Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 4-1-Yemen-25

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 4-1-Yemen-25

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is the early winner in Yemen. -- Bruce Riedel….Muhammed's Army may eventually come home to Mecca."….

If the al-Qaeda franchise were to seize control of Yemen's second largest city, such a dangerous development would certainly create new security dilemmas for locals already enduring a grave humanitarian crisis. It could also pose a serious threat to international traders if jihadist terrorist groups were to usurp control of both the Yemeni and African sides of the narrow Bab-el-Mandab--one of the world's busiest shipping lanes, linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea -1-. Saudi Arabia finds its own security further imperiled by Daesh-affiliated cells that have carried out attacks against police officers, Shi'ite mosques, and Western expatriates in recent months, and with the "caliphate" leadership vowing to topple the ruling Al Saud family. Therefore, Riyadh may very well regret having pursued a short-term foreign policy that is creating conditions in Yemen in which AQAP gains the most from the nation's chaotic and ungovernable environment. Saudi Arabia would benefit from having the same long-term orientation toward Sunni extremism as it does toward the global oil landscape.

The new Saudi monarch, King Salman, has embarked on a high-risk gamble in launching a military intervention to defeat what Saudi Arabia perceives as Iranian expansionism in Saudi Arabia’s traditional client state, and to reinstall Hadi as president. Thus far, the Saudi-led coalition has succeeded in driving the Houthis out of Aden and many areas of southern Yemen. It has faltered, however, in its broader aims of removing the Houthis from the capital, while also being hampered by the continued Houthi pressure on Saudi Arabia’s southwestern border regions and by the South Yemen separatist movement’s renewed activism as a result of the Saudi-led intervention.

Saudi Arabia’s ongoing armed intervention in Yemen, which began overtly in March with airstrikes in support of Yemen’s internationally-recognized president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, has since become a coalition effort, although the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as Saudi Arabia’s major military partner in the intervention.

Concurrently, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait have landed troops in the southern city of Aden, the former capital of South Yemen, and are using the city to assist local, southern tribal militias organized under the broad network of al-Muqawama al-Sha’biya (Popular Resistance Committees).

A battalion of Sudanese troops arrived in Yemen's southern port city of Aden on

1 Cees remember the al-Suri plan if the AQSL longer-term strategy: Strategic move in Phase VI; DAR AL HARB to start in 2016. As noted and mentioned in AQ master strategist Abu Mus'ab As-Suri his manifesto; The Call to Global Islamic Resistance, So, the most important enemy targets in detail: Third: The straits and the main sea passages: On the Earth there are five (5) important straits, four of them are in the countries of the Arabs and the Muslims. The fifth one is in America, and it is the Panama Canal. These straits are: 1. The Strait of Hormuz, the oil gate in the Arab-Persian Gulf. 2. The Suez Canal in Egypt. 3 . The Bab el Mandib between Yemen and the African continent. 4. The Gibraltar Strait in Morocco. -- Most of the Western world's economy, in terms of trade and oil, passes through these sea passages (for more see the end of this doc)

1The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see. –Winston Churchill

Cees de Waart: CdW Intelligence to Rent of 12 03/05/2023

mailto:[email protected]


Saturday, 17 Oct, military officials said, bolstering Saudi-led Arab forces trying to keep out the Iran-backed Houthis and curb the growing presence of militants. A military source in Aden said that 300 Sudanese soldiers and officers arrived by sea on Saturday. Their purpose was to "help maintain security for the city against the Houthis and Saleh," the source said, referring to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose supporters have sided with the Houthis.

In viewing Yemen as an important battleground in the grander struggle against Iran's expanding regional influence, Saudi Arabia has united with a variety of Yemeni Sunni factions in an effort to crush the Houthi insurgency. This has entailed the kingdom cooperating with Sunni Islamist groups that Saudi Arabia--along with other Arab and Western governments--have designated as "terrorist" organizations.

Saudi Arabia’s Yemen Intervention: A High Risk Gamble?Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 20October 2, 2015 By: James Brandon, Nicholas A. Heras

Damage in Najran, Saudi Arabia from a rocket launched by Houthi forces in Yemen (Source: Twitter).Saudi Arabia’s ongoing armed intervention in Yemen, which began overtly in March with airstrikes in support of Yemen’s internationally-recognized president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, has since become a coalition effort, although the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as Saudi Arabia’s major military partner in the intervention. On balance, the coalition campaign to oust the predominately Zaydi Shi’a Ansar Allah (Partisans of God—a.k.a. the Houthis) movement and their allies, which include forces loyal to Yemen’s former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, has made strong progress. Saudi Arabia’s daily air strikes on the Houthis and their allies in the country’s capital of Sana’a and in other Houthi-dominated areas in Yemen’s western highland region are degrading the Houthi alliance’s conventional military forces (al-Arabiya, September 28; al-Arabiya, September 5).Concurrently, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait have landed troops in the southern city of Aden, the former capital of South Yemen, and are using the city to assist local, southern tribal militias organized under the broad network of al-Muqawama al-Sha’biya (Popular Resistance Committees). This has succeeded first in pushing the Houthis and their allies back from the city and pressuring Houthi-held areas around the city of Taiz in the country’s southwest and in the mainly desert region of Mareb, to the west of Sana’a (The National, September 7; YouTube, July 3; YouTube, June 17; YouTube, June 8; YouTube, June 5; YouTube, May 31; Khabar News Agency [Taiz], April 21; YouTube, April 21; al-Arabiya, March 26).Border TroublesIn spite of these successes, Houthi and allied forces continue to maintain strong control over northern Yemen, including Sana’a, and Houthi forces have launched consistent attacks on several areas of southwestern Saudi Arabia that border Yemen, particularly in Najran and Jizan Provinces (YouTube, June 9; YouTube, May 29; YouTube, May 5). For instance, on September 18, two Bangladeshis were killed when mortars fired from Yemen struck a hospital in Samtah, a town in the Saudi Red Sea coastal province of Jizan that is only a few miles





from the Yemen border (Daily Star [Dhaka], September 19). Earlier, on September 14, Saudi Arabia announced that one soldier had been killed in an attack on a border post in Jizan, (SPA, September 14). A day earlier, four soldiers had been killed in another cross-border attack in Najran (SPA, September 13). This stream of attacks, while not seriously jeopardizing Saudi control of the area, is nonetheless almost constant, placing considerable pressure on civilian populations in the region, particularly through the Houthis’ use of indiscriminate rocket attacks.A further challenge to Saudi Arabia is the latest risk of the conflict with the Houthis igniting long-dormant tensions in Najran and Jizan. Local politics in these provinces is significantly driven by sectarian and tribal loyalties that uneasily coexist with the Saudi state. Najran and Jizan, which have only been formally governed by the al-Saud dynasty since 1934, retain a strong territorial identity of their own, often in conscious opposition to the forcibly-imposed sterner al-Saud/Wahhabist traditions of central Arabia. In addition, there are strong cross-border ties between tribes in Najran and Jizan, and with the core areas of Houthi support in northern Yemen (YouTube, March 29; al-Akhbar [Beirut], November 12, 2014). [1]Suggestive of Saudi awareness of these potential tensions, early in the coalition’s campaign in Yemen, the Saudi government deployed a strong, and highly symbolic, Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) force to its southwestern provinces that border Yemen (YouTube, April 27). Najran, which historically had a majority Ismaili Sh’ia Muslim population and also a significant Zaydi Shi’a population with historic socio-cultural ties to areas of northern Yemen presently controlled by the Houthis, has previously been the site of significant protests against the Saudi regime, as well as inter-sectarian violence between Sunnis and the Shi’a sects (YouTube, April 27; YouTube, April 27; Okaz [Riyadh], April 1; al-Riyadh, April 1; AP, May 12; Okaz [Riyadh], April 1; al-Akhbar [Beirut], November 12, 2014; BBC, April 25, 2000). [2] Apparently concerned with demonstrating the loyalty of the local Najrani population, Saudi media showed footage of elaborate local, tribal welcoming ceremonies for SANG forces, especially from the Bani Yam, the most important Ismaili tribal confederation in the governorate (YouTube, April 27; YouTube, April 26; YouTube, March 28). Saudi Arabia’s Minister of the National Guard, Prince Mu’atib bin Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud, the son of the recently deceased King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud and a powerful player within the Saudi royal family, also personally travelled to Najran to participate in festivities marking the SANG’s deployment with the region’s powerful local tribes (YouTube, June 14). These efforts can be understood as an attempt to bolster local loyalties to the Saudi state, to spread a wider message that the area is calm and also to show SANG forces protecting the local population against the Houthi threat.In addition, there have previously been unverified reports—mainly from Iranian state media sources—of local opposition forces emerging from Najrani tribes who were deeply dissatisfied with Saudi Arabia’s air campaign in Yemen. Most strikingly, in mid-June, reports by Iranian media, and media produced by Iran’s allies in Syria, claimed that an armed opposition organization called Ahrar al-Najran (Free Ones of Najran) had been formed in the region by these local, anti-Saudi tribal forces (Shaam Times [Damascus], June 18; Fars News [Tehran], June 15; YouTube, June 15). Pro-Iran media also claimed that the movement had captured a military base, shot down a Saudi helicopter, engaged in numerous clashes with government forces and also set up an organization called “The Youth of Najran” (Fars News, July 2; Fars News, July 1). In addition, these media sources claimed that the Saudi Air Force was conducting air strikes against Najrani armed opposition groups belonging to the Ahrar al-Najran movement (Fars News, July 22; Tasnim News Agency [Tehran], July 2). There has been no independent corroboration of





any of these events, however. Moreover, since summer, Iranian claims of domestic Saudi opposition forces in Najran have tailed off. This suggests either that such forces, if they existed, have become less active, or that Iran’s government decided that promoting such propaganda were no longer in its interests.

South Yemeni Secession ThreatFurther complicating the Saudi-led coalition’s efforts in Yemen is the re-emergence of an emboldened Southern Yemeni secessionist movement. This is primarily being driven by local anti-Houthi Popular Resistance Forces, stylizing themselves as the Southern Resistance; these forces are more loudly seeking support for the independence of South Yemen, which was forcibly reunified with North Yemen after the country’s 1994 civil war, through the assistance of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, even if this move runs contrary to the Saudi-led coalition’s aim to restore a strong, pro-Saudi national government in Sana’a (al-Jazeera, November 29, 2014; YouTube, December 23, 2013; YouTube, March 19, 2013).As the Saudi and UAE-led coalition seeks to build a Houthi-resistant, quasi-national government structure in southern Yemen, these local calls from prominent southern Yemeni actors for secession (and a growing rejection of President Hadi, a unitary Yemeni state or even a devolved federalism structure), present a growing policy dilemma for Saudi Arabia (Aden al-Ghad, September 16; Aden al-Ghad, September 8; al-Akhbar [Beirut], January 30; YouTube, March 25, 2013). As the necessary local partners for the Saudi and UAE-led coalition against the Houthis and allies forces, the Southern Resistance militias and the overall southern secessionist movement, which is generally strongly anti-Houthi, and anti-Saleh, cannot easily be dismissed, and are reportedly being engaged actively at least by pragmatic policymakers in the UAE, who understand the need to address southern pro-separatist sensibilities and related grievances (al-Youm al-Saba [Aden], September 15; Yemen Akhbar [Aden], September 14; Ababiil [Aden], September 3; YouTube, September 23, 2014). Saudi Arabia, therefore, finds itself in a quandary in southern Yemen too: it needs to build up southern forces to counter the Houthis; however, by doing this, the strength of southern separatists, whose long-term goals run counter to its own, is increased.

OutlookThe new Saudi monarch, King Salman, has embarked on a high-risk gamble in launching a military intervention to defeat what Saudi Arabia perceives as Iranian expansionism in Saudi Arabia’s traditional client state, and to reinstall Hadi as president. Thus far, the Saudi-led coalition has succeeded in driving the Houthis out of Aden and many areas of southern Yemen. It has faltered, however, in its broader aims of removing the Houthis from the capital, while also being hampered by the continued Houthi pressure on Saudi Arabia’s southwestern border regions and by the South Yemen separatist movement’s renewed activism as a result of the Saudi-led intervention.Saudi policymakers therefore find themselves at a crossroads. On one hand, they are clearly tempted to continue to press boldly, and potentially dangerously, towards Sana’a in hope of restoring Yemen as a unitary, centrally-ruled Saudi client state, with President Hadi at its helm. However, the potential unwillingness of the Southern Resistance militias to advance into northern Yemen to displace the Houthis, seems likely to severely limit these ambitions. Adding to the pressure are the Houthi cross-border attacks and the potential for a prolonged conflict to reignite long dormant tribal, regional and sectarian irredentist feeling in southwestern Saudi Arabia.As a result, if Saudi Arabia wants to end the conflict quickly, unless the government is willing to commit large numbers of their own forces in north Yemen, or to find some other way to mobilize significant Yemeni forces against the Houthis, the Saudis may have to





recognize some form of Houthi self-rule in the north, and a significantly devolved form of government in southern Yemen. Alternatively, and even more radically, they may have to acquiesce to an independent South Yemen that may be favored by some pragmatists in the UAE government, and which would at least secure them a strong pro-Saudi bastion in southern Yemen.None of these options are particularly palatable to Saudi Arabia, which is loath to see a de facto Houthi state on its southern border, or to set a precedent of partitioning a fellow Arab state along quasi-sectarian lines, with all the implications this holds for Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. The most obvious alternative, however, is for the Saudi military to plunge deeper into the Yemeni morass, and to take on the battle-hardened and highly capable Houthi guerrillas on their own turf, with all the risks this entails to Saudi Arabia’s finances, to its military and to its regional and international prestige.James Brandon is a political and security risk analyst. Nicholas A. Heras is a Middle East researcher at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and an associate fellow for The Jamestown Foundation.Notes1. Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pgs. 266-267.2. For more information on Ismaili Shi’a protests in Najran, and the Saudi state security forces’ harsh reaction, see: “The Ismailis of Najran: Second-Class Saudi Citizens,” Human Rights Watch, September 3, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/saudiarabia0908web.pdf.

Files:TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue20_04.pdf

Saudi Arabia and al-Qaeda Unite in YemenArticle Byline InformationPosted: 09/24/2015 In viewing Yemen as an important battleground in the grander struggle against Iran's expanding regional influence, Saudi Arabia has united with a variety of Yemeni Sunni factions in an effort to crush the Houthi insurgency. This has entailed the kingdom cooperating with Sunni Islamist groups that Saudi Arabia--along with other Arab and Western governments--have designated as "terrorist" organizations. However, as the U.S. continues to wage its War on Terror in Yemen, Riyadh's strategy is complicating the kingdom's already chilly relationship with Washington.Saudi Arabia's alignment with "terrorist" groups in Yemen was highlighted in June when the Saudi-backed exiled Yemeni government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi sent Abdel-Wahab Humayqani to Geneva as one of its delegates in the failed UN-sponsored roundtable talks. In December 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department designated Humayqani a "Specifically Designated Global Terrorist," having allegedly served as a recruiter and financier for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and having orchestrated a car bombing in March 2012 that targeted a Yemeni Republican Guard base, killing seven.Despite the international community's condemnation of Saudi Arabia's bombing of civilian areas in Yemen, recent victories on the part of Riyadh-sponsored forces in Aden and elsewhere seem to have inspired greater confidence in the kingdom that the Sunni Arab coalition can crush the Houthi insurgency through a prolonged military campaign. Yet, Saudi Arabia's embrace of such extremists raises questions about whether the kingdom will attempt to achieve victory over the Houthis--viewed in Riyadh as a proxy of Iran--at any price, and serves to reemphasize concerns that many in the West have had about the





company Riyadh chooses to keep.Historical Context

After thousands of Yemeni nationals who had joined ranks with Osama bin Laden in the Soviet-Afghan War returned to Yemen in 1980s, the Saudi-backed Yemeni regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh sponsored such militants in the fight against South Yemen's Marxist regime, and later in a campaign to defeat southern secessionists. During the 1990s, Yemen became a central location for militant Salafist groups such as AQAP's predecessors, including Islamic Jihad in Yemen, Army Aden Abyan and al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY).By the early 2000s, AQY had weakened as a result of a declining membership, but Saudi Arabia's crackdown on its own local al-Qaeda branch prompted many Saudi members to flee to Yemen. By 2009, the Saudi and Yemeni branches had merged into AQAP. In addition to targeting the central state of Yemen, Houthi insurgents, and Western nationals/interests in Yemen, AQAP has also made clear its intention to topple the ruling Saudi family, accusing it of maintaining an "unholy" alliance with the U.S.In August 2009, then-Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayif (currently the kingdom's Crown Prince) met with members of the public as part of a Ramadan celebration, including Abdullah Hassan Taleh al-Asiri, a militant from AQAP who claimed to have renounced terrorism and had asked to repent before the Prince. Al-Asiri's real intentions were made clear after he entered a room with Mohammed bin Nayif and detonated an improvised explosive device carried inside him. The explosion killed Asiri but failed to assassinate the prince, leaving him with only minor injuries. It is indeed remarkable that Saudi Arabia appears to be teaming up with the group that only six years ago carried out that failed assassination attempt on Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayif.The de facto partnership between Riyadh and AQAP is made further evident by the fact that the Saudi-led military coalition has entirely avoided bombing AQAP targets, despite its aggressive bombing of other territories under Houthi control. While doubtful that AQAP has abandoned its objective of overthrowing the Saudi monarchy, Riyadh likely perceives its tacit alliance with AQAP as a short-term venture and is focused on the immediate task at hand.Perhaps under the pretext of countering Wilayat al-Yemen (Yemen's Daesh--also known as the "Islamic State"--division), Riyadh perceives strategic value in working with its rival, AQAP. Although Wilayat al-Yemen and AQAP have thus far not waged any large-scale armed campaigns again each other, their competition for recruits and the mantle of Yemen's dominant Sunni Islamist militia lead some analysts to expect their conflicting interests to eventually pit the two groups against each other. Concerned that the Houthi takeover of swathes of Yemeni territory is aiding Wilayat al-Yemen's ability to lure greater Sunni support through its highly sectarian and ultra-violent agenda, countering the group's ability to gain further traction likely contributes to Riyadh's evolving relationship with AQAP.

Implications for the WestThe Obama Administration has identified AQAP as the world's most dangerous al-Qaeda branch, and the gravest terrorist threat to U.S. national security. In 2000, al-Qaeda orchestrated the attack against the USS Cole, and two years later the group waged a suicide bombing that targeted the French oil tanker M/V Limburg. Both attacks were carried out by individuals who would come to hold prominent roles in AQAP.Throughout 2008 and 2009, AQY/AQAP attacked Western embassies, in addition to Belgian and Korean tourists in Yemen. On Christmas Day in 2009, an AQAP affiliate unsuccessfully attempted to bomb a Detroit-bound jet, and ten months later the group made another attempt to strike the U.S. homeland by bombing two Chicago-bound cargo planes (the plot was intercepted by Saudi intelligence officials). Additionally, while





AQAP's role in the January 2015 Charlie Hedbo massacre in Paris remains a source of debate in intelligence circles, the organization claimed responsibility.In June of this year, Washington officials voiced concern about Humayqani's role in the Geneva talks, underscoring the U.S. and Saudi Arabia's conflicting strategies toward the Yemeni crisis. Although Washington has provided logistical and intelligence support for the Saudi-led military campaign against the Houthis, the U.S. military's direct involvement in Yemen since Riyadh waged Operation Decisive Storm in March has been exclusively striking AQAP targets with Washington's controversial drone program.Despite Saudi Arabia's official lukewarm endorsement of the Iranian nuclear deal, Riyadh is gravely concerned about the geopolitical implications of a gradual improvement in the West's relationship with Iran. Unsettled by the idea that Tehran will more forcefully assert its influence in the Arab world by providing more support to Iranian-backed paramilitary groups with newly available funds derived from sanctions relief, Saudi Arabia is flexing its muscles in Yemen. Viewing the Houthi insurgents as an Iranian proxy committed to establishing a client state for the Islamic Republic on Saudi Arabia's southern border, officials in Riyadh clearly perceive a graver threat from the Houthis than from Sunni Islamist militias such as AQAP.From Washington's perspective, the Riyadh-led campaign in Yemen is contributing to chaotic unrest in Yemen that provides fertile ground for the local al-Qaeda branch and creates a magnet for other extremist groups. Having seized control of the Riyan airport and Mukalla (an oil rich city with a major sea port and a population of 300,000) in April, AQAP has emerged as an increasingly influential actor amidst the bloody turmoil and humanitarian crises that have spiraled out of control since the Saudi-led coalition began bombing Yemen in March. By positioning itself as a disciplined Sunni force capable of effectively countering the Houthi insurgents, AQAP has unquestionably established itself as a de facto partner of the U.S.-backed Saudi-led campaign in Yemen, despite being the primary impetus for Washington's ongoing drone campaign there.Ties between elements of Saudi Arabia's ruling monarchy and global jihadist terror groups are not new. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, questions regarding the costs and benefits of maintaining a strong alliance with Riyadh resulted in spirited debate in the U.S. By having deep economic relations with Western nations and being the world's top crude oil exporter, Riyadh has long used its powerful influence in the Middle East's geopolitical order and international energy markets to foster ties with groups like AQAP with minimal objection from the kingdom's Western allies.In the case of Yemen, analysts contend that the Obama Administration's support for Riyadh's war against the Houthis has occurred within the context of Washington's efforts to secure Saudi support for the Iranian nuclear agreement, despite U.S. reservations over the kingdom's policies. Paris has been a strong backer of Riyadh's campaign in Yemen, largely due to France's interest in becoming the kingdom's leading arms dealer. Over time, however, Riyadh's de facto alliance with AQAP should raise further questions in the U.S. and France about whether the kingdom is a genuine partner in the global War on Terror or is a direct sponsor of groups affiliated with those who perpetrated the 9/11 and Charlie Hebdo attacks.In Syria, where Saudi Arabia's support for hardline jihadist militias is fueling tension in Riyadh's relations with Western governments, the means and objectives of the kingdom are increasingly at odds with those of American and European officials. As the U.S. explores diplomatic opportunities with the Houthis in Yemen, and as EU officials begin eyeing Iran as a potential partner in regional security crises, there is a widening gulf between Western and Saudi perceptions about security considerations in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia's Blowback in Yemen?





Beyond implications for Saudi relations with the West, the kingdom is playing a risky high stakes game of poker by incorporating a short-term alliance with AQAP into a larger strategy of countering Iran's alleged hegemonic aims in the Middle East. If history can serve as any guide, groups such as AQAP are unlikely to maintain any loyalty to state or other non-state sponsors that serve as allies of convenience. Riyadh has in the past sponsored jihadist movements in foreign countries--most notably Afghanistan and Pakistan--that later turned their guns on the kingdom. As the conflict in Yemen is extremely fluid, and complicated by the vast array of armed groups with a broad range of objectives and ideologies, the nation's future political landscape is entirely unpredictable. Riyadh is taking a big risk by cooperating with armed groups on its borders that have previously exposed their hostility toward the kingdom and its Arab/Western allies.Last month U.S. officials and local Yemeni sources reported that AQAP militants were closing in on Aden. According to unconfirmed media reports, al-Qaeda's flag flew over an administrative building with the group patrolling some of the city's neighborhoods. If the al-Qaeda franchise were to seize control of Yemen's second largest city, such a dangerous development would certainly create new security dilemmas for locals already enduring a grave humanitarian crisis. It could also pose a serious threat to international traders if jihadist terrorist groups were to usurp control of both the Yemeni and African sides of the narrow Bab-el-Mandab--one of the world's busiest shipping lanes, linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea.Saudi Arabia finds its own security further imperiled by Daesh-affiliated cells that have carried out attacks against police officers, Shi'ite mosques, and Western expatriates in recent months, and with the "caliphate" leadership vowing to topple the ruling Al Saud family. Therefore, Riyadh may very well regret having pursued a short-term foreign policy that is creating conditions in Yemen in which AQAP gains the most from the nation's chaotic and ungovernable environment. Saudi Arabia would benefit from having the same long-term orientation toward Sunni extremism as it does toward the global oil landscape.This article was originally published by Foreign Policy Journal (FPJ).Giorgio Cafiero is Co-Founder of Gulf State Analytics. Daniel Wagner is CEO of Country Risk Solutions and author of the book "Managing Country Risk".

** Cees, What Next? See my Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 17-50-The Deep Battle against the West

Jul 12, Container lines won’t reduce the amount of cargo moving through the Suez Canal despite heightened security tensions — most recently inflamed by the reported





arrest of 13 people on suspicion of planning to sabotage the waterway integral to trade between Asia and the Europe, and increasingly the U.S. Even after Egyptian authorities reportedly arrested 13 members of the Muslim Brotherhood suspected of planting bombs around the canal to upset shipping, it is doubtful carriers would avoid using the waterway; the risk doesn't outweigh the extra cost of routing cargo around the Horn of Africa, said Kevin Doherty, president of Nexus Consulting, an Arlington, Virginia-based security firm. The 13-member cell, which included a Suez Canal Authority employee, was accused of planting bombs near canal sanitation and electrical facilities, according to Reuters. Doherty expects more attacks on the canal and even a temporary closure, as the completion of the canal expansion nears and the region become more volatile. “They were lucky with the (rocket-propelled grenade attack),” said Doherty referring to a 2013 attack by suspected terrorists on a Cosco Asia container ship transiting the waterway. “If they would have hit the bunker of the vessel or a tanker, the canal would been closed for environmental cleanup. Lightering (transferring liquid cargo from one tanker to another) would have taken five to six days.”

** Nov 2014, Al-Qaeda's central leadership is calling on regional jihadist actors to carry out attacks against key pipelines and oil tankers in several marine chokepoints.• An article in Al-Qaeda's Resurgence magazine emphasised its intent to wage "economic

war" in order to cause a spike in oil prices, and increase the cost of shipping and marine insurance.

• A sustained campaign against oil tankers is unlikely, but jihadist groups have the capability to carry out one-off attacks, particularly in the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

EVENTAl-Qaeda has called for attacks on oil pipelines and tankers in several marine chokepoints, in an article in the first issue of its new English-language magazine, Resurgence. The most likely targets for a one-off attack are the Suez Canal in Egypt and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, but a sustained campaign is unlikely.Al-Qaeda has called for attacks on oil pipelines and tankers in several marine chokepoints in its new English-language magazine. Resurgence is published by As-Sahab, the media wing of Al-Qaeda's central leadership, and focuses heavily on the Indian subcontinent while noticeably avoiding any mention of the rival Islamic State. However, the article On Targeting the Achilles Heel of Western Economies is likely to increase the intent of jihadist groups to target shipping. Groups aligned with Al-Qaeda's central leadership, such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, are probably looking to conduct a spectacular attack in order to reassert their significance in light of the rival Islamic State's current dominance of jihadist discourse. Specific targets mentioned in the article include the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Egypt's Suez Canal and

SUMED pipeline, the Turkish Straits and the Strait of Gibraltar. --- C As noted and mentioned in AQ master strategist Abu Mus'ab As-Suri his manifesto; The Call to Global Islamic Resistance, So, the most important enemy targets in detail: Third: The straits and the main sea passages: On the Earth there are five (5) important straits, four of them are in the countries of the Arabs and the Muslims. The fifth one is in America, and it is the Panama Canal. These straits are: 1. The Strait of Hormuz, the oil gate in the Arab-Persian Gulf.





2. The Suez Canal in Egypt. 3 . The Bab el Mandib between Yemen and the African continent. 4. The Gibraltar Strait in Morocco. -- Most of the Western world's economy, in terms of trade and oil, passes through these sea passages. Also passing through them are the military fleets, aircraft carriers and the deadly missiles hitting our women and children... It is necessary to shut these passages until the invader campaigns have left our countries. This can be done by targeting American ships and ships of its allies, on the one hand by blocking the passages with mines and sinking the ships in them, or by threatening the movement there by piracy, martyrdom operations, and by the power of weapons whenever possible.-- IHS assesses that the most likely targets for an attack are the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb, although the risk of a successful attack in the Strait of Hormuz is moderate. There is no indication that jihadist groups in the United Arab Emirates have the capability to assemble a sufficiently powerful boat-borne improvised explosive device (IED) to cause significant damage to tankers, and increased vigilance by security forces since the 2010 attack on the Japanese tanker MV M Star are likely to disrupt plots. Tankers in the Turkish Straits and the Strait of Gibraltar are also unlikely to be targeted successfully, given the relatively low capabilities of jihadist groups in Turkey and Morocco, and the effectiveness of security forces there. (Three jihadists were arrested in Morocco in 2003 for plotting to attack a ship in the Strait of Gibraltar with an explosive-laden speedboat.)Suez Canal and SUMED pipelineSinai-based jihadist group Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis has demonstrated the intent and capability to undermine the Egyptian government through attacks on economic and infrastructure targets, and has the capability to launch attacks against the Suez Canal and the SUMED pipeline. Nevertheless, such attacks have been rare. The last attack on a ship transiting the canal was on 31 August 2013, when the container ship COSCO ASIA was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) near Qantara, sustaining only light damage to the hull. Although similar occasional one-off attacks are likely, a sustained campaign against shipping in the Suez Canal is not likely, given limited jihadist capabilities and the probable consideration that this would damage Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis' reputation among ordinary Egyptians, which the group is keen to avoid.An RPG fired from the bank is very unlikely to sink a ship and block the Suez Canal for more than a few hours. However, more advanced anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) have increased range and accuracy, enabling a trained operator to target the bridge of a ship, heightening the risk of casualties among the crew. These missiles are frequently used by jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq, and IHS assesses that Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Sinai is likely to have access to them. However, in the case of the Suez Canal, the minimum range of some of the more capable ATGMs is likely to limit their use against potential shipping targets, given the narrowness of the Canal. The risk of attacks with small boat-borne IEDs is low. These would easily be spotted by Egyptian security forces, and would probably be limited to small dinghies, which are unable of carrying the amount of explosives needed to breach a ship's hull. Another attack option might be a large submersible IED remotely detonated under the hull of a ship as it passes over it, so the pressure wave would break open its hull, similar to the effect caused by a torpedo. However, IHS has seen no precedent for this kind of attack, and an attempt to install this kind of device would most likely be detected by security forces.The Resurgence article also mentioned the SUMED oil pipeline as a potential target. The pipeline runs from the Ain Sukhna terminal in the Gulf of Suez to Sidi Kerir on Egypt's Mediterranean coast. This enables Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) to unload part of their cargo at the entrance of the canal and reload once they have transited. IED and RPG





attacks against pipelines in Egypt have so far been concentrated on the Arab Gas pipeline in Sinai, and to a lesser extent on domestic gas pipelines in northern Egypt. The SUMED pipeline has not been targeted so far, but groups such as Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis do have the capability to carry out IED attacks in mainland Egypt that are capable of damaging a section of this pipeline. A successful attack on the SUMED pipeline would cause disruption of up to several days for VLCCs only.Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of AdenThere is a strong precedent for marine terrorism off the coast of Yemen, and the large amount of unregistered traffic in the Gulf of Aden places shipping at particular risk. In October 2000, the USS Cole was hit by a boat-borne IED just outside the port of Aden, killing 17 US sailors and causing USD250 million worth of damage. In October 2002, the French oil tanker Limburg was similarly attacked in the Gulf of Aden, near the port of al-Shihr. Both attacks were organised by Yemeni jihadist networks, some of which later merged with AQAP. Al-Qaeda has previously threatened to block the Bab el-Mandeb by sinking a ship in the strait, most recently in 2010.AQAP has demonstrated its ability to launch boat-borne IED attacks against marine assets off the Yemeni coast. On 27 August 2011, the Yemeni Navy claimed to have sunk a small boat it suspected was laden with explosives as it approached a warship off Abyan. Two weeks earlier, AQAP had taken over a fishing harbour at Shaqra in Abyan province, which seems to have been the launch point for the attack. However, increased security measures along the coastline, which reportedly include US support in conducting surveillance and increased vigilance at sea, mitigate the risk of successful attacks. On 20 November 2013, Yemeni naval forces destroyed a suspicious boat approaching Yemen's liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal at Balhaf. Ports and export terminals are at much higher risk from land-based attacks, including Grad-type rockets, mortars, or vehicle-borne IEDs combined with groups of militants armed with RPGs and heavy machine guns.The Resurgence article also explicitly mentioned the possibility of hijacking a ship in order to scuttle it in the Bab el-Mandeb shipping lane. AQAP is most active in southeast Yemen, and a hijacking attempt would be most likely to be launched from the southern coast, east of Aden, on ships crossing westwards through the Gulf of Aden. However, the international naval taskforce and armed guards deployed on ships have led to a significant drop in piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden over the past three years, also strongly mitigating the risk of successful hijackings by AQAP.FORECASTAlthough a sustained jihadist campaign of attacks against oil tankers is unlikely, some groups have the intent and the capability to carry out one-off attacks. Ships passing through the Suez Canal are most likely to be fired upon from the bank with RPGs or ATGMs, but this is very unlikely to sink a ship or block the canal for more than a few hours. Vessels in the Bab el-Mandeb are more likely to be targeted with boat-borne IEDs launched from the southern coast of Yemen, but are unlikely to sustain enough damage to sink a ship, and an attack on a single ship in the Bab el-Mandeb shipping corridor would be unlikely to block it. Pipelines, such as the SUMED in Egypt, are vulnerable to attack by jihadists, which would typically cause disruption of one or two days. The main damage done by such attacks is likely to be psychological, eroding commercial confidence in the adequacy of security measures, and incurring additional security costs, even when attacks are unsuccessful.

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Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 4-1-Yemen-25

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