Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 3-15-CEBy Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence.

Remember: “The Nafir1 to Crimea has started and Turkey is the starting point.”

3-14-CE. "Of course, there are those who are fighting for faith, for an idea, but you can't call it a holy war. Cutting throats in front of a camera isn't jihad. And in my five months there I did not see any suffering women or starving kids. And there were many people who thought as I did, that it was all true, and that's why they went there, having left their homes," RIA quotes Magomed S. as saying.

Hence it is right of our Muslim brothers in the Caucuses to perform Jihad against the Russian aggressor and its allies. --- Zawahiri2

Ali Abu Muhammad al Dagestani, who succeeded Doku Umarov as the emir of ICE in March 2014, has steadfastly supported al Qaeda and the Taliban throughout the controversy over the Islamic State’s rise. He has continued to do so even as some Chechen jihadists, including Abu Omar al Shishani, have risen to prominent positions within Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s organization. In late June 2014, Dagestani released a video in which he discussed the efficacy of suicide bombings and the necessity of avoiding civilian casualties. Dagestani referred to Ayman al Zawahiri as “our leader” in the video and noted that Zawahiri has “urged rebels to avoid places where civilians gather.” The ICE emir was likely referencing the jihadist guidelines issued by al Qaeda under Zawahiri’s direction. Al Qaeda is attempting to limit the jihadists’ civilian casualties in the Muslim majority world as it tries to build a broader base of popular support. In September 2014, Dagestani released another video addressing Zawahiri and other leading jihadist ideologues as the “scholars of the ummah,” or international community of Muslims. All of the other scholars addressed by the ICE head in the video back al Qaeda in its rivalry with the Islamic State. The other scholars included: Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, Hani al Sibai, Tariq Abd al Halim, and Abu Qatada al Filistini, all of whom have criticized Baghdadi.

The Islamic Caucasus Emirate's (ICE) leader in Dagestan, Said Arakanskiy, denounced the jihadists who defected to the Islamic State in a newly-released video.

• If Dagestan were to disintegrate in a Yugoslavia-type scenario, it would almost certainly trigger the splitting apart of the two bi-national republics in the region (Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria), demands for the formation of a unified Circassian republic, and challenges along the borders of every other republic in the region. Consequently, Moscow and Makhachkala are likely to do everything they can to maintain the status quo. But the fact that many are now questioning whether that is possible should be a wakeup call for everyone concerned about the region.

1 http://counterjihadreport.com/tag/nafir/ The Islamic Arabic term “Nafir” is a call to action that requires any member of a jihadi group to travel to the country Nafir is called against and participate in a holy war in the name of Allah. Nafir was declared in the early stages of the conflicts in Syria and Egypt, and it helped spark jihadi migrations into these nations. In this case, there’s no evidence yet of radical Muslim fighters flocking to Crimea to team up with the Muslim minority living there, but the #NafirforUkraine hashtag has been used more than 1,000 times, predominantly in tweets from Saudi Arabia.

2 https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/dr-ayman-al-e1ba93awc481hirc4ab-22general-guidelines-for-the-work-of-a-jihc481dc4ab22-en.pdf

• As elements of the Islamic State (IS) infiltrate the territory of the North Caucasus, the looming question is whether the caliphate will have an actual impact on the situation in the region

• the head of the administration of Chechnya’s governor and government, Magomed Daudov, said “over 3,000 of our young guys” are fighting in Syria on the side of the radicals. This was the first time a Russian official put forward such a large figure for the number of militants in Russia

• In any case, whether the 3,000 figure included only Chechens or all citizens of Russia who are fighting in Syria, the figure is double the figure cited by Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Alexander Bortnikov during his appearance at a recent summit in Washington, DC, at almost the same time Daudov was speaking in Grozny.

If the number of Muslim volunteers from Russia continues to increase, Russia could become the main supplier of manpower for the jihadists in Syria and Iraq by the end of 2015.

Were Chechen Security Personnel Responsible For Nemtsov's Death? Recently, Boris Nemtsov questioned the rationale for the grandiose rally of security personnel Ramzan Kadyrov held in Grozny in late December, at which Kadyrov affirmed that he had at his disposal 10,000 volunteers loyal to Vladimir Putin who are ready "to carry out any command" in order to defend stability in Russia. March 01, 2015 for many in both Russia and the West, the Kremlin is inevitably the prime suspect in the February 27 assassination of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov. But the possibility of a Chechen connection should not be dismissed out of hand, given Nemtsov's repeated criticism of Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov, and the fact that since 2011, security personnel loyal to Kadyrov have reportedly engaged with total impunity in abductions and killings in Moscow. Alternatively, Kadyrov's men may have killed Nemtsov at Russian President Vladimir Putin's behest.The independent Novaya Gazeta investigated those reports, and met with Federal Security Service (FSB) staffers who in 2013 threatened to resign to protest prosecutors' refusal to bring charges against a group of Moscow-based Chechen Interior Ministry personnel arrested on suspicion of such killings. Instead, the men were released.The website Caucasus Knot recalls that four years ago Kadyrov publicly called for Nemtsov to be imprisoned in light of his role in the mass protests in Moscow in December 2010. Nemtsov responded by branding Kadyrov "a psychologically very sick man" in need of urgent medical care. Nemtsov expressed regret that such men control the entire Caucasus, adding that he hoped that "eventually he will be dismissed and have to answer for everything."In May 2014, Nemtsov addressed a formal request to FSB Director Aleksandr Bortnikov to investigate reports that Chechen security personnel were being infiltrated into eastern Ukraine to fight on the side of the pro-Russian separatists. More recently, Nemtsov questioned the rationale for the grandiose rally of security personnel Kadyrov convened in Grozny in late December, at which Kadyrov affirmed that he had at his disposal 10,000 volunteers loyal to Putin who are ready "to carry out any command" in order to defend stability in Russia. Nemtsov estimated the Kremlin's annual subsidies to Chechnya at 60 billion rubles ($974.77 million) and predicted that in light of Russia's economic problems, "the unspoken contract between Kadyrov and Putin -- money in exchange for loyalty -- is coming to an end."

History With Chechnya; Nemtsov was born in Sochi, on the fringe of the Caucasus, and his engagement in Chechnya dates back to at least 1997, when as fuel and energy minister he and then-Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko jointly persuaded the Chechen leadership headed by President Aslan Maskhadov to repair the Baku-Tikhoretsk-Novorossiisk oil pipeline, according to Argumenty I Fakty, No. 37, September 2001.In December 2000, Nemtsov, then a State Duma deputy representing the Union of Rightist Forces, and fellow parliament members met in Moscow with Maskhadov's emissaries in the hope of launching formal talks to end the war that had erupted one year earlier.As a basis for such talks, Nemtsov had drafted a five-point peace plan under which Chechnya would have broad autonomy within the Russian Federation, but would "never" become independent. Instead, it would become a parliamentary republic with a civilian non-Chechen governor-general, who would be in charge of all "administrative, financial, political and military power in the republic." The stipulation that the governor-general should not be a Chechen meant that had Nemtsov's plan been endorsed and implemented, Kadyrov's father Akhmed-hadji, then Putin's appointed satrap in Chechnya, would have been sidelined.That governor-general would seek to reach agreement by January 2003 with all influential Chechen leaders, including Maskhadov. In the event that deadline was not met, Nemtsov advocated splitting Chechnya, with the northern lowlands being incorporated into Stavropol Krai and separated by border fortifications from the southern mountains where the resistance had taken refuge. The plan also provided for state assistance to Chechens forced to flee during the fighting.In September 2001, Nemtsov reportedly incurred Putin's ire by travelling to Chechnya to deliver computers to two schools in the Achkhoi-Martan district southwest of Grozny. Putin reportedly responded by issuing an ultimatum to Nemtsov: either conclude a peace deal with the Chechens within one month or resign from the State Duma. Ramzan Kadyrov, for his part, was quoted as affirming in an Instagram post that there could be "no doubt" that Western intelligence services intent on destabilizing the situation in Russia were behind Nemtsov's death. Kadyrov also commented that Nemtsov was not impressed by his efforts to rebuild Chechnya. -- Liz Fuller

FSB Director Says Islamic State fighters Include 1,700 Russian Citizens February 26, 2015 -- Volume 12, Issue 36 As elements of the Islamic State (IS) infiltrate the territory of the North Caucasus, the looming question is whether the caliphate will have an actual impact on the situation in the region. As of now, it can be said with certainty that little has changed in the region since multiple rebel commanders of the Dagestani and the Chechen jamaats switched sides from the Caucasus Emirate to the IS in December 2014. However, this does not mean that there will be no impact in the near future. In a recent video, Yakub (Makhram Saidov), a well-known amir who pledged allegiance to the IS, addresses someone named Aslanbek and says that the insurgency is faring well in the cold winter. Saidov’s career as a militant dates back to the beginning of the second Russian-Chechen war and he is one of the few surviving militants on the territory of Chechnya today. In the video, Saidov is probably addressing Aslanbek Vadalov, and from his words it can be understood that Vadalov had not been in the North Caucasus for a long time (YouTube, February 21). It is also clear from the video that the insurgents are experiencing difficulties in food supplies as a result of their supplier’s fears and subsequent escape to the West. Amir Yakub does not discuss the insurgents’ plans or the nature of his relations with the leader of the Chechen velayat of the Caucasus Emirate, Amir Hamzat (Aslan Byutukaev). He only discusses practical information about the daily lives of members of his group: indeed, the

newly converted follower of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi does not say anything about what he plans to do or not to do. Presumably, having pledged allegiance to the IS, the militants now expect some response or directions from Umar Shishani, the ethnic Chechen from Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge who is an Islamic State senior commander. Meanwhile, Chechen authorities are concerned about a possible increase in activities of militants with ties to the IS. On February 19, a meeting of the Youth Council of the North Caucasian Federal District in Grozny took place under the chairmanship of Moscow’s envoy to the North Caucasus, Sergei Melikov (Chechnyatoday.com, February 19). Speaking of the young people’s inclination to join radical movements, the head of the administration of Chechnya’s governor and government, Magomed Daudov, said “over 3,000 of our young guys” are fighting in Syria on the side of the radicals (YouTube, February 20, at 9 minutes, 52 seconds). This was the first time a Russian official put forward such a large figure for the number of militants in Russia. It is unclear, however, if the official meant militants from all over Russia or only Chechens, given that he started speaking of the issue as a Russian issue, but then referred to “our young guys.” According to Daudov, a round table that included around 10 young persons who had returned from Syria took place in Grozny. Thus it appears there are people returning to the region from the Syrian war, and the official expressed concern that others will follow. The figure was echoed by the envoy, Sergei Melikov, who said that those 3,000 young men were lost for society and expressed the wish that they never return home. In any case, whether the 3,000 figure included only Chechens or all citizens of Russia who are fighting in Syria, the figure is double the figure cited by Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Alexander Bortnikov during his appearance at a recent summit in Washington, DC, at almost the same time Daudov was speaking in Grozny. Bortnikov told journalists at the end of the summit that the number of Russian citizens fighting with the IS has almost doubled to 1,700 from a year ago (Echo.msk.ru, February 20). It is unclear why the officials in Grozny spoke of 3,000 militants. One possibility is that the officials in Chechnya meant all Chechens, not only from Chechnya proper, but also from Europe, Turkey and the Middle East—in other words, Chechens who went abroad to study or left Chechnya during the war there. In any case, this figure is quite large and testifies to the rise of Islamic radicalism in Chechen society. It should be noted that if the 3,000 militants fighting in Syria include only Chechens, hundreds of people from Dagestan, the Volga region and Moscow should be added to it. A group called “Nogai Steppe” even exists (Kavkazcenter.com, February 19). Thus, it is now possible to discern a trend of every ethnic group in Russia attempting to establish its own national unit in Syria. These estimates are consistent with the estimates of a Canadian expert, Rafal Rogozinsky, who says that about 4,000 militants in the IS come from Central Asia alone (Novostimira.com, October 20, 2014). It appears that the countries of the former Soviet Union are supplying a significant portion of the IS’s manpower for waging jihad in the Middle East. Against the backdrop of these pieces of information, it is likely that FSB Director Bortnikov deliberately provided a low figure, in an attempt to downplay the level of danger Russia faces after its citizens return home from fighting in the Middle East. Moscow will urgently have to seek closer relations with Turkey, which has become the key transit country for those traveling to and from Syria. For Russia, Turkey is the only channel to obtain at least some level of on-the-ground intelligence about the jihadists fighting in Syria. If the number of Muslim volunteers from Russia continues to increase, Russia could become the main supplier of manpower for the jihadists in Syria and Iraq by the end of 2015.

--Mairbek Vatchagaev

Though the security situation has improved in Russia's turbulent North Caucasus, which for years has been plagued by almost daily battles between police and Islamic insurgents, the reduced number of fatalities seen in 2014 may just be the calm before the storm, analysts said 3. "This may be the end of the Caucasus Emirate [a militant jihadist organization], but that doesn't please me. Because I know that instead of them, someone else will come along to fill that void, maybe the Islamic State, maybe some other group that's even worse," "Despite the substantial reduction in the number of fatalities and the successes of Russian law enforcement, we believe that what is more important is the nature of the conflict … and that hasn't changed," Shvedov said, noting that security services had continued to exercise a heavy hand, especially in Chechnya. "The fact that some leaders of the Caucasus Emirate in Dagestan have pledged loyalty to the IS shows not only that the Caucasus Emirate has been weakened, but that there is room for another group to take over," The atmosphere of fear perpetuated by Kadyrov's tactics, the economic recession and the return of fighters from Syria could prove to be the perfect storm for the next generation of young men in the North Caucasus, Shvedov said. "They will become the new leaders, they will come to the foreground and they may organize new bombings, … and from this group of people we may see a new insurgent leader in the North Caucasus."

--- said Grigory Shvedov, a human rights activist and the editor of news site Kavkazky Uzel, speaking at a seminar on the North Caucasus insurgency in Moscow.

New jihadist leader in Dagestan denounces Islamic State defectorsBy THOMAS JOSCELYN, LWJ February 16, 2015

The Islamic Caucasus Emirate's (ICE) leader in Dagestan, Said Arakanskiy, denounced the jihadists who defected to the Islamic State in a newly-released video. Arakanskiy's short speech, totaling two minutes and 30 seconds, was released via the Vilayat Dagestan's official

web site and on its Twitter feed on Feb. 14. A screen shot from the video, showing Arakanskiy, can be seen above. The Vilayat Dagestan is one of ICE's official "provinces." Its former leader and some of his allies broke their allegiance to ICE emir Ali Abu Mukhammad al Dagestani late last year. This provoked a swift backlash from Dagestani, who quickly appointed Arakanskiy as ICE's new leader in Dagestan. [See LWJ report, Dagestani

jihadist swears allegiance to Islamic State, invoking backlash.]In the new video, Arakanskiy makes it clear that he is an ICE loyalist who will not be following the defectors. "I, emir of Vilayat Dagestan of the Caucasus Emirate, pledge allegiance to our emir Sheikh Abu Mukhammad [al Dagestani], may God protect him, [and I swear] that I will obey him and follow him in trouble and joy whether I like it or not, as long as he follows Koran and the Sunnah [the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed]," Arakanskiy says, according to a translation obtained by The Long War Journal.Arakanskiy continues by addressing the "mujahideen brothers who have renounced their allegiance to" Ali Abu Mukhammad al Dagestani and "sworn allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi," the leader of the Islamic State. He argues that these defectors "should not split the ranks of mujahideen because it makes non-believers happy and weakens jihad." Not only do they no longer follow Dagestani, they have abandoned the "scholars of jihad," Arakanskiy

3 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/experts-say-conflict-in-north-caucasus-waning-but-far-from-over/516142.html

says. The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has created an interesting dynamic in the jihadists' world. Baghdadi's henchmen have tried to peel off some of the jihadists allied with al Qaeda's international network. They have had some success in this regard, as demonstrated by Vilayat Dagestan's leadership crisis. By the same token, however, the Islamic State's rivalry with al Qaeda has also further exposed the degree to which al Qaeda commands the loyalty of jihadists who have not been publicly recognized as being a part of Ayman al Zawahiri's organization. Al Qaeda is known to hide its hand in some groups. For instance, the Al Nusrah Front in Syria was a part of al Qaeda's network well before its formal allegiance to al Qaeda was exposed in April 2013. Zawahiri had prohibited any official recognition of al Qaeda's presence in Syria. While careful observers could detect al Qaeda's influence in Al Nusrah from the get-go, it was not until after the dispute between the emirs of the Al Nusrah Front and the Islamic State became public that Al Nusrah's close ties to al Qaeda's senior leadership were widely recognized. Similarly, ICE's loyalty to al Qaeda has become more clear as a result of the Islamic State's challenge. The "scholars of jihad" Arakanskiy references are likely the same al Qaeda ideologues who have denounced the Islamic State and endorsed Ali Abu Mukhammad al Dagestani as ICE's emir. In January, top sharia officials from both the Al Nusrah Front and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) issued a joint statement saying the ICE defectors were mistaken and that Dagestani was a well-qualified leader for the group. One of the statement's signatories was Harith al Nadhari, a senior AQAP sharia official who was a staunch critic of the Islamic State. In early February, the Vilayat Dagestan openly mourned Nadhari after AQAP issued a statement saying he had been killed in a US drone strike. The Vilayat Dagestan's web site continues to feature Nadhari's commentaries, as well as messages and videos featuring other pro-al Qaeda, anti-Islamic State thinkers, such as Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi.

Dagestan Risks Becoming a ‘Yugoslavia in the Caucasus’ February 24, 2015 -- Volume 12, Issue 34 Dagestan, the most ethnically complex republic in the North Caucasus, faces an ever greater risk that it will disintegrate as Yugoslavia did. This growing danger exists both because of the changing demographics and power relationships within this Russian federal-level entity and due to the growing influence of Dagestan’s two neighboring regions—the country of Azerbaijan and the Russian republic of Chechnya—on its peoples. And as was the case with Yugoslavia, the disintegration of Dagestan would be not only bloody but would unsettle numerous relationships in the region and Eurasia as a whole. In an article for Sevkavinform.ru, Musa Musayev writes that what makes the Yugoslav scenario thinkable in Dagestan are the rapidly worsening problems within the republic, most of which are longstanding, as well as the efforts of Baku and Grozny to expand their influence. The Dagestani neighbors’ moves on the republic certainly have precedents in the past, but are far more significant now given Dagestan’s own problems, Musayev notes (Sevkavinform.ru, February 20). According to the journalist, the increasing influence of Azerbaijan and Chechnya reflects the fact that the two have much in common, even though one is an independent state and the other is a subject of the Russian Federation. Both have tightly-controlled power verticals, both have consolidated elites, and both are animated by a recognition of the need to overcome the results of destruction in a previous war, the first by the use of oil and the second by subsidies from Moscow. As a result, Musayev says, both have been able to mobilize their societies and boost the authority of those in power.

People in Dagestan can see all this, and it is in sharp contrast to what they see in their own republic, which remains mired in the past with ethnic groups and clans fighting among themselves for what money there is. Dagestan has oil like Azerbaijan, but it has not been able to develop it. And the money it receives from Moscow is not the basis for its economic development as it is in mono-ethnic Chechnya; rather, rubles from the Russian center have become “an apple of discord” and a source of corruption and internal power struggles. In this situation, many groups within Dagestan believe that they could do better off if they lived in separate mono-ethnic republics rather than be roped together as they are now. The Azerbaijani and Chechen diasporas in the country promote that idea. In part, the former believe that the southern Dagestani city of Derbent is an Azerbaijani city (see EDM, January 26). And the latter think that Dagestan’s Khasavyurt and Novo-Lak districts, with their Chechen populations, should be handed over to the Republic of Chechnya. Musayev says local elites have already shifted their loyalties from Makhachkala to Baku or Grozny, respectively. Exacerbating this situation are the calls by some Russian nationalists to do away with Dagestan and restore the tsarist-era administrative territory of Terek Gubernia, which would mean that the northern portion of the republic would be transferred to Stavropol krai. To make this palatable, these same nationalists have been promising some of the local non-Russian nationalists that they can set up their own national republics to the south. But there is no way to make any of these territories mono-ethnic without significant population transfers or, what would be even worse, a murderous campaign of ethnic cleansing. Unfortunately, Musayev says, those pushing for the partition of Dagestan are thinking only about their own narrowly defined interests. At the same time, the current leadership of Dagestan does not seem capable of doing anything serious to resolve the internal conflicts or counter the moves of the Chechens or the Azerbaijanis. That only makes the effectiveness of the Azerbaijani and Chechen regimes more attractive to people in Dagestan and increases the likelihood of a Yugoslavia-type outcome there. Besides inertia, only three things are keeping this outcome at bay, at least for the moment, although Musayev does not enumerate them. First, many in Dagestan are frightened by the assimilationist programs of Baku and Grozny. Generally, Dagestani ethnic groups do not want to give up their national identities and feel that they might be putting themselves even more at risk if they turned to either of these. Second, except for the four largest national groups in Dagestan, the nationalities there are so small that even their leaders do not believe they could make it on their own. Thus, they feel they are better off as small fish in a small pond rather than as small fish in a large ocean, which they fear they would flow into if the Dagestani republic were to break apart. And third, at least for the time being, and despite all its talk about the amalgamation of non-Russian areas with predominantly Russian ones, Moscow will oppose any such moves lest they trigger others, which would further call into question Russian control of the North Caucasus. If Dagestan were to disintegrate in a Yugoslavia-type scenario, it would almost certainly trigger the splitting apart of the two bi-national republics in the region (Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria), demands for the formation of a unified Circassian republic, and challenges along the borders of every other republic in the region. Consequently, Moscow and Makhachkala are likely to do everything they can to maintain the status quo. But the fact that many are now questioning whether that is possible should be a wakeup call for everyone concerned about the region. --Paul Goble

ICE emir: Zawahiri "our leader" Ali Abu Muhammad al Dagestani, who succeeded Doku Umarov as the emir of ICE in March 2014, has steadfastly supported al Qaeda and the Taliban

throughout the controversy over the Islamic State's rise. He has continued to do so even as some Chechen jihadists, including Abu Omar al Shishani, have risen to prominent positions within Abu Bakr al Baghdadi's organization. In 2013, Abu Omar al Shishani helped found Jaish al-Muhajireen wal Ansar, or the Army of the Emigrants and Helpers, before officially joining the Islamic State. Jaish al-Muhajireen wal Ansar, which is led by Chechens but includes other fighters as well, remains loyal to Dagestani. The group has tried to remain neutral in the conflict between the Islamic State and its jihadist rivals in Syria. However, like Vilayat Dagestan, Jaish al-Muhajireen awl Ansar and its allies in Ansar al Din, a coalition of several Syrian rebel groups, mourned the loss of Nadhari earlier this month. [See LWJ report, Rebel coalition in Syria mourns al Qaeda official killed in US airstrike in Yemen.]In late June 2014, Dagestani released a video in which he discussed the efficacy of suicide bombings and the necessity of avoiding civilian casualties. Dagestani referred to Ayman al Zawahiri as "our leader" in the video and noted that Zawahiri has "urged rebels to avoid places where civilians gather."The ICE emir was likely referencing the jihadist guidelines issued by al Qaeda under Zawahiri's direction. Al Qaeda is attempting to limit the jihadists' civilian casualties in the Muslim majority world as it tries to build a broader base of popular support.In September 2014, Dagestani released another video addressing Zawahiri and other leading jihadist ideologues as the "scholars of the ummah," or international community of Muslims. All of the other scholars addressed by the ICE head in the video back al Qaeda in its rivalry with the Islamic State. The other scholars included: Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, Hani al Sibai, Tariq Abd al Halim, and Abu Qatada al Filistini, all of whom have criticized Baghdadi.Dagestani referred to the "scholars" collectively as "our valued brothers, the loved ones, the delights of our eye." It is likely that he addressed them in these glowing terms as a reply, of sorts, to the Islamic State and its supporters, who have been accused of slandering the veteran jihadist ideologues for not supporting the Islamic State."We rely on you in our jihad and follow you as our paragon," Dagestani said, addressing the jihadist leaders. "Therefore, do not forget us in your provision of advice and guidance whenever this is feasible and possible for you."In late September and early October of last year, Dagestani played a leading role in promoting a jihadist truce initiative in Syria. He joined some of the same ideologues he had praised in publishing "An Initiative and Call for a Ceasefire Between Factions in Syria." The proposed truce aimed to take advantage of the America-led bombing campaign in Syria to promote a ceasefire between the Islamic State and its foes. The Islamic State did not formally agree to such a deal. [See LWJ report, Pro-al Qaeda ideologues propose truce between Islamic State, rivals.] When denouncing the defectors who have sided with the Islamic State, both Dagestani

and Abu Usman, ICE's top sharia judge in Dagestan, have referred to the jihadists' scholarly consensus concerning the Islamic State's "caliphate." They argue that the defectors have ignored the opinions of leading jihadist thinkers in swearing bayat (oath of allegiance) to Baghdadi. Said Arakanskiy's new video echoes this argument.

Regards Cees

Let me recall: Cradle of Jihad: Al-Qaeda Focus on Central Asia4

Image of China from a November 27, 2006 video inciting jihad in East Turkistan

Written in 2014, Central Asia, extending from the Caspian Sea through western China, has long been a strategic focus of al-Qaeda. The writings of top al-Qaeda strategists, most notably Abu Musab al-Suri (AKA Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmarian Nassar) and Ayman al-Zawahiri, advocate for the establishment of a jihadist front throughout Central Asia to serve as a stepping stone towards the creation of an al-Qaeda stronghold, extending from the Caucuses across the Caspian Sea and into Pakistan. Indeed, far from being an abstract desire, al-Qaeda and affiliated movements appear to be actively integrating Central Asian jihadist groups into their training and infrastructure in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Writing in 1999, al-Suri identified retrenchment of jihad in Central Asia as critical for the global success of al-Qaeda, asserting that the geography of the region creates a natural fortress and access to military and industrial equipment left in the region by the Soviet Union will provide critical sources of funds for the mujahideen. Moreover, al-Suri identifies Central Asia as al-Qaeda’s best chance to gain control of weapons of mass destruction, the use of which he strongly encourages. Similarly, Ayman al-Zawahiri calls for a “cordon” of jihadist strength from the Caucuses to Central Asia.

The modern states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are widely understood to comprise the bulk of Central Asia; additionally, the western Chinese provinces of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai and Tibet are frequently associated with the region, as is the state of Afghanistan. Central Asia, as a cultural and linguistic entity, is largely congruent with the historical nation of Turkistan. In fact, jihadist discourses on Central Asia make reference to the historical nation of Turkistan as an occupied state and exhort the jihadist community to rise up in armed struggle against China.

Abu Musab al-Suri

Abu Musab al-Suri, one of the most influential strategists for al-Qaeda, expressly addressed the importance of Central Asia for the global jihad in a 1999 strategy paper, Muslims in Central Asia and the Future Battle of Islam 5. Although dating to 1999, the paper continues to be distributed on jihadist forums. Al-Suri repeated his focus on jihad in Central Asia in his opus work, The Call to Global Islamic Resistance. Al-Suri specifies that of the arenas in which al-Qaeda can create a strong base for future jihadist efforts, Central Asia is the most important for the movement to strengthen and solidify their hold on, claiming:

“The most important of these areas [of Islamic resistance]…are: a- Central Asia, b- Yemen, c- North Africa…In the strong [position of] Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the spread of jihad [makes] it the first

4 http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21-jihad/38-cradle5 https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-musab-al-suri-muslims-in-central-asia-and-the-coming-battle-of-islam.pdf

and the most important of these bases. This is not a military or a security secret. The enemy knows it and therefore seeks to strike it today and to drive us out. We must strive to remain and defend it.”

He notes that Central Asian nations contain stockpiles of Soviet military infrastructure, pointedly claiming that there are “booties that are waiting for someone to take.” He calculates that the combination of widespread Islamic fervor and political unrest among the population, combined with the allegedly vast quantity of military and industrial equipment left in Central Asia by the Soviet Union, presents an opportunity for jihadists to seize riches inconceivable in any other region of the world. In al-Suri’s calculations, these riches will seed and support the global jihadist movement and propel it to success:

“This space equally shares very high Islamic emotions. The inherited military equipment, structures, stockpiles, accumulation of the Soviet Union in this region is a military wealth and inheritance which the people of Islam will never dream of providing it in another place. There are booties that are waiting for someone to take... By seizing it with an uprising jihad in those countries, it will provide us with what is needed to start jihad for the rise of the Hour, and Allah knows best.”

CBRN and weapons of mass destruction are an additional source of resources that al-Suri believed al-Qaeda can develop after forging a base in Central Asia. He wrote that the region is jihadist’s only hope of thwarting Western attempts to deny Muslims their “own strategic (nuclear, germinal, bacterial) weapons of mass destruction exactly as it is owned by … the Jews and the west”.

Muslims in Central Asia and the Future Battle of Islam reiterates the theme of Central Asian resources enriching and supporting the world wide jihad. In addition to the material benefits accrued by obtaining a foothold in Central Asia, al-Suri notes approvingly that the mountainous terrain covering much of the region provides a natural fortress, writing of the Afghan- Tajikistan border:

“The region’s natural terrain forms a natural strategic military castle…the mountains of North Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and Central Asia to the Aral Sea form impregnable fortifications that are hard to surround and control. Because of its abundance [of] water and food, it is possible for it to be a base to launch from and retreat to."

This strategic assessment was echoed by Ayman al-Zawahiri in his December 2001 autobiography Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. Describing jihadist footholds in Caucasus and Afghanistan during the 1990s, Zawahiri predicted a chain of jihadist expansions leading to the creation of a jihadist bridge from Kashmir to the Caucasus through Afghanistan and Turkmenistan and the overthrow of American influence in Central Asia, writing:

“The liberation of the Caucasus would constitute a hotbed of jihad…and that region would become the shelter of thousands of Muslim mujahideen from various parts of the Islamic world …If the Chechens and other Caucasian mujahideen reach the shores of the oil-rich Caspian Sea, the only thing that will separate them from Afghanistan will be the neutral state of Turkmenistan. This will form a mujahid Islamic belt to the south of Russia that will be connected in the east to Pakistan, which is brimming with mujahideen movements in Kashmir…”

In Zawahiri’s strategy, success of jihad in the Caucasus will inflame jihadist sentiment throughout Central Asia, resulting in the disintegration of the Russian Federation and removal of American strategic influences throughout Central Asia. Continuing his analysis of the strategic value of the region, Zawahiri casts the reasons for an American war on Afghanistan as an attempt to disrupt the creation of a swath of territory from the Caucuses to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

II. Turkistan For al-Suri, the region of Central Asia is indistinguishable from Turkistan, which he divided into East and West Turkistan. In describing the regions of Central Asia, he delineates East Turkistan as:

“East Turkistan: Occupied by China and has an area of approximately 1,734,750 square kilometers and has 25 million Muslims… Its capital is ‘Urmitchi …Its inhabitants’ lineage is Turkish which occupies the bow that extends from China to Turkey through Central Asia and the Caucasus countries (a quick review on it at the end of the research.)… [the] five later countries: Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan are called West Turkistan”

To reinforce his insistence that Turkistan is an essential component of Central Asia, Abu Musab al-Suri concluded Muslims in Central Asia and the Future Battle of Islam with a briefing on Turkistan. Almost a decade old, al-Suri’s calls for jihad in Central Asia and East Turkistan have remained salient to the global jihadist movement. In the past two years, jihadist forum members have released several calls for jihad in East Turkistan and an

organization known as the Turkistan Islamic Party has claimed responsibly for suicide bombings Central Asia. Ayman al-Zawahiri cited the case of Chinese occupation of East Turkistan as evidence of the United Nations bias against Muslims in a December 20, 2006 video message titled “Realities of the Conflict Between Islam and Unbelief.”

On November 7, 2006, the al-Fajr Center, an Internet information committee that is one of the primary distributors of communications for jihadist groups, overtly called for the establishment of jihad in East Turkistan in a 32-minute documentary style video in which the Islamic Part of East Turkistan accused China of gross atrocities against Muslims in “East Turkistan” and stated that their fighters trained with the Taliban.

The video includes a brief history of the Chinese occupation of East Turkistan, in addition to listing geographical and demographic information about the area, and provides examples of the “tyranny” perpetrated by the Chinese communist government. In order to support the latter point, the crux of the film, viewers reminded of injustices allegedly committed against Islam by the Chinese central government and local leaders, specifically Wang Lequan.

According to the narrators, after being driven out of East Turkistan, in 1997 some members of the East Turkistani resistance journeyed to Afghanistan, where they joined the Taliban. These fighters, under Hassan Abu Muhammad al-Turkestani, formed the basis of the Turkistan Islamic Party:

“In 1997 some of them joined the Taliban and reestablished the Islamic Turkestani Party. After the American invasion of Afghanistan many of them died while defending the Islamic Emirate in 2001 and the Pakistani army killed their Emir Hassan Abu Muhammad al-Turkestani with a number of his followers in the border areas of Serhad in November of 2003...”

Jihadist focus on East Turkistan represents not only the emotional flashpoint of a lost nation, but rather an active and enduring struggle against occupation of a Muslim nation by China. Repeatedly, in video and audio messages such as his second set of responses to questions posted during the 2008 open interview initiative, Zawahiri castigates the United Nations for oppressing the Muslim people, citing as an example the alleged Chinese occupation of East Turkistan. Other jihadist media calls upon supporters to liberate Muslim lands held by disbelievers, including the Balkans, Spain, and East Turkistan.

Conclusion Although seemingly periphery to the major jihadist fronts in Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Palestine, and Somalia, al-Qaeda strategists have long targeted Central Asia as a critical component of the global jihad. Although emphasizing different attributes of the region, both Abu Musab al-Suri and Ayman al-Zawahiri identified gathering strength in the region as critical for the long-term strength of a global jihadist movement. Al-Suri identified the material riches and geographic strength of the region as providing an important cradle to nurture al-Qaeda into self-sufficiency as a military and industrial power. Zawahiri, on the other hand, focused on the strength al-Qaeda could gain if the mujahideen strongholds of

Afghanistan and the Caucasus were joined, speculating that such a position of strength would allow for outwards expansion.

Within the framework of al-Qaeda’s strategic focus on Central Asia, the increasing integration of Central Asian jihadist groups, notably the Islamic Jihad Union and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, into al-Qaeda and the Taliban’s camps on the Afghan-Pakistan border suggest that Central Asian jihadist groups are rapidly being brought into the global jihadist movement. Moreover, Central Asian jihadist groups such as the Turkistan Islamic Party and the Islamic Jihad Union have stated that their fighters carry out attacks in Afghanistan in conjunction with the Taliban, raising the specter that these collaborations reflect a step to fulfillment of al-Qaeda’s goal to create a stronghold in Central Asia. Continuing the apparent operational integration of Central Asian jihadist movements with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the Turkistan Islamic Party’s July 21, 2008 video issuing threats against the Beijing Olympics comes after their 2006 acknowledgement of having trained with the Taliban in Afghanistan.