Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator Part 2014 Part 4-1-AQIMBy Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence.

In The "War of the Cross, we need a Strategy."They say those who forget history are doomed to repeat it again.

AQIM confirms that the formation of an Islamic Caliphate is AQIM's "demand" and that its members "are working towards" the goal through their jihad. The Islamic State's caliphate has not put an end to AQIM's quest. Nor, in AQIM's view, has the Islamic State successfully usurped al Qaeda's authority. AQIM rejects the Islamic State's caliphate, however. The al Qaeda group says while it too wants to resurrect the caliphate, the Islamic State has not followed the appropriate protocols.

Cees: In recent weeks, every major terrorist assault has brought with it questions about the possible involvement of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the group known as Isis. The truth is that, in many countries in the Muslim world, Isis may have sympathisers but it does not yet have well-established roots. Well before the attacks, however, al-Qaeda had spent nearly 20 years building up contacts and cells in Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia 1.

Addressing the UN Council, Ambassador Tete Antonio, the representative of the African 19 December 20142 – Amid a proliferation of well-funded and well-organized transnational criminal activities in Africa, the Middle East and beyond, the United Nations Security Council today adopted a resolution spotlighting its concern over the ties between cross-border crime and terrorism and called on UN Member States to ramp up efforts in combatting the two activities. Union to the UN, In the Sahel – a vast expanse of territory stretching from

Mauritania to Eritrea, including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan – the Ambassador explained that drug and arms trafficking, human smuggling, kidnapping-for-ransom, and illicit proliferation of arms and money laundering had become “intimately intertwined” with the financing of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

1 Ambassador Bola Dada, Nigeria, Whatever the strategy they made that time, there is a link to what is happening now. When Sudan came under pressure during the US Bill Clinton era, they sent Bin Laden away. Osama Bin Laden had established himself there. In fact, one of his wives was the daughter of the Speaker. So when Sudan was under pressure to send Osama Bin Laden away, he decided to divide his Al-Qaeda army into three; he took the first team to Afghanistan and kept the second team in Sudan; the third group he sent out to be disturbing the whole world, including Magreb which is close to Mali, Chad and Niger. I raised an alarm in 2001 that Al-Qaeda was in Nigeria – that Al-Qaeda had penetrated Nigeria through Chad. Then when I got wind of the distribution of Osama Bin Laden Al-Qaeda groups, I reported. I told them to check our borders between Mali, Niger, and Chad – that Al-Qaeda was on the move. They call it Afikaya, a doctrine that all African states must be governed by Muslims. . I got wind of it in one document. I read it with my eyes that all African countries must be governed by Muslims and any country that is mistakenly being ruled by a Christian, they should make life difficult for him. They said it’s the injunction of the Quran. I read it. [1] http://www.punchng.com/news/i-was-chased-out-of-sudan-when-i-raised-the-alarm-about-boko-haram-ambassador-bola-dada/

2 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49655#.VJV7oqd5A

Daesh looks to usurp AQIM Analysis by Jemal Oumar in Nouakchott for Magharebia – 19/12/2014 The long-simmering differences between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) are reaching the boiling point. One of al-Qaeda's most active affiliates has seen attrition, with several cells splitting off to ally with Daesh. But the biggest holdback of al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is its leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel (alias Abou Moussaab Abdelouadoud). And he remains an obstacle to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's plan for the Maghreb. The enmity between the terror bosses runs so deep that some in the Islamic State want to see Droukdel dead. Algerian daily El Khabar last month cited pro-Islamic State forums as saying that the group aimed to open a "new front" against AQIM. In early fall, al-Baghdadi's media spokesman called online for a fatwa against the AQIM emir, accusing him of kufr for refusing to swear allegiance to the self-styled caliphate. Officially, ISIS denies ever accusing its opponents of kufr, claiming that it only fights those who fight against it, says Sid Ahmed Ould Tfeil, an expert on salafist groups. "However, developments on the ground show otherwise," he tells Magharebia. Indeed, several foreign jihadists who regretted their involvement with the extremist group were executed for trying to defect, informants told AFP on November 21st. One youth was overheard talking on the phone to his parents about how to return home, said one militant. "When he decided to leave, they sent him to the front," Naël Moustapha continued. "The next day I heard he was dead, shot in the back." Some managed to escape, but ISIS quickly "took the situation in hand" he says, explaining that the oath to the group is considered "sacred and inalienable". Given its reputation for killing its own, as well as raping, crucifying and robbing others who do not follow is path, ISIS is too extreme even for al-Qaeda. Since acquiring allegiance from Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia and Libya, and Algeria's Djound Al-Khilafa, ISIS has been trying to lure cells still loyal to Droukdel, in order to enhance its presence in the Maghreb and the Sahel. Droukdel refused to recognise the Islamic State, preferring to renew his allegiance to al-Qaeda, but others within his organisation began to change sides. AQIM is split between those who see Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as their new leader and those who remain under the banner of the parent al-Qaeda organisation led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. The infighting started in mid-July, when AQIM chief Droukdel decided not to throw his support behind al-Baghdadi. Droukdel's reticence led al-Baghdadi to try to influence his rival's followers by all possible means. The tug-of-war for jihadists' loyalty between the two groups has now reached unprecedented levels. "ISIS says al-Qaeda divided the ranks of global jihad," analyst Ould Tfeil adds, "while al-Qaeda accused ISIS of declaring a caliphate on its own". The Greater Maghreb region has high value to both AQIM and Daesh, and the conflict over which sides holds the most influence shows no signs of abating. "Disputes have undoubtedly reached a peak after Algeria's Djound Al-Khilafa disobeyed al-Qaeda and swore allegiance to ISIS," Ould Tfeil notes. "There are also armed extremist groups that didn't swear allegiance to al-Qaeda in the past, and are likely to be approached by ISIS using its money as the biggest and richest source of financing of armed groups around the world," the analyst continues. He points to Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu Mohamed al-Joulani, who admitted that it was al-Baghdadi who "supported him with money and men to build the first jihadi base in the Levant". Droukdel's refusal to back al-Baghdadi sets AQIM apart from jihadi groups in the Maghreb and Sahel, such as Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia and Boko Haram in Nigeria. And the action may have other consequences. "We shall witness an internal war within al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which will benefit ISIS," Algerian daily L'Expression editorialised. ISIS is already making its presence felt in the Maghreb.ISIS lays Maghreb groundwork Morocco has broken up several Islamic State cells. The most recent arrest came Tuesday (December 16th), when security forces dismantled a terror cell that recruited women for Daesh in Syria and Iraq. The two leaders of the cell were arrested in Fnideq. Several female members of the group, including a minor, were caught in

Spain. Algeria has fought off al-Qaeda's local branch for years. Now it is also seeing the first attempts by the ISIS spider to build its web. In September, ISIS reached out online to the new Algerian cell Djound Al-Khilafa and instructed it to act, build a network and raise recruits. "Jihadist leaders in North Africa had their differences long before the appearance of ISIS on the scene," Ould Tfeil concluded, noting the spilt spearheaded by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (aka "Laaouar"). He also refused to swear allegiance to al-Baghdadi and reiterated his allegiance to the parent al-Qaeda and its chief Ayman al-Zawahiri. "However, Laaouar's dependence on Ansar al-Sharia in Libya and Boko Haram in Nigeria may prompt him to change his stance from ISIS in the near future," the analyst told Magharebia. According to Isselmou Ould Mustapha, a Mauritanian expert on jihadist movements, the clash between AQIM and ISIS all boils down to a question of age. "There is a conflict between the young generation and old leaders in the Maghreb branch of al-Qaeda," he tells Magharebia. "The young jihadists are impressed by the swift successes made by ISIS on the ground, while the old leaders still cling to the traditional leadership represented by Ayman al-Zawahiri." "The conflict between the young and old generations has taken place in other terrorist groups, like the Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar al-Sharia in Derna," he adds. The growing presence of Daesh in the Maghreb is no longer restricted to swearing allegiance. There may now be training camps operating in the name of Islamic caliphate state. ISIS offshoot emerges in Libya A group is now calling itself the "IS in Cyrenaica". Small cells are cropping up in eastern Libya, following the declaration of allegiance to ISIS by Derna extremist group Shura Council for Islamic Youth. This allegiance was accepted by al-Baghdadi in a message published on November 13th. The group has started to implement Daesh-style brutality, posting a video last August of the execution of an Egyptian citizen at a football stadium."Jihadist groups look at the Greater Maghreb as a backyard for the Islamic State," analyst Abdelhamid al-Ansari says. They look at this region as a centre for recruiting enthusiastic youth who embrace jihadist ideology, taking advantage of the poor economic conditions, facing most young people. Daesh is not winning over all extremists. Radical preacher Abu Qatada attacked ISIS and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a recent post on his Facebook page. "Al-Baghdadi is only a liar, a misguided man, and his group is just a bunch of malicious people," he said. "In a moment of inattention on your part, those people can commit unimaginable malicious acts against you," he said. "Therefore, keep away from them, and don't tell them about things related to your jihad or affairs. If you can expel them, it will be better." The cleric continues: "Beware their false, cold piety; they are like stray dogs, who can turn on you when you least expect it. Then, remorse won't do any good." "I wonder how can a God-fearing man who knows the sanctity of blood and knows the danger of accusing mujahideen of kufr and justifying the taking of their women sympathise with them," he asked. "This is strife that only ignorant, despicable people fall into." Abu Qatada' stance is in line with many other Muslim clerics, such as Sheikh Abdullah Bin Bayyah. He addressed Muslim youth in a video released a fortnight ago, saying: "The road taken by youth in ISIS and other terrorist groups won't lead to paradise, but to deviation and destruction." "Real jihad lies in building nations, honouring one's parents and doing good to people," Bin Bayyah said.

"The establishment of the rightly-guided Caliphate ... is the effort of every honest mujahid, and all organizations and known jihadi groups in their honest and the correctness of their method, strived and exerted their selves, and spilled blood, and spent money in the cause," AQIM says, according to SITE's translation. We "confirm that we still adhere to our pledge of allegiance to our sheikh and emir, Ayman al Zawahiri, since it is a Sharia-accorded pledge of allegiance that remains hanging on our necks, and we do not see what requires use to

break it," AQIM's statement reads. July 20143. AQIM, alongside two other jihadist groups - Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) - took control of much of the desert north of the Mali in 2012, including the three main towns of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. They were ousted from the towns and forced back into desert hideouts by a French military intervention launched in January 2013, though sporadic attacks continued. In September, AQIM and the Yemen-based Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) urged jihadists in Iraq and Syria to unite against the common threat from a US-led coalition assembled to fight IS. Some AQIM members have also reportedly broken away from al-Qaida and instead pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group. Also in July, AQIM rejects the Islamic State's caliphate, however. The al Qaeda group says while it too wants to resurrect the caliphate, the Islamic State has not followed the appropriate protocols. "The establishment of the rightly-guided Caliphate ... is the effort of every honest mujahid, and all organizations and known jihadi groups in their honest and the correctness of their method, strived and exerted their selves, and spilled blood, and spent money in the cause," AQIM says, according to SITE's translation. Earlier this year: Although collaboration was once questioned, it is now widely indicated that AQIM has linkages to al-Murabitun, MUJAO, and the Nigerian terrorist groups Boko Haram and Ansaru

Its main battlegrounds are far away and its true influence hard to judge, but the ISIL's black banner is attracting the attention of jihadists in Africa, particularly in Nigeria. ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's so-called caliphate is based in Syria and Iraq and draws most of its recruits from the Middle East, North Africa and Europe's immigrant communities. But the group's rapid rise to the top of the global jihadist movement, displacing Al-Qaeda as a source of inspiration, has had an echo south of the Sahara, where several insurgencies are underway. Outside observers see the ISIL's influence, for example, in the tactics, rhetoric and even online media presence of the Boko Haram rebels of northeast Nigeria and neighboring border areas. "There are no direct operational contacts," said Peter Pham, head of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, a Washington think tank. "But it is quite clear that Boko Haram is paying attention to the IS and the IS is paying attention to Boko Haram." Jacob Zenn, an African specialist at the Jamestown Foundation, said Boko Haram had initially received backing from Al-Qaeda's regional offshoot Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. "It has more recently begun to model its ideological and military doctrine after the Islamic State and, in turn, has started to receive recognition from the Islamic State," he told AFP. "Boko Haram controls now between 20,000 and 40,000 square kilometers (7,700 to 15,400 square miles), 10 local governments. They feel strong," he said. "They use heavy equipment, they parade with tanks taken from the Nigerian army flying the black flag, like they saw on ISIL videos. ISIL presents a compelling model. Al-Qaeda is the brand of yesterday." And a new generation of jihadists have turned away from the lengthy online sermons of Osama bin Laden's successor Ayman al-Zawahiri and to the slick propaganda videos of the Islamic State. "These supporters of ISIL are not necessarily taking orders from ISIL central," said Zenn. "But they may justify their own attacks and operations on the grounds that the IS organization is doing the same, and vice-versa." Former CIA officer Michael Shurkin, now with the Rand Corporation, said the ISIL state-building agenda would win more support in Africa than Al-Qaeda's bombing campaigns. "It's governing a place," he said. "As a symbol, it's very powerful and very dangerous. IS itself, I don't know exactly how dangerous they are, except for people who live in Syria, Iraq or Lebanon. Groups like Nigeria's Boko Haram or Mali's Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) already have local recruiting grounds. The ISIL

3 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/07/aqim_rejects_islamic.php

model could make them hard to beat. "If the US war on terror has accomplished anything, it's stuffing Al-Qaeda into a box. It's very different with IS," said Shurkin

ALGIERS, Dec. 13 (Xinhua) -- An al-Qaida senior member in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was killed in Libya by troops of Gen. Khalifa Haftar, an Algerian security source told Xinhua on Saturday. Djilali Mansour, alias Abu Younes, was killed with five other al-Qaida-linked militants, including two Algerians, in an area near Benghazi, the source said on condition of anonymity .The source specified that Abu Younes is originated from Algeria's western province of Sidi Belabes. He was wanted by the Algerian justice since he joined the fiefs of the dismantled Islamic Armed Group (GIA) in 1996. Abu Younes became later a senior member at the consultation council of the AQIM. His presence in Libya was probably a sign of his split from AQIM to join Islamic state (IS) linked group of the Caliphate Soldiers, the source said, adding that he went to Libya not to fight, but rather to acquire arms and make contacts with local armed groups. He was probably killed on December 2 during bombardment by troops of General Haftar. His dead body was discovered near the city of Benghazi, and then identified according to the documents he was carrying with him, the source said.

Late Oct 2014, France its forces had "destroyed" an Al-Qaida convoy in Niger carrying a large amount of weapons from Libya to Mali. " The convoy belonged to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a North African group affiliated to the main Al-Qaeda organisation. In Nov, According to the UN, both Ansar al Sharia groups in Libya are "associated" with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an official branch of al Qaeda that remains loyal to Ayman al Zawahiri. They are both also tied to Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia, which orchestrated the assault on the US Embassy in Tunis on Sept. 14, 2012. The UN added Ansar al Sharia Tunisia to its al Qaeda sanctions list in September. The UN found that, like its sister organizations in Libya, Ansar al Sharia Tunisia has "links to" AQIM. There are well-established ties between Ansar al Sharia in Libya and Tunisia. The UN notes in its designation that Ansar al Sharia in Libya has a "support network in Tunisia."

Sep 2014, A new armed group calling itself the "Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria4" has split from al-Qaeda's North African branch and sworn loyalty to the group calling itself the Islamic State (IS)5, fighting in Syria and Iraq. In a communique released, a regional commander of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) said he broke away from the group, accusing it of "deviating from the true path". Gouri Abdelmalek, nom de guerre Khaled Abu Suleimane, claimed leadership of the splinter group, and was joined by a AQIM commander

4 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/algeria-al-qaeda-defectors-join-group-201491412191159416.html

5 The Arabs call it "Daesh," a name that the group considers so degrading that it has threatened to kill anyone under Islamic State rule who uses it. The Islamic State's opponents in the Muslim world have already embraced the name. Arab governments have long refrained from using Islamic State, instead referring to it by the Arabic acronym for its full original name, Daesh — short for Dawlat al-Islamiyah f'al-Iraq w Belaad al-Sham. "Daesh" is an acronym for the Arabic phrase meaning the "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria" (though the last word can also be translated as "Damascus" or "Levant"), and it is thought to offend the extremist group because it sounds similar to an Arabic word. The name is commonly used by enemies of ISIS, and it also has many negative undertones, as Daesh sounds similar to the Arabic words Daes ("one who crushes something underfoot") and Dahes ("one who sows discord"). IS supporters, in any case, dislike the term Daesh as it does not spell out the crucial Islamic component. In the words of Simon Collis, the British Ambassador to Iraq: “Arabic speakers spit out the name Da’ish with different mixtures of contempt, ridicule and hostility. Da’ish is always negative.” It’s certainly entered the ever-adaptive Arabic language big time: in the plural form – “daw’aish” – it means bigots who impose their views on others.

of an eastern region in Algeria. "You have in the Islamic Maghreb men if you order them they will obey you," Suleimane said in reference to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-professed "caliph" of the IS group. Algerian officials did not immediately comment on the statement. The "Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria" is the latest group to break with AQIM and side with Baghdadi, after veteran Algerian jihadist, Mokhtar Belmokhtar's group, "Those who sign in Blood" pledged allegiance to the IS group. Dec 5, Algiers — Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other Sahel terrorist groups are working with Colombian drug cartels, according to figures released by the United Nations. Leaders of AQIM have met several times in the Sahel region with representatives of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), International Business Times reported on Sunday (November 30th). "Narco-jihadists" transport cargo by road through a triangle that includes the west of Libya, Niger, southern Algeria, Mali, and eastern Mauritania, the report said. The newspaper cited statistics from the United Nations indicating that the Maghreb branch of al-Qaeda had received huge sums of money from such gangs, amounting to 15% of each gramme of cocaine sold by smugglers.6 This newly-created "marriage of convenience" between terrorist groups and smugglers is a serious threat, said Boughaba Abdelaziz, a prosecutor at the Mila court. "Such a relation is sustained by the continued security crisis on the country's eastern and southern border," he said. "The terrorist groups provide protection for drug and cigarette smuggling convoys," he added.

Al-Shabab in Somalia is a good case in point. Whilst the group receives some limited funding from external sources, it has developed a highly effective charcoal export business which generates up to $80m a year, according to the UN. Al-Shabab has also mastered another funding tool - business, personal and transport tax. Like IS, al-Shabab controls territory and population, operating a form of quasi-government in the areas under its control - raising taxes and offering some services, particularly security and justice, in return. Based in the vast, sparsely inhabited regions across the Sahara and Sahel, AQIM raises its funding from two main sources• Abduction of foreign tourists and workers for ransom in a trade which is believed to have earned the group close to $100m over five years• Control over smuggling routes for drugs which are flown in from Latin America along "Highway 10" - referring to the 10th parallel - as the most direct route across the Atlantic en route to Europe

Al-Qa‘ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Al-Qa‘ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is an Algeria-based Sunni Muslim jihadist group. It originally formed in 1998 as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), a faction of the Armed Islamic Group, which was the largest and most active terrorist group in Algeria. The GSPC was renamed in January 2007 after the group officially joined al-Qa‘ida in September 2006. GSPC had close to 30,000 members at its height, but the Algerian Government’s counterterrorism efforts have reduced its ranks to fewer than 1,000. Following its formal alliance with al-Qa‘ida, AQIM expanded its aims and declared its intention to attack Western targets. In late 2006 and early 2007, it conducted several improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against convoys of foreign nationals working in the energy sector. AQIM in December 2007 attacked United Nations offices in Algiers with a car bomb and in February 2008 attacked the Israeli Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, with small arms. AQIM, which operates primarily in the northern coastal areas of Algeria and in parts of the desert regions of southern Algeria and northern Mali, mainly employs conventional terrorist tactics, including guerrilla-style ambushes and mortar, rocket, and IED attacks. Its principal sources of funding

6 http://allafrica.com/stories/201412060088.html

include extortion, kidnapping, and donations. AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdal announced in May 2007 that suicide bombings would become the group’s main tactic. The group claimed responsibility for a suicide truck-bomb attack that killed at least eight soldiers and injured more than 20 at a military barracks in Algeria on 11 July 2007, the opening day of the All-Africa Games. In May 2009, AQIM announced it had killed a British hostage after months of failed negotiations. In June of the same year, the group publicly claimed responsibility for killing US citizen Christopher Leggett in Mauritania because of his missionary activities. In 2011, a Mauritanian court sentenced a suspected AQIM member to death, and two others to prison for the American’s murder. In 2010, AQIM failed to conduct the high-casualty attacks in Algeria that it had in previous years. Multinational counterterrorism efforts—including a joint French-Mauritanian raid in July 2010 against an AQIM camp—resulted in the deaths of some AQIM members and possibly disrupted some AQIM activity. In 2011, however, AQIM killed two French hostages during an attempted rescue operation, and in 2013 killed one French hostage in retaliation for France’s military intervention in Mali. In 2012, AQIM took advantage of political chaos in northern Mali to consolidate its control there and worked with the secular Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA) to secure independence in Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktou for ethnic Tuaregs.

UN recognizes ties between Ansar al Sharia in Libya, al QaedaLWJ November 19, 2014 , The United Nations Security Council today added Ansar al Sharia in Libya to its al Qaeda sanctions list. "As a result of the new listings," the UN announced, "any individual or entity that provides financial or material support to" Ansar al Sharia Libya, "including the provision of arms or recruits, is eligible to be added to the Al Qaeda Sanctions List and subject to the sanctions measures." The UN notes that the Ansar al Sharia chapters in Benghazi and Derna are associated with one another, but lists them separately under a heading that reads, "Entities and other groups associated with Al Qaeda." Despite their separate listings, the two Ansar al Sharia groups operate together and have published their propaganda under a shared brand. Ansar al Sharia fighters from both Benghazi and Derna participated in the Sept. 11, 2012 terrorist attack on the US Mission and Annex in Benghazi. Four Americans, including Ambassador Christopher Stevens, were killed during the assault.

According to the UN, both Ansar al Sharia groups in Libya are "associated" with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an official branch of al Qaeda that remains loyal to Ayman al Zawahiri. They are both also tied to Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia, which orchestrated the assault on the US Embassy in Tunis on Sept. 14, 2012. The UN added Ansar al Sharia Tunisia to its al Qaeda sanctions list in September. The UN found that, like its sister organizations in Libya, Ansar al Sharia Tunisia has "links to" AQIM. There are well-established ties between Ansar al Sharia in Libya and Tunisia. The UN notes in its designation that Ansar al Sharia in Libya has a "support network in Tunisia." In addition, the Benghazi chapter is tied to Al Mourabitoun, which is led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former AQIM commander who established his own jihadist group. Belmokhtar is openly loyal to Zawahiri and, according to a previous designation by the UN, still works with AQIM despite his differences with the group's leadership. Earlier this month, Agence France Presse obtained a copy of a dossier that was submitted to the UN to justify today's action. The documents provided to the UN show that 12 of the 24 jihadists who participated in the January 2013 siege of the In Amenas gas facility in Algeria were trained in Ansar al Sharia camps in Benghazi. Belmokhtar commanded the terrorists responsible for the In Amenas siege and claimed responsibility for the raid on behalf of al Qaeda. Britain, France, and the US moved to have Ansar al Sharia Libya added to the UN sanctions list earlier this month, and all 15 members of the UN Security Council had until today to agree to the sanctions. A consensus was reached and the sanctions were approved. UK Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond praised the UN's decision in a statement. Hammond said that the Ansar al Sharia groups in Benghazi and Derna both "have links with Al Qaeda and are responsible for acts of terror in Libya, including bomb attacks, kidnappings, and murder." Ansar al Sharia camps in Derna and Benghazi have been used to funnel foreign fighters to Syria, according to the UN. The camps in Benghazi have also shipped jihadists off to Mali. Today's action by the UN confirms The Long War Journal's reporting and analysis. Numerous pieces of evidence tie the Ansar al Sharia organizations in Libya and Tunisia to al Qaeda's international network.

AQIM rejects Islamic State's caliphate, reaffirms allegiance to ZawahiriLWJ July 14, 2014, Update: The SITE Intelligence Group reports that, on July 15, AQIM officially released its statement rejecting the Islamic State's caliphate. This confirms the authenticity of the message described below. This image is taken from Ansar al Sharia Tunisia's Facebook page, which reposted AQIM's statement rejecting the Islamic State's caliphate. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has purportedly released a statement rejecting the Islamic State's caliphate. And the group rejects the Islamic State's demand that all jihadists now swear bayat (or allegiance) to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed new caliph. We "confirm that we still adhere to our pledge of allegiance to our sheikh and emir, Ayman al Zawahiri, since it is a Sharia-accorded pledge of allegiance that remains hanging on our necks, and we do not see what requires use to break it," AQIM's statement reads. The message was first obtained and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group, which notes that it was posted on Twitter feeds that have not yet been authenticated by AQIM. The al Qaeda branch has operated multiple official Twitter feeds in the past, but they have taken

down. AQIM has not confirmed that the new Twitter sites that released the statement are, in fact, official. If the statement is not genuine, then we can expect AQIM to say so in short order. The statement is attributed to AQIM's official propaganda arm, the Al Andalus Foundation for Media Production, which is the only body authorized to disseminate AQIM's messages. And other jihadist groups have reposted the statement, which indicates that jihadists consider it authentic. In particular, Ansar al Sharia Tunisia, a jihadist organization that is affiliated with AQIM, reposted the message on its official Facebook page.The message attributed to AQIM begins by noting the jihadists' infighting in Syria, where the Islamic State has warred against its rivals, including the Al Nusrah Front, which is an official branch of al Qaeda. "We were silent throughout this period, not for our inability to speak or a shortcoming on our part, but fearing that our talk will be fuel for the fire of the burning sedition," AQIM says. The organization feared that "the enemies of the Muslims would take advantage of our words and transform them into a strike against a sect of the mujahideen, in a time when we hope to heal the rift and dissipate the plight." Next, AQIM reveals an interesting detail that was not publicly known. The al Qaeda branch apparently tried to help mediate the jihadists' feud in private. "It is not enough to have hope and be silent, so we sought in efforts to mend the conditions in secret, together with our brothers in the other jihadi fronts, in our belief that the disputes of the mujahideen should be resolved in secret, away from the ears and eyes of lurking enemy media." Other al Qaeda parties, including veteran jihadists dispatched by al Qaeda's senior leadership to Syria, have assisted in the mediation efforts as well. And in an audio message recorded in late February, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) said that it had "sought reconciliation between the mujahideen" and was "still trying our best in it." So, accepting the group's words at face value, AQIM joined this international coalition in attempting to resolve the ongoing dispute. Those efforts failed, leading al Qaeda's general command to disown the group now known as the Islamic State in early February. And in late June, after making advances in Iraq alongside allied organizations, the Islamic State declared itself a caliphate. This was a direct challenge to the authority of Ayman al Zawahiri and al Qaeda's senior leadership. AQIM rejects the Islamic State's caliphate, however. The al Qaeda group says while it too wants to resurrect the caliphate, the Islamic State has not followed the appropriate protocols. "The establishment of the rightly-guided Caliphate ... is the effort of every honest mujahid, and all organizations and known jihadi groups in their honest and the correctness of their method, strived and exerted their selves, and spilled blood, and spent money in the cause," AQIM says, according to SITE's translation. "It is obvious for the Muslims and all jihadi organizations that follow the correct method, that the announcement of such a serious step (meaning the establishment of the Caliphate), will not happen but after the expansion of consultation," AQIM's statement continues.Coordination with other jihadist groups and Islamic scholars is considered to be a crucial step in establishing the caliphate. But the Islamic State unilaterally did so, thereby ignoring numerous ideologues and leaders many jihadists believe should have been consulted. This is what AQIM means when it says "the expansion of consultation" is necessary before announcing a caliphate. In fact, AQIM says that it was previously consulted by the Islamic State with respect to the infighting in Syria, thereby making the Islamic State's failure to consult before the caliphate announcement all the more noteworthy. "We are not the ones who speak in secret if we say that when the signs of sedition appeared in Syria, our brothers in the [Islamic] State sent to us messages in which they made us aware of details of what happened, and it is an act for which we thank them, as we thanked them their trust in us," AQIM's statement reads. "Then why today, and the calamity is greater and the issue is more serious, do they make such an announcement without the advice of the leaders of the mujahideen, who have proven their sincerity and excellence, their advice for the Ummah, and

their efforts to establish the rightly-guided caliphate were proven[?]" Echoing the criticisms of other leading jihadists, AQIM wonders what the Islamic State's position is with respect to the Taliban, the Islamic Caucasus Emirate, and all of the "al Qaeda branches in other regions." The Islamic State's caliphate declaration can be read as an attempt to abrogate the authority of all these groups, which AQIM obviously does not think is justified. AQIM calls on a number of jihadist leaders to rectify the intra-jihadist conflict. Among the leaders mentioned in AQIM's statement are Ayman al Zawahiri, the heads of the other al Qaeda branches, Taliban emir Mullah Omar, and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (now called "Caliph Ibrahim" by his followers). Also included on AQIM's list of jihadists the group hopes can bring an end to the infighting is Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, a staunch critic of the Islamic State and its caliphate. AQIM wants the "scholars of the Ummah, led by the sheikhs of the mujahideen and their references, to give us a fatwa that is absolutely clear in this calamity, and to straighten our position if they see that it is crooked." Perhaps out of frustration that more has not been done to confront the Islamic State's caliphate claims, AQIM says, "The truth is our demand, so this is the time to speak the truth aloud and to guide the mujahideen." The al Qaeda group again implores the jihadi factions in Syria to end their war against one another. "We call upon the jihadi factions that are fighting against the [Islamic] State, and on top of them, our brothers in the Al Nusrah Front, to stop the campaign of incitement against it, and to commit to the order of their emir, Sheikh Ayman [al Zawahiri]," AQIM's statement reads, according to SITE's translation. "We also call on our brothers in the Islamic State to do the same. All this is to facilitate the reconciliation between them." Earlier this month, it was erroneously reported by some media outlets that AQIM had defected from al Qaeda's ranks and sworn bayat to the Islamic State. That reporting was based on a misreading of another statement issued by AQIM, in which the group praised the Islamic State's advances in Iraq. But even in that statement, AQIM referred to Zawahiri as the organization's "sheikh" and "emir." Assuming the latest statement from AQIM is authentic, the group makes clear that it is still loyal to Zawahiri, and doesn't think highly of the Islamic State's attempted power grab within the jihadist world. AQIM confirms that the formation of an Islamic Caliphate is AQIM's "demand" and that its members "are working towards" the goal through their jihad. The Islamic State's caliphate has not put an end to AQIM's quest. Nor, in AQIM's view, has the Islamic State successfully usurped al Qaeda's authority. While no other al Qaeda group has officially responded to the Islamic State's claims, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula released two messages earlier this month demonstrating that it also remains loyal to al Qaeda's senior leadership.

December 13 at 11:45 AM MUBI, Nigeria — With a military escort instead of the usual pomp, the Emir of Mubi was reinstalled Friday in his palace, where until recently flew the black-and-white flag of Nigeria’s Islamic extremists, Boko Haram. An army tank now guards Mubi’s town gate, fortified by sandbags, as residents return from the mountain hideouts where they hid while their city was held for more than a month by the militants. After weeks of setbacks and reports that soldiers ran away when Boko Haram attacked, Nigeria’s military, including newly deployed Special Forces, have gone on the offensive and have recaptured some cities and towns that had been held by Boko Haram.

Dec 12, Mali has confirmed that four Islamist militants were freed in exchange for the release of French hostage Serge Lazarevic this week. "Yes, we did it and we have done it for Malians before, too," said Justice Minister Mohamed Ali Bathily. Mr Lazarevic was seized by armed men in Mali in 2011 and was the last French hostage in the region still being held by al-Qaeda-linked militants. France had refused to confirm reports of a prisoner exchange. "Here

it concerned a citizen who comes from a country that came to help us, when our country was in a critical situation," Mr Bathily told France 24 television, referring to France's military intervention against insurgents in Mali last year. "The authorities of his country were fighting to release the hostages. Mali for its reputation and honour could only help to save the life of the hostage." Two members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) who allegedly took part in Mr Lazarevic's abduction have previously been named as having been released - Malians Mohamed Aly Ag Wadoussene and Haiba Ag Acherif. The Malian Human Rights Association told the BBC's Alex Duval Smith in Bamako it had learned that a further two militants, Tunisian national Oussama Ben Gouzzi and Habib Ould Mahouloud, from Western Sahara, were released last week.

AQIM’s Threat to Western Interests in the SahelApril 28, 2014 Author(s): Samuel L. AronsonAlready one of the most volatile and impoverished regions of the world,[1] Africa’s Sahel has been on the forefront of U.S. foreign policy following the coup d’état in Mali in 2012. The subsequent French military intervention, Operation Serval, served to disorganize extremists and stabilize the region, including the neighboring countries of Niger, Algeria, Nigeria, and Mauritania. Yet in a region with vast open land, weak central governments, and porous borders, terrorist groups are able to operate transnationally with few restraints. Although the Sahel region has been viewed by some policymakers as lacking significant Western political and economic interests, there has been moderate oil and gas drilling over the last decade along with mining operations, including for gold and uranium.[2] As is commonplace in post-colonial Francophone Africa, a sense of hostility still exists toward French nationals, thus contributing to the difficulties of conducting business or residing in the region as a Westerner. Nevertheless, the Sahel has a sizeable presence of Western aid workers, extractive industry employees, faith-based personnel, and, to a lesser extent, diplomats and tourists.[3] Since the rebranding from a domestic Algerian Salafist group to al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in early 2007, a number of offshoots and other terrorist organizations have formed in the region, including Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s katibat (battalion) al-Murabitun (Those Who Remain Steadfast), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Boko Haram, and its splinter group, Ansaru.[4] While each of these groups has a unique context and dynamic, it is widely recognized that, in recent years, they have—at the very least—communicated with one another.[5] Less clear, however, is the extent of inter-group collaboration and the subsequent threat increase to Western interests. The possibility of continued or increased collaboration in the near future makes it important to examine two typologies of motivation—criminal kidnap-for-ransom and politically-motivated terrorism—insofar as they highlight an analytical distinction between attacks. Since the start of Operation Serval, several larger terrorist attacks have occurred in the Sahel, underscoring cooperation between groups and indicating a potential shift from the former to the latter. With an emphasis on the private sector, this article explores four central findings. First, it highlights the linkages between AQIM, Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s al-Murabitun brigade, Boko Haram, and Ansaru. Second, it finds a notable (and possibly temporary) shift from criminality to politically-motivated terrorism. Third, it finds that among the most threatened interests in the Sahel are extractive companies operating near border regions. Lastly, it finds that the adaptability of Belmokhtar makes him one of the region’s greatest near-term threats to Western interests.Linkages; Although collaboration was once questioned, it is now widely indicated that AQIM has linkages to al-Murabitun, MUJAO, and the Nigerian terrorist groups Boko Haram and Ansaru.[6] To understand this relationship, however, it is important to examine the historical context. AQIM was formed in January 2007, formally rebranding from its previous

name, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The official affiliation with al-Qa`ida—beginning several months prior—was largely seen as an effort to maintain relevancy as an extremist group on the global stage, but the group’s interest was still strictly regional in nature. The GSPC, formed in 1998, was itself a derivative of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).[7] While much of the overarching ideology—a leading tenet of which is a Salafist Qur’anic interpretation—remains static, smaller philosophical and personal disagreements ultimately led to numerous spinoffs and splinter cells.[8] In the wake of a personality dispute with AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel and other subordinate leaders in northern Mali, Belmokhtar split from the group and formed the katibat al-Mulathamin (The Veiled Ones).[9] Belmokhtar’s group merged with MUJAO in August 2013 to create al-Murabitun.[10] Notwithstanding whether any of these groups continue to work with AQIM and its leader Droukdel, it is widely understood that the various units under Belmokhtar’s control claim allegiance to al-Qa`ida core, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri.[11]The study of Sahelian terrorism must also consider the Nigerian violent extremist groups Boko Haram and its 2012 splinter Ansaru. The linkages between these two groups and AQIM are less clear. When Boko Haram first transitioned into a jihadist group after 2009,[12] most scholars and policymakers dismissed its affiliation with AQIM and al-Qa`ida core as only rhetoric.[13] The idea that an inexperienced domestic insurgency from northeast Nigeria would be embraced by the broader transnational jihadist community was rebuked as aspirational at best. Yet, by the summer of 2009, evidence suggested that Boko Haram members were training with AQIM.[14] In 2010, AQIM leader Droukdel declared that AQIM would provide Boko Haram with weapons, support, and training.[15] This collaboration between Boko Haram and AQIM is supported by public statements from both groups, as well as clear indications that Boko Haram’s suicide attack on the United Nations office in Abuja, Nigeria, in 2011 employed tactics that were strikingly similar to bombings by AQIM.[16]This again revealed that terrorist groups in the Sahel are adaptive. Differences in ideology are not mutually exclusive in group membership, funding, and coordination. On the contrary, splinters of AQIM, such as al-Murabitun and the AQIM ally in northern Mali, Ansar al-Din,[17] collaborate at least marginally. There is even some evidence that Boko Haram and its splinter group Ansaru have both trained and coordinated with AQIM, al-Qa`ida core, and even Somalia’s al-Shabab.[18]Sahelian terrorist organizations appear willing to change their names and sacrifice personal and ideological variances. The merger of al-Mulathamin and MUJAO in August 2013 (themselves splinters of AQIM) created a larger and better coordinated group, al-Murabitun, which is asserting its prominence in the region.[19] A statement sent to Nouakchott Information Agency in January 2014 reiterated Belmokhtar’s desire to continue attacks against “France and her allies” in the Sahel.[20] Keeping in mind the limitations of forecasting, it is clear that al-Murabitun’s intent, capability, and access throughout the region are likely a continued threat to Western interests. Against the backdrop of Boko Haram’s legacy of domestic insurgency in Nigeria, Ansaru and even some actors within Boko Haram have demonstrated a capability and desire to continue executing attacks against Western interests. A video statement[21] by Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in February 2014 reiterated the group’s aspirational intent to harm Western interests throughout Nigeria (including the oil-rich delta region[22]) and into neighboring Cameroon and Niger.Borderless Kidnapping Belmokhtar’s legacy of kidnapping spans more than a decade. A seasoned Islamist militant with experience in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the early 1990s, he returned to Algeria in 1993 and rose through the ranks of the GIA and, later, the GSPC.[23] Belmokhtar’s successes at making money through smuggling cigarettes, narcotics, and possibly humans[24] foreshadowed his alleged political motivation with al-Murabitun. Belmokhtar was not simply raising money to fund jihad and insurgencies in Africa. On the

contrary, while a portion of the profits surely financed the operational overhead costs of the group, a sizeable minority also benefited him and his associates personally.[25] Belmokhtar is able to ensure his leadership role and prominence in the region by controlling financial opportunities for his associates and followers. In April 2003, the GSPC—of which Belmokhtar was an active member—took 32 Europeans hostage in northern Mali in his first major kidnapping operation.[26] The group subsequently released all but one hostage (who died in the desert) in return for a ransom payment of more than $6 million.[27] Dozens of small-scale kidnappings of Western tourists, diplomats, aid workers, and extractive industry personnel since that time have netted Belmokhtar an estimated $50 million in ransom payments.[28] AQIM as a group is estimated to have made more than $90 million in total ransom profits from 2003 to 2013.[29]Motivational; Shift? A major shift in Belmokhtar’s tactics and procedures occurred at the end of 2012 following his split from AQIM. In the days following France’s Operation Serval in northern Mali in January 2013, Belmokhtar instructed several dozen followers to attack a gas facility near In Amenas, Algeria—within 50 miles of the Libyan border—taking nearly 800 hostages. At least 39 foreign workers, including three Americans, were killed in the attack and ensuing Algerian military rescue operation.[30] In his claim of responsibility, Belmokhtar stated that the attack was in response to the Algerian government granting airspace access to France, and he threatened to kill dozens of more captives if France did not put an end to its military operation in northern Mali.[31]His justification for the attack was questionable for two reasons. First, the scale of the attack took precision and preparation that would likely have taken weeks, if not longer, to coordinate. Procuring an arsenal of weaponry and explosives for several dozen militants in less than a week is not likely. Second, his alleged motivation for the attack is inconsistent with nearly two decades of Belmokhtar’s patterns and priorities. To be sure, Belmokhtar is known for his ability to adapt, even managing to escape arrest and capture reportedly seven times.[32] This was not the first time he had justified his actions with political ideology, but it had previously been peripheral to his criminality. The magnitude of the attack at In Amenas, however, indicated a more coherent motivation that resonated with Salafi-jihadis worldwide.[33] Nevertheless, significant indications point toward the overt justification of political ideology to shadow what was likely an attempt to obtain a hefty ransom payment.This suggested shift in motivation was again seen in Niger in May 2013. Two simultaneous attacks were conducted by MUJAO and al-Mulathamin, targeting a French uranium mine not far from the Algerian border and a military camp housing French forces in central Niger.[34] These attacks employed similar tactics and weaponry as the Algerian gas facility siege but included the use of suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs).[35] Belmokhtar’s spokesman immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks, stating they were in response to the government in Niger cooperating with the French.[36]The work of Belmokhtar and AQIM after 2012 must be examined in the context of both political terrorism and criminal kidnap-for-ransom. When analyzing the attacks through a lens of criminality, it appears that Belmokhtar is a savvy businessman who manipulatively leverages purported jihadist ideology to inspire supporters and solicit ransom payments by governments and private organizations. Whether his political motivation may be insincere is largely peripheral to mitigating the threat of kidnapping in the Sahel. Nevertheless, it underscores that Belmokhtar is a businessman who is willing to adapt as necessary to engage in kidnap-for-ransom. When examined through a lens of political ideology, Belmokhtar’s Salafi-jihadi tendencies are a result of his decades-long affiliation with al-Qa`ida core in Afghanistan and Pakistan[37] and his role as a respected Islamist figure in North and West Africa. As a former leader of AQIM and a supporter of various related factions such as MUJAO, Boko Haram and Ansaru, Belmokhtar is viewed as an amir of Salafi-jihadism in a

region that is predominantly Muslim. The French intervention in Mali may have reinforced his belief that Western governments are attacking Islam to exert political and economic influence in Mali.Indeed, as both typologies are feasible within the context of Belmokhtar’s activity, a third explanation may exist. Insofar as evidence points to Belmokhtar as a businessman and a radical amir, it is quite likely that his actions are motivated by both money and ideology. More debatable is the balance between these motivations, which is far from confirmed and remains fluid. As the UN Security Council continues to push governments and private sector organizations to cease paying ransoms,[38] the notion of political terrorism vis-à-vis criminality becomes a more beneficial way to instill fear in Westerners while still producing funds through soliciting ransoms.The international community recognizes this transitive move by violent extremist organizations in the Sahel. Resolutions 1904 and 2133, passed by the United Nations Security Council in 2009 and 2014, respectively, forbid the payment of ransoms to groups affiliated with al-Qa`ida. While the U.S. and UK governments categorically follow this policy, European states have been slower to follow suit. The lack of any real enforcement mechanism inhibits the motivation for governments, and even private sector organizations, to stop paying ransoms, leading to off-the-record deals with kidnappers and hefty payments to AQIM and its affiliates, averaging $5.4 million per ransom in 2011—an increase of nearly $1 million from the year prior.[39] Multinational kidnap-for-ransom insurance, consulting, and negotiating firms charge premiums to lone businessmen and large corporations alike, creating an insurance and consulting market worth roughly $500 million in 2011.[40] The primary advice given by most kidnap consulting and negotiation firms is to not contact the U.S. or host-country governments, but rather communicate solely with the firm.[41]U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power stated in relation to al-Qa`ida, “We know that hostage takers looking for ransoms distinguish between those governments that pay ransoms and those that do not—and that they make a point of not taking hostages from those countries that refuse to make concessions.”[42] There is even a credible belief among policy experts that U.S. and British citizens are less likely to be kidnapped but more likely to be killed as a result of the U.S. and UK governments’ categorical refusal to pay ransoms. One such instance was the 2009 kidnapping of a British citizen in Niger, who was subsequently held and killed in Mali.[43] On the contrary, French and other European hostages have historically been released in exchange for ransom payments.[44]Greatest Near-Term Threat to the West The U.S. Department of State continues to warn against the threats posed by violent extremist groups in Africa’s Sahel. In response to attacks and kidnappings that specifically targeted private sector organizations in Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and elsewhere in the region, the U.S. government declared AQIM, Belmokhtar’s al-Murabitun (al-Mulathamin), and separately Ansaru and Boko Haram as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.[45] Additionally, the State Department’s Rewards for Justice Program has offered rewards of up to $5 million and $7 million on Mokhtar Belmokhtar[46] and Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau,[47] respectively.Two trends are evident when analyzing the attacks and kidnappings conducted in the Sahel during the last five years. First, Western private sector groups—non-governmental organizations (NGOs), corporations and even tourists—are the targets of choice for AQIM, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and Ansaru.[48] Second, patterns of target and location have appeared. At most risk are the extractive industries (mining, oil and energy, and construction) operating near border regions.[49] Evidenced through the work of Ansaru in 2012 and al-Mulathamin/MUJAO in 2013, there have been at least seven separate incidents affecting the extractive sector since 2010, all within 250 miles from a border.[50] While the most fatal was the January 2013 attack near In Amenas, Algeria, numerous smaller incidents occurred in

Niger and northern Nigeria. Indeed, companies in the extractive industry are likely to retain kidnap-for-ransom insurance and have a set precedent for paying ransoms, compared with NGOs and private citizens who may lack financial resources. Conducting attacks near borders often allows militants and kidnappers to cross into a neighboring country undetected.Conclusion; As France’s Operation Serval begins to draw down in northern Mali and successful Western and Sahelian counterterrorism operations continue to rid the region of senior terrorists,[51] the Sahel is still a critical area to monitor during the coming years.[52] The combination of weak central governments, porous borders, and vast open land allows terrorist groups such as AQIM and Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s al-Murabitun to operate with few restraints.These terrorist groups have collaborated with Boko Haram and its splinter group Ansaru in Nigeria, highlighting the linkages between various actors—even those with marginally different ideologies and objectives—and the adaptivity of terrorism in the Sahel. While the January 2013 French military incursion in Mali motivated terrorists in the region to justify hostage taking and armed assaults, it is clear that kidnap-for-ransom still plays a largely financial and criminal role in the operations of Belmokhtar and his associates. When taking into account recent terrorism incidents in the Sahel and statements by Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Boko Haram’s Abubakar Shekau, a pattern emerges, revealing that extractive companies operating near borders face the most risk. With increasing counterterrorism resources devoted to the Sahel in recent years, it is clear that extremist actors in the region remain a significant threat to Western interests.Samuel L. Aronson is the West Africa analyst at the U.S. Department of State’s Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). His research background lies in counterterrorism partnerships and capacity building in Africa. He holds an M.Sc. from the London School of Economics, is fluent in Swahili, and conversational in Somali. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. Government.[1] “Sahel: Backgrounder on the Sahel, West Africa’s Poorest Region,” Integrated Regional Information Networks, June 2, 2008.[2] John Campbell and J. Peter Pham, “Does Washington Have a Stake in the Sahel?” Council on Foreign Relations, January 14, 2014; Franklin Charles Graham IV, “Abductions, Kidnappings and Killings in the Sahel and Sahara,” Review of African Political Economy 38:130 (2011).[3] Carlos Echeverria Jesús, “Kidnappings as a Terrorist Instrument of AQIM and the MUJAO,” Paix et sécurité internationales: revue maroco-espagnole de droit international et relations internationales, 2013.[4] These groups have been covered extensively within both academic and policy literature. For more background, see previous issues of the CTC Sentinel or The National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) “2014 Counterterrorism Calendar: Terrorist Groups,” available at www.nctc.gov/site/groups/.[5] “LRA, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa,” testimony by the coordinator for counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 25, 2012.[6] Ibid.[7] Ibid.[8] Paul Cruickshank, “Algeria Gas Facility Attack Fuels Jihadist Rivalry,” CNN, January 30, 2013; Jacob Zenn, “Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali Intervention,” CTC Sentinel 6:3 (2013).[9] “AQIM Leaders Belmokhtar and Abdelmalek Droukdel Split,” Militant Leadership Monitor 3:12 (2012).[10] “2014 Counterterrorism Calendar: Terrorist Groups.”[11] Eric Ouellet et al., “The Institutionalization of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2014; personal interview, anonymous, U.S. Embassy, Niamey, Niger, January 21, 2014.[12] Boko Haram “…has gained recent notoriety because of its transition from being a local radical Salafist group, which until 2009 had a largely quietest nature, to a Salafi-jihadi group that has demonstrated the capacity to carry out major operations…” See David Cook, “The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria,” CTC Sentinel 4:9 (2011).[13] Zenn.[14] “Boko Haram: Growing Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, September 13, 2013.[15] Ibid.[16] Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, “Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria,” West African Politics and Society Series 2 (2014); personal interview, anonymous, U.S. Embassy, Abuja, Nigeria, January 17, 2014.[17] The alliance between AQIM and Ansar al-Din is detailed in the U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Terrorist Organization designation, March 21, 2013, available at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/206493.htm.[18] “LRA, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa.”[19] Seth G. Jones, “The Extremist Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” House Committee on Homeland Security, January, 15, 2014; General David M. Rodriguez, “Posture Hearing,” Senate Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2014.[20] “Terror Group Threatens France over Mali,” Associated Press, January 6, 2014; “Les Mourabitoune de l’Azawad menacent de s’en prendre a la France et ses allies,” Agence Nouakchott d’Information, January 4, 2014.

[21] “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Threatens Oil Refineries, Muslim Clerics,” Voice of America, February 20, 2014.[22] The likelihood of a Boko Haram attack in Nigeria’s Delta is currently deemed as low, although the implications of an attempted suicide bombing or armed assault would be much greater.[23] “Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar,” BBC, June 4, 2013.[24] Andrew Black, “Mokhtar Belmokhtar: The Algerian Jihad’s Southern Amir,” Terrorism Monitor 7:12 (2009).[25] Belmokhtar was reportedly forced out of AQIM for, in the words of one Malian official, “straying from the right path.” Some members of AQIM questioned his devotion to Salafi-jihadism and believed his interests lied in criminality and smuggling. Also see ibid.; personal interview, anonymous, U.S. Embassy, Niamey, Niger, January 21, 2014.[26] “Les disparus du Sahara seraient les otages d’un groupe terroriste islamiste,” Le Monde, April 17, 2003. The exact role of Belmokhtar in this operation is not entirely agreed on by policy experts. The public leader of the GSPC operation, however, was Amari Saifi (also known as El Para).[27] Jesús.[28] “Statement on Reported Killing of Mokhtar Belmokhtar,” U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 2, 2013.[29] “Millions in Ransoms Fuel Militants’ Clout in West Africa,” New York Times, December 12, 2012.[30] “Timeline of the In Amenas Siege,” Guardian, January 25, 2013.[31] “New Video Message from Katibat al-Mulathamin’s Khalid Abu al ‘Abbas (Mukhtar bin Muhammad Bilmukhtar): Claiming Responsibility for the In Aménas Operation,” Jihadology, January 22, 2013.[32] “‘This is the Eighth Time’ — Caution Greets Reports of Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s Death,” Independent, March 3, 2013; personal interview, Jeremy Keenan, University of London, February 2014.[33] “Regional Security Lessons from the Attack on Algeria’s In Amenas Gas Plant,” U.S. Institute of Peace, January 23, 2013.[34] “Suicide Bombings in Niger Kill Dozens in Dual Strikes,” New York Times, May 23, 2013.[35] SVBIEDs were rarely used by AQIM and Mokhtar Belmokhtar prior to this attack.[36] “Statement in Belmokhtar’s Name Claims Role in Niger Attacks,” Financial Times, May 24, 2013.[37] William Thornberry and Jaclyn Levy, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 1, 2011.[38] “Ransom Business: Blood Money,” Economist, November 6, 2013; “U.N. Security Council Urges End to Ransom Payments to Extremists,” Reuters, January 27, 2014.[39] “Remarks of Under Secretary David Cohen at Chatham House on ‘Kidnapping for Ransom: The Growing Terrorist Financing Challenge,’” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 5, 2012.[40] “Kidnap and Ransom Insurance. I’m a Client…Get me Out of Here,” Economist, June 27, 2013.[41] This notion has been reiterated numerous times during interviews between this author and private sector corporate executives, NGOs, and security vendors.[42] “Statement by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on the Adoption of UNSCR 2133 on Kidnapping for Ransom,” United States Mission to the United Nations, January 27, 2014.[43] “Al-Qaeda Kills British Hostage,” al-Jazira, June 4, 2009.[44] “No More Ransoms Paid for French Hostages, Hollande Tells Families,” Radio France Internationale, March 19, 2013.[45] See list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, available at www.state.gov/j/ct/list.[46] “Rewards for Justice Program: Mokhtar Belmokhtar (2014),” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, available at www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?page=belmokhtar&language=english.[47] “Rewards for Justice Program: Abubakar Shekau (2014),” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, available at www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?page=shekau&language=english.[48] This statement is not necessarily true for Boko Haram. It is believed that Boko Haram operates primarily as a domestic insurgency—confined to a region of Nigeria with few Westerners—rather than a transnational jihadist organization, although this article makes clear its relationship with al-Qa`ida and its affiliates.[49] To be sure, the relationship between the target and location is not necessarily causal; there may be additional variables that are not yet evident to this author. Regardless, the history of attacks affecting extractive companies near borders in the Sahel is worth noting.[50] Personal interview, anonymous, U.S. Embassy, Niamey, Niger, January 21, 2014; Jesús.[51] This claim is evidenced by many articles in major media publications during 2013.[52] See the statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Linda Thomas-Greenfield on October 30, 2013.