legally binding or

politically binding. They may be multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral or unilateral. They may comprehensively ban a class of

weapons, place restrictions on their use, limit their numbers or seek to curb their proliferation . An arms control measure covering hypersonic boost-glide systems or HGVs could be standalone or form part of a broader arrangement covering other strategic systems. Given the importance of other weapons systems, particularly missile defences, as a motivating factor for the pursuit of this technology, the latter may be more realistic. Ultimately, the form an arms control measure takes will be determined by its objectives and what is feasible given the States

involved. Possible outcomes are surveyed below. 61. The most direct and robust way to address the issues raised by boost-glide systems would be a multilateral international legally binding regime. This could take the form of an outright ban or something in the style of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty that restricts the technology to those States already in possession. A legally binding instrument would likely require some form of verification to be effective and acceptable to a broad range of parties. Verification measures could include continuous monitoring systems, facilities declarations, inspections and regular data exchanges.

Given the current deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament, such an agreement could be pursued directly by the interested parties. Alternatively, a process under the auspices of the United Nations could proceed through a dedicated negotiating body, which could be created and mandated by the General Assembly, following the examples of the Arms Trade Treaty and Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. 62. Given the relatively small number of States currently pursuing hypersonic

weapon technologies, and the likelihood that this number will stay relatively low, another option could to pursue a bilateral or plurilateral legally binding instrument, either specifically on the issue of hypersonic weapons or as part of a broader bilateral (or possibly, trilateral)

strategic arms reduction agreement (refer paragraph 44). Article V(2) of New START provides a party believing that a “new kind of strategic offensive arm is

emerging” the right to raise it within the Treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission. Even if the Treaty is not extended in 2021 , there could be a useful norm-setting value to these consultations. 63. Another avenue for pursuing a legally binding prohibition or limitation on these

technologies would be the revival and expansion of the INF Treaty. In 2007, Russia held consultations on a draft proposal to the First Committee aimed at multilateralizing the INF Treaty. The same year, Russia and the United States issued a joint statement during the sixtysecond session of the General Assembly, marking the Treaty’s 20th anniversary, calling on all interested States to “discuss the possibility of imparting global character” to the INF.84 The proposal did not gain any traction and the United States dissociated itself from these efforts soon afterwards. Following the US announcement about its intention to withdraw, Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed his country’s position that it would be worth pursuing broadening the Treaty.85 While Russia and the United States are the Treaty’s two main parties, Soviet successor States Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine also actively participate in the Treaty’s implementation.86 64.

Another legally binding measure would be a flight test ban, which could be viewed as sufficient in itself or as an interim step toward a comprehensive prohibition. This would likely only be useful for HGVs, not MaRVs, since the latter are already deployed. Moreover, given how close some States are to deployment, this could lead to a temporary acceleration in testing. 65. If legally binding approaches are not feasible, politically binding measures that go beyond transparency and confidencebuilding measures (which are outlined in the next section) to impose limitations or reductions may be an option. Such arrangement may be bilateral or plurilateral, or even unilateral as in the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–92. 66. States may also seek to limit the spread of relevant technologies through export control measures. This could for instance be done by seeking to explicitly include hypersonic weapon technology under the existing regimes discussed above (Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement). Possible transparency and confidence-building measures 67. In addition to hard arms control measures, various transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) could be pursued. These approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may rather be mutually reinforcing. TCBMs could prepare the ground for eventual arms control measures. Some of the verification measures listed in paragraph 60 above could be pursued as TCBMs in their own right. Possible TCBMs are outlined below. 68. States could formalize the exchange of information on flights, including test flights, of relevant systems. States subscribing to HCoC should already use that mechanism to provide flight notifications. States which do not participate in HCoC could seek to opt in for flights involving specific technologies, such as HGVs, or to enter into specific bilateral or plurilateral arrangements. While practice and infrastructure for such information sharing already exists between Russia and the United States, it does not include China, which is also not an HCoC subscribing State. 69. In a similar vein, while infrastructure is in place between Russia and the United States for communications at times of crisis, no such channels are known to exist between China and the United States. Establishing hot lines or similar would have broader benefits for crisis stability but would be especially important given the ambiguities relating to HGV warheads and targets. 70. Many participants in the November 2018 meeting were of the view that the risks and doctrine associated with the deployment of boost-glide systems had not been adequately explored, either within States, or collectively between relevant States. An exchange of information or dialogue on risks and doctrines, strategies and policies associated with these technologies could as such be worthwhile and serve to build confidence. 71. Relevant States could seek to formalize arrangements for an information exchange on nuclear weapons-related and other critical infrastructure, with the aim of agreeing to reciprocal non-targeting statements.87 72. While addressing much more than the technologies under consideration here, many participants in the November meeting pointed out that de-alerting nuclear forces would help address some of the particularly destabilizing aspects of HGVs, particularly in relation to the short reaction times they entail. 73. The Group of Governmental Experts on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms and its further development will meet again in 2019. It could seek the explicit inclusion of HGVs and MaRVs in the Register’s category on missiles as a contribution to transparency about these sensitive technologies. In its most recent report (A/71/259), the Group recommended including unmanned combat aerial vehicles as a new subcategory, a recommendation subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly.88 Possible ways forward 74. Although only three States

are believed at present to have engaged in advanced HGV development, it is feasible and desirable for States to pursue a multilateral process that would address issues related to the development of hypersonic weapons (or, more narrowly, boost-glide systems). The

goal of this process could be to consider measures that minimize the risks associated with weapons of this kind and perhaps agree on transparency measures or even restrictions on development and deployment. This process, however, would have to deal with the fact that the States developing these systems are likely to have quite different understandings of their purpose, and diverging perceptions about the dangers associated with their development and deployment. This could make it challenging to reach a common understanding. 75. A formal multilateral negotiation process could be mandated by the General Assembly and could be preceded by a General Assembly-mandated Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). This GGE could either be dedicated specifically to the issue of hypersonic weapons, or it could be a broader GGE such as a revived group on the issue of missiles in all its aspects or a group on on strategic arms control more broadly. Alternatively, intergovernmental consideration between a larger number of States (GGEs are typically limited to 20 members) could proceed without a General Assembly mandate. Such discussions could take place in the context of the Conference on Disarmament or as a standalone plurilateral process led by a group of interested States. 76. It is clear that a significant amount of groundwork needs to take place before any such formal process could be initiated. In the meantime, States can be expected to continue to raise the issue only

marginally in multilateral settings such as the First Committee, Conference on Disarmament and United Nations Disarmament Commission. 77. Several participants in the November meeting expressed the view that although the topic was ripe for discussion, many States had little or

no awareness of the technologies and issues related to HGVs. For this reason, informal and ad hoc discussions and awareness-raising is necessary in the immediate

term. To this end, UNODA and UNIDIR intend to raise awareness, including through the preparation of this study and events promoting it to States at relevant meetings.

Hypersonic weapons is a unique opportunity for arms controlRichard H. Speier et al. 17., George Nacouzi, Carrie A. Lee, and Richard M. Moore. 2017. “Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons.” RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

Negotiations and coordination with other governments take time, so it is worth asking how much time is available for hypersonic missile

nonproliferation measures before the hardware and technology are too widespread to contain. It appears that there will be a decade or less during which

hypersonic missiles and their enabling technologies will remain in the hands of a few key actors and will not become fielded. Although there are predictions that hypersonic missiles will be ready for military use in the 2017-to-2020 period, the history of such complex systems suggests otherwise. Given the rate at which

governments move, now is the time to raise the possibility of the control of such systems with other governments . As the history of other nonproliferation regimes demonstrates, sooner is better than later. One occasional proposal for controlling

hypersonic missiles is to negotiate either a global ban or a nonproliferation treaty to stop their spread. However, the history of technology bans negotiated between the current “haves” and the “have-nots” is not promising. Typically, the have-nots demand a price for their restraint—often in the form of access to civilian forms of the items to be banned. The NPT includes a provision agreeing to share the benefits of “peaceful nuclear explosions,” and proposals for a ballistic missile NPT typically include a provision to share space launch vehicle technology.4 One

proposal is to initiate a test ban on hypersonic missiles among the United States, Russia, China, and perhaps France and India.5 However, all of these proposals for

bans run up against the question of whether the United States, Russia, and China— now heavily invested in hypersonic

developments— would give up the weapons . Without foreclosing the possibility of bans, this report will look at other options that do not require them. Another

frequent suggestion for dealing with proliferation is to promote confidence-building measures. These measures are designed to reduce tensions by such means as

preannouncement of tests or mutual observation of facilities. However, because they do not necessarily hinder the spread of the hardware and technology in question, their nonproliferation value is questionable. Yet another approach is to offer incentives to nations to abjure hypersonic missiles. These might be positive incentives such as offers of nonhypersonic military aid in return for hypersonic restraint. However, such an approach raises the classic problem that to pay a price for someone not to do something is to encourage that someone to find more objectionable activities not to do. There are also negative incentives, i.e., sanctions. However, sanctions generally require widespread support, and this requires widespread agreement that the particular instance of the sanctioned activity is sufficiently objectionable—a difficult standard to meet except in the cases of such rogue nations as Iran and North Korea.6 Shared defenses against hypersonic missiles are one form of positive incentive that might be considered. The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2017 call for examination of such defenses includes provisions for working jointly with other nations. However, as noted previously, the prospects are not clear for effective defenses against hypersonic missiles. Even shared warning of an impending hypersonic attack—perhaps relying on some

form of satellite observation—would, if feasible, offer no more than a few additional minutes of reaction time. Multilateral export controls are international measures that have already been well tested. These require only the actions of the nations possessing the technology in

question, not the have-not nations. As is detailed in Appendix C, hypersonic missile technology is exceedingly complex. For example, igniting a scramjet engine has been compared to lighting a

match in a 5,000 km/hr wind. During flight, the shape of a hypersonic missile will change; so flight controls need to be adaptive to compensate for this effect. Propulsion (for HCMs),

materials, thermal management, flight control, and testing are challenges even for the United States, Russia, and China. Consequently, for other nations, such hypersonic developments could be prohibitively difficult, without experienced foreign support . Because a number of regimes for technology export controls currently exist, there is a substantial body of experience to extend them to hypersonic missiles . We examine such an approach more deeply in the remainder of this chapter. Potential Export Controls The United States, Russia, and China are key players in any discussion about the control of hypersonic technology capabilities . No export controls against the spread of such capabilities can be effective unless at least these three nations support them . If one of the three chose to freely export hypersonic weapons, the restraint of the other two would be undercut. Some would add France and India to this group—and with France, its nonproliferation experience might give it an important role.7 What would be the attitudes of the three governments toward export controls on hypersonic weapons and their technology? Of course, it is impossible to know this with confidence without approaching them through diplomatic channels to obtain an official response. And such responses can vary from time to time

depending on other aspects of the relationships of these governments. The authors met with subject-matter experts on these governments or in some cases officials of the governments. Those meeting with the authors were generally optimistic on the attitudes of the governments toward a nonproliferation policy. Without giving up current programs, the three might very well be disposed to try to prevent further proliferation .8 The maps in Figures 4.1–4.3 show some reasons why Russia and China might prefer to avoid a world in which hypersonic weapons were widely marketed. Both would face challenges to defend against Japanese hypersonic weapons—Russia at least in its far east and China in its most critical cities and infrastructure. The same Chinese cities and infrastructure would be vulnerable to intermediate-range Indian missiles. To these reasons, one could add the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military threats to European Russia; a Poland able to purchase hypersonic missiles on the world market would be especially objectionable to Russia. The value of a policy shared by the three governments is highlighted when considering the technical barriers to

developing hypersonic weapons.9 The barriers to developing hypersonic missiles are so great that a tripartite embargo on exports of

complete hypersonic delivery systems and major subsystems could be effective for several years. And other governments might themselves honor such an embargo as part of a wider effort to

ensure that hypersonic missiles are not deployed in their neighborhoods. A simple tripartite embargo, either alone or with other measures and other supporters,

could therefore be the key to hindering hypersonic missile proliferation .10 What other measures might supplement such an embargo?

Measure of caution toward the spread of lower-level hypersonic technology (short of the embargoed complete systems) could further reduce the proliferation problem while allowing acceptable uses of lower-level technology to be pursued. There is a 35-member international policy that currently handles the missile proliferation problem in this two-tiered manner, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Russia is a member of the MTCR, but China is not. However, China claims that it observes a version of the MTCR. A policy toward hypersonic nonproliferation could be adopted in whole or in part within the MTCR, or—perhaps because China is not a member of the MTCR—the key tripartite governments could formulate it separately. Consequently, there are possible arrangements within or outside of the MTCR. By bringing in other nations, the effectiveness of a nonproliferation policy could be substantially enhanced. Is the Missile Technology Control Regime Adaptable to

Hypersonic Technology? A key feature of the MTCR that affects its application to hypersonic weapons is that the MTCR is designed to control the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering WMDs (nuclear, chemical, or biological payloads). Because the MTCR was originally intended to control nuclearcapable missiles, its strongest restraints (strong presumptions to deny exports) are against missiles capable of delivering 500-kilogram (kg) payloads. The MTCR was later broadened to place similar restraints against missiles intended to deliver WMDs. But hypersonic missiles may not fit into these categories. As noted previously, they can be effect tive with a small payload or no payload at all.11 To redesign the MTCR to direct its strongest restraints against such destabilizing missiles would be a major change in the MTCR’s focus—but not an impossible one. Consequently, it will be worth exploring whether it is feasible to place all hypersonic controls in the MTCR or whether to look at other solutions. Other possibilities would be to ensure that the lesser restraints of the MTCR (case-by-case export application reviews) cover hypersonic hardware and technology. These lesser restraints can be effective. The MTCR includes extensive information exchanges and a “no-undercut” rule (see Appendix D) that help to coordinate the restraint of 35 governments. Another option might be a hybrid approach with (1) the United States, Russia, and China declaring strong restraints against the export of complete delivery systems and their major subsystems, and (2) the MTCR requiring case-by-case export reviews of lesser components. In fact, the MTCR already requires such reviews of items like scramjets and their (currently undefined) components, so it would not be a stretch to cover other hypersonic items similarly. Whatever approach is to be taken, it is likely that the final policy would, like the MTCR, strongly hinder the export of some items and allow the export of others. The MTCR strongly hinders the export of rockets and unmanned air vehicles capable of delivering a 500-kg payload to a range of 300 km. It also strongly hinders the export of any missiles intended to deliver WMDs. However, it allows several classes of activities and, in some cases, does not affect them at all. Such allowed activities include the export of manned aircraft, the tightly controlled export of 500-kg/300-km–capable systems on a rare basis, the indigenous development of missile systems, the export of lesser components on a case-by-case basis after examining the end-use and the end-user, and the sharing of benefits without the sharing of hardware (e.g., the provision of space launch services without the export of rockets).12 At this point, it is appropriate to note the potentially important role of France in a hypersonic missile nonproliferation policy. France is the point of contact in the MTCR, the central point handling documents and hosting intercessional meetings that explore new issues. Moreover, France is perhaps the leading developer of hypersonic technology after the United States, Russia, and China. Whether or not France

participates in initial policy actions by the primary three governments, it could be central in coordinating the expansion of any policy to a wider set of international participants. Recommended Items to Control This report

recommends items that should be subject to new export restraints. The details are laid out in Appendix D. But how should one implement such restraints? The basic requirement is that the United States, Russia, and China agree on export restraints that they will not undercut. Without such a tripartite sponsorship, any policy will be exceedingly weak . The minimum tripartite

agreement would need to embargo complete hypersonic missiles and their major subsystems. As is described in detail in Appendix C, without complete missiles, most potential proliferators would face a long and difficult process to obtain such weapons. Once a basic tripartite agreement is reached (or in parallel to it), a higher number of nations can agree on a broader set of export restraints. As noted above, we believe that France could play a central role in this process. We do not need to prejudge whether this process would take place within or outside of the

MTCR, but the MTCR is well suited for much of the effort. A strong presumption of export denial should be imposed on three items: (1) complete HGVs, (2) complete HCMs, and (3) warheads for HGVs and HCMs .13

Impact---Proliferation New emerging tech prevents effective non-proliferation efforts Natasha E. Bajema 19. Senior research fellow at the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction and leads a multi-year initiative on the impact of emerging technologies on WMD called “Emergence and Convergence.” She has more than 19 years of WMD-related expertise, including serving on extended detail assignments within the Pentagon and the National Nuclear Security Administration. 5-13-2019. "Countering WMD in the Digital Age: Breaking Down Bureaucratic Silos in a Brave New World." War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/countering-wmd-in-the-digital-age-breaking-down-bureaucratic-silos-in-a-brave-new-world/. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

Although nuclear weapons remain far more resistant to digital technologies than biological weapons, policymakers may face some new and significant digital/physical challenges in several

areas: proliferation, supply chains, command and control, and deterrence. Given the overwhelmingly physical nature of a nuclear weapons

program, the main effects of digitization will be through increased availability and quantity of digital

information and greater autonomy . The first digitization challenge to nuclear weapons involves risks posed by the proliferation of digital information as a result of 3D printing. 3D printing or additive manufacturing refers to a growing

family of technologies through which material is added gradually, layer-by-layer. These technologies allow physical objects to be converted into digital information, giving anyone with access to a computer , a 3D printer, and the Internet the ability to create and share physical things over digital pathways. A dditive m anufacturing is especially advantageous for the nuclear weapons and nuclear energy sectors, which do not enjoy the benefits of economies of scale. 3D printing allows companies such as the United Kingdom’s Sellafield Ltd and Siemens to design one-off solutions to solve nuclear-specific challenges while saving money, reducing part production times, and increasing safety. For example, in 2014, Sellafield used 3D printing to support the decommissioning and disposal of nuclear waste at the nuclear power plant. The company used a 3D scanner to capture the dimensions of a container for radioactive material, designed a digital model for a lid that would fit the container perfectly, and printed the lid, saving both time and money that would be

required if they used traditional tooling. In 2017, Siemens installed the first 3D-printed replacement part in a nuclear power plant in Slovenia. Although these are innocuous examples, they indicate the start of a trend that will expand as more sensitive parts are produced for nuclear reactors . The nuclear weapons sector is also harnessing the advantages of a dditive m anufacturing . Within the

U.S. nuclear weapons complex, the Kansas City National Security Campus, for example, has used 3D printing for more than a decade to produce non-nuclear components to improve the design, prototyping, and manufacture of nuclear weapons fixtures, achieving a savings of more than $45 million. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories are working to refurbish components of the W80 nuclear warhead, several of which will be 3D-printed. Meanwhile, a warhead being developed for hypersonic weapons by a defense contractor

will contain three major parts produced with 3D printers. As companies and militaries integrate 3D printers into their operations to produce sensitive parts, they are contributing to a growing repository of digital build files , much like Word and

PowerPoint documents. These files — designed, tested, and qualified by scientists and engineers — embed a certain level of technical expertise in

electronic form, which means individuals without the requisite skills can produce parts by loading up a 3D printer with the required raw materials and then pressing the “print” button. To be sure, we are not yet at the point where additive manufacturing technologies can

fully circumvent the skills needed for post-processing and assembly of WMD. However, the technologies are advancing. If states and non-state actors are able to hack companies’ or militaries’ computer systems and get access to these digital build files, they may be able to skip critical steps in developing parts required for nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons. Similarly, digital pathways may

allow actors to circumvent the need for skilled engineers and scientists in their pursuit of nuclear weapons. In the past, policymakers worried about brain drain — the idea that underpaid scientists and engineers might be persuaded to assist states or non-state actors in developing nuclear capabilities. In the future, the

commercial value of digital information combined with the anonymity afforded by the Internet may change the

incentives for nuclear experts considering sharing technical expertise . Once a digital file is created, most of the work is done

(except of course, for transmission costs and the materials required for its conversion to physical form). Selling additional copies of the digital file involves

almost zero transaction costs when compared to producing, selling and transporting physical parts .

Extinction---nuclear war via brinksmanship and preemptive strikes Matthew Kroenig 15. Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2015. “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2014.893508

The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war , nuclear terrorism , global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances , and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this

review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many

reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation . Many of these threats will be

illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear

weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons , the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945,

the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great

Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD , new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure- second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first . For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large

arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike . Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore,

decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive

might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action .

Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures .

That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed .

Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack .49 If there are advantages

to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of

MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war . Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed

states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no

guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since

1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above,

nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility

of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis . By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship , states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them , including the 1962 Cuban

Missile Crisis, have come close . And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we think about future

nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange . Nuclear Terrorism

The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism .54 While September 11th was one of the greatest

tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a ‘religious duty’ for Al- Qa’eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.55 Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56 Indeed, in recent years, many US

politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.57 Analysts have pointed out the tremendous

hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases .

States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons , or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are

good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread , the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases . Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might

be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state , with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft , allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is

evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem . US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a

nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. Regional Instability The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers , contributing to regional instability . States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy . In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression . Indeed, international relations theories about the ‘stability-instability paradox’ maintain

that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.60 Historically , we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability . Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.62 Currently, Iran

restrains its foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange .

UQ- New STARTNew START is being pushed now but passage isn’t guaranteedHoward LaFranchi et al. 19., Peter Ford, Ann Tyson, and Fred Weir. Staff writers and correspondent at CSMonitor, citing Thomas Callender, a senior fellow for defense programs at The Heritage Foundation in Washington. 3-14-2019. “A budding nuclear threat, from more than just the usual suspects.” Christian Science Monitor. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/2019/0314/A-budding-nuclear-threat-from-more-than-just-the-usual-suspects. accessed 7-20-2019//JDi

“John Bolton thinks the constraints of arms control agreements weaken the U.S., and do not strengthen its security, and he has been busy

killing off our agreements one by one” at least since the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty the U.S. withdrew from in December 2002, Mr. Cirincione says. Yet others believe no one should assume the treaty is dead . “ All indications are that there is a strong debate in the White House on extending New START, but if you listen to what senior officials are saying, it shows that the administration as a whole is committed to arms control ,” says Thomas Callender, a senior fellow for defense programs at The Heritage Foundation in Washington. “But as [Secretary of State Mike] Pompeo has said, there has to be compliance by both parties, and it has to be verifiable.”

IL – Congress-Trump relations key to New STARTEffective inter-branch relations on arms control is key to New STARTVaddi 5-9 (Pranay Vaddi, a fellow in the nuclear policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served as an adviser on the New Start Treaty and worked on arms control issues at the State Department. TheHill, "Congress must act on arms control with extension of New Start Treaty," https://thehill.com/opinion/international/442872-congress-must-act-on-arms-control-with-extension-of-new-start-treaty, 5-9-2019, acc 7-21-2019//Sarwa)

The leaders of the House Foreign Affairs Committee exhibited bipartisan cooperation in advancing international security interests by supporting extension of the New Start Treaty. It prevents a nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia and gives the United States key information about Russian nuclear weapons, reasons why Pentagon leaders strongly endorse it. By introducing a bill to push for renewing the New Start Treaty before it will expire in 2021, Chairman Eliot Engel and Ranking Member Michael McCaul give Republicans and Democrats a way to support the newfound desire of President Trump to reduce global nuclear dangers.

The White House reportedly wants to negotiate bold new arms control agreements with Russia and China. Since the New Start Treaty entered into force, Russia has continued nuclear modernization and introduced several new nuclear weapons systems. China has continued to increase its arsenal of mostly conventional armed ballistic missiles, creating additional risks for American forces and those of our allies across the Pacific region. Members of both parties should support efforts to address these threats. However, these negotiations could be very complicated and, if history is any guide, finalizing new arms control agreements could take years.

Extending the New Start Treaty buys time for the administration to seek new agreements. Conducting arms control negotiations with the safety net of limits on deployed weapons and verification and intelligence monitoring provisions under the New Start Treaty will make such efforts easier. This more recent White House perspective stems from worries of the cost of a nuclear arms race. The loss of New Start Treaty information could force the United States to significantly grow its nuclear arsenal to account for “worst case scenario” planning. American military leaders recognize this danger and support the New Start Treaty. They also see no need to deploy nuclear weapons beyond its limits, as evidenced in the nuclear posture review. In pushing for extension, Engel and McCaul are helping President Trump meet his goal of stopping a nuclear arms race.

The House bill is named for the late Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana and Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher of California, a Republican and Democrat who each understood the importance of bipartisan cooperation on arms control. Lugar had a long career advocating for nuclear nonproliferation that was capped off by his partnership with John Kerry to shepherd the New Start Treaty through the Senate in 2010, bringing a dozen Republican colleagues with him to support ratification. Tauscher, who joined the State Department in 2009 as the most senior arms control official after leaving Congress, helped push the New Start Treaty through the Senate, leaning on years of legislative engagement with the nuclear laboratories in her district and the relationships with her former Republican colleagues.

The bill identifies the potential risks to international security of allowing the New Start Treaty to lapse in 2021. It requires the administration to report to Congress on the state of national security should the

New Start Treaty lapse. How may allies react to its expiration? Can the intelligence community manage the loss of information about Russian nuclear forces, and at what cost? Will the United States be better off without the New Start Treaty, as opposed to if it were extended? Indeed, these are leading questions, but the answers will demonstrate the clear value of extending the New Start Treaty, along with the inherent key risks should it lapse.

President Trump can extend it with the stroke of a pen. Difficult politicized Senate advice and consent votes during an election year are not required. However, Republican support for the New Start Treaty in Congress is an important signal to voters and the policy mutable commander in chief that it is important to national security and worthy of preservation. At a time when the world looks to Washington for signs of American leadership to lower the risks of nuclear war, Engel and McCaul truly act as statesmen. It is my hope that this is the first of many more examples of Republicans joining Democrats to support the extension of the New Start Treaty.

Hopefully more Republicans see McCaul is not damaging his relationship with his voters or President Trump by publicly supporting arms control, but is helping rebuild nonpartisan interest in and support for prudent arms control policy. In the spirit of Senator Lugar and Congresswoman Tauscher, Democrats and Republicans should work together on nuclear arms control, beginning with the extension of the New Start Treaty.

Impact – New START GoodNew START is key to prevent nuclear warBell 18 (Alexandra Bell, the Senior Policy Director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. She previously served as the Director for Strategic Outreach in the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the Department of State. Kingston Reif is the Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association.Breaking Defense, "A Real Nuclear Triumph for Trump: Extend New START," https://breakingdefense.com/2018/07/a-real-nuclear-triumph-for-trump-extend-new-start/, 7-14-2018, acc 7-21-2019//Sarwa)

President Trump prepares to meet Vladimir Putin in a high stakes one-on-one meeting, there is growing and legitimate concern in Washington and European capitals about concessions Trump might make in the hopes of getting along with the Russian strongman.

The anxiety is warranted, given President Trump’s public statements on NATO and the invasion of Ukraine, as well as his dismissal of Russian election interference. There is, however, a possible US-Russian compromise that should be welcomed and encouraged: the extension of the landmark New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START .

Yes, relations between the United States and Russia have deteriorated significantly in recent years, with contacts cut off at many levels. Nevertheless, the two countries still have to talk about a basic, life-or-death reality: They possess between them over 90 percent of the roughly 15,000 nuclear weapons on the planet, and each presents an existential threat to the other. Given that grim fact, leaders in Washington and Moscow have a special responsibility to avoid direct conflict and reduce nuclear threats.

Acknowledging that truth, President Trump told reporters on March 20 that he’d like to meet with Putin “to discuss the arms race, which is getting out of control.” Both the United States and Russia are spending massive sums to upgrade their Cold War-era arsenals and develop new types of weapons.

In this context, talking about New START makes sense. It is one of the few remaining bright spots in the US-Russia relationship. Signed in 2010, the treaty requires the United States and Russia each to reduce strategic nuclear forces to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads, 700 deployed long-range missiles and bombers, and 800 deployed and non-deployed missile launchers and bombers by Feb. 5, 2018 — a deadline that both countries met.

New START also includes a comprehensive suite of monitoring and verification provisions to help ensure compliance — but the agreement will expire on Feb. 5, 2021. Under its terms, it can be extended by up to five years without further approval by the US Senate or Russian Duma if both presidents agree.

Extension of the treaty should be a no-brainer from both a security and an economic perspective. In March 2017, Gen. John Hyten, who leads US Strategic Command, told Congress that “bilateral, verifiable arms control agreements are essential to our ability to provide an effective deterrent.” New START monitoring provides real-time insights directly into Russian strategic forces – insights that cannot be gained in any other way. Further, the verifiable caps aid U.S. military planning by reducing the need to make worst-case assessments that could prompt additional costly nuclear force investments.

Washington is already planning to spend at least $1.7 trillion to sustain and upgrade the current arsenal, which is based on the New START limits, over the next three decades.

If the treaty is allowed to lapse, there will be no limits on Russia’s strategic nuclear forces for the first time since the early-1970s. Even more dangerous is the fact that other arms control guardrails are in danger of collapsing. The United States determined that Russia is in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Heading off the risk of unconstrained and wildly expensive US-Russia nuclear competition demands maintenance of the one bilateral nuclear agreement that is actually working.

While the benefits of extending New START are manifest, obstacles remain. National Security Advisor John Bolton has long castigated the agreement, calling it “unilateral disarmament” and “an execrable deal.” In reality, the treaty places equal limits on both sides that provide mutual benefit. Trump’s Secretaries of Defense and State appear to agree, as they both support the treaty.

Other Republican critics of New START argue that it should not be extended so long as Russia is violating other arms control agreements and developing new weapons, such as those unveiled by Putin in a speech last spring. But Russia’s development of new strategic systems actually reinforces the case for extending New START. The agreement provides for discussion and possible limitation of emerging strategic offensive arms. If Russia moves forward on any of these systems, the United States should insist on relevant discussions in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the treaty’s implementing body.

But New START extension should never be used as a bargaining chip because it is too important to be gambled away. If the treaty disappears in 2021, Russia would be free to expand the number of strategic nuclear weapons pointed directly at the United States.

Unfortunately, the biggest obstacle to extension might be Trump himself. He has denounced New START as another bad deal negotiated by his predecessor, like the Iran deal that he recently upended. As Trump prepares for his meeting with Putin, he should be reminded that the treaty provides the predictability that our military leaders want, the transparency that our intelligence community needs, and the stability that our allies deserve.

Agreeing to extend New START would be an easy win for Trump and the United States. By doing so he would be building on the arms control legacy of President Reagan. And it would allow him to claim, on the grandest of stages in Helsinki, that he struck a great deal to meaningfully reduce the nuclear threat.

New START is key to strategic stability between the US and Russia- turns the affDvorkin 19 (Vladimir Dvorkin, Carnegie Moscow Center, "Preserving Strategic Stability Amid U.S.-Russian Confrontation," https://carnegie.ru/2019/02/08/preserving-strategic-stability-amid-u.s.-russian-confrontation-pub-78319, 02-08-2019, acc 7-21-2019//Sarwa)

Strategic stability is in a state of crisis. This impasse has been caused by several factors in U.S.-Russia relations, including profound mistrust, the lengthy absence of strategic dialogue, and serious disagreements on key global and regional issues. In light of the United States’ decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Russia’s subsequent decision to do the same, and

the uncertain prospects of efforts to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) before it is due to expire in 2021, this crisis is poised to worsen.

While multilateral arms control with other nuclear-armed powers is likely unattainable for the time being, it is still possible for Washington and Moscow to bolster strategic stability by striving to extend New START, refusing to exaggerate the destabilizing effects of key global trends on the U.S.-Russia nuclear balance, and holding open, regular talks about strategic stability and emerging technologies that do pose destabilizing risks.

STRATEGIC STABILITY

The concept of strategic stability was formally agreed on for the first time by then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and then U.S. president George H.W. Bush during the final negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in June 1990.1 Strategic stability was defined in terms of removing incentives for either side to launch a nuclear first strike. More specifically, strategic stability incorporates at least three elements.

First, strategic stability entails that strategic offensive and defensive arms should be configured so that neither side’s defenses can undermine the other’s retaliatory strike capability.

Second, strategic stability requires reducing the number of warheads carried by each strategic missile. Doing this makes it more difficult for a single incoming missile to eliminate several enemy missiles, each armed with a large number of warheads, before they are launched.

Third, strategic stability puts a premium on the survivability of nuclear weapons, which would make it more difficult for an enemy to destroy them in a disarming first strike.

The concept of strategic stability since has been enshrined in various nuclear arms control agreements, including the U.S.-Soviet/Russian treaties on strategic offensive arms reductions (the START agreements). Additionally, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty limited strategic defenses, which both sides considered destabilizing at the time. Under the terms of START I in 1991, meanwhile, Moscow increased the proportion of mobile ground- and rail-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in its arsenal. This treaty also envisaged that Moscow would improve the survivability of its ballistic missile submarines. For its part, the United States committed itself to emphasizing the role of highly survivable submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in its nuclear posture.

A HOST OF DESTABILIZING FACTORS, REAL AND IMAGINED

Since the early 2000s, the U.S.-Russia strategic relationship has grown increasingly strained. Moscow saw the U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty in 2002 as destabilizing. In the ensuing years, the Russian defense establishment began voicing concerns over a number of new perceived threats, including the possibility of a disarming U.S. first strike by strategic, non-nuclear, high-precision weapons; the use of new technologies such as hypersonic weapons and advanced cyberwarfare capabilities as well as unmanned and robotic systems; the deployment of space weapons; the rise of third countries’ nuclear arsenals; and the impact of regional instability on nuclear-weapon states.

Diplomatic exchanges on these issues highlighted serious disagreements between Russia and the United States, indicating an erosion of the two sides’ once-shared understanding of strategic stability. To make matters worse, two important existing treaties are now in peril: Washington and Moscow will both scrap

the 1987 INF Treaty later in 2019, and the two sides may not extend New START (due to expire in 2021) either. There is now a heightened risk that nuclear weapons could be used in a conflict, something that seemed almost unthinkable during the post-1991 heyday of U.S.-Russian relations.

Some of the purported risks that Moscow often cites as threatening its second-strike capability and, therefore, strategic stability have been exaggerated. This is particularly true of missile defense, the prospect of a first strike using high-precision, non-nuclear weapons, and space weapons. That said, the impasses over the INF Treaty and NEW START do pose real challenges, as does Moscow’s and Washington’s ill-advised openness to using launch-on-warning strikes in certain circumstances.

MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS

One of Moscow’s chief complaints regards the ways that U.S. missile defenses purportedly undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent and, by extension, strategic stability. U.S. efforts to build missile defense capabilities continue to provoke neuralgia in Russia’s military and national leadership. Because of the grand scale of the U.S. missile defense program, Moscow refuses to contemplate further reductions in strategic offensive arms beyond those stipulated in New START. Admittedly, a dense missile defense system realistically would be capable of intercepting single (or even multiple) launches of ballistic missiles equipped with only the simplest countermeasures. Such a system, however, would be completely incapable of significantly reducing the nuclear deterrent of Russia or the United States.2 The fate of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) convincingly proved that it is virtually impossible to create a missile defense system capable of protecting а country from а retaliatory strike involving hundreds of warheads. This remains true today.

Moreover, even as Moscow complains about U.S. missile defense, Russia continues to improve the defense penetration capacity of its missiles. Speaking before a group of military officers in September 2015 about adding forty new ICBMs to the country’s nuclear forces, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the new missiles would “be capable of overcoming the most technically advanced anti-missile defense systems.” Putin was referring to new types of Russian ICBMs such as the Yars and the Bulava. Moreover, other missiles in Russia’s strategic arsenal—including the Sineva, the Voevoda, and the Topol-M—have also been equipped with effective penetration aids that make them capable of overcoming missile defense systems quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the one the United States plans to deploy. The high penetration capabilities of these Russian ballistic missiles remains an effective stabilizer of U.S.-Russian strategic stability by blunting the destabilizing effects of U.S. missile defense. Consequently, the impact of missile defense on Russia’s second-strike capability for the foreseeable future should not be overstated.

HYPERSONIC DISARMING STRIKES

Apart from U.S. missile defense, Russian leaders also take a dim view of the United States’ Conventional Prompt Global Strike program. Putin himself has weighed in, arguing that the emergence of high-precision, long-range, non-nuclear arms capable of hitting distant targets in short time horizons, in effect, allows the possibility of a disarming first strike. This assessment fueled Russia’s skepticism toward then U.S. president Barack Obama’s notion that deep nuclear arms reductions could eventually lead to a nuclear-free world. In such a world, Putin stated, “Nations that are leaders in creating and producing [such] high-precision systems will have a clear military advantage.”

Yet the Kremlin’s assessment of Conventional Prompt Global Strike is challenged by the findings of three authoritative Russian military experts. Their research demonstrates that it would be impossible for Washington to conduct simultaneous high-precision cruise-missile strikes against even one of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces’ (SRF) positions in the European part of Russia.3 Their calculations are based on a host of factors, including the size and configuration of the SRF target as well as the estimated number of cruise missiles the United States would need to reliably hit a hardened missile site, such as an underground missile silo or a command center.

These Russian experts further confirm that it would be impossible for the United States to destroy part of Russia’s SRF in a first strike without using nuclear weapons. Because the destructive potential of non-nuclear high-precision weapons in a hypothetical attack against hardened Russian missile sites would be incomparably smaller than the damage wreaked by nuclear weapons, such an attack would have to employ an exceptionally large number of non-nuclear weapons. The number of missiles needed could actually be even greater than these experts have suggested, given Moscow’s ability to interfere with the guidance systems of high-precision munitions.

Given these realities, it would be extremely difficult for the United States to plan simultaneous attacks against several hundred targets scattered across Russia’s vast territory. Preparing for such an attack and assembling the forces necessary to execute it would take a long time. Any such preparations would not be easy to conceal, and Moscow would almost certainly have enough time to counter by putting its nuclear forces on high alert.

For all these reasons, it appears unlikely that the Pentagon would seriously consider a disarming conventional strike against Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Such an attack would not only prove to be entirely pointless but would also trigger a devastating retaliatory nuclear strike. Similar reasoning counters speculation about the possibility of a U.S. disarming strike using expensive hypersonic weapons that Washington is currently developing and will probably acquire in only limited quantities. This means that the impact of U.S. long-range, high-precision conventional missiles on strategic stability would almost certainly be more modest than Russian officials have suggested.

THE EMERGENCE OF SPACE WEAPONS

As preoccupations with space weapons mount, outer space is becoming a new area of major power competition with implications for strategic stability. Countries have already discussed banning the militarization of space for many years, but reaching an agreement has proven extremely difficult. A Russian-Chinese proposal presented at the UN failed to attract much support, and an attempt to adopt a Space Code of Conduct was also unsuccessful.

Part of the challenge is that simply banning the introduction of weapons in space would be insufficient. In addition to prohibiting countries from using space weapons to strike targets on the ground, at sea, or in the air, efforts to prevent space from being militarized would also have to ban countries from testing and deploying ground-, sea-, and air-based weapons capable of striking targets in space. Additionally, there would have to be a more detailed assessment of threats arising from Russia’s growing capabilities to penetrate and even disrupt spacecraft operations, which the United States has periodically alluded to in recent years.

Given these hurdles, it would be extremely difficult for Washington and Moscow to reach an agreement on all these and other space-related issues. Yet giving up on trying to solve the problem would only make things worse. At the same time, one has to acknowledge the limited impact of space weapons on strategic stability. Even the kind of space-based missile defense system that the United States contemplated but never deployed in the early 1980s as part of then president Ronald Reagan’s SDI, given technological realities, would have been incapable of protecting U.S. territory from a retaliatory nuclear strike.

THE RISKS OF A LAUNCH-ON-WARNING POSTURE

Aside from technological innovations, an important aspect of U.S. and Russian nuclear doctrine has implications for strategic stability. Russia and the United States are the only nuclear-armed states capable of a launch-on-warning strike. Such a strike is ordered on the basis of information provided by ballistic-missile early-warning systems. In such a scenario, leaders would have to decide whether to launch a counterstrike under very tight time constraints. This is really only an issue between Washington and Moscow, because the other nuclear-weapon states lack significant counterforce potential against the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces, so the two main nuclear powers do not need to concern themselves with a launch-on-warning strike by these other countries.

But it still remains a risk for the United States and Russia. Apart from possible errors, launch-on-warning strikes are particularly dangerous because a head of state would have extremely little time—literally minutes—to decide whether to launch a strike. The growing role of individual leaders over institutional structures even in democratic states, let alone authoritarian ones, exacerbates these dangers. While this risk primarily applies to Russia and the United States for now, in the future other nuclear powers may adopt this dangerous strategy.

So far, mindful of the risks associated with launch-on-warning strikes, both the United States and Russia have relied primarily on deterrence strategies premised on a traditional retaliatory strike. Actually, in Russia’s case, a launch-on-warning strike designed to protect its ICBMs is no longer relevant. A decision to launch ICBMs before they could be hit by U.S. missiles might have been reasonable in Soviet times, when the country’s forces mostly consisted of stationary ICBMs that were not very survivable. But today, most mobile Russian ICBMs would survive any initial U.S. strike, so a launch-on-warning strike would not be necessary because Moscow could always order a retaliatory strike with its surviving mobile ICBMs, which would dissuade Washington from launching an initial attack in the first place.

Nevertheless, despite the aforementioned reasons for caution, Russia has reaffirmed its launch-on-warning concept. Moscow’s and Washington’s continued insistence on retaining the option of a launch-on-warning strike is unnecessary and dangerous, and the two countries should reconsider their position on this matter.

NUCLEAR MULTIPOLARITY

In addition to emerging military technologies, the fact that more countries now wield nuclear weapons, a phenomenon called nuclear multipolarity, is a salient feature of the twenty-first century global strategic environment. The steady development of China’s nuclear arsenal, the arrival of new nuclear powers like India and Pakistan, and the more recent emergence of a North Korea armed with nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles have complicated the task of maintaining strategic stability.

Russian leaders believe that meaningful strategic arms control in the future has to be multilateral. In 2012, Putin stated that all nuclear powers should participate because, otherwise, Russia and the United States would be “endlessly disarming themselves while other nuclear powers would be building up arms.” In 2013, Moscow responded skeptically to an Obama administration proposal to reduce strategic offensive weapons by one-third below the level agreed to in New START; Russia stated, in effect, that the two parties’ capacities for further bilateral nuclear reductions would be exhausted after New START’s provisions were implemented.

For their part, China and these other emergent nuclear-armed countries have traditionally maintained that multilateral nuclear arms control agreements will only be possible after Russia and the United States reduce their arsenals to the size of other nuclear powers. Additionally, any such agreement, in their view, would have to take into account the number of Russian and U.S. weapons on heavy bombers as well as nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

These conditions are highly unlikely to be met for the foreseeable future. Even if Russia and the United States were able to overcome their differences on any number of sore points and open new negotiations on further reducing their nuclear arsenals, they would only be able to limit their strategic offensive nuclear arsenals to approximately 1,000 warheads. Even those smaller totals would still be many times larger than those of the other nuclear powers. In addition, the prospect of reducing the U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear arsenals would remain uncertain. Even if, for the sake of argument, the size of the Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals were pared down to that of other nuclear powers, there would still likely be insurmountable difficulties to reaching multilateral agreements on verifiable reductions to the total combined number of nonstrategic and strategic weapons, since any experience gained in strategic arms control would not be readily applicable to nonstrategic nuclear arms.

To understand why, recall that, apart from the INF Treaty, Moscow and Washington have always negotiated about reducing strategic nuclear arms, not nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This is at least partly because it is extremely difficult to verify the implementation of agreements involving nonstrategic nuclear weapons (not covered by New START), as many of the relevant delivery vehicles have dual purposes, different typologies, and multiple deployment areas. In addition, except for the UK, all the other nuclear powers are armed with both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and it would be virtually impossible for all these countries to reach a verifiable agreement that covered both.

To illustrate the problem, it is worth mentioning that New START’s verification measuresinclude up to eighteen reciprocal inspections per year and forty-two different obligatory notifications regarding the current state of strategic arms, their movements, and inspection-related matters. The treaty also helps facilitate the exchange of Russian and U.S. telemetric data obtained during missile launches. A new arms control agreement covering multiple countries and nonstrategic nuclear weapons would be exponentially more complicated.

Given these obstacles, the prospect of multilateral nuclear arms control is all but illusory. What is possible instead is step-by-step progress toward consultations between and among nuclear-weapon states on nuclear arms transparency and restraint. Such consultations would help bolster strategic stability in a multipolar nuclear environment.

THE LAST DAYS OF THE INF TREATY

In the meantime, Russia and the United States should strive to preserve existing arms control agreements. The impending or potential collapse of key arms control treaties has complicated efforts to maintain strategic stability in recent years. In February 2019, the U.S. government formally announced that it would withdraw from the INF Treaty later in the year, and soon afterward Moscow responded in kind. Some Russian observers have long criticized the treaty and not only because the Soviet Union had to eliminate more than twice as many missile systems as the United States did. Russians also have been dissatisfied with the INF Treaty because five other nuclear-armed powers geographically close to Russia—China, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan—are armed with intermediate-range missiles, while Moscow had to renounce such missiles under the treaty’s terms.

Russian critics, however, need to remember that even though Russia gave up more weapons, the United States gave up a very threatening capability. U.S. Pershing II ballistic missiles were equipped with high-precision reentry vehicles that could penetrate deep into the earth’s surface and vary their warhead yield depending on the target. Equipped with unique technology, it was the most advanced weapons system of the time. Similarly, U.S. cruise missiles, equipped with a terrain guidance system, had improved accuracy and were not easily detectable by Soviet air defense systems. The features of these missile types, along with the short flight time of Pershing II missiles to their targets (eight to ten minutes), posed a significant threat to hardened central command sites in Moscow where Russia’s leaders might be during a hypothetical U.S. attack.4

In addition, these U.S. capabilities threatened land-based ICBM launchers and other military nuclear infrastructure in the European part of the Soviet Union. A final important factor is that, unlike the Soviet missiles that were eliminated under the INF Treaty (which could not reach U.S. territory), relevant U.S. missiles could strike deep inside the Soviet Union. Given these other factors, the Soviet decision to sign the treaty in 1987 and sacrifice quantity in exchange for a U.S. sacrifice in quality was eminently justifiable.

Notably, even before Trump’s decision to abrogate the INF Treaty, there had been no prospect for making it a multilateral agreement. The missiles prohibited by the treaty make up the bulk of the nuclear arsenals of China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan, and it would be pointless to try to convince them to abandon these weapons and join the treaty, especially considering the aforementioned verification issues.

Russia has few reasons to lament the loss of its medium- and intermediate-range missiles, since new Russian ICBMs are capable of striking the same range of potential targets as the Soviet-era missiles Moscow lost under the INF Treaty.5 The same is true of Russia’s air-launched cruise missiles. Russia’s nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis countries on its periphery is therefore fully guaranteed.

Ultimately, the specific U.S. and Russian mutual allegations of violations of the INF Treaty were not severe enough to directly undermine either party’s deterrent capabilities. This dispute could have been resolved by the treaty’s Joint Verification Commission, but that did not happen, even though several experts offered suggestions on how the differences could be addressed. This failure is hardly a technical issue. Given the ongoing confrontation between the United States and Russia, and the relationship’s prevailing harsh atmosphere, mutual trust has totally broken down.

But the abandonment of the INF Treaty itself will have a strongly negative impact on strategic stability. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will be further eroded, and the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used will increase. If the decision to withdraw from the treaty results in the development and deployment of new, more effective U.S. ballistic and cruise missiles in Europe much closer to Russian borders than during the Cold War—a prospect that the Trump administration denies—Russia would presumably field its own systems targeting NATO military infrastructure. In the end, Russia and NATO would find themselves in a more dangerous confrontation now than they did in the 1980s.

THE POTENTIAL NON-EXTENSION OF NEW START

The INF Treaty is not the only agreement in peril. For decades, strategic nuclear arms agreements between Moscow and Washington like New START have bolstered strategic stability. These agreements have made it possible for the two countries to maintain a stable balance of nuclear forces affordably and receive exhaustive information about the current conditions and future prospects of the modernization of strategic offensive arms. These accomplishments have been made possible by dozens of annual local inspections and exchanges of information and notifications regarding the condition and transporting of nuclear arsenals, the addition or removal of strategic systems, and exchanges of telemetric data from missile launches.

Past experience suggests that a lack of this information inevitably and logically leads countries to overestimate their opponents’ capabilities and, consequently, increase the quality and quantity of their own arsenals at considerable cost. This dynamic can easily lead to a nuclear arms race. If New START were allowed to expire in 2021, strategic stability would be in danger.

Granted, if the information exchanges conducted under the treaty ceased, Russia and the United States could still obtain some data through other technical means, but satellite-based intelligence platforms would be a totally insufficient source of information by comparison. For instance, it would then become difficult to determine the number of warheads deployed on ICBMs and SLBMs. Given the terms of New START, the U.S. Trident II missile typically carries four or five warheads each, although each missile can be equipped with perhaps as many as twelve warheads. Meanwhile, each U.S. Minuteman III ICBM can be equipped with three warheads, although since June 2014 they have typically only carried one. Uploading U.S. Trident II and Minuteman III missiles to their full capacity would more than double the total number of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. Russia’s strategic nuclear forces could take countermeasures, but the strategic balance between the United States and Russia would be impaired.

A FEW WAYS TO REINFORCE STRATEGIC STABILITY

The crisis befalling strategic stability between Russia and the United States can and should be avoided, assuming that Moscow and Washington can muster the political will to pursue four mutually reinforcing steps.

Renew New START. Moscow and Washington need to extend the treaty for five more years and begin negotiations on further reductions of strategic nuclear weapons. If the United States and Russia could trim their nuclear arsenals to approximately 1,000–1,200 weapons and 500–550 delivery vehicles each, that would allow the two countries to preserve the strategic balance and significantly reduce the cost of maintaining their arsenals. The impeccable implementation of New START so far suggests that there is

still a certain amount of trust between U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons professionals. This foundation should be built upon.

Avoid exaggerating the supposed destabilizing effects of certain security factors. Several issues that are widely portrayed as obstacles to U.S.-Russia negotiations on further reductions of strategic nuclear arms need to be tackled in a less emotional fashion without overstating their destabilizing effects. In reality, issues like the nuclear arsenals of other countries, U.S. and NATO missile defense systems, and the hypothetical possibility of a disarming strike with strategic non-nuclear weapons all have little or no effect on the stable nuclear balance between the two countries.

Hold regular talks on strategic stability. Russia and the United States need to conduct open, regular talks on strategic stability along with legislative briefings in both countries. It is important for Moscow and Washington to better understand how new technologies and military programs are creating new capabilities that will affect strategic stability. The development of conventional, cyber, space, anti-satellite, and other offensive weapons technologies may have serious consequences for global security. Ongoing discussions of these issues should lead to practical steps to reduce the risks associated with these developments.

Abandon launch-on-warning nuclear strategies. This important step would help lower the risk of catastrophic errors. Lengthening the time required for leaders to decide whether to launch a retaliatory strike would not undermine deterrence, since such a second strike would still be guaranteed to inflict unacceptable losses on an attacker and therefore dissuade the other party from striking first.

New START is key to future arms control agreements with Russia and China Daryl G. Kimball 19. Executive Director of the Arms Control Association. 5-1-2019. "Trump Arms Control Gambit: Serious or a Poison Pill?" Arms Control Today. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-05/focus/trump-arms-control-gambit-serious-poison-pill. accessed 7-21-2019//JDi

Smart U.S. leadership is an essential part of the nuclear risk reduction equation . Unfortunately, after more than two years into President Donald Trump’s term in office, his administration has failed to present a credible strategy to reduce the risks posed by the still enormous U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals , which comprise more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear

weapons. Instead, Trump has threatened to accelerate and “win” an arms race with nuclear-armed Russia and China as tensions with both states have grown . Trump has shunned a proposal supported by his own Defense and State departments to engage in strategic stability talks with

Moscow. Trump also has ordered the termination of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty without a viable

plan B, and his national security team has dithered for more than a year on beginning talks with Russia to extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) before it expires in February 2021. Now, the president is dropping hints that he wants some sort of grand, new arms control deal with Russia and China . “Between Russia and

China and us, we’re all making hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of weapons, including nuclear, which is ridiculous,” Trump said on April 4 as he hosted Chinese Vice Premier Liu He in the

Oval Office. According to an April 25 report in The Washington Post, Trump formally ordered his team to reach out to Russia and China on options for new arms control agreements . The instructions on Russia apparently call for the pursuit of limits on so-called nonstrategic nuclear

weapons, a category of short-range, lower-yield weapons that has never been subject to a formal arms control arrangement. At first glance, that may sound promising.

Bringing other nuclear actors and all types of nuclear weapons into the disarmament process is an important and

praiseworthy objective. But this administration has no plan, strategy, or capacity to negotiate such a far- reaching deal . Even if it did, negotiations would likely take years. China, which is estimated to possess a total of 300 nuclear warheads, has never been party to any agreement that

limits the number or types of its nuclear weaponry. Beijing is highly unlikely to engage in any such talks until the United States and Russia significantly cut their far larger arsenals, estimated at 6,500 warheads each. Russian President Vladimir Putin may be open to broader arms

control talks with Trump, but he has a long list of grievances about U.S. policies and weapons systems , particularly the ever-

expanding U.S. missile defense architecture. The Trump administration’s 2019 Missile Defense Review report says there can be no limits of any kind on U.S. missile defenses—a nonstarter for

Russia. These realities, combined with the well-documented antipathy of Trump’s national security advisor, John Bolton, to New START strongly suggest that this new grand-deal gambit does not represent a serious attempt to halt and reverse a global arms race. It is more likely that Trump and Bolton are scheming to walk away from New START by setting conditions they know to be too difficult

to achieve. With less than two years to go before New START expires , Washington and Moscow need to begin working immediately to reach agreement to extend the treaty by five years. Despite their strained relations , it is in their mutual interest to maintain verifiable caps on their enormous strategic nuclear stockpiles. Without New START, which limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, there will be no legally binding

limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals for the first time in nearly five decades. Extending New START would provide a necessary foundation and additional time for any follow-on deal with Russia that addresses other issues of mutual concern, including nonstrategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range weapons, and understandings on the location and capabilities of missile defense systems and advanced

conventional-strike weapons that each country is developing. A treaty extension could help put pressure on China to provide more

information about its nuclear weapons and fissile material stockpiles . China also might be more likely to agree to freeze the overall size of its nuclear arsenal or agree to limit a certain class of weapons , such as nuclear-

armed cruise missiles, so long as the United States and Russia continue to make progress to reduce their far larger and more capable arsenals. If in the coming weeks, however, Team Trump suggests China must join New START or that Russia must agree to limits on tactical nuclear weapons as a condition for its extension,

that should be recognized as a disingenuous poison pill designed to create a pretext for killing New START. Before Trump and Bolton try to raise the stakes for nuclear arms

control success, they must demonstrate they are committed to working with Russia to extend the most crucial, existing agreement : New START .

New START is key to US-Russia arms limitationsPifer 19 (Steven Pifer, Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Center on the United States and Europe, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative Brookings, "Extending New START is a no-brainer—And yet, we can’t count on it," https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/20/extending-new-start-is-a-no-brainer-and-yet-we-cant-count-on-it/, 2-20-2019, acc 7-20-2019//Sarwa)

The Trump administration has finished off the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a treaty mortally wounded by Russia’s deployment of a banned intermediate-range missile. That leaves the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) as the sole agreement limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.

New START has less than two years to run. At the February 15-16 Munich Security Conference, a senior Russian official reiterated Moscow’s readiness to extend the treaty. The administration, however, continues its odd reluctance to take up that offer. House Democrats should use their power of the purse on the issue.

WHY EXTENSION MAKES SENSE

Signed in 2010, New START limits the United States and Russia each to no more than 700 strategic ballistic missiles and bombers, and no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads. Those limits took full effect in February 2018. Both sides have complied, although technical questions have arisen. Russian officials question the way in which the U.S. military converted some launchers so that they would not count.

By its terms, New START runs until February 5, 2021. It can be extended for up to five years by simple agreement between the U.S. and Russian presidents.

When asked about extension in 2017, administration officials said they would wait to complete the nuclear posture review and to see if the Russians met the New START limits. Both of those boxes were checked more than a year ago. Administration officials now say they are studying extension but see no need to rush.

New START extension is in the U.S. interest.

First, extension would constrain Russian strategic nuclear forces until 2026. It makes little sense to let the treaty lapse in 2021, when Russia has hot production lines churning out new missiles, submarines, and bombers.

Second, New START extension would not impact U.S. strategic modernization plans. They are sized to fit within New START’s limits. Moreover, the United States will not start producing significant numbers of replacement missiles, submarines, and bombers until the second half of the 2020s.

Third, extension would continue the flow of information that the sides share with each other about their strategic forces. That comes from data exchanges, notifications, on-site inspections and other verification measures, all of which end if New START lapses. Making up for that loss of information would require a costly investment in new national technical means such as reconnaissance satellites.

Retaining a strategic triad makes sense (though the need for 400 deployed ICBMs is debatable). Retaining New START makes sense as well. House Democrats should simply insist on a trade.

AFF ANSWERS

AT: Arms Control NB

Counterplan – 2AC1. Perm do both2. Perm do the counterplan- counterplans should compete textually and functionally off the

mandate of the plan, not implementation3. Perm do the aff and all possible combinations of planks4. Perm consult over something else

5. The aff doesn’t have to fiat certainty or immediacy-a. should isn’t certain

Black’s Law dictionary 79 (Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 1237)

Should. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although usually no

more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from “ought.” It is not normally synonymous with “may,” and although often interchangeable with the word

“would,” it does not ordinarily express certainty as “will” sometimes does.

b. Should isn’t immediateDictionary.com 10 – (“Definition: Should”, dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/should)

should /ʃʊd/ Show Spelled[shood] Show IPA –auxiliary verb 1. pt. of shall. 2. (used to express condition): Were he to arrive, I should be pleased. 3. must; ought (used to indicate duty, propriety, or expediency): You should not do that. 4. would (used to make a statement less direct or blunt): I should think you would apologize. Use should in a Sentence See images of should Search should on the Web Origin: ME sholde, OE sc ( e ) olde; see shall –Can be confused:  could, should, would (see usage note at this entry ). –Synonyms 3. See must1 . –Usage note Rules similar to those for choosing between shall and will have long been advanced for should and would, but again the rules have had little effect on usage. In most constructions, would is the auxiliary chosen regardless of the person of the subject: If our allies would support the move, we would abandon any claim to sovereignty. You would be surprised at the complexity of the directions. Because the main function of should in modern American English is to express duty, necessity, etc. ( You should get your flu shot before winter comes ), its use for other purposes, as to form a subjunctive, can produce ambiguity, at least initially: I should get my flu shot if I were you. Furthermore, should seems an affectation to many Americans when used in certain constructions quite common in British English: Had I been informed, I should (American would ) have called immediately. I should (American would ) really prefer a different arrangement. As with shall and will, most educated native speakers of American English do not follow the textbook rule in making a choice between should and would. See also shall. Shall –auxiliary verb, present singular 1st person shall, 2nd shall or ( Archaic ) shalt, 3rd shall, present plural shall; past singular 1st person should, 2nd should or ( Archaic ) shouldst or should·est, 3rd should, past plural should; imperative, infinitive, and participles lacking. 1. plan to, intend to, or expect to: I shall go later.

c. “Resolved” isn’t certainWebster 9 – (Merriam Webster 2009, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved)

# Main Entry: 1re·solve # Pronunciation: \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzolv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzov\ # Function: verb # Inflected Form(s): re·solved; re·solv·ing 1 : to become separated into component parts; also : to become reduced by dissolving or analysis 2 : to form a resolution : determine 3 : consult, deliberate

d. Resolved isn’t immediatePTE 9 –( Online Plain Text English Dictionary 2009, http://www.onelook.com/?other=web1913&w=Resolve)

Resolve: “To form a purpose; to make a decision; especially, to determine after reflection; as, to resolve on a better course of life.”

6. Process CP’s are a voter

a. Predictability – infinite number of normal means standards they could hold us accountable for we’d never be prepared

b. Education – sidesteps topic education to discuss implementation that can be run on any topic – discourages in depth research

c. No solvency advocate is an independent voter - must have one specific to the plan that it SHOULD be done via their process otherwise it promotes bad debate

d. C/I can’t involve possibility of doing entire plan – otherwise crushes aff offense and we can’t be read for every artificial net benefit

7. The net benefit is absurd- no spillover, Congress won’t ever use it again or they’d use it now- and President would say to any future deals, there’s no real benefit to Trump giving veto power to the House Democrats

8. Can’t solve- Senate GOP will just go along with Trump no matter what9. Can’t solve- contracts are key- they have symbolic value

Uniqueness – New STARTNew START is deadPifer 19 (Steven Pifer, Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Center on the United States and Europe, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative Brookings, "Extending New START is a no-brainer—And yet, we can’t count on it," https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/20/extending-new-start-is-a-no-brainer-and-yet-we-cant-count-on-it/, 2-20-2019, acc 7-20-2019//Sarwa)

WHY WE SHOULD WORRY

Extension should be a no-brainer. However, in a White House that operates on its own facts and at times with an indecipherable logic, extension is not a given.

President Trump does not seem to understand much about nuclear arms control. During his first telephone conversation with President Putin, Trump reportedly dismissed New START as a bad deal done by his predecessor. He has taken delight in undoing the accomplishments of President Obama (witness the Iran nuclear accord).

National Security Advisor Bolton shows disdain for arms control and has criticized New START. One of its faults, according to Mr. Bolton: It provides for equal limits on the United States and Russia. He felt the treaty should allow the U.S. military to have more. (U.S. diplomats would have had an interesting time trying to negotiate that.) Asked about New START extension, Mr. Bolton notes two alternatives: renegotiation and a new treaty modeled on the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).

Renegotiation would allow U.S. officials to try to improve New START, perhaps with more intrusive verification measures, or even broadening the agreement to cover non-strategic nuclear weapons. Moscow, however, would seek changes as well, such as constraints on missile defenses—anathema to Washington.

Renegotiation would prove difficult, take considerable time, and have at best uncertain prospects for success. A wiser course would extend New START and then seek a renegotiation or a new follow-on treaty.

As for SORT, negotiated by Mr. Bolton, it limited deployed warheads only. Mr. Putin accepted that in 2002, but Russian officials have long since made clear that limits should apply to warheads and delivery vehicles, as they do in New START.

SORT, moreover, was “sort of” arms control. Lacking agreed definitions, counting rules or monitoring measures, it was unverifiable. In doing their own counts on the honor system, the U.S. and Russian militaries may not have even counted the same things.

Neither Secretary of State Pompeo nor Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan has shown interest in championing New START. The uniformed military leadership argued the treaty’s value in the past, but Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Joseph Dunford recently has hedged.

While ratification of a treaty requires consent from two-thirds of the Senate, the president alone can decide to leave a treaty. The Trump administration did not consult with either Congress or allies on withdrawal before Trump announced his intention to pull out of the treaty last October.

Uniqueness---Arms ControlNot enough staff for effective arms control Julian Borger 7/1. The Guardian's world affairs editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans. 7-1-2019. "US arms control office critically understaffed under Trump, experts say." Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/01/us-arms-control-office-understaffed-trump. accessed 7-21-2019//JDi

A state department office tasked with negotiating and implementing nuclear disarmament treaties has lost

more than 70% of its staff over the past two years, as the Trump administration moves towards a world without arms control for the first time in nearly half a century. The Office of Strategic Stability and Deterrence Affairs, normally a repository of expertise

and institutional knowledge that does the heavy lifting of arms control, has been whittled down from 14 staffers at the start of the Trump administration

to four , according to the former staffers . The state department declined to comment. The state department has instead focused its arms control efforts on

“creating the environment for disarmament” (CEND)shifting the onus for disarmament from the nuclear weapons powers to non-weapons states. An invitation to a 2 July state department conference on the subject invites non-nuclear states to come up with “measures to modify the security environment to reduce incentives for states to retain, acquire, or increase their holdings

of nuclear weapons”. The shift in approach comes as the administration claims to be conducting a review on whether to extend the New Start agreement limiting US and Russian strategic nuclear warheads, or find an alternative to it that would include China and new weapons

systems. Vladimir Putin has said Russia is in favour of a New Start extension, but warned that time is running out. “If we do not begin talks now, it would be over because there would be no time even for formalities,” Putin told the Financial Times. There was no sign Putin and Trump came any closer to agreement when they met at the G20 summit in Osaka on Friday. The White House said the leaders agreed to keep talking about a “21st-century model of arms control, which President Trump stated as needing to include China”. China has ruled out participation in an arms control agreement with US and Russia whose nuclear arsenals are 20 times bigger than the Chinese, estimated at fewer than 300 warheads. Even if Beijing were willing, a trilateral agreement would require extensive and prolonged negotiation. But former officials and arms control experts in Congress say there have been no serious consideration of what to do when New Start expires in February 2021. “There is no one home,” a congressional staffer involved in arms control said. “There is no serious effort to come up with a plan. There is nothing real going on.” Frank Rose, who was assistant secretary of state for arms control until 2017, said he had tried to rebuild the strategic stability bureau when he was in office, especially by recruiting a young

generation of experts. “We’ve got a real problem,” Rose said. “Regardless of your views on whether we should extend New Start or negotiate a new

agreement, you need to have career expertise to actually do the negotiations .” He added: “You don’t grow these people overnight. It takes time and nurturing .” Pranay Vaddi, a former member of the strategic stability office, said: “The main mission of that office is

implementing the existing arms control agreements with Russia – the nuclear ones, New Start and INF and the sort of running the interagency process.” After an exodus of most of the office’s staffers at the end of last year, Vaddi said: “The bottom line is that, for a myriad of reasons, the state department isn’t equipped [to pursue arms control negotiations].” Few experts believe that the downgrading of the state department’s capacity to negotiate disarmament agreements is a case of negligence . It is more widely seen as a deliberate strategy directed by John Bolton , Trump’s national security adviser, and a lifelong opponent of arms control agreements which he sees as unnecessary constraints on US sovereignty.

Intrinsic perms

Perm do the aff and consult congress over export of weapons.Sciarra ’88 (Vanessa Patton - DOJ Trial Attorney. JD Yale, BA Yale “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure,” 97 Yale L.J. (1988). LexisNexus. JJN)

However, statutes involving the export of weapons, nuclear materials and sensitive technologies all typically involve agreements made with foreign governments and could be subject to a fast-track guarantee procedure. Other agreements to participate in bilateral or multilateral undertakings, such as agreements to establish or renew foreign military bases, could also be handled under the procedure . In each case,

Congress will have to assess whether the balance established under broad delegation is preferable to the balance established with a power-sharing mechanism like the fast-track guarantee procedure.

Pres Powers – 2ACThe CP forces an interbranch fight setting a precedent that destroys prez powersKlukowski 11 (Resefarch Fellow, Liberty University School of Law; Fellow and Senior Legal Analyst, American Civil Rights Union; National-Bestselling Author. George Mason University School of Law, J.D. “Making Executive Privliege Work: A Multi-Factor Test in an Age of Czars and Congressional Oversight.” 59 Clev. St. L. Rev. 31.)

Most controversies between Congress and the White House over information are decided more by politics than by law, and so a settlement is

usually reached favoring the party with the public wind to its back. n348 Questions of law should not be decided in that fashion. Therefore, the reach and scope of executive privilege should be settled by the courts in such situations, so that the President's power is not impaired whenever the political wind is in the President's face and at his opponents' backs, or the President is inappropriately shielded when political tides flow in his favor.

While the best outcome in any interbranch dispute is the political branches reaching a settlement, "such compromise may not

always be available, or even desirable." n349 It is not desirable where it sets a precedent that degrades one of the three branches of government. If one branch of government demands something to which it is not constitutionally entitled and that the Constitution has fully vested in a coequal branch, the vested branch should not be required to negotiate on the question . Negotiation usually involves compromise. This negotiation

would often result in one branch needing to cede to the other , encourag ing additional unconstitutional demands in the future . Though this may perhaps be a quicker route to a resolution, it disrupts the constitutional balance in government . As the Supreme Court has recently explained, "'convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives--or the hallmarks--

of democratic government.'" President Reagan declared that "you aren't President; you are temporarily custodian of an institution, the Presidency. And you don't have any right to do away with any of the prerogatives of that institution, and one of those is executive privilege. And this is what was being attacked by the Congress."

n351 Thus, any White House has the obligation to fight to protect executive privilege , and the courts should draw the line to preserve that constitutional prerogative . Likewise, there are times when it is the President who is refusing to give Congress its due under the Constitution, where Congress must assert its prerogatives for future generations. Conversely, where confidentiality is not warranted, courts must ensure public disclosure and accountability.

Causes extreme restraint and spillover Rottinghaus 17 (2017, Brandon Rottinghaus, University of Houston, Exercising Unilateral Discretion: Presidential Justifications of Unilateral Powers in a Shared Powers System, American Politics Research)

Presidents gain legal authority to act from both the Constitution and from statutes, making the Court a key element in the explanation of the use of presidential prerogative (Whittington, 2009). This arrangement is supported by Justice Robert Jackson’s famous “practical grouping” of presidential power in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). When the president acts under authority delegated by Congress, in addition to his constitutional authority, presidential power is at its maximum and most safe from judicial oversight. This is confirmed by recent scholarship, which has shown that even during wartime the Supreme Court usually casts itself as an auditor of process, checking to see if Congress has delegated authority to the president,

rather than as an umpire of zero sum contests between executive power and individual rights (Pildes & Issacharoff, 2004). Because, as

Justice Jackson wrote in Youngstown, “presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending on their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress,” the Court may intervene to limit the exercise of unilateral power on Congress’ behalf. This intervention is rare in practice but this arrangement does provide for the possibility of judicial oversight and this may alter the amount of discretion employed by the president in a unilateral order . Joint, Congress–Court rejection of a president’s orders would limit executive reach

so presidents are strategic in considering institutional disagreement when they face a united front in the other two branches of government. We presume the circumstances under which the president will issue a unilateral order with broad or narrow discretion are influenced by the political constraints of Congress and the Courts. Mayer (2009) argues that “broad grants [of

authority], ambiguity and the potential for swift action are a compelling combination” (p. 432). When presidents have broad discretion, it gives the president the authority to act when they determine such action to be expedient . Presidents in general prefer to justify their orders with broad discretion, providing them maximum flexibility and the greatest latitude to secure

their policy aims with an order. Yet, there is a potential cost to issuing an order with broad authority, even if properly used, in that Congress may object to an expansive use of authority or the courts may strike the order down on the grounds it exceeds the executive’s authority. A Congress and Supreme Court which is at ideological loggerheads with a president may object to the president’s use of an order with broad discretion because of the policy latitude it affords a president. A president must weigh the possible backlash in their justification of the authority relied upon in an order. Although unilateral orders are rarely overturned, the prospect of a rebuke

from either Congress or the Courts (and risking permanent inability to act in the future ) may alter a president’s behavior . Strategic presidents will issue an order with broad justification in political circumstances when they think they can get away with it. What political circumstances motivate presidents to cite broad authority? We argue the greater the distance in ideology between the president and the median member of Congress, the more likely the president should be to issue more orders under broad discretion. When the president and Congress are similar in ideological orientation, presidents are more comfortable broadening their legislative reach through statute with a unilateral order because they believe Congress will back them up if there are any interpretive differences. Congress is comfortable allowing (not challenging) the president who issues an order with broad discretion because they generally agree ideologically and they trust the president to pursue an agreeable policy outcome. From these findings and extending this logic, we estimate the distance between the president and the median member of Congress and expect that presidents are more likely to issue an order with broad discretion when there is greater distance in ideology between the president and the median members of each chamber (Hypothesis 1). Using similar logic, the greater the distance in ideology between the president and the median member of the Supreme Court, the more likely the president is to issue more orders with broad discretion (independent of Congress; Hypothesis 2). With broad discretion, the president is comfortable exercising unilateral power when only one branch may push back. The Court has also usually avoided solo, head-on confrontations with the chief executive (Cooper, 2002). The Courts have generally been deferential to the executive, especially on matters involving executive prerogative, in times of crisis and when the president has taken decisive action (Melnick, 2005). The president has flexibility to execute the laws but this ends if he seeks to alter the “plain letter of the law” (Rudalevige, 2014). The Court’s doctrine of decision making on cases involving executive power favors the president and, even when challenged, presidents are more likely to reap outcomes favorable to their use of executive power (specifically challenges to the use of executive orders) when the majority of the justices deciding the case are from the same political party as the president (Howell, 2003). Ideological goals within the Court that are more proximate from the White House’s ideology (often on issues of executive power) yield a president who should be more willing to exercise the full weight of his discretion in unilateral orders and a court that embraces a doctrine to allow more executive institutional control. The additive frictional effect, however, should have the

opposite outcome. Presidents want to avoid joint confrontation with both Congress and the Courts given that this is a powerful recipe for halting executive use of power (either temporarily or permanently) as discussed in the previous section. For instance, when the executive is delegated broad discretion, it positions him to implement policy that may deviate from legislative intent (Mayer, 2009) prompting a possible judicial challenge (Thrower, 2016). Because the president can justify his order using a

number of statutory and nonstatutory options, presidents tend to choose an option that is least odious to possible judicial oversight (J. D. Bailey & Rottinghaus, 2014; Quint, 1989). Wishing to avoid an interbranch entanglement, presidents may “seek

favorable legislative terms that can insulate their decisions from judicial review” (Whittington, 2009, p. 655). Being generally risk averse, in practice this implies that presidents mitigate larger claims of discretionary action when acting unilaterally. As Justice Jackson’s holding implies, presidents who run afoul of Congress (here operationalized as greater ideological distance) and who face a court predisposed to disagree with a president (here also operationalized as greater ideological distance), a strategic president should adjust their citation pattern and narrow their authority as cited in the text of the order. Therefore, when the president’s ideology is farther from both the median justice’s ideology and the median member of a Congressional chamber’s ideology, he should (a) continue to use their discretionary unilateral power but (b) mute that power so as not to aggravate two branches of government (Hypothesis 3).5 That is, we should continue to see presidents utilizing executive power based on statutory authority, but that power will be justified using more narrow authority instead of broad authority. When the president and Congress are farther apart ideologically, but not the Court, presidents face the need for greater interpretative room to establish an executive order and will maximize their ability to control the outcome of that policymaking

process. The Court may decline to intervene and/or Congress may ignore the issue, but the potential of disagreement or stoppage of a policy should be enough incentive for presidents to self moderate their use of discretion. The potential of having two branches of government jointly minimize a policy and

set a precedent that may be difficult to work around will incentivize a strategic president to narrow the scope of their authority under the cited justifications in the text of the order. This allows the White House to insulate their unilateral decision-making process for possible review and rejection.

War powers solve crisis escalation, WMD prolif, AND nuclear terror Yoo 17 (April 13th, 2017, John Yoo is the Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “Trump’s Syria Strike Was Constitutional,” https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/04/trump-syria-strike-constitutional-presidents-have-broad-war-powers)

Common sense does not support replacing the way our Constitution has worked in wartime with a radically different system that mimics the peacetime balance of powers between president and Congress. If the issue were the environment or Social Security, Congress would enact policy first and the president would faithfully implement it second. But the Constitution does not

duplicate this system in war. Instead, our Framers decided that the president would play the leading role in matters of national security . If the issue were the environment or Social Security, Congress would enact policy first and the president would faithfully implement it second. Those in the pro-Congress camp call upon the anti-monarchical origins of the American Revolution for support. If the Framers rebelled against King George III’s dictatorial powers, surely they would not give the president much authority. It is true that the revolutionaries rejected the royal prerogative, and they created weak executives at the state level. Americans have long turned a skeptical eye toward the growth of federal powers. But this may mislead some to resist the fundamental difference in the Constitution’s treatment of domestic and foreign affairs. For when the Framers wrote the Constitution in 1787, they rejected these failed experiments and restored an independent, unified chief executive

with its own powers in national security and foreign affairs. The most important of the president’s powers are those of commander in chief and chief executive. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 74: The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength , and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority. Presidents should conduct war , he wrote, because they could act with “ decision , activity , secrecy and dispatch .” In perhaps his most famous words, Hamilton wrote: “Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government . . . . It is essential to the protection of

the community against foreign attacks.” The Framers realized the obvious . Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes , making them unsuitable to regulation by preexisting legislation . Instead,

they can demand swift, decisive action — sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances

— that is best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or that is delayed by disagreements . Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Our Framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because they had no single executive, with the

Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch , Congress’s loose, decentralized structure would paralyze American policy while foreign threats grew . Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Congress’s track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one. Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress’s isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and Fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States

out of the conflict. President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. While pro-Congress critics worry about a president’s foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security could come from inaction and isolationism . Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without

the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War and the passage of the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the resolution in 1973 over President Richard Nixon’s veto, and no president has ever accepted the

constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. No federal court has ever upheld the resolution . Even Congress has never enforced it . Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue that we should radically remake the American way of war.

They typically base their claim on Congress’s power to “declare war.” But these observers read the 18th-century constitutional text through a modern lens by interpreting “declare war” to mean “start war.” When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain — where the Framers got the idea of declaring war — fought numerous major conflicts but declared war only once beforehand. Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers, and making treaties. There are none for waging war because the Framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process. In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.” This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the Framers had wanted to require congressional permission before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive. Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay, or modify war plans. Before 1945, the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. Since World War II, Congress has authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power worldwide. If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offense-minded military. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. Congress’s check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse. If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president’s decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually. It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action. Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation. The Framers expected Congress’s power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention. Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the

purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the war. Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by Congress’s funding power. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo, or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen

not to exercise its easy check. We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution. A radical change in the system for

making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security . In order to forestall another 9/11 attack , or take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations , the executive branch needs flexibility . It is not hard to think of

situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation, which can lead to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions , will come at the price of speed and secrecy . The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security .

Presidents can take the initiative, and Congress can use its funding power to check presidents. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the Framers left war to politics. As we confront the new challenges of terrorism , rogue nations , and WMD proliferation , now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.

Pres Powers – UQ – 1ARStatutory authority is unchecked---any previous actions have fallen short of real constraints. Hay 18 (Trade and economics reporter. “Congress Hates Trump's Trade Wars, but It Won't Do Anything About Them,” 8/21/2018. https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/d3ejbq/why-congress-wont-do-anything-about-trump-tariffs)

But that resolution, of course, had no impact on Trump’s escalating tariffs. And Congress hasn’t taken the next, more drastic step of passing a law (presumably over Trump’s veto) to limit the president’s tariff powers, or claim more oversight over them. Nor has Congress taken serious action on other issues of bipartisan malaise over which the legislature could reasonably assert control, like the president’s overly broad powers to authorize the use of military force across the world under the auspices of the war on terror. This raises the natural question for casual observers, eternally frustrated with

the body’s seeming spinelessness, as to why Congress is so reticent to check the presidency—especially under a president as capricious as our current commander-in-chief. In fairness to Congress, influential bipartisan groups of

legislators in both chambers are still flogging a number of bills that would constrain Trump’s powers. A coalition of

longtime Republican Trump critics in the Senate, like Jeff Flake and Bob Corker, as well as more Trump-friendly politicians like Pat

Toomey, are pushing hard for a vote on a bill that would require congressional approval for certain types of

presidentially-imposed tariffs. Even Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch, a nominal Trump ally, is using his position to slowly craft similar shackling legislation. Given all the legislative ideas and energy floating around on trade, Whiting is hopeful that Congress will be able to pass some sort of law reasserting its powers over trade policy, ideally within the next few months. Whiting’s hopes notwithstanding,

most analysts agree that these measures will not gain any traction . In large part, that’s because Republicans know that Trump’s tariffs have not had a material impact on their base, aside from farmers. They know that the president remains fairly popular within the GOP , even in states that have been hit harder than others

by his trade policies. And they know, stressed congressional analyst Mark Harkins, that Trump is unique among recent presidents in his willingness to “destroy” his political opponents , even those within his own party . “Most Republicans who have tried challenging him have not fared well politically ,” said Simon Lester, a trade policy expert at the libertarian-leaning Cato Institute. This fear makes it hard for Republicans to muster party unity on even symbolic votes to slap Trump on the wrist . It is also hard for them to form veto-proof coalitions with Democrats, who Congress watcher John Johannes noted “are in a hunker-down mood, waiting for the November elections.” A fair number of Democrats also quietly support Trump’s protectionism to a degree, pointed out Peterson Institute for International Economics fellow Jacob Kirkegaard; Democrat Sherrod Brown recently blocked an attempt to advance the Senate’s GOP-backed trade powers bill. These constraints have led GOP leaders to avoid advancing

bills in favor of trying to talk Trump down on trade unofficially, although that has not been successful. Even without the unique pressures of the Trump era , the experts I’ve spoken to agreed that Congress is generally reticent to go toe- to-toe with the executive branch over political powers . Some of that stems from Congress’s general dysfunction and inaction, said Harkins. A lot more of it stems from a longstanding sense of deference to the president on national security . “It is not a coincidence that Trump has chosen a set of national security rules” to issue his tariffs, said Kirkegaard. “The Constitution is clear on which branch of government deals with trade policy, but

national security is on the presidential side.” Especially in a post-9/11 world , he added, legislators are loath to question those prerogatives. If Trump does something truly drastic or insane, like unilaterally pulling out of NAFTA, that would likely spur legislative action, noted Kirkegaard. If he followed through on his talk about a tariff on cars, which would

impact many voters, Congress might feel compelled to respond, though Kirkegaard and others I spoke to doubted that even that

would be enough . Trump actually has crossed a few Rubicons to date —like refusing to define a strategy to fight ISIS, taking a radically soft approach with his Russia rhetoric, and allowing Chinese telecom company ZTE to operate in the US. Those moves have prompted substantive legislative action beyond symbolic resolutions, like

those supporting NATO or the free press against his attacks. But these steps have fallen far short of serious challenges to presidential powers.

Presidential powers strong now Galbraith 18 (Jean Galbraith law professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2018, “The Separation of Powers Today”, Insights on Law and Society, Volume 18, Issue 1, Available Online at: https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/insights-on-law-and-society/2018/issue-1-2018/separation-of-powers-today.html Accessed 8-24-2018)

The rise of presidential power owes much to congressional action and inaction. Because the framers failed to foresee the party system, they did not realize how it might hinder Congress’s ability to act as a check on the president. Where they share a

party affiliation, members of Congress will typically view the president as an ally and may therefore be unwilling to curtail his or her power. As for members of Congress who do not share a party affiliation with the president, they will find it difficult to pass any legislation, let alone legislation that restricts presidential power . Because of the president’s veto power, Congress needs two-thirds majorities in both houses to pass any legislation to which the president objects. Such supermajorities require bipartisanship. This can sometimes be obtained: Congress’s recent bill bringing new sanctions to bear on Russia, Iran, and North Korea had such

strong bipartisan support that President Trump reluctantly signed it into law, thus avoiding a veto override. Yet major legislation that meaningfully restricts presidential power is very hard to pass. Not only does Congress usually fail to check

presidential power, but it often acts to enhance it . As recent years have shown vividly, Congress has difficulty passing

major legislation. When such legislation does get passed, it typically delegates a great deal of authority to the president and other executive branch officials. By way of example, the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act instruct the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to pass regulations that protect our air and water, but these statutes leave the EPA with considerable discretion to determine what it will regulate and when it will do so. Such delegations are appealing to Congress for several reasons. As a matter of process, they enable Congress to capitalize on ambiguity, avoiding difficult decisions that might otherwise make the legislation impossible to pass. As a

matter of substance, they provide flexibility that is functionally needed for governance. And once passed, these statutes will linger for years, as their revision or repeal proves hard to obtain.

Executive power strong now—Trump can easily circumvent statutory restrictions, but the plan’s enforcement destroys deference to the executive on national security Anderson 18 (August 23rd, 2018, Scott R. Anderson is a David M. Rubenstein fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, previously served as an Attorney-Adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State, “What to Make of Trump's NDAA Signing Statement,” https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-make-trumps-ndaa-signing-statement)

All of this more or less comports with what we know about Trump’s approach to his own national security-related constitutional authorities thus far. While he has flaunted presidential norms and conventions in a variety areas, Trump has not yet made dramatic new assertions of constitutional authority over foreign affairs and national security . A report submitted earlier

this year to update Congress on changes to the legal and policy framework for the use of force and related national security operations held over from the Obama

administration highlighted only a few relatively minor modifications . Even the legal justification for Trump’s signature assertion of execution power—the strikes he has twice pursued against Syria’s Assad regime for its chemical weapons activities, without

congressional authorization—builds only slightly on precedents set by his predecessors. In part this is because Trump, like his

immediate predecessors, can often cite broad statutory authorizations like the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force in support of his actions, meaning he

does not need to rely on his constitutional authority alone. And in part, this reflects the breadth of

presidential authority that the executive branch has come to claim as a matter of course , regardless of who is president. Of course, this does not mean that Trump’s signing statement presents no cause for concern. The Trump administration has shown itself willing to wield executive privilege aggressively in other contexts, which may mean that its objection to the NDAA’s reporting requirements will have a significant impact on the amount of information disclosed. Moreover, this would be in sync with the Trump administration’s policy reservations about transparency on national security issues as well as other policies it has adopted limiting it. Trump’s poorly explained pushback on civilian casualty reports is similarly concerning, particularly as apathy about the impact of military operations on civilians has become a significant point of criticism for his administration. And Trump’s open-ended objections relating to his foreign affairs and commander in chief authorities do still leave open the possibility that he will ultimately adopt aggressive constitutional views that severely undermine the NDAA’s implementation, even if he has not chosen to do so thus far. The signing statement alone, however, is not an indicator that any of these worst-case scenarios will come to pass. If anything, it helps to flag these as issues to watch closely as the Trump administration proceeds to implement the NDAA,

when other institutions—most notably Congress—will have opportunities to further guide its actions. What Comes Next... Regardless of the ultimate scope of its constitutional objections, the Trump administration seems likely to implement some provisions of the NDAA in a manner that Congress did not intend—or at least, not as they were drafted. How will these conflicts between Congress and the executive branch—both of whom presumably contend to be acting in line with the constitution—

be resolved? In many cases, no such conflict will ever arise. Some of the NDAA’s most controversial provisions—on recognition

in Crimea, troops in North Korea, and cooperation with Russia, to name a few—only have legal effect if Trump wishes to take certain extreme actions. In this sense, they serve as guardrails, making Congress’s objections clear and triggering a political (or even constitutional) fight if Trump steers U.S. foreign policy off the road. If they have the deterrent

effect intended, this will never occur and the debate over the constitutionality of these provisions will remain primarily academic. Other NDAA provisions, however, must be either applied or ignored at some point . How the Trump administration chooses to do so is subject to judicial review , but in practice this rarely occurs . While the political question doctrine

is no longer an obstacle to such adjudication, other legal doctrines—such as standing, ripeness, and mootness—often make legal challenges difficult. Moreover,

such litigation can take substantial time, making it less useful for resolving conflicts over provisions that relate to particularly time-sensitive decisions. And until the courts issue a contrary ruling, the executive branch’s interpretation is likely to remain the operational one . For these reasons, these conflicts are most likely to play out through continued dialogue among the political branches . In some cases, the president may succeed in persuading Congress to concede on a particular issue , either by accepting his interpretation or amending the contested provision. For example, after a prior NDAA prohibited U.S.-Russian military cooperation, the Trump administration interpreted that prohibition as not reaching efforts to de-conflict U.S. and Russian military operations in Syria. While this interpretation had little support in the text of that provision—and in fact ignored a waiver provision seemingly designed for such purposes—Congress not only accepted it with no apparent controversy but revised the

prohibition in this year’s NDAA to exempt de-confliction activities. That said, if the president persists in an interpretation with which it does not agree, Congress has ways it can put additional pressure on him. The most direct method is to enact penalties for non-compliance through follow-on legislation, most often by withholding funding—an area widely seen as within Congress’s constitutional prerogative—from certain administration priorities. Indeed, several provisions in the new NDAA play this role by restricting certain security assistance funds until the executive branch provides Congress with reports on the U.S. strategy in Iraq and Syria that it requested in last year’s NDAA but never received. (And notably, while Trump’s signing statement raises concerns with these provisions, he focuses on preconditions and reporting requirements contained in each, not the funding restriction—an omission that may reflect the Trump administration’s tacit acceptance of the extent of Congress’s power of the purse.)

That said , the president’s veto authority can make enacting such retributive measures difficult. Hence members of Congress may instead pursue other retributive measures, such as holding up Trump administration nominations. Or they may seek to use letters to senior officials, floor statements, and congressional hearings to try and bring these

conflicts to the attention of the ultimate arbiter: the voting public, whose decisions provide the clearest incentives for the political branches. Regardless, neither the NDAA nor Trump’s signing statement are likely to control how these conflicts will be resolved . Instead,

they are merely opening salvos in a new round of inter-branch dispute, which is arguably the defining feature of our separation of powers . Those who are inclined to read the worst into Trump’s actions may wish to bear this context in mind, as

the constraints it imposes can lead even him to moderate his actions on occasion. And those who applaud Congress for finally taking steps to reign in the Trump administration in the NDAA should ensure that members of Congress exercise the follow-through needed to ensure those provisions have their intended effect.

Pres Powers – 1AR

The plan spills over—congressional restrictions set a precedent that causes demands to snowball, which disrupts the constitutional balance—that’s Kulowski.1nc Sciarra proves it spills over to nukes

The plan wrecks war powers Woodford 18 (January 12th, 2018, Shawn Robert Woodford is a PhD and a military historian with over a decade of research, writing, and analytical experience on operations, strategy, and national security policy, His work has focused on special operations, unconventional and paramilitary warfare, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, quantitative historical analysis, nineteenth and twentieth century military history, and the history of nuclear weapon development, “Of Nuclear Buttons: Presidential Authority To Use Nuclear Weapons,” http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2018/01/12/of-nuclear-buttons-presidential-authority-to-use-nuclear-weapons/)

The U.S. constitution offers no clear guidance. War power are divided between congress, which has the sole authority to declare war and to raise and maintain armed forces, and the president, who is commander in chief of the armed forces. Congress attempted to clarify the circumstances when it was permissible for the president to unilaterally authorize the use of military force in the War Powers Resolution of 1973. It stipulates that the president may commit U.S. military forces abroad only following a congressional declaration of war or authorization to use force, or in response to “a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed

forces.” Successive presidents have held that the resolution is unconstitutional, however, and have ignored its provisions on several occasions. Congress has traditionally afforded presidents wide deference in the conduct of foreign affairs and military conflicts, albeit under its existing mechanisms of oversight . In waging wars, presidents are subject to U.S. law, including obligations to follow congressionally-approved international conventions defining the laws of war. While the president and

congress have disagreed over whether or not to begin or end foreign conflicts, the legislative branch has rarely elected to impose limits on a president’s prerogatives on how to wage such conflicts, to include the choice of weapons to be employed. The situation in Korea is an interesting case in itself. It was the first post-World War II case where a president committed U.S. military forces to an overseas conflict without seeking a congressional declaration of war. Congress neither authorized U.S. intervention in 1950 nor sanctioned the 1953 armistice that led to a cessation of combat. Truman instead invoked United

Nations Security Council resolutions as justification for intervening in what he termed a “police action.” Legally, the U.S. remains in a state of hostilities with North Korea. The 1953 armistice that halted the fighting was supposed to lead to a formal peace treaty,

but an agreement was never consummated. Under such precedents , the Trump administration could well claim that that the president is within his constitutional prerogatives in deciding to employ nuclear weapons there in a case of renewed hostilities. In all reality, defining the limits of presidential authority over nuclear weapons would be a political matter. While congress possesses the constitutional right to legislate U.S. laws on the subject, actually doing so would likely require a rare bipartisan sense of purpose strong enough to overcome what would undoubtedly be resolute

political and institutional opposition. Even if such a law was passed, it is likely every president would view it is an unconstitutional infringement on executive power . Resolving an impasse could provoke a constitutional crisis . Leaving it unresolved could also easily result in catastrophic confusion in the military chain of command in an emergency. Redefining presidential nuclear authority would also probably require an expensive retooling of the nuclear command and control system. It would also introduce unforeseen second and third order effects into American foreign policy and military strategy . In the end, a better solution to the problem might simply be for the American people to exercise due care in electing presidents to trust with decisions of existential consequence. Or they could decide to mitigate the risk by drastically reducing or abolishing the nuclear stockpile.

Congressional restriction EVISCERATES war fightingYoo 17 (April 2017, John Yoo is a J.D. from Yale, Emanuel Heller Professor of Law and director of the Korea Law Center, the California Constitution Center, and the Law School’s Program in Public Law and Policy, "Trump’s Syria Strike Was Constitutional", National Review, https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/04/trump-syria-strike-constitutional-presidents-have-broad-war-powers/)

Common sense does not support replacing the way our Constitution has worked in wartime with a radically different system that mimics the peacetime balance of powers between president and Congress. If the issue were the environment or Social Security, Congress would enact policy first and the

president would faithfully implement it second. But the Constitution does not duplicate this system in war. Instead, our Framers decided that the president would play the leading role in matters of national security . If the issue were the

environment or Social Security, Congress would enact policy first and the president would faithfully implement it second. Those in the pro-Congress camp call upon the anti-monarchical origins of the American Revolution for support. If the Framers rebelled against King George III’s dictatorial powers, surely they would not give the president much authority. It is true that the revolutionaries rejected the royal prerogative, and they created weak executives at the state level. Americans have long turned a skeptical eye toward the growth of federal powers. But this may mislead some to resist the fundamental difference in the Constitution’s treatment of domestic and foreign affairs. For when the Framers wrote the Constitution in 1787, they rejected these failed experiments and restored an independent, unified chief executive with its own powers in national security and foreign affairs. The most important of the president’s powers are

those of commander in chief and chief executive. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 74: The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength, and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority . Presidents should conduct war, he wrote, because they could act with “ decision , activity , secrecy and dispatch .” In perhaps his most famous words, Hamilton wrote:

“Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government . . . . It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks .” The Framers realized the obvious. Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes, making them unsuitable to regulation by preexisting legislation . Instead, they can demand swift , decisive action — sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances — that is best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or that is delayed by disagreements. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Our Framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because they had no single executive, with the Constitution’s

single president for precisely this reason. Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch ,

Congress’s loose, decentralized structure would paralyze [gridlock] American policy while foreign threats grew. Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy .

Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift

and decisive action required in wartime. Congress’s track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one . Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress’s isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and Fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict. President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to

help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. While pro-Congress critics worry about a president’s foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security could come from inaction and isolationism . Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.”

Vietnam, however, could not have continued without the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War and the passage of the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the resolution in 1973 over President Richard Nixon’s veto, and no president has ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. No federal court has ever upheld the resolution. Even Congress has never

enforced it. Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue that we should radically remake the American way of war . They typically base their claim on Congress’s power to “declare war.” But these observers read the 18th-century constitutional text through

a modern lens by interpreting “declare war” to mean “start war.” When the Constitution was written,

however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities . In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain — where the Framers got the idea of declaring war — fought numerous major

conflicts but declared war only once beforehand.

Trump EffectiveTrump’s foreign policy has been effective---default to ev, not media hyperbole. Tobin Harshaw & Richard Haass 18. **Journalist. **President of the Council on Foreign Relations; Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State; DPhil, Oxford; Professor of International Studies; Research associate, International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Trump's No Isolationist. Is That a Good Thing?” https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-01-13/richard-haass-on-trump-s-foreign-policy-and-america-first

Remember when Donald Trump's unlikely presidential victory meant a return to Republican isolationism of the 1920s

and '30s ? Or worse? Well, a funny thing happened on our way to the Coolidge administration: The guy who pledged to put America First has been pretty active about doing so, and putting U.S. blood and treasure on the line around the globe . From the stepped-up fights against terrorists in the Middle East and Afghanistan to the brinkmanship with North Korea to the decision to send "defensive" weapons to Ukraine, the White House has belied the idea that the U.S. is best off turning its back on allies, enemies and the rest of the globe. The question, of course, is whether this has been for the best. I don’t mean whether the Donald Trump Voter is

chagrined that Donald Trump hasn't done exactly what he promised. That base, we are told, perhaps never took him literally, and

probably hasn't been paying a whole lot of attention to special-forces troop levels in Rojava. But to look into the question of whether a globally active Trump administration is better than one with its head stuck in the sand , I talked this week with Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations and author of one of the last year's most influential books on U.S. global policy, "A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order," which has just been released in paperback with a new afterword. Haass is a pillar of the foreign-policy establishment, but isn't a partisan with an ax to grind: He has worked at the Pentagon, State Department and White House in the Carter, Reagan and both Bush administrations. Here is an edited transcript of our chat. Tobin Harshaw: So, we have made it through year one of the Trump Era, and the question being tossed around in foreign policy circles is, "Were things as bad as you expected?" I'm wondering if you think that is even the right question to be asking. Richard Haass: It's a loaded way of asking. It's not a useful

way, because so much of that depends upon one's expectations. We now have a year of evidence. It's better just to say, "Here's my

take on it -- here's what I like and here is what gives me heartburn or worse." Otherwise you're playing off your own expectations. TH: Exactly. So let's start on the bright side. If you had to pick one issue where you think the administration seems to be on

the right track at this point, what would it be? RH:I could choose two or three. I believe their efforts against ISIS in Iraq and Syria have clearly been successful. TH: Would you consider those a continuation -- a slightly amped-up continuation -- of the Obama approach, as many people do? RH: Essentially. Military commanders in the field were given greater discretion, perhaps greater encouragement, so they advanced at a quicker pace than many anticipated. Now the challenge is to cope with that success. How does one translate a battlefield victory into something that endures? And that's an area where the jury's still out. The administration hasn't yet produced a policy that builds on its accomplishments on the

battlefield against ISIS. I would say a second good decision was the announcement a few weeks ago to provide Ukraine with defensive arms. It's something that should have happened years ago under the Obama

administration. That actually was somewhat surprising because one might have thought that when considering an administration which, shall we say, has been reluctant to get crosswise with Russia, one might not have expected this decision. So I took this as a pleasant surprise. TH: Indeed, and those two things are kind of related. People were concerned that this administration was going to go very soft on Putin, and it hasn't been that way. On the other hand, Trump came into office saying that there are issues on which we can work with Russia, Syria being the main one. Do you think the surprisingly hard line toward Moscow on other fronts is going to make it more difficult to work with the Russians on Syria? RH: No, I think it was going to be hard to work with Russians on Syria regardless. I don't see that kind of linkage. There is some potential overlap between the U.S. and Russia -- I don't want to exaggerate it -- but some potential overlap in that the Russians don't want to see the Syria situation unravel to a point where they have to escalate their own involvement. I don't rule out the potential for some kind of diplomacy. But at the moment, I don't see the U.S. and Russia on the same page in Syria. Russia seems much more interested in consolidating government control over liberated areas. It seems to me that the U.S. and Russia are proving they can disagree for independent reasons in any number of theaters. TH: Is there one other thing that you think is

going well? RH: I think part of the North Korea strategy is going well. And I say "part." I think what's going well is the focus on it,

which has translated into several resolutions in the UN Security Council and greater economic pressure and international isolation on North Korea.

AT: Trump BadThe military and intelligence communities are geared towards continuity – that means they’ll support Trump insofar as he continues Obama-era foreign policy, but won’t go along with any of his crazy bad ideas – so there’s no risk of a turnGoldsmith 16 (Law Professor @ Harvard, "Libertarian Panic, Unlawful Action, and the Trump Presidency", Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/libertarian-panic-unlawful-action-and-trump-presidency)

But my focus in this post is on (2) and (3), about which I have much less worry. The basic concerns here are that Trump will get away with unlawful or abusive action. Specifically, based on Trump’s campaign statements and early appointments, my Lawfare colleagues worry that Trump will (among other things) return to or “normalize” torture, order “indiscriminate attacks” on civilians, abuse the intelligence agencies to engage in political and other forms of unlawful surveillance, “throw his opponent in jail,” create a

“Muslim registry,” “censor the internet,” and in general engage in “counterterrorism policies that would violate domestic and international law.” I have no idea if Trump will attempt to follow through on any of his campaign pledges or suggestions for unlawful action, but if he does I seriously doubt he will succeed . Bureaucracy “He'll sit here," Truman said of Eisenhower, "and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike — it

won't be a bit like the Army. He’ll find it very frustrating.” Richard Neustadt famously built on this story to illustrate that hard power does not by itself translate into effective power. It is a

lesson Trump is about to learn. One hurdle to a president executing his wishes is the powerful permanent bureaucracy in the intelligence and defense communities that transcend administrations . A President’s commands are not self-executing . He has to convince the bureaucracy to go along , and he often has political control only over the tippy-top of the agencies in question . The CIA has only three political appointees—the

Director, the Deputy Director, and the General Counsel. I believe that at NSA, only the Director is a political appointee. The DOD has more, but

especially in the context of its size, not that many more. President Trump can surely place loyalists in “non-political” spots in these agencies, but the vast majority of people running the Intelligence Community and DOD will be the same people that ran it under Obama .

These permanent officials have deep expertise , trans-administration interests and values , and deft infighting skills that enable them to check and narrow the options for even the most aggressive presidents . The “persistence in the interests and outlook of the national security leadership and especially of the

national security bureaucracy,” is one reason why Obama continued so many Bush-era counterterrorism policies , I

argued in Power and Constraint. I predict the national security bureaucracy will also be a force for continuity and restraint

in the other direction in a Trump administration. Michael Glennon wrote a good book that agreed with my descriptive point about the continuity-preserving power of the bureaucracy and argued that this power was largely illegitimate. Glennon seems to Leon Neyfakh (and to me) to back away from his descriptive thesis in suggesting that Trump but not Obama could steamroll this bureaucracy. I think this is much harder to do than Glennon suggests. Massive bureaucratic firings are politically hugely costly, bureaucratic expertise narrows presidential options in ways the White House cannot control, and the bureaucracy contains many veto points and accountability checks. One set of such points and checks consists of the hundreds of intelligence community lawyers. I know many are skeptical of lawyers’ checks because of (among other things) some early Bush administration practices, but I believe those practices were ultimately a result of excessive internal executive branch secrecy that I do not think can be replicated today. For reasons I explained at length in Power and Constraint and lack space to reiterate here, IC lawyers today operate in a significantly different legal and bureaucratic and cultural environment than they did in 2001, in large part as a reaction to early Bush-era initiatives. The law governing their operations is clearer and (mostly) more restrictive than in 2001; there are many forms of institutional transparency and redundant accountability built in to executive branch legal deliberations that were not present in 2001; and everyone in government is aware of the painful recriminations suffered by the early Bush

lawyers and other officials as a result of their repudiated legal interpretations. Beyond the lawyers, career officials in the intelligence and defense communities are deeply committed to lawful action to a degree that outsiders do not appreciate . I do not believe that the armed services under Trump will carry out orders to target civilians or to unwind the interrogation constraints in the Army Field Manual , because doing so would be clearly unlawful . I do not believe that the NSA career officials will—as the NSA did in the 1960s and 1970s—engage in domestic political surveillance, because doing so would be clearly unlawful . I do not believe —for reasons I explain more fully elsewhere—that CIA will return to waterboarding. Not only are all of these practices that people worry about unlawful ,

the culture and interests of these agencies would not permit these practices to occur , I predict.

Congrses Bad – 2AC

Regular participation in arms sales substantially increases Congressional workload- makes them ineffectiveGilmour and Craig ’84 (Robert S.– professor of political science at University of Connecticut and member of the Vermont bar. Barbara Hinkson– assistant professor of government at Wesleyan Unviersity. “After the Congressional veto: Assessing the Alternatives.” Barbara Journal of Policy Analysis and Management; Spring 1984; 3, 3; ProQuest. JJN)

If, however, Congress is now determined to develop a system of regularized participation in the arms sales program it will need to devise a comprehensive procedure for scheduling arms sales discussions on the congressional agenda and for providing Con- gress with current and accurate information on the sales under consideration. Moreover, members require such information when arms sales proposals are tentative, not after an American offer has been finalized.24 Setting the agenda could be achieved through imposition of a joint resolution of

approval, but assuring the timely flow of arms sales information is a far more compli- cated objective. It entails an enormous increase in the workload of Congress and it raises questions about the desirability of such deep congressional involvement in sensitive foreign policy deci- sions.