CPTED: Designing Violence out of Schools

Design

Violence

Out of

Schools Russell James, J.D., Ph.D. Associate Professor Texas Tech University

General Concepts

School Applications

Making it Happen

CPTED in Schools

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CPTED in Schools

General Concepts

(Anti-CPTED Premise) shifts the location of

anti-social activity

(CPTED Premise) decreases anti-social activity

Greater perceived risk of getting caught…

Research predominantly supports the pro-CPTED premise




Educational CPTED is important either way




Perceived risk of being caught is based upon SAT

scores…

S urveillance (Will I be seen?)

A ccess (Who can get in and out)?

T erritoriality (Does anyone care what happens here?)

“burglarized houses had less visual access to immediately neighboring houses than did non-burglarized houses”

Brown, B. (University of Utah), Altman, B. (University of Utah). 1983. Territoriality, defensible space and residential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.

Most burglary entries do not occur through the front door, often because of natural surveillance

Open access to side or rear entry points where there is no natural surveillance make for more attractive burglary entrances

“Convenience stores experienced mean annual robbery rate reductions after installation of CCTV systems (-23%); installation of video cameras with monitors (-54%)”

C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110

Office beverages available with payment on an “honor” system.

Picture above payment instructions rotated weekly.

Payments were higher when picture of eyes was posted.

M. Bateson, D. Nettle & G. Roberts (2006). Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting. Biology Letters 2, 412–414.

A B

Two groups with two computer backgrounds. Each person receives $10. Computer question: Do you want to share any of it with another (anonymous) participant?

K. J. Haley (UCLA), D.M.T. Fessler (UCLA). 2005. Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245–256

Sharing 55%

Not Sharing

45%

Normal Screen

Sharing 88%

Not Sharing

12%

Eyes Screen

K. J. Haley (UCLA), D.M.T. Fessler (UCLA). 2005. Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245–256

In London double-decker buses, far more vandalism to seats farther away from high traffic stairwell areas and driver

Sturman, A., (1980). Damage on buses: The effects of supervision. In Clarke R., and Mayhew, P. (Eds.) Designing out crime (31-38). London: Her Majasty’s Stationery Office.

What natural surveillance issue best predicted convenience store robberies?


Visibility from outside the store to inside the store was the most important sight line


Visibility from outside the store to inside the store was a more significant predictor of convenience store robberies than the number of clerks or the proximity to drug traffic, gangs, or subsidized housing


“Burglarized houses had fewer fences and locked gates surrounding the yard than did non-burglarized houses”

Brown, B., Altman, B. (1983). Territoriality, defensible space and residential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.

Preventing access by adding chain link fencing and lighting to lower levels of this parking garage led to 50% drop in reported crime

Tseng, C.-H. (Ohio State U.), Duane, J. (Ohio State U.), & Hadipriono, F. (Ohio State U.). 2004. Performance of Campus Parking Garages in Preventing Crime. Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities, 18(1), 21-28.

Cul-de-sacs may limit access and make visiting cars more noticeable

Helpful in a law-abiding community, but Harmful in a gang-controlled community

T erritoriality

(Does anyone care what happens here?)

“burglarized houses had fewer symbolic barriers characteristic of primary territories (i.e., fewer markers depicting the identity of the territory owners)”

Brown, B. (University of Utah), Altman, B. (University of Utah). 1983. Territoriality, defensible space and residential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.

“Broken windows” theory:

signs of disorder like broken windows, litter,

and graffiti induce other types of

disorder and petty crime

K Keizer et al. Science 2008;322:1681-1685 Published by AAAS

Visible violation of graffiti prohibition led to violating litter prohibition where Dutch experimenters posted bicycle fliers and added graffiti

K Keizer et al. Science

2008;322:1681-1685

Published by AAAS

When letter with money was hanging out of a post office box theft occurred 13% normally but 27% if box had graffiti

In a study of 400 convenience store robberies, one significant difference between robbed and non-robbed stores was distance from nearest graffiti

S. A. Hendricks, D. P. Landsittel, H. E. Amandus, J. Malcan, & J. Bell. (1999) A matched case-control study of convenience store robbery risk factors. Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 41(11), 995-1004

No maintenance implies no one

cares what happens there

Better to remove it, than

leave it vandalized

All three CPTED principles must work together

Access barriers alone can be overcome

Surveillance +

Access +

Territoriality

work together

If no one cares what happens here, is it less risky to try opening the door with a crowbar or bolt cutter?

Territoriality impacts Access

Some high fences control access, but

(1) Blocking surveillance

(2) Sending a territoriality message that the area is dangerous and no one cares what happens outside the wall

An opaque chain link fence blocks surveillance and permits graffiti showing a lack of external territoriality

With proper design and maintenance,

high fences can limit access without

damaging surveillance or

territoriality

A high fence blocking access without damaging surveillance or territoriality

Stark window bars limit access, but may also send a negative territoriality message

about neighborhood safety

Glass block can create security similar to window bars but without the stigma

Closed stairwells have low natural surveillance and easy access for both entry and escape

Combined with territoriality deficiencies, stairwells can create CPTED problem areas

Design solutions can improve the

natural surveillance for

stairwells

Open stairwells have strong

natural surveillance properties

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/31/Student_center_York_University_Goddess_of_Democracy.jpg

CPTED in Schools

School Applications



T erritoriality (Does anyone care what happens here?)

School CPTED concepts are the same…

A study of five Midwestern high schools found of 166 violent incidents, none took place when adults were present Astor RA, Meyer HA, Behre WJ. 1999. Unowned places and times: Maps and interviews about violence in high schools. Am Educ Res J 36:3–42.

Adding openings or windows in solid walls

Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp


Blocking access to hidden areas

convex mirrors for visibility around corners

Electronic surveillance



Promote surveillance and prevent hiding by keeping bushes below 1.5 feet and tree limbs above 8 feet


Design signage to prevent concealment

“replacing bathroom entrance doors with right-angle entrances permit the warning sounds of crime to travel more freely and reduce the sense of isolation”

Sommer, R. (1983). Social design: Creating buildings with people in mind. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall

Bathroom areas allowing sound and smoke to transmit to hallway



45 degree tapered angles allow seeing around blind

corners and

expanding scope of

vision


moving the staff lunch area or office locations

A



coaches’ offices should have direct visual and auditory surveillance

Too much obvious access

control can undermine

school environment

Effective and subtle

Attractive window grates or separated small windows prevent access

Converting most exterior doors to emergency exits improves access control

Avoid pull down ladders or utility boxes that allow

roof access

Territoriality (Does anyone care what happens here?)

Gangs use graffiti to establish their territory; schools take it back through repainting, following up with ongoing, vigilant maintenance

Any generally neglected exterior area will also seem ideal for misbehavior

Landscape buffers may reduce access to

graffiti prone walls


Consider the use of

inspirational or student-

created artwork

In progress results from my fMRI research shows greater fear reduction from public art

than from visible security cameras

Combining Access Control

and Natural Surveillance


Access Control + Surveillance

A secure bicycle

rack



wrought iron

fencing instead of solid

walls

CPTED in Schools

Making it Happen

The frontal approach

Suggest that the school hire a CPTED

specialist to complete an analysis of campus buildings

and make recommendations on improvements

Did you just say, “let’s spend money so we can create a

need to spend more money?”

The “what I think” approach

Examine the buildings and make recommendations based on what you see

Why should we spend

money based on your

subjective opinions?

What if neither of these

approaches work?

Campus Risk Assessment Algorithm Maps Russell James, J.D., Ph.D.

Associate Professor Texas Tech University

A free Excel template to generate hot spot maps available at goo.gl/h3KVY

or http://www.encouragegenerosity.com/maps.xlxs

http://www.encouragegenerosity.com/maps.xlsx

*a more precise model would incorporate a discounting function by multiplying each area block by 1 where, d = meters to the target space if greater than 7, else d=1 k*(1.1d/7) k=2 if area is separated from target space by glass or video, else k=1

1. Panorama Viewing Area (PVA) The total area* from which a person in the space can be viewed

2. Student PVA Typical student population of the PVA over time

3. Staff PVA Typical staff population of the PVA over time

Input three objective scores for each space

Hot Spot Type 1: Crimes of Opportunity (Minor)

High activity/low

supervision reflected by a high level of

Student PVA Percentile*

- Staff PVA Percentile *

*percentiles are relative ranking across all occupied areas

Hot Spot Type 2: Concealed Criminal

Activity (Major)

Low activity/low supervision reflected by an accessible area with

low total score of

Student PVA Percentile* + Staff PVA Percentile*

*percentiles are relative ranking across all

occupied areas

1. Paste outline into Excel template

Obtain / create a line drawing floor plan (or campus map) picture with a transparent background to paste and resize in Excel

2. Insert data into Excel template

Insert number of blocks visible from each block [PVA tab] X the

student [StudentPVA tab] or staff

[StaffPVA tab] population

during target period in cells

underlying map

3. Results

Color coded maps with percentile

rankings for PVA, PVA-

Student, PVA-Staff, Hot

Spot Type 1, and Hot Spot

Type 2

Time Series CRAA Maps

Complete

previous analyses for each 20

minute block during a school

day

Publish CRAAMaps, with suggestions for addressing hot spots • Physical changes to

increase visibility • Camera placement • Staff location

changes • Access restriction

(for low activity areas)

Prove the problem

Track exact location of

campus conduct

violations and overlay

against CRAAMs

Prove the solution

but not at a comparison

hot spot

Place treatment(s)

at one hot spot

track violations in one

compared to the other

General Concepts

School Applications

Making it Happen

CPTED in Schools

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Russell James, J.D., Ph.D. is associate professor in the Department of Applied and Professional Studies at Texas Tech University. He is the most frequently published author in ISI-ranked academic journals on the topic of residential satisfaction. His research in residential satisfaction led to his interest in environmentally-influenced perceptions of safety. He has presented his urban studies related research nationally and internationally at conferences including The Environmental Design Research

Association, The Housing Educators Research Association, and The European Network of Housing Researchers. He worked briefly in the U.S. Attorneys Office (narcotics division) in Kansas City and later served over five years as president of Central Christian College in Moberly, Missouri during which time several new buildings were constructed. His current research involves the use of fMRI brain scanning to uncover neural correlates of financial and environmental satisfaction.

CPTED: Designing Violence out of Schools

Education

Transcript of CPTED: Designing Violence out of Schools