1ncUS – Saudi relations high now - TrumpAziza 2019

Sarah Aziza covers foreign affairs, human rights, and gender April 18 2019 “Trump’s Veto on Yemen War Is a Sign That the Strongmen in the U.S. and Saudi Arabia Are Winning” https://theintercept.com/2019/04/18/trump-veto-yemen-saudi-arabia-mbs/

ON TUESDAY, Donald Trump invoked his veto power for only the second time in his presidency. Trump’s move struck down a congressional resolution to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen. In doing so, he stifled a moment of rare bipartisanship, flexing his own authoritarian tendencies to protect a fellow autocrat, the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is known by the initials MBS.

By doing so, Trump not only signaled his loyalty to a prince who has been widely implicated in the murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, as well as the imprisonment and torture of numerous human rights activists, but he has also ensured that the U.S. would remain complicit in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Far from an effort to protect the Constitution, as Trump claimed, the veto was rather the latest example of the autocratic, tit-for-tat deal-making that has in recent years increasingly dominated the geopolitics of the Middle East.

Trump made clear that his decision was intended to augment his executive powers. In his statement, he called the bill — which would have made history as the first legislation under the 1973 War Powers Act to receive bipartisan support — a “dangerous attempt to weaken [his] constitutional authorities.” Trump said that scaling back U.S. involvement in the deadly Yemen conflict would imperil “American citizens and brave service members, both today and in the future.”

The bill, though, just like the president’s objection to it, had much more to do with Trump’s relentless and ill-advised

devotion to MBS. The resolution first gained momentum in the aftermath of Khashoggi’s murder in October 2018, a crime that many — including the U.S. intelligence community — have linked to the crown prince. MBS is also responsible for leading the coalition of Persian Gulf states in its four-year offensive in Yemen, which has left thousands of Yemeni civilians dead and millions ravaged by famine and disease. In addition to overseeing this disastrous war, MBS has also ordered numerous crackdowns on his own civilians, including mass arrests and alleged torture of nonviolent human rights advocates. By calling for an end to U.S. support for the war, Congress took aim at Trump’s obstinate and increasingly untenable loyalty to MBS. Since Khashoggi’s killing, even staunch supporters of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, such as Sen. Lindsey

Graham, R-S.C., have grown critical of Riyadh. In contrast, Trump has persistently ignored the ongoing abuse of Saudi human rights activists and downplayed the mounting catastrophe in Yemen, calling Saudi Arabia a “ truly spectacular ally .” IT WAS NO great surprise, then, to see the president resort to veto power to protect MBS’s disastrous Yemen campaign. Beneath the shallow appeals to constitutionalism and national security, Trump is acting in accordance with a now-familiar pattern: gravitating toward fellow strongmen and personality-driven deal-making. This entrepreneurial narcissism has fueled much of the president’s volatile foreign policy, from his on-again-off-again “relationships” with Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un to his rabid devotion to building a wall on the Mexican border. This trend has dramatic implications in the Middle East. Since the collapse of the Arab Spring and in the wake of years of foreign intervention, hopes of democracy in the region have in large part given way to a cast of authoritarian rulers. From MBS in Saudi Arabia to Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey to the recently re-elected Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel, the

region has grown increasingly polarized under hawkish, right-wing leaders. Among this fray, Trump, along with his his son-in-law and adviser Jared Kushner, identified MBS as an ideal partner. The president and crown prince share an alarmist message of Iran as a regional menace and both use this stance to justify destabilizing policies, such as the

dismantling of the Iran nuclear deal and the war in Yemen. Trump has also lauded MBS and the Saudis for their alleged work to curb extremism in the region, despite reports that Riyadh has cut deals with Al Qaeda fighters in Yemen. For his ongoing support, which includes billions in arms sales, Trump has expected cooperation from the Saudis on his own regional agenda, including in his efforts to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict. Trump and Kushner are preparing to push for this “deal of the century” in coming months — a

negotiation that has far more to do with backroom bargaining than any democratic or humanitarian concerns. The veto, for all its cynical implications about the state of U.S. foreign policy, should also concern Americans at home. Tuesday’s announcement came barely a month after Trump’s first veto, which he used to enforce his border statement of emergency over congressional opposition. So Trump went to the outer limits of legality in pursuit of an irrational pet project, the so-called border wall with Mexico, at great financial and human cost. Such actions are only the logical extension of a presidency that began with the morally indefensible and constitutionally untenable “Muslim ban,” issued by executive order in the first days of the administration. The president has repeatedly availed himself of these personalized, unilateral mechanisms of power. The effects of such a pattern cannot be held at bay by the occasional congressional override or dissident judge. Americans must recognize this dangerous erosion of democratic principles and, fighting fatigue, continue to resist.

Collapse of the Saudi alliance causes proliferation and instabilityBlackwill 2019

Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 84 April 2019 “Trump’s Foreign Policies Are Better Than They Seem” Robert D. Blackwill Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Diller–von Furstenberg Family Foundation Distinguished Scholar at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/CSR%2084_Blackwill_Trump.pdf

Saudi Arabia is America’s longest-standing ally in the Middle East, even though the kingdom is not a partner made in heaven for the United States. Its citizens, including Osama bin Laden, have been involved in numerous terrorist attacks against the United States, most consequentially on 9/11. Saudi Arabia is not a democracy. It fuels Islamist extremism far beyond its borders through its exports of ultraconservative Wahhabi religious doctrine. Its human rights practices are often deplorable, and occasionally medieval. Its treatment of women is unacceptable. It has used oil in the past as a weapon against U.S. national interests. It bombs innocent civilians in Yemen. It occasionally threatens to acquire nuclear weapons. It promises huge sums of money to worthy regional actors, and then often fails to deliver. It blockades Qatar. And now, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman apparently ordered the execution in Istanbul of journalist and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi.227 All this has produced a flood of U.S. criticism of Saudi Arabia and calls to sanction Riyadh, end U.S.-Saudi military cooperation in Yemen, cut off arms sales, and overall rupture the intensity and substance of the bilateral relationship. As the Washington Post editorial page put it, “Who Needs Saudi Arabia?”228

The president’s answer is that the United States does, and he is right.229 The murder of Khashoggi, including its barbarous method, was as abhorrent as it was stupid. But bin Salman is the most powerful man in Saudi Arabia and its likely future king. At this writing, he is thirty-three years old and could easily rule the kingdom for the next four decades and beyond, well after Trump and many of his current critics are dead. Thus the United States will most likely have to deal with him for a long time . Making an enemy of him now is not a good idea, especially given the many other challenges the United States faces in the region.

Moreover, Mohammed bin Salman, though authoritarian, espouses a moderate and modern message (in Saudi terms) and is the leader most likely to keep extremist forces from gaining power and influence in the kingdom. An unstable Saudi Arabia would be a preeminent source of potential terrorists and radical ideology. Further, without Saudi Arabia, the United States cannot have a coherent and effective policy to counter Iran’s hegemonic activities in the Middle East. No other Arab state could be the hub of such an indispensable U.S. effort. And although the United States has dramatically reduced its dependence on Saudi oil, the global economy and the economies of U.S. treaty allies depend on energy from the kingdom.230

In addition, the U.S. security relationship with Saudi Arabia goes well beyond arms sales: it also involves intense intelligence community collaboration and significant financing for counterterrorist campaigns.231 To add to the list, Mohammed bin Salman has a different and more benign view toward Israel than do many other Arab rulers, and as former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert observes, “Saudi Arabia is the country that in the end will determine the ability of the Arabs to reach a compromise with Israel.”232 Moreover, without reliable U.S. military protection, Riyadh might well seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Finally, if the United States weakens its partnership with Saudi Arabia, U.S. adversaries China and Russia will fill the vacuum , including by providing the kingdom with nuclear reactors without full-scope safeguards —a line Riyadh should not cross. Saudi Arabia needs the United States at least as much as the United States needs it. Washington should be stout in defending its equities in dealing with Riyadh. But this mutual dependence is an enduring strength of the bilateral relationship. It should not be damaged because of Saudi Arabia’s sometimes problematic policies.

Trump Grade on Saudi Arabia Policy: B+

Nuclear warIsmail ’15 (Muhammad Ismail, Ph.D. in Political Science @ Qurtuba University, assistant professor @ Qurtuba University, teaches master-level Political Science courses. “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Regional Implications and Possible Outcomes,” 2015 in Asian Politics & Policy, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.12184/epdf)While some observers talk about the inevitability of nuclear proliferation in West Asia should Iran develops its own nuclear weapons, others do not agree. Bahgat (2007b, pp. 66, 86, 118, 123–124, 213) believes that a nuclear weapons option is highly unlikely for Saudi Arabia, based on an understanding of its relationship with the United States. This article contends, however, that it is highly possible that Saudi Arabia may opt for nuclear weapons technology of its own . According to leaked U.S. diplomatic cables, King Abdullah had, on several occasions, advised the U.S. government to carry out preemptive attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. These cables also describe how other Arab countries in West Asia have secretly argued for forceful military action against Iran’s nuclear program. Saudi Arabia’s energy consumption has been rising, so it recognizes the necessity of developing nuclear power to increase reservoirs of energy. If the Saudi government develops nuclear plants to generate electricity, then it could possibly go in the direction of producing nuclear weapons should Iran declare itself a NWS . Although Saudi Arabia has signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Iran’s nuclear program might make a Saudi nuclear program inevitable (Black, 2013; Lake & Rogin, 2014). Saudi Arabia and Iran have been arch-enemies since the 1979 Islamic Revolution . One reason is that they have longstanding religious tensions. One represents the Sunni Wahabi sect of Islam and the other Shiite sect of Islam. This division brought religious animosity into regional politics as well, because both nations harbor hopes of exercising Islamic leadership. Moreover, the Saudi and Iranian governments are locked in a violent and frightening competition over Lebanon’s internal politics . The Iranian government supports Hezbollah while Saudi Arabia openly supports the Sunnis and Christians in Lebanon. Following after the 2006 Lebanon-Israel War, the Saudi and Iranian governments used their respective influence over the different Lebanese political factions to find a political settlement (Wehrey et al., 2009). Furthermore, the two nations possess different views about the regional security order, with the Saudis fearful that a nuclear Iran will become more powerful and will threaten its immediate West Asian neighbors by igniting Shiite beliefs . Saudi Arabia, thus, perceives Iran’s nuclear threat more acutely than the rest of the West Asian states. Iran’s nuclear program could create tensions between these two major powers with strategic and security repercussions beyond the immediate neighborhood (Black, 2013; Lake & Rogin, 2014). Historical Background of Saudi Arabia-Iran Rivalry Relations were not always

difficult, however. Before 1979, diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia were normal and cordial because the United States was a friend to both countries and did not let them compete with one another (Delpech, 2006, p. 79). The basic and most important objective of both countries then was to prevent the spread of the Soviet Union’s communist influence in West Asia (Delpech, 2006, p. 79). After 1979, relations soured because of the brand of Islam and type of government introduced by Khomeini. The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) further deteriorated the bilateral ties between them, because the Saudi government openly helped Iraq against Iran. The rivalry between the two countries for regional leadership became intense in the 1980s and Iran has never forgiven Saudi Arabia for supporting Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War (Delpech, 2006, p. 79). The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 again lessened the tension between Iranian and Saudi governments but in the 1990s, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani did not do enough to revive the cordial relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Under the reformist Muhammad Khatami, during the last years of 1990s and early 2000s, top-level bilateral relations improved (Delpech, 2006, p. 79), leading the two nations to sign an agreement on regional security in April 2001. Then, in February 2002, Prince Abdullah openly repudiated reference to Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil” (Delpech, 2006, p. 79). The Persian Gulf States are nearer to Iran than other states and they have been thought of as being more concerned about Iran’s nuclear quest. Soon after establishing a new theocratic model of government in 1979, the revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini spoke openly against the Arab governments, questioned the legitimacy of the ruling monarchical families of the neighboring Persian Gulf States, and has continuously called for replacing these monarchical regimes with Islamic type of governments the way they had established in Iran. This attitude of the Iranian ruling class toward helping non state actors to oust the Saudi monarchy led to the deterioration of erstwhile cordial relations between the Saudi and Iranian governments. McNaugher (1984) argues that the Persian Gulf countries are not militarily strong enough to defend their territorial integrity and sovereignty from external attack. He further points out that these countries often look abroad for ways of deterring threats and settling serious disputes among regional players (p. 517). The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have mainly been promoting regionalism rather than conflict resolution among their members. Saudi Arabia, thus, ostensibly has only the following options in response to Iran’s nuclear quest: (1) ignore Iran’s nuclear quest; (2) increase its close association with the United States or formally accept U.S. protection against any external threat or attack; or (3) develop its own nuclear program to counter the Iranian threat (Nuri, 2006, p. 22). Due to the nature of distrust between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the first option is not viable . The second option is also not viable after the Iran-U.S. rapprochement following the November deal and because Saudi Arabia wants to decrease its dependency on United States. The third option is the most viable but it is also the most dangerous one. In fact, the worst-case implication of Iran’s nuclear program on the whole West Asian region would be that some important states like Saudi Arabia would opt to develop their own nuclear weapons program. Saudi Arabia is one of the most important, strongest, wealthiest, and biggest states in West Asia and it has the capability to initiate its own nuclear weapons program, to balance Iranian nuclear power with the same nuclear-ready status. This would risk creating an uncontrollable nuclear arms race in West Asia, making it the most dangerous region in the world because even a minor incident can create havoc in the region . No one can tell when the Saudi government might change its mind and start to develop its own nuclear weapons (Bahgat, 2006, pp. 421–443; Russell, 2008, pp. 521–537), because Saudi Arabia has a long-standing tradition of hostility toward Iran that goes deeper than the issue of nuclear weapons (Delpech, 2006, p. 79). Contending Positions Saudi Arabia’s ruling class is worried about possible preemptive strikes on Iran’s nuclear installations by the United States or Israel or by both of them, because in retaliation, the Iranian forces plus its mercenaries in the region might target U.S. strategic installations and military bases in the region, especially in the Persian Gulf States, including the U.S. Air Force base and headquarters in Qatar (Hersch, 2006, p. 42). In August 2002, the Iranian opposition group, Mujahedeen-e Khalq revealed that Iran’s hidden nuclear activities were causing

discomfort among all its neighboring countries, including Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia views Iran’s nuclear program as a significant effort toward the domination of the West Asian region. It, thus, took a clear and public stand against Iran’s nuclear quest. After all, Saudi Arabia does not possess a nuclear weapons program and it has commitments as a non-NWS under the nuclear NPT signed in 1988. The Saudi government also signed the safeguards agreement in 2005 declaring that “the kingdom did not (possess) facilities, nuclear reactors or fissile materials,” stated that the kingdom was “anxious to cooperate continually with the IAEA,” and pledged to abide by the NPT (Delpech, 2006, pp. 79–80). Saudi Arabia also supported the diplomatic talks between Iran and the Europeans, as failure by the international community to stop Iran’s nuclear quest will certainly have direct repercussions for Saudi Arabia. However, Iran’s mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle may give impetus to the Saudi government to opt for nuclear technology. If Saudi Arabia opts for its own nuclear program , its government might seek help from Pakistani nuclear research scientists (Sokolski, 2006, p. 33), as there is a longstanding close relationship between the Saudi and Pakistani governments regarding nuclear technology. It is believed that Saudi Arabia provided significant funds to Pakistan’s nuclear program from the outset, and it is quite well known that relations between the Saudi and Pakistani intelligence services have been close for a long time, with Saudi officials having visited Pakistani military nuclear sites several times (Delpech, 2006, pp. 79–80). There were rumors in December 2004 that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had signed an agreement by which Islamabad promised to help the kingdom develop nuclear technology and acquire missiles that could give it superiority in the regional balance of power (Delpech, 2006, pp. 79–80). Iranian professor Abu Mohammed Asgharkani has stated that Iran’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon were stepped up when the Iranian government learned of such an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (Delpech, 2006, pp. 79–80). However, no confirmation has ever been given so far concerning such reports and the Saudi government denied it had such plans. The Saudi government said, “All radioactive products in Saudi Arabia are exclusively for the purpose of medical and petroleum research” (Delpech, 2006, p. 81). Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi National Security Advisor, had wanted his government to join the coalition to stop Iran’s enrichment program (Cooper & Rutenberg, 2007). But there were competing voices. In 2002, Prince Naef bin Ahmed Al-Saud, a colonel in the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces decried that Israel had a total monopoly on nuclear weapons in the West Asian region, noted that both the Pakistani and Indian governments refused to obey the nuclear nonproliferation regimes, and that both Iran and Iraq were trying to develop nuclear programs (Al-Saud, 2011, pp. 124–130). Turki al-Faisal, who was then in-charge of Saudi intelligence and became Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Washington, said that the Arab states would start developing nuclear programs if the attempt to stop Iran’s nuclear quest does not succeed (see Dagoni, 2012). He also conveyed in unofficial conversations with important British and U.S. officials that his government was ready to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue and will use all economic, diplomatic, and security resources to deal with the Iranian government’s ambitions to achieve regional power status on achieving the status of a NWS (Dagoni, 2012). Mitchell Reiss argued that the Saudi government might follow Iran’s nuclear quest in anticipation of the failure of nuclear nonproliferation efforts in the region to stop Iran’s nuclear program (Reiss, 2004, pp. 3–4). Saudi nuclear abilities are not easy to understand, and there are few indirect statements that tell us that the Saudis tried to start and develop a nuclear program. The first secretary of the Saudi Arabian mission to the United Nations (UN) claimed in the early 1970s that the Saudi government had developed a nuclear program for military purposes (Guzansky, 2012, p. 34). The prestigious newspaper, the Guardian also exposed some official papers that showed Saudis desperately seeking help and support from the US government on nuclear technology and extended deterrence, as it was believed that a party less directly involved in the regional politics can be trusted (Huth, 1999, pp. 25–48; Morgan, 2003, p. 35).

UQ

2nc – uq – arms sales keySaudi alliance strong now – institutional support and shared interests overwhelm individual relations crisesHennigan 2018

W.J. Hennigan covers the Pentagon and national security issues OCTOBER 18, 2018 “What Makes the U.S.-Saudi Relationship So Special? Weapons, Oil and 'An Army of Lobbyists'” https://time.com/5428669/saudi-arabia-military-relationship/

It’s a cold financial calculation: Saudi money for U.S.-made weaponry results in American jobs.

This is President Donald Trump’s rationale in dismissing calls in Congress to halt future arms sales to Saudi Arabia following the mysterious disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi, the Saudi journalist and American resident.

“I don’t like the concept of stopping an investment of $110 billion into the United States,” Trump said last week.

“All they’re going to do is say, ‘That’s OK. We don’t have to buy it from Boeing. We don’t have to buy it from Lockheed. We don’t have to buy it from Raytheon and all these great companies. We’ll buy it from Russia. We’ll buy it from China,” he said.

The 75-year alliance between the two nations has been built on a simple arrangement: American demand for Saudi oil and Saudi demand for American firepower .

It is a relationship that is not easily unwound as a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators found out earlier this year when they moved to cut off military assistance to the Saudis in their war against Houthi rebels in Yemen. The United Nations has said that more half of the more than 10,000 people who have been killed in the three-year old war are civilians, and the lives of millions are potentially at risk from famine.

The U.S. government has provided intelligence, munitions and midair refueling to Saudi warplanes since operations kicked off in 2015. Attempts by American lawmakers to stop that aid have thus far failed.

Saudi Arabia has spent at least $5.8 million on lobbying Congress this year, according to data compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics, a government watchdog. But recently filed documents detailing expenses and reimbursements put the actual number closer to $9 million , said Lydia Dennett, investigator with the Project on Government Oversight.

“The Kingdom has a veritable army of lobbyists and PR firms working to promote their interests in a wide variety of ways,” she said.

The Foreign Influence Transparency Initiative, a left-leaning think tank in Washington, recently compiled records filed under Foreign Agents Registration Act that show in 2017 Saudi lobbyists contacted over 200 members of Congress, including every Senator. The data also found the Saudi agents contacted officials in the State Department, which oversees foreign military sales, nearly 100 times.

The Saudi-U.S. relationship is peerless when it comes to arms sales. The kingdom buys more American weapons than any other nation. Saudi Arabia accounted for nearly one-fifth of American of all weapons

exports over the past five years, according to a recent report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

The Pentagon has a team of U.S. service members based out of the capital Riyadh wholly dedicated the “management and administration of Saudi Arabian Foreign Military Sales.” It serves as a direct pipeline to move weapons from U.S. arms manufacturers into the arms of the Saudi military.

The U.S. military’s Joint Advisory Division works alongside commanders in each branch of the Saudi military to help fill their weapons needs. Once the Saudis commit to what they want — tanks, attack helicopters, missiles, ships, laser-guided bombs — the arms packages must be OK’d by the U.S. Defense and State Departments, and approved by Congress.

The arrangement falls under the U.S. Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia, which is led by a two-star American general. The mission is primarily designed to bolster Saudi Arabia against arch-rival Iran in order to assert power and influence in the Middle East.

“We have other very good allies in the Middle East, but if you look at Saudi Arabia: They’re an ally and they’re a tremendous purchaser of not only military equipment, but other things,” Trump said Wednesday in the Oval Office.

It was the President’s latest attempt to trumpet $400 billion in business deals that his administration signed in May 2017 during a two-day visit to Saudi Arabia. The eye-popping figure includes $110 billion in military sales, which analysts point out is misleading because it represented letters of interest and not firmed-up contracts.

Saudi Arabia has thus far only committed to purchase $14.5 billion-worth of equipment since the announcement was made 17 months ago. The Administration says the Saudis are currently pursuing more than $114 billion in military hardware.

But even if the kingdom moves forward with the sales, the transactions wouldn’t be worth it, according to William D. Hartung, director of the arms and security project at the Center for International Policy. “Jobs are no excuse for arming a regime with Saudi Arabia’s dismal human rights record, whether it is its role in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi or its indiscriminate bombing of civilians in Yemen,” he said.

The Khashoggi case has caused an escalating debate on Capitol Hill over the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Lawmakers on both sides have called for a reappraisal if the kingdom is found responsible for Khashoggi’s disappearance or death.

James Carafano, a vice president at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, says it’s critical that Washington doesn’t rush policy changes on such an enduring alliance until the facts are clear. “This isn’t an episode of ‘Law & Order.’ This is a murder investigation and a murder investigation takes a lot of time,” he said.

The Trump Administration has repeatedly called for patience. On Thursday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told reporters outside the White House that the U.S. will give Saudi Arabia a “few more days” to “conduct a complete, thorough investigation.”

“We’re all going to get to see the response from Saudi Arabia to this,” he said. “When we see that, we’ll get a chance to determine—all of us will get a chance to make a determination as to the credibility of

the work that went into that, whether it’s truly accurate, fair, and transparent in the very way they made a personal commitment to me, and ultimately made a personal commitment to the president when they spoke to him.”

Before taking the short walk back into the White House, he added that Saudi Arabia was also “an important strategic alliance of the United States. We need to be mindful of that as well.”

2nc – uq - generalTrump is making assurances on arms sales now – prevents the need for Saudis to go rouge Gould 2018

Joe Gould covers congress for defense news November 20, 2018 “Trump statement sticks with Saudis, hyping economic benefits of alliance” https://www.defensenews.com/2018/11/20/trump-statement-sticks-with-saudis-hyping-economic-benefits-of-alliance/WASHINGTON and HALIFAX, Canada — President Donald Trump released a lengthy statement Tuesday justifying the U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia by focusing on domestic economic benefits and the threat from Iran — and saying he does not know whether Saudi leaders ordered a journalist’s murder.

In the White House statement, Trump repeated disputed claims he won $110 billion in U.S.-Saudi arms deals as he signaled he will not move to take stronger action against Saudi Arabia since the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and amid the civilian deaths from Saudi-led airstrikes in Yemen’s civil war.

Per Trump, his trip to Saudi Arabia last year landed the mega deal for weapons as part of a Saudi agreement to spend $450 billion in the U.S. — “a record amount of money” that “will create hundreds of thousands of jobs, tremendous economic development, and much additional wealth for the United States."

“Of the $450 billion, $110 billion will be spent on the purchase of military equipment from Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and many other great U.S. defense contractors,” the statement reads. “If we foolishly cancel these contracts, Russia and China would be the enormous beneficiaries — and very happy to acquire all of this newfound business. It would be a wonderful gift to them directly from the United States!”

Trump, in the statement, pointed to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s denials of involvement in Khashoggi’s murder.

“King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman vigorously deny any knowledge of the planning or execution of the murder of Mr. Khashoggi. Our intelligence agencies continue to assess all information, but it could very well be that the Crown Prince had knowledge of this tragic event — maybe he did and maybe he didn’t!” Trump’s statement reads.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said the order to kill Khashoggi on Oct. 2 in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul came from the highest level of the Saudi leadership. Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar said Saturday that an 18-member “kill team” from Saudi Arabia carried out the murder of Khashoggi and could have smuggled his body parts out of the country thanks to their diplomatic status.

Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Adel al-Jubeir, said Tuesday in an Arabic-language newspaper interview that claims, including by the CIA, that Salman gave the order to kill Khashoggi were false.

Though the Trump administration has imposed sanctions on 17 Saudis accused of involvement in the killing and made a joint decision with Riyadh to end U.S. refueling of Saudi aircraft involved in the Yemen

war, Trump’s letter signals he will seek to defy the growing call in Congress to take further action in light of Khashoggi’s death, like halting U.S. arms sales to the kingdom.

Trump said in his statement that while he understands members of Congress may “like to go in a different direction” he would only proceed if ideas “are consistent with the absolute security and safety of America.”

“As President of the United States I intend to ensure that, in a very dangerous world, America is pursuing its national interests and vigorously contesting countries that wish to do us harm,” he said. “Very simply it is called America First!”

In a statement Tuesday, the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee decried Trump’s “disturbing willingness to take the word of Vladimir Putin or the Saudi Crown Prince over U.S. intelligence professionals.”

“This White House statement is a stunning window into President Trump’s autocratic tendencies, his limited grasp of world affairs, and his weakness on the world stage. It is shocking to see President Trump continue to act as an accomplice to a clear cover up by Saudi leadership,” said Sen. Jack Reed, of Rhode Island.

Reed is co-sponsoring bipartisan legislation to halt arms sales to Saudi Arabia, mandate sanctions for Khashoggi’s killers, and bar U.S. refueling of Saudi-led coalition aircraft engaged in the Yemen civil war, among other oversight measures related to the conflict there.

Another co-sponsor, Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services Committee member Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H, offered her own rebuke of Trump’s letter.

“President Trump’s habit of siding with murderous foreign dictators over American intelligence professionals is a stain on our democracy that undermines the American ideal,” Shaheen said in a statement. “Fortunately, the President is not the sole protector of that ideal. Congress must now stand up with bipartisan resolve to condemn the brutal slaying of Jamal Khashoggi and pass legislation to respond to this and other Saudi crimes.”

While it’s unclear whether that bill will see a vote, Sen. Bernie Sanders, I-Vt., said he expects his war powers resolution — meant to compel an end to U.S. involvement in the Yemen war — to come to a vote after Thanksgiving.

Economic benefits

A new report by the Center for International Policy, a Washington-based think tank, argues that U.S. arms sales Trump touts in the letter amount to $14.5 billion and fewer than 20,000 U.S. jobs per year. The president is getting it backwards, and the U.S. role as Saudi Arabia’s weapons supplier gives the U.S. strong leverage over Riyadh, according to the report’s author, William Hartung, director of the think tank’s Arms and Security Project.

“The Saudi military depends on U.S. arms, spare parts and maintenance to carry out its brutal war in Yemen, and could not prosecute that war for long without that support,” Hartung said.

Two-thirds of the 365 combat-capable aircraft in the Saudi arsenal are of American-origin, including 171 F-15 combat aircraft, a mainstay of the Saudi air war in Yemen. The Saudi land forces and National

Guard possess more than 3,000 U.S.-supplied armored vehicles, and the Saudis have tens of thousands of U.S.-supplied bombs and missiles.

That’s why a competitor could not easily replace the U.S. in supplying Riyadh, according to Hartung.

“It would take decades for the Kingdom to wean itself from dependence on U.S. equipment, training and support, and new equipment might not be easily interoperable with U.S.-supplied systems,” Hartung said. “Saudi Arabia could buy a Russian or Chinese system here or there to send a political message, but they could not easily replace the role of sales and support from the United States, along with the United Kingdom, as the major bulwarks of its military capability.”

Though Trump has claimed U.S.-Saudi arms deals account for 40,000 jobs, Hartung reckons that because there are $2.5 billion in annual arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia, only 17,500 jobs would have been created in any given year. Still, that’s equal to less than three one-hundredths of 1 percent of the total U.S. labor force of more than 160 million people.

To boot, many of the jobs will be created in Saudi Arabia as part of its new economic plan, which calls for 50 percent of the value of Saudi arms purchases to be produced in the kingdom by 2030.

A key part of Trump’s rationale is that Iran was responsible for the war in Yemen, attempting to destabilize Iraq, supporting Hezbollah and propping up Syrian President Bashar Assad. Saudi Arabia would leave Yemen if Iran does, he argued.

Since 2015, the Saudi-led coalition allied with the government has been fighting the Iran-backed Houthis, who took over Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, have fired long-range missiles into Saudi Arabia and have targeted vessels in the Red Sea.

“Likewise, the Iranians have killed many Americans and other innocent people throughout the Middle East,” the letter reads. “Iran states openly, and with great force, ‘Death to America!’ and ‘Death to Israel!’ Iran is considered ‘the world’s leading sponsor of terror.’ ”

The Pentagon’s top uniformed officer was asked at a public forum Saturday to provide a military perspective on the impact of a freeze of U.S. arms sales to Riyadh. Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joe Dunford said Saudi Arabia has been and is now “an important partner for regional security."

“Their cooperation, interoperability and capability, if you will, would be a stabilizing force for the region, has been a stabilizing force for the region,” Dunford said, adding that Saudi Arabia was one of America’s partners in the Middle East.

“Working forward,” he said, “we will listen carefully to whatever the policy is in light of recent events.”

The House Intelligence Committee’s ranking member, Rep. Adam Schiff, D-Calif., on Tuesday fired back at Trump’s statement, calling for an end to support for Saudi Arabia in the war in Yemen, suspending arms sales to the kingdom “and diminish[ing] our reliance on Riyadh regarding other matters in the region.”

Schiff, the panel’s presumptive chairman when Democrats assume control of the House, previously said the committee will conduct a “deep dive” examination of Saudi Arabia’s conduct in the wake of the Khashoggi murder.

“It is true that our relationship is with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, not just its Crown Prince, and that must factor into our response,” Schiff said in a statement.

“But to suggest ‘maybe he did and maybe he didn’t’ or that we are incapable of finding out the truth, or that knowing the truth our silence can be bought with arms sales, undermines respect for the Office of the Presidency, the credibility of our intelligence community and America’s standing as a champion of human rights.”

2nc – uq – Pompeo statementPompeo is making active assurances nowGulf News 2019

January 13, 2019 “Pompeo: US-Saudi partnership key to regional stability” https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/saudi/pompeo-us-saudi-partnership-key-to-regional-stability-1.1547367278366

Dubai: Washington’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is “fundamental to the stability and security of the region,” US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on Saturday.

“The relationship must go forward . We have to have good relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and this administration intends to do so,” Pompeo said in an interview with Al Arabiya.

Pompeo will meet with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman on Sunday and plans to address many regional issues.

When asked if it was a partnership or a friendship with Saudi Arabia, Pompeo told Al Arabiya: "Call it what you will. They've been great partners in the missions that we have asked them to assist us with.

Stability

He added: “This relationship, this mutually beneficial relationship to create stability in the Middle East — and to assist the US in executing things that keep the American people safe — is very important. And I'm convinced the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will be a great ally in doing so."

Pompeo arrived in Abu Dhabi over the weekend, one of the stops on his nine-nation tour of Middle East, and his travels will continue on Sunday with stops in Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

He will wrap the tour up on Monday and Tuesday in Oman and Kuwait.

Pompeo's Middle east touris aimed at reassuring America's partners that withdrawing troops from Syria does not mean Washington is abandoning the region.

Pompeo has traveled to Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates where he called for increasing pressure on Iran and push for unity among Gulf neighbours still embroiled in a festering dispute with Qatar.

Link

2nc - framingErr neg---nobody knows how Saudi would act in a crisis---make prolif likelyLippman ’12 (Thomas W, former Middle East bureau chief for the Washington Post, award-winning journalist who has written about Middle Eastern affairs and American foreign policy for more than three decades, former adjunct senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations and an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, author of 5 previously published books on the Middle East and diplomacy, appeared frequently on national TV and radio, SAUDI ARABIA ON THE EDGE: The Uncertain Future of an American Ally, A Council on Foreign Relations Book, pg 239)

Perhaps the most important question about the long-term security of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf is, what will the Saudis do in the event that Iran develops, or is known to acquire, nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them? Will they try to acquire or develop their own nuclear arsenal to balance Iran’s power? Will they participate in a regional nuclear arms race ? Will they refrain from the nuclear temptation and seek new assurances from the longtime guarantor of their security, the U nited S tates? Or, most likely, do they not know what they would do because matters have not yet reached a point where they have to decide? Because of the opacity of Saudi Arabia’s decisionmaking process, there is no way to know for sure.

2nc – Iran ThreatCollapse of confidence in security guarantees locks in proliferationGause 2010

September 24, 2010 F. Gregory Gause III, Professor and chair of political science department, University of Vermont Deborah Jerome, Interviewer https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea

Also, there are two positive foreign policy consequences that could come from the sale. Its psychological effect could give the Saudis more credibility with regional elites in their contest for influence with Iran, making potential Saudi allies in places like Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen more confident in throwing in their lot with Riyadh. And if Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability, the Saudis would undoubtedly consider the option of proliferating themselves. If they are confident of their American security guarantee--and these big arms sales are warrants of the American commitment to their security--American advice not to obtain nuclear weapons will carry more weight.

In the end, the Saudis are going to buy weapons. If we do not sell them, Moscow, London, Paris, and Beijing will.

2nc - Reverse CausalUS alliance forces restraint – empirics prove abandonment causes lash outKliegman 2019

April 17, 2019 Aaron Kliegman news editor of the Washington Free Beacon Prior to joining the Free Beacon, Aaron worked as a research associate at the Center for Security Policy, a national security think tank, and as the deputy field director on Micah Edmond's campaign for U.S. Congress. In December 2016, he received his master's degree from Johns Hopkins University’s Global Security Studies Program in Washington, D.C., with a concentration in strategic studies “The Folly of Abandoning Saudi Arabia in Yemen” https://freebeacon.com/blog/folly-abandoning-saudi-arabia-yemen/

Trump was right to veto the resolution. As the president mentioned in his statement, American involvement with the coalition is limited to logistical support—which includes identifying nonmilitary and civilian facilities for coalition aircraft to avoid. Tragically, this support has not avoided all civilian casualties, but it certainly has reduced them. Furthermore, the Pentagon ended its most direct military involvement—in-flight refueling of Saudi aircraft—last year, in the aftermath of Khashoggi's murder. So the argument that the United States is supporting a belligerent Saudi war machine is not really accurate . Moreover, recall that Saudi Arabia launched its military campaign during the Obama administration, at a time when Riyadh felt it had to go rogue because the United States was an unreliable ally. The fact is ending American support for the coalition will, if anything, cause the Saudis to be more reckless, not less. Journalists and politicians fail to understand this basic point: allies are more likely to listen to Washington if they feel the United States supports them, not if they feel abandoned and pressured. And the United States has more influence when it is actively involved , not sitting back and watching events unfold from a distance.

The most disturbing part about this congressional effort is the obvious motivation simply to punish Saudi Arabia, even at the expense of American interests. Like it or not, Saudi Arabia is an essential American ally. Riyadh is an important partner in counterterrorism, and a huge purchaser of American arms sales. The Saudis also are a necessary staple of the global oil market, which affects what Americans pay at the pump regardless of how much oil the United States exports. Not to mention that the Houthis (and Iran) would love control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world's busiest oil highways. The Houthis have threatened to disrupt international shipping in this waterway, with weapons supplied by Iran.

Moreover, few developments would be more catastrophic for the Middle East than the collapse of the House of Saud. As chaotic as the Middle East is, the Saudi government's stability is one of the few threads keeping the region from reaching a deeper circle of hell. Allowing the Houthis to fire missiles at Riyadh and pose a constant threat on Saudi Arabia's southern border risks destabilizing a key pillar of American interests in the Middle East. Khashoggi's murder was heinous, and the administration's moves to end the in-flight refueling and to impose sanctions on Saudi officials were warranted. But it would be the height of folly to blow up the alliance.

Members of Congress should absolutely want to end the humanitarian suffering in Yemen. Indeed, the United States should continue to support the United Nations' efforts to end the conflict. But abandoning Saudi Arabia would only perpetuate the violence. Too often lost in discussions about Yemen is the fact that the Houthis's brutal and incompetent governance has worsened the humanitarian disaster. They

have failed to repair sanitation services, worsening Yemen's cholera epidemic, and have confiscated food and medical aid from civilians to support their fighters. The Houthis have also used child soldiers to field more fighters. The Saudis have certainly waged a clumsy and incompetent war, but too many critics are blinded by their hate of Riyadh to see the Houthis for the monsters that they are. And that does not include their anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Semitic ideology, which is all too evident in their slogan: "Death to America, death to Israel, curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam!" Perhaps self-righteous journalists and politicians can find some time to criticize the Houthis, not just the Saudis.

In sum, the United States cannot lose sight of the key strategic objective in Yemen: to prevent the creation of a southern Hezbollah, which would enhance Iran's nefarious influence in the Middle East and only perpetuate violence and suffering. That means continuing American support for Saudi Arabia in Yemen, as hard a pill as that may be to swallow.

2nc - AT – Extended DeterrencePolitical credibility is key to security guarantees McInnis 5 - coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a research associate at CSIS[Kathleen J., “Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Credibility Gap in the Middle East,” The Washington Quarterly • 28:3 pp. 169–186. http://www.twq.com/05summer/docs/05summer_mcinnis.pdf]Taking into consideration the potential for Egypt and Saudi Arabia to proliferate, could the United States assure Cairo and Riyadh, dissuading them from building their own nuclear weapons, by extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella? Assurance gained through a reasonably sound extended deterrence policy relies on two primary factors: capability and credibility. Although the United States arguably possesses the physical capability to deter the Iranian regime on behalf of Gulf/Near Eastern states, whether it has sufficient political credibility needed to assure its regional allies is not clear. Without this credibility, states in the region may yet be tempted to acquire their own nuclear guarantee.What does it mean to be credible? Essentially, allies must be confident that the United States would defend them and their interests in the event of an act of aggression. This involves an unambiguous obligation , created through physical presence and underpinned by political commitment , to the survival of these states and their regimes. Yet, as Cold War experience taught, establishing credibility can be difficult. France, for example, ultimately decided that U.S. security assurances were insufficient and decided to acquire its own nuclear deterrent .

Impact

2nc - timeframeThe impact is quick – only happens post-withdrawalSaunders ’15 (Paul J. Saunders, MA in Political Science & Russian/East European Studies @ the University of Michigan, Executive Director of the Center for National Interest, previously a senior advisor in the US Department of State, previous senior policy advisor in the US House of Representatives, “Preventing a Middle-East Nuclear Arms Race,” 26 February 2015, http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2015/middle-east-arms-race)Some have suggested that Saudi Arabia could clandestinely purchase nuclear material , nuclear technology , or even nuclear weapons from Pakistan to ensure a quick breakout if it faced an imminent threat from Iran. This may well be a possibility, but would Saudi leaders bet their national security on Pakistan ’s willingness to accelerate its nuclear program? If Saudi Arabia and Iran entered a serious confrontation, Tehran could well see such a move as one step short of a declaration of war by Pakistan. Would Islamabad take that risk?Others might argue that the United States could short-circuit an independent Saudi nuclear deterrent by publicly committing to provide its own nuclear umbrella . However, this policy could likewise succeed only if top Saudi leaders believed that the US commitment would be reliable in a crisis —and if they believed that Iran’s government thought so too. Given the rather mixed attitudes toward Saudi Arabia in Congress and among the American public, the debate inside the United States before and after an announcement like this would likely do little to reassure Saudi officials.

2nc – virtual prolif impactEven if Saudi doesn’t overtly go nuclear—they’d develop a virtual capacityPollack 7/9/15 (Kenneth, Senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He served as the director of the center from 2009 to 2012, and its director of research from 2002 to 2009, “Regional implications of a nuclear agreement with Iran”, 7/9/15, http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/07/09-pollack-iran-nuclear-agreement)Yet the Saudis are often far more subtle and creative than others give them credit for. Even if Iran were to acquire an actual weapon or a near-term breakout capability, the Saudis might not simply take the obvious path forward and buy a nuclear weapon itself. There are many ways that the Saudis could take actions that would create ambiguity and make Iran (and others) wonder whether the Saudis had acquired a nuclear capability without declaring that the Kingdom had joined the nuclear club. Riyadh could build a nuclear plant of its own and begin to enrich uranium, perhaps even hiring large numbers of Pakistanis and other foreigners to do so very quickly, in almost exactly the same manner that the Iranians have proceeded. A favorite Israeli scenario is that one day, satellite imagery of Saudi Arabia suddenly reveals the presence of a half-dozen nuclear-capable Pakistani F-16s at a Saudi air base. Pakistan has long contributed military support , equipment and even whole formations to Saudi defense, so this would not be anything extraordinary . Everyone would wonder whether the F-16s had brought nuclear weapons with them and the Saudis could studiously avoid answering the question. The Iranians, and the whole world, would not know. There would be no proof that the Kingdom had acquired a nuclear weapon and therefore no particular basis to impose sanctions on Riyadh. Yet overnight, the Iranians would have to calculate that the Kingdom had acquired a nuclear weapon , but it would be very difficult for anyone to punish the Saudis because there would be no evidence that they had.

Saudi virtual prolif collapses the NPT and causes a destabilizing arms raceBowen & Moran, ’15 – *professor of nonproliferation and international security and the director of the Centre for Science and Security Studies in the Department of War Studies at King's College in London, ** Senior Lecturer in International Security, and Deputy Director (Research Development) of the Centre for Science & Security Studies (CSSS) in the Department of War Studies(*Wyn, **Matthew, Living with nuclear hedging: the implications of Iran’s nuclear strategy, International Affairs 91: 4 (2015) 687–707, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/INTA91_4_01_BowenMoran.pdf)

What, then, does this all mean for the non-proliferation regime? Iran has exploited the loopholes of the NPT through a subtle form of nuclear brinkmanship, and the danger is that other states may learn from this approach and seek to follow suit. Nuclear hedging could prove an attractive option for states seeking at least some of the deterrent and coercive benefits that nuclear weapons can bring. Although clearly not able to provide the same military, political or symbolic power as the actual possession of nuclear weapons, hedging does have some value in this regard. Indeed, the case of Saudi Arabia illustrates that some

countries may already be following a similar path to Iran. In a regional context like the Middle East, the emergence of two or more nuclear hedgers could begin to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the NPT as a bulwark against proliferation, not least because it could prove difficult to contain ‘hedgers’ at low levels of latency. Moreover, the strategic uncertainty that such hedging may engender could potentially provoke a dangerous spiral whereby states would seek to optimize their hedging strategy, and in the process increase the incentives for taking the final steps towards the bomb.

Causes pre-emptive strikesIchimasa, ’12 – Senior Fellow, Policy Studies Department, Defense Policy Division @ National Institute for Defense Studies(Sukeyuki, The Concept of Virtual Nuclear Arsenals and “a World without Nuclear Weapons”, NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, 13, Dec. 2012, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2012/bulletin_e2012_3.pdf)

As noted, a variety of approaches have been argued with regard to the deterrence inherent in the¶ concept of virtual nuclear arsenals. However, it should be noted once again that the concept’s¶ “weaponless deterrence” dimension has drawn fierce criticisms from supporters of nuclear¶ deterrence and strategy scholars. In particular, the criticism, which is along the same lines of the¶ criticism of minimum deterrence,46 i.e., that the concept of virtual nuclear arsenals lacks credibility about the use of nuclear weapons—a major premise of the concept—and cannot constitute an effective nuclear deterrence,47 must be considered. Kenneth Waltz says he cannot support the¶ concept of virtual nuclear arsenals. He reasons that virtual nuclear arsenals are equivalent to deterrence without second strike capability , and notes the unstableness inherent in the system of virtual nuclear arsenals, i.e., the dangers of deterring by mutual monitoring and competitive reconstruction of nuclear arsenals.48 Colin Gray makes the case that it is difficult to conceive that¶ nuclear deterrence would be realized, arguing that: the concept of virtual nuclear arsenals will¶ likely lead to an end result that is disproportionate to today’s power distribution for the five nuclear¶ weapon states and other de-facto nuclear weapon states; the delayed response that is a given¶ condition of the mechanism of reconstructing nuclear arsenals will favor non-compliant states¶ both politically and militarily; and no state would deem that a state is a “nuclear weapon state”¶ because it retained nuclear weapons which are actually non-operational.49 According to Michael¶ Wheeler, dismantled nuclear arsenals are more vulnerable to attacks than nuclear arsenals that are operationally deployed ; hence, it is difficult to deem them as an effective deterrent. Wheeler also¶ criticizes that considering that even in today’s world, the building and maintenance of nuclear¶ arsenals requires specialized, large-scale infrastructure, including means of delivery of nuclear¶ warheads, targeting systems, reconnaissance systems, communications systems, procurement¶ systems, and logistics support systems, the reconstruction of nuclear arsenals under a virtual¶ nuclear arsenal regime is equivalent to developing nuclear arsenals from scratch and will prove to¶ be futile.50 George Perkovich and James Acton et al. contend that the monitoring and inspection of dismantled nuclear arsenals would increase the risks of inappropriate leakage of the storage facilities’ location, which would bring on a preemptive first strike by the enemy and accordingly cause a destabilization of deterrence.51¶ As such, from the perspective of the conventional theory of nuclear deterrence which has¶ extended from the Cold War era, there is no way of getting around saying that the concept of virtual nuclear arsenals is in an extremely insufficient and unstable situation. On the other hand, however,¶ if the concept of virtual nuclear arsenals is redefined as being in a transition phase toward “a world¶ without nuclear weapons,” perhaps it would be possible to find subtle inter-linkages between the¶ theories of deterrence and nuclear disarmament.

2nc prolif – Global Prolif Saudi prolif spills over – goes globalRussell 5 (Richard, Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East: Strategic Contest, p. 118)The easing of a Saudi nuclear weapons program’s opacity could occur gradually over time – after it is firmly established and protected from potential preventive or preemptive strikes – behind the scenes in diplomatic exchanges and in subtle public references. The Saudis would want to plant in the minds of potential rivals the suggestion that Riyadh is not to be diplomatically and militarily intimidated or coerced. Recent leaks to the media of unconfirmed reports of Saudi-Pakistani nuclear cooperation, in fact, work toward this end. A Saudi nuclear deterrent could more blatantly be revealed in the midst of a future Gulf military crisis, perhaps one involving military posturing by Iran against the Gulf states. Eithier way, public awareness of a Saudi nuclear deterrent will put t he West, and particularly the United States, in an awkward position. The United States would lose some prestige in light of a security partner choosing a policy course in direct opposition to the American policy to contain and stem the international proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Washington in the aftermath of revelations of a Saudi nuclear deterrent would be under strong domestic and international pressure to take measures to show its displeasure with Riyadh. The United States, however, must avoid steps that would completely rupture American-Saudi security ties: both Washington and Riyadh share the grand strategic interest of seeing that no one power ever grows to dominate the Gulf. The United States needs to recognize that Saudi Arabia will continue to be a major player in the regional competition for power in the greater Middle East region. More broadly, the recognition of a Saudi nuclear deterrent would be a major blow against international proliferation regimes. The global community would be forced to see that despite the best of intentions and efforts, the “nuclear genie” will not be put back into its bottle The West and the United States will have to face the fact that weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles will be an ever-present reality of the post-11 September world. Despite the arguments from some quarters that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will enhance international security by bolstering deterrence and lessening the chances for inter-state war, prudent statecraft would assume that deterrence in practice is unlikely to be as effective as envisioned in theory .

2nc relations - Laundry ListUS-Saudi relations are key to stop terrorism, contain Iran, and maintain stability in Afghanistan and PakistanLeVine ’11 (Steve, author of The Oil and the Glory and a blogger on energy issues at ForeignPolicy.com, Jan/Feb, Foreign Policy, “FRENEMIES FOREVER” proquest)

Besides, Saudi Arabia isn't just a giant gas station with a flag. Saudi help is now essential for numerous top-shelf U.S. priorities, from containing Iran to countering terrorism to extricating U.S. troops from Afghanistan and keeping Pakistan stable. Only Saudi Arabia, with its carefully cultivated, behind-the-scenes links to countries and leaders who do not trust Washington, can play this role. In some ways, what we're seeing is just a revival of old ties. For nearly five decades after President Franklin D. Roosevelt met King Abdul Aziz aboard a U.S. destroyer in the Suez Canal in 1945, the relationship pivoted on oil, but also on a mutual distrust of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet empire broke up in 1991, that logic fell apart too, and the alliance struggled for a new rationale, fitfully working together to contain Iraq and Iran, the region's chief troublemakers, but finding few other shared interests. Cooperation against terrorism languished. Saudi royals funneled money to militants in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the former Yugoslavia. Across the Muslim world and in mosques in Europe and the United States, Saudibacked Wahhabi madrasas preached anti-American vitriol. U.S. officials investigating the 1996 Khobar Towers attack, in which 19 Americans were killed, complained of being stonewalled by their Saudi counterparts. And we all know where Osama bin Laden grew up. September 11 marked a breaking point. U.S. public opinion turned sharply against the kingdom because of the large number of Saudi terrorists involved in the attack, and members of President George W. Bush's administration bristled at the lack of investigative cooperation from Riyadh. Meanwhile, the Saudis tired of Washington taking them for granted as allies. The final straw for Riyadh was fury at Bush's perceived coddling of Israel and inaction in the face of Palestinian deaths. By the summer of 2002, a distinct chill had set in. Then, in 2003 and 2004, the two countries were brought together again after al Qaeda's Saudi branch launched a series of attacks on oil installations, government facilities, and foreign compounds in Riyadh and other cities - an audacious attempt to deepen the split between the royal family and the United States. After a bruising crackdown that included gun battles in the streets, Saudi security forces eventually triumphed, and the remnants of the militants fled south to Yemen. The Saudis poured money and security help into Yemen, with which the kingdom shares a 930-mile border. So did the United States. But Yemen struggled to deal with an influx of battle-hardened radicals from Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and elsewhere. The wake-up call came in August 2009, when an al Qaeda suicide bomber tried to kill the Saudi counterterrorism chief. Prince Mohammed bin Nayef. Prince Nayef then had his agents infiltrate Yemeni tribes that protect the militants, a turning point that helped uncover the details of an October 2010 bomb plot, when al Qaeda's Yemen branch attempted to send explosive packages through FedEx and ups to the United States. Without Saudi Arabia's insistent calls to the cía, U.S. officials concede, there is almost certainly no chance the bombs would have been detected. Beyond al Qaeda, the United States and Saudi Arabia share a host of common enemies, most notably the Saudis' Persian Gulf rival Iran. When the United States invaded Iraq and ousted Saddam Hussein in 2003, it also removed a Sunni shield against Iranian radicalism. U.S. troops now fill that role, but ineffectively. Tehran has won much influence within Iraq, and its sway over Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza is increasing. Now, with U.S. forces gradually drawing down in Iraq, Washington wants Saudi Arabia to carry a larger portion of the burden. Riyadh appears more than happy to help America "cut off the head of the snake," as the Saudi king was quoted saying in a WikiLeaked cable. In October, the State Department authorized the largest arms sale in U.S. history, a $60 billion Saudi purchase of 154 new and

upgraded F- 15 fighter jets, 190 helicopters, advanced radar equipment, and satellite-guided bombs. Saudi diplomats are also playing an invaluable role in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Palestine, and Syria, working to mediate between the various warring factions and carrying private messages from Washington to U.S. adversaries like Hamas and the Taliban.

Terrorism causes extinction Toon et al 7 – Owen B. Toon, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdfTo an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion , or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

Instability in Afghanistan leads to nuclear war.Wesley 10 (Michael, Exec. Director of the Lowy Institute for Int. Policy. Professor of Int. Relt’s @ Griffith U, Feb. 25 2010 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/02/25/A–stable–Afghanistan–Why–we–should–care.aspx)

We do have an interest in the future of domestic stability within Afghanistan, but we need to think much more clearly about which countries build and guarantee that stability. An Afghan state built just by the US and its allies will be inherently unstable because, as we demonstrated after the Soviet Union withdrew, we have little stomach for any continued strategic involvement in the

region. Pakistan, India and China , on the other hand, have deep and enduring strategic interests there, and their competition would soon undermine anything ISAF and NATO leave behind. Understanding the dynamics of strategic competition among Asia's rising behemoths has to be the first step in trying to figure out how to mitigate it. Great power competition in the twenty-first century will be different because of the depth and extent of the dependence of national economies on the global economy. National economies are now less self–sufficient and more vulnerable to the disruption of trading and investment relations than at any time in history. What stops great power confrontations getting out of hand these days is not so much the fear of nuclear annihilation as the fear of global economic ruin – and the resulting national ruin .The danger is that in the heat of the competition, the great powers will lose sight of this fact. This is why instability and weakness in Afghanistan is so dangerous – because in the fog of proxy war, intensely jealous great powers will assume their rivals have the upper hand and redouble their own efforts to exert influence and control, leading to a vast, very likely nuclear, conflict . To avoid the worst possible outcome, all three rivals must be engaged in the process of building a stable Afghanistan – and collectively guaranteeing it. The most realistic route is to actively involve the SCO in the future of Afghanistan while broadening that organisation to include India and Pakistan. This solution ties the stability of the northern and southern tiers of Central Asia to each other, thereby broadening the stakes of those involved. The one hope and one fear that bind China and Russia together are also remarkably relevant to the SCO's proposed new members.

Pakistan break-down causes global nuclear warMorgan 06 [Stephen J., former member of British Labour Party Executive Committee, “Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan,” 2006, http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639]

Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would , of course, open a “ Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India , but Israel becomes a possibility , as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda . Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility . This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

2nc relations – econ

Collapses the global economy – bypasses resiliencyFreeman, 4(Chas, Middle East Policy Council President, 9/17, Federal News Service, p. lexis)

The second matter, and far more grave in many ways, is the demonstration of the end of the special relationship with Saudi Arabia; the end of the discounts and the end of the Saudi emphasis on primacy in the American market signals -- because there's another issue you didn't mention, which we will get into, and that is the part of this special relationship has been the defense of the dollar by the Saudis. Twice within OPEC , other members , Iran in particular, have moved to eliminate the dollar as the unit of account for the oil trade. Were this to occur in the current context of massive budget, balance of trade and balance of payments, deficits for the United States, the results could be absolutely devastating to the global economy and to our own. The reason the Saudis defended the dollar on the two previous occasions was not economic analysis but political affinity for the United States. Question if that affinity is no longer there, will they play that role? And this is a large issue with people like Paul Volcker, saying there is a very substantial danger within the next five years of some sort of dollar collapse, and this is not a minor, minor matter.

2nc relations - heg

Saudi relations key to regional power projectionMuasher et al 9-12-11 (Marwan Muasher, Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Middle East Program, Abdulaziz Sager, Founder and Chairman, Gulf Research Center, Chas Freeman, President Emeritus, Middle East Policy Council, Marina Ottaway, Senior Associate, Carnegie Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: MANAGING U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/91211_transcript_SaudiPanelTwo.pdf)

The U nited S tates has a big interest in the use of Saudi airspace and the areas around Saudi Arabia for transit. We couldn’t be operating the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan if we didn’t have access to a base in Qatar, which you can’t get to except across Saudi Arabia. This access was always dependent on the relationship and friendship that I described. It’s always been on a case-by-case basis, but the context for case-by-case evaluation by the Saudis has now changed. There’s been no practical change, but the conceptual basis for this American ability to rely on transit rights in – not rights – transit privileges in Saudi Arabia has changed.

Saudi Alliance key to heg and military presence- outweighs bahrainTelhami and Hill, 2 – Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park and non-resident senior fellow at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution, AND Director, Center on the United States and Europe Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy (Shibley and Fiona, November/December. Does Saudi Arabia Still Matter? Differing Perspectives on the Kingdom and Its Oil.” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58444/shibley-telhami-fiona-hill-et-al/does-saudi-arabia-still-matter-differing-perspectives-on-the-kin?page=show)

Given America's ongoing security interest in the Persian Gulf, it is highly likely that the U.S. military will retain a large presence in the region. Washington must therefore continue to place high priority on sustaining favorable relations with Riyadh , since Saudi approval and cooperation will remain essential to any continued American military presence . It is certainly possible that the United States will reduce the number of troops it keeps in Saudi Arabia, or will at least have them assume a lower profile, but it is hard to imagine that , with the exception of Kuwait, any of the smaller members of the G ulf C ooperation C ouncil ( which comprises Bahrain , Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) could afford to host large American bases without Saudi acquiescence . In addition, U.S. options would be significantly handicapped if Saudi Arabia were to deny overflight rights to U.S. military aircraft, or prohibit ground troops from launching operations from Saudi soil in the case of a war with Iraq.

2nc relations – me war

U.S.-Saudi relations key to solve multiple scenarios of Middle East instabilityBrzezinski 9(Zbigniew, Professor of American Policy@John Hopkins University, May 8, “U.S.-Saudi Relations in a World Without Equilibrium Conference Transcripts -- Session 1 The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski”, http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2009/ioi/090508-ussa-brzezinski.html)

I think we need to work together and we have to draw some fundamental lessons from the experience of the previous century. In the previous century - the twentieth century - Europe twice committed suicide. And it took a lot of effort, including American effort, to help bring Europe to its feet. It committed suicide because it couldn't handle nationalist, ethnic, territorial, and yes, even also religious conflicts, on its own. It succumbed to the easy temptation of trying to resolve conflicts by force. But force tends to produce unpredictable consequences. It tends to escalate. It tends to get out of hand. And this is why it is so urgent to recognize in regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; or the problem with Iran; or the issues involving Afghanistan and Pakistan; or the growing tensions within various countries in the Middle East -- political, social, and religious; external threats. As for example, Saudi Arabia recently expressed concerns about threats emanating from South Yemen. Religious differences, not only between Jews and Christians, or Jews and Muslims, or Muslims and Christians, but also among Muslims, the Sunni and the Shiite -- that none of these issues in the present context in the Middle East can be constructively resolved by conflict. But if there is not to be conflict, peace has to be institutionalized . It has to be reinforced, and it has to be built with deliberate effort. And as Professor Hagel said, "With a real sense of urgency." Because in fact a number of problems in the Middle East -- Middle East proper and Middle East at large -- are getting out of hand. The opportunities for a solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict are beginning to fade away. If we don't move soon, there will be no peace. But if there is no peace, what will there be? There will be a resumption of conflict and we had a little preview of it last December in Gaza, and we know what the consequences are. That will require a major American commitment stemming from the very practical realization that the two parties in the conflict cannot resolve it on their own. We know that. If 30 years of experience is not evidence of that, then I don't know what evidence is. The United States has to be actively engaged as a peace maker , and that means that the U nited States has to be willing to spell out at least the minimum parameters of peace so that the parties are then propelled toward serious negotiations. We need to do that. Saudi Arabia needs to help. We can do it from the outside. Saudi Arabia is in the region. Saudi Arabia can influence the Arabians , the Arab countries, and the Arab political movements. Saudi Arabia can mitigate some of the tendencies towards extremism within the population, and particularly within some of its more fundamentalist religious manifestations. We need this initiative to be comprehensive, large scale, and mutually reinforcing. And if we don't do it together, we and the Arabs around Israel and Palestine, it is not going to happen. And if it doesn't happen, it will become worse. War is not a solution for the problem posed in the region by Iran. If there is a conflict with Iran either provoked by someone or initiated by us the consequences for the region will be devastating. They will be devastating for us as well. Let's have no illusion about that. There is no solution to the problem of Iran -- in a narrow sense, the nuclear program; in a larger sense, the role of Iran in the region -- that can be achieved by war. Let's not be tempted by it. Let's not have anyone urge us privately to do it, even if not publicly. And let us not have anyone else provoke it. I think we are conscious about this imperative. We can avoid a conflict which will be self destructive for the region , not to mention

the fact that it will probably undermine America's role in the world. And whether one likes it or not, a constructive American role in the world is the only alternative to global chaos from which everyone suffers. So the stakes are enormous. I could go on and on and talk about Afghanistan, Pakistan, but Senator Hagel has mentioned that and very aptly. My central message is very simple. If we want to deal with these problems, we have to work in concert. We have to take certain initiatives that we have long delayed in taking. And Saudi Arabia has to provide affirmative, assertive, outspoken leadership and not wait for others to act, but to be a partner . We need in brief: an American, Saudi Arabian, genuine alliance for peace in the Middle East.

Relations key to regional stabilityLippman ’12 (Thomas W, former Middle East bureau chief for the Washington Post, award-winning journalist who has written about Middle Eastern affairs and American foreign policy for more than three decades, former adjunct senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations and an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, author of 5 previously published books on the Middle East and diplomacy, appeared frequently on national TV and radio, SAUDI ARABIA ON THE EDGE: The Uncertain Future of an American Ally, A Council on Foreign Relations Book, pg 2)

It is possible to imagine a world in which Saudi Arabia is not central to American interests . It would be a utopia in which the United States has freed itself from dependence on imported oil. It would be a world in which Israel has achieved a durable peace with all its neighbors; extremism and the appeal of violence have been extirpated from Islam ; Iran is a friendly partner of the United States and its allies; Iraq and Yemen are stable, responsible countries; and nations are cooperating instead of competing in the allocation of water and food for their growing populations. In that imaginary world , the vast, opaque, largely uninhabitable country known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia might not be important to Americans, except perhaps as a place to make money. But in the real world , the world of today and of the next two or three decades, the stability, security, and reliability of Saudi Arabia are vital, to the well- being of America and its allies.

2nc prolif – IndoPakSaudi Nukes causes Indo Pak warRoberts 11 - fellow of the Royal Society of Literature(Andrew Roberts, "Iran's Nuclear Domino Effect," Jan 2, 2011, www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/01/02/irans-nuclear-weapons-could-lead-to-a-saudi-and-pakistan-alliance.html)

The Saudis have already indicated privately—and WikiLeaks has done nothing to cast doubt on this—that when what Edelman terms “the nuclear cascade” is unleashed once Iran goes nuclear, they will be in the first wave. “Saudi Arabia is the lynchpin ,” says Edelman, “the key country .” The extremely close links between the two Sunni countries Saudi Arabia and Pakistan , which go back at least as far as 1979 when Pakistan helped to clear Islamic fundamentalists out of the Grand Mosque, and A.Q. Khan’s time in Saudi Arabia at precisely the time when his nuclear-proliferation ring was at its most active, invite what Edelman guardedly calls “speculation” that a mutually convenient arrangement would be arrived at very soon after Iran went nuclear. “We in the West have gotten fat, dumb, and happy when contemplating a relativelystable nuclear Southern Asia over the past decade. It might not stay like that .” “ Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia,” states Edelman , “or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and the technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer.” The Saudis might not even, technically at least, be violating theNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty if the weapons remained operated by the Pakistanis, albeit on Saudi territory. Nor does Congress consider this all to be mere “speculation” either: The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Staff Report of February 2008 stated that there was “some circumstantial evidence” to suggest that an agreement of some sort might already exist between the two countries. Where Edelman goes an important stage further than anyone else is in considering the instability t hat would inevitably result in Southern Asia if Pakistan gained the capability in Saudi Arabia to withstand a first strike from India ’s nuclear arsenal. “ To have a second-strike capability against India would give Pakistan a huge benefit,” he told me. “It would be very troublesome for the Indians, who would face a far more complex nuclear picture. We in the West have gotten fat, dumb, and happy when contemplating a relatively stable nuclear Southern Asia over the past decade. It might not stay like that.” With Pakistan already ahead of India in nuclear weapons technology, especially in delivery capabilities, Edelman believes that the Islamabad option will make the nuclear situation in South Asia significantly more dangerous .

ExtinctionToon 7 – Professor in the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, University of Colorado, (“Nuclear War: Consequences of Regional-Scale Nuclear Conflicts”, Science 2 March 2007, vol. 315 no. 5816, pp. 1224-1225)Nuclear arsenals containing 50 or more weapons of low yield [15 kilotons (kt), equivalent to the Hiroshima bomb] are relatively easy to build (1, 6). India and Pakistan, the smallest nuclear powers, probably h ave such arsenals , although no nuclear state has ever disclosed its inventory of warheads (7). Modern weapons are compact and lightweight and are readily transported (by car, truck, missile, plane, or boat) (8). The basic concepts of weapons design can be found on of the Internet. The only serious

obstacle to constructing a bomb is the limited availability of purified fissionable fuels. ¶ There are many political, economic, and social factors that could trigger a regional scale nuclear conflict, plus many scenarios for the conduct of the ensuing war. We assumed (4) that the densest population centers in each country—usually in megacities—are attacked. We did not evaluate specific military targets and related casualties. We considered a nuclear exchange involving 100 weapons of 15-kt yield each, that is, ~0.3% of the total number of existing weapons (4). India and Pakistan, for instance, have previously tested nuclear weapons and are now thought to have between 109 and 172 weapons of unknown yield (9). ¶ Fatalities were estimated by means of a standard population database for a number of countries that might be targeted in a regional conflict (see figure, above). For instance, such an exchange between India and Pakistan (10) could produce about 21 million fatalities—about half as many as occurred globally during World War II. The direct effects of thermal radiation and nuclear blasts, as well as gamma-ray and neutron radiation within the first few minutes of the blast, would cause most casualties. Extensive damage to infrastructure, contamination by long-lived radionuclides, and psychological trauma would likely result in the indefinite abandonment of large areas leading to severe economic and social repercussions. ¶ Fires ignited by nuclear bursts would release copious amounts of light-absorbing smoke into the upper atmosphere . If 100small nuclear weapons were detonated within cities, they could generate 1 to 5 million tons of carbonaceous smoke particles (4), darkening the sky and affecting the atmosphere more than major volcanic eruptions like Mt. Pinatubo (1991) or Tambora (1815) (5). Carbonaceous smoke particles are transported by winds throughout the atmosphere but also induce circulations in response to solar heating. Simulations (5) predict that such radiative dynamical interactions would loft and stabilize the smoke aerosol, which would allow it to persist in the middle and upper atmosphere for a decade. Smoke emissions of 100 low yield urban explosions in a regional nuclear conflict would generate substantial global scale climate anomalies , although not as large as in previous “nuclear winter” scenarios for a full-scale war (11, 12). However, indirect effects on surface land temperatures, precipitation rates, and growing season lengths (see figure, page 1225) would be likely to degrade agricultural productivity to an extent that historically has led to famines in Africa, India, and Japan after the 1783–1784 Laki eruption (13) or in the northeastern United States and Europe after the Tambora eruption of 1815 (5). Climatic anomalies could persist for a decade or more because of smoke stabilization, far longer than in previous nuclear winter calculations or after volcanic eruptions. ¶

Studies of the consequences of full-scale nuclear war show that indirect effects of the war could cause more casualties than direct ones, perhaps eliminating the majority of the world’s population (11, 12). Indirect effects such as damage to transportation, energy, medical, political, and social infrastructure could be limited to the combatant nations in a regional war. However, climate anomalies would threaten the world outside the combat zone. The predicted smoke emissions and fatalities per kiloton of explosive yield are roughly 100 times those expected from estimates for full-scale nuclear attacks with high-yield weapons (4).

2nc impact – East Asian allied prolif The plan decks US credibility in Asia---perception of abandoning Saudi Arabia spills over---causes Japanese and South Korean prolif Amitai Etzioni 14, professor of international relations at The George Washington University, former senior adviser to the Carter White House, “Near East and Far East: Not So Distant,” 3/3/14, http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/near-east-and-far-east-not-so-distant/

Actually, there is a profound link between the two theaters: namely whatever takes place in the Middle East greatly affects what takes place in Southeast and East Asia. The more the United States turns out to be a fickle, unreliable ally of its longstanding friends in the Middle East—especially Saudi Arabia and Israel—the more the leaders of South Korea and Japan will worry whether they can rely on the United States’ defense umbrella. Similarly, the more Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain must worry about the backing of the U.S.—the more Vietnam and the Philippines are likely to worry about being trampled as the elephant and tiger rumble.¶ Israel would not have been born without the United States’ support. Since 1948, a succession of American presidents, a wide array of public leaders from both parties, and the media have treated Israel as a close and critical ally of the United States. The House Foreign Affairs Committee recently approved a bill that would designate Israel a “major strategic ally,” a label afforded to no other country. In a speech to “the people of Israel” in March 2013, President Barack Obama stated that “the security relationship between the United States and Israel has never been stronger.”¶

However, mistrust of the U.S. is now widespread in Israel. Many believe that Obama and large portions of the American public are keen to avoid any new entanglements in the Middle East, come what may. Many Israelis fear that the deal that is now being negotiated with Iran will lead to the breakdown of the sanction regime; that Iran will continued its clandestine development of nuclear arms; and that it will dash to assemble a handful of nuclear weapons just as the Obama administration is packing to leave. Indeed, the Israelis cannot help but note that many American observers, including some highly regarded ones, already argue that the United States could contain a nuclear Iran just as it contained the U.S.SR and that doing so is a better option than starting a war to avoid an Iranian nuclear bomb.¶ Saudi Arabia has been celebrated for decades as an important United States ally—as a scholar at the Middle East Institute put it, it is “vital to the strategic and economic interests of the United States.” Although it may seem odd at first blush, the Saudis feel even more abandoned and beleaguered than Israel. Israel has nuclear arms and a strong military of its own to deter Iran; Saudi Arabia has a relatively weak and inexperienced military and no nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Saudi regime is challenged from within, as are all authoritarian regimes in the region; Israel does not face this issue. The Saudis also witness, with great dismay, that the United States not only acquiesced to rise of the Muslim Brotherhood but in effect helped to oust President Hosni Mubarak—whose regime the Saudis note was similar to their own. Moreover, as Iran gains ground in Iraq, strengthens its foothold in Lebanon, supports fighting in Syria, and increases its influence in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia sees itself as engaged in a mortal fight between Sunnis and Shias—with the Sunnis on the weaker side. And they hear American voices increasingly arguing that given the development of new forms and sources of energy, the whole Middle East is losing its importance to the United States.¶ Much depends on what happens next. The United States may well be forced to re-pivot back to the Middle East; a major terrorist attack on U.S. soil originating in the region may well have such an effect. The same holds true if Pakistan’s government collapses or other reasons emerge to fear the Taliban’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Disruptions to the flow of oil could force the U.S. to act, if only because its European allies and the already fragile global economy would suffer greatly otherwise. The collapse of Jordan’s regime or a victory of forces allied with Iran in Syria might also precipitate U.S. action. However, if the United States continues to in effect disengage from

the Middle East, tolerate the rising influence of Iran in the region, and appear to abandon Israel and Saudi Arabia—Japan and South Korea cannot help but take notice and act in response.¶ Much depends on how history next unfolds in the Middle East (recognizing that the world’s attention is for the time being focused on Crimea). If Iran abides by an agreement to limit its nuclear program to peaceful purposes, the Lebanese army countervails Hezbollah, the Syrian conflict ends with a partition or coalition government, and Jordan holds—the Near East challenge to U.S. credibility may remain limited. However, if these events unfold in ways that now many suspect, leaving little doubt that nations better fend for themselves than trust the U.S. to protect them—Japan is likely to move more expeditiously to arm itself, not just “reinterpreting” but revising its pacifist constitution. Nor can one disregard that if Japan chose to become a nuclear power, it could do so in a short order given that it has very sizable stores of plutonium. At the same time, South Korea is likely to further extend its current trend of following its own agenda rather than closely dovetailing it with U.S. positions.¶ In short, whatever happens in the Near East next will have significant consequences in the Far East. There are two realms but only one U.S.A. Its weakness—and challenged credibility—in one theater is likely to have significant repercussions in the other.

That goes global and nuclearCimbala 14Stephen J. Cimbala, professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University, “Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Perils and Prospects”, Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 6, No. 1,March 2014Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basin ( Russia , China , Japan , South Korea , and North Korea – not including the United States , with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption. Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy.19 In Paul Bracken’s terms, North Korea can use its nuclear weapons to support either a “strategy of extreme provocation” or one intended to “keep the nuclear pot boiling”

without having crossed the threshold of nuclear first use.20 In October 2013 there were reports of the DPRK renewing nuclear activities, and perhaps preparing for new nuclear tests. A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked , in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan , and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran . An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place US proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options , not excluding preemptive war , defenses, and counter-deterrent spec ial op eration s . In addition, an unrestricted nuclear arms race in Asia would most likely increase the chance of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war . It would do so because : (a) some states in the region already have histories of protracted conflict ; (b) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems , especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation ; (c) unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction resulting in an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch , by rogue commanders; (d) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption .

2nc – Pakistan ImpactFailing assurance forces Saudi-Pakistan nuclear allianceTertrais 9 – Senior Research Fellow, Foundation for Strategic Research Bruno, Security Guarantees and Extended Deterrence in the Gulf Region: A European Perspective, Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 5, DecemberMany analysts—not only in Washington—fear that failing to reassure Gulf allies may lead them to look for alternative strategic options to ensure their security. Despite its very limited capabilities in the nuclear field, Saudi Arabia often tops the list of three or four countries which could “go nuclear” if and when Iran does. As a second-best option, Saudi Arabia could ask Pakistan, a country with which it has had a very close relationship for decades, to give it a nuclear guarantee . Such a guarantee could even be entrenched by the presence of Pakistani nuclear weapons on Saudi soil but remaining under Islamabad’s control, thus mimicking the NATO “nuclear sharing” arrangements. Pakistan could consider that such an arrangement would have advantages in terms of the survivability of its arsenal: weapons stationed in the Arabian Peninsula would pose a major political and operational challenge for New-Delhi and probably negate its preemptive strike options. While Islamabad and Riyad both have friendly relations with the West, such a radical change in the nuclear picture may have unforeseen and unwanted consequences.

Saudi-Pakistan nuclear co-op causes nuclear warEdelman, et al., ’11 (Eric, Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and Former Undersecretary for Defense, Andrew Krepinevich, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and Evan Montgomery, Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “The dangers of a nuclear Iran,” FA 90;1, http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2010.12.27-The-Dangers-of-a-Nuclear-Iran.pdf)There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the IranIraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the CSS-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory , a practice that the United States has

employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. N-PLAYER COMPETITION Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war . Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access t o these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft.

AT No Prolif

2NC Yes ProlifYes Saudi prolif – they have the means and the willObaid 6/19/15 (Nawaf Obaid, PhD in War Studies @ the King’s College, London University, is a visiting fellow and associate instructor at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He is also a senior fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies and a distinguished fellow at the National Council on U.S. Arab Relations, “Actually, Saudi Arabia could get a nuclear weapon,” 19 June 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/19/middleeast/obaid-saudi-nuclear-weapon/)(CNN) Now that the Obama administration has largely given up its resistance to Iran's development of some kind of nuclear program, the Middle East is poised to see a change in the balance of power . As the Saudi Ambassador to the United Kingdom recently stated, should Iran acquire a nuclear weapon, "all options" could be on the table when it comes to the Saudi response . That could include an indigenous nuclear program. And although some commentators remain skeptical about the Kingdom 's ability to produce nuclear weapons, I would argue that it actually has the will and the ability to do so. There are six core components that a country must possess in order to create a nuclear program capable of being weaponized: 1) an adequate educational system , 2) skilled scientists , 3) financial means , 4) technological infrastructure , 5) belief there is a pressing security threat , and 6) the national will and leadership to do so. Saudi Arabia possesses each of these .For a start, the Saudi educational system, especially in the sciences, has improved in recent years, and is undergoing changes that should see even greater progress. Meanwhile, the Kingdom's education budget has more than doubled since 2005, with more than $350 billion spent on education since then. Indeed, in 2014, spending on education and training represented about a quarter of the governmental budget, and the Saudi leadership has funded a massive foreign scholarship program that has seen more than 200,000 Saudis studying abroad. As a result, Saudi Arabia is the third largest student "exporter" after China and India.In addition, Saudi Arabia has had nuclear physicists with PhD's from Harvard, MIT, Stanford and other top U.S. universities conducting advanced research in nuclear physics at the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) for decades before the King Abdullah Atomic Energy City (KACARE) was created and took over all nuclear matter. As detailed in a 2011 KACARE white paper on the government's civil nuclear strategy, a select committee of Saudi nuclear scientists has already conducted groundbreaking research on an elaborate civil nuclear program. With this in mind, as a Washington Institute for Near East Policy policy brief notes, plans are in place for the "construction of sixteen nuclear power reactors over the next twenty years at a cost of about $80 billion." King Salman is expected to give his final blessing before the end of this year.Depending on how the Iranian negotiations conclude, the Saudi leadership will form a similar select committee to draft a white paper on a weaponized nuclear program. One of the underlying fundamentals of Saudi nuclear strategy has been to have a program based on indigenous technology to ensure that the entire fuel cycle remains under Saudi control. In short, the country doesn't want to buy nuclear weapons from countries like Pakistan.The current Saudi nuclear scientific community is perfectly capable of mastering the complexities of such a program. Since the end of World War II, the technology associated with producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium has become more efficient and has served as the cornerstone of most civilian nuclear programs around the world.Is there a widespread belief that Saudi Arabia faces a n impending national security threat , which would motivate it to want to develop a nuclear weapon? In short, yes. Iran has pursued an intrusive, insurrectionary policy in Arab countries with Shia communities, some of them directly surrounding the Kingdom. A nuclear Iran would be viewed as a direct threat to the Kingdom, and a response of equal measure would be considered prudent, necessary and justified.

Finally, the required national will and leadership to create a nuclear program is clear . Saudi nationalism is on the rise and the Saudi people expect their leaders to take a strong stance in these difficult times . The revitalized foreign and defense policy doctrines being adopted by King Salman have brought a great deal of hope to Arabs across the region. The Saudi monarch is utilizing his Kingdom's unique religious legitimacy and enormous political, financial and military means to project sustained power and unify the Arab world.The thinking in Washington seems to be that Saudi Arabia should remain a passive player in the Middle East, with even President Obama suggesting the Kingdom should not develop a nuclear program. Instead, there is talk of a "nuclear umbrella" that would supposedly safeguard Gulf states including Saudi Arabia against a nuclear Iran. But this is completely unacceptable to the Saudi leadership. As with any important nation with global responsibilities, it is a matter of vital national security that the Kingdom be able to defend itself and its allies from hostile outside forces. A nuclear Iran is one such force. With the U.S. continuing to move in the direction of allowing such a development, the Kingdom can only look to itself to protect its people, even if this means implementing a nuclear program . And make no mistake, it has the scientists to develop the technology , finances , and national will to do so .

Lean neg – they’ll do whatever it takes to prolifPollack ’15 (Kenneth M. Pollack, PhD in Political Science @ MIT, senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, he served as the director of the center from 2009 to 2012, and its director of research from 2002 to 2009, “Regional implications of a nuclear agreement with Iran,” 9 July 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/07/09-pollack-iran-nuclear-agreement)Especially in light of these assessments of likely Iranian and Israeli behavior after a nuclear deal, Saudi Arabia is the real wild card we must consider . The Saudis aren’t exactly fans of a nuclear deal with Iran. And certainly, Saudi Arabia is the most likely candidate to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran were to do so. [2] In private, Saudi officials have repeatedly warned American officials (including this author) that if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, Saudi Arabia will follow suit—and nothing will stop them —because they will not live in a world where Iran has a nuclear weapon and they do not. Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former Saudi Intelligence Chief, has gone so far as to repeat that warning in public.[3] For instance, in 2011, Turki commented that, “It is in our interest that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon, for its doing so would compel Saudi Arabia, whose foreign relations are now so fully measured and well assessed, to pursue policies that could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences.”[4]

Nuclearization itself causes war even if it’s not successful.Guzansky ‘15 (7/22, Yoel, is a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University and former Iran Coordinator in Israel’s National Security Council. “Could the Iran Deal Drive Saudi Arabia to Go Nuclear?”, http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.667189)Current Saudi policy is based on the presumption that its right to enrich uranium should be recognized, as in Tehran's case. Developing a nuclear program including the ability to enrich uranium would be only a long-term option for Saudi Arabia, due to the kingdom's current lack of knowledge and facilities. From Riyadh’s point of view, however, the agreement with Iran gives it 10 years of Iranian nuclear restraint, and in this time, the kingdom will be able to choose from various nuclear options permitted under the NPT.In order to develop a civilian nuclear program, the kingdom will likely seek to partner with countries including Pakistan , with which the kingdom has close defense relations. Differences have emerged recently between Riyadh and Islamabad regarding the war in Yemen, but if Pakistan becomes convinced that its ally – which not only financed a large part of its nuclear program but provides the country with significant economic aid – needs long-term assistance to build an enrichment facility, it would help, even if unofficially.

Because the process of building independent nuclear capability is prolonged and demanding, the kingdom must find a medium-term response to cope with the challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear status. One such possibility is that Saudi Arabia may ask Pakistan to station its own nuclear warheads on Saudi territory as sort of an extended deterrent arrangement, should Iran openly build a bomb. And even if Saudi Arabia’s path to nuclear capability is not guaranteed, its very presence in the arms race is liable to set in motion various processes with negative consequences for regional stability in general, and for Israel in particular.

Pakistan will give the Saudis nukesHenderson 2018

March 08, 2018 Simon Henderson | Director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at the Washington Institute “Does Saudi Arabia Intend to Develop a Nuclear Weapons Capability?” https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/75723

Saudi Arabia probably already has a nuclear weapons capability, courtesy of Pakistan. The assumption is that Pakistan’s nuclear-tipped missiles could be sent to the kingdom, either to boost Saudi deterrence against Iran or to safeguard part of Pakistan’s strategic force in time of crisis with India, complicating New Delhi’s options.

The details of such a Saudi-Pakistani understanding—it may not be a written agreement—are reconfirmed every time there is a change of government in Pakistan , or a change on the Saudi throne. Hence the two visits that Saudi defense minister (and now crown prince) Muhammad bin Salman has made to Pakistan since his father King Salman took over the throne in 2015. Hence, also, the regular visits by Pakistan’s military leadership to the kingdom—on military and security policy any civilian government in Islamabad takes a back seat.

They’ll buy from North KoreaKeck ’15 (Zachary Keck is managing editor of The National Interest. He was previously managing editor of The Diplomat, “The Ultimate Nightmare: North Korea Could Sell Saudi Arabia Nuclear Weapons,” 22 June 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ultimate-nightmare-north-korea-could-sell-saudi-arabia-13162?page=2)But while Saudi Arabia couldn’t purchase a nuclear weapon from Pakistan, it might have more luck with North Korea. In fact, there are a number of compelling reasons to believe North Korea might be amenable to such a request .Most obviously, North Korea has a troubling history of proliferating nuclear tech nology, including to the Middle East. There have long been persistent (albeit largely unconfirmed) rumors that North Korea has provided Iran with nuclear technology, and Pyongyang also helped Syria build a nuclear reactor (which Israel destroyed in airstrikes in 2011). More generally, North Korea has a long track record of selling advanced military tech nology like ballistic missiles to numerous pariah nations.Moreover, Saudi Arabia would be an extremely valuable patron for North Korea . Currently, Kim Jong-un is trying to improve the economy especially for North Korean elites in order to shore up support for his rule. This effort has been made extremely difficult by the more hardline stance China has taken against North Korea ever since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012.Pyongyang has been scrambling to find suitable replacements for China, but so far it has had little luck. Russia appears to want to improve ties with North Korea, but its growing financial woes will limit its ability to provide North Korea with enough economic assistance to offset the loss of Chinese aid.

Meanwhile, South Korea appears intent on limiting its economic relationship with North Korea absent significant concessions from Pyongyang on the latter’s nuclear program.Saudi Arabia would face no ne of these constraints . Unlike South Korea, Saudi Arabia is not overtly threatened by North Korea’s nuclear program. And unlike Russia, it does not face enormous financial difficulties.In fact, Saudi Arabia is awash in petrodollars , boasting the third largest foreign currency reserves in the world after only China and Japan. Although it has been using these to soften the impact of lower oil prices, it still has $708 billion in FX reserves, more than enough to provide significant support for North Korea.Saudi Arabia could also provide North Korea with other kinds of valuable assistance . For instance, foreign workers make up over half of Saudi Arabia’s labor force, and North Koreans working in Saudi Arabia could provide the Hermit Kingdom with another significant source of hard currency. Indeed, this is one of the Kim regime’s favorite tactics for skirting international sanctions. As the Asan Institute of Policy Studies has explained: “Earnings are not sent back as remittances, but appropriated by the state and transferred back to the country in the form of bulk cash, in clear violation on UN sanctions.”Some estimate that as many as 65,000 North Koreans are working abroad in 40 different countries, and that this number has doubled or even tripled since Kim Jong-un took power. Yet, according to Asan, Saudi Arabia doesn’t even rank in the top ten nations in terms of North Korean laborers. Changing that would be a huge boon to the Kim regime. Finally, besides hard cash, North Korea faces a chronic energy shortage , with China accounting for nearly 90 percent of North Korea’s energy imports in recent years. Saudi oil and natural gas could significantly reduce North Korea’s reliance on China for its energy needs, while also helping to stimulate the North Korean economy.

Yes prolif – Iran ThreatIran deal expiration creates the impetus for Saudi ProlifBurkhard et al 2017

Sarah Burkhard, Erica Wenig, David Albright, and Andrea Stricker “Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Ambitions and Proliferation Risks” INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY March 30, 2017 – Rev. 1 https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/SaudiArabiaProliferationRisks_30Mar2017_Final.pdf

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has an uneasy relationship with Iran. The Iran nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which went into effect in January 2016, has limited Iran’s sensitive nuclear program and subjected it to greater international monitoring. Many hoped that the JCPOA would also ease regional security tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, yet they have actually increased despite the deal. The JCPOA has also not eliminated the Kingdom’s desire for nuclear weapons capabilities and even nuclear weapons, but rather reduced the pressure on Saudi Arabia to match Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities in the short term. In that sense, the deal has delayed concerns about nuclear proliferation in Saudi Arabia. However, there is little reason to doubt that Saudi Arabia will more actively seek nuclear weapons capabilities, motivated by its concerns about the ending of the JCPOA’s major nuclear limitations starting after year 10 of the deal or sooner if the deal fails. If Iran expands its enrichment capabilities, as it states it will do, Tehran will reduce nuclear breakout times, or the time needed to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon, to weeks and then days. With these concerns, the Kingdom is likely to seek nuclear weapons capabilities as a hedge. A priority of the administration of Donald J. Trump is to prevent Saudi Arabia from developing such capabilities, in particular acquiring reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. The administration’s stated commitment to better enforce and strengthen the JCPOA provides a sounder foundation to achieve that goal.

AT No Pakistan coopEven if the Pakistani government has an incentive not to cooperate, unofficial leaks of know-how and material are still possibleFloto, ’14 -- has covered humanitarian, training, and peacekeeping operations as a US Marine Corps Combat Correspondent(Patrick, 1-23, The Potential for Nuclear Proliferation in Saudi Arabia, Fair Observer, http://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/potential-nuclear-proliferation-saudi-arabia/)

¶ Saudi Capability to Develop or Procure a Nuclear Weapon¶ Traditionally, Saudi Arabia has never had much potential to develop or procure a nuclear weapon due to its lack of motivation and capability. King Abdullah's 2009 vow and Saudi Arabia's lack of confidence in the temporary and reversible goals outlined in the Joint Plan of Action provides the kingdom with motivation to explore several short-term and long-term avenues available today, due to stronger foreign relations with nuclear states and a bolstered education program to obtain a nuclear insurance policy.¶ Saudi Arabia has a long-standing relationship with nuclear-armed Pakistan and has made significant investments in the Pakistani nuclear program over the years.¶ Gary Samore, President Barack Obama's former counter-proliferation advisor, speculated that the Saudi investment in the Pakistani nuclear program led "the Saudis [to] believe that they have some understanding with Pakistan that, in extremis, they would have claim to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan."¶ Pakistan denies this charge, claiming to be "a responsible nuclear weapon state with robust command and control structures and comprehensive export controls." Though Pakistan may officially have little incentive to either provide nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia or deploy them in Saudi territory, there exists the possibility for unofficial leaks of know-how or material from the Pakistani nuclear program to support a Saudi initiative.¶ Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who played a key role in the development of the Pakistani nuclear program, was accused of selling nuclear secrets and equipment to Libya and North Korea. He was subsequently fired by the Pakistani government in 2004 and placed under house arrest until February 2009. The large financial resources available to Saudi Arabia allow access to this avenue of unofficial procurement.¶ These underhanded attempts at proliferation may prove to be unnecessary for the Saudis in the long-run, given their recent attempts at developing a new generation of highly educated scientists and public desire for a civilian nuclear program.¶

Tons of evidence and experts agree – Pakistan will sell 2 nuclear warheads to Saudi if they want to rapidly prolifAmir Mir, Oct 4, 2011, senior Pakistani journalist with The News, Is Pakistan helping the Saudis with a nuclear deterrent?, Rediff, http://www.rediff.com/news/special/is-pakistan-helping-the-saudis-with-a-nuclear-deterrent/20111004.htmAs early as 1969, the Pakistan air force flew the aircraft of the royal Saudi air force to help fend off an invasion from South Yemen. In the 1970s and 1980s, about 15,000 Pakistani soldiers were stationed in Saudi Arabia to protect the country's oil fields. Against the backdrop of the recent uprisings in the Middle East and the Arab world which led to the ouster of several autocratic rulers of the Muslim world, Pakistan had played a key role in the region by supporting Saudi Arabia to preempt a possible revolt against the Saudi kingdom. Besides placing two army divisions on standby to help Riyadh should any trouble break out, the Pakistan government helped the Saudi kingdom with the recruitment of thousands of ex-Pakistani military personnel for Bahrain's national guard. Resultantly, Islamabad has

received more financial aid from the Saudis than any other country outside the Arab world. Those in Riyadh who favour the preparation of a nuclear programme for military uses in cooperation with Pakistan include Saudi Defence Minister Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz, and its former intelligence chief, Turki Bin Faisal. Hence, while progressing towards this end several Pakistani nuclear scientists recently visited Saudi Arabia to meet , among others, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, the head of the Saudi national security council and former ambassador to the United States. Prince B andar is considered among those in the Saudi royal family who are encouraging the nuclear connection with Pakistan to put his country on a secret path to becoming nuclear . According to the UPI report, Saudi Arabia is beefing up its military links with Pakistan to counter Iran's expansionist plans which includes acquiring atomic arms from the only Muslim nuclear power or its pledge of nuclear cover. ' Pakistan has become a front-line State for Sunni Islam and is being positioned by its leaders, particularly in the powerful military and intelligence establishments, as a bulwark against Shia Iran and its proxies. Increasingly, Pakistan is rushing to the defence of Saudi Arabia, with whom it has a long had discreet security links,' the UPI report said. The UPI report added that the concerns about Saudi plans to buy readymade nuclear weapons were raised in June 1994. A Saudi defector, Mohammed Abdalla al-Khilewi, the No 2 official in the Saudi mission to the United Nations in New York, claimed Riyadh had paid up to $5 billion to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein [ Images ] to build it a nuclear weapon. Al-Khilewi is a former Saudi Arabian diplomat noted for his brazen May 1994 defection in which he issued a declaration on the Saudi embassy letterhead proclaiming King Fahd to be despotic and calling for a redistribution of the country's wealth and power. An expert in nuclear proliferation, al-Khilewi had produced 13,000 documents to support his claim that Saudi Arabia was engaged in a secret 20-year effort to acquire nuclear weapons , first with Ira q, which Riyadh backed in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, and then with Pakistan. His documents showed that Riyadh helped bankroll Pakistan's clandestine nuclear project and signed a pact that in the event Saudi Arabia was attacked with nuclear weapons, Islamabad would immediately respond against the aggressor with its own nuclear arms. Well-informed diplomatic circles in Islamabad believe the recent media reports about a possible nuclear cooperation between Riyadh and Islamabad are credibl e. According to them, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have developed extensive defence and strategic ties to an extent that Riyadh is now secretly working on an alleged nuclear programme with the help of Pakistani experts. The nuclear partnership between Riyadh and Islamabad is reportedly aimed at providing the kingdom with a nuclear deterrent on short notice if and when needed. Determined not to fall behind in the Middle East nuclear race, Saudi Arabia has allegedly arranged to make available two Pakistani nuclear bombs or guided missile warheads which are most probably held in Pakistan's nuclear air base at Kamra in the northern district of Attock in Punjab province. In fact, the fresh reports about the Pakistan-Saudi nuclear deal were prompted by the International Atomic Energy Agency's recent disclosure that Iran has begun to install the centrifuges in its uranium enrichment facility in Natanz.

Saudi will buy nukes from Pakistan – top security source and wikileaks provesAndrew Roberts, Jan 2, 2011, historian & a fellow of the Royal Society of Literature, Iran's Nuclear Domino Effect, The Daily Beast,www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/01/02/irans-nuclear-weapons-could-lead-to-a-saudi-and-pakistan-alliance.htmlMight the impending nuclearization of Iran rapidly lead to a situation in which India targets nuclear weapons on Saudi Arabia? That is one of the many unnerving repercussions envisaged in an authoritative article, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,” in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, written by, among others, Eric Edelman, President George W. Bush’s undersecretary of defense for policy from 2005 to 2009. When an analyst of Edelman’s seniority and ability, who moreover was working in the Pentagon with full access to all the available intelligence on precisely this issue as recently as two years ago, pronounces on questions of this gravity it behooves us to pay serious attention.

Writing under the auspices of the high-powered defense think tank the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, E delman and two colleagues examine the ramifications of Saudi Arabia attempting swiftly to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan the moment that it is clear that Iran has them. He reports “rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees .” Now , people who have held jobs as sensitive as Edelman’s do not report “rumors” in a respected journal like Foreign Affairs unless they believe them to be very much more than that. Both in the article and more fully in an interview I have conducted with him today, Edelman sets out his thinking on a subject that should have very profound implications for decision-making in the Obama administration as it considers the long-term ramifications of permitting Iran to go nuclear. For although we can all see the primary and perhaps also the secondary implications for security in the Middle East of the so-called containment strategy, the United States must now ponder the long-term tertiary and even later consequences. One of these must be what Edelman terms “the Islamabad option,” by which the Saudis and Pakistanis would effectively enter into an offensive-defensive “dual-key” nuclear arrangement, rather like the one the U.S. has had with Britain from the late-1960s to the present day. The Saudis have already indicated privately—and WikiLeaks has done nothing to cast doubt on this—that when what Edelman terms “the nuclear cascade” is unleashed once Iran goes nuclear, they will be in the first wave. “Saudi Arabia is the lynchpin,” says Edelman, “the key country.” The extremely close links between the two Sunni countries Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which go back at least as far as 1979 when Pakistan helped to clear Islamic fundamentalists out of the Grand Mosque, and A.Q. Khan’s time in Saudi Arabia at precisely the time when his nuclear-proliferation ring was at its most active , invite what Edelman guardedly calls “speculation” that a mutually convenient arrangement would be arrived at very soon after Iran went nuclear.

Pakistan will provide Saudi with either weapons or the technical support to quickly prolif. Or they will move their nukes to Saudi, which avoids NPT violation.Andrew Roberts, Jan 2, 2011, historian & a fellow of the Royal Society of Literature, Iran's Nuclear Domino Effect, The Daily Beast,www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/01/02/irans-nuclear-weapons-could-lead-to-a-saudi-and-pakistan-alliance.html“Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia ,” states Edelman, “ or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and the technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer.” The Saudis might not even , technically at least, be violating the N uclear Non- P roliferation T reaty if the weapons remained operated by the Pakistanis, albeit on Saudi territory. Nor does Congress consider this all to be mere “speculation” either: The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Staff Report of February 2008 stated that there was “some circumstantial evidence” to suggest that an agreement of some sort might already exist between the two countries.

Pakistan would sell to Saudi, despite their public statements that they won’t. Saudi would even violate promises to the US if it perceives Iranian edge.Hugh Tomlinson, Feb 11, 2012, Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons to counter Iran, The Australian, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/saudi-arabia-to-acquire-nuclear-weapons-to-counter-iran/story-fnb64oi6-1226268171576SAUDI Arabia could acquire nuclear warheads within weeks of Iran developing atomic weapons as the threat from Tehran triggers an arms race across the Middle East. In the event of a successful Iranian nuclear test, Riyadh would immediately launch a twin-track nuclear weapons program. Warheads would be purchased off the shelf from abroad, with work on a new ballistic missile platform getting under way

to build an immediate deterren t , according to Saudi sources. At the same time, the Saudi kingdom would upgrade its planned civil nuclear program to include a military dimension, beginning uranium enrichment to develop weapons-grade material in the long term. Saudi officials emphasise that Riyadh has no military nuclear program at present and will continue to lobby for nuclear disarmament across the region. But the Saudi government accepts privately that there is no chance of Israel surrendering its undeclared arsenal of warheads, and Riyadh is determined to match Tehran if its arch enemy in the Gulf goes nuclear. Like many Western powers, Riyadh is convinced that Iran is seeking to build nuclear weapons, and is preparing for a worst-case scenario should Western efforts to halt Iran's nuclear advance fail. The Times has learnt that c ommanders of Saudi Arabia's Strategic Missile Force have been actively considering the missile platforms on the market. "There is no intention currently to pursue a unilateral military nuclear program but the dynamics will change immediately if the Iranians develop their own nuclear capability," one senior Saudi source said. "Politically, it would be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability and not the kingdom." Pakistan is the most likely vendor of warheads to Riyadh, according to Western officials. Saudi Arabia is believed to have shouldered much of the cost of Pakistan's nuclear program and bailed out Islamabad when it was sanctioned by the West after its first nuclear test, in 1998. In exchange, the countries have long been rumoured to have an agreement whereby Pakistan would sell Saudi Arabia warheads and nuclear technology if security in the Gulf deteriorated. Riyadh and Islamabad have persistently denied that any such arrangement exists, but Western defence officials and diplomats in Riyadh are convinced there is an understanding. One said the kingdom would call in its favour from Pakistan "the next day" after an Iranian nuclear test and could have warheads within weeks. This would place Saudi Arabia in breach of a memorandum of understanding signed with the US in 2008, promising US assistance with civil nuclear power on condition that Riyadh does not pursue "sensitive nuclear technologies ". But if Tehran builds a bomb, the regional landscape would change completely.

AT SanctionsSanctions don’t stop prolif—Saudi is immuneFloto, ’14 -- has covered humanitarian, training, and peacekeeping operations as a US Marine Corps Combat Correspondent(Patrick, 1-23, The Potential for Nuclear Proliferation in Saudi Arabia, Fair Observer, http://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/potential-nuclear-proliferation-saudi-arabia/)

Years of Saudi investment and cooperation with the Pakistani nuclear program provides an avenue for short-term procurement of a nuclear weapon. However, recent education initiatives by King Abdullah — providing legions of the best and brightest young Saudi scientists and engineers training at world-class institutions abroad — allow for the possibility of a long-term nuclear weapons program in the kingdom itself. ¶ Saudi Arabia's consistent position as the world's largest single producer of oil could grant the kingdom immunity from potential sanctions, similar to those facing Iran. This is especially the case if the world supply of oil is already hampered by existing sanctions on another major producer.

Sanctions on Saudi wouldn’t work—they simply sell too much oil for any regime to be effectiveWeinberg, 3-31-15 -- Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies(David Andrew, Doomsday: Stopping a Middle East Nuclear Arms Race, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/doomsday-stopping-middle-east-nuclear-arms-race-12511?page=2)

Imagine the imposition of financial sanctions on the central bank of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—the only Arab member of the G20 group of major economies. To this, add biting multinational trade sanctions to stop the the majority of Saudi Arabia’s oil production from being sold on international markets. If these measures seem preposterous, it is because they are. Yet American counter-proliferation policy in the Middle East may be premised on implementing this bizarre, nightmarish scenario.¶ During recent testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken suggested that “the best way” to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East is through “the model that’s being set” via the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. Blinken elaborated, saying that “I doubt any country would want to follow” the model set by Iran of “a decade or more of isolation and sanctions.” In short, the “answer” for how to prevent a Middle Eastern nuclear cascade “is exactly what we’ve been doing.”¶ Yet virtually every Sunni power in the region is moving to develop its nuclear power infrastructure, in part due to burgeoning domestic demand for electricity, but also in response to Iran’s nuclear program. Saudi Arabia’s former intelligence chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal, explained this month to the BBC that “whatever comes out of these talks, we will want the same.” He noted that in particular, “if Iran has the ability to enrich uranium to whatever level, it’s not just Saudi Arabia that’s going to ask for that.”¶ In addition to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates are all embarking on nuclear energy crash programs. Experts believe several of these states have concluded that nuclear energy offers opportunities not just for domestic energy production but also for military purposes, so that they can “pick up some capabilities along the way.” Amman just reached a $10 billion deal with Russia to build Jordan’s first nuclear power plant, and the Russians signed a similar agreement to construct the Egyptians’ first plant when Putin visited Cairo in February. No doubt the Emiratis are regretting signing a 2009 U.S. agreement offering to forego the right to enrich uranium in exchange for American nuclear cooperation ever since Iran has effectively been granted a de facto right to domestic enrichment.¶ But the country that most feels itself in Iranian crosshairs is Saudi

Arabia. The late Saudi King Abdullah once urged America to launch military strikes on Iran’s nuclear program to “cut off the head of the snake” and warned the United States point blank that “if they get nuclear weapons, we will get nuclear weapons.” Saudi King Salman is currently walking back his predecessor’s regional campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood in order to press the Brotherhood’s regional supporters—Turkey, Qatar, Sudan, and Hamas—to assist with his more immediate priority of confronting Iranian depredations in the region. The new Saudi-led military campaign against Iranian-backed Houthi insurgents in Yemen, code named Operation Decisive Storm, is the latest expression of the king’s resolve.¶ As I told members of Congress in testimony last year, the Saudis view Tehran’s nuclear intentions through the prism of its support for terrorism and other mischief-making throughout the region. King Salman’s designated heir, Crown Prince Muqrin, once memorably explained to U.S. officials that claims about a “Shi’ite crescent” extending through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon did not go far enough; rather, he characterized Iranian activities as a “full moon” encircling the Kingdom, affecting the Shi’ite population in its Eastern Province as well as Saudi neighbors in Bahrain, Yemen, and Kuwait. This deep skepticism of Iranian motives was only intensified when Iranian officials began to gloat about the recent success of their Houthi proxies at demolishing the Yemeni state.¶ While all six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) formally welcomed the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) signed with Iran in November 2013, most of them privately opposed it. Saudi Arabia’s current ruler presided over a cabinet meeting that issued a vaguely positive yet skeptical declaration in response to the JPOA, but the editorial in a newspaper controlled by his son was closer to Riyadh’s genuine views on the agreement, treating it as a sign that Washington is abandoning the Gulf.¶ The Saudis worry that if sanctions are lifted under a nuclear deal, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will be flush with cash to intensify its agenda of regional subversion. By virtue of focusing solely on the nuclear in talks with Iran, the P5+1 is guaranteeing Gulf Arab opposition to such a deal.¶ In early March, when Secretary of State Kerry visited the Saudis to brief them on nuclear talks with Iran, Riyadh had some tough words for America’s top diplomat about their security concerns. “Nothing will be different the day after this agreement… with respect to all the other issues that challenge us in the region” including “Iran’s other destabilizing actions.” And wouldn’t you know it, those were Kerry’s words.¶ The Secretary of State presumably meant his remarks to reassure the Saudis—indicating that America would stand by its commitment to the GCC’s security in the face of Iranian paramilitary encroachments. Yet ever since President Obama decided in 2013 not to enforce his red line against the use of chemical weapons by Iran’s Syrian proxy, Bashar al-Assad, the Gulf monarchs have had additional reason to be skeptical. Indeed, during their press conference, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal took Kerry’s remarks to their logical conclusion, emphasizing that the GCC’s first concern is not the Iranian nuclear program per se but rather “everything else that Iran does,” since it is through these actions that the rest of the Gulf divines Iranian intentions. He has since warned that Iran should not receive a nuclear deal it does not “deserve” so long as Tehran is conducting “aggressive policies… and ongoing interventions” in the region.¶ Viewed in this context, it should come as little surprise that alumni of the Obama administration report “we’ve been pressing them [the Saudis] to agree not to pursue a civilian fuel cycle, but the Saudis refuse.” Perhaps the best that can be achieved in this regard is what Sigurd Neubauer of the Arab Gulf States Institute calls the “silver standard,” leveraging U.S. nuclear expertise in exchange for Riyadh committing to obtain any reactor fuel it requires on the international market instead of producing the material itself. Added inspection requirements with the International Atomic Energy Agency could also help some.¶ But observers worry that Saudi Arabia could bypass this hurdle altogether if Iran continues to make progress toward a nuclear weapon by purchasing a Saudi bomb off the shelf from Pakistan. The severe international consequences of such a scenario mean that this possibility simply cannot be taken lightly.

AT Uranium ShortageThey’ll get uranium from JordanTrofimov 5-7-15 -- writes a weekly column, Middle East Crossroads, about the region stretching from West Africa to Pakistan(Yaroslav, Saudi Arabia Considers Nuclear Weapons to Offset Iran, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-considers-nuclear-weapons-to-offset-iran-1430999409)

In the immediate future, Saudi Arabia wouldn’t have to violate its nonproliferation commitments even if it chooses to pursue that path, said Mr. Heinonen, now a senior fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.¶ “The first 4-5 years they don’t need to even talk about sensitive technology—they just have to keep it their mind. Over the next few years they will just build this infrastructure, they will be really nice boys with IAEA, and there will be no problem. I don’t think they will go secret because there is no point of doing it at this stage,” he said.¶ Conveniently, Mr. Heinonen added, Saudi Arabia’s neighbor and close ally Jordan sits on the region’s largest uranium reserves: “Jordan has a lot of uranium but it has no money to extract it, so I imagine the Saudis can work together with them.”

AT ZakariaZakaria is wrong—Saudi does have capability and science ranking doesn’t dictate prolif ability Lewis 15 - director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.Jeffery, Sorry, Fareed: Saudi Arabia Can Build a Bomb Any Damn Time It Wants To, 6/12, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/12/sorry-fareed-saudi-arabia-can-build-a-bomb-any-damn-time-it-wants-to/Fareed Zakaria has written a predictably buzzy article suggesting that, whatever Saudi officials might say, Riyadh is simply too backward to build a nuclear weapon. “Whatever happens with Iran’s nuclear program,” Zakaria writes, “10 years from now Saudi Arabia won’t have nuclear weapons. Because it can’t.” While I don’t think it is terribly likely that Saudi Arabia will choose to build nuclear weapons, I think it is deeply misguided to conclude that Saudi Arabia (or pretty much any state) cannot do so. Simply put, Zakaria is wrong — and it’s not all that hard to demonstrate why. Zakaria isn’t explicit about what he believes to be the technical requirements for building a nuclear weapon, but he clearly thinks it is hard. Which was probably true in 1945 when the United States demonstrated two different routes to atomic weapons. Since then, however, the technologies associated with producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium have been developed, put to civilian use, and spread around the globe. The fact that most states don’t build nuclear weapons has a lot more to do with restraint than not being able to figure it out. Zakaria’s argument that Saudi Arabia can’t build nuclear weapons is pretty shallow and relies largely on two assertions: a flip comment about Saudi Arabia lacking even a domestic automotive industry, and a superficially data-driven claim about Saudi Arabia’s “abysmal” math and science ranking. First, automobile production is a terrible indicator of whether a state can build a nuclear weapon. The technologies are really not at all similar — or at least they don’t have to be. India, Pakistan, and North Korea all succeeded in building nuclear weapons despite not having much of an auto industry at home. And the Soviets were really good at building nuclear weapons, even though their cars famously sucked. And, anyway, Saudi Arabia is investing in a domestic auto industry. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is hoping the Meeya will be on the market by 2017. So, there’s that. More importantly, Saudi Arabia is investing in a civil nuclear industry. “Where would Saudi Arabia train the scientists to work on its secret program?” Zakaria wonders. Oh, I don’t know, how about the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy? Somehow Zakaria never mentions that Saudi Arabia is building a dedicated city for training nuclear scientists. I can’t predict whether this investment will pay off, but then again neither can Zakaria — if he even knows it exists. Zakaria is also skeptical because, he writes, Saudi Arabia “ranks 73rd in the quality of its math and science education, according to the World Economic Forum — abysmally low for a rich country. Iran, despite 36 years of sanctions and a much lower per capita GDP, fares far better at 44.” Abysmally low for a rich country? Perhaps. But for a nuclear weapons state? Not nearly. Let’s do what he should have done and make a little table using his own data. Here is a list of selected countries — in bold if they currently possess nuclear weapons — by “Quality of Math and Science Education.” (Again, this is his data. Don’t blame me!)∂ Using Zakaria’s own measure, Saudi Arabia would hardly be the least nerdy country to acquire a nuclear weapon. Now, obviously I’d prefer to have historical data. But I strongly suspect that China’s and India’s rankings weren’t nearly so high in 1964 and 1974 when they conducted their first nuclear tests. The point is this: You don’t need to be a rich country, or have a great education system, to build a bomb. This should be no surprise. Did I mention that we just celebrated the 70th anniversary of the first nuclear explosion, Trinity? Seventy years. What other 70-year-old technology do we believe remains impossible for non-European countries to acquire, even after several have done so? You know what else was invented in the 1940s? Microwave ovens,

solid-body electric guitars, and the Slinky. I don’t mean “acquire” in terms of buying a nuclear weapon off the shelf — I agree with Zakaria that is a nutty idea. And I don’t mean purchasing a turn-key infrastructure to produce plutonium, as Syria did from North Korea, or highly enriched uranium as Libya did from Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan. No, I mean building a bomb from scratch. The fancy machine tools, materials, and components that were good enough to build the nuclear weapons of the 1970s are widely available now. My favorite example is that one of the machine tools linked to the A.Q. Khan network was a used Denn machine tool. If you go to the Denn website, they tell you what their machine tools can be used for: everything from armaments to kitchenware. And, be still Fareed Zakaria’s fluttering heart, auto parts. (Flow forming machines make sweet rims.) Talk about dual use! The United States was deeply skeptical that Pakistan could build centrifuges in the 1970s because of the country’s limited industrial base. What U.S. analysts didn’t grasp was that Pakistan’s industrial base — and that of every other proliferator — was the entire world. There is no reason to think this problem went away with A.Q. Khan. Take a spin around Alibaba, the big Chinese online B2B procurement site sometime. Moreover, a proliferator doesn’t have to try to acquire the most modern centrifuges. When U.N. inspectors were stumbling across the remnants of the Iraqi nuclear program in the early 1990s, they made a surprising discovery: Calutrons. These were an obsolete uranium enrichment technology (electromagnetic isotope separation) from the 1940s that fell out of favor after World War II. Inefficient, sure, but good enough to make the highly enriched uranium for the Little Boy bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. Frankly, we’re lucky that nuclear weapons have not spread as quickly as the technology to make them. Some of the success in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons is down to sanctions, export controls, and the occasional air strike. Most of the success, however, goes to the regime that discourages states that could build nuclear weapons from doing so in the first place. If you ask a policy wonk whether the nonproliferation regime has been successful or not, the chances are better than even that you’ll hear about President John F. Kennedy’s famous warning that “I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these weapons.” (It’s kind of a standard talking point we all learn early on.) That didn’t happen — and credit usually goes to the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To see why, look at the countries that were in Kennedy’s list of 15, 20, or 25 nuclear-armed states. Kennedy’s estimate came from a 1963 briefing paper provided by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that is now declassified. Here is McNamara’s chart:∂ Look at those names. They aren’t rogue states, but rather a list of the world’s relatively industrialized countries, along with a few developing regional powers like China and the UAR (The United Arab Republic was a brief political union of Egypt and Syria). The working assumption behind Kennedy’s estimate was that any state that could build nuclear weapons probably would. That’s because, before the NPT, nuclear weapons were seen by many people as just another weapon, part of any modern military’s future arsenal. In fact, virtually all the non-Warsaw Pact countries on this list seriously considered a nuclear weapons program. Australia, Sweden, and Switzerland all had active nuclear weapons programs. The NPT helped changed that. (In the case of Australia, Jim Walsh has written a particularly compelling account of the role played by the NPT in constraining Canberra’s nuclear aspirations.) Treaties are absolutely necessary. It is simply not possible to sustain a nearly universal regime through technology denial and military action. The regime depends on the vast majority of states choosing compliance, allowing the international community to focus its enforcement efforts on a small number of hard cases like North Korea and Iran. The nonproliferation regime can only function with the support of those states that can build nuclear weapons, but choose not to — states like Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are clearly alarmed by the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon. While I suspect that a lot of the talk about acquiring nuclear weapons is intended to make the United States focus on Saudi security concerns, it doesn’t help to dismiss Riyadh’s anxieties by mocking their educational system and ability to go nuclear. Rather, we need to focus on making sure the nonproliferation regime works for Saudi Arabia and other states. That means closer consultations on

regional defense issues, expanded security arrangements, and crucially an attempt to head off an Iranian bomb with a negotiated settlement. Fareed Zakaria may well win his bet that the Saudis will not have a bomb in 10 years, but it’s not because they can’t have one. If he wins — and I hope he does — it’s because the United States and other powers have successfully addressed Iran’s nuclear program and the regional security issues that would push Riyadh toward a bomb. And who knows, maybe in 10 years we’ll all be driving Meeyas.

AT TreatiesSaudi can quickly proliferate – its treaty and agreement obligations are tentative and all rest on perceptions of Iran’s advantage. It will use current air and missile systems or buy from China.Andrew Dean and, Nicholas A. Heras, Feb 23, 2012, “Iranian Crisis Spurs Saudi Reconsideration of Nuclear Weapons,” Terrorism Monitor, www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39048&cHash=01d44c8e664bfe24313e375883a05c37Rising tension in the Persian Gulf over the Islamic Republic of Iran’s purported ambition of developing nuclear weapons could lead to a nuclear arms race between Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On December 5, 2011, one of the most important members of the Saudi royal family, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, stated that a nuclear armed Iran would cause Saudi Arabia to seriously consider obtaining nuclear weapons as well (Agence France Presse, December 5, 2011). Further adding fuel to speculation, a recent report in the Times of London, citing an unidentified Saudi security source linked to the Saudi Strategic Missile Force asserted that in the event of an Iranian nuclear weapon being developed, Saudi Arabia would immediately purchase nuclear weapons and begin enriching its own uranium, possibly directly from Pakistan (Times, February 9). At present, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) allies are maintaining a public position of support for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East (AP, January 25, 2012). In conjunction with this policy, Saudi Arabia is expanding its peaceful nuclear power generating capability as a means of addressing rising domestic energy demand while saving valuable oil assets for export. The Kingdom is maintaining an aggressive policy of seeking multilateral agreements to address its need for nuclear power plants, research nuclear reactors, and manufacturing capability for nuclear fuels. To achieve this goal, Saudi Arabia has signed nuclear technology agreements with Argentina, South Korea, France, and China (Arab News, January 16, 2012). Beyond the pursuit of peaceful nuclear technology, Saudi Arabia's announcement it was considering pursuing nuclear weapons to counter a growing Iranian threat leads to many strategic questions about the Kingdom's likely deployment methods in the event it were to develop or receive nuclear weapons and the political costs that the Saudi government would incur with some of its closest allies for seeking to possess nuclear weapons. The United States, in particular, has expressed strong disagreement with a potential “Saudi nuke,” both as a matter of policy towards promoting a nuclear weapons free Middle East, and due to questions amongst U.S. lawmakers whether or not the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a trustworthy ally. Although the Saudi and U.S. governments reached a tentative, non-binding agreement for U.S.-Saudi cooperation for civilian nuclear technology in 2008, no formal agreement exists between the two nations (Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2011). In the past year, senior United States law makers have severely criticized the possibility of Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. The chair of the House Foreign Relations Committee, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R), captured the mood against supporting nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia by stating that Saudi Arabia’s “ties to terrorism and terror financing alone should rule it out as a candidate for U.S. nuclear cooperation,” (Agence France Presse, July 30, 2011). In the event of a policy decision to counter an Iranian nuclear weapon with a nuclear weapon of its own, Saudi Arabia has several existing platforms for deploying nuclear warheads. At present, the Royal Saudi Air Force has dozens of operational tactical fighter aircraft and short-range bombers that could double as delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads such as the B61. These aircraft include Saudi Arabia’s aging fleet of Panavia Tornados, soon to be replaced by the more capable European Typhoon, and the F-15S, and the F-15SA. These latter aircraft were the subject of a recent $29.4 billion purchase made by the Kingdom that will include 84 new F-15s and modernization packages for the 70 existing F-15s in the Royal Saudi Air Force (DefenseNews, December 29, 2011). In addition to the Royal Saudi Air Force's air-to-ground capabilities, the Kingdom possesses one of the most robust

networks of ballistic missile sites in the Middle East. It is estimated that Saudi Arabia currently possesses 40-60 aging Chinese-manufactured CSS-2 medium-range ballistic missiles, and an estimated 9-12 launchers to fire them. The CSS-2, or East Wind system, is capable of delivering only non-nuclear payloads within a 2,800 kilometer radius. The Saudi CSS-2 missiles are currently aimed at major population centers within Iran, but are terribly inaccurate and undependable, which raises questions about the Saudi leadership's willingness to deploy such weapons (Nuclear Threat Initiative, November, 2011). Iran's nuclear ambitions, coupled with Saudi Arabia's sizable but outdated ballistic missile system, increases speculation about recent sales discussions between the Saudis and Chinese for a nuclear-capable, highly accurate upgrade, such as the Dongfeng 21 (DF-21 or NATO-designated CSS-5). If the Saudis were to purchase the DF-21, a medium-range, road-mobile ballistic missile, it would signify a considerable operational improvement in accuracy, mobility, and lethality. The DF-21 is capable of delivering 250 or 500 kiloton conventional warheads accurately within a 2,150 kilometer range. The road-mobile feature, provided by the Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL), makes the DF-21 more survivable as they are more difficult to target. (Missile Threat, February 14, 2012). Saudi military planners will seek to exploit deficiencies in Iran’s missile defense. Iran's indigenously developed Bavar 373 missile defense system, which was developed after Russia reneged on the delivery of $800 million worth of S-300PMU missiles, may be Iran's greatest vulnerability. The Russian-made S-300 is widely recognized as one of the world's most advanced missile defense systems. The Iranian government, however, claims that their alternative is equally capable, a claim that is difficult to corroborate given Iran's historical need to acquire advanced radar and electronics technologies from suppliers abroad like North Korea, Russia, and China (UPI, November 23, 2011). The now public insinuation of a Saudi “nuclear option” has upped the ante in the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the Middle East region, and would severely strain relations between Saudi Arabia and some of its strongest allies, including the United States. In over a year of turbulent events in the region, Saudi Arabia has asserted itself vis-à-vis Iran in intervening militarily against popular demonstrations against the Saudi allied al-Khalifa monarchy in Bahrain, in developing its “Iran Initiative,” and by helping Qatar to spearhead a G.C.C. policy of supporting anti-Assad movements in Syria, a longtime Iranian ally. Prince Turki’s statement and the continued assertions by individuals knowledgeable about Saudi nuclear strategies indicate that Saudi Arabia is motivated to confront an Iranian nuclear weapons program with a nuclear weapons program of its own. Saudi Arabia has the technology and the strategic partnerships necessary to quickly develop a nuclear weapons capability.

Saudi’s commitment to non-prolif treaties are tentative and only to maintain US relations – several indicators show they can and would prolifMark Jansson Feb 21, 2012, is the Deputy Director of the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI). The views expressed above are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of PONI or CSIS. Conceding the Saudi Nuclear Breakout, CSIS, http://csis.org/blog/conceding-saudi-nuclear-breakoutSaudi Arabia has never sat atop the list of nuclear breakout concerns, but its track record reflects some ambivalence about the issue. It grudgingly acceded to the NPT in 1988, only after infuriating the United States when word got out about its clandestine acquisition of Chinese CSS-2 (DF-3) missiles, which were capable of delivering a nuclear payload. According to Thomas Lippman’s account in The Nuclear Tipping Point, the Saudi decision to join the NPT was “a political decision for Saudi Arabia, not a strategic one ” and intended primarily to “placate” its “indispensable patron .” Saudi Arabia’s support of Iran during the Iran-Iraq war despite Saddam’s covert nuclear weapons program; its reported offer to finance the reconstruction of the Osirak reactor following its bombing by Israel in 1981, perhaps including an arrangement with Iraq to assume ownership of some of the weapons it produced; and its financial assistance to the Pakistani nuclear weapons program and rumored arrangement to acquire Pakistani warheads upon request certainly beg some questions about the steadfastness of the Saudi

commitment to the foundational principles of the NPT. The recently inked nuclear cooperation deal with China, the supplier of the CSS-2s in 1988 and reported supplier of newer and still nuclear-capable DF-5s, may also be a little concerning .

AT Public Saudi officials and press are socializing the public to accept nuclearizationMark Jansson Feb 21, 2012, is the Deputy Director of the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI). The views expressed above are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of PONI or CSIS. Conceding the Saudi Nuclear Breakout, CSIS, http://csis.org/blog/conceding-saudi-nuclear-breakoutIt is not just what is said to western media that matters, but also what is being communicated domestically. Norman Cigar at Marine Corps University has been following the Saudi op-ed pages and print media – semi-official news sources in his view . Recently at a conference in Quantico, Cigar gave a fairly troubling account of how these outlets h ave served to promulgate the logic of Saudi Arabia acquiring a nuclear weapon. The socialization of this idea to people in and around the country is something to be concerned about .

AT Infrastrucutre Saudi has the infrastructure to quickly prolifRick Francona, Dec 5, 2011, former NBC News Middle East military analyst, retired intelligence officer, The coming nuclear arms race in the Middle East , Middle East Perspective, http://francona.blogspot.com/2011/12/coming-nuclear-arms-race-in-middle-east.html,The former director of Saudi Arabia's intelligence service stated this week that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, then the Kingdom may be forced to as well. Although Prince Turki al-Faysal couched his remarks by first citing the world's failure to convince Israel to abandon its nuclear weapons, then casually adding "as well as Iran," his meaning was perfectly clear - if Iran develops them, we'll buy our own. Saudi Arabia is currently planning to build 16 nuclear reactors to generate electricity. The weapons program would be an easy add-on, although the Kingdom is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Saudi interest in a nuclear weapons capability is not new. In 1987, the Saudis purchased CSS-2 missiles from China; the missiles are designed to carry a nuclear warhead. Although the Saudis did not acquire that capability, they did express interest in a joint research and development program with Pakistan. If the Saudis decide to move ahead with a nuclear weapons capability, they have the requisite infrastructure already in place.

AT EUThe EU cannot replace the US as Saudi’s guarantor Michael Bauer (Senior Expert „Europe and the Middle East” Programme “Europe” Bertelsmann Stiftung) and Christian-Peter Hanelt 2008 (Research Fellow Center for Applied Policy Research), Security Situation in the Gulf Region Involving Iran, Iraq und Saudi Arabia as Regional Powers. Policy Recommendations for the European Union and the International Community, Discussion paper Center for Applied Policy Research and Bertelsmann Stiftung September 2008 http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/bst/en/media/xcms_bst_dms_20376_25600_2.pdfIn view of the perceived failure of their Iraq strategy, the United States have less and less authority in the region. Even though the Gulf states still depend on U.S. guarantees for their security , domestically they find themselves confronted with a population that eyes the American presence in their countries critically. A further weakening of the USA might eventually lead to a strategic vacuum opening manoeuvring space for other act ors in and outside the region. • T he E uropean Union faces huge expectations in the region (“Europe is accepted, wanted, and needed”). Up to date and probably also until further notice the EU plays only a marginal strategic role in the region and will not be in a position to compensate for the weakness of the United States. Nevertheless, other actors try to improve their access to the region and thus add to the complexity of the strategic situation. India and China have to satisfy the increasing energy needs of their economies and are therefore interested in good relations with Iran and the GCC states alike. Russia and China are using the market the region provides for their arms industries.

Saudi leaders perceive EU/NATO as unable to replace US for security Anthony H. Cordesman, and Nawaf E. Obaid, 2005, National security in Saudi Arabia: threats, responses, and challenges, p. XXIISaudi Arabia also maintains military ties with Europe, particularly with Britain and France. Some Saudi officials see efforts to expand the role of NATO in the Middle East as a possible way of reducing Saudi de facto dependence on the United States, and/or of using NATO as a more politically acceptable cover for Saudi military ties to Washington. Saudi strategists and policymaker s, however, are all too aware of the real world limits on European power-projection capabilities as well as to the limitation of the power- projection forces NATO and the EU are trying to build. They understand that Europe will not be able to replace the United States in assistant Saudi Arabia to deal with serious foreign threats at any time in the foreseeable future.

AT ReputationEmpirically proven- security trumps reputation in Saudi ArabiaBowman 2008 (Bradley, at time of writing, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member for the Middle East under Senator Lugar, major and strategic plans and policy officer in the U.S. Army. As an assistant professor of American Politics, Policy, and Strategy and an academic counselor in the department of social sciences at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Major Bowman taught courses in American foreign policy and American politics, as well as designed and taught a new course entitled "Studies in Grand Strategy" that was featured on NPR. Major Bowman served brief details on the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff and in the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy during the summer of 2006. He earned an MA in international relations from Yale (2004) and a BS in American politics from the United States Military Academy at West Point (1995), CHAIN REACTION: AVOIDING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479213&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)The second argument frequently cited relates to the character of the regime. Some argue the Saudi regime is too conservative, too timid to take such a bold and controversial step. However, the Saudi regime’s undoubtedly conservative and occasionally timid approach to foreign relations has not kept Saudi Arabia from taking covert and controversial measures in the past in order to protect its interests. The Saudi acquisition of 50–60 CSS-2 missiles, 10–15 mobile launchers, and technical support from China at a cost of about $3 to $3.5 billion in the late 1980s provides an example. These missiles, which represent some of the longest-range missiles in the world, were acquired by the Saudis after the U.S. decision not to sell the Saudis surface-to-surface missiles. This Saudi moveapparently conducted without the knowledge of Israel or the U nited S tates- reflected anything but a conservative or timid approach. While the acquisition of a nuclear weapon would represent a much greater challenge to the bilateral relationship, the CSS-2 affair demonstrates that in order to ensure its own security, Saudi Arabia will not hesitate to aggressively bypass or risk alienating the U nited S tates in order to protect Saudi interests.

AT Tech

Even if they’re right- they could buy from PakistanBowman 2008 (Bradley, at time of writing, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member for the Middle East under Senator Lugar, major and strategic plans and policy officer in the U.S. Army. As an assistant professor of American Politics, Policy, and Strategy and an academic counselor in the department of social sciences at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Major Bowman taught courses in American foreign policy and American politics, as well as designed and taught a new course entitled "Studies in Grand Strategy" that was featured on NPR. Major Bowman served brief details on the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff and in the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy during the summer of 2006. He earned an MA in international relations from Yale (2004) and a BS in American politics from the United States Military Academy at West Point (1995), CHAIN REACTION: AVOIDING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479213&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)The third argument often cited relates to Saudi Arabia’s nuclear technology capabilities. Saudi Arabia lacks the human expertise and the technical knowledge necessary to develop a nuclear weapons program on its own. Experts consistently describe Saudi Arabia’s nuclear infrastructure and know how as far inferior to Egypt and Turkey. However, many individuals emphasize that the U.S. should not underestimate Saudi Arabia’s ability to buy the technology required. Many scholars and U.S. diplomats believe Saudi Arabia may have some sort of formal or informal understanding with Pakistan regarding nuclear weapons. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have common interests and complementary assets. Pakistan has a nuclear capability and limited money, while Saudi Arabia has no nuclear capability and virtually unlimited money. While no solid evidence exists to confirm the formalization of such an agreement, some circumstantial evidence suggests an agreement or ‘‘understanding’’ may exist.

Developing tech and knowledge base nowBowman 2008 (Bradley, at time of writing, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member for the Middle East under Senator Lugar, major and strategic plans and policy officer in the U.S. Army. As an assistant professor of American Politics, Policy, and Strategy and an academic counselor in the department of social sciences at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Major Bowman taught courses in American foreign policy and American politics, as well as designed and taught a new course entitled "Studies in Grand Strategy" that was featured on NPR. Major Bowman served brief details on the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff and in the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy during the summer of 2006. He earned an MA in international relations from Yale (2004) and a BS in American politics from the United States Military Academy at West Point (1995), CHAIN REACTION: AVOIDING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479213&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)THE SAUDI NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM In December 2006, Saudi Arabia joined the five other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to announce their intention to explore the development of a shared nuclear power program. These six countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) join Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and Turkey as countries who have expressed interest in developing nuclear energy programs in the wake of Iran’s nuclear activities. The GCC

states have taken great pains to cooperate with the IAEA fully and to progress in a transparent manner. At the initial announcement, the Saudi Foreign Minister said, ‘‘This is not a secret and we are doing this out in the open. Our aim is to obtain the technology for peaceful purposes, no more no less.’’ 9 Despite these assurances, numerous individuals interviewed by staff expressed a belief that the GCC announcement should be seen primarily as a response to Iran’s nuclear program. Analysts and scholars in the United States and the Arab world interviewed by staff believe the Saudi-led announcement was intended to communicate to the Iranians, ‘‘we can play this game too,’’ while building a foundation of nuclear knowledge and expertise that would be useful should Saudi Arabia decide to pursue nuclear weapons in the future. This is not to suggest the Saudis do not have an energy-based argument for their interest in nuclear energy. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Saudi Arabia’s Water and Electricity Ministry (WEM) predicts that the country’s electricity demand will double by the years 2023–25. Saudi Arabia already uses large amounts of its oil for domestic energy needs. In fact, 7 years ago, 16 of every 100 barrels of Saudi oil were consumed in Saudi Arabia. This year the amount of Saudi oil consumed in-country has grown to 22 of every 100 barrels, even as the global oil market has become tighter. As the Saudis seek to build an industrial infrastructure and employ more Saudis, consumption demands will continue to grow.10 Given the high price of oil and gas, the Saudis would rather export their fossil fuels than burn them. A nuclear power capacity would allow the Saudis to export more oil and gas and consume less. However, the timing and the forum for the Saudi-led announcement suggests the primary purpose of the decision was to warn the Iranians and begin the process of a nuclear- hedging strategy that will keep Saudi Arabia’s nuclear options open.

AT NPT

NPT can’t stop Saudi prolifCrimi 11 – Frank, Saudi Up the Nuclear Ante, Front Page Magazine, 7-22, http://frontpagemag.com/2011/07/22/saudis-up-the-nuclear-ante/

Fearful that he will soon face a nuclear-armed Iran, Saudi Arabia’s Prince Turki al-Faisal recently warned that the Saudi Kingdom would have no choice but to develop its own nuclear weapons, a move he said would lead to “untold and possibly dramatic consequences.” While the Saudi’s have long voiced the strategic goal of a nuclear-free Middle East, they have also unequivocally stated that they won’t sit back and allow themselves to be the only nonnuclear nation in the region. So, the remarks by al-Faisal — a former Saudi intelligence official — simply echo that view, one espoused by Saudi King Abdullah in 2006 when he said that if Iran ever developed nuclear weapons, “everyone in the region would, including Saudi Arabia.” However, with Iran now edging ever closer to acquiring its own nuclear weapons, it appears the Saudis have actually begun laying the groundwork for a similar pursuit. For example, in April 2011, the Saudis purchased from China advanced ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. One of the missiles, the DF-21, can carry a 500kT nuclear warhead over 1,800 kilometers. Moreover, in June 2011, the Saudi government announced a $300 billion plan to build 16 nuclear reactors over the next 20 years. While the Saudis have long been looking to develop a civilian nuclear program to meet its increasing electricity demands — having recently signed nuclear cooperation agreements with both France and China — the acquisition of nuclear power plants is the first crucial step in the development of a nuclear weapons program.

A2 prolif defense

2nc – prolif bad – general Prolif causes nuclear war – optimists are wrongKroenig ‘15 (Matthew Kroenig, Ph.D. in Political Science @ UC Berkeley, is an Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government @ Georgetown University & Nonresident Senior Fellow @ the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?” 2015, http://www.matthewkroenig.com/The%20History%20of%20Proliferation%20Optimism_Feb2014.pdf)Proliferation through Rose-Colored Glasses. The proliferation optimist position has a distinguished pedigree, and provides a useful rationale for actors interested in developing strategic deterrence with limited means, but it provides a weaker intellectual framework for comprehensively understanding the likely effects of nuclear proliferation on international politics. Scott Sagan and other contemporary proliferation pessimists have provided systematic and thoroughgoing critiques of the proliferation optimism position.32 Sagan shows that the spread of nuclear weapons leads to greater levels of international instability because: states might conduct preventive strikes on the nuclear facilities of proliferant states, proliferant states might not take the necessary steps to build a secure, second-strike capability, and organizational pathologies within nuclear states could lead to accidental or inadvertent nuclear launch.33 As Frank Gavin writes in his review of the optimism/pessimism debate, “The real problem, however, is that Sagan plays small ball in his debate with Waltz, conceding the big issues. Why not challenge Waltz on his core arguments about deterrence and stability?”34 Rather than repeat the substantial efforts of previous pessimists, therefore, I will take up Gavin’s challenge and focus on three big issues. In particular, this section maintains that proliferation optimists : present an oversimplified version of nuclear deterrence theory , follow a line of argumentation that contains an internal logical contradiction , and do not address the concerns of U.S. foreign policymakers . First and foremost, proliferation optimists present an oversimplified view of nuclear deterrence theory. Optimists argue that since the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), any nuclear war would mean national suicide and, therefore, no rational leader would ever choose to start one. Furthermore, they argue that the requirements for rationality are not high. Rather, leaders must value their own survival and the survival of their nation and understand that intentionally launching a nuclear war would threaten those values. Many analysts and policymakers attempt to challenge the optimists on their own turf and question whether the leaders of potential proliferant states are fully rational.35 Yet, these debate overlook the fact that, apart from the optimists, leading nuclear deterrence theorists believe that nuclear proliferation contributes to a real risk of nuclear war even in a situation of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) among rational states.36 Moreover, realizing that nuclear war is possible does not depend on peculiar beliefs about the possibility of escaping MAD.37 Rather, as we will discuss below, these theorists understand that some risk of nuclear war is necessary in order for deterrence to function. To be sure, in the 1940s, Viner, Brodie, and others argued that MAD rendered war among major powers obsolete, but nuclear deterrence theory soon advanced beyond that simple understanding.38 After all, great power political competition does not end with nuclear weapons . And nuclear-armed states still seek to threaten nuclear-armed adversaries. States cannot credibly threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they still want to coerce their adversaries. This leads to a credibility problem: how can states credibly threaten a nuclear-armed opponent? Since the 1960s, academic nuclear deterrence theory has been devoted almost exclusively to answering this question.39 And their answers do not give us reasons to be optimistic. Thomas Schelling was the first to devise a rational means by which states can threaten nuclear-armed opponents.40 He argued that leaders cannot credibly threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they can make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”41 They can engage in a process, the nuclear crisis, which increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. As states escalate a nuclear crisis there is an increasing probability

that the conflict will spiral out of control and result in an inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange . As long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater than the incremental increase in the risk of nuclear war, however, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherently credible. In these games of nuclear brinkmanship , the state that is willing to run the greatest risk of nuclear war before backing down will win the crisis , as long as it does not end in catastrophe. It is for this reason that Thomas Schelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a “competition in risk taking.”42 This does not mean that states eagerly bid up the risk of nuclear war. Rather, they face gut-wrenching decisions at each stage of the crisis. They can quit the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but only by ceding an important geopolitical issue to an opponent. Or they can the escalate the crisis in an attempt to prevail, but only at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear exchange . Since 1945 there were have been twenty high stakes nuclear crises in which “rational” states like the United States run a frighteningly-real risk of nuclear war. 43 By asking whether states can be deterred, therefore, proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis? Optimists are likely correct when they assert that a nuclear-armed Iran will not intentionally commit national suicide by launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack on the United States or Israel. This does not mean that Iran will never use nuclear weapons, however. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to think that a nuclear-armed Iran would not, at some point, find itself in a crisis with another nuclear-armed power. It is also inconceivable that in those circumstances, Iran would not be willing to run some risk of nuclear war in order to achieve its objectives. If a nuclear-armed Iran and the United States or Israel were to have a geopolitical conflict in the future, over the internal politics of Syria, an Israeli conflict with Iran’s client Hezbollah, the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, or some other issue, do we believe that Iran would immediately capitulate? Or is it possible that Iran would push back, possibly brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to coerce its adversaries? If the latter, there is a risk that proliferation to Iran could result in nuclear war and proliferation optimists are wrong to dismiss it out of hand. An optimist might counter that nuclear weapons will never be used, even in a crisis situation, because states have such a strong incentive, namely national survival, to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used. But this objection ignores the fact that leaders operate under competing pressures . Leaders in nuclear-armed states also have strong incentives to convince their adversaries that nuclear weapons might be used. Historically we have seen that leaders take actions in crises, such as placing nuclear weapons on high alert and delegating nuclear launch authority to low-level commanders , to purposely increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force less-resolved opponents to back down . Moreover, not even the optimists’ first principles about the irrelevance of nuclear posture stand up to scrutiny. Not all nuclear wars would be equally devastating.44 Any nuclear exchange would have devastating consequences no doubt, but, if a crisis were to spiral out of control and result in nuclear war, any sane leader would rather face a country with five nuclear weapons than one with five thousand. Similarly, any sane leader would be willing to run a greater risk of nuclear war against the former state than against the latter. Indeed, scholars have demonstrated that states are willing to run greater risks and are, therefore, more likely to win nuclear crises when they enjoy nuclear superiority over their opponents.45 Proliferation optimists might be correct that no rational leader would choose to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but, depending on the context, any sane leader would almost certainly be willing to risk one. Nuclear deterrence theorists have also proposed a second scenario under which rational leaders would be willing to instigate a nuclear exchange: limited nuclear war.46 For example, by launching a single nuclear weapon against a small city, a nuclear-armed state could signal its willingness to escalate a crisis, while leaving its adversary with enough left to lose to deter the adversary from launching a full-scale nuclear response. In a future crisis between China and the United States, for example, China could choose to launch a nuclear strike on a U.S. military base in East Asia to demonstrate its seriousness. In that situation, with the continental United States intact, would Washington choose to launch a full-scale nuclear war on China

that could result in the destruction of many American cities? Or would it back down? China might decide to strike after calculating that Washington would prefer a humiliating retreat over a full-scale nuclear war. If launching a limited nuclear war could be a rational strategic gambit under certain circumstances, it then follows that the spread of nuclear weapons increases the risk of nuclear use. To be sure, some strategic thinkers, including Henry Kissinger, advocated limited nuclear war as a viable strategy only to recant the position later due to fears of uncontrollable escalation. Yet, this does not change the fact that leading nuclear deterrence theorists maintain that limited nuclear war is possible among rational leaders in a MAD world .47 In sum, proliferation optimists present an oversimplified conception of nuclear deterrence theory. Leading academic deterrence theorists maintain that the spread of nuclear weapons could lead to nuclear use in games of nuclear brinkmanship and through limited nuclear options even among rational leaders in a situation of MAD. Indeed, they understand that a risk of nuclear war is necessary in order for nuclear deterrence to function, which leads us to our next point. The second weakness in the proliferation optimist argument is that it rests on an internal logical contradiction. This might come as a surprise to some, given that optimists are sometimes portrayed as hard-headed thinkers, following their premises to their logical conclusions. But, the contradiction at the heart of the optimist argument is glaring and simple to understand: either the probability of nuclear war is zero, or it is nonzero, but it cannot be both. This is true whether the risk of nuclear war is exogenous or endogenous to the behavior of the actors involved; the probability of nuclear war simply cannot be both zero and nonzero. If the probability of nuclear war is zero, then nuclear weapons should have no deterrent effect. States will not be deterred by a nuclear war that could never occur and states should be willing to intentionally launch large-scale conventional wars against nuclear-armed states. In this case, proliferation optimists cannot conclude that the spread of nuclear weapons is stabilizing. If, on the other hand, the probability of nuclear war is nonzero, then there is a real danger that the spread of nuclear weapons will result in a catastrophic nuclear war . In this case, proliferation optimists cannot conclude that nuclear weapons will never be used. In sum, either the spread of nuclear weapons raises the risk of nuclear war and, in so doing, deters large-scale conventional conflict. Or there is no danger that nuclear weapons will ever be used and the spread of nuclear weapons does not increase international stability. But, despite the claims of many proliferation optimists, it is nonsensical to argue that nuclear weapons will never be used and to simultaneously claim that their spread contributes to international stability. As was argued above, the most obvious way out of this dilemma is to concede that nuclear proliferation does indeed raise the risk of nuclear war .

Prolif Fast / BadNew and rapid proliferators are uniquely destabilizing – offensive posturing, launch on warning, poor controlHorowitz 9 – professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania (Michael, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53.2, Apr 09 pg. 234-257)Learning as states gain experience with nuclear weapons is complicated. While to some extent, nuclear acquisition might provide information about

resolve or capabilities, it also generates uncertainty about the way an actual conflict would go—given the new risk of nuclear

escalation—and uncertainty about relative capabilities. Rapid proliferation may especially heighten uncertainty given the potential for reasonable states to disagree at times about the quality of the capabilities each possesses.2 What follows is an attempt to describe the implications of inexperience and incomplete information on the behavior of nuclear states and their potential opponents over time. Since it is impossible to detail all possible lines of argumentation and possible responses, the following discussion is necessarily incomplete. This is a first step. The acquisition of nuclear weapons increases the confidence of adopters in their ability to impose costs in the case of a conflict and the expectations of likely costs if war occurs by potential opponents. The key questions are whether nuclear states learn over time about how to leverage nuclear weapons and the implications of that learning, along with whether actions by nuclear states, over time, convey information that leads to changes in the expectations of their behavior—shifts in uncertainty— on the part of potential adversaries. Learning to Leverage? When a new state acquires nuclear weapons, how does it influence the way the state behaves and how might that change over time? Although nuclear acquisition might be orthogonal to a particular dispute, it might be related to a particular security challenge, might signal revisionist aims with regard to an enduring dispute, or might signal the desire to reinforce the status quo. This section focuses on how acquiring nuclear weapons influences both the new nuclear state and potential adversaries. In theory, systemwide perceptions of nuclear danger could allow new nuclear states to partially skip the early Cold War learning process concerning the risks of nuclear war and enter a

proliferated world more cognizant of nuclear brinksmanship and bargaining than their predecessors. However, each new nuclear state has to resolve its own particular civil–military issues surrounding operational control and plan its national strategy in light of its new capabilities. Empirical research by Sagan (1993), Feaver (1992), and Blair (1993) suggests that viewing the behavior of other states does not create the necessary tacit knowledge; there is no substitute for experience when it comes to handling a nuclear arsenal , even if experience itself cannot totally prevent accidents. Sagan contends

that civil–military instability in many likely new proliferators and pressures generated by the requirements to handle the responsibility of

dealing with nuclear weapons will skew decision-making toward more offensive strategies (Sagan 1995). The questions surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear command and control suggest there is no magic bullet when it comes to new nuclear powers’ making control and delegation

decisions (Bowen and Wolvén 1999). Sagan and others focus on inexperience on the part of new nuclear states as a key behavioral driver. Inexperienced operators and the bureaucratic desire to “justify” the costs spent developing nuclear weapons, combined with organizational biases that may favor escalation to avoid decapitation—the “use it or lose it” mind-set — may cause new nuclear states to adopt riskier launch postures, such as launch on warning , or at least be perceived that way by other states (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992;

Sagan 1995).3 Acquiring nuclear weapons could alter state preferences and make states more likely to escalate disputes once they start, given their new capabilities .4 But their general lack of experience at leveraging their nuclear arsenal and

effectively communicating nuclear threats could mean new nuclear states will be more likely to select adversaries poorly and to find themselves in disputes with resolved adversaries that will reciprocate militarized challenges. The “nuclear experience” logic also suggests that more experienced nuclear states sahould gain knowledge over time from nuclearized interactions that helps leaders effectively identify the situations in which their nuclear arsenals are likely to make a difference. Experienced nuclear states learn to select into cases in which their comparative advantage, nuclear weapons, is more likely to be effective, increasing the probability that an adversary will not reciprocate. Coming from a slightly different perspective, uncertainty about the consequences of proliferation on the balance of power and the behavior of new nuclear states on the part of their potential adversaries could also shape behavior in similar ways (Schelling 1966; Blainey 1988). While a stable and credible

nuclear arsenal communicates clear information about the likely costs of conflict, in the short term, nuclear proliferation is likely to increase uncertainty about the trajectory of a war, the balance of power, and the preferences of the adopter.

Prolif is fast – breakdown of normsBlechman, 8 – Stimson Center Co-Founder, Stimson Center Nuclear Disarm Distinguished Fellow, Ph.D. (Barry, 9/29. “Nuclear Proliferation: Avoiding a Pandemic.” http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/nuclear-proliferation-avoiding-a-pandemic/)There is serious risk that the international agreements and processes that have kept the number of nations a rmed with nuclear weapons fairly low are breaking down. Over the past ten years, three nations joined the six previously declared nuclear powers and a tenth is in the offing . Unless strong actions are taken during the first 18 months of the administration, we could see a world of twenty or even thirty nuclear -armed states by the 2020s . Meeting this challenge requires specific, near-term steps to shore up the current regime plus bold actions to move eventually to a world completely free of nuclear weapons.

AT No Spillover / CascadeSaudi prolif spirals – collapses the NPT and causes nuclear war – yes brinkBleek 13 {Philipp C., Assistant Professor in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Program (Monterey Institute of International Studies – Middlebury College), Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Friends Don’t Let Friends Proliferate: Credibility, Security Assurances, and Allied Nuclear Proliferation,” 2/28, http://posse.gatech.edu/sites/posse.gatech.edu/files/BleekLorberISAISA'13.pdf}

Over the past decade, the question of how to prevent nuclear proliferation in both the Middle East and East Asia has gained significant urgency. Apparently in part due to Iran’s progress towards acquiring a nuclear weapons breakout capability and North Korea’s acquisition of rudimentary nuclear weapons, several U.S. allies and friendly states appear to be at least opening the door to potential future pursuit of nuclear weapons. In the Middle East, for example, concerns have arisen over Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s decisions to bolster their civil nuclear infrastructures, with many viewing these moves as motivated at least in part by a desire to hedge their bets against Iran.1 U.S. policymakers fear that such proliferation would lead “to an unraveling of the NPT regime and to a greater likelihood of nuclear weapon use.”2

Saudi bomb spills over – Turkey, Jordan, EgyptKazi ’13 Reshmi Kazi is Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis “Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Aspirations: Challenges, Opportunities and Options” August 2013 http://www.pugwashindia.org/pdf/saudi.pdf

Though it is too early to predict that Riyadh will go the nuclear path yet the recent international happenings do point that Riyadh might be considering the nuclear option. A nuclear Riyadh is bound to have catastrophic consequence in the region. Apart from further weakening the non-proliferation regime, other states in the Middle East may also strive to achieve the nuclear option. The nuclear ambitions of Turkey, Jordan and Egypt are known to the world. In May 2013, Japan and Turkey agreed to conclude nuclear energy pact for peaceful purposes. Still awaiting the approval of Diet, Asahi Shimbun the pact includes a provision allowing Turkey to enrich uranium an extract plutonium by reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. Though Japan has stated that it would not approve fuel reprocessing by Turkey, this as not been specified out in the bilateral pact. Jordan is also reported aspiring for nuclear energy to meet its economic demands. However, nuclear energy programme will always bear the potential pathway to a weapons capability and will raise concerns for horizontal proliferation.

AT SuzukiSuzuki concludes neg—no decisive evidence and can’t account for loose nukes or accidents—conclusion of their articleSuzuki 15 – (June 2015, Akisato, Researcher, Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, MA in Violence, Terrorism and Security at Queen's University, “Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests,” Research and Politics, SagePub)

The findings of this paper also have significant policy implications. The international community is sensitive to nuclear proliferation, and with Iran well on the way to

developing full nuclear capabilities, it is crucial to understand the implications of nuclear proliferation for international security. This paper suggests that, at least in terms of a systemic propensity for interstate conflict, nuclear proliferation might be welcomed – although, given that nuclear asymmetry can provoke dyadic conflict, reducing this side effect of nuclear proliferation by some other measure will be desirable. Finally, this paper should not be seen as decisive evidence that nuclear proliferation contributes to international security in general. Nuclear proliferation may increase risks of nuclear weapons being leaked to terrorist groups (Bueno de Mesquita and Riker, 1982: 304) or used accidentally

(Intriligator and Brito, 1981). It is untenable to assess the merits and demerits of nuclear proliferation only in terms of a systemic propensity for conflict. Additional research should examine these risks. Nonetheless, this paper makes a significant contribution to the literature by adding new empirics for a more comprehensive assessment of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict.

Case

Saudi Alliance good – Iran/Econ/terrorSaudi alliance good – key to econ, counter-terror, and Iranian counterbalancing – sustained support key Cordesman 2010

September 24, 2010 Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies Deborah Jerome, Interviewer “Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?” https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea

The United States shares critical strategic interests with Saudi Arabia that shape the proposed Saudi arms sale. First, for all the talk of energy independence over the last four decades, the U.S. Department of Energy estimates that the United States will be as strategically dependent on imported oil through 2035 as it is today. These projections do not even take account of our indirect imports of oil in the form of manufactured goods, or our dependence on the health of a global economy that requires stable supply- and market-driven prices. The stability of Gulf energy exports is critical to our economy and every job in the United States

Second, U.S. military power is finite, and both the United States and Saudi Arabia face rapidly changing threats. The United States needs allies that have interoperable forces that can both fight effectively alongside the United States and ease the U.S. burden by defending themselves . Iran already poses a massive asymmetric naval-air-assault force threat to the Gulf states. The U.S. invasion of Iraq has left Iraqi forces a decade away from being a counterbalance to Iran; Saudi Arabia is the only meaningful regional power to work with. Additionally, al-Qaeda in the peninsula is based in Yemen , and the threat of terrorism and outside infiltration means highly mobile Saudi forces are critical to the security of Saudi energy and civil facilities . Helping Saudi Arabia create a combination of effective air and naval power also helps ensure the security of tanker and other shipping in the Gulf of Oman and a steadily more unstable Red Sea.

Third, Iran already poses a missile and chemical weapons threat and may pose a nuclear one within the next three to five years . Upgrades of the Saudi Patriots create a base for an integrated approach to air and missile defense. They lay the groundwork for follow-on sales of advanced missile defense systems like THAAD, and an emphasis on defense (not Saudi purchases of missiles or nuclear systems). Coupled with recent U.S. offers of "extended regional deterrence" and the creation of a Saudi Air Force that is more of a threat to Iran than Iran’s conventional missiles are to Saudi Arabia, they offer the best hope of both giving Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states security and stopping a nuclear arms race in the region.

Fourth, the proposed arms sale package creates a level of interdependence that gives both the current Saudi government as well as Saudi governments for the next fifteen to twenty years a strong incentive to work with the United States. Saudi Arabia will need continuing support from the United States during the entire lifecycle of every major system sold, and no future Saudi government can ignore this fact. Moreover, the sales are large in dollar terms, but not in terms of numbers of weapons. This will not be some kind of massive build-up. Saudi Arabia had an air force with some 417 combat aircraft in 2000, and it now has only 219. The Saudi F-15 buy will not even restore the force to 2000 numbers. It will take some three to five years to deliver and put fully in service, replace some eighty-seven obsolete F-5A/Bs

and F-5EIIs that were in service in 2000, and help Saudi Arabia compensate for the serious performance limits on 107 aging Tornados still in service.

Stability TurnEnding arms sales escalates provocative behaviorBisaccio 2018

Oct 23, 2018 Derek Bisaccio Military Markets Analyst “Examining U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia” http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/feature/5/196962/us-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia%3A-policy-options.html

Depending on how severely the U.S. was to act, cutting defense cooperation could produce the opposite effect than intended with respect to Saudi policies: Saudi Arabia could well double-down, or in any case refuse to budge, rather than concede to Washington. Should the U.S. cut only a few deals, or refuse to sell a few systems, the pressure will be so miniscule as to hardly register in Riyadh.

A more aggressive approach, however, would not be guaranteed to produce a better effect on Saudi policy. A useful comparison may be the U.S. response to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s overthrow of Egypt’s previous government and the subsequent massacre of protestors in Rabaa. The U.S. criticized the government of President Sisi and cut a significant amount of arms cooperation pending improvement toward a more democratic system.

Two years later, the U.S. rescinded the policy, having made little to no progress.[iv] Bahrain hardly moved on its domestic policies despite the U.S. temporarily enacting a hold on the sale of F-16s to the country until it improved its human rights record.

Perhaps extending these bans or making them bite harder would have the intended effect, but solely using coercive measures to target governments based on their domestic policies, however repulsive those policies may be, is not likely to produce positive change, particularly if those policies are related to what the government conceptualizes as maintenance of regime security.

Talk by prominent U.S. lawmakers that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has “got to go” while the U.S. is considering implementing these sorts of coercive measures adds to the risk that Saudi Arabia might perceive the U.S. actions as hostile,[v] even if privately some members of the royal court agree with the criticism of the Crown Prince or see him as having gone too far in stamping out rivals.

AT – proxy warSaudi involvement is the only hope for stability – US support is keyPosey and Phillips 2018

Dec 6th, 2018 Madyson Hutchinson Posey Former Research and Administrative Assistant James Phillips Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation “Ending U.S. Military Support for Saudi Arabia in Yemen Would Trigger Dangerous Consequences” https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/ending-us-military-support-saudi-arabia-yemen-would-trigger-dangerous

In a new resolution, a bipartisan group of senators is calling for the United States to end its involvement—specifically its support of Saudi Arabia—in the Yemen conflict.

On Wednesday, the Senate voted 63-37 to pass a procedural measure that will clear the way for a floor debate on the issue next week.

The push comes largely in response to the recent murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

The Trump administration has banned 21 Saudi suspects in that murder from entering the U.S., imposed sanctions on 17 Saudi officials, and expressed its willingness to take further action if warranted by ongoing investigations. Many senators seek to do more to punish the Saudis, even if it means sacrificing the interests of the Yemeni government and making a negotiated settlement of the conflict more difficult.

The killing of Khashoggi was certainly abhorrent, but ending U.S. support for the multinational coalition in Yemen is not the proper solution . It risks dangerously conflating two separate issues and would inevitably trigger unintended consequences that would undermine U.S. national security interests in the region.

Senators must remember that Saudi Arabia is not the only belligerent in Yemen. A cutoff of U.S. support would also hurt the elected and internationally recognized government of Yemen , which was ousted by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in 2015 in a bloody coup that violated a U.N.-brokered ceasefire.

Withdrawing U.S. support would also harm the interests of other U.S. allies fighting in Yemen, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.

The war in Yemen is complex. Those who rush to blame Saudi Arabia entirely for the suffering of the Yemeni people ignore the war crimes and heavy-handed treatment meted out by the Houthis to their opponents and the ruthless role that Iran plays in supporting the Houthi Ansar Allah (“Supporters of Allah”) movement, a Shia Islamist extremist group.

The Saudis are rightly criticized for not doing more to prevent civilian casualties as they target Ansar Allah positions. But the Houthis should not be given a free pass for deliberately targeting civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with increasingly sophisticated Iranian ballistic missiles.

Ansar Allah also deserves criticism for its violent role in destabilizing Yemen and creating the conditions that led to the current humanitarian disaster. Ansar Allah regularly attacks the Saudi border, launches

missiles strikes into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and diverts international medical and food aid to favor its own supporters and sell on the black market.

Ansar Allah also has targeted U.S. Navy vessels, those of allied nations, and civilian shipping in the Red Sea with Iranian-supplied missiles, gunboat attacks, and boat bombs. Undermining the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen risks exacerbating this threat to international shipping and giving Iran the opportunity to threaten oil shipments through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, just as it has threatened to do in the Strait of Hormuz.

Those who advocate withdrawing support for Saudi Arabia apparently believe that they can somehow end the current conflict in Yemen through a one-sided strategy that penalizes allies and boosts Ansar Allah, a group that chants “Death to America” and looks more like Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy group, every day.

Never mind that Saudi Arabia is supporting the internationally recognized government of Yemen in this effort. Never mind that leaving Ansar Allah to run amuck will not bring an end to the humanitarian suffering, but only prolong it.

The U.S. currently extends only limited support to Saudi Arabia in Yemen centered on intelligence and information sharing. There are no U.S. troops involved in combat operations, except for occasional commando raids and air strikes against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a Sunni terrorist group that continues to target the U.S. homeland, as well as Saudi Arabia, France, and other countries.

The Trump administration already has stopped the aerial refueling of Saudi warplanes involved in the Yemen conflict and called for a negotiated settlement. But the United States cannot afford to abandon its allies and hope for the best. Undermining the Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition would make an acceptable political settlement impossible.

The Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia will continue to fight this war with or without U.S. support . Those who would connect two unrelated issues, condemn Saudi involvement, and ignore Iran’s hostile role inside Yemen will only do more harm to innocent Yemeni civilians and empower Iran and its Yemeni proxies.

Fill inUK/France fill inThompson 2010

September 24, 2010 Loren Thompson, Chief Operating Officer, Lexington Institute Deborah Jerome, Interviewer https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea

If Congress delays or modifies the proposed transaction, the Saudi government will probably move to purchase modern weapons from other sources such as Britain or France. The kingdom needs to replace its aging Cold War arsenal, and it is surrounded by nations potentially posing a threat to its security. Little purpose would be served by declining to assist Saudi Arabia in meeting its legitimate defensive needs.

Whatever the differences may be between our governments and cultures, the Saudis have been reliable allies of America for decades and have exercised a moderating influence on the behavior of other oil-producing states. Helping them means helping ourselves.

Aff

AT – Prolif DA

UQRelations collapse inevitable – structural shifts undermine the basis for the allianceAshford 2018

October 22, 2018 Emma Ashford is a Research Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute “The U.S.-Saudi Alliance Was in Trouble Long Before Jamal Khashoggi’s Death” https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-saudi-alliance-was-trouble-long-jamal-khashoggis-death

Drifting Apart

Washington’s willingness to criticize the Khashoggi murder owes as much to the changing nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship as to growing repression. Though the few defenders of the Saudi government have trotted out the standard arguments in favor of the U.S.-Saudi partnership — oil, regional politics, arms sales — these arguments are far less persuasive today than they were 35 years ago. The United States simply no longer needs a close relationship with Saudi Arabia to achieve its foreign policy goals and meet its energy needs.

Take oil. It’s true that Saudi Arabia remains among the world’s largest producers of oil, producing around a quarter of the world’s crude oil. And thanks to changing production patterns — notably the growth of shale oil production in the United States — America is far less directly dependent on Middle Eastern energy.

Certainly, this doesn’t mean Saudi oil supplies are unimportant to the United States. Since oil is priced globally, Saudi domestic stability is still key to ensuring a reasonable price for oil. Yet oil markets have come a long way since the Carter Doctrine. During President Jimmy Carter’s time, the United States was reeling from twin oil shocks, as the 1973 OPEC embargo and the 1979 Iranian revolution triggered oil shortages and price hikes throughout the Western world. The Carter Doctrine — which promised to protect Middle Eastern oil-rich states, prevent Soviet regional hegemony, and protect global oil supplies — effectively committed the United States to act as Saudi Arabia’s guarantor of security, a commitment fulfilled during the Gulf War.

Today, most of these risks have disappeared. Innovations like spot pricing and strategic reserves help to stabilize the market during shocks. There is no Soviet threat poised to dominate the region . To ensure the free flow of oil, the United States doesn’t need a heavy military presence in the region. Instead, it needs to protect the global commons (i.e., sea lanes), and maintain the expeditionary capacity to re-enter the region if it becomes necessary, a posture often described as an over-the-horizon approach.

Energy security is a good reason to maintain a U.S. interest in Middle Eastern stability. It is no longer a sufficient reason to provide the Saudi government carte blanche.

Public understanding of these shifts in global energy production remains limited, as illustrated by recent concerns about Saudi Arabia’s empty bluff to cut off oil supplies. But arguments about Saudi Arabia’s importance for regional stability are no less dated, and far more visibly false; only 4 percent of Americans now consider Saudi Arabia to be a U.S. ally.

In Yemen, for example, Saudi-led forces have repeatedly ignored the laws of war, bombing schools and hospitals and refusing to allow necessary supplies to reach civilians trapped by conflict. Yemen is now experiencing a mass humanitarian crisis, including a famine that may soon be the worst in a hundred years. In Syria, the Saudis have mounted a concerted effort to fund and arm rebel groups in the fight against the Assad regime. With little vetting and less oversight, many of these weapons ended up in the hands of extremists.

These are only the most obvious examples. Saudi Arabia also actively opposed many of the uprisings of the Arab Spring, with Saudi tanks putting down a pro-democracy uprising in neighboring Bahrain. An ill-advised blockade — and apparent planned invasion of Qatar — remains unresolved, as does the kingdom’s bizarre diplomatic spat with Canada. And Saudi money — both private and public — has long pushed an intolerant and hardline version of Islam that continues to inspire extremism throughout the region.

America’s key interest in the Middle East is stability. Yet in recent years, Saudi foreign policy has far more often been destabilizing than stabilizing. Saudi Arabia is often portrayed as a bulwark against Iranian regional influence, but it’s unclear why a destabilizing reactionary Saudi foreign policy is any better than a revolutionary Iranian one . Just as Iran sponsors Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia has sponsored various militant groups in Syria. Iran meddles in Lebanese politics, while Saudi Arabia recently kidnapped the Lebanese prime minister. If America’s regional interest is stability — rather than simply taking sides — it doesn’t make sense to back either country in their regional aspirations.

Even arms sales — a more contemporary argument in favor of a close partnership with Saudi Arabia — are no longer convincing. With his typical exaggeration, President Donald Trump cited $110 billion in arms sales and the resulting U.S. jobs as an excellent reason to maintain good relations with Riyadh. In fact, experts assess that Saudi arms sales are in reality worth only about $20 billion, while the 4,000 jobs created are a tiny fraction of the overall U.S. defense industry. With Saudi human rights abuses now regularly making headlines, it is much harder to justify the sale of offensive weapons to the kingdom.

A Failing Marriage of Convenience

These gradual changes in the U.S.-Saudi relationship have been slowly felt in recent years. Even before Khashoggi’s death, the Kingdom’s bloody war in Yemen generated pushback from human rights groups. Meanwhile, Trump’s close relationship with the government of Saudi Arabia has driven journalists to explore the free flow of Saudi money into institutions and lobbying firms here in Washington.

Perhaps the biggest change has been on Capitol Hill, where the Saudi alliance once enjoyed wholehearted support. A younger generation of policymakers like Murphy, Sen. Mike Lee and Rep. Ro Khanna now argue for fewer arms sales, an end to U.S. support for the war in Yemen, and a shift to a more arms-length relationship with Saudi Arabia. Nor is the opposition limited to new arrivals; Sen. Bernie Sanders has been an open and repeated critic of Saudi Arabia.

Opinion has shifted even further in the last few weeks: Congress has called for a Magnitsky investigation into Khashoggi’s death, suggesting the potential for sanctions. Even Sen. Lindsey Graham, typically an ardent supporter of Saudi Arabia, vowed to “sanction the hell out of Saudi Arabia.” Ever the trigger-happy proponent of regime change, the senator even called for Mohammed bin Salman to be removed from power.

Certainly, the Saudi regime retains the support of the White House, which sees Saudi backing for the anti-Iran campaign and potential willingness to prop up oil prices as sufficient to win its loyalty. Yet Western companies are pulling their support for Saudi Arabia’s Future Investment Initiative conference later in the month, and Saudi money is becoming increasingly toxic in Washington .

With the increasing divergence between Saudi and American interests, the Khashoggi murder offers an opportunity for lawmakers. Sanctions legislation, or legislation forbidding the use of U.S. forces to back the Saudi-led War in Yemen, would send a clear signal that Saudi behavior is unacceptable. It would lay the groundwork for a future administration to adopt a more balanced approach to the Middle East, one focused on stability, not on supporting the goals of any one state. And it would reorient American foreign policy to more accurately reflect the reality of the global oil market: that Saudi Arabia’s future increasingly lies in selling its resources to Asia, not the West.

Once, the U.S.-Saudi marriage of convenience served both sides well. But it was just that — a marriage of convenience. With changes in the oil market and regional security, the rationale for the relationship has been diminishing for years. It has undoubtedly taken time for opinion in Congress and elsewhere to catch up to this reality. It may take longer still — into the next administration — for the White House to finally acknowledge that the Saudi alliance no longer serves U.S. needs. But the shock of Khashoggi’s death has created an opening to reassess this alliance, highlighting that Americans have no shared values with Saudi Arabia, and perhaps, fewer shared interests than they thought.

Congress is killing US-Saudi relations now – arms sales legislation, amending the AECA, and KhashoggiCarney 19, Jordain Carney, "Trump, Congress set for new showdown on Saudi Arabia," TheHill, 6-27-2019, https://thehill.com/homenews/house/450545-trump-congress-set-for-new-showdown-on-saudi-arabia dw

Lawmakers and President Trump are laying the groundwork for a new showdown over Saudi Arabia,

underscoring deep frustrations on Capitol Hill. With Trump expected to veto resolutions blocking his arms sales to Saudi Arabia,

lawmakers are already eyeing additional avenues to push back on the U.S.-Saudi relationship , which has

soured in Congress over the Yemen civil war and the death of Washington Post contributor Jamal Khashoggi. Members in both chambers are moving forward with separate bills that would hem in Trump or penalize Saudi Arabia. The House Foreign Affairs Committee advanced a bill Wednesday that would require the director of national intelligence to determine who is responsible for Khashoggi’s death and would impose visa restrictions on those people. Committee Chairman Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.) said he expects that bill to come to the floor “shortly” after the July Fourth recess. “The horrific murder of Jamal Khashoggi demands accountability and justice,” Engel said during the committee’s consideration of the bill. “After the astounding evidence we’ve seen, it can’t just be business as usual. And since the administration is dragging its feet on taking any meaningful

action, Congress must step forward.” The action in the committee comes as several Saudi-related amendments have been filed for the House’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act, including measures to block the arms sales, amend the Arms Export Control Act and end U.S. military support for the Saudi coalition in Yemen, among others. The House will take up the mammoth defense bill next month, though only a fraction of the 600-plus amendments typically get a vote.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also approved legislation this week that would restrict Trump’s ability to use an “emergency” provision of the Arms Export Control Act to bypass a requirement that the administration give Congress a 30-day notification before an arms sale. Several Republicans have raised concerns about how the administration used the

emergency provision, bolstering its chances of picking up additional GOP support outside of the committee. The bipartisan legislation,

spearheaded by Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), comes after Trump sparked fierce backlash by leapfrogging Congress on a deal to sell arms to Saudi Arabia despite bipartisan opposition on Capitol Hill. The administration argued that

Iran’s actions in the region required enacting the emergency language on the Arms Export Control Act and forcing through the sale. Menendez said that he hasn’t gotten a commitment for a floor vote on his legislation but that he “is going to push for it.” Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch (R-Idaho) is also drafting additional Saudi Arabia legislation that he is expected to unveil after the recess. Risch has stressed he wants a bill that could win over both White House and Democratic support, a potentially high bar given the deep differences between some lawmakers and Trump when it comes to Saudi Arabia. “Some of the things that have happened cannot go unnoticed. There are certainly going to have to be repercussions and we have been negotiating with all parties, including my staff and the staff of the ranking member, together with the State Department and the White House,” Risch said during a recent floor speech, announcing that he and Menendez had set up a framework for further committee action. Menendez is expected to offer the Saudi Arabia Accountability and Yemen Act as an amendment to the forthcoming Risch legislation. Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), who has been at the center of the chamber’s Saudi Arabia action, said he had also been in touch with Risch as the GOP senator has drafted the bill and “we’ve given some suggestions to the chairman

about it.” The push for additional action comes as the House still needs to vote on resolutions blocking Trump’s arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan. The 22 arms sales, estimated to be worth more than $8 billion, include precision-guided bombs, Patriot missiles, mortar rounds, drones, fighter jet parts and other military support. Engel said he does not have a specific timeline for considering the arms sales resolutions but vowed to take them up in his committee. “We’re absolutely going to pursue it,” he said. “We’ve already had some classified briefings. And it’s too important an issue because it has repercussions not only for Saudi Arabia now, but for lots of countries, including Saudi Arabia, down the road.” Asked if there is a rush to pass the resolutions before the first weapons are delivered, Engel would not comment on the timeline of the deliveries, citing classified information.

But in general, he said, “the deadline is now. We have to move on these things now.” A spokesperson for House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) told The Hill that they would plan to bring the Senate-passed resolutions to the floor in July. Trump is expected to veto the resolutions of disapproval; the Senate will not have the votes to override the veto after initially passing the resolutions blocking the sale with 51

and 53 votes, respectively. But the push for additional legislation is the latest sign of the growing frustration on Capitol Hill about the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The Senate passed a resolution last year that named Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as responsible for Khashoggi’s death. The resolution marked a significant break with Trump — he has refused to name the crown prince as responsible — but stalled in the then-GOP-controlled House. Congress passed a separate resolution earlier this year forcing Trump to remove troops in or affecting Yemen unless they were fighting al Qaeda; Trump vetoed the resolution. But unlike the Yemen resolution or the move to block Trump’s arms sales, any additional legislation will need 60 votes in the Senate and Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s (R-Ky.) support to get a floor vote, throwing a curveball into the chances of getting another bill to Trump’s desk. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, said he hoped the Senate will be able to find common ground, either by getting a bill Trump would back or building enough support to successfully override a veto, which would be the first

of the Trump administration. “You get a bill that would get a veto override, that’s one way to do it,” he said, “another would be to get a bill that he’ll sign, so we’ll keep plugging away.”

US moving towards lower relations now – congress decision on arms and human trafficking listAFP 19, Bangkok Post Public Company Limited, "US adds Saudi Arabia, Cuba to blacklist on human trafficking," https://www.bangkokpost, 6-20-2019, https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/1699308/us-adds-saudi-arabia-cuba-to-blacklist-on-human-trafficking dw

The United States on Thursday added Saudi Arabia and Cuba to its blacklist of countries that it says are not doing enough to fight human trafficking, a designation that could bring sanctions. In an annual report, the State Department faulted ally Saudi Arabia for rampant violations against its vast foreign labour force and accused adversary Cuba of trafficking through its programme of sending doctors overseas. Other countries that remained on Tier 3, the worst ranking in the report, included China, Myanmar, North Korea, Russia and Venezuela. A Tier 3 ranking means that the United States can restrict assistance or withdraw support for the country at the International Monetary Fund or other global development bodies. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the United States last year took measures against 22 countries due to the designation, although the president can issue waivers.

"That action and the message that goes with it is very clear -- if you don't stand up to trafficking, America will stand up to you," Pompeo said as he presented the report alongside Ivanka Trump, President Donald Trump's daughter and adviser. On Saudi Arabia, the United States said that the kingdom has often jailed, fined or deported human trafficking victims, accusing them of immigration violations or prostitution rather than providing assistance. The report called on Saudi Arabia to do more to help workers fleeing abusive bosses and to reform its sponsorship system, in which employers control workers' permits to leave the country. "We want to makes sure that, particularly for domestic workers, that they have the ability to change employers, the ability to exit the country when they're ready to, and make sure they have freedom," said John Cotton Richmond, the State Department's ambassador-at-large for the fight against trafficking. Richmond, who visited Saudi Arabia during the drafting of the Trafficking in Persons report, said it was important to be truthful. "Obviously there's a lot happening in our relationship with Saudi Arabia; they're an important ally," he told AFP. "But we also want to make sure

that we look at the facts, we look at the information that is there, that we give an accurate assessment," he said. "For the TIP report to be

useful, it's got to have integrity." Trump has faced growing criticism in Congress for his staunch support of Saudi Arabia on multiple fronts, including over its offensive in war-ravaged Yemen.

Only prolifs if Iran doesOnly prolifs if Iran doesKatzman 2018

March 08, 2018 Kenneth Katzman | Senior analyst of Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Persian Gulf Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, but provides this analysis in his personal capacity “Does Saudi Arabia Intend to Develop a Nuclear Weapons Capability?” https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/75723

Saudi Arabia will not likely use civilian nuclear technology as a cover to pursue a nuclear weapons program unless Iran moves toward doing so. Saudi Arabia seeks to develop nuclear technology to meet growing energy demand, as well as to demonstrate to Iran that Tehran does not have a monopoly on nuclear technology in the Gulf region. Any U.S. approval for Saudi Arabia to develop nuclear power will carry significant restrictions on the use of U.S. technology to preclude Saudi Arabia from developing a nuclear weapon. Saudi leaders undoubtedly understand that the kingdom’s relationship with the United States would be harmed irreparably if Saudi Arabia were to violate those restrictions. Still, the acquisition of civilian nuclear technology adequately serves the kingdom’s purpose of signaling to Iran that any moves by the Islamic Republic to develop a nuclear weapon can be easily countered by Saudi Arabia.

No prolifNo Saudi prolif – technical incapability, no foreign support, US will dissuade

Esfandiary and Tabatabai 15 - MacArthur Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies at King's College London, visiting assistant professor in the Security Studies Program at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and an associate in the Belfer Center's International Security Program and Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University. Previously, she was a nonresident research associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. She was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Belfer Center in 2013 and 2014.

(Dina and Ariane, “Why nuclear dominoes won't fall in the Middle East ”, 4/22/15, http://thebulletin.org/why-nuclear-dominoes-wont-fall-middle-east8236, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)

Saudi Arabia: The human and technical impediments to a nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia is viewed as the Middle East's most likely nuclear proliferator. Riyadh has been the loudest voice in the region, claiming it'll "go nuclear" should Iran do so. It also wants an enrichment capability to mirror Iran’s. An assessment of the nascent Saudi nuclear power program shows that for all of Riyadh 's foot-stomping, it doesn't have the technical capability to build nuc lear weapon s . Even if this technical deficit could be overcome , its allies could influence its intentions . Saudi Arabia has ambitious plans for its nuclear industry. It wants to build 16 nuclear reactors in the next few decades, but right now Saudi Arabia does not have any nuclear reactors , and its first won't go on line until 2022, at earliest . To date, the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA-CARE) has scouted out foreign suppliers and developed regulatory frameworks—but gone no further down the nuclear path. Riyadh lacks the human capacity to develop and operate its own nuclear infrastructure in the foreseeable future. But Saudi Arabia is aware of its technical shortcomings, and it’s looking for other options After contributing financially to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and defense sector, the Saudis may want Islamabad to return the favor, some observers believe. The Saudi leadership plays along with suggestions it may acquire nuclear technology from Pakistan. In March 2015, King Salman bin Abdulaziz urgently summoned Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Riyadh to discuss strategic cooperation efforts, while calling for Pakistani involvement in Saudi efforts in Yemen. This was intended to remind nuclear weapons state negotiators that Riyadh is keeping its nuclear options open. But it is unlikely the Saudis will get a nuc lear weapon from Pakistan. Pakistan —which covertly developed its nuclear arsenal outside the nuclear nonproliferation regime—aims to normalize its nuclear status, rather than becoming further alienated from the international community . Islamabad was already singled out for the activities of the world's biggest and most successful illicit nuclear trafficking network, led by a key figure in its nuclear weapons program, A.Q. Khan. What’s more, Islamabad is extremely proud of its nuclear achievements. In the words of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, “We will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own [bomb].” Pakistanis didn’t eat grass, but they endured a great deal of hardship to get the bomb. The program was extremely costly for the country. So, it’s no surprise that many Pakistani officials and former officials take issue with assertions that their country might give nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia. Even if Pakistan agreed to provide the Kingdom with the bomb, the Saudis are very unlikely to go through with such an acquisition. Saudi Arabia is dependent on the United States for security guarantees. As long as Washington remains Riyadh’s main security guarantor, it has the

power to influence Saudi decision making on other issues, including, specifically, nuclear weapon acquisition. And the Kingdom would find it very difficult to attract another country willing to supply the security and trade guarantees that the United States now provides. It is hard to imagine any of the world's major powers agreeing to be viewed as a supporter of nuclear proliferation. It is reasonably likely that Saudi Arabia will continue its efforts to develop a civilian nuclear program. Saudi Arabia recently signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with South Korea to explore the feasibility of building two nuclear reactors in the Kingdom. Moving forward with South Korea as the main supplier raises a key issue: Washington says that Seoul’s reactors are US designs, and that, if that technology is to be sold, the countries acquiring it must enter into nuclear cooperation contracts (known as 123 agreements, because they are based on Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act) with the United States. Although South Korea disputes the need for a 123 agreement, if Saudi Arabia does agree to enter into such a pact, it could well mean a ban on enrichment and reprocessing in the Kingdom, closing domestic paths to the bomb . Riyadh could of course acquire nuclear technology from the two other countries that have developed nuclear power plants on an international basis, France and Russia. But given Paris’s hardline stance on nonproliferation, it’s unlikely to oblige an effort by Saudi Arabia to develop the enrichment or reprocessing capabilities needed to produce fissile material in the Kingdom. Moscow , too, would think twice before allowing Riyadh to go nuclear , particularly given the competition between the two countries in world petroleum markets and their divergence on regional security matters.

zakariacan’t build it, won’t buy nukes, and no state-sponsors

Zakaria 15

Fareed, PhD from Harvard and foreign affairs columnists for the Washington Post, the Washington Post, June 11, “Why Saudi Arabia can’t get a nuclear weapon,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/saudi-arabias-nuclear-bluff/2015/06/11/9ce1f4f8-1074-11e5-9726-49d6fa26a8c6_story.html

Of the many unnerving aspects of the future of the Middle East, a nuclear arms race would top the list. And to feed that unease, Saudi Arabia has been periodically dropping hints that, should Iran’s nuclear ambitions go unchecked, it might just have to get nuclear weapons itself. This week, the Saudi ambassador to London made yet another explicit threat, warning that “all options will be on the table.”∂

Oh, please! Saudi Arabia isn’t going to build a nuc lear weapon. Saudi Arabia can’t build a nuclear weapon. Saudi Arabia hasn’t even built a car. (By 2017, after much effort, the country is expected to manufacture its first automobile.)∂ Saudi Arabia can dig holes in the ground and pump out oil but little else. Oil revenue is about 45 percent of its gross domestic product, a staggeringly high figure, much larger than petro-states such as Nigeria and Venezuela. It makes up almost 90 percent of the Saudi government’s revenue. Despite decades of massive government investment, lavish subsidies and cheap energy, manufacturing is less than 10 percent of Saudi GDP.∂ Where would Saudi Arabia train the scientists to work on its secret program? The country’s education system is backward and dysfunctional, having been largely handed over to its puritanical and reactionary religious establishment. The country ranks 73rd in the quality of its math and science education, according to the World Economic Forum — abysmally low for a rich country. Iran, despite 36 years of sanctions and a much lower per capita GDP, fares far better at 44.∂ And who would work in Saudi Arabia’s imagined nuclear industry? In a penetrating book, Karen Elliott House, formerly of the Wall Street Journal, describes the Saudi labor market: “One of every three people in Saudi Arabia is a foreigner. Two out of every three people with a job of any sort are foreign . And in Saudi Arabia’s anemic private sector , fully nine out of ten people holding jobs are non-Saudi. . . . Saudi Arabia, in short, is a society in which all too many men do not want to work at jobs for which they are qualified; in which women by and large aren’t allowed to work; and in which, as a result, most of the work is done by foreigners.”∂ None of this is to suggest that the kingdom is in danger of collapse. Far from it. The regime’s finances are strong, though public spending keeps rising and oil revenue has been declining. The royal family has deftly used patronage, politics, religion and repression to keep the country stable and quiescent. But that has produced a system of stagnation for most, with a gilded elite surfing on top with almost unimaginable sums of money.∂ Saudi Arabia’s increased assertiveness has been portrayed as strategic. In fact, it is a panicked and emotional response to Iran, fueled in no small measure by long-standing anti-Shiite bigotry. It is pique masquerading as strategy. In October 2013, after having spent years and millions of dollars campaigning for a seat on the U.N. Security Council, it abruptly declined the post at the last minute, signaling that it was annoyed at U.S. policy in its region.∂ Its most recent international activism, the air campaign in Yemen, has badly backfired. Bruce Riedel, a former top White House aide, says that damage to civilians and physical infrastructure “has created considerable bad blood between Yemenis and their rich Gulf neighbors that will poison relations for years. Yemenis always resented their rich

brothers, and now many will want revenge.” He notes that the air campaign is being directed by the new defense minister, the king’s 29-year-old son, who has no experience in military affairs or much else.∂ But couldn’t Saudi Arabia simply buy a nuc lear bomb? That’s highly unlikely . Any such effort would have to take place secretly, under the threat of sanctions , Western retaliation and interception. Saudi Arabia depends heavily on foreigners and their firms to help with its energy industry, build its infrastructure, buy its oil and sell it goods and services. Were it isolated like Iran or North Korea, its economic system would collapse . ∂ It is often claimed that Pakistan would sell nukes to the Saudis. And it’s true that the Saudis have bailed out Pakistan many times. But the government in Islamabad is well aware that such a deal could make it a pariah and result in sanctions. It is unlikely to risk that , even to please its sugar daddy in Riyadh. In April, Pakistan refused repeated Saudi pleas to join the air campaign in Yemen.∂ So let me make a prediction: Whatever happens with Iran’s nuclear program, 10 years from now Saudi Arabia won’t have nuclear weapons. Because it can’t.

Pressure Solves--no capacity and US pressure solves

Esfandiary and Tabatabai 15

Dina Esfandiary, McArthur Fellow in the Centre for Science and Security Studies @ King’s College in London, Ariane Tabatabai, visiting professor in the Security Studies Program @ the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and a columnist for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Washington Post, April 28, “Why an Iran deal won’t lead to nuclear proliferation,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/04/28/why-an-iran-deal-wont-lead-to-nuclear-proliferation/

None of these states have expressed an interest in reprocessing, which closes the plutonium path to the bomb . Some have even foregone enrichment, which blocks the uranium path to the bomb. That’s the case for the UAE. But some states, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, want to reserve “the right” to enrich. Riyadh went further and stated it wanted whatever Iran got out of the negotiations, including enrichment.∂ Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and the UAE are all dependent on foreign suppliers and expertise for their programs. They lack the human capacity for the programs. Foreign involvement makes it difficult, though not impossible, to covertly develop a nuclear weapon. This means that suppliers also need to do their due diligence and ensure that buyers use their equipment for purely peaceful purposes. ∂ One explanation as to why Tehran went so far in developing its indigenous nuclear technology, including enrichment, is that international suppliers weren’t as involved and reliable after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Following the revolution, Iran’s original suppliers, the United States, France and Germany, dumped the country, which then looked East. It went to Pakistan, including the illicit nuclear procurement network led by Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan, Russia and China. But Iran’s government believed it could not rely on any of these partners. Without a strong involvement in its program by foreign suppliers committed to nonproliferation, Iran was able to pursue indigenous nuclear technology. This diminished the international community’s leverage on Tehran.∂ The Iranian context, however, is different from other countries in the region, which depend on the West and U.S. allies for their nuclear programs. Today’s nuclear newcomers must comply with certain international requirements for their programs to be completed by these suppliers. This means that suppliers can and should try to limit the further prolif eration of enrichment and reprocessing. ∂ But technical constraints aside, there are political obstacles to the proliferation cascade theory. Countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia are dependent on Western allies for their security. Washington can leverage this influence to stop them from going nuclear. The U nited States showed its willingness to do just that in 19 88 , when it learned that Riyadh purchased Chinese missiles and it threatened to block the sale of military equipment .

Won’t prolif – international pressureLippman 2018

March 08, 2018 Thomas W. Lippman | Author and former journalist, author of Saudi Arabia on the Edge: The Uncertain Future of an American Ally “Does Saudi Arabia Intend to Develop a Nuclear Weapons Capability?” https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/75723

Speculation about Saudi Arabia’s possible desire to acquire or develop nuclear weapons has arisen periodically since 1988, when the Saudis secretly acquired nuclear-capable Chinese missiles. Now that Saudi Arabia is pressing ahead with its plans to build civilian nuclear power plants, the speculation has predictably intensified.

In reality, Saudi Arabia is highly unlikely to seek nuclear weapons, no matter what becomes of Iran’s nuclear program, because the negative consequences of doing so would far outweigh any conceivable strategic gain. The kingdom, a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has tied its future to full integration with the global economic and industrial system. It cannot afford the international ostracism that nuclear proliferation would bring.

Moreover, the Saudis know that they have few friends in the U.S. Congress. Any sign that the kingdom was moving toward nuclear weapons would end U.S. arms sales and terminate the strategic relationship that has long ensured the kingdom’s security.

AT NoKo Sells Nuke

North Korea link = false

Fitzpatrick 15 (Mark, Director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, former 26-year career in the US Department of State, including as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non-proliferation, responsible for policies to address the proliferation problems posed by Iran, North Korea, Libya, Iraq, and South Asia, founding member of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, member of: the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons; the International Advisory Board of the Canberra-based Centre for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament; and the Policy Advisory Group of the United Nations Association of the UK, “Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Nuclear Rumour Mill,” IISS, May 20, 2015, https://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2015-932e/may-7114/saudi-arabia-pakistan-and-the-nuclear-rumour-mill-1419)

Wanting enrichment is a far cry from possessing it, however. How would the Saudis acquire enrichment technology? Their nascent nuclear industry is at a rudimentary stage. They have no facilities relating to enrichment and no known research programme or specialists in this field. Developing uranium enrichment on their own would take 15 years or more. If they really want to match Iran’s enrichment programme, they naturally would want to buy the technology, but who would sell it? The 49 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have agreed not to transfer any nuclear technology that would contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is no standard interpretation of this clause, but clearly it would apply to a Saudi enrichment programme that was initiated to contribute to a weapons option. Although the NSG guidelines are voluntary, the ‘non-proliferation principle’, as it is called, has become an entrenched norm. Any inclination to violate it would put the would-be exporter under intense international pressure. Five nations that possess enrichment technology are outside the NSG: India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. Iran obviously would not empower its Gulf rival in this way, and neither would Israel. India, which seeks NSG membership, prides itself on not allowing proliferation-sensitive exports and has strong reasons to keep its export record clean. North Korea may have no compunction against selling nuclear technology to any would-be buyer, but it has no connections with Saudi Arabia and every major intelligence agency is watching to ensure that none develop .

AT Pakistan Supplies

No Pakistani deals

Marshall 15

Jonathan, Author of several books regarding Middle East foreign affairs and correspondent for the Huffington Post, May 20, “Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Threats Are Bluster,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-marshall/saudi-arabias-nuclear-thr_b_7332388.html

As if the Mideast weren't troubled enough, we now learn from Rupert Murdoch's Sunday Times that Saudi Arabia has apparently "taken the 'strategic decision' to acquire 'off-the-shelf' atomic weapons from Pakistan."∂ This and many recent similar stories blame the emergence of Saudi Arabia's alleged nuclear ambitions on President Barack Obama's perceived failure to check Iran. "Saudi Arabia is so angry at the emerging nuclear agreement between Iran and the major powers that it is threatening to develop its own nuclear capability -- one more indication of the deep differences between the United States and the Persian Gulf Arab states over the deal," commented The New York Times in an editorial on May 15.∂ Saudi Arabia has been playing the nuclear card for years, however. In 2003, the Saudis leaked a "strategic review" that included the option of acquiring a "nuclear capability" as a deterrent. The Guardian, which broke the story, called it a "worrying development" that reflected "Riyadh's estrangement from Washington" and "worries about an Iranian nuclear programme."∂ In 2006, Saudi Arabia announced its interest in developing a nuclear energy program with other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. As journalists reported at the time, "Few observers doubt that promoting the idea of a joint atomic energy program between the predominantly Sunni Arab states is a way for Saudi Arabia to send a message to the United States that the Arab state will match Tehran's nuclear power if it needs to."∂ Years have passed without the Saudis making good on these threats. And, there are strong reasons to question the veracity of leaks about Riyadh's nuclear intentions now. Many experts seriously doubt whether the Saudis really intend to break their treaty obligations and risk international sanctions by trying to acquire nuclear weapons , particularly when they have lived with a nuclear-armed Israel for years. ∂ Saudi Arabia would require many years to build nuclear weapons from scratch; the country has only a very modest atomic energy research program, not a single nuclear power reactor, and no known enrichment facilities. Thus Riyadh's nuclear ambitions only make sense if Saudi Arabia has , as often claimed, arranged with Islamabad to obtain fully armed nuclear weapons in exchange for financing Pakistan's nuclear program. ∂ Such claims , while not totally implausible, remain "speculation," according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a leading NGO devoted to proliferation issues. Stories about the Pakistan connection originated with a former Saudi diplomat who defected to the U nited States in the 1990s. He also claimed that Saudi Arabia provided almost $5 billion to Saddam Hussein to finance an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. ∂ "Riyadh has denied the veracity of Khilewi's statements, and most experts dismiss their credibility ," according to NTI. " Most analysts believe it highly unlikely Pakistan would ever follow through with such an agreement, were it to even exist, given a host of disincentives."∂ The story has been kept alive over the years by Israeli intelligence leaks. As BBC news reported in 2013, "it is Israeli information - that Saudi Arabia is now ready to take delivery of finished warheads for its long-range missiles - that informs some recent US and NATO intelligence reporting. Israel of course shares Saudi Arabia's motive in want ing to worry the US

into containing Iran . "∂ Pakistan called the claim of a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia "speculative, mischievous and baseless." Of course, Islamabad would say that even if the deal were real. But Pakistan would face "huge disincentives " against transferring nuclear weapons, including the threat of international sanctions and the loss of military aid from Washington, notes Philipp Bleek, a proliferation expert at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. ∂ "Moreover," Bleek writes, "Pakistan is locked in an arms race with archrival India, and New Delhi's long-term nuclear weapon production capabilities significantly exceed those of Islamabad, so the latter can ill-afford to spare a meaningful number of nuclear weapons ." Pakistan's recent refusal to send troops to support Saudi Arabia's attacks on Yemen is further evidence that it is no puppet of Riyadh. ∂ Bleek observes that the very frequency of leaks about Saudi Arabia's nuclear intentions weighs against the seriousness of that threat: ∂ "History suggests that while some states have trumpeted their potential desire for nuclear weapons -- think Germany in the early years of the Cold War, or Japan more recently -- they tend not to be those that later went on to actually acquire them. And for good reason: calling attention to proliferation intentions is counterproductive if one is intent on actually proliferating. Instead, states tend to draw attention to their potential proliferation in the service of another goal: rallying others to address the security concerns that are motivating potential proliferation, and especially securing protection from powerful allies."

Prolif DNo impact to proliferation or rogue states.Mueller ’18 (John Mueller – PhD in Political Science @ UCLA, Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist at Ohio State University and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, “Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter,” 15 October 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/nuclear-weapons-dont-matter?fa_package=1123220)

HOW ABOUT PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM?

Great powers are one thing, some might say, but rogue states or terrorist groups are another. If they go nuclear, it’s game over—which is why any further proliferation must be prevented by all possible measures, up to and including war.

That logic might seem plausible at first, but it breaks down on close examination. Not only has the world

already survived the acquisition of nuclear weapons by some of the craziest mass murderers in history (Stalin and Mao), but proliferation has slowed down rather than sped up over time. Dozens of technologically sophisticated countries have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals , but very few have done so. This is because nuclear weapons turn out to be difficult and expensive to acquire and strategically provocative to possess .

They have not even proved to enhance status much , as many expected they would. Pakistan and Russia may garner more attention today than they would without nukes, but would Japan’s prestige be increased if it became nuclear? Did China’s status improve when it went nuclear—or when its economy grew? And would anybody really care (or even notice) if the current British or French nuclear arsenal was doubled or halved?

Alarmists have misjudged not only the pace of proliferation but also its effects . Proliferation is incredibly dangerous and necessary to prevent, we are told, because going nuclear would supposedly empower rogue states and lead them to dominate their region . The details of how this domination would happen are rarely discussed, but

the general idea seems to be that once a country has nuclear weapons , it can use them to threaten others and get its way, with nonnuclear countries deferring or paying ransom to the local bully out of fear.

Except, of course, that in three-quarters of a century, the United States has never been able to get anything close to that obedience from anybody, even when it had a nuclear monopoly. So why should it be true for, say, Iran or North Korea? It is far more likely that a nuclear rogue’s threats would cause its rivals to join together against the provocateur —just as countries around the Persian Gulf responded to Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait by closing ranks to oppose, rather than acquiescing in , his effort at domination.

CaseWeapons sales lock in arms racing and destabilizes Saudi ArabiaHartung 2010

September 24, 2010 William Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Initiative, New America Foundation Deborah Jerome, Interviewer “Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?” https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea

On the face of it, the proposed arms deal with Saudi Arabia is a win-win situation: The United States gets jobs at a time of high unemployment; Saudi Arabia gets to bolster its military and further cement its relationship with its main protector; and Israel gets the promise of equipment superior to anything transferred to the Saudis. Best of all, say the deal’s advocates, it sends a signal to Iran that the United States and its Persian Gulf allies will not be intimidated.

Or so it would seem. But the reality is much more complicated. First, to the extent that the deal is about jobs, as Boeing and the Obama administration claim, that is the wrong criterion for making a major arms sale.

Security considerations must come first. And on this front, there are serious questions that have not been addressed by the boosters of the deal. By throwing weapons at Saudi Arabia with one hand while giving them to Israel with the other, are we not simply arming both sides of a nascent arms race ? Is Iran likely to be cowed by the Saudi mega-deal, or will it simply seek a way to ratchet up its own military capabilities ?

Is the Middle East really suffering from a dearth of advanced weaponry? In the past three years alone, the United States has offered over $30 billion in armaments to Persian Gulf states, counterbalanced by offers of a similar amount to Israel. The United Kingdom and Russia have supplied billions more to the Persian Gulf states. Attempting to create a balance at higher and higher levels of weaponry is both dangerous and unnecessary.

In addition, how stable is Saudi Arabia? In the short run, there may be no major cause for concern, but the combat planes, helicopters, missiles, and bombs that are part of the deal will last for decades. Would anyone have predicted in the mid-1970s that the heavily armed regime of the Shah of Iran would be toppled by a group of Islamic fundamentalists?

The Saudi deal will no doubt go through, but it shouldn’t. It consists primarily of offensive weapons--fighter planes, attack helicopters, and guided bombs--that serve no constructive purpose. Fighter planes and guided bombs aren’t relevant to addressing the potential threat posed by Iranian missiles, nor are they likely to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Combat aircraft and attack helicopters might be used in Saudi strikes against terrorists and separatist groups in northern Yemen, but doing so would be counterproductive , more likely to inflame passions against Riyadh than to solve its border security problems.

Congress and the public should think twice before signing off on what may be the first stage of a new Mideast arms race.

AT – Iran TurnUS support of Saudi Arabia makes Iran more aggressive Shepp, 7-1-2018 - Jonah, "While Condemning Iran, the U.S. Contributes to Terrorism in the Middle East, Too," Intelligencer, http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/08/iran-us-contribute-terrorism-middle-east.html

Our close relationship with Saudi Arabia , which easily rivals Iran as an inspiration, sponsor, and financier of terrorism, is a big part of the problem .By supporting Saudi hegemony in the greater Middle East, we have abetted the proliferation of a radical Islamist ideology no less toxic than that of the Iranian mullahs. Moreover, by keeping Iran in a constant state of threat, we justify its leaders’ paranoia and motivate them to counter the Saudis with weapons proliferation and terrorist activities of their own.

UQInfluence over arms sales collapsing now – short term withdrawal of weapons is key to prevent domestic Saudi arms industryStratfor 2018

Stratfor American geopolitical intelligence platform and publisher Nov 9, 2018 “Saudi Arabia Lays the Foundation for a Defense Industry of Its Own” https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/saudi-arabia-defense-industry-weapons-imports-vision2030

Saudi Arabia, flush with money, nestled in a hostile environment and saddled with demographic shortcomings, has long spent freely to bring in weapons from abroad. And over the past five years, driven by its intensifying competition with archrival Iran and a heavy military commitment in the Yemen conflict, this trend has accelerated. During the period of 2013-17, the number of arms systems the Saudi government purchased grew by 255 percent compared with its acquisitions from 2008-12, ranking it behind only India among global arms importers, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

As Saudi Arabia pursues its regional interests, it has increasingly sought to insulate itself from outside influence. To guard against dependence on arms imports, which could subject it to political pressure, it has worked to build up the capabilities of its own defense industry. This shift in philosophy comes as the kingdom's usual arms suppliers increasingly reconsider the extent of their weapons trade with Riyadh because of mounting casualties from Yemen's civil war and outrage over the apparent murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Besides lessening dependence on foreign weapons sources, a mature local defense industry could also play a key role in diversifying the Saudi economy while Riyadh is working to ease its overreliance on energy exports. If the Saudi defense sector can be successfully built out, it could provide jobs for a large number of citizens and help address concerns about growing unemployment.

Building the Base for a Defense Industry

Saudi aspirations for an indigenous defense industry are certainly ambitious. In its overarching Saudi Vision 2030 economic strategy, Riyadh wants to produce locally at least half of the equipment it will need for security and military use by 2030. To move toward that goal, when Saudi Arabia negotiates major arms contracts with trade partners, it increasingly insists that component manufacturing and final assembly be done in the kingdom.

Riyadh has also overhauled some parts of the government structure to oversee the growth of its defense industry. For instance, the General Authority for Military Industries was created in 2017 to coordinate weapons procurement and research and development with an emphasis on local sourcing. In the same year, Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI), a state-owned defense company with a focus on aeronautics, land weapons systems, missiles and defense electronics, all areas of heavy Saudi need, was founded. SAMI's lofty goals include the creation of more than 40,000 direct and 100,000 indirect jobs in the country by 2030, which, by then, it hopes would add more than $3.7 billion to the kingdom's annual gross domestic product, which stood at about $684 billion in 2017.

[chart omitted]

Saudi Arabia already has made concrete progress in building its defense industrial base. Large Western defense companies employ thousands of Saudis at their plants in the kingdom. Two-thirds of the workers employed by BAE Systems to assemble the Hawk trainer jets it sold to Riyadh, for instance, are Saudi citizens. In March 2018, Boeing and SAMI formed a joint venture partnership with the goal of localizing 55 percent of the service and maintenance work done on Boeing aircraft sold to the kingdom by 2030. According to Boeing, this would create 6,000 jobs or training opportunities for Saudi youths.

Wrinkles in the System

While Saudi Arabia has certainly laid the groundwork for its defense industry and has made some early progress in developing it, guiding the sector to maturity will be no simple matter. It is one thing to agree on paper to significant technology transfers and local job creation, but it is another to effectively implement such deals. Struggles by defense companies to satisfy stipulations within pending agreements that mandate local sourcing of services and raw materials have led to contract delays. It has also proved particularly difficult for defense companies with well-established and staffed manufacturing plants in the United States and Europe to set up assembly lines in Saudi Arabia, despite the relative simplicity of assembly compared with full manufacturing.

A particular problem those companies have run into has been in finding a sufficient number of Saudis who have both the necessary technical skills and the willingness to work on a factory floor. The shortcomings of the Saudi educational system have forced defense companies to conduct their own staff training, causing delays and adding costs. In fact, the choice of who would lead SAMI provides an illustrative point of the larger issue. Taking the helm as CEO of the state-owned defense company was not a Saudi, but rather Andreas Schwer, a German citizen and former head of combat systems at Rheinmetall AG.

Moving Away From the U.S. and Europe

Beyond the long-term strategy of making its own equipment, Saudi Arabia has also weighed the option of diversifying weapons purchases away from U.S. and European states, which currently satisfy the bulk of Saudi demand. Such an approach not only would allow Saudi Arabia to reduce its dependence on the United States and the European Union, but could also give Riyadh access to countries more willing to overlook its track record on human rights and to offer generous technology transfer rights as part of contracts. The kingdom, for instance, has opened negotiations with Russia over the purchase of the S-400 surface-to-air missile system in hopes that Moscow would offer a deal better than the U.S. offers on its Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. And Saudi Arabia has purchased large numbers of armed drones from China as the United States continues to refuse to sell such technology to countries in the region.

While there are certainly potential benefits for the Saudis in diversifying arms sources, there are considerable limits as well. For one thing, neither Russia nor China is in the position to replace the United States as a present and powerful guarantor of Saudi security against Iran . Even more important, because the Saudi military is equipped chiefly with Western weapons, a major forcewide shift toward non-Western equipment would create serious logistical and training problems in a force already not well-known for its maintenance capabilities or its professional acumen. For those reasons, the Saudi state will have no choice but to continue to rely on its alliances with the United States and, to a lesser extent, European states. This will extend to its arms-purchasing relationship as well.

Even in the best of cases, the Saudi defense industry will not be developed enough to give it full independence in weapons sourcing even by 2030. Considering the industry's current underdeveloped state, even if it matures considerably, the kingdom will still have to look abroad for the high-tech weaponry it desires. Saudi Arabia thus will have no choice but to continue to rely on arms imports in the coming years, but that dependence will not preclude it from following an increasingly independent course. Furthermore, given the limits of the kingdom's strategy to find other sources of weapons, Riyadh will remain keen to maintain its significant relationship with Western powers, particularly the United States.