RUSSIA DA

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Russia DA---1NC

Russian arms sales are low now, but only because of US competition Leonid Bershidsky 19, “Trump Is Winning, Putin's Losing in Global Arms Sales,” March 12, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/03/12/trump-is-winning-putins-losing-in-global-arms-sales-a64786

Global arms sales are on the increase, consistent with the growing number of conflicts and deaths brought about by them. The U.S. and its allies have been the main beneficiaries. Russia , by contrast, is on the decline , a sign that Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical bets aren’t

turning into long-term influence.

The world has grown significantly less violent since 1950, but there has been an marked uptick in the number of armed conflicts in recent years. The emergence of Islamic State, hostilities in eastern Ukraine, and the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar are just some examples.

The number of fatalities has increased even more dramatically , according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Between 2011 and 2017, the average annual death toll from conflict neared 97,000, three times more than in the previous seven-year period.

That helps to explain the 7.8 percent increase in international arms transfers from 2014 to 2018 compared with the previous five-year period seen in the latest data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the global authority on

the weapons trade. The Middle East has been absorbing weapons at an alarming pace: The flow of armaments to the region rocketed by 87 percent in the last five years.

Russia took an active part in the bloodiest of the conflicts, but it doesn’t appear to have been able to convert this into more sales . It was the only one of the world’s top five exporters , which together account for 75 percent of the business, to suffer a major loss in market share. It remains the world’s second-biggest arms exporter.SIPRI has its own, rather complicated, system for calculating transfer volumes based on the military value of the equipment traded rather than on its market price. But in dollar terms, too, Russia trails the U.S.

Yury Borisov, Russia’s deputy prime minister in charge of the defense industry, said last month that Russia “steadily reaches” $15 billion in arms exports a year and hopes to retain that amount. This suggests officials believe sales have hit a ceiling.

By contrast, the U.S. closed $55.6 billion of arms deals in 2018 , 33 percent more than in 2017 , thanks to the Trump administration ’s liberalization of weapons exports . According to the SIPRI figures, U.S. exports were 75 percent higher than Russia’s in 2014 through 2018 – a far wider gap than in the previous five-year period.

For the U.S., Middle Eastern countries have been especially important – particularly Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest arms importer, and its major irritant, Qatar . Some 52 percent of U.S. weapons sales were to the Middle East in the last five years . Under President Donald Trump, the relationship with Saudi Arabia became even more lucrative for the defense industry.

For Russia, the Middle East accounted only for 16 percent of its weapons exports over the same period, with most going to Egypt and Iraq. Its major trade partners were India, China and Algeria – but sales to India dropped significantly as its government sought to diversify suppliers and bought more from the U.S., South Korea and, most painfully for the Kremlin, Ukraine. Russia has been losing key aircraft tenders in India to the U.S. This, along with the economic collapse of another major

client, Venezuela, and the current potential for regime change in Algeria, all makes a rebound in Russian sales look unlikely.

The plan gives Russia market control---they won’t signGreg Suchan 9, “Why You Shouldn’t Expect Too Much (or Anything) from an ATT,” 2009, https://www-jstor-org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/10.5305/procannmeetasil.103.1.0339?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searchText=Why&searchText=You&searchText=Shouldn%27t&searchText=Expect&searchText=Too&searchText=Much&searchText=%28or&searchText=Anything%29&searchText=from&searchText=an&searchText=ATT&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3DWhy%2BYou%2BShouldn%25E2%2580%2599t%2BExpect%2BToo%2BMuch%2B%2528or%2BAnything%2529%2Bfrom%2Ban%2BATT&ab_segments=0%2Fdefault-2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=search%3A561f876badc5afda3eef99a94ace52e9&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contentsAnother case in point: Iran’s supply of weapons and explosives to terrorists and insurgents in Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza

is not the consequence of the lack of an international agreement on arms transfer norms . Tehran supplies those weapons because doing so serves the policy objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran . Similarly, Russia supplies advanced weapons to Iran and China , and China supplies

weapons to Iran, Burma, and Sudan. They do so for economic and foreign policy reasons that suit Moscow and Beijing.Does anyone think that these governments will agree to an ATT that requires them to stop such transfers? No , they won’t. So if negotiations on an ATT produce anything, it will be a document filled with high-minded but vague phrases about not violating international law or generally recognized standards of human rights but nothing that will provide a clear basis for determining that specific arms transfers (e.g., Russia’s sale of missiles to Iran or China’s sale of tanks to the Sudanese perpetrators of genocide in Darfur) are a violation of the treaty. For my money, an ATT that doesn’t require signatories to stop arms transfers to state sponsors of terrorism and pariah states is not worthy of the support of the United States and other responsible arms suppliers.

Collapses US InfluenceAlexander Benard 18, "America Needs to Sell More Weapons," 7-1-2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-needs-to-sell-more-weapons-1530477651These are valid concerns. But as Russia and China actively pursue weapons sales as part of an aggressive strategy to expand their spheres of influence , U.S. strategic interests must be given more weight.

Over the past decade, Russia has easily maintained its position as the world’s second-largest weapons supplier, comprising 22% of global sales from 2013-17. Chinese arms exports increased by nearly 40% from 2013-17 compared with the previous four years, the largest

increase for any large exporter country except Israel, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Neither Russia nor China has qualms about selling weapons to even brazen human-rights violators . In fact they often provide the technologies authoritarian governments use to surveil and repress their citizens. And they are especially eager to peel off countries the U.S. has declined to arm .

Russia sells aircraft, submarines, antiaircraft systems and missiles. China has made strides in advanced missile systems as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. The sale of these sophisticated weapons poses a direct threat to U.S. security interests. It also creates challenges around interoperability. Technologies developed by the Russians and Chinese—such as advanced radars, sonars, sensors and communications platforms—cannot integrate

effectively with U.S. technologies . The more a country purchases from Russia or China, the less able it is to purchase from the U.S. in the future, pushing a country further out of America’s security orbit . The lack of interoperability would also present major obstacles if the U.S. needed to fight a war alongside an ally whose advanced military equipment had been sourced from Russia or China.

Countries cut off by the U.S. will still be able to purchase advanced systems . Worse, they will be able to do so without depending on the U.S. for maintenance , ammunition or spare parts . This eliminates a key lever for U.S. influence in the event that human-rights abuses occur, for instance.Take Turkey. In 2016 and 2017 it had been attempting to purchase helicopters and other technology from U.S. manufacturers, but was turned down due to concerns around deteriorating governance. Then in late 2017 it acquired a sophisticated missile-defense system from Russia for $2.5 billion, an unprecedented move for a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Vietnam’s relations with the U.S. have been pleasantly thawing, partly because of a common concern around China’s aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam in 2016, but residual concerns about human rights have largely limited sales to sonars and radars. In addition the U.S. has not provided meaningful military assistance to Vietnam to help offset costs. As a result, Vietnam continues to purchase much of its military equipment from Russia, which often subsidizes the transactions.

Or consider Thailand, traditionally one of America’s closest security partners in Asia. A 2014 coup caused concern about the country’s trajectory and led the U.S. to limit some weapons sales. China took immediate advantage, signing a deal to sell over $1 billion of submarines to the Thai navy. In late 2017 Bangkok announced plans to establish a joint naval center with Beijing to service those submarines, as well as a joint arms factory to produce and maintain other military equipment.

There are more examples around the world. As the U.S. moves into a phase of more intense competition with Russia and especially China, its approach to arms transfers must change. If not, its global security partnerships will be steadily eroded by more assertive and less scrupulous rivals.

Loss of influence causes great power warsKagan 07, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [Robert “End of Dreams, Return of History” Policy Review (http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10)]Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the

behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the U nited S tates to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a

multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons . That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic . It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate

the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such

that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of

international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not . Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not only on the goodwill of peoples but also on American power. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt

secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the U nited S tates could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war . People who believe greater equality among nations would be

preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other

Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China’s neighbors . But even China,

which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist

Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West , and therefore to the need for a permanent

American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet

communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would

change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition . The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia , if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

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Uniqueness – Russia Sales Low Now – 2NC

Russian arms sales and their defense industry are low nowStratfor 4-29-2019 - American geopolitical intelligence platform and publisher founded in 1996 in Austin, Texas, by George Friedman, who was the company's chairman. Chip Harmon was appointed president in February 2018. Fred Burton is Stratfor's chief security officer (“Russia's Defense Industry Finds Itself in a Tailspin,” Strafor Worldview, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russias-defense-industry-finds-itself-tailspin)//BB

Russia's defense industry is face to face with a major foe, but it's not a foreign military power. The Kremlin has been striving to modernize all branches of the Russian military, but the country's defense industry is struggling thanks to decreasing volumes of orders, difficulties in attracting high-skilled talent and limits to its technological capabilities. According to recent figures, the performance of Russia's aerospace sector is declining precipitously. In 2018, for instance, Russian aircraft and spacecraft makers produced 13.5 percent less than in 2017. And there's been no letup in 2019 either: In the first two months of the year, aerospace output plummeted 48 percent year on year. The decline in Russia's defense output raises concerns about the competitive strength of Russia's defense industry in general, whose health is critical if the country is to project itself as a military power in the longer term. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov attributed the reduction in output to a slowdown of orders for military systems, but projections suggest the slowdown is not just a short-term fluctuation; in fact, it's expected to become even worse in the future. The downturn in oil prices has taken a bite out of Russia's bottom line, squeezing spending for the military — all at a time when the country's arms manufacturers have lost their competitive edge in the global arms market. Together, these factors ensure that Russia's defense industry will struggle to get out of its funk. Suffering From a Dearth of Funds This dire picture stands in stark contrast to Russia's frequent presentation of sensational new platforms. In reality, however, just a few of the big-ticket weapon systems — such as the T-14 main battle tank or the Su-57 fighter aircraft — find buyers, as the rest remain mere prototypes. Russia has prioritized some hardware, such as the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, due to their strategic relevance to the country's overall military posture, but Moscow has failed to fully develop other programs or only introduced them on a limited scale. Under pressure from a limited government budget, the Kremlin even started reducing its military spending in 2017 — a strong indicator that, despite the modernization push, Russia's financial challenges are taking a toll on the country ambitions. Economically, the plunge in oil prices at the end of 2014 hurt Russia's bottom line, depriving the country of essential revenue and forcing it to dip into its reserves to bridge the gap. Today, more than four years on, Russian oil revenues are rising, yet the country is continuing to deal with the consequences of the lean years. Beyond that, low revenues from taxes, which have forced Russia to raise taxes and the retirement age, and Western sanctions over Moscow's activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, have shrunk the financial pool available to military planners. Low oil prices, declining revenues from taxes and Western sanctions have taken a chunk out of the financial pool available to Russia's military and the broader defense industry. But the Kremlin's problems don't end there. In the past, Russia has benefited from its position as a major global arms exporter to fuel further military development. During the 1990s, for example, such sales were critical to the country as it faced severe economic hardship. While Russia remains the world's second-largest arms exporter (only the United States sells more), the actual value of those exports has been decreasing significantly . Between 2014 and 2018, their total value dropped by as much as 17 percent. Again, budgetary limits are somewhat to blame: In the past, Russia frequently used arms exports as a political tool, offering weapons at a heavy discount, if not entirely free. But with Russia no

longer able to offer customers a good deal on its fighter jets and other defense products, the country is losing business .

US pressure is whittling away at Russians arms markets nowKhlebnikov 19 - expert on the Middle East at the Russian International Affairs Council (Alexey, “Russia looks to the Middle East to boost arms exports,” Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/russia-looks-middle-east-boost-arms-exports)//BB

Therefore, Russia’s position in the regional and global arms market is getting more complicated and difficult given Moscow’s declining share of total exports, decreasing imports in Asia and Oceania, and rising competition in the Middle East. In addition, growing U.S. pressure on Russia via its secondary sanctions puts Moscow in a very challenging situation that will make it harder to sign big new contracts and increase its arms exports. Despite all of these difficulties Moscow is working hard to get new deals, both in the Middle East — the world’s fastest-growing and the most attractive arms market — and elsewhere, as part of a broader effort to maintain its status as a leading arms supplier. However, given the geopolitical headwinds and intense competition, maintaining that status looks like it will be an increasing challenge in the years ahead .

Russia’s defense industry is struggling because of low arms sales --- ripples through supply-chainBorshchevskaya 17 - Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on Russia's policy toward the Middle East. She is also a Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University. In addition, she is a fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy. (Anna, “The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East,” Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/program/tactical-side-russias-arms-sales-middle-east/)//BB

Ultimately, the loss of export opportunities not only complicates Russia's efforts to finance its defense industry, it also reduces the scale at which the defense industry produces, which, in turn, decreases scale-dependent savings that accompany higher levels of production. In effect, this means that the more Russia fails to find foreign customers for specific weapon systems, the more it will become burdened with a higher relative cost per unit as it seeks to meet its own needs. The conundrum, in turn, will further limit Russia's ability to competitively price weapons systems for export, thereby perpetuating the effect. This is why, for example, India's withdrawal from the joint development and production of the Su-57 fighter aircraft last year has cast doubt on Russia's ability to sustain the program in a meaningful way or at an acceptable cost. As a result, Russia has sought — albeit unsuccessfully so far — to export the Su-57 more widely in an effort to find a partnership that would make the aircraft viable. The Search for Solutions Russia, accordingly, has been considering other solutions to safeguard its defense sector and improve its overall industrial performance. One possible remedy centers on what amounts to burden sharing across sectors. In this, the country is looking to harness the defense industry's strengths for civilian production, similar to the way Western enterprises such as Boeing or Airbus operate. By producing non-military products for domestic and foreign civilian markets, Russian defense manufacturers could sustain themselves even if their military goods are earning less revenue. Russia's arms industry faces an even greater problem in the years to come: reduced competitiveness. Unfortunately for Russia, the chances that such a gambit will succeed are low — even for domestic consumption. Although Moscow has been pushing an import substitution program amid the West's sanctions, Russian firms continue to privilege foreign, instead of domestic, components. In 2018, 38

percent of Russian industrial enterprises purchased equipment from abroad; two years before, the figure was just 6 percent. Ultimately, if Russian arms producers are failing to find sales for defense customers at home, they're unlikely to find any more of a domestic civilian market for their wares. As a great power, Russia has lofty ambitions for the modernization of its military. Budget constraints, more competition from elsewhere and other issues, however, mean many of the army's most ostentatious projects never make it past the showroom. And moving forward, the Russian defense industry's plight is unlikely to improve as it faces a vicious circle that is leaving it worse for wear.

Link---Fill-in---2NC

US competition blocks Russian export industry growthMoscow Times 19, "Russia Remains Second-Largest Arms Exporter Despite Sales Drop – Think Tank," 3-11-2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/03/11/russia-remains-second-largest-arms-exporter-despite-sales-drop-think-tank-a64763Russia remains the world’s second-largest arms exporter after the United States despite five years of declining sales abroad , the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has said in a new report that was disputed by Russia’s state-owned arm exporter.

Russia’s arms exports dropped 17 percent between 2014 and 2018 when compared to 2009-2013 ,

contributing to a widening gap with U.S. exports , SIPRI said in the report published Monday.

The Swedish think tank said declining arms purchases by India and Venezuela played a major factor in Russia’s reduced exports.

The state-owned Rostec corporation, which includes the Rosoboronexport arms exporter in its vast portfolio, disputed the accuracy of SIPRI's calculations, saying that sales have grown throughout the past decade, RIA Novosti reported Monday.

Egypt proves Liz Sly 18, "In the Middle East, Russia is back," 12-5-2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-the-middle-east-russia-is-back/2018/12/04/e899df30-aaf1-11e8-9a7d-cd30504ff902_story.html?noredirect=onMoscow has also been extending its reach into Egypt , a U.S. ally since the 19 70s . After the Obama

administration suspended some arms sales to Egypt in 2014 over human rights abuses , Russia stepped in to sell fighter jets and attack helicopters . That has been followed by a deal giving Russia the right to use Egyptian military bases and a commitment to hold regular joint military exercises.

AT: No ambitions

Big ambitions and thriving nowMark Episkopos 19, research assistant at the Center for the National Interest, PhD student at American University,“See How Russia Is Selling Lots of Military Hardware Around the Globe,” June 11, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/see-how-russia-selling-lots-military-hardware-around-globe-62097

In keeping with their ongoing export strategy of targeting prospective clients who are beyond the reach of western sanctions,

Rosoboronexport plans to make further inroads in Africa, Latin America, the Middle-East, and Central Asia . Furthermore, the Russian arms trade is aggressively competing for second and third world import markets with a glut of cheaper , Soviet-inherited hardware that may lack the technical bells and whistles of their latest offering s , but nonetheless offers cost-effective performance for low and medium intensity warfare.

Rosoboronexport’s ongoing success presents the Washington security establishment with a stark political reality that shows no signs of changing over the coming years : Russia’s remarkably resilient arms export business has not only survived, but is thriving , under the post-Crimea sanctions regime.

AT: Sanctions

Sanctions don’t affect RussiaMark Episkopos 19, research assistant at the Center for the National Interest, PhD student at American University,“See How Russia Is Selling Lots of Military Hardware Around the Globe,” June 11, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/see-how-russia-selling-lots-military-hardware-around-globe-62097

Since the 2014 Crimean annexation, Rosoboronexport executives have wasted no time in arguing that the the Russian defense industry would be in even better financial shape were it not for the effects of the western sanctions regime: "For five years, Russia and Rosoboronexport have been confronted with serious restrictions from some international financial institutions that have become strongly dependent on the political will of some world arms market players. We can only perceive them as unfair competition and the attempts of pressure on us and our partners," said Mikheyev.

Mikheyev’s claim is inarguably true as far as the secondary effects of sanctions are concerned; the Kremlin is currently being denied western capital inflows that, among other things, could otherwise have contributed to the growth of the Russian defense sector. However, sanctions have had no discernable effect on Moscow’s ability to secure a series of lucrative arms deals over the past several years . The reason is hardly surprising: the nations most likely to abide by the sanctions regime are western NATO members who are already militarily and politically invested in NATO’s defense infrastructure, and thus were never prospective Russian

clients to begin with. Meanwhile, sanctions have done little to stop some of the world’s biggest arms importers from doing business with Russia.

It was only last year that India signed a gargantuan 5.43 billion dollar weapons deal with Russia . There was talk of punishing India under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), but

Washington is dragging its heels over concerns of alienating New Delhi . Washington successfully sanctioned China under CAATSA , but this had no discernible effect on the burgeoning Sino-Russian defense relationship . Most recently, Moscow exploited the growing political rift between NATO -aligned Turkey and the west to not only sell the S-400 to Ankara, but to secure a joint Russian-Turkish manufacturing deal for its upcoming S-500 anti air system.

Russia Won’t Follow-on

AT Follow On---No Binding Enforcement

No follow on – vagueness, no rewards, structural government issues, and policy vs. lawTED R. BROMUND 5/23, “Trump's rejection of the Arms Trade Treaty Is based on reality,” 05/23/19, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/445254-trumps-rejection-of-the-arms-trade-treaty-is-based-on

The supposed purpose of the ATT is to end irresponsible international arms sales . But as one of the treaty’s most distinguished defenders, former Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman, has admitted, its terms are “clearly ambiguous.”

In fact, it contains no definitions at all. None.

Why is the treaty so vague? The ATT’s negotiators wanted to get all the world’s nations on board . The only way to do this was to make the treaty as vague as possible. But treaties are contracts that bind the United States. Being bound to vagueness is inherently dangerous.

The ATT has no rewards for compliance . The only thing you get from going along with it is a warm feeling. It also has no enforcement mechanism . Given its defects, that’s a good thing, but relying on the fuzzies to create compliance isn’t serious.

If nations around the world want to not sell arms to dictators, all they need to do is not sell . No treaty is necessary. If nations want to control their borders to prevent illicit arms imports, the same is true.

We don’t need a treaty. We need more democratic , competent governments . Without them, no treaty can work. With them, no treaty will be necessary.

The argument that progressives offer is that if the U.S. stops making arms sales the left dislikes, this will create influential “norms .” If you truly believe that Russia will become responsible if the U.S. simply does things that progressives like, good luck to you.

But there is no basis for this belief. It’s a fantasy, and a self-disarming one at that.

The progressive focus on the U.S.’s arms sales isn’t a coincidence. Iran’s arms sales don’t much bother the treaty’s advocates. But they really hate the West’s.If you doubt this, look at what they do. When the progressive group behind the ATT wanted to quote a foreign condemnation of the president’s decision, to whom did they turn first?

To Press TV, the mouthpiece of the Iranian regime.

The treaty’s friends have sued the British government to stop its arms sales. They leak assiduously against the French government. They vehemently oppose U.S. arms sales, and — like Trevor Thrall

in these pages — support the treaty as a way to stop those sales.

But they do and say nothing about the dictators.

When Rachel Stohl, one of the treaty’s most vehement defenders, wrote about the missiles that shot down flight MH-17 in 2015 ,

who did she blame for supplying them? Vladimir Putin?

No. She blamed “today’s globalized environment.”

The treaty’s friends always condemn the U.S. in the clearest terms. But when it comes to the dictators, out rolls the poisonous fog of the passive voice in which no one is responsible for anything.

The treaty’s friends have a blame-America-first policy . They openly use the ATT as a weapon against the West, and only against it. In practice, therefore, they are siding with Iran’s mullahs, Putin and Beijing.Worse, the ATT is part of a wider network of progressive treaties, including one on cluster munitions. That treaty, according to Jim Shields, head of the U.S. Army’s Program Executive Office Ammunition, has created “capability gaps that we are really concerned about.”

It is easy to say that the ATT will never affect U.S. arms transfer policy . The history of the cluster munitions treaty says otherwise . So do the lawsuits of the ATT’s advocates themselves.

The ATT is a treaty. A treaty is legal instrument. But arms sales are decisions of policy, not law .

The decision to authorize an arms sale should often be tough because the world isn’t black and white. It’s

mostly grey. Trying to impose a legal framework on that reality is going to produce bad policy . There are lots of tough calls in

foreign policy. Being against the Arms Trade Treaty isn’t one of them.

MisinterpretationTheodore R. Bromund 13, Senior Research Fellow in Anglo-American Relations, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, “The U.S. Cannot Fix the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty,” March 13, 2013, https://www.heritage.org/node/11920/print-displayThe existing draft text of the ATT is badly flawed . This is largely unavoidable and reflects the inherent flaws in the concept of any global treaty on the arms trade . Furthermore, no treaty can resist misinterpretation by a nation that is intent on doing so . Thus, virtually any clause in the current ATT text could be problematic—and bad for the U.S.—in that the U.S. will interpret it one way, and Russia, for example, will interpret it in another , and there will be no way to hold Russia to the correct sense of the treaty.For example, Article 4.1 states that, when considering whether to authorize an export of conventional arms, “each State Party shall assess whether the proposed export would contribute to or undermine peace and security.”[20] This summer, Russia argued that its export of arms to Syria contributed to security by allowing the Assad regime to fight on an equal basis against those trying to overthrow it . In the future, China will be free to argue that this criterion should limit U.S. arms sales to Taiwan on the grounds that the sales undermine Chinese security and threaten the peace.[21]

The Treaty isn’t strong enough for Russia to joinAgence France-Presse 15, “Russia Will Not Sign 'Weak' Arms Trade Treaty,” May 17, 2015, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2015/05/17/russia-will-not-sign-weak-arms-trade-treaty/MOSCOW — Russia will not sign the United Nations A rms T rade T reaty that requires governments to ensure their exports will not fuel conflicts, a senior foreign ministry official said Sunday.

"We decided not to join. We weighed all the pros and cons and decided it is not obligatory for us ," Mikhail Ulyanov, who heads the foreign ministry's non-proliferation and arms control department , told TASS state news agency.

He criticized the "too weak treaty " which however " places certain burdens on its participants."

"We don't have a negative attitude to this treaty but we don't see the point of joining it ," said Ulyanov, arguing

that Western countries and Russia already have export controls in place, and that the treaty would not be effective for developing countries.

No enforcement and can’t stop other transfers of conventional weaponsRichard Solash 13, “Explainer: What Is The United Nations Arms Trade Treaty?” September 25, 2013, https://www.rferl.org/a/un-arms-trade-treaty-explainer/25117736.htmlThere is no clear enforcement mechanism in the UN Arms Trade Treaty . It also remains unclear whether the transfer of conventional weapons in ways other than sales -- for

example, such as rental contracts or gifts -- would fall under the treaty .

AT Follow On---Discrimination

US lead in ATT will lead to discrimination against Russia’s interestsJoshua D. Sorenson 15, Juris Doctor, December 2014, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Provo, UT, August 1st, 2015, “United Nations Arms Trade Treaty: Russia's justifications for abstention and the treaty's effectiveness in application”, https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1136&context=ilmrThe concern that the ATT may discriminate against Russian interests is valid. The ATT

may, in fact, prohibit more Russian arms transfers than American or other western States’ transfers should Russia become a party to the ATT. 1. Russia: ATT Discriminates Against Russian Interests Russia claims that the ATT , as drafted, discriminates against Russian interests. Believing that the implications of the ATT had

not been fully considered, Russia expressed concern that the treaty would discriminate against “the Russian military-industrial complex .” 107 In an effort to avoid the negative implications of such a treaty, Russia did not become a party to the ATT.108 Rather, Russia will continue to supply arms according to “its own ideas about who, where and why it is selling these weapons.”109 According to Kozyulin, “The [ATT] has a number of points that can be considered discriminating against [Russia].” 110 The foremost

concern revolves around the likely negative impact on Russia’s military-industrial sector . 111

Joining the treaty would affect Russia’s “ability to supply arms to individual States , which the US and the West can equate to ‘terrorist regimes.’”112 Russia believes that the ATT is drafted to prohibit more Russian arms transfers than American or other western States’ transfers .113 Another

of Russia’s concerns is with the potentially discriminatory effect of the amendment provision of the ATT .114 Article 20 of the ATT provides the option, according to some experts, of making amendments that may be even harsher on Russia , depriving “some Russian producers from certain arms markets . . . [a]nd . . . limit[ing] the supply of arms into Russia.”115 Russia did not end the ATT talks because it was optimistic that its concerns would

be taken more seriously.116 However, until the above mentioned concerns are more adequately addressed, Russia feels “the entire story of the contract looks more like another attempt to ‘put pressure’ on Russia and displace it from its traditional markets.”117 Russia sees the ATT as an example of the West’s efforts to “use international treaties as a political lever to limit Russia n military exports.” 118 2. The ATT May

Discriminate Against Russian Interests in Its Effect but Not on Its Face The justification that the ATT discriminates against Russia, if indeed true, is a valid concern for Russia. Russia has not claimed that the ATT, on its face, expressly discriminates

against Russia, but rather that the result of the ATT is discriminatory.119 First, if Russia were a party to the ATT, a significant curb in arms sales would likely result, seriously damaging Russia’s military-industrial sector .120

As reported by Russian news outlets, at least half of Russia’s arms transfers go to nations , such as Syria, Venezuela, and China, which have been deemed “unreliable or criminal ” due to previous behavior.121 If

half of Russia’s arms transfers go to States that would likely be prohibited under the ATT, then serious damage to Russia’s arms trade business would result from joining the ATT. The ATT may actually affect more Russian arms transfers than American arms transfers. That result would not only be discriminatory in relative terms, but it would have a large impact in absolute economic terms. After all, Russia is the second largest arms supplier in the world.122 Additionally, the fact that the U nited S tates signed and ratified the ATT and that Russia abstained from signing the treaty may indicate that the treaty is more favorable to American interests than to Russian interests. With the help of its allies, the United States has a history of promoting

favorable UN resolutions that effectively create sales markets for its businesses .123

Strong American and European business interests drive a lot of political action.124 The United States and some

other western States joined the ATT after opposing it for a number of years. That delay may suggest that the United States and the other western States only joined after crafting the treaty to better favor their national interests.125

Russia is not alone in thinking that the ATT may be discriminatory . Other States, such as Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua, have expressed concern that the ATT “might be abused to create political pressure.” 126 Even American media outlets recognize the “hope” of the ATT’s proponents that some otherwise “reluctant to ratify” nations “will feel public pressure.”127 The United States and its allies in favor of American interests at the expense of other nations’ interests would likely wield this abuse of public pressure. Throughout history large,

powerful western nations have used their political and economic power to advance their own national interests over the interests of weaker nations . 128 The ATT might be yet another tool to create pressure on countries to behave in a way that advances western interests over other nations’ own interests.

Vague unbalanced treatyTass 15, Tass news agency, “Diplomat: Russia does not sign Arms Trade Treaty because it is unbalanced,” September 9th, 2015, “Diplomat: Russia does not sign Arms Trade Treaty because it is unbalanced,” https://tass.com/russia/819795Recently, new tools emerged in the global arms trade, in particular, the Arms Trade Treaty, which came into force last December. We did not sign this document and see no reason to move in this direction," Ryabkov said.

According to him, the document is unbalanced , with the issues of countering the illegal weapons trafficking represented superficially in it.

"Vague humanitarian criteria are documented in the treaty . They give rise to various interpretations , including unscrupulous ones ," the Russian deputy foreign minister said.

The treaty was adopted by the UN General Assembly on April 3, 2013, following several years of intense consultations between the organization’s member-

countries. A total of 154 countries voted for it. Iran, North Korea and Syria voted against the document, and 23 more countries, including Russia, abstained.

AT Follow On---Russia Cheats

Even if they win a risk of follow-on, Russia will cheatKeith B. Payne et al. 17, •Dr. Keith B. Payne, Study Director and Contributing Author, President, National Institute for Public Policy; Head, Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, •Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Chairman, Senior Review Group, former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, •Dr. Stephen Blank, Contributing Author, Senior Fellow for Russia, American Foreign Policy Council, former Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, •Mr. Matthew Costlow, Contributing Researcher, Analyst, National Institute for Public Policy; Missouri State University, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Graduate, •Mr. Fritz W. Ermarth, Senior Reviewer, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and staff of the National Security Council during the Carter and Reagan administrations, •Dr. Colin S. Gray, Senior Reviewer, Professor Emeritus, Centre for Strategic Studies, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading; European Director, National Institute for Public Policy, •Amb. Robert G. Joseph, Senior Reviewer, Senior Scholar, National Institute for Public Policy; former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense, National Security Council, •Mr. Harrison Menke, Contributing Author, Policy Analyst, SAIC; Missouri State University, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Graduate, •Mr. Guy B. Roberts, Senior Reviewer, former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy and Director for Nuclear Policy, NATO; co-editor of National Security Law and Policy, 2015, •Mr. Thomas Scheber, Contributing Author, Vice President, National Institute for Public Policy; former Director of Strike Policy and Integration, Office of the Secretary of Defense, •Dr. Mark Schneider, Contributing Author, Senior Analyst, National Institute for Public Policy; former Principal Director for Forces Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, •Mr. David Trachtenberg, Contributing Author, President and CEO of Shortwaver Consulting LLC, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense"Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict," 3-17-2017, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2017.1277121

Cheating on arms control agreements appears to be a part of Russia's overall strategy .

According to reports from Congressional hearings in April 2015, Russia is not complying with a significant number of formal treaties and other commitments . The list of agreements for which Russia is not in compliance includes treaties and agreements on nuclear forces, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) and the

PNIs of 1991 and 1992, as well as treaty regimes/ conventions for chemical and biological weapons .1111. “H.R. 1735—FY16 National Defense Authorization Bill Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,” op. cit.View all notes

In addition, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States reported in 2009 that Russia was “apparently” conducting low-yield nuclear tests, in violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT ).1212. Perry and Schlesinger, et al., America's Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, op. cit., p. 83.View all notes

At the same time, the U nited S tates has fully complied with the provisions of those nuclear agreements and the U.S. strict “zero yield” interpretation of the CTBT is a restrictive interpretation that is not defined in the treaty and which other signatories apparently do not share . This asymmetry between the United States and Russia regarding compliance with nuclear arms treaties is decidedly one-sided . Russian noncompliance provides unique military benefits to further Russia's nuclear weapons programs while the United States maintains full compliance with restrictive treaty interpretations . In this asymmetric relationship, the United States must take special, sometimes costly, steps to reassure nervous allies and develop effective counters and responses to Russia, which possesses the largest nuclear arsenal in the world.

In addition, Russia's negotiating strategy leading to the New START Treaty, signed in 2010, appears to have provided unique benefits to Moscow at the expense of the U nited S tates . For example, under the provisions of the

treaty, Russia has increased—not decreased—the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems, while the United States has been required to reduce the numbers of its treaty-accountable items. According to DoD's report to Congress on its plans to implement the New START Treaty, the United States will have to spend over $300 million dollars just to comply with the reductions, inspections, and demonstrations called for by this treaty.1313. U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Plan to Implement the Nuclear Force Reductions, Limitations, and Verification and Transparency Measures Contained in the New START Treaty Specified in Section 1042 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Department of Defense Report to Congress, April 2014, available at http://archive.defense.gov/documents/New-START-Implementation-Report.pdf.View all notes

Also, Moscow has ceased complying with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

and has not fulfilled its obligations under the Vienna Documents, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, and the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime .14

14. “H.R. 1735—FY16 National Defense Authorization Bill Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,” op. cit.View all notes

In summary, Russia has used noncompliance with treaties and other agreements to give itself an advantage in developing, building, and deploying both nuclear and conventional weapons that support Russia's expansionist grand strategy.

In summary, considerable available evidence supports the thesis that Russia's current leaders have a worldview that Russia—the rightful heir of the once powerful Soviet empire—has been greatly wronged by, and is now threatened by the West , and this perceived condition needs to be rectified, even if at great risk and a steep price. A grand strategy to restore lost influence and power has been part of a Russian pattern of behavior for well over a decade . Consistent use of Russia's elements of power are evidenced in Russian behavior in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. And, as of this writing, the

struggle in Ukraine continues, and Russia is building up and employing its military capabilities in Syria.1515. Spyer, “Russia in Syria: Putin Fills Strategic Vacuum in the Middle East,” op. cit.View all notes

The ATT fails even if every nation signed onEconomist 18, “A UN treaty to regulate the global arms trade has little impact,” Aug 18th 2018, https://www.economist.com/international/2018/08/18/a-un-treaty-to-regulate-the-global-arms-trade-has-little-impact

IF ALL—or even most—countries abided by the letter and spirit of the UN Arms Trade Treaty ( ATT ), the

world might be rather less grim . Governments that sign up are supposed to halt exports of weapons if they have good reason to think they will be used to flout international humanitarian law. That could cover both internal repression and waging wars by inhumane methods.

Every country in the European Union has ratified the treaty; when it was being crafted, Britain was a keen advocate. But Russia and China have stayed out . The American administration (under Barack Obama) inked the accord, but it has yet to be ratified by the Senate and this looks unlikely to happen. The treaty, which covers everything from tanks to small arms, was opposed by

America’s gun lobby. Conservative critics in Washington, DC, now call it a piece of liberal Utopianism which would hobble America without reining in its main rivals.

Link Turns Case

Africa---2NC

Russia wants and can sell weapons to AfricaPeter Beaumont 18, “Russia's scramble for influence in Africa catches western officials off-guard,” September 11th, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/sep/11/russias-scramble-for-influence-in-africa-catches-western-officials-off-guard

Russia is engaged in a frantic new scramble for influence in Africa , which is being spearheaded by a rash of military

cooperation and arms deals signed across the continent in 2018. The most recent – an agreement for a planned Russian logistics base in Eritrea, which would give it access to the Red Sea – was announced in early September after nine months that have seen Kremlin officials crisscross from the Horn to the Great Lakes and southern Africa.

The pace of Russia’s renewed intervention has raised fears over the human rights and security implications of selling arms to regimes that are weak or in conflict , particularly as the US has

signalled its own plans to withdraw troops and close missions.

Scrutiny was heightened last month following the murder of three Russian journalists in Central African Republic while they were investigating the activities of the controversial Russian military services firm Wagner.

The moves, say observers, have accelerated markedly in 2018 as senior Russian officials have shuttled between capitals offering arms and military services deals – often with few conditions attached – in exchange for diplomatic support and potentially lucrative mineral extraction contracts.

But if CAR has been unusual, with the arrival of some 175 Russian private contractors and military personnel in addition to the supply of arms, it has also become emblematic of the wider Russian efforts in Africa, catching out even those working there.

“The official narrative is that the Russian government and CAR had a long standing cooperation,” said one international official who has closely observed events in CAR since Russian advisers began arriving.

“But honestly if anyone had said last autumn that this was going to happen and that there would soon be so many Russian people on the ground, no one would have believed it.”

“Everyone has been struck by the speed at which this has got going,” another observer told the Guardian.

“In January this year we got word the Russians were training the president’s security forces in Berengo in [the former CAR dictator Jean-Bédel] Bokassa’s old palace there. It went from rumours on social media to a sizeable Russian presence at an incredible speed.”

It has not only been the supply of small arms and boots on the ground; there are also concerns Russia has interposed itself as a mediator between the CAR government and rebel armed groups in talks in Sudan. This undercuts the African Union’s own mediation and there

have been claims Russia is using them to negotiate access to diamonds, gold and uranium in rebel-controlled areas.

It is not only in CAR that western officials have been caught off-guard by Russia’s escalating interest in Africa.

Senior officials including Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and Valentina Matviyenko, chairwoman of the Russian federation council (and a close ally of Vladimir Putin), have led the charge to sign military cooperation deals.

In a high profile visit in March, Lavrov visited Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe, signing a raft of agreements for economic zones, mineral exploration and for military and technical cooperation.

In July it was the turn of Dmitry Shugaev, director of Russia’s federal service for military and technical cooperation, who appeared on the edges of the BRICS summit to announce the signing of a memorandum of understanding with the Southern African Development Community for military cooperation, including training.

Facebook Twitter Pinterest At the BRICS summit in South Africa in July: (L-R) the prime minister of India, Narendra Modi; the president of China, Xi Jinping; the president of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa; the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin; and the president of Brazil, Michel Temer. Photograph: Gianluigi Guercia/AFP/Getty ImagesForeign policy experts, who have noted the sharp rise in Russian engagement in Africa, believe it is being driven by several factors.

One reason is the threat of diplomatic isolation from Europe and the US over Moscow’s policies in Syria and before that Ukraine. This has pushed the Kremlin to seek African allies, not least for their votes at the UN general assembly.

“Russia also sees itself as having a historic footprint [from the era of the Soviet Union when it supported liberation movements],” says Paul Stronski, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“When it started its return in the last couple of years the Russian position in Africa was in a sorry state particularly in comparison with China.

“It can’t offer consumer goods like China but what it can offer is arms and occasional debt relief either in exchange for an arms deal or the rights to explore and drill for hydrocarbons or other extractables.

“What we are seeing is a Russia n return that is trying to find a niche where they can be competitive . The niche they really own is arms .” And while the main effort has been fronted primarily by senior Russian officials, Stronski adds, the second level of engagement has drawn in a familiar cast of characters from the twilight world of Putin proxies including businessmen and private military contractors like Wagner, not least in the CAR.

Like other observers, Thierry Vircoulon, of the International Crisis Group, sees a Russian strategy that mixes business, diplomatic and arms sales interests.

“It all started in September last year when the president of CAR went to [the Black Sea resort of] Sochi and made the first arms deal there.

“The relationship has expanded since that time with the compensation for Russian companies being access to the country’s minerals in exchange for military services .”

Vircoulon argues, however, that there is a profound difference between the last period of Russian interest in Africa, at the height of Soviet influence, and today.

“The difference is that now it is not as clear cut. Russia is using private military contractors who, while not officially linked to the Kremlin, are linked to the Kremlin. It its not even much of a disguise and they are targeting the regimes that do have not have very good relations with the west or who are dissatisfied with west like Sudan, Zimbabwe and CAR .”

It has not only been in the sphere of Russian military services that the Kremlin has been active .

Russia has been busy reactivating its old person-to-person networks, many forged during the Cold War when young activists and fighters in the African liberation studied in Moscow.

But perhaps as striking as the presence of military advisors in CAR has been been Russian attempts to build a base in the Horn of Africa.

While efforts to open a base in Djibouti were rebuffed, Sergei Lavrov announced in September that Russia was planning to open a logistics site in Eritrea on the Red Sea, joining a rush of other countries setting up in the Horn ,

also suggesting that UN sanctions on Eritrea be lifted.

Middle East---2NC

Middle East Demand is high, but competition makes it difficult for Russia to sell Alexey Khlebnikov 19, has been published on international relations topics in particular on the Middle East in academic journals and media sources in Russia, Europe, U.S., and the Middle East, he is a Ph.D. candidate, “Russia looks to the Middle East to boost arms exports,” April 8, 2019, https://www.mei.edu/publications/russia-looks-middle-east-boost-arms-exports

Regional demand: The growing Middle Eastern market

Although Asia and Oceania remain the world’s largest arms market , accounting for 40% of total imports, countries in the region have started to import less. By contrast, across the Mid dle East , the demand for arms is only expected to grow , driven by ongoing conflicts (such as those in Syria, Yemen, and Libya), the fragile security situation, and the threat of military confrontation between state and non- state actors. According to SIPRI, over the last decade the region’s arms imports grew by 75% from 20% of the global total in 2009-13 to 35% in 2014-18.

Russia is not alone in looking to the Mid dle East as a source of growth, however. Indeed, as the most attractive and lucrative arms market, the Mid dle East attracts all the major arms exporters and the competition is fierce . At present, Middle Eastern countries import only 10%

of their arms from Russia, while 54% comes from the U.S . and 9% from France. Therefore, Russia’s presence in the market is quite limited , although it is growing thanks to the Kremlin’s outreach to regional arms importers . In last year’s SIPRI report Russia was not even in top three arms exporters to the region.

As it looks to ramp up its exports, Moscow is highly dependent on the broader political and economic situation in the Middle East. Given the fact that the majority of the regional actors — Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Qatar, Turkey, Jordan, and Kuwait — are U.S. allies and importers of American arms, Russia finds itself in a very tricky situation.

European exporters are also ramping up their regional presence. In recent years, the leaders of the European arms industry — France, Germany, the UK, and Italy — increased their share of the global arms market by boosting their exports to the Middle East . France is the major Russian competitor in Egypt, which imports 37% of its arms from France against 30% from Russia. In this sense, Egypt plays both sides, trying to diversify its suppliers: In 2015 Cairo signed a deal with Moscow for 50 Russian MiG-29 fighters as well as with Paris for 24 Rafale jets.

Algeria, a long-time major customer, imported 66% of its arms from Russia in 2014-18, although imports from Germany account for 10% of its total as well. The current political turmoil in Algeria might well result in a change in Russia’s market share and a shift in favor of European producers. The UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey — where Russia is currently seeking new contracts — also import a significant share of their arms from the U.S. and European suppliers.

Therefore, Russia’s position in the regional and global arms market is getting more complicated and difficult given Moscow’s declining share of total exports, decreasing imports in Asia and Oceania, and rising competition in the Middle East . In addition, growing U.S. pressure

on Russia via its secondary sanctions puts Moscow in a very challenging situation that will make it harder to sign big new contracts and increase its arms exports.

Despite all of these difficulties Moscow is working hard to get new deals, both in the Middle East — the world’s fastest-growing and the most attractive arms market — and elsewhere, as part

of a broader effort to maintain its status as a leading arms supplier. However, given the geopolitical headwinds and intense

competition , maintaining that status looks like it will be an increasing challenge in the years ahead.

Russia is looking to expand to the Middle East – only US-Russia competition stops RussiaAlexey Khlebnikov 19, has been published on international relations topics in particular on the Middle East in academic journals and media sources in Russia, Europe, U.S., and the Middle East, he is a Ph.D. candidate, “Russia looks to the Middle East to boost arms exports,” April 8, 2019, https://www.mei.edu/publications/russia-looks-middle-east-boost-arms-exports

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) recently published annual report, Russia’s share of global arms exports shrank by around one-fifth over the last decade, falling from 27 percent to 21 percent, while the U.S. share increased from 30 percent to 36 percent, widening the gap between the two major arms exporters. As Russia looks to reverse this decline, it is focusing on the Middle East , the world’s second-largest and fastest-growing arms market , as a way to boost its exports.

While it is early days, the effort seems to be paying off so far. According to Russian media reports, Russia and Egypt recently signed a new arms deal worth at least $2 billion . This deal , which involves the purchase of over 20 4++

generation Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets (Flanker-E), makes Egypt a major importer of Russian arms and comes on top of

previous deals between the two countries for tens of MiG-29 jets, Ka-52K helicopters, and coastal defense units. In addition to the deal with Egypt, Russia is also moving ahead with the sale of the S-400 anti-aircraft system to Turkey in yet another confirmation of Moscow’s growing focus on the Middle East.Whether this shift will be enough to compensate for the broader decline in Russia’s global market share, however, is another question entirely. For their part,

Russian officials have pushed back against this narrative, refuting SIPRI’s analysis. They argue that in recent years the volume of Russian arms exports has actually increased and its portfolio of orders reached a record $51 billion in 2018. That said, it is important to note that SIPRI aims to define trends in global arms transfers and calculates volumes based on the military value of the equipment rather than its market price . As a result,

even if Moscow did reach a record in 2018, the broader trend of a declining Russian share of the global arms market is still quite clear . A downward trend: Exports in decline

What’s driving this trend ? Global political and economic developments — and their negative impact on Russia’s ability to

secure new arms deals — may be a partial explanation. The confrontation between Russia and the West , which was

exacerbated by the Ukraine crisis in 2014 and Moscow’s subsequent campaign in Syria, plays an important role in this regard. Sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its European allies may eventually hamper Russia’s ability to sign new arms contracts, and for now the U.S. seems set on using them to ramp up pressure on Russia. In August 2017 U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which aims to punish Moscow for its malign actions. Under the legislation, countries trading with Russia’s defense and intelligence sectors can face secondary

sanctions. Rostec, a state corporation that brings together all the major producers of defense and high-tech products, is on the CAATSA list, which means U.S. policy changes can have a significant impact on its exports , especially to countries that have military-technical agreements with Russia. In this context, the Kremlin faces more uncertainty and risks in the arms exporting business.

Latin America---2NC

Russia wants to sell to Latin AmericaJulia Gurganus 18, "Russia: Playing a Geopolitical Game in Latin America," 5-3-2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/03/russia-playing-geopolitical-game-in-latin-america-pub-76228ARMS SALES AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIPSMoscow’s efforts to build ties to Latin America enjoy one important advantage: many of these countries are familiar with Soviet weapons and equipment , having purchased them in years

past, and are attracted by the lower price tag of Russian arms. Through arms sales, Moscow looks to generate income, displace U.S. suppliers, and sustain and improve state-to-state security relationships . Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela have been the leading purchasers of Russian arms in the region. For example, Russia has supplied 90 percent of Nicaraguan arms imports since 2000.

The volume of arms sales can vary significantly from year to year, often depending on one major deal .

Nevertheless, Russia has demonstrated that it is a serious competitor to the United States (see figure 2). Between

2000 and 2017, the share of arms sales to Latin America from Russia was about 20 percent , on par with the share of

U.S. sales, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. While recent deals with Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela have stalled for various reasons, Russia is pursuing new opportunities this year with Bolivia, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru.

AT: Other specific regions

Russia planning sales to MENAMark Episkopos 19, research assistant at the Center for the National Interest, PhD student at American University,“See How Russia Is Selling Lots of Military Hardware Around the Globe,” June 11, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/see-how-russia-selling-lots-military-hardware-around-globe-62097

In keeping with their ongoing export strategy of targeting prospective clients who are beyond the reach of western sanctions,

Rosoboronexport plans to make further inroads in Africa, Latin America, the Middle-East, and Central Asia . Furthermore, the Russian arms trade is aggressively competing for second and third world import markets with a glut of cheaper , Soviet-inherited hardware that may lack the technical bells and whistles of their latest offering s , but nonetheless offers cost-effective performance for low and medium intensity warfare.

Rosoboronexport’s ongoing success presents the Washington security establishment with a stark political reality that shows no signs of changing over the coming years : Russia’s remarkably resilient arms export business has not only survived, but is thriving , under the post-Crimea sanctions regime.

IL

I/L – US Influence

Arms sales are key to international influence, alliances, and global dominance Leonid Bershidsky 19, “Trump Is Winning, Putin's Losing in Global Arms Sales,” March 12, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/03/12/trump-is-winning-putins-losing-in-global-arms-sales-a64786

Arms sales are perhaps the best reflection of a major military power’s international influence . The market isn’t all about price and quality competition; it’s about permanent and situational alliances . The growing gap between the U.S. and Russia in exports shows that Putin’s forays into areas such as the Middle East are failing to translate into Russian influence in the region .

Although Putin’s warm relations with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi and his alliance with Iran, which has a lot of influence over Iraq, are paying off to some extent, they can’t quite compensate for ground lost elsewhere.

The U.S.’s allies , France, Germany and the U.K. among them, have been rapidly increasing their market share ,

too. That’s a rarely mentioned way in which the security alliance with Washington is paying off for the Europeans. All the ethical objections to selling arms to countries such as Saudi Arabia notwithstanding, E uropean U nion member states need markets for their defense industries , which employ about 500,000 people. Being under the U.S. umbrella opens doors where Russia and China are less desirable partners – that is, in most of the world.

Many tears have been shed in the U.S. about the collapse of the American-led global order . But if you take arms sales as a proxy for influence , the U.S.’s global dominance looks to be resilient . In a more conflict-prone, competitive world, America is doing rather well while its

longstanding geopolitical rivals stumble.

Russian market control collapses US InfluenceAlexander Benard 18, "America Needs to Sell More Weapons," 7-1-2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-needs-to-sell-more-weapons-1530477651

America’s arms-sales policies are too restrictive , lead ing even some pro-U.S. countries to buy weapons from Russia and China. This year’s National Defense Authorization Act would give Defense Secretary Jim Mattis authority to waive certain new restrictions for specific countries enacted by Congress last year. But the problem is more fundamental: The U.S. arms-sale regime needs to be recalibrated to protect American influence in a highly competitive geopolitical environment.

The U.S. government blocks weapons sales to foreign countries for various reasons. Congress is often wary of selling arms to countries that could use them to undermine civil liberties. The Defense Department often worries the purchasing country could allow sensitive U.S. technology to fall into the wrong hands. The State Department arms-control bureau has a general aversion to any weapons proliferation on grounds that it could trigger an arms race.

These are valid concerns. But as Russia and China actively pursue weapons sales as part of an aggressive strategy to expand their spheres of influence , U.S. strategic interests must be given more weight.

Over the past decade, Russia has easily maintained its position as the world’s second-largest weapons supplier, comprising 22% of global sales from 2013-17. Chinese arms exports increased by nearly 40% from 2013-17 compared with the previous four years, the largest

increase for any large exporter country except Israel, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Neither Russia nor China has

qualms about selling weapons to even brazen human-rights violators . In fact they often provide the technologies authoritarian governments use to surveil and repress their citizens. And they are especially eager to peel off countries the U.S. has declined to arm .

Russia sells aircraft, submarines, antiaircraft systems and missiles. China has made strides in advanced missile systems as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. The sale of these sophisticated weapons poses a direct threat to U.S. security interests. It also creates challenges around interoperability. Technologies developed by the Russians and Chinese—such as advanced radars, sonars, sensors and communications platforms—cannot integrate

effectively with U.S. technologies . The more a country purchases from Russia or China, the less able it is to purchase from the U.S. in the future, pushing a country further out of America’s security orbit . The lack of interoperability would also present major obstacles if the U.S. needed to fight a war alongside an ally whose advanced military equipment had been sourced from Russia or China.

Countries cut off by the U.S. will still be able to purchase advanced systems . Worse, they will be able to do so without depending on the U.S. for maintenance , ammunition or spare parts . This eliminates a key lever for U.S. influence in the event that human-rights abuses occur, for instance.Take Turkey. In 2016 and 2017 it had been attempting to purchase helicopters and other technology from U.S. manufacturers, but was turned down due to concerns around deteriorating governance. Then in late 2017 it acquired a sophisticated missile-defense system from Russia for $2.5 billion, an unprecedented move for a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Vietnam’s relations with the U.S. have been pleasantly thawing, partly because of a common concern around China’s aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam in 2016, but residual concerns about human rights have largely limited sales to sonars and radars. In addition the U.S. has not provided meaningful military assistance to Vietnam to help offset costs. As a result, Vietnam continues to purchase much of its military equipment from Russia, which often subsidizes the transactions.

Or consider Thailand, traditionally one of America’s closest security partners in Asia. A 2014 coup caused concern about the country’s trajectory and led the U.S. to limit some weapons sales. China took immediate advantage, signing a deal to sell over $1 billion of submarines to the Thai navy. In late 2017 Bangkok announced plans to establish a joint naval center with Beijing to service those submarines, as well as a joint arms factory to produce and maintain other military equipment.

There are more examples around the world. As the U.S. moves into a phase of more intense competition with Russia and especially China, its approach to arms transfers must change. If not, its global security partnerships will be steadily eroded by more assertive and less scrupulous rivals.

I/L – Middle East key to heg

Russia raiding US influence in the Middle East forces a transition to multipolarity Michael Kofman 6/14/18, a Senior Research Scientist at CNA Corporation and a Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, "RAIDING AND INTERNATIONAL BRIGANDRY: RUSSIA’S STRATEGY FOR GREAT POWER COMPETITION", War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/raiding-and-international-brigandry-russias-strategy-for-great-power-competition/The Middle East is a flanking theater in the competition , one where the U nited S tates is visibly weak , and its allies are interested in any alternative external power to reduce their own dependency on Washington . Russia will look for ways to raid America’s influence there without taking ownership,

security responsibilities, or otherwise over extending itself. The military campaign in Syria came cheaply, taught Russia that it can indeed project power outside its region, and challenged America’s monopoly on use of force in the international system. The Black Prince’s Strategy Forget the decisive Mahanian battle. The typical conventional wars, which the United States frequently wargames, but probably will never get to fight (thanks to nuclear deterrence), are poorly aligned with how adversaries intend to pursue their objectives. Avoiding disadvantages in direct competition is undoubtedly important, as Russia and China have equally invested in conventional and nuclear capabilities, but it is precisely because of our investments in these realms that we have made raiding lucrative. The surest way to spot a raid is when the initiating power doesn’t actually want to possess the object in contest but is instead seeking to inflict economic and political pain to coerce a more important strategic concession out of their opponent. This is not to say that limited land grabs or conventional warfare will disappear from the international arena, but raiding poses a more probable challenge to the United States and its extended network of allies. Great power raiding is not meant to represent a unified field theory of adversary behavior in the current competition. Not everything aligns neatly with this concept, nor can the actions of a country with numerous instruments of national power be reduced so simply. Nonetheless, raiding for cost imposition and outright pillage, together with other behaviors by intelligence services and elites that may be summed up as in international brigandry, do encapsulate much of the problem. The Russian long game is to raid and impose painful costs on the United States, and its allies, until such time as China becomes a stronger and more active contender in the international

system. This theory of victory stems from the Russian assumption that the structural balance of power will eventually shift away from the U nited S tates towards China and other powers in the international system, resulting in a steady transition to multipolarity . This strategy is emergent, but the hope is that a successful campaign of raiding , together with the greater threat from China, will force Washington to compromise and renegotiate the post-Cold War settlement . Can Russia win? If winning is defined as Moscow attaining influence and securing interests in the international system not commensurate with the relative balance of power, but rather based the amount of damage they have inflicted by raiding – quite possibly . If the raider has staying power, and makes a prolonged strategic burden of itself, it can get a favorable settlement even though it is weaker, especially if its opponent has bigger enemies to deal with. Throughout history, leading empires, the superpowers of their time, have had to deal and negotiate settlements with raiders.

Middle East is an important region for Russia---it’s NATO’s southern flank that Russia is seeking to exploitTommy Steiner 1/26/17, a senior research fellow at the Institute for Policy and Strategy, IDC Herzliya and teaches International Relations and Security Studies at IDC’s Lauder School of Government, “NATO and its Middle East and Mediterranean Partners: Taking NATO’s Role in its Southern Flank to a New Strategic Level”, Southern Challenges and the Regionalization of the Transatlantic Security Partnership

**ICI = Istanbul Cooperation Initiative = European + Middle East security cooperation partnership However,

a resurgent Russia and the growing threat of ISIS in the run-up towards the 2014 Wales Summit increased NATO’s interest in partnerships, including Middle Eastern partners . At the Wales Summit, NATO designated five of its 41 partners as “enhanced opportunities partners” — one of which was Jordan. The five partners would hold closer political dialogue with NATO, gain more access to NATO’s exercises and expertise, and increase their military interoperability with NATO’s forces. Subsequently, NATO invited additional partners to join an offshoot of this initiative — the Interoperability Platform (IP). Essentially, the IP is a flexible forum bringing together allies and partners to examine a broad range of issues regarding interoperability for future crisis management — from command and control, through education and training, onto exercises and logistics. Several regional partners have signed up: Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and the UAE. With the resolution of the Turkish–Israeli dispute, Israel’s participation is currently under consideration. Aside of these institutional developments, NATO is “looking” to its Southern flank more earnestly in the past two years. The inflow of thousands of asylum-seekers/ refugees into Europe and the wave of radical Islamist terror provided a profound appreciation to the notion that European security is inseparable of Middle East security . Although Russia received most of the attention at the Warsaw Summit, the southern flank was not neglected. In their joint communique, the allies declared that ISIS “now represents an immediate and direct threat” to NATO members and to the international community.18 Allies announced new capacity building missions for Iraq and Tunisia and, perhaps more importantly, the launch of a new maritime security operation in the Mediterranean — Operation Sea Guardian. Important as they may be, these new missions alone will not transform NATO into a strategic actor in the region. Arguably, providing defense capability building in the Middle East is important, but in itself, reflects a rather low level of ambition.19 The new maritime operation however, could be an important building block for expanding NATO’s engagement with regional partners and bolstering its strategic imprint in the region. Notably, several NATO partners in the Mediterranean and the Middle East have expressed considerable interest

— mostly privately — in exploring a strategic role for NATO in the region. For several years, reports suggest that Saudi Arabia is actively considering joining the ICI — in itself an important boost to NATO’s relations in the Middle East.20 A formal NATO– GCC partnership was discussed by U.S. and Gulf officials in April 2016 — in the run-up to the conclusion of the Iran nuclear deal.21 Another proposal was to hold ministerial level meetings raising the public and political profile of NATO’s engagement in the region22 Furthermore, most if not all regional partners could concretely contribute to NATO’s missions in the region and even beyond — for instance in counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, and in the Israeli case, to NATO’s work on cyber-security. The growing interest among regional actors runs in parallel to attempts at institutionalizing regional military and security cooperation even though this objective appears elusive at this point.23 Both trends reflect an understanding among regional actors of the increasingly important regional dimension of their respective security challenges and that in addressing these challenges, a collective and multilateral effort would be more effective. Consequently, the current dynamic strategic environment of persistent volatility and uncertainty is an elastic moment for shaping a new NATO role in the Middle East, preferably carried out in real joint authorship with NATO’s MD and ICI partners collectively. Considering the

decreasing strategic appetite of the United States in the Middle East and the domestic challenges facing the European Union, transatlantic partners should seriously consider working together to enhance security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and to tackle common challenges along with their regional partners . Furthermore, the apparent

enhancement of the informal strategic dialogue and cooperation among several key NATO partners in the Middle East, including Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and GCC members may suggest that the time is ripe for NATO to work with many of its partners to shape a more favorable regional security setting .24 While the Alliance is

rightfully focused on the Russian resurgence and its implications for allies’ collective security, the “Russia Factor” is becoming a serious challenge in NATO’s “Southern flank” as well. The growing Russian military presence in the region, and particularly its maritime build-up in the Mediterranean and the deployment of advanced antiaircraft defense systems in Syria, restricts NATO allies’ freedom of action and navigation in the Mediterranean, and consequently, their ability to project and rapidly deploy forces across the Middle East . Thus, Russia’s military deployment in Syria and in the Mediterranean Sea could well create a “collective security” challenge for NATO along its Southern flank. Therefore, transforming NATO into a strategic actor in the Mediterranean and the Middle East is particularly timely and increasingly essential for Transatlantic security.

I/L – Social Fabric – Yes Risk

Risk is high – Russians and international terrorists are targeting Western activists with the goal of disrupting the social fabric of the United States through active measures. Sir David Omand 18, visiting professor in the War Studies Department @ King’s College specializing in the development of national security strategy and counter-terrorism strategy, “The threats from modern digital subversion and Sedition”, Journal of Cyber PolicyLeading examples today of subversive use of the digital space

Democracies are already suffering the effects of subversive hostile aggression from a number of different directions. For Europe, two prominent subversive threats stem from:

(1) a fundamentally weak and therefore potentially dangerous Russia that seeks to resume its place at the international top table and sees NATO and the EU and their members as standing in its way , and is employing hybrid means accordingly against the US and European nations using , as earlier noted, a combination of state agencies and criminal groups ; (2) a global insurrection by Salafist-Jihadist extremists seeking to find ways of establishing a caliphate under extreme Sharia law by overthrowing governments in the Middle East and elsewhere they regard as apostate and attacking and weakening democracies that support those regimes, including by recruiting supporters from within our own societies to conduct terrorist attacks. They too see the democracies as standing in their way, and the digital medium as well suited to their modus operandi.

The inclusion as a prime example of digital subversive activity of the attempts by Russian groups to use the digital space to mount information and covert operations to subvert the policies of Western nations will come as no surprise . Wide publicity has been given to the exploits of Russian hacking groups, Russian interference with the 2016 US presidential election , and the continuing Russian campaign against EU member states over their policies on Ukraine . The current Western interest in hybrid chal- lenges has been largely sparked over the last few years by such Russian bad behaviour . First with Estonia, then Georgia, then over the annexation of Crimea and Ukraine and over today’s NATO’s strategy, especially in relation to the Baltic States. In parallel, Russia has been rebuilding and re-equipping its armed forces and deploying them – in incursions Soviet-style into NATO airspace and waters, and in its intervention

in Syria. Some of the observed activity may come from ‘patriotic’ Russian hacker groups that unbidden wish to respond to what are perceived as an anti-Russian activity, but these are actions which they understand would have the support of the Russian intelligence agencies and other state organs . As we have

been reminded by General Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, all this is not a set of coincidences. Posing hybrid threats is Russian doctrine as it was that of the Soviet Union (Giles 2016).

Russian use of subversion including the use of ‘active measures’ has a continuity that stretches back to the Soviet Comintern and Cominform and the Soviet ways of retaining control of the Warsaw Pact . A clear example was the Soviet hybrid campaign in 1968 to remove Alexandre Dubcek and crush his ‘socialism with

a human face’ reforms by military intimidation by Soviet tanks and disinformation. The latter included provocations to foment violence at demonstrations and the fabrication of evidence of a Western plot to create fake news to justify Moscow’s intervention.

They are targeting Western activitiesSir David Omand 18, visiting professor in the War Studies Department @ King’s College specializing in the development of national security strategy and counter-terrorism strategy, “The threats from modern digital subversion and Sedition”, Journal of Cyber PolicyWhat is of course new in the last decade, and driving current concerns, is how subversive threats can be posed and conducted in cyberspace and the amplify ing effect that the digital medium provides . The intimidation or coercion component of subversion against a state can, for example, now take the form of cyberattacks on key infrastructure. A recent example was the multiple 2017 Russian cyberattacks on the Ukrainian electricity grid, turning off power to thousands of citizens for several hours, as part of

a political intimida- tion campaign (Greenberg 2017). There can also be personalised intimidation of opponents. For example, pro-Russian forces exploited the use by former US officials and military officers of the social media site LinkedIn as a professional network, gathering infor- mation on critics of Russian actions and then attempting to discredit them or have them suspended from their networks . An example given (Stein 2017) was the case of Charles Leven, a distinguished former CIA officer who was trolled and labelled a suspected paedophile and accused of embezzling government funds while in service. Investigative journal- ists bold enough to seek to uncover what is going on, such as the Finnish journalist Jessikka Aro (Techdirt 2016), have also been intimidated by technology-mediated method- ologies such as doxing, trolling, online harassment and cyberbullying.The information operations and ‘active measures’ possible on the internet range from the covert planting of ‘fake news’ to embarrassing personal information being stolen and made public –

‘weaponised information’ as it has come to be known (for a history of the term see Kelly 2016). The best-known example of the latter is the Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election through the hacking of the emails of key staff members of the Democratic Party Committee, as determined by the US Director of National Intelli- gence (DNI 2017). It is not an exaggeration to say that the threat from digital subversion , hostile activity against a state conducted at least in part through cyberspace, has now become a major component of the national security strategies of the major democracies. Cyber-assisted and cyber-enabled subversion and seditionExploitation of digital information flows for criminal gain is a fast-growing and increasingly recognised phenomenon of the digital era. A distinction made by the UK National Crime Agency (NCA 2016, 5) in analysing cybercrime is between cyber-assisted crimes, where the speed and global nature of the internet enable classic forms of criminality such as fraud to be executed on a much larger scale and at much greater speed, targeting many more victims simultaneously than in the past, and cyber-enabled crime, where the nature of the medium provides novel opportunities for targeted illegal gain, such as through the use of malware planted on websites or mobile devices. The latter includes what are known as ‘pure cyber’ attacks such as attacks designed to disrupt IT infrastructure, remove data or compromise the integrity of data.Comparable distinctions can be made when examining how the internet can be used deliberately to execute subversive and seditious information operations. On the one hand, the internet provides cyber-assisted opportunities for distributing news, publicity and advertising that can be adapted for digital propaganda purposes giving more impact (especially visually) and reaching far larger audiences than traditional media outlets carry- ing such material could have achieved in the past. On the other hand, the internet pro- vides novel cyber-enabled opportunities to attempt to manipulate opinions and recruit supporters through the unique characteristics of social media.There are a multitude of different platforms that connect groups of like-minded individ- uals, making it easier for those conducting information operations to reach out to target audiences, with platforms such as Twitter that through their design ensure that key mess- ages and alerts to breaking news can be rebroadcast to cascade very rapidly to those most likely to be responsive to them. The cumulative effect of such algorithmic components contributes greatly to the sedition process. Any major change of environment for an indi- vidual will affect what that person is likely to consider normal behaviour, and that seems to be especially the case for the digital environments that are created by technology. Evi- dence that the digital environment can heighten a sense of detachment from the feelings of others can be seen in the phenomena of extreme cyberbullying and sadistic trolling. As Aiken (2016b) has emphasised, anonymity online, almost like a superpower of invisibility, fuels this sense of detachment.In addition, the digital processing of personal data including browsing history and con- sumer spending enables the large-scale targeting of messages at individuals or selected groups that have combinations of particular common characteristics such as geographic location and socio-economic status (already widely used for canvassing by political parties). Where individuals derive most of their information about the world from a very limited set of websites, the messages and stories they absorb will appear to be mutually reinforcing precisely because all the accessed outlets share an underlying common politi- cal outlook or world view, producing what has been called the digital echo chamber effect. This effect is similar to that traditionally associated with the readership of newspapers and the viewing of TV channels associated with the particular political outlooks of their owners but may be much stronger online due to the immersive quality of the medium. The target- ing possible through the availability of data points on millions of people makes the digital practice very different. As a leading exponent company, Cambridge Analytica has explained: ‘We collect up to 5,000 data points on over 220 million Americans, and use more than 100 data variables to model target audience groups and predict the behaviour of like-minded people’ (cited in Guardian 2017b). Americans also seem to trust information from their own social group that will reflect their social consensus much more than ‘news’ outlets (DeFonzo 2011).So just as criminals can exploit cyberspace to conduct both cyber-assisted and cyber- enabled crime, so nation states and non-state groups can use the capabilities of the inter- net both to disseminate their narratives and world views directly and to exploit the unique characteristics of the digital space to coordinate and mount covert influence operations and ‘active measures’. It may not always be possible, however, to draw hard and fast dis- tinctions between the responsibility of state and of non-state actors, since the latter may include criminal hacker groups that

are tolerated by the host authorities provided that their criminal attacks are directed overseas. As is believed to be the case in Russia, such non-state groups form a valuable resource that can be tasked by state authorities when necessary to assist in digital intelligence gathering, intellectual property theft or other cyber-active measures.

I/L – Arms Industry

Competition makes Russia vulnerable – collapses the industry soon Richard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad 17, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Cecillie is a Research Manager, Cost Analysis Research Programme, Department Of Analysis, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (Ffi), "Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter," 3-20-2017, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russias-role-arms-exporter-strategic-and-economic-importance-arms-exports-russiaAs well as accounting for a growing share of exports, production for sale abroad is important to the maintenance of Russia’s fundamental capacity to produce arm ament s . During the Soviet period, exports accounted for 3–12 per cent of annual arms production, according to different estimates.77 Figure 15 shows how the size of arms exports and production for the annual state defence order has

evolved over the past decade and a half. At the turn of the century, exports were worth more than twice the state defence order, a tendency that characterized the 1990s when exports helped many producers to survive as the government slashed defence spending.

This helped maintain employment and production lines across the industry . However, rapid economic growth from 1999 helped boost government finances, eventually leading to a sustained increase in the volume of the state defence order from 2005 onwards. Gradually, production to satisfy domestic demand has outpaced that to meet demand for exports. Domestic demand picked up strongly from 2011 with the adoption of the 10-year state armaments programme to re-equip and modernize the armed forces by 2020.78 By 2015, the value of the state defence order exceeded the value of exports by a

factor of two, although the decline in domestic defence orders that began in 2016 means that the relative importance of arms exports is growing again. This has caused a corresponding increase in the share of arms production in total manufacturing value-added. By 2015 arms production accounted for 9.2 per cent of manufacturing value-added.79

Figure 15: Value of Russia’s arms exports and the state defence order, 2000–16, constant 2015 billion roubles

Figure 15: Value of Russia’s arms exports and the state defence order, 2000–16, constant 2015 billion roublesNote: Annual average dollar/rouble exchange rates used for each year to convert dollar export prices reported by CAST into domestic currency. Rouble prices deflated using consumer price index. Sources: CAST (2017); authors’ calculations.

Yet the bonanza looks unlikely to last . According to Russian officials, domestic procurement of armaments is scheduled to decline gradually over the next three years .80 Other problems remain

for the defence industry, moreover. Despite the increase in financial resources directed towards it over the past few years, several structural weaknesses threaten to impair the ability of Russian firms to remain competitive in global markets . There are weaknesses within the industry, and within the wider national innovation system – such as ageing physical capital, an ageing R&D workforce, and inadequate linkages between higher education and

defence-industrial firms – that suppress modernization.81 The defence industry has also experienced difficulties caused by Western and Ukrainian sanctions imposed in the aftermath of the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.82 For instance, the cessation of exports

from Ukrainian firms to Russia caused shortages of air-to-air missiles, helicopter engines and gas turbines for naval ships.83 The arms embargo imposed by Western countries reduced Russian access to some foreign-made components used within weapons systems, such as diesel engines for the Gremyashchy-class corvettes. Although the Russian authorities have developed an import-substitution

plan to replace embargoed products with domestically produced ones, it is not clear how successful these efforts will be.84 Taken

together, these deficiencies could hinder the development of a future generation of new weapons systems , which would in turn leave Russia vulnerable to competition from newly emerging arms exporters .85

I/L – Russia Influence

Arms sales are key to Russia’s influence Richard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad 17, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Cecillie is a Research Manager, Cost Analysis Research Programme, Department Of Analysis, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (Ffi), "Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter," 3-20-2017, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russias-role-arms-exporter-strategic-and-economic-importance-arms-exports-russia

Second, armaments exports can serve as a useful instrument of foreign policy . By supporting

the formation of linkages with politically aligned states, the Soviet Union used arms sales to expand its spheres of influence and create a more favourable political and strategic situation .6

For the Soviet Union, ‘[p]olitical goals were the dominant factor when the decision to export conventional arms was taken’.7 Arms exports today help Russia achieve a wide range of national security objectives, including supporting its image as a global power, maintaining an independent foreign policy, expanding its influence in the regions to which it is able to export arms, and initiating and strengthening defence relations .8

In 2012, President Putin stated that arms exports were ‘an effective instrument for advancing [Russia’s] national interests, both political and economic’.9 In 2013, the deputy prime minister for the defence industry, Dmitry Rogozin, stated in

even balder terms that the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation – the agency leading arms sales abroad – was ‘the country’s second foreign policy agency’ and that its objective in selling arms was so that Russia could ‘gain or increase [its] influence’ in other countries .10

Emphasizing the role of good political relations in facilitating arms sales , he added that Russia only sells weapons to ‘friends and partners’.

If one of the consequences of arms exports is increased political influence abroad, then Russia’s performance in this strategic industry is of geopolitical , as well as economic, significance for the country.

Boosts Russian international influence and erodes the WestRichard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad 17, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Cecillie is a Research Manager, Cost Analysis Research Programme, Department Of Analysis, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (Ffi), "Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter," 3-20-2017, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russias-role-arms-exporter-strategic-and-economic-importance-arms-exports-russia

Russia continues to occupy a global position of strength in an industry of immense strategic importance. It can be considered a superpower in the global arms trade, exporting a wide range of sophisticated weapons systems to a growing number of countries around the world. Only the US is able to offer the same full spectrum of armaments to its customers . Russia is the dominant supplier

of weapons systems to at least one country in each of the regions examined here. This has the potential to strengthen its political, economic and military influence in those countries . Russia is also

seeking to strengthen its position in new markets, and its large portfolio of orders suggests that it will

continue to occupy an important global position in the years to come.

Armaments exports play an important role in the Russian economy. They account for a small but significant share of total exports, and for a substantial share of manufactured exports. This makes the industry one of the leading sectors through which Russia is integrated with the global economy.Armaments exports play an important role in the Russian economy. They account for a small but significant share of total exports, and for a substantial share of manufactured exports. This makes the industry one of the leading sectors through which Russia is integrated with the global economy. Arms exports continue to play an important role in providing demand for goods and services produced by the defence-industrial complex in Russia. Exports are not as important to the defence-industrial complex as they were in the 1990s, but they continue to help keep production lines in service, and thus help preserve the full spectrum of defence-industrial production capabilities.86 This might become even more important in the future if, as planned, defence expenditure is further reduced from its current elevated level.87 If the scheduled reduction in spending is indeed sustained, international arms sales would help offset reduced domestic demand.

There are several reasons to expect that Russia’s leading position in the production and export of armaments will persist well into the future.

First, in addition to the healthy export revenues generated by arms-producing firms, Russia’s industry has benefited from the rapid growth in defence procurement since 2011. Along with a programme to upgrade the capital stock in use across the industry, this injection of funds has helped boost productive capabilities and laid the foundations for the development of new weapons systems.88

Second, Russia’s willingness and ability to offer a full spectrum of defence-industrial goods facilitate the conclusion of large export deals, thus supporting the development of long-term relationships to equip the armed forces of key customers.

Third, the country’s arms manufacturers may well benefit from the success enjoyed by Russia’s armed forces in Syria. The fact that its weapon systems – such as the Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft and the Kalibr missile systems – have been proven to be operationally effective could boost the attractiveness of Russian weapons in other countries. This point should not be pushed too far, however; after all, airstrikes by Russian forces have taken place in a largely uncontested airspace. Whether these systems would perform as well against better-equipped forces is an open question.

Fourth, Russia is likely to continue to be seen as a reliable source of weapons for countries that do not enjoy warm relations with the US. This means that a wider range of countries are potential markets for Russian exporters, in contrast with the situation facing some of their Western competitors. Russian armaments producers have the opportunity to exploit the tensions that exist between the US and countries such as Iran, China or Syria, and also those that may emerge in countries that traditionally source their weapons from the US, such as Turkey, Egypt or the Philippines.

This is not to say that the outlook for Russia is entirely rosy. A number of internal and external challenges threaten to erode its competitive position as an arms exporter in the future.

First, in the past Russian firms have proven weak in the provision of after-sales support and guidance to their customers. This is a lucrative aspect of the arms trade, and one of immense practical importance to the customer. This is, though, an area in which Russia has taken steps to improve performance, with construction under way of a system to enhance after-sales services.89

Second, developments outside Russia might also threaten its position in the global arms market. If efforts by China and India to develop indigenous production capabilities were to prove successful, their need to import Russian aircraft, missiles, submarines and engines may diminish. Both countries – especially India – remain behind Russia in key areas. However, if they are able to produce viable substitutes for Russian goods in the future, this will result in a decline in demand for Russian exports and the emergence of potential competitors in third-country markets. For example, China’s progress in the development of advanced fighter aircraft – notwithstanding the persistence of its weaknesses in engine production – offers the prospect of greater competition for Russia in markets not traditionally served by Western producers.

Third, changes in international relations might also adversely affect Russia’s prospects as a leading arms exporter. Although its producers might benefit from any shift in foreign policy allegiance from traditional US allies towards Russia, a shift in the opposite direction by traditional Russian clients such as India or Vietnam could knock a significant hole in arms revenues.

This last potential challenge illustrates that the arms trade is as much driven by developments in the geopolitical marketplace as it is by commercial concerns. In turn, the multidimensional nature of the arms trade suggests that Russia will make great efforts to ensure that it remains successful in this industry for decades to come. This is likely to involve a concerted effort to ensure that sufficient domestic investment in productive capabilities will take place to guarantee that new weapons systems emerge. It is also likely to involve policymakers attempting to wield arms exports as a component of wider foreign policy.

Indeed, it is this final point that deserves greater attention by researchers in the future. If, as Keith Krause has argued, arms exports serve as an important tool wielded by states in pursuit of other foreign policy objectives, then it is plausible that Russia’s strong position in the global arms market might be expected to boost the country’s position in international affairs more widely.90 In addition to the economic motives behind arms sales, Krause suggests that arms exports can help states both in the pursuit of victory in war and in the broader pursuit of power in the international arena.91 Both motives appear to lie behind Russian arms exports in a number of cases.

For Krause, arms exports can help the exporting country achieve several objectives in the pursuit of the beneficiary country’s victory in war. They include: guaranteeing independence of arms supply to ensure military security; acting as a quid pro quo for military base/landing rights; assisting friends and allies in maintaining an effective (and/or common) defensive posture against external threats; substituting for direct military involvement; and providing testing for new weapons systems. It is not difficult to find at least prima facie evidence for these motives playing some role in motivating Russian arms exports to Armenia, Syria and Tajikistan.

When looking at the role arms exports play in supporting the exporter’s pursuit of geopolitical power, Krause states that the sale of weaponry can help to: provide access to and influence over leaders and elites in recipient states in pursuit of foreign policy objectives ; symbolize commitment to the recipient’s security or stability against internal or external threats; create or maintain a regional balance of power ; create or maintain a regional presence ; and provide access to scarce, expensive or strategic resources . It is likely that at least some of these motives are present in Russia’s sales to countries all over the world.

Moreover, the zeal shown by Russian firms in expanding arms exports to countries beyond their traditional client base – such as to Saudi Arabia, Turkey or the Philippines – is surely as much to do with the possibility of weakening ties between those countries and their traditional allies in the West . It is in this respect that Russia’s future performance as an arms exporter might have truly strategic significance. If Russia is able to expand its influence beyond its traditional markets, we should expect to see Russia’s broader political influence in those regions rise . In this sense, the motives underlying the strenuous Russian efforts to expand arms exports might well go beyond simple commercial concerns or a desire to place the defence-industrial complex at the centre of efforts to modernize the Russian economy.

Makes Russia confident enough to push – escalates despite international treaties – even follow-on ensures violationsKeith B. Payne et al. 17, •Dr. Keith B. Payne, Study Director and Contributing Author, President, National Institute for Public Policy; Head, Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, •Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Chairman, Senior Review Group, former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, •Dr. Stephen Blank, Contributing Author, Senior Fellow for Russia, American Foreign Policy Council, former Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, •Mr. Matthew Costlow, Contributing Researcher, Analyst, National Institute for Public Policy; Missouri State University, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Graduate, •Mr. Fritz W. Ermarth, Senior Reviewer, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and staff of the National Security Council during the Carter and Reagan administrations, •Dr. Colin S. Gray, Senior Reviewer, Professor Emeritus, Centre for Strategic Studies, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading; European Director, National Institute for Public Policy, •Amb. Robert G. Joseph, Senior Reviewer, Senior Scholar, National Institute for Public Policy; former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense, National Security Council, •Mr. Harrison Menke, Contributing Author, Policy Analyst, SAIC; Missouri State University, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Graduate, •Mr. Guy B. Roberts, Senior Reviewer, former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy and Director for Nuclear Policy, NATO; co-editor of National Security Law and Policy, 2015, •Mr. Thomas Scheber, Contributing Author, Vice President, National Institute for Public Policy; former Director of Strike Policy and Integration, Office of the Secretary of Defense, •Dr. Mark Schneider, Contributing Author, Senior Analyst, National Institute for Public Policy; former Principal Director for Forces Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, •Mr. David Trachtenberg, Contributing Author, President and CEO of Shortwaver Consulting LLC, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense"Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict," 3-17-2017, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2017.1277121

Putin 's international political objectives appear largely open today : he will have Russia take whatever turns out to be available to take , preferably if the taking allows for some

humiliation of the principal enemy, the United States . A practical political and strategic problem for Putin is to guess just how far he dares to push NATO in general and the United States in particular, before he finds himself, almost certainly

unexpectedly, in a situation analogous to 1939. Just how dangerous would it be for Russia to press forcefully the Baltic members of NATO? Vladimir Putin would not be the first statesman to trust his luck once too often, based upon unrealistic confidence in his own political genius and power .

There is danger not only that Putin could miscalculate the military worth of Russia's hand, but that he also will misunderstand the practical political and strategic strength of NATO ‘red lines .’ In particular , Putin may well discover, despite some current appearances, that not all of NATO's political leaders are expediently impressionable and very readily deterrable.

Putin's military instrument is heavily dependent , indeed probably over-dependent, upon the bolstering value of a whole inventory of nuclear weapons. It is unlikely to have evaded Putin's strategic grasp to recognize that these are not simply weapons like any others. A single political or strategic guess in error could well place us , Russians included, in a world horrifically new to all.

This National Institute study, Russian Strategy: Expansion, Crisis and Conflict, makes unmistakably clear Putin's elevation of strategic intimidation to be the leading element in Russian grand strategy today. Putin is behaving in militarily dangerous ways and

‘talking the talk’ that goes with such rough behavior. Obviously, he is calculating, perhaps just hoping, that American lawyers in the White House will continue to place highest priority on avoiding direct confrontation with Russia . This study presents an abundantly clear record of the Russian lack of regard for international law, which they violate with apparent impunity and without ill consequence to themselves,

including virtually every arms control treaty and agreement they have entered into with the United States since 1972 (SALT I).

The challenge for the United States today and tomorrow is the need urgently to decide what can and must be done to stop Putin's campaign in its tracks before it wreaks lethal damage to the vital concept and physical structure of international order in much of the world, and particularly in Europe.

AT: Russia won’t => instability

Russia wants to cause instabilityKeith B. Payne et al. 17, •Dr. Keith B. Payne, Study Director and Contributing Author, President, National Institute for Public Policy; Head, Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, •Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Chairman, Senior Review Group, former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, •Dr. Stephen Blank, Contributing Author, Senior Fellow for Russia, American Foreign Policy Council, former Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, •Mr. Matthew Costlow, Contributing Researcher, Analyst, National Institute for Public Policy; Missouri State University, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Graduate, •Mr. Fritz W. Ermarth, Senior Reviewer, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and staff of the National Security Council during the Carter and Reagan administrations, •Dr. Colin S. Gray, Senior Reviewer, Professor Emeritus, Centre for Strategic Studies, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading; European Director, National Institute for Public Policy, •Amb. Robert G. Joseph, Senior Reviewer, Senior Scholar, National Institute for Public Policy; former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense, National Security Council, •Mr. Harrison Menke, Contributing Author, Policy Analyst, SAIC; Missouri State University, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Graduate, •Mr. Guy B. Roberts, Senior Reviewer, former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy and Director for Nuclear Policy, NATO; co-editor of National Security Law and Policy, 2015, •Mr. Thomas Scheber, Contributing Author, Vice President, National Institute for Public Policy; former Director of Strike Policy and Integration, Office of the Secretary of Defense, •Dr. Mark Schneider, Contributing Author, Senior Analyst, National Institute for Public Policy; former Principal Director for Forces Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, •Mr. David Trachtenberg, Contributing Author, President and CEO of Shortwaver Consulting LLC, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense"Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict," 3-17-2017, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2017.1277121

Bottom line. Despite widespread Western expectations of a post-Cold War cooperative relationship , Russia's grand strategy and actions cannot be dismissed as mere bluster for domestic

consumption or as insignificant flights of fancy. Overall, Russia's goals and behavior appear to be a formula for further crises and conflict with the West . Of greatest concern is the prospect of misunderstanding, overreach, and escalation , whether intended or unintended .

Recent Russian actions are already changing the calculus of other countries and this dynamic is undermining U.S. efforts toward a stable international order . What, therefore, should the United States do in response to contemporary Russian grand strategy with its corresponding hostile actions toward the United States and its allies? In particular, what should the U.S. prepare to do to deter further Russian acts of aggression and to respond to those actions that are not deterred?

Impact

Air Supremacy Impact

Russia and China already are taking over – the plan just gives them an opportunity – that destroys air supremacy SHANE CROUCHER 18, “RUSSIA AND CHINA ARE SEDUCING U.S. ALLIES WITH CHEAP WEAPONS, WARNS GENERAL JOSEPH VOTEL,” 2/28/18, https://www.newsweek.com/general-joseph-votel-us-allies-actively-seeking-cheaper-weapons-russia-and-823325

One of the most senior generals in the U.S. suggested America faces losing influence in the world because its partners are looking to buy military equipment and training from its rivals, particularly Russia and China , who offer cheaper weapons and can supply them faster .

In a statement to the House Armed Services Committee, General Joseph L. Votel, commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), warned that "some of our partners are seeking alternate sources of military equipment from near-peer competitors like Russia and China".

Votel said the U.S. increasingly relies on "interoperability" in its military operations—using its allies to "accomplish common objectives"—and so its programs to supply partners with the equipment and training they need are vital in maintaining this cooperation.

He made reference to U.S. government-funded Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs, which "encompass security cooperation and security assistance activities," and Foreign Military Sales (FMS).

"However, due to political considerations, cost, or delivery speed , some of our partners are seeking alternate sources of military equipment from near-peer competitors like Russia and China ," Votel said. "When our partners go elsewhere , it reduces our interoperability and challenges our ability to incorporate their contributions into theater efforts ."

In 2017, the U.S. State Department spent $5.7bn on Foreign Military Financing, according to a data guide published by the Security Assistance Monitor group, around the average spend in recent years. That military aid went to 53 countries, including $150m for Iraq, $350m for Jordan, and $3.1bn for Israel.

In his wide-ranging statement, laying out CENTCOM's view of U.S. defense challenges in the Middle East, Votel accused Russia of acting as "arsonist and firefighter" in Syria by "fueling the conflict in Syria between the Syrian Regime, YPG, and Turkey, then claiming to serve as an arbiter to resolve the dispute".

"Moscow continues to advocate for alternate diplomatic initiatives to Western-led political negotiations in Syria and Afghan-led peace processes in Afghanistan, attempting to thwart the UN's role and limit the advance of American influence," he added.

He also said Russia's role in Syria, militarily supporting the Assad regime in its brutal fight against jihadists and rebel forces, established Moscow "as a long-term player in the region, and the Kremlin is using the conflict in Syria to test and exercise new weapons and tactics, often with little regard for collateral damage or civilian casualties."

Votel warned: " An increase in Russian surface-to-air missile systems in the region threatens our access and ability to dominate the airspace ."

US air supremacy is key to prevent loss in war – Peter Layton 16, a visiting fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Brisbane, March 2016, “America’s Air Supremacy Is Fading Fast”, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/americas-air-supremacy-fading-fast-15458

Today, the dangers of a resurgent Russia and a more assertive China have become both more apparent and important . America’s current air supremacy force structure remains highly effective for wars against third world tyrants, such as Saddam Hussein in 2003. These kinds of wars though are not the only conflicts now possible. Instead, there is a growing need to be able to deter, and potentially to win, wars involving near-peer competitors.Some consider the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will in time address declining air supremacy. Countering this sanguine view, the worrying RAND study earlier noted included the F-35 (and the F-22) albeit not the new Chinese J-20 or J-31 stealth aircraft. This study, in looking at 2017, may actually understate what China will be capable of later this decade when it has more than 1,000 advanced fighters in service.

So what? Does air supremacy matter? Air supremacy will not win a war but it will stop a war being lost . America has not won a war without air supremacy —a point that has been widely recognised. It’s no surprise that China sees air superiority as one of the key “Three Superiorities” that can decide a conflict’s outcome . Nor is it a surprise that a major part of Russia’s force modernisation is fighter development and procurement.

Air power capability gaps make NATO susceptible to Russian A2ADDr. Frans Osinga 16, Air Commodore and special chair in War Studies at Leiden University, 10/3/17, “European Security and the Significance of the F-35”, https://www.japcc.org/european-security-and-the-significance-of-the-f-35/However, Russia’s military modernization is particularly geared towards negating NATO’s asymmetric advantage in the air power arena, undermining NATO’s conventional deterrence capabilities . Russia has invested heavily in Anti-Access and Area-Denial ( A2AD ) capabilities: EW systems, cyber warfare capabilities , and long range Surface to Surface Missiles (SSM) and Surface to Air Missile ( SAM ) systems . As a result, today, the West needs to reconsider how to preserve Western supremacy in the commons (sea, air, space and cyber-space) and how to use the commons to project power in a contested environment. As US Air Force (USAF) General Frank Gorenc, then commander of US Air Forces in Europe and Africa stated, ‘The advantage that we had from the air, I can honestly say, is shrinking […] Those A2/AD capabilities are fundamentally undermining the essence of the American way of war . 29

This problem is particularly acute along the borders of Europe and in its heart; Kaliningrad. 30   With its amassed air defence and surface to surface missile capabilities it can deny air operations over large parts of the Baltics and Poland, it can threaten military facilities and transport infrastructure – and thus reinforcement (such as the VJTF) – in eastern Europe and well into Germany and deny the use of sea lines of communications . US capabilities in Europe are not sufficient to tackle this A2AD problem. Russia is increasingly able to create positions of local military advantage in its immediate vicinity , advantages that extend to the ability to seize and hold territory , and then to be able to deploy higher order capabilities , ranging from A2AD systems to nuclear weapons, to block, deter, negate or frighten NATO in its attempts to push these forces back . 31 A RAND study concluded that ‘As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members ’. 32

Causes Russian revisionism to escalate to instability, collapse of institutions, and nuclear warDr. Frans Osinga 16, Air Commodore and special chair in War Studies at Leiden University, 10/3/17, “European Security and the Significance of the F-35”, https://www.japcc.org/european-security-and-the-significance-of-the-f-35/

With the Spring 2014 annexation of the Crimea, the emergence of a revisionist Russia has transformed the air power gap from primarily an operational handicap during expeditionary interventions, as well as a political embarrassment , into a security problem . Russia has become an unpredictable power , according to Francois Heisbourg, and indeed Russia displays increasingly an anti-western political narrative which is fuelled by nationalism , honor, and a historic perception of identity and humiliation by the West . It manifests an enmity towards international law, western institutions and values. It seemingly wants to regain the Cold War era spheres of influence between Russia and Western Europe . 20 Its military doctrine and capabilities seem geared to support this political aim. In waging persistent shadow wars using cyber-operations , the deployment of special forces dressed as civilians and ‘little green men’, disinformation campaigns and denying involvement, it deliberately tries to remain below the threshold of NATO Article 5 . This Hybrid

Warfare,21, 22 however, may not be the real or only problem now facing Western Europe.23 What the Crimea crisis really demonstrated was the rapid modernization of Russian conventional forces . It demonstrated the ability to conduct intimidating snap exercises – some involving up to 150,000 military personnel – along the borders of Eastern European countries involving large army and air formations . Part and parcel of this new strategy is the threat of nuclear weapons . The combination of these capabilities translates into options to rapidly create facts on the ground forc ing NATO and the EU to develop quick responses . Russia could then influence that response by threatening with nuclear escalation . 24 While this does not

necessarily mean Russia is prepared for a direct confrontation with NATO, Russian Prime Minister Medvedev did not reassure Western leaders when he stated that there is the risk of a 3rd   world war and the emergence of a new cold war .25

The 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit communiqué recognizes that Russia’s ‘aggressive actions , provocative military activities and its demonstrated willingness to attain political goals by the threat and use of force are a source of regional instability and fundamentally challenge the Alliance’ .26 Subsequently, since 2014 a flurry of initiatives was taken to demonstrate resolve and unity, avoid the perception of

weakness that Russia could exploit, and to re-assure Baltic, Central European and Scandinavian countries. A renewed emphasis has been placed on deterrence and collective defence .27 The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) was launched, small headquarters would be established and the NRF was to be expanded. Small military capabilities would be prepositioned in the east, air policing would be intensified and the number of exercises enhanced . In Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland multinational battalion sized battle groups would be established to ‘unambiguously demonstrate, as part of our overall posture, Allies’ solidarity, determination, and ability to act by triggering an immediate Allied response to any aggression’.28

AT: US Coercion Solves

NATO proves even allies can use Russian weapons and refuse to be coerced by the USAlex Gorka 18, “Weapons “Made in Russia”: NATO Summit Tells Member States to Get Rid of Russian Weapons,” July 15th, 2018, https://www.globalresearch.ca/weapons-made-in-russia-nato-summit-tells-member-states-to-get-rid-of-russian-weapons/5647651The final declaration of the recent NATO summit in Brussels says that the allies are committed to “working to address, as appropriate, existing dependencies on Russian-sourced legacy military equipment through national efforts and multinational cooperation”(paragraph 31).

From now on they will “foster innovation to maintain our technological edge.” Actually, the very need to include such a clause into the text of the document speaks highly of “Made in Russia” weapons . The pledge to get rid of them is an attempt to please the US chomping at the bid to fill the

void with American systems. At the same time , it hardly expresses the sincere desire of the nations that have Russian arms in the armed forces’ inventory to dispose of them . This is a very interesting issue worth

having a closer look at.

There is nothing new in this. It’s a time-worn topic. But whatever is said and promised, the allies continue to use Russian weapons . Some of them even make new purchases . It was assumed that former Warsaw Pact members , such as Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, would get rid of them upon entering NATO (1999-2004). It turned out differently .

The government of Poland is known for its anti-Russia stance but the Polish military has failed to replace Russian small arms , anti-tank and air defense systems, and Grad multiple rocket launcher systems , including the RM-70, the Czech

version of Grad. Its aviation continues to use MiG-29 fighters, Su-22M4 attack planes, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters. Warsaw has decided to shift an armored division in the east. The force will use modernized Soviet-made T-72 tanks.

Hungary is the only former Warsaw Pact member to replace Russian (Soviet) combat planes . Germany withdrew from service

its MiG-29s only in 2003 transferring 22 of the remaining 23 to Poland. Formally, they were sold for a symbolic price.

T-72 tanks are a big success to be still used by Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic . Germany

continues to keep them in storage. Many hundreds of Soviet era armored vehicles are used or stored by former Warsaw Pact member-states.

In the 1990s, Greece , which never belonged to the defunct Pact, purchased from Russia S-300 and Tor-M1 air defense systems along with air cushion craft and anti-tank missiles . The Russia-Greece military cooperation treaty was signed in mid-1990s to be still effective. The Army uses 500 Russian BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles bought from Germany.Turkey’s military has in service BTR-80 armored personnel carriers (APCs), Mi-17 transport helicopters, anti-tank missiles and small arms. Ankara has signed a contract to purchase Russian cutting edge S-400 air defense systems and has so far resisted US vigorous pressure to cancel the deal.

Russia-US Security Dialogue Looming: Time to Address a Broader Security AgendaRemoving Russia weapons is a serious problem for the Balkan NATO members. Montenegro, which joined NATO last year, maintains huge stockpiles of Russian weapons stored. Some systems, such as the Strela-2 man-portable air-defense system (MANPAD), are still used by its tiny 1,950-strong military. Slovenia and Croatia also use Russian weapons.

The main problem is maintenance. Ukraine has tried but failed to service Soviet-era weapons in the inventory of NATO states. It leaves only Russia fit for the job. Last year, Bulgaria signed a contract with it for performing complete overhaul and technical maintenance of its 15 MiG-29 aircraft for $49 mln. It had tried to find somebody else but couldn’t.

Interoperability is another problem and it will get worse. Sooner or later, obsolete Russian weapons will be removed but Turkey’s example shows there is a strong desire to purchase new ones and promote defense cooperation with Moscow. Greece would also like to do it but at present its economy is in dire straits.

There are always ways to get around the rules. Some NATO countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, manage to find loopholes. They modernize Russia weapons giving them new names. This will enable them to say they comply with the rules while continuing to use them. Poland believes that buying a license from Russia to produce the Mig-29 makes it a Polish, not Russian, plane. The same applies to the Igla MANPAD renamed Grom-M to be later improved into what became known as the Piorun, with a new seeker and rocket motor. The Grom and Piorun missiles are integrated into the Poprad weapons station. It is exported as a Polish weapon. 23 mm ZU 23-2 GRAU 2А13 and 23-4 Shilka self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery guns have been upgraded with electric drives, fire-control systems (FCS), and detection systems and MANPADS to become Polish 23-2TG and 23-4МР Biała systems. The list can go on.

The PT-01 Twardy tank is a modernized variant of T-72 tank built in Poland under license. No Russia-sold license is valid more than 5 years. A license cannot be re-exported. This rule is breached on and off.

Russian weapons are reliable, simple in operation and maintenance, and boast comparatively low prices . Military cooperation with Russia could provide NATO countries with cheaper and more effective weapons than they are offered by the US and European defense companies . Operating Russian (Soviet) equipment presupposes keeping a relationship with Russia’s defense industry to perform maintenance and procure spare parts.

Moscow is demonstrating higher efficiency of defense programs but the Russian bogey is used to justify unfair trade practices and thus benefit US and large European arms.

Many countries will need favorable terms to buy American systems , like Poland in the case of the Patriot PAC-3 MSE deal. The US will practice defense lending

schemes to make them tied to America forever.

Ankara has signed a contract to purchase the S-400 despite the fact that any military cooperation is hindered by anti-Russia sanctions . New American punitive measures against Russia have entered into law to expose other countries to penalties for doing business with its defense industry and urging them to divest off of Russian

weapons.

Turkey refuses such an approach. It means the declaration says one thing but practice is different. Ankara does it because it says it wants the best . It may be contagious. Others will want the best for their money . As one can see, the loopholes have already been found . Anyway, nothing can change the fact that Russia is the world leader in producing the best weapons and the temptation to cooperate with it may happen to be too strong to be stopped by political pressure.

NATO Impact---2NC

Arms sales to Africa is used to destroy NATO – only US presence detersAndy Wolf 19, "Russia attempting to regain influence in Africa as a way to attack NATO from the south," 4-11--2019, https://warisboring.com/russia-attempting-to-regain-influence-in-africa-as-a-way-to-attack-nato-from-the-south/Africa once again finds itself being visited by Russian men with guns, in numbers unseen since the days of the Cold War.

The Russian military is peddling arms and training across the continent in exchange for mineral wealth and mining rights , and making a return to nations where their influence had previously changed entire nations.In the Central African Republic, President Faustin-Archange Touadera appointed a Russian national as a security advisor and gave up important mining rights in exchange for weapons, training, and infrastructure.

With the continent awash with AK-pattern rifles, Soviet-era equipment, and ideologies that lean favorably towards all things Russian, the threat isn’t a far-fetched one: in the past, prosperous African nations have been marred by civil war and taken over completely , thanks to Russian influence.

According to The New York Times, Russia is also seeking to push itself closer to NATO’s southern flank by interfering in Libya , a nation torn apart by civil conflict- and assisting a former general in regaining control of oil resources.

While all of this may sound rather intimidating, keep in mind that the United States has a considerable presence in Africa , be it military advisor forces or even bases where drones and other aircraft can be stationed, albeit on a

temporary basis.

A new player in Africa is China, who for a time filled the vacuum left by the major powers and seeks to provide infrastructure in exchange for goods.

With Russia slowly attempting to annex neighboring territories and making a return to foreign shores with promises of protection, weapons, and training, it seems in many ways that the second Cold War is right around the corner- and that it may be much more interesting this time around.

Makes Russia confident enough to push – escalates despite international treaties – even follow-on ensures violationsKeith B. Payne et al. 17, •Dr. Keith B. Payne, Study Director and Contributing Author, President, National Institute for Public Policy; Head, Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, •Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Chairman, Senior Review Group, former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, •Dr. Stephen Blank, Contributing Author, Senior Fellow for Russia, American Foreign Policy Council, former Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, •Mr. Matthew Costlow, Contributing Researcher, Analyst, National Institute for Public Policy; Missouri State University, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Graduate, •Mr. Fritz W. Ermarth, Senior Reviewer, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and staff of the National Security Council during the Carter and Reagan administrations, •Dr. Colin S. Gray, Senior Reviewer, Professor Emeritus, Centre for Strategic Studies, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading; European Director, National Institute for Public Policy, •Amb. Robert G. Joseph, Senior Reviewer, Senior Scholar, National Institute for Public Policy; former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense, National Security Council, •Mr. Harrison Menke, Contributing Author, Policy Analyst, SAIC; Missouri State University, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Graduate, •Mr. Guy B. Roberts, Senior Reviewer, former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy and Director for Nuclear Policy, NATO; co-editor of National Security Law and Policy, 2015, •Mr. Thomas Scheber, Contributing Author, Vice President, National Institute for Public Policy; former Director of Strike Policy and Integration, Office of the Secretary of Defense, •Dr. Mark Schneider, Contributing Author, Senior Analyst, National Institute for Public Policy; former Principal Director for Forces Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, •Mr. David Trachtenberg, Contributing Author, President and CEO of Shortwaver Consulting LLC, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense"Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict," 3-17-2017, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2017.1277121

Putin 's international political objectives appear largely open today : he will have Russia take whatever turns out to be available to take , preferably if the taking allows for some

humiliation of the principal enemy, the United States . A practical political and strategic problem for Putin is to guess just how far he dares to push NATO in general and the United States in particular, before he finds himself, almost certainly

unexpectedly, in a situation analogous to 1939. Just how dangerous would it be for Russia to press forcefully the Baltic members of NATO? Vladimir Putin would not be the first statesman to trust his luck once too often, based upon unrealistic confidence in his own political genius and power .

There is danger not only that Putin could miscalculate the military worth of Russia's hand, but that he also will misunderstand the practical political and strategic strength of NATO ‘red lines .’ In particular , Putin may well discover, despite some current appearances, that not all of NATO's political leaders are expediently impressionable and very readily deterrable.

Putin's military instrument is heavily dependent , indeed probably over-dependent, upon the bolstering value of a whole inventory of nuclear weapons. It is unlikely to have evaded Putin's strategic grasp to recognize that these are not simply weapons like any others. A single political or strategic guess in error could well place us , Russians included, in a world horrifically new to all.

This National Institute study, Russian Strategy: Expansion, Crisis and Conflict, makes unmistakably clear Putin's elevation of strategic intimidation to be the leading element in Russian grand strategy today. Putin is behaving in militarily dangerous ways and

‘talking the talk’ that goes with such rough behavior. Obviously, he is calculating, perhaps just hoping, that American lawyers in the White House will continue to place highest priority on avoiding direct confrontation with Russia . This study presents an abundantly clear record of the Russian lack of regard for international law, which they violate with apparent impunity and without ill consequence to themselves,

including virtually every arms control treaty and agreement they have entered into with the United States since 1972 (SALT I).

The challenge for the United States today and tomorrow is the need urgently to decide what can and must be done to stop Putin's campaign in its tracks before it wreaks lethal damage to the vital concept and physical structure of international order in much of the world, and particularly in Europe.

Russia-NATO war goes nuclearDave Majumdar 19, "Hell: How Many Millions Would Die In a NATO-Russia War?," 4-23-2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hell-how-many-millions-would-die-nato-russia-war-53857

If a war were to breakout in the Baltics between Russian and NATO, it might ultimately be irrelevant what the conventional balance is on the ground . “The other problem with the fixation on conventional deterrence in the Baltic fight is

that just as in the old standoff between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, this battle is fraught with opportunities for nuclear escalation ,” Kofman wrote. “Most Russian experts I know in the military analysis community ,

including those in Russia, don’t see much of a chance for conventional battle with NATO to stay conventional .”

Russia will use low yield nuclear weapons that force the US to escalate or draw-downJoel Gehrke 7/12, Foreign Affairs Reporter for the Washington Examiner, 7-12-2019, "Russians are serious about using nukes, US NATO general warns," Washington Examiner, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/russians-are-serious-about-using-nukes-us-nato-general-warnsRussian military planners are serious about using nuclear weapons in limited military conflicts , a top U.S. general warned lawmakers Wednesday.“I think it's a part of Russian doctrine and their way of warfare, if you will,” General Curtis Scaparrotti, who leads U.S. European Command and serves as NATO’s supreme allied commander on the continent, told the House Armed Services Committee.His warning aimed to shoot down the suggestion that Russia is developing those weapons merely to alarm the Department of Defense,

which is planning to modernize U.S. nuclear forces to account for the new threats. Pentagon officials believe that Russia, which can’t

compete with U.S. forces in a sustained conventional conflict, envisions the use of nuclear weapons to achieve swift victories over weaker neighbors before the America n military can intervene .“‘Escalate to dominate’ is the way they look at it,” Scaparrotti told lawmakers. “And if you look at the modernization of their

weapon systems today, I think that you can see how those in some scale of escalation can be used to do just that. And I think they're actually being developed for that reason.”

His civilian colleague testifying agreed, adding that Chinese military planners have a similar theory of winning conflicts. Both countries aim to force the United States into a difficult dilemma.“Russia’s and China’s military modernization , combined with the challenges in time and distance we face, provide the opportunity for these actors to pursue rapid, short duration actions — what is commonly called the ‘fait accompli’ scenario ,” Kathryn Wheelbarger, the acting assistant secretary of defense for

international security affairs, said in her prepared testimony. “Were such a scenario to transpire, it places the United States in an untenable position of responding in ways that may be viewed as escalating the conflict — a deeply problematic path when confronting nuclear-armed powers.”Russia is backing up that strategy with “an active stockpile of approximately 2,000” weapons systems capable of delivering “non-strategic” — that is, relatively small-scale — nuclear weapons , Scaparrotti noted in his prepared testimony.

“Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile is of concern because it facilitates Moscow’s mistaken belief that limited nuclear first

use, potentially including low-yield weapons , can provide Russia a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict,” he said.

US-Russia war leads to nuclear escalation – causes extinctionDr. Stoyan Sarg 16, Director of the Physics Research Department at the World Institute for Scientific Exploration, 10/31/16, “Are We on the Eve of Total Life Extinction?”, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2016/10/31/are-we-on-the-eve-of-total-life-extinction/

Are we on the eve of total life extinction? It may not be by natural weather conditions or environmental contamination, but by human

madness. In October 2015, Foreign Policy Journal published my article “The Unknown Danger of Nuclear Apocalypse“. The major point from my

analysis of the first few seconds of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, as well as some effects on the Sun, led me to the following scary conclusion:

In the case of simultaneous (within a minute) powerful nuclear explosions in the atmosphere , a part of the atmosphere could be sucked into space due to one or more powerful tornadoes that extend to the upper atmosphere and space .

Such a fateful event, of course, cannot be tested in the Earth environment, but supporting evidence comes from the fate of our neighboring planet Mars . It has been known for many years that Mars once had liquid water in rivers and even an ocean, and so it had an atmosphere. Recent analysis of scientific data indicates that the Martian atmosphere once contained oxygen . Now,

however, it is a dead planet.

In the article “Evidence for Large, Anomalous Nuclear Explosions on Mars in the Past“, presented at the 46th Lunar and Planetary Science Conference (2015) organized by NASA , Dr. John Brandenburg presented solid scientific arguments about a fateful planetary event on Mars that wiped out its atmosphere in a very distant past.

The skeptics, who may claim that this is speculation, may feel comfortable believing that a similar effect could not happen on our planet. I

would suggest that they look at the scientific evidence and weigh the arguments. Isn’t the fate of Mars a good lesson for our civilization at the

present time?

Presently we are at the stage of a very dangerous confrontation between the nuclear superpowers , and most of the rhetoric comes from the present US administration and its NATO

allies against Russia . In the campaign at the American Legion National Conference in Cincinnati, Ohio on 31 August, Hillary Clinton said:

“As President, I will make it clear that the United States will treat cyberattacks just like any other attack. We will be ready with serious political,

economic, and military responses,” How will she be sure that the cyberattack is organized by Russia or some other government? It is known

that hackers could work from anywhere, without borders or government coordination.

In the third presidential debate between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton on October 19, 2016, she said: “The bottom line on nuclear weapons is that when the president gives the order, it must be followed. There’s about four minutes between the order being given and the people responsible for launching nuclear weapons to do so.”

On September 12, 2011, at a Republican presidential debate, Representative Ron Paul disclosed, “We’re in 130 countries. We have 900 bases around the world”. Presently NATO has additional bases in east Europe and Baltic countries. Rus sia on the other hand has two foreign bases in Syria and Vietnam , and another six bases in neighboring countries that were part of the former Soviet Union .

On October 3, 2016, the Obama administration suspended talks with Russia on ending war in Syria. The reason was the Russian military support of the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, who actually invited Russia to join the fight against ISIS. On the same day, the army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley warned : “ The US military , despite all our challenges, will stop you, and we will beat you harder than you have ever been beaten before ”. How could Russia not feel threatened by such rhetoric in Washington?

On October 4, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the suspension of an agreement between the US and Russia signed in 2000 to supply the US with plutonium . The relations between the US and Russia deteriorate with each passing day .

Feeling encircled by the new NATO military bases in East Europe, Russians , whose memories of WWII on their territory are vivid, now fear the onset of WWIII . The Russian president clearly warned that nuclear war is imminent , while continuing to say that Russia does not plan to invade any country.

Starting on October 4, the Russian government organized a 4-day, large-scale, all-Russian civil defense drill . It claimed that more than 40 million people would be involved, including 200,000 emergency services personnel and

soldiers and 50,000 units of equipment. This drill was at a level unprecedented even for the time of the Cold War .

One logical question arises: Could a global nuclear war between the superpowers be triggered by some unpredicted event? My answer is: Yes . At the time of the Cold War , the nuclear military response was not as automated as in the present days of technological advance. The US also did not have bases at the border of the former Soviet Union. There was about a 30 minute gap in which the top commander-in-chiefs of USA and Soviet Union could communicate urgently to stop a massive nuclear strike . This 30 minute gap no longer exists .

Recently, the UN raised an initiative to start negotiations on a treaty to ban nuclear weapons, but major nuclear powers like the United States,

Russia, Israel, France, the United Kingdom, and Australia are opposed. This initiative might have been workable two decades ago, but now it is

ill-conceived. This could not happen in the present atmosphere of mistrust.

In the past, nuclear warheads were mounted on ballistic missiles and big rockets, but now they can be carried by smaller tactical missiles . How could Russia, for example, trust that the bases surrounding its border would not have

tactical missiles able to carry nuclear weapons? Russia will feel vulnerable , because it does not have bases surround ing USA borders .

I don’t intend to judge the politics between the superpowers, who is right and who is wrong. My point is that the politicians are not informed about the real danger from a nuclear apocalypse. They live with the belief that they and their descendents will survive a nuclear war , while ordinary people are not considered.

However, they are wrong .

The scientific evidence from Mars indicates that nuclear explosions can extinguish all life on Earth , including their own. I would remind those who believe that WWIII is not possible that ordinary people on the eve of WWI and WWII also did not believe that such a war could happen .

XT---War Escalates

Russia-NATO war escalates – US involvementDave Majumdar 19, "Hell: How Many Millions Would Die In a NATO-Russia War?," 4-23-2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hell-how-many-millions-would-die-nato-russia-war-53857

But Kofman as notes, Russia would need to size its invasion force to not only beat the local NATO forces in the Baltics but to fight the entire alliance and defeat a counter-attack. Planners in Moscow would have to account for an inevitable counter-attack by the United States and its allies , thus it would not like limit itself to an invasion force of twenty-seven combat battalions as posited by the RAND study. Nor would the Kremlin necessary only afford itself a ten-day timeframe.

“If Russia was planning a full-scale invasion of the Baltic states, it would also have to plan to take on all of NATO and defend against a counter-attack,” Kofman wrote in War on the Rocks. “Great powers typically don’t attack superpowers with cobbled-together forces and

hope for the best. Moscow would likely bring to bear a force several times larger than that assumed in the wargame and maintain the logistics to deploy additional units from other military districts. Opinions will vary among Russian military experts about the size of force Russia could muster in a hurry, but one estimate I suspect you will not hear is twenty-seven battalions thrown

together for what could be World War III. Think much bigger and not within an arbitrary ten-day time limit [of the RAND study].”

If the Russians do not the intent to invade the Baltics or have the forces in place to start a war, what might start a conflict in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia? Oliker posits a plausible scenario where a misunderstanding could spark a war.

“It is plausible that the saber rattling , perhaps combined with exercises, could lead NATO countries to be concerned that some sort of Russian action in the Baltics is planned ,” Oliker said. “ If that then results in NATO military actions geared to neutralize Russian capabilities in Kaliningrad, Moscow could , in turn, perceive that as a threat (recall that most of Russia’s scenarios start with some sort of NATO

aggression) and take steps to ameliorate that threat . Particularly in the absence of sound communication channels, and if

tensions are otherwise high, it is possible that these competing actions could lead to an escalation spiral including , with everyone on edge and predicting aggression from the potential adversary, to conflict .”

Global Democracy Impact---2NC

Arms sales control is key to international influence, alliances, and global dominance Leonid Bershidsky 19, “Trump Is Winning, Putin's Losing in Global Arms Sales,” March 12, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/03/12/trump-is-winning-putins-losing-in-global-arms-sales-a64786

Arms sales are perhaps the best reflection of a major military power’s international influence . The market isn’t all about price and quality competition; it’s about permanent and situational alliances . The growing gap between the U.S. and Russia in exports shows that Putin’s forays into areas such as the Middle East are failing to translate into Russian influence in the region .

Although Putin’s warm relations with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi and his alliance with Iran, which has a lot of influence over Iraq, are paying off to some extent, they can’t quite compensate for ground lost elsewhere.

The U.S.’s allies , France, Germany and the U.K. among them, have been rapidly increasing their market share ,

too. That’s a rarely mentioned way in which the security alliance with Washington is paying off for the Europeans. All the ethical objections to selling arms to countries such as Saudi Arabia notwithstanding, E uropean U nion member states need markets for their defense industries , which employ about 500,000 people. Being under the U.S. umbrella opens doors where Russia and China are less desirable partners – that is, in most of the world.

Many tears have been shed in the U.S. about the collapse of the American-led global order . But if you take arms sales as a proxy for influence , the U.S.’s global dominance looks to be resilient . In a more conflict-prone, competitive world, America is doing rather well while its

longstanding geopolitical rivals stumble.

Russian influence and destruction of alliances destroys democracy – now’s the brink Stephen Blank 18, a specialist on Russian foreign and defense policies and international relations across the former Soviet Union. He is also a leading expert on European and Asian security, including energy issues. Since 2013 he ..., "Russia’s surge of interest in Africa is about grand global strategy, not just economics," 8-1-2018, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/opinion-russia-returns-to-africa,politics,2631.html

Since the end of World War II, the most crucial underpinning of freedom in the world has been the vigor of the advanced liberal democracies and the alliances that bound them together . Through the Cold War, the key multilateral anchors were NATO, the expanding European Union, and the U.S.-Japan security alliance . With the end of the Cold War and the

expansion of NATO and the EU to virtually all of Central and Eastern Europe, liberal democracy seemed ascendant and secure as never before in history.

Under the shrewd and relentless assault of a resurgent Russian authoritarian state, all of this has come under strain with a speed and scope that few in the West have fully comprehended , and that puts the future of liberal democracy in the world squarely where Vladimir Putin wants it: in doubt and on the defensive .

On the global chessboard, there has been no more deft and brilliant (and of late, lucky) player than Putin. From the early days of his presidency a decade and a half ago, he began to signal that he intended to make Russia great again, and that he saw this imperative as a zero-sum game: As the West gained friendships among post-communist states, Russia lost, and so everything possible had to be done to force Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Balkan states out of a Western liberal orientation and back into the greater Russian orbit.The first dramatic salvo came in the summer of 2008, when Russia intervened militarily to back separatist forces in the enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia seeking to break away from Georgia. Russia’s military assault was brief but brutal, and involved bombing civilian populations both in the disputed areas and in the rest of Georgia, as well as attacking fleeing civilians. The overconfident pro-Western president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, was dealt a painful lesson courtesy of Putin, and the two breakaway “republics” remain under Russian occupation to this day. It was the first time since the end of the Soviet Union that Russia’s military violated the sovereignty of an independent state, but it would not be the last.

Since huge swaths of society rose up in color revolutions in the former Yugoslavia in 2000, in Georgia in 2003, and in Ukraine in 2004-2005—all to protest electoral fraud and bring about a transition from authoritarianism to democracy—Putin has behaved as if obsessed with fear that the virus of mass democratic mobilization might spread to Russia itself. Neither was he prepared to condone the “loss” of key parts of the former Soviet Union, such as Georgia and Ukraine, to any potential alliance structure with the West. As the forces of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution squandered their miraculous victory in corruption and political squabbling, Putin won another victory in 2010, when the pro-Russian villain of the rigged election that prompted the 2004 uprising, Viktor Yanukovych, finally won the presidency.

But Yanukovych’s authoritarianism and pro-Russia orientation—which led him to scuttle a much hoped-for association agreement between Ukraine and the EU—increasingly outraged the Ukrainian people, who ousted him in a second people-power revolution (the Euromaidan) in February 2014. Soon thereafter, Russian troops without insignias infiltrated Crimea and, with sympathetic local actors, seized control of its infrastructure. Militarily weak and bereft of Western military support—which in any case was difficult to deliver quickly and effectively due to the distance relative to Russia’s proximity—Ukraine watched helplessly as Putin consolidated his conquest with a pseudo-referendum that endorsed Crimea’s re-absorption into Russia.

It was the first time since the Nazis marauded across Europe in World War II that the boundaries of a European country had been altered by military aggression. But Putin did not stop there. In a replay of its shadowy campaign of aggression against Georgia, Russia infiltrated its troops and equipment into the Donbas region of far eastern Ukraine, in support (and probably orchestration) of separatist forces there. It was one of those eastern Ukrainian armed groups that used a Soviet-era missile system to shoot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 on July 17, 2014. More blatant Russian military intervention followed, with Russia denying any involvement of its own soldiers, despite abundant evidence to the contrary. Today, Russia still occupies a portion of the Donbas region. A major swing state between West and East has been militarily violated and partially dismantled, and the story isn’t over yet.

Like President Bush with respect to the Georgia crisis in 2008, President Obama did not respond militarily to this aggression. But he was not passive. Together with the European Union, the U.S. imposed several rounds of painful economic and financial sanctions on key Russian officials, banks, and businesses. As the sanctions have broadened, they have hurt important Russian elites and seriously impaired the functioning of the Russian financial, energy, and defense sectors—not exactly a great formula for making Russia great again.

Putin has been desperate to get out from under these sanctions so that his regime can thrive domestically and internationally. His goals appear to be twofold. First, he seeks to restore some form of Russia n empire—with at least informal dominion over all the territories of the former Soviet Union— while forcing the West to accept this new balance of power and treat Russia as a superpower once again. Second, he seeks to invert Woodrow Wilson’s famous call to arms and instead

“make the world safe for autocracy.” Democracy is his enemy . He is smart enough to know that he cannot undermine it everywhere, but he will subvert, corrupt, and confuse it wherever he can.

And so Putin’s regime has been embarked for some years now on an opportunistic but sophisticated campaign to sabotage democracy and bend it toward his interests , not just in some marginal, fragile places but at the very core of the liberal democratic order, Europe and the United States . As The Telegraph reported in January, Western intelligence agencies have been monitoring a Russian campaign on a Cold War scale to support a wide range of European parties and actors—illiberal parties and politicians of both the far left and far right—that are sympathetic to Russia and Putin. This includes not just newer neo-fascist parties, but anti-immigrant far-right parties like the National Front of France—which obtained a 9 million euro

loan from a Russian bank in 2014—and the Freedom Party of Austria, both of which have been gaining popularity for some time. While the Freedom Party lost the election for Austria’s ceremonial presidency last Sunday, its candidate, Norbert Hofer, won over 46 percent of the vote, and it remains the third-largest party in the parliament, poised to do better in the next elections.

Hofer’s defeat may temporarily slow the right-wing populist momentum across Europe, but National Front leader Marine Le Pen, who endorsed Putin’s annexation of Crimea and has called for an end to Western sanctions on Russia, could well be elected the next President of France next spring. And even if she loses, Putin is likely to be sitting pretty with the next French president. Le Pen’s principal rival, former French Prime Minister Francois Fillon, who recently won the conservative presidential primaries in France, has for years been calling for an end to sanctions on Putin and a closer relationship between France and Russia.

The romance between far-right, anti-immigrant European parties and Vladimir Putin’s Russia springs not just from practical ties of support but a shared conservative reaction against liberalism, globalization, and multiculturalism, and a celebration of Putin, in the words of the scholar Alina Polyakova, as “as a staunch defender of national sovereignty and conservative values who has challenged US influence and the idea of ‘Europe’ in a way that mirrors their own convictions.” This same spirit suffused the Brexit campaign in the U.K., whose longtime populist champion, Nigel Farage, has combined fierce demands for British independence from Europe with fawning admiration for Putin. Yet the Russian boost to Brexit did not come only from the right. Russian media lavishly praised the successful campaign for Labour Party leadership of the far-left candidate Jeremy Corbyn, a NATO and EU skeptic whose extremely tepid support for the Remain campaign contributed to the narrow victory of Brexit.

Meanwhile, the damage to liberalism in Europe was also being driven by a more brutal form of Russian intervention—in Syria. Russia’s bombing campaign there has not only tilted the war in favor of the dictator, Bashar al-Assad, who along with his allies has killed more civilians than either ISIS fighters or rebels, but it also dramatically accelerated the

flow of Syrian refugees (now nearing 5 million) into other countries, including European ones. While Europe’s refugee crisis has many sources and causes, roughly 30 percent of European asylum-seekers last year were Syrian refugees, and the human exodus from that civil war has incidentally further helped to feed right-wing

(pro-Putin) populist parties and movements across Europe, while undermining liberal leaders like Angela Merkel of Germany.

The destabilizing effects of the refugee crisis in Europe have been a kind of dividend of Putin’s campaign to defend his Middle East ally. But Putin has also attempted to destabilize democracies directly through methods more reminiscent of the Cold War. After Montenegro’s parliamentary elections on October 16 (which saw Putin pouring money into the pro-Russian

opposition party and sympathetic media and NGOs, in an unsuccessful attempt to defeat the pro-NATO prime minister), evidence emerged of a plot involving three Russian citizens (alleged in the Montenegrin news media to be agents of the GRU, Russian military intelligence) and some 20 right-wing Serbian nationalists. Montenegrin authorities now allege they planned to stage a terrorist attack that would discredit the election outcome, assassinate the pro-Western prime minister, and topple his government.

As these political dramas and tensions have unfolded in democratic Europe, Putin’s Russia has made brilliant use of old and new forms of propaganda to exploit political divisions. The leading element of this has been RT (Russia Today) which is not only one of the most widely watched (and heavily subsidized) global sources of state television propaganda—and which claims 70 million weekly viewers and 35 million daily— but a vast social-media machinery as well. Added to this is the hidden influence of a vast network of Russian trolls—agents paid to spread disinformation and Russian propaganda points by posing as authentic and spontaneous commentators.

What began as a somewhat preposterous effusion of fake news reports spreading panic , for example, about an Ebola outbreak in the

U.S., morphed into something more sinister, sophisticated, and profoundly consequential: a dedicated campaign to discredit Hillary Clinton and tilt the U.S. presidential election to Donald Trump. The army of Russian trolls started infiltrating U.S. media with conservative commentaries, playing up Clinton’s scandals and weaknesses, and widely diffusing other right-wing narratives against Clinton. The Russian government (America’s own intelligence agencies

believe) hacked into the emails of the Democratic Party and of Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta and passed them on to Wikileaks to dispense in a devastating drip-drip-drip of divisive and

unflattering revelations. In The Washington Post’s words, the campaign portrayed “Clinton as a criminal hiding potentially fatal health problems and preparing to hand control of the nation to a shadowy cabal of global financiers.” All of this gave

Trump significantly more political traction while dispiriting and discouraging possible Clinton voters (many of whom simply stayed home in disgust). Given how close the U.S. election outcome was, it is easy to imagine that this intervention might have provided Trump with his margin of victory in the Electoral College.

We stand now at the most dangerous moment for liberal democracy since the end of World War II . There are still many more democracies worldwide today than when the Cold War

ended. But outside the West , many of them are fragile or rapidly declining . Turkey is in the grip of full authoritarianism , the Philippines is sliding in that direction , and Korea and Brazil have both seen their first women presidents disgraced in eruptions of public anger over corruption and misuse of power. Some 200,000 Muslim Indonesians have flooded the streets of Jakarta demanding that the Christian governor be arrested for insulting Islam. In much of Africa, the people still overwhelmingly want democracy, but leaders in numerous countries are dragging their systems in the opposite direction.

Authoritarianist populism ensures global nuclear conflict, thermonuclear war, and escalates every catastrophe Eric Orts 18, the Guardsmark Professor at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 6/27/18, “Foreign Affairs: Six Future Scenarios (and a Seventh),” https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/foreign-affairs-six-future-scenarios-seventh-eric-orts

7. Fascist Nationalism. There is a nother possible future that the Foreign Affairs scenarios do not contemplate, and it’s a dark

world in which Trump, Putin, Xi, Erdogan, and others construct regimes that are authoritarian and nationalist . Fascism is possible in the United States and elsewhere if big business can be seduced by promises of riches in return for the institutional keys to democracy. Perhaps Foreign Affairs editors are right to leave this dark world out, for it would be very dark: nationalist wars with risks of escalation into global nuclear conflict , further digital militarization (even Terminator-style scenarios of smart military robots), and unchecked climate disasters.

The global challenges are quite large – and the six pieces do an outstanding job of presenting them. One must remain optimistic and engaged, hopeful that we can overcome the serious dangers of tribalism, nationalism , and new fascism. These "isms” of our time stand in the way of solving some of our biggest global problems, such as the

risks of thermonuclear war and global climate catastrophe .

XT---S-400s IL

Turkey bought S-400s due to refusal to sell PatriotSuzan Fraser 19, "AP Explains: Why NATO member Turkey wants Russian missiles," 7-18-2019, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/ap-explains-why-nato-member-190606170.htmlTurkey , which neighbors trouble spots such as Syria, Iraq and Iran, has long sought to address shortcomings concerning its air defenses . It says it was forced to negotiate with Russia for the purchase of the S-400s after the U.S. refused to sell the American-made Patriot system . Turkey has also argued that the S-400 is one of the best available systems and says the deal with Russia involves joint production and technology transfers which meet its long-term goals of defense self-sufficiency.

Turkey bought S-400s only cuz no PatriotsDailySabah 19, "Trump says F-35 situation not fair to Turkey as US refused to sell Patriots," 7-16-2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2019/07/16/trump-says-f-35-situation-not-fair-to-turkey-as-us-refused-to-sell-patriots

U.S. President Donald Trump said Tuesday that the current situation with Turkey over F-35 jets was not fair , as the country had wanted to buy U.S. Patriot missiles before but Washington had refused at the time. Trump's comments to reporters, made at a Cabinet meeting at the White House, follow Turkey's purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system, which has raised tensions with the United States and other NATO allies.

"The situation with Turkey is very complex and tough. We are in contact with Turkish officials ," he said, expressing his reluctance to punish Turkey over its acquisition.

The president said the U.S. repeatedly turned down Turkey's requests to purchase Patriot missile systems in the past and that the whole situation was unfair.

Trump again appeared to blame his predecessor, Barack Obama, for failing to sell America's best alternative to the Russian S-400s — Patriot missiles, made by Raytheon Co. He said Turkey was "forced to buy another missile system."

"The Obama administration would not sell them the Patriot missiles . They needed the Patriot missiles for defense. They would not sell them under any circumstance. And Turkey tried very hard to buy them and they wouldn't sell them, and this went on for a long period of time ," Trump said and added that Washington only decided to sell the Patriots after Ankara decided to buy S-400s instead.

"All of a sudden, everybody started rushing in saying to Turkey, okay, we'll sell you the Patriot missile."

"Because of the fact that (Turkey) bought a Russian missile, we're not allowed to sell them billions of dollars' worth of aircraft. It's not a fair situation," Trump said, lamenting the jobs that would be lost.

He said Turkey ordered "substantially over" 100 F-35 planes and plans to order more but the U.S. would not sell the fighter jets after Ankara's purchase of S-400s.

"Turkey is very good with us, very good, and we are now telling Turkey that because you have really been forced to buy another missile system, we're not going to sell you the F-35 fighter jets. It's a very tough situation that they're in, and it's a very tough situation that we've been placed in, the United States," Trump told reporters.

He said the U.S. and Turkey were continuing talks to resolve the issue.

"We're working through it, we'll see what happens. But it's not really fair. He (President Erdoğan ) wanted to buy our Patriot missile. We wouldn't sell it … And then when he made a deal with another country , Russia, to buy their system that he didn't

even want, and then all of a sudden, we say oh, okay, we'll now sell you the patriot. And because of the fact he bought a Russian missile, we are not allowed to sell him billions of dollars' worth of aircraft. It's not a fair situation," he said.

Populism Impact---2NC

Russia wants to sell the S-400s that cause populism via division throughout the Middle East---plan gives them an opportunity Maxim A. Suchkov 7/15, “Russia eyes big picture with S-400 sale to Turkey,” 7/15/19, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/07/russia-turkey-s400-us-technology.html#ixzz5u9dNt1bt

MOSCOW — Russia sent Turkey a seventh batch of components for the S-400 missile systems over the weekend. The deliveries began on July 12 with three cargo planes delivering several tractors and a loading vehicle from the S-400 complex to Murted Air Base. The deliveries are set to be completed by April 2020 and Turkey expects to dispatch more specialists to Russia for training on operating the missile defense system.

"Their current number is not enough. Now there are 100 specialists but this number may be increased tenfold ," Turkish President Recep Tayyip

Erdogan said on Sunday. Erdogan hailed the S-400 deal as “the most important agreement in [Turkish] modern history.”

"Turkey is not getting prepared for war," he stressed. "These missile defense systems are meant to ensure peace and security in our country. We make other steps to improve our defense capacities."

In turn, Moscow said the agreement is critical in that it sets the tone for more robust military-technical cooperation with other Middle Eastern countries . The head of the the Russian parliament's foreign

affairs committee, Leonid Slutsky, called the S-400 deliveries “a first shot.” Slutsky has been under US and European sanctions since 2014 over Russia’s takeover of Crimea and the war in east Ukraine.

Improved Turkish-Chinese come at a cost to Uighurs

"Turkey is the first sign. The S-400 and a more advanced armament system from Russia will definitely appear in the region . We will cooperate closely; volumes of such cooperation are huge. I am confident we should increase such cooperation in every possible way," Slutsky said. Russia’s foreign policy toolkit is more modest than that of the United States, yet on a number of occasions it has shown that in the Middle East, the ability to use resources may be more important than the volume of those resources.

Moscow long ago figured out that the American grip on the region hinges to a large degree on its military component . Being unable to compete with the United States in physical presence nor in military procurements — and, frankly, seeing no

need to pursue this path — Russia has nonetheless gradually filled niches by selling arms and forging associated military-technical partnerships. For some regional states, such as Egypt and Iraq, Russian proposals offered a solution to reduce their political-military dependence on the United States . For others — the Saudis, for instance — military dealings

with Russia are a bargaining chip in talks with Americans to get a better deal for themselves. For the rest of those dealing with both Moscow and Washington, it is a mix of both sets of incentives.

Just like “Russian interference” in the US elections, “ S-400 ” has become a buzzword for Russia’s perceived potency and exposes Western discomfiture. The interference issue is understood as Moscow's attempt to divide (predominately Western) societies to bring populist forces to power. The S-400 and Russia's other military-technical proposals serve to “diversify and conquer.” Moscow wins its partners by providing them a political, military or technological alternative to what the United States has to offer. Technologically it may be not as advanced as the American products, yet at least as Moscow sees it, many world elites today prioritize strategic independence over technology, especially when there is a prospect (that Moscow also offers) of being able to produce its own technology in the long run.

The Russian-Turkish agreement on the S-400 ticks all the boxes for Moscow and Ankara. Pavel Luzin, an analyst of Russian foreign policy and defense, says he sees the S-400 as having become a tool for Russia's foreign policy.

“Russia tries to play the role of alternative power in international relations, and supplies of long-range surface-to-air missiles allow Moscow to establish and/or maintain long-term cooperation with customers like Turkey, China and India,” Luzin told Al-Monitor. “For other states like Qatar, Vietnam and Egypt, a potential S-400 purchase may bring additional options and [create] more room in their foreign policies. So Moscow tries to trade these options with them. However, the prospects of new deals also depend on the US reaction toward the deal with Turkey. If the Americans put enough pressure [on Turkey], the export of S-400 may become less warranted,” he concluded.

Populism ensures enscalation of all conflictEric Orts 18, the Guardsmark Professor at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 6/27/18, “Foreign Affairs: Six Future Scenarios (and a Seventh),” https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/foreign-affairs-six-future-scenarios-seventh-eric-orts

7. Fascist Nationalism. There is a nother possible future that the Foreign Affairs scenarios do not contemplate, and it’s a dark world

in which Trump, Putin, Xi, Erdogan , and others construct regimes that are authoritarian and nationalist . Fascism is possible in the United States and elsewhere if big business can be seduced by promises of riches in return for the institutional keys to democracy. Perhaps Foreign Affairs editors are right to leave this dark world out, for it would be very dark: nationalist wars with risks of escalation into global nuclear conflict , further digital militarization (even Terminator-style scenarios of smart military robots), and unchecked climate disasters.

The global challenges are quite large – and the six pieces do an outstanding job of presenting them. One must remain optimistic and engaged, hopeful that we can overcome the serious dangers of tribalism, nationalism , and new fascism. These "isms” of our time stand in the way of solving some of our biggest global problems, such as the

risks of thermonuclear war and global climate catastrophe .

***AFF***

US Heg Non-Unique

Russia Arm Sales High Now – 2AC

Russian sales in 2018 proveTMS 18, The Moscow Times, independent Russian news agency, “Russia's Arms Exporter Sold $19Bln Worth of Weapons in 2018, Official Says,” Nov. 1, 2018, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/11/01/russias-arms-exporter-sold-19-billion-worth-weapons-2018-ceo-says-a63380

Russia sold $ 19 billion worth of weapons in 2018 , according to a senior official from Rostec, the government-owned industrial giant that includes Russia's monopoly arms exporter in its vast portfolio.

Russia's state arms seller Rosoboronexport was set up in 2000 by Vladimir Putin and has since sold over $50 billion worth of arms, according to Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov. It is the sole entity responsible for the supply and export of Russian arms and military equipment abroad. Early last month, Russia signed a $5.43 billion deal to supply India with five S-400 missile systems.

"Over the past 18 years , Rosoboronexport has become one of the world’s leaders in the delivery of armaments and military hardware and has achieved record figures ,” Chemezov was cited as saying by the state-run TASS news agency on Thursday.

“Today Russia confidently holds second place in the world by volume of military and technical cooperation,” Chemezov said, adding that in 2018, the country sold nearly 25 percent more arms than the year before .

Overall, Rosoboronexport signed an estimated 1,100 contracts worth an estimated $19 billion in 2018 , according to Alexander Mikheyev, the deputy head of Rosoboronexport's aviation sector.

Russia Arm Sales High Now – 1AR

Russian arms sales are increasing nowSavitsky 11-12-2018 – military analyst based in St Petersburg, Russia. (Arkady, “US Pressure Fails to Affect Russia’s Growing Arms Exports,” Strategic Culture Foundation, https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2018/11/12/us-pressure-fails-to-affect-russia-growing-arms-exports/)//BB

On November 6, Russian President Vladimir Putin chaired a meeting of the Commission for Military Technology Cooperation with Foreign States. He noted that “Our capabilities in the military technical sphere must be used to modernize and upgrade all our industries, to support our science and to create a powerful technological potential for the country’s dynamic development.” The president called for “renewed efforts, not only, in preserving, but also, in strengthening Russia’s leading position on the global arms market, primarily in the high-tech sector, amid tough competition.” The US efforts to press other countries into suspending military cooperation with Russia are inefficient. The number of customers, especially in the Middle East and Africa, is growing. The demand for Russia’s military production is especially high in the Asia-Pacific Region, accounting for almost 70% of all arms sales, including India (35%), China (12%) and Vietnam (10%).Today, Russia’s overall military exports are equal to around $15 billion, with the global order book of $55 billion. According to Alexander Mikheev, the head of Rosoboronexport, the sole state intermediary agency for Russia's defense exports / imports, Russia has already exported arms to over 40 countries, signing 1,100 contracts worth about $19 billion in 2018 – a 25% increase compared to the last year . The president’s speech coincided with the opening ceremony of Airshow China 2018 (Nov. 6-11), one of the five largest aerospace exhibitions in the world, Russian manufacturers scored a big success. 14 defense producers displayed over 200 units of hardware. China has defied US threats to go through with the large deal to buy S-400 air defense systems and Su-35 multifunctional fighters (ten jets already delivered). The joint programs, such as the development of a heavy AHL helicopter and a long-range powerful aircraft, are in force. The order book of China’s imports exceeds $7 billion, growing from 5% to 14-15%. The two nations are involved in a joint project to produce diesel-electric submarines Amur-1650 (export version of Lada Project 677). This is a $2 billion deal. China confirmed the plan to purchase six Mi-171A2Y “Ansat” helicopters, which will make a 5,000 km long demonstration tour across Southeast Asia, including stops at Hanoi (Vietnam), Phnom Penh (Cambodia), Bangkok (Thailand) and Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia). VKO concern "Almaz-Antey" used the Airshow China 2018 event to introduce the Viking – the export version of the Buk-M3 anti-aircraft missile system. Viking boasts the range of 65 km. 36 targets can be tracked and engaged simultaneously. It has the capability of striking tactical ballistic and cruise missiles as well as sea and ground targets. The Radioelectronic Technologies Company (KRET) presented over 40 exhibits, including the multipurpose airborne multipurpose radar with AFAR "Beetle-AME" designed to detect and track aerial, surface and ground targets at the same time. The Russian-Chinese long-overhaul CR929 jet attracted public attention at the air show. Its basic version will carry 280 passengers over a distance of 12,000 km. India has also defied the US pressure and will start receiving receive S-400s in the fall of 2020. The $5 billion deal was signed in October during the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to New Delhi. Russia and Vietnam have signed a $4.5 billion package of deals, including the $1 billion purchase of a batch of Russian Su-30 MK2 fighters and a $2 billion agreement on the sale of six Russian diesel-electric Project 636.1 Varshavyanka (Kilo) submarines. A Mi-35M attack helicopters deal with to Bangladesh is expected to be inked soon. In February, Russia signed a $ 1.14 deal with Indonesia to supply 11 Su-35 4++ generation fighters. 2018 is rich in international defense shows. As of November 12, Russia has taken part in about 20 international exhibitions and forums, such as the Eurasian Air Show in

Turkey’s Antalya, International Far Eastern Maritime Show in Vladivostok and ADAS-2018 defense exhibition in the Philippines (for the first time). It intends to attend some more large ones till the end of the year. Russia has also taken part in the Indo Defense 2018 show (Nov.7-10) to display over 200 systems and equipment units. There were two weapons presented for the first time ever in Jakarta: the 122 mm projectile for Tornado-G MLRS and 140 mm projectile for ship-based Ogon flame throwing launcher. There will be the IDEAS-2018 exhibition in Pakistan in late November, EDEX-2018 will be held in Egypt in mid-December, and Chile will host the EXPONAVAL – 2018 naval exhibition in early December. Russia will take an active part in all of them though its presence at Le Bourget Paris air show in June was very limited and it decided to take no part in Farnborough – 2018 air show in July. Moscow prefers the shows where it has more potential customers. This year, some new systems were offered to potential buyers, such the Viking and Tor-E2 anti-aircraft missile systems, Sprut-SDM1 light floating tank, Karakut and Sarsar vessels, Il-78MK-90A aerial tanker and Il-76MD-90A (E) military cargo aircraft. The Sprut-SDM1 light tank is a special case. The airborne light amphibious tank with firepower of MBT has no rivals in the world. The US-imposed sanctions have failed to reduce the demand for Russian weapons. China, India as well as many other countries refuse to bow. New ways to pay for the deals without dollars are sought. For instance, India will pay for S-400s in Russian rubles. The talks to get around dollars are underway with China. Some deals may be temporarily postponed, some talks frozen, but all in all, the US policy of using sanctions to reduce Russia arms exports and thus weaken the competitor has failed. The most important agreements, including the S400 deal with Turkey, a NATO country, have not been affected. This agreement will also skirt dollar payments. The Russian arms sales are on the rise .

Specifically --- they are expanding in the Middle EastKhlebnikov 19 - expert on the Middle East at the Russian International Affairs Council (Alexey, “Russia looks to the Middle East to boost arms exports,” Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/russia-looks-middle-east-boost-arms-exports)

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) recently published annual report, Russia’s share of global arms exports shrank by around one-fifth over the last decade, falling from 27 percent to 21 percent, while the U.S. share increased from 30 percent to 36 percent, widening the gap between the two major arms exporters. As Russia looks to reverse this decline, it is focusing on the Middle East, the world’s second-largest and fastest-growing arms market, as a way to boost its exports. While it is early days, the effort seems to be paying off so far. According to Russian media reports, Russia and Egypt recently signed a new arms deal worth at least $2 billion. This deal, which involves the purchase of over 20 4++ generation Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets (Flanker-E), makes Egypt a major importer of Russian arms and comes on top of previous deals between the two countries for tens of MiG-29 jets, Ka-52K helicopters, and coastal defense units. In addition to the deal with Egypt, Russia is also moving ahead with the sale of the S-400 anti-aircraft system to Turkey in yet another confirmation of Moscow’s growing focus on the Middle East.

Heg Non-Unique

Russia is ahead of usPAUL CRAIG ROBERTS 17, “One Day Tomorrow Won’t Arrive,” OCTOBER 28, 2017, http://www.unz.com/proberts/one-day-tomorrow-wont-arrive/

Before the idiots in Washington get us blown off of the face of the earth, the morons had better come to terms with the fact that the US military is now second class compared to the Russian military.

For example, the US Navy has been made obsolete by Russia’s hypersonic maneuvering Zircon missile.

For example, the speed and trajectory changes of the Russian Sarmat ICBM has nullified Washington’s ABM system. One Sarmet is sufficient to take out Great Britain , or France, or Germany, or Texas. It only takes a dozen to wipe out the U nited S tates. Why don’t you know this?

For example, Washington’s enormously expensive F-35 jet fighter is no match whatsoever for Russian fighters.

For example, US tanks are no match for Russian tanks.

For example, Russian troops are superior in their combat readiness and training and are highly motivated and not worn out by 16 years of pointless and frustrating wars over no one knows what.

Heg I/L

No I/L---arms not key to influence

Expansion of Russian arms sales does not correlate with increased influenceAndrew Reaves 18, graduate student at Naval Postgraduate School, July 2018, “RUSSIAN ARMS SALES IN THE AGE OF PUTIN: FOR POLITICS OR PROFIT?,” https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/59571/18Jun_Reaves_Andrew.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)//BBIt is unlikely that Russian arms sales will disappear in the near future, but their strategic pull is weakening. Influence and

leverage, as arms export analyst Andrew Pierre notes, are indeed transitory phenomena.687 While Putin ha s successfully integrated arms sales into his strategy of fostering polycentrism, challenging American hegemony, and

reestablishing Russia’s presence globally, his strategic end state of returning Russia to its former world power status lacks international attractiveness. Furthermore, his focus on short-term political gains in lieu of a more farsighted plan to achieve his strategic end state has handicapped [hampered] his use of arms exports .688 In fact,

arms sales have merely supported multiple pragmatic relationships, not an anti-Western coalition , as states seek to maximize their benefits at the expense of Russia. As Lo observes, Putin’s policy “is frequently held hostage to short-term political and economic expediency...and the over-personalization of decision-making.”689 Thus, while Russia’s recent dispersal of arms might strengthen the ability of other states to either reduce the power of the West or promote regional balancing, it does not mean that Russia’s overall strength and influence rise reciprocally . For as long as Putin’s strategy remains myopic as he seeks partners in a quixotic quest to renew Russia’s grandeur and global influence, states will continue to gain reverse leverage on Russia. Recently imprisoned anti-Putin activist Aleksey Navalny phrased it best in his ominous foreshowing of Putin’s future:This regime is doomed, I’ve said it and I will repeat it, but of course, I will not mention specific dates: in the eleventh year I said that they had a year and a half left, and I will not say anything more. Doom is obvious, because [Putin’s regime] is [a] feudal power, in the post-industrial world unthinkable [sic]; because it prevents us from developing, inventing, building, growing, teaching and healing.690While Navalny’s words might err on the dramatic, there is truth within them. Although Putin might still view arms sales as an important item inside his political toolbox, military exports are quickly becoming a dull and impractical instrument unable to yield the outcomes that Putin desires regardless of the previous benefits they once provided.

US arms sales not key to hegemony---decreasing sales k2 diplomatic flexibilityA. Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 3-13-2018, Thrall, associate professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, Dorminey, policy analyst at the Cato Institute, "Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy", Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#fullWe argue, however, that Washington’s faith in the wisdom of foreign arms sales is seriously misplaced . The benefits tend to be oversold, and the downsides are often simply ignored. The defense industry and its champions, in particular, have long exaggerated the economic boon of arms sales.5 And even if they were greater, economic benefits alone are not worth subverting strategic considerations. More importantly, the strategic deficits of arms sales are severe enough to overwhelm even the most optimistic economic argument. It is the strategic case for and against arms sales that we consider in this analysis.

Arms sales create a host of negative, unintended consequences that warrant a much more cautious and limited approach, even in support of an expansive grand strategy like primacy or liberal hegemony. From the perspective of those who would prefer a more restrained American foreign policy, the prospective benefits of engaging in the arms trade are even smaller. Even in cases where the United States wants a nation to arm itself, there is rarely a need for the weapons to come from the United States.

Moreover, the U nited St ates would generate significant diplomatic flexibility and moral authority by refraining from selling arms . Given these outsized risks and nebulous rewards, the United States should greatly reduce international arms sales.

Heg Impact

LIO Resillient

Existing liberal order is structurally sound---creates incentives to join, not overturnG. John Ikenberry 18, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, March 2018, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive,” Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 24-25Self-Reinforcing Characteristics of Liberal International Order

The U nited S tates has dominated the post-war international order . It is an order built on asymmetries

of power; it is hierarchical. But it is not an imperial system . It is a complex and multilayered political formation with liberal characteristics— openness and rules-based principles—that generate incentives and opportunities for other states to join and operate within it. Four characteristics reinforce and draw states into the order. First, it has integrative tendencies . Over the last century states with diverse characteristics have found pathways into its “ecosystem” of rules and institutions .

Germany and Japan found roles and positions of authority in the post-war order; and after the cold war many more states —in Eastern Europe, Asia, and elsewhere—have joined its economic and security partnerships . It is the multilateral logic of the order that makes it relatively easy for states to join and rise up within the order. Second,

the liberal order offers opportunities for leadership and shared authority. One state does not “rule” the system . The system is built around institutions , and this provides opportunities for shifting and expanding coalitions of states to share leadership. Formal institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, are led by boards of directors and weighted voting . Informal groups , such as the G-7 and G-20,

are built on principles of collective governance . Third, the actual economic gains from participation within the liberal order are widely shared. In colonial and informal imperial systems, the gains from trade

and investment are disproportionately enjoyed by the lead state. In the existing order, the “ profits of modernity” are distributed across the system. Indeed, China’s great economic ascent was only possible because the liberal international order rewarded its pursuit of openness and trade-oriented growth. For the same reason, states in all regions of the world have made systematic efforts to integrate into the system. Finally, the liberal international order accommodates a diversity of models and strategies of growth and development. In recent decades the Anglo-American model of neoliberalism

has been particularly salient. But the post-war system also provides space for other capitalist models, such as those associated with European social democracy and East Asian developmental statism . The

global capitalist system might generate some pressures for convergence, but it also provides space for the coexistence of alternative models and ideologies.

These aspects of the liberal international order create incentives and opportunities for states to integrate into its core economic and political realms. The order allows states to share in its economic spoils . Its pluralistic character creates possibilities for states to “work the system”— to join

in, negotiate , and maneuver in ways that advance their interests . This, in turn, creates an order with

expanding constituencies that have a stake in its continuation . Compared to imperial and colonial

orders of the past, the existing order is easy to join and hard to overturn .

Overwhelming alt-causes to the rules-based liberal order, but it’s resilient Quentin Peel 18, associate fellow with the Europe Programme at Chatham House, 5/25/18, “Threats to a Rules-Based International Order,” https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/threats-to-rules-based-international-order/Fears for the future of the rules-based order , and a determination to preserve it, have been expressed in the most recent UK and Australian security and foreign policy doctrines, as well as the EU Global Strategy. But different leaders have put a different emphasis on the sources of the threat. Some see it as coming from the rising nationalism of China , the revanchism of Russia , and the America First doctrine of President Trump. Others fear rogue states and non-state players . The threat of

dramatic technological change , with an essentially unregulated cyber-space, is another key factor undermining a rules-based order.In her speech at the Lord Mayor’s banquet in London last autumn, Theresa May declared that the rules-based system was in danger of being eroded and singled out Russia as the worst offender: “It is Russia’s actions which threaten the international order on which we all depend,” she said, citing the illegal annexation of Crimea, fomenting conflict in the Donbas, repeated violation of national airspace of several European countries and cyber espionage. The only other country mentioned by Mrs May was North Korea, along with non-state actors such as “Daesh and Islamist terrorism” in the Middle East.Julie Bishop, Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, also singled out North Korea and non-state actors as threats to the rules-based order when she addressed the UN General Assembly last September.But neither she nor Mrs May dared to mention the man most responsible for the sharp increase in alarm in Europe and the Asia-Pacific about the sustainability of the rules-based order: US President Donald J. Trump.As John Ikenberry puts it, “For the first time since the 1930s, the United States has elected a president who is actively hostile to liberal internationalism.” Ikenberry fears that the internal populist backlash in the western world – as expressed by the

election of Donald Trump, the Brexit vote in the UK, and the rise of populist nationalism in countries such as Hungary, Poland, Turkey and the Philippines – is a greater threat to the rules-based order than revanchist Russia, nationalist China or the unpredictability of rogue states such as North Korea. If the architects of the system have lost faith in its capacity to deliver fair regulation, it is indeed sorely endangered.Problems of the Rules-based International OrderA 2015 Chatham House paper singled out three interconnected problems of the rules-based international order:

legitimacy, equity and complacency.

First, “rules must be visibly observed by their principal and most powerful advocates.” US legitimacy was undermined first by its invasion of Iraq, then further by the failure to close Guantanamo Bay; the US Senate report on the use of torture; the use of

presidential authority to order lethal drone strikes on adversaries in the Middle East and Pakistan; and the exposure by whistle-blower

Edward Snowden of illegal US espionage activities over the internet. “The danger today is that this questioning of US global leadership has opened the space for other countries to pursue a ‘ might is right ’ approach to their own policy priorities,” the paper concludes.Equity is called into question if a rules-based order is perceived to work for a minority, and not the majority. The world economic order had always distributed benefits unequally, but the global financial crisis of 2008-9 had made the structural weaknesses of the system, and the unfairness of income distribution and austerity, much more apparent . That was particularly true in the European Union, where the backlash against austerity compounded dissatisfaction with EU migration policies. The rise of populist nationalism was one result.As for complacency, it was found in the sheer success and longevity of the rules-based order as the “natural order of

things” for seven decades. “Global free trade regimes , UN Security Council-sanctioned interventionism, human rights activism, and anti-censorship campaigns are elements of a transformative agenda being actively pursued by Western states and societies. What many in the West see as an attempt to spread the benefits of modernity is perceived elsewhere as an aggressive bid for dominance .” The backlash to the metropolitan liberal agenda has come not only from more conservative and authoritarian regimes abroad, but also from conservative electorates at home.

These three issues are serious but need not be fatal . Revision of the rules to ensure relevance and consistent application of the rules could help the survival of the rules-based order.

Rising challengers won’t destroy the liberal international order---they want access to trade, investment, and technologyG. John Ikenberry 18, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow

Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, March 2018, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive,” Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 25-26What Rising States WantThe liberal international order was built by the Western liberal democracies, but its basic features do not exclusively advance the interests of these countries. In fact, as China and other non-Western developing states rise, they have already demonstrated a growing interest in the perpetuation of some sort of open and multilateral global system . These countries may not want Western dominance of global institutions, but they want the West’s rules and organizational principles.These rising states certainly want an open world economy . They want access to other countries for

trade , investment , and tech nology . It is their outward-oriented development strategies that have propelled them forward. The ascent of these countries began in the late 1980s with broad-gauged reform efforts. Countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey broke with their closed, authoritarian pasts and moved toward more reform-oriented and accountable governments. Together with China, these countries opened up to the world economy. As Ted Piccone argues, they all “entered the global marketplace through an increasing reliance on international trade, migration, remittances, energy, and foreign investment flows.” This liberalization and economic openness has come along with a mix of nationalist and populist appeals, and ideological critiques of Western neoliberalism. More generally, however,

these rising states see their prospects for growth and advancement to be tied to engagement with and integration into a reformed and open world economy . The rising non-Western states also have an interest in the preservation —and perhaps the expansion—of a rules-based international system . A multilateral system of rules and institutions offers rising states some measure of protection and equal treatment. As John Ruggie argues, multilateralism is an “institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct: that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions .” Multilateralism gives relations among states a rule-based character . The more rule-based the order is, the less it is

subject to the straightforward domination of powerful states. This sort of system of governance should be attractive to weak and peripheral states . So, too, as rising states gain in wealth and standing, they

will want a rule-based system to protect their gains. One fear of these states is that they will face discrimination and marginalization. In the trade area, for example, the W orld T rade O rganization is attractive to rising states because of its multilateral principle of equal and most-favored nation treatment.For these reasons, rising states have incentives to be stakeholders in some sort of updated and reformed liberal international order. As Miles Kahler argues, Brazil, China, and India have shown themselves to be the “ conservative globalizers .” None is directly allied with the United States, yet each has made “large bets on opening its economy and breaking with a more autocratic past”; and along the way their “populations have endorsed the benefits of trade and foreign investment, providing a political base for this turn to the global economy.” Rising states want predictable and fair-minded access to and treatment within an open global system. They resist the political domination of existing global institutions by Western powers. But the remedy for this problem is actually the deepening of the foundations of an open and rule-based order, not its destruction.

Internal link

No Fill in – 2AC

Financial strains means Russia cannot fill inStratfor Worldview 5/2, world's leading geopolitical intelligence platform, 5/2/19, “Russia’s Defense Industry Finds Itself in a Tailspin,” https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/05/02/russias_defense_industry_finds_itself_in_a_tailspin_114387.htmlRussia's defense industry is face to face with a major foe, but it's not a foreign military power. The Kremlin has been striving to

modernize all branches of the Russian military, but the country's defense industry is struggling thanks to decreasing volumes of orders, difficulties in attracting high-skilled talent and limits to its technological capabilities . According to recent figures, the performance of Russia's aerospace sector is declining precipitously. In 2018, for instance, Russian aircraft and spacecraft makers produced 13.5 percent less than in 2017. And there's been no letup in 2019 either: In the first two months of the year, aerospace output plummeted 48 percent year on year.

The decline in Russia's defense output raises concerns about the competitive strength of Russia's defense industry in general, whose health is critical if the country is to project itself as a military power in the longer term. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov attributed the reduction in output to a slowdown of orders for military systems, but projections suggest the slowdown is not just a short-term fluctuation ; in fact, it's expected to become even worse in the future. The downturn in oil prices has taken a bite out of Russia's bottom line, squeezing spending for the military — all at a time when the country's arms manufacturers have lost their competitive edge in the global arms market. Together, these factors ensure that Russia's defense industry will struggle to get out of its funk.Suffering From a Dearth of FundsThis dire picture stands in stark contrast to Russia's frequent presentation of sensational new platforms . In reality, however , just a few of the big-ticket weapon systems — such as the T-14 main battle tank or the Su-57 fighter

aircraft — find buyers, as the rest remain mere prototypes. Russia has prioritized some hardware, such as the Sarmat intercontinental

ballistic missile, due to their strategic relevance to the country's overall military posture, but Moscow has failed to fully develop other programs or only introduced them on a limited scale .Under pressure from a limited government budget, the Kremlin even started reducing its military spending in 2017 — a strong indicator that, despite the modernization push, Russia's financial challenges are taking a toll on the country ambitions. Economically, the plunge in oil prices at the end of 2014 hurt Russia's bottom line, depriving the country of essential revenue and forcing it to dip into its reserves to bridge the gap. Today, more than four years on,

Russian oil revenues are rising, yet the country is continuing to deal with the consequences of the lean years. Beyond that, low revenues from taxes, which have forced Russia to raise taxes and the retirement age, and Western sanctions over Moscow's activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, have shrunk the financial pool available to military planners.

But the Kremlin's problems don't end there . In the past, Russia has benefited from its position as a major global arms exporter to fuel further military development. During the 1990s, for example, such sales were critical to the country as it

faced severe economic hardship. While Russia remains the world's second-largest arms exporter (only the United States

sells more), the actual value of those exports has been decreasing significantly. Between 2014 and 2018, their total value dropped by as much as 17 percent. Again, budgetary limits are somewhat to blame: In the past, Russia frequently used arms exports as a political tool, offering weapons at a heavy discount, if not entirely free. But with Russia no longer able to offer customers a good deal on its fighter jets and other defense

products, the country is losing business.And Russia's arms industry faces an even greater problem in the years to come: reduced competitiveness . Russia has long dominated some of the market by offering affordable military equipment without attaching any conditions regarding human rights, but the rise of China's military industry, as well as several smaller producers around the world, has made it much more difficult to compete for contracts.Ultimately, the loss of export opportunities not only complicates Russia's efforts to finance its defense industry, it also

reduces the scale at which the defense industry produces, which, in turn, decreases scale-dependent

savings that accompany higher levels of production. In effect, this means that the more Russia fails to find foreign customers

for specific weapon systems, the more it will become burdened with a higher relative cost per unit as it seeks to meet its own needs. The conundrum, in turn, will further limit Russia's ability to competitively price weapons systems for export, thereby perpetuating the effect.

Current solutions are failing to revitalize Russian DIBStratfor Worldview 5/2, world's leading geopolitical intelligence platform, 5/2/19, “Russia’s Defense Industry Finds Itself in a Tailspin,” https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/05/02/russias_defense_industry_finds_itself_in_a_tailspin_114387.htmlRussia, accordingly, has been considering other solutions to safeguard its defense sector and improve its overall

industrial performance. One possible remedy centers on what amounts to burden sharing across sectors . In this, the country is looking to harness the defense industry's strengths for civilian production, similar to the way Western enterprises such as Boeing or Airbus operate. By producing non-military products for domestic and foreign civilian markets, Russian defense manufacturers could sustain themselves even if their military goods are earning less revenue.Unfortunately for Russia, the chances that such a gambit will succeed are low — even for domestic consumption. Although Moscow has been pushing an import substitution program amid the West's sanctions , Russian firms continue to privilege foreign, instead of domestic, components . In 2018, 38 percent of Russian industrial enterprises purchased equipment from abroad; two years before, the figure was just 6 percent. Ultimately, if Russian arms producers are failing to find sales for defense customers at home, they're unlikely to find any more of a domestic civilian market for their wares.

AT: Air Supremacy

Nonunique – already shrinking

American air supremacy is already shrinking – their authorPeter Layton 16, a visiting fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Brisbane, March 2016, “America’s Air Supremacy Is Fading Fast”, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/americas-air-supremacy-fading-fast-15458American air supremacy is in a bear market of long-term decline with no end in sight . The RAND Corporation recently determined: “ continuous improvements to Chinese air capabilities make it increasingly difficult for the U nited S tates to achieve air superiority within a politically and operationally effective time frame . . . .” These improvements are part of the reason the Center for Strategic and International Studies considers that: “ at the current rate of U.S. capability development, the balance of military power in the [Asia-Pacific] region is shifting against the U nited S tates. Worse, with Russia resurgent , American air supremacy is also declining in Europe . General Frank Gorenc, USAFE Commander notes:" The advantage that we had from the air , I can honestly say, is shrinking . . . . This is not just a Pacific problem. It’s as significant in Europe as it is anywhere else on the planet . . . . I don't think it's controversial to say they've closed the gap in capability."