Day, G. (2003). Creating a superior customer-relating capability. MIT Sloan Management Review ( 44 ) pp. 77-82. (AR48783)

Creati ng a Superior Customer-Relati ng Capa bi 1 ity

1 n most markets, t here are one or two companies that outperform thcir

rivals by staying more closely connected to thei r customers- Entcrp rise

Rent-A-Car, Pioneer Hi-Bred Sceds, Fideli ty lnvestments, Lex us and lntuit are

promincnt examplcs. T heir advantage, however, does not have much to do

witb CRM tools and technologies. In fact, info rmation technology is mcrely a

necessary, bu t not sufficient, condition fo r achieving this advantage. O n its

own, as mounting cvidence indicares, IT cont ributes lirtle to creating better

relationships with custo mers. 1 Rather, superior customc r- relating capability is

a function of how a business builds and manages its organization. In particu­

lar, it results from a clear focus on, and deft orchcstration of, th ree organiza­

tional components:

T he fi rst is an organizational orie~~tatio11 that makes customcr retention a

priori ty and gives employees, as part o f an overall will ingness to treat customers

d ifferently, wide lati tude to satisfy them.

T he second component is a co11flgurntio11 that includes the structurc o f the

organization, its processes for personalizing productor service offerings, and its

incentives for building relationships.

i11[onnatioll is the final component: in formation about customers that is in­

depth, relevant and available through JT systcms in all parts of thc company.2

Although each of these components is, by itself, rclat ively straightforward,

it is only when all threc work in concert that a superior capabil ity is crcated.

My research has indicatcd that the most succcssful companies- thosc w ith

the best con nections to their customers - are those ablc to crea te and main­

tain th at integrated focus on o rientation, conliguration and information. This

find ing held true for companies in all types of markets, whether they werc

growing fast or slowly, were extremely or moderately competitivc, had many

customers or few, or whether they were sel ling to businesses orto consumcrs.

(See "About the Research.")

All companies can improve thei r customer relationships and, consequently,

thei r performance by concentrating on these key components and dcveloping

a clearer sensc of how they inter relate. Todo so, managers must gain a greatcr

understanding of each.

George S. Day is the Geoffrey T. Boisi Professor al the University of Pennsytvania's Wharton Schoot in Philadelphia. He can be reached at dayg@wharton.upenn.edu.

Companies with

the best connections

to their customers

unwaveringly focus

their orientation,

configuration and

use of information

on the people

and businesses that

buy from them.

George S. Day

SPRING 2003 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 77

About the Reseorch A survey was sent to senior managers in 342 midsize to

large businesses: the focus was on CRM initiatives and their

relationship to competitive strategy. A representative sam­

ple of senior marketing, sales and MIS managers and exec­

utives was drawn from a database combining information

from Dun & Bradstreet and Marketplace. U.S. companies

with more than 500 employees and from all 50 states were

selected from the manufacturing, transportation, public

utilities, wholesale and retail trade, finance. insurance and

real estate sectors. In the first mailing, 1,100 surveys were

sent out: about tour weeks later, a second wave was sent

to 900 new contacts. The final response rate from the two

mailings was 17°o. Data collection was completed in March

2001. In addition to the survey, managers were interviewed

from 14 companies, including Dow Chemical, GE Aircraft

Engine Business Group, Ford and Fidelity lnvestments.

Orientotion Thc most importan! indicator of an organizational focus on cus­

tomers is the shared bcl ief that customcr retention is a high pri­ori ty for everyone, not just a concern to be delegatecl Lo marketing or sales. Next in irnportance is the openness of the organization to sharing information about custorners. An orien­lation is counterproductive when one function such as sales bclieves it owns the customer. Potentially useful information is then hcld clo~cly by onc pcrson who knows the customer and its hbtory, vulnerabilities and requirements and is unlikely to con­ven that inforrnation into knowledge that can be shared by other teams and functions. Similarly, if the mind-set and history of the

business cclebrates customcr acquisitions through individual effort, littlc energy will be spent on capturi.ng customer informa­tion or assembling it all in one place.

A customcr-relationship orientation is also shaped to somc degrcc by thc bclief that diffcrent customers should be treated differently, on the basis of their long-run value. Most compa­nic~ givc lip scrvice to this notion, but few have gonc as far as lBM did undcr Lou Gertsner, who made ita company value lO

takc on only the bcst customers and 10 do everything possible to ca ter to their necds. That hard-nosed approach saved 1 BM from thc worst of the problems that HP, Cisco and Compaq encountered by chasing eveqr Internet startup without regard to thcir long-tcrm ability to pay. The kind of leadership and organizationwide cmphasis on customer retention shown by TBM sets lcadcrs apart. In general, companies that embodied the altitudes and valucs of a lrue orientation toward customcrs­abou t I So/o of tho~e studicd in my research - cnjoyed a signi f­ican! advantagc over thcir rivals.

78 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIE.W SPRING 2003

Configurotion This term refers to the incentives, metrics, accountabilities and structure that align an organization toward building customcr relationships. Configuration is the most intluential component of a superior capabiliry and best cxplains differences between businesses in their succcss with customers.

Thc use of incentives is an important means of kceping pea­pie in an organization focused on customcrs. Although this idea is wcll known, few companies act as though they believe it. A

countercxample is Siebel Systems - not surprisingly, perhaps, sin ce it is thc leader in CRM software- which ti es SOo/o of man­agcment's incentive compensation to measures of customcr satis­faction.3 In addition, 25% of its salespcople's compensa tion is

based on those measures- and is paid a ycar aftcr the signing of the sales contraer, when thc customcr's leve! of satisfaction with the rcsult:. can be determined. In most software companies, sales­people are paid when the contract is signed, a policy that fosters a one-timc-transaction mind-set.

Companies with superior configurations are also structured

to cnsure that their customers ha ve a scarnless interaction with al! parts of the business. That prcvents a customer from having to dcal with diffcrent fun ctional groups as separatc cntitics within thc sarnc company. A searn lcss connection is oftcn best achieved whcn accountability for the ovcrall quality of customer relation­ships is clear. Companies organized around cu:.tomer groups and processcs ( rather than products, functions, or geographics) are rnuch better at providing clear accountability than thuse organ­i7ed according to products, functions or geographics.

The real payoff

comes when

all the elements of a configura-

tion - metrics, incentives and structures - are properly aligned.

Thc real payoff comes when al! thc clements of a config­uration - mctrics, incentives

and structures - are properly aligned. Achieving that align­ment was the challcnge to the General Electric Aircraft Engine Business Group when it found thal its jet engine customers were not happy with the service com­ponen! of thc offering, even though the company's inter­na! (six-sigma quality) metrics showcd the opposite. The group then bcgan a CRM project that was based on an in-dcpth study of what customers rcally wanted in tcrms of rcsponsiveness, relia­bility, value addcd by the services .111d help in improving thcir pro­ductivi ty. The projcct led the group to make wholcsalc changcs

in its configuration: New metrics

based on customer requirements

were added lo traditional func­

tional mctrics (such as product

reliability and compliance with

standards), and thc sales, market­

ing and product support groups

were organized around cus­

tomer-facing proces~es rather

than functions. A corporate vice

president was assigned to cach of

the top 50 customers for the sale

purpose of building the relation­

ship, so cach customer had a

clear channel to thc top of thc

organization.

To help customers improve

their productivity - which was

what they wanted most from the

relationship - the engine group

also put lcaders of thcir six-sigma

quality program on site with cus­

tomers to provide training and

Most companies

think of informa­

tion technology

first when they

consider CRM

capabilities -

instead of last,

as they should.

work hand-in-hand on engine-scrvice projccts and parts inven­

tory management. Working and learning togelher, cmployees

from GE and its customers found that the Internet wa~ the best

too! for per onalizing the delivery of parts, and it beca me part of

the CRM project. The technology was not thc driver of thc proj­

cct, but it did help to tighten Lhe connections. Thc last step was

to incorporare customcr-service metrics into the employee

evaluation criteria and provide rewards for superior scrvice.

Throughout lhe capability-building proccss, aU aircraft-group

employces were kcpt informed of new devclopments - for

example, a screen appeared on thcir workstations each morning

with a summary of the group's performance on key customer

requirements, as well a current engine-related problems such as

delays or aborted takeoffs, so corrective action could be taken

swiftly. As a rcsult of its efforts to reconfigure the organization in

favor of its customcrs, the aircraft-cngine group now routinely

earns high ratings on a range of customer-satisfaction mctrics

and is scen by its customers asan importan! con tributar to lheir

productivit y.

lnformotion Most companies lhink of information technology first when

they consider CRM capabilities - instead of last, as they

should. In distinguishing leadcrs from followers, it is thc lcast

important piece of the puzzle. And yet in intcrviews, executives

confess lO spending most of their resourccs on databa~cs, soft­

ware and data mining. They often do so reactively or out of fear:

"Software vendors and consu ltants keep bringing us new solu­

tions. Wc know they are making the same pitch to our competi­

lors, and wc don' t wanl to fall behind" - this is a representativc

commen t. At the same time, most companies are nol happy

with the poor quality of their data and their continuing inabil­

ity to obtain a full picture of their customers' history, activity,

requirements and problems. lt's the classic Red Quecn syn­

drome: Although the companies are going faster and faster,

lhey stay in lhl' same place.

CRM technologic~ can help companies gain a coherent and

comprchensive picture of customers, better organize in terna!

data lo cut service costs, help salespeople clase deals fastcr, and

improve the targeting of marketing programs. But they can assist

in these ways only if the organization has begun to reconfigure

and reorient itself toward customers.

A Bottle for Customers To undersland how differences in cuslomer-relationship capa­

bil ity lead to differences in financia! performance, con~ider

crcdit-card providers Capital One and First USA, a subsidiary of

Bank One Corp. Despitc being half the ~ izc of Fi rst USA, Capita l

One has leveraged its superior capability lo consistcntly outpcr­

form its bigger rival, earning 40o/o more interest income from

cach customer and enjoying double the profi t margin.4

Strategic differences are at Lhe root of the story. First USA's

priority is rapid growth in the "prime market," which is made up

of relativcly low-risk customers who have established credit his­

tories and can command low-intcrcst cards. Since many other

card issucrs are chasing lhe same people, these customers are nei­

ther loyal nor espccially profitablc. First USA has been more

succcssfu l selli ng "affin i ty" cards lh rough orga n izations li ke

universities, but il otherwise gives little consideration to differ­

ences in customers' credit risk or polcntial profitability. The real

thrust of First USA's strategy, according to Richard Vague, thc for­

mer chairman, is "to be laser-focused on operaling efficicncy and

pass tho~e savings on to customers."

The csscnce of Capital One's strategy, according lo a pub­

lished mission statemcnt, is to "delivcr the right product, at the

right price, to the right customer, at the right time." Thc corn­

pany has consciously avoided the low-profit, high-churn prime

market in favor of the "su perprimc" and ''subprime" segments.

In the formcr, Capital Onc focuses on "bigh chargers'' who gen­

erate large merchant fees in place of interest charges from

rcvolving balances. In the subprime market, the cornpany ta rgcts

pcoplc with limited credil histories such as college studcnts; it

hopes that they will remain loyal customers as they become

more afOuent. Capital One contains risk in thi~ market by issu­

ing cards with low credit limils that are partially secu red (by a

tudent's parenls, for exam ple).

first USA's strategy is not panning out. As personal dcbt

SPRING 2003 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 79

mounts, the company has had to

d eal with a climbing customer

attrition rate, decl ines in revenue

and quarterly losses. Effons 10

change will be severely hamstrung

by an absence of the righl orienta­

Lion, in fo rmation or configura­

ti en needed to forge cuslomer

relationships.

T he strategic focu s on e ffi­

ciency at First USA con tributes lo

a self-centered or ientatio n that

d oesn't aUow e mployees to see

customers as individuals. This

insensitivity has Jed lo some

nolably wrong- footed decis ions.

In m id- J 999, the company el imi­

nated thc grace period for late

payments, while ra ising late fees.

The policy was applied across the

board; no d istinclions were made

on the basis of diffcrences in the

lifetime value of 1heir customers.

Not su rpris ingly, customers de­

parted in droves, a nd the bank

was forced to rescind the move.

Capital One's

orientation is

shaped by a

belief in micro-

segmentation -

that is how the

company identifies

and keeps its

most valuable

customers.

First USA also lacks the information it needs to bui ld cus-

tomer relationsh ips. The company grew to its large size by

acquiring customer portfolios fro m other crcdit-card compa­

nies and by using third parlies like Arfinity Partners to source

potential rela tionshi ps with associat ions. Beca use it ha~

acquired many of its customers indirectly, First USA has been

unable to obtain the data needed to build warehouses of rich

customer information - t he raw mate rial of the customer­

relating capabiJi ty.

The configura tion of First USA a lso gets in the way. The com­

pany is hierarchically organized according to products or func­

tions like operations, col lections and systems. Within th e

brand-marketing funclion, which manages all cards under the

First USA name, there are separare groups for acquisitions, port­

folios and e-business- but no onc has responsibili1y for cus­

tomer retention. Incentives are also misaligned. Because the

information system can' t tease out an individual's profitabi lity,

fronl line cmployees can't be rewarded for keeping valuable cus­

tomers. lnstead, they try to retain everyo ne, whether they are

good, bad or indiffe rent long-term prospects.

By contrast, Ca pital O nc's orientation is fundamentally

shaped by a bel ief in the microsegmentation of its customers­

that is how the company identifies and kccps those who are

most valuable. Employees at all Jevels have implici t permission

80 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW SPRING 2003

tu act as customcr advocates, and service rcpresentatives are

measured not only on thcir performance but also on how sup­

portive they are to collcagues. The sense of shared va lues and

collaboration con tributes to a low turnovcr rate (S% per yca r

among customer-contact people versus an industry average of

LS% to 20%), which improves service and helps keep costs

down.

Capital Onc is also a leader in its use of information. lt invcsts

heavily to learn about ils customers: In 200l , the compa ny ran

45,000 tests on product variants, procedural changes and cus­

tomer interactions. Thus when ever a customer calls, for example,

computcrs instantly pull up the full history of thc account and

cross-reference il with data from millions of customers. Poor

prospects are routed toa voice-response unit and allowed to el ose

lheir accounts. Others are routed toa service rep along with two

dozen pieces of information about the cardholder and the likcly

reason for thc cal l. A represcntative dealing with a customer who

wants Lo close the account , fo r example, will find three interest­

rate countcroffers displayed by lhe IT system. Armed with the

frccdom to negot iate, the contacl person can try to persuade the

customer to accept a better offer; if the customer stays on al the

highest of the new rates, the retention specialist will be rewa rded

with a bonus.

The alignment of the whole organizatio n with strategy is

further reinforced by Capital One's confi guration. The com­

pany strucl ures its U.S. card business by market-scgmen t

groups based on customcrs' credit quality, thei r activity with the

ca rd , membership in affin ity groups and so on. Each segment is

treated as a profit cenler. The manager of the prime segment,

for exam ple, has the autono my and thc team to ru n that parl of

the operation like a small business. lnstead of a cumbersome

top-down organizat ion, Capital O ne is adroit at sensing oppor­

tun ities from the bottom up and is motivaled to pursue thcm

quickly.

lmproving the Capability Thc process of improving a customer-rela ting capability has

much in common with that of creating a market-driven organi ­

zation, in which success comes when commitment by thc com­

pany's leaders signals that they are serious about thc initiative,

when the kcy implementers unders tand the need fo r change and

see what must be done differently, and when there is a sense of

mgency.5 The best ímpetus for improvement is a realistic assess­

ment of how the company compares with its riva ls in o rientation,

i11formation and configuration. The organ ization mus! also con­

sider the consequences of not catching up and possiblc improve­

ments (or countermoves) by compctilors while the initiative is

being carried out.

Thesc genera l guidelines are not suf(icienl, however, beca use a

program for improving a customer-rclating capabili ty introduces

additional complications and pressure points. Onc recu rring

problem is that success depends on bringing IT, marketing and

sales together. Although these groups are not instinctively adver­

saria!, deep differences in interests, priorities and backgrounds

often frustrate cooperation. Divergent approaches may escalate

to turf wars. For example, one part of the business may not want

to let others tap into its customer database as "free riders" who,

in addition, might spoil established relationships. A further

complication is that CRM initiatives can be inwardly focused

when they are undertaken to fi x productivity or service short­

comings. The antidotes are a deep immersion in the customer

experience and an understanding of what customers expect

from a closer relationship.6

Companies must also recognize that the collective mind-set,

beliefs and values embedded in an orientation toward relation­

ships is what sets lcaders apart. Yet efforts to change this aspect of

a culture directly are unlikely to succeed- change happcns when

behavior patterns are altered and people come to understand

how the new behaviors lead to better performance. To ga in orga­

nizationwide commüment to the improvement program, com­

panies should invest in market understanding and align the

configuration; only then should they install CRM technology.

lnvest in Customer Understanding The key to such understanding is segmentation: The more a com­

pany can break down its customers into different groups with dif­

ferent needs and expectations, the better it can serve them.

A major publisher of directories shaped its transformation

through careful segmentation. The company had always done

conventional segmentation studies - which mostly served to

satisfy its curiosity about a very diverse customer base. Because

the sales force was rewarded for acquiring rather than keeping

customers and the other functions were unwilling to disrupt their

processes, the organization resisted having different types of rcla­

tionships with customers of differing value.

Thc turning point came when the publisher sct out to under­

stand how its customcrs vicwcd the total experience of dealing

with the company. The publisher also polled a diverse group of

customers, asking each to describe its ideal experience. The dif­

fcrencc bctween the expectations of the largcst customers (the

4% that represented 45% of the publisher's revenues) and the

smallest was startling. The largest customers wanted a single

point of contact where they could resolve problems, coupled

with service tailored to thc ir necds, consultation on how to use

the directory to build relationships, and help in tracking results.

Thc smallest custorners wanted a simple, low-risk experience;

the predominant view was "Leave me alone unless 1 need you."

They clearly didn't require a sales ca l!, and the economics seldom

justified one.

This gave the organization clear ignals about how to meet

customer expectations better while also cutting costs. Key

account managers with industry expertise were assigned to the

largest accounts, and the smallest were served over the Internet

and by a telephone sales force.

Change the Configuration Most postmortems of CRM failure trace the problerns back lo the

configuration - the lack of incentives and metrics and the

abscnce of a customer-facing organization. (A common pitfall is

to concentrate on the customer-contact processes without mak­

ing corresponding cha nges in interna! structurcs and systems.l)

Superior configurations, such as those of Capital One and Siebel,

use incentives that emphasize customer retention.

But before incentives can be established, the right metrics

must be in place. Many companies don't know their cuslomer

defection rate or their customer-purchase share. But even if those

metrics are available, they cannot easily be traced back to specific

parts of the organization. Are defections and a declining share of

wallet lhe result of service shortcomings, quality problerns or

delivery missteps? Or are defectors simply attracted by a com­

petitor or consciously "polygamous"? Many companies rely on

customer satisfaction measures, but even these are problematic

whcn as many as 90o/o of customers do not respond to surveys

and those that do may have a courtesy bias and not give a rating

below four on a five-point scale.

A better approach is to ha ve a portfolio of metrics that revcals

the long-term profitabi lity of the customers. Companies can st ill

The collective

mind-set, beliefs

and values

embedded in

an orientation

toward relation­

ships is what sets

leaders apart.

measure customer loyalty and sat­

isfaction bul should supplement

such metrics with those that

determine the cost lo acquire and

serve customers as well as with

proxies for direct measurements

of loyalty and satisfaction - met­

rics on employee retention, cus­

tomer complaints and company

performance on attributes tha t

are important to customers, such

as on -time delivery and service

responsivcness.

Although organ izing accord­

ing to customer groups or seg­

mcnts is a common hallmark of a

superior capabili ty, it is not always

appropriate. Compan ies must be

willing to treat different kinds of

customers differently and to toler­

ate the accounting and organiza­

tional complex.ities that th reaten

to erode econom ies of scale.

SPRING 2003 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 81

Nokia successfully split its monolithic $21 billion mobile-phone unit into nine customer units, each with its own product R&D, marketing and P&L responsibi li ty.8 One unit will serve business users, anotber will focus on barebones handsets for uscrs in developing countries, and so on.

Microsoft, on the other hand, tried to organize according to different typcs of customers to gct product-development groups closer to customers. Thc intent was admirable but the cffort came undone because decisions about products such as Windows wcre spread across too many of thc new divisions. Short of organizing entirely around customcr segments, com­panies can takc intermediate steps by using key account managers and orienting customer-contact functions around segments while leaving manufacturing and devclopmen t organ­ized by product.

Orchestrating Change Canadian Pacific Hotels has successfully combined deep cus­tomer insights with configuration changes to build grcater loyalty with business travclers. In 1999, the chain had 27 hotcls in the "quality" tier and was proficient with convcntions and group travcl, but it was not wcll rcgarded by business travelers - a notoriously demanding and diverse group but also a vcry lucra­tive one. CP Hotcls bcgan by investing to learn what would most satisfy this segment of thc market. lt turned out that business travelers weren't especially intercstcd in earning extra nights in a CP hotel as a reward for loyalty; instead, they wanted "beyond thc ca l! of duty" cfforts to rectify problems, recognition of their indi­vidual preferences, and lots of Oexibility regarding arrival and checkout times.

CP Hotels responded by committing to rnake extraordinary efforts to always satisfy customers in its frcquent-guest club. Delivering on this promisc provcd remarkably difficult. The company began by mapping each step of the "guest experience" from check-in and valet parking to checkout and setting a stan­dard of performance for each activity.9 From that analysis, it determincd what services should be offered, which processcs were needed, and whatlevcl of staffing was needcd in order to be ablc to honor the commitmcnt.

The biggest hurdle was thc company's historie bias toward handling largc tour groups, which meant tha t the skills, mind­sets and proccsscs at hand were not the ones needed to satisfy individual executives. Even small enhancements such as free local calls or gift-shop discounts requircd signjficant changes in infor­mation systcms. The management structurc was changed so that cach hotel had someone with broad, cross-functional authority to ensure the hotel lived up lo its ambitious comm itment. f inal! y, the company put systems and incentives in place to make sure cvcry property was in compliancc with the new emphasis and performance was meeting or cA.cccding the sta ndards.

82 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW SPRING 2003

Aftcr implement ing thcse changcs, CP Hotels' sharc of Canadian business travel jumped by 16% in a flat market. By all measurcs, the chain had won greater loyalty from its target segment. Long-term success will take sustained commitment to keep ahead of compctitors that want to match or leapfrog the company. Companies that sustain their commitment scnd a signa! to both thcir employees and customcrs tha t their cus­tomer-rclating capability is one of the centerpicces of their stra tegy.

More and more compan ics are tu rning toward thcir cus­tomers, but there's still a lot of confusion about what that means and how to do it successfully. The widespread disappointments with CRM systems are a warning about how difficult it is to improve a customer-relating capability. The kcy to a sustainablc advantage in this arca is the right blend of incentives, metrics and structural changes. These can start to produce a true customer­directed orientation that, when combined with technology to generate ami distribute information, can turn a company into a market-driven leader.

REFERENCES

1. See, for example, B. Caulfield, "Facing Up to CRM," Business 2.0, August 2001 , 149-150; L. Yu, "Successful Customer-Relationship Management." MIT Sloan Management Review 42 (summer 2001), 18-19; J. Taschek, "How To Avoid a CRM Faiture," e-Week, October 15, 2001 ; and L. Dignan, "ls CRM All lt's Cracked Up To Be?" Apr. 3, 2002, http://news.com.com.

2. These three components are also represented in the three factors of resources, processes and values used lo define an organization's set of capabitities by C.M. Christensen and M. Overdorf, "Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change." Harvard Business Review 78 (March-April 2000): 67-76.

3. B. Fryer, '·High Tech the Otd-Fashioned Way," Harvard Business Review 79 (March 2001): 119-125.

4. This case comparison is based on interviews with the management of Capital One and First USA. plus security analysts' reports. public sources, and B. Anand, M.G. Rukstad and C.H. Paige, "Capital One Financia! Corporation," Harvard Business Schoot case no. 9-700-124 (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2000).

5. G.S. Day, "Creating a Market-Driven Organization," Sloan Manage­ment Revtew 41 (fall 1999): 11-22.

6. Other approaches lo understanding customers' expenences can be found in P. B. Seybold, "Gel lnside the Lives of Your Customers," Harvard Business Review 79 (May 2001 ): 80·91 .

7. D. Rigby, F. Reichheld and P. Schefter, "Avoid the Four Perils of CRM," Harvard Business Review 80 (February 2002): 101-109.

8. A. Retnhardl, "Nokia's Next Act," BusinessWeek, Juty 1. 2002, 56-58.

9. For another look at companies that are concerned with the cus­tomer's entire experience. see L.L. Berry, L.P. Carbone and S.H. Haeckel, "Managing the Total Customer Experience," MIT Sloan Management Revtew 43 (spring 2002): 85-89.

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