[email protected] Safety performance of tankers Manager Research 11 September 2005.
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Transcript of [email protected] Safety performance of tankers Manager Research 11 September 2005.
The complexity of safetyPresentations based on observations
Regulations have basically been reactive created to limit consequences rather than addressing basic causes of accidents
Causes of shipping accidents have been recorded for the last 100 years and it was soon recognised that every accident has a unique character with a multiple of potential causes and numerous possible combinations*
Studies show that 80% or more of accidents are caused by operator or human error (including collective management failure)
Poor safety culture is caused by poor management not ensuring that work morale and commitment, communication, crew qualifications, training, procedures, equipment and other resources are sufficient and efficient to meet aims.
*Blue-chip or sub-standard – DNV study
The complexity of safetyZero accident tolerance has raised the
safety culture
Since 1993 and $125 bn has been invested in
modern tankers 163 m dwt of SH tonnage
has been removed from the market
Pollution from tankers has been reduced, but
Effect of DH not yet seen to any great extent
Tanker incidents down
Reported tanker incidents 1978 - 2005
0
200
400
600
800
1000
78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 P05
War
Hull & Machinery
Fire/Expl
Grounded
Coll/Contact
Misc
Reported tanker incidents 9 ms 2005 - total 104
3%
13%38%
13%
33%
Collision/Contact Groundings
Misc.
Fire &Explosion
Hull & Machinery (18 engine, 2 hull, 14 others)
Tanker pollution down
Accidental pollution from tankers oil spilt per tonne mile 1990 - 2005
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 00 03
Accidental oil spills from tankers
Major structural accidents - 000 tonnes
Source: INTERTANKO/ITOPF
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
Katina P
Erika
2003Balu sunk
sulphuric acid
Kirki
Haven
Prestige
March 2001Castor
deck crack no pollutionFebruary
2001Kristial sunk
Chemical spill
Thanassiss A
ESP
ABT Summer
Nakhodka
20032 Fire&Exp
Barge Bouchard8,400
not includedVictoriya1,000 tsincluded
Tanker accidental oil spillsdown 80%
Source: ITOPF
ts spilt
0
300
600
900
1,200
1989-96 1997-04
0
18,000
36,000
54,000
72,000
90,000
m ts spilt
bn tonne-miles
99.9999% of the oilarrived safely
‘000 bn tonne-miles
Oil pollution into the seaMaritime sources
4%
67%
4%
2%
3%
2%0%
18%Shipping general
Accidents tankers+barges
Tank washing/VOC
Exploration and Production
Coastal Refineries
War related accidents
Leisure Craft
Natural seeps/others
Tanker/barges: 5%Shippping:9% of which tanker/barge accidents 2.8%
Source: GESAMP
Total losses down
Tanker total losses by size
Source: Clarkson Shipyard Monitor/INTERTANKO
No
1988 – 1996: 29 CTLs 1996 – 2005: 14 CTLs
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
8 m
s05
Products
Panamaxes
Aframaxes
Suezmaxes
VLCC
Tanker and bulker total losses
Source: Clarkson Shipyard Monitor/INTERTANKO
%
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1989
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Tankers: 43
Bulkers. 135
Explosions
Large tankers explosion before IGS requirements 1983/1985
Tanker Size dwt Year• Seatiger, 123,692 1979, 2 fatalities• Atlantic Empress 292,666 1979, 29 “• Energy Determination 321,186 1979 , 1 “• Albahaa B 239,410 1980, 6 “• Mycene 238,889 1980, 6 “
Tanker Fire & explosion 2001-2005
Type/cause F&E
dwt range
TotalBelow
10,000 10-29,999 30-99,999Above
100,000
Engine room fire 10 10 1 21
During repairs 5 6 6 17
Tank related 2 1 2 1 6
Boiler 3 2 5
Accommodation 2 1 1 4
Cleaning 3 3
Electrical 2 1 3
Load/Discharge 3 3
Bunkering 1 1 2
Various/Unknown 13 0 7 3 15
Total 44 3 27 13 87
% 51% 3% 31% 15% 100%
Source: Informa/INTERTANKO
Tanker Explosion 2001-2005
Source: Informa/INTERTANKO
Type/cause F&E
dwt range
TotalBelow 10,000 10-29999 30-99,999
Above 100,000
During repairs 3 3 4 10
Tank related 2 1 2 1 6
Engine room fire 4 1 5
Cleaning 3 3
Load/Discharge 3 3
Various/Unknown 13 0 7 3 15
Total 20 2 10 8 40
% 50% 5% 25% 20% 100%
25/20%
15/7%
13/24%
8/3%
8/3%
Average age down
Tanker incidents and age development
Source:LMIS/Informa/INTERTANKO
%
0
220
440
660
880
1100
78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04P05
0.0
3.2
6.4
9.6
12.8
16.0
Incidents
Age
Tanker pollution and age development
Source:LMIS/Informa/INTERTANKO
000 ts
0
130
260
390
520
650
78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04P05
0.0
3.2
6.4
9.6
12.8
16.0
Pollution
Age
Years
Tanker fleet double-hull development
Source: Fearnleys/INTERTANKO
%
622
51 59 67 70 73 76 84
9478
4941 33 30 27 24 16
0
20
40
60
80
100
1991 1997 End02
End03
End04
End05
End06
End07
End10*
DH SH/DB/DS
% dwt share*:
* Assumes phase out according to regulations (rounded upwards, 25 years after 2010.
Improving safety
In shipping high standards reflect the quality of the owner not the regulatory regime
Erik Murdoch
Director of Risk Management, The Standard P&I Club
Regulating safety
Source: INTERTANKO
Formal regulations and controls
Self regulation
Unsafe - Chaos
AlienationLack of motivation and flexibilityProcedures purely to meet reg. req.
Compliance cultureBureaucracyCheck list mentality stops initiative
ConfusionLack of global standards
Safety culture
Leading members of our community, politicians, regulators and charterers alike, appear to be digesting the fact that mere legislative or penalising measures are already reaching their limitations as a driver for further improvement. Many have even started to express their concerns that all such externally imposed controlling devises are becoming counterproductive or even harmful.
Emmanuel Vordonis, Executive Director Thenamaris Ships Management,Member of iNTERTANKO’s Executive Committee
Poseidon challenge
Conclusion
Conclusion
Strong improvement in tanker safety performance since beginning 1990s
Lack of good statistics root cause information
New safety initiatives should be based on thorough research
Balance self-regulation of overregulation
No complacency: initiatives on newbuilding standards, explosions, Poseidon challenge
