Open Borders AFF – HSS – 1AC Options

1AC K Version

1AC HispanophobiaAs “Americans,” we conceal ourselves from global conflict, war, genocide, and violence behind our television screens – we look through one lens to develop a scholarship and “Truth” of what is actually occurring. In this process we subjugate what we are told – we integrate and process this information into our perspectives of the world. Specifically, the U.S.-Mexican border serves to constitute Mexicans as the, “dirty, foreign Other” through a politics of fear – political gestures based on this understanding are the event horizon for politics to comeŽižek, 07 - Slavoj Žižek is a Slovene philosopher and cultural critic. He is a senior researcher at the Institute for Sociology and Philosophy, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, and a professor of philosophy and psychoanalysis at the European Graduate School (“Censorship Today: Violence, or ........ Ecology as a New Opium for the Masses”, Nov. 26, 2007,

http://www.lacan.com/zizecology1.htm) Last but not least, new forms of apartheid, new Walls and slums. On September 11th, 2001, the Twin Towers were hit; twelve years earlier, on November 9th, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. November 9th announced the "happy '90s," the Francis Fukuyama dream of the "end of history," the belief that liberal democracy had, in principle, won, that the search is over, that the advent of a global, liberal world community lurks just around the corner, that the obstacles to this ultra-Hollywood happy ending are merely empirical and contingent (local pockets of resistance where the leaders did not yet grasp that their time is over). In contrast to it, 9/11 is the main symbol of the forthcoming era in which new walls are emerging everywhere,

between Israel and the West Bank, around the European Union, on the U.S.-Mexico border . So what if the new proletarian position is that of the inhabitants of slums in the new megalopolises? The explosive growth of slums in the last decades, especially in the Third World megalopolises from Mexico City and other Latin

American capitals through Africa (Lagos, Chad) to India, China, Philippines and Indonesia, is perhaps the crucial geopolitical event of our time s . It is effectively surprising how many features of slum dwellers fit the good old Marxist

determination of the proletarian revolutionary subject: they are "free" in the double meaning of the word even more than the classic proletariat ("freed" from all substantial ties; dwelling in a free space, outside the police regulations of the state); they are a large collective, forcibly thrown together, "thrown" into a situation where they have to invent some mode of being-together, and simultaneously deprived of any support in traditional ways of life, in inherited religious or ethnic life-forms. While today's

society is often characterized as the society of total control, slums are the territories within a state boundaries from which the state (partially, at least) withdrew its control, territories which function as white spots, blanks, in the official map of a state territory. Although they are de facto included into a state by the links of black economy, organized crime, religious groups, etc., the state control is nonetheless suspended there, they are domains outside the rule of law . In the map of Berlin from the times of the now defunct GDR, the are of West Berlin was left blank, a weird hole in the detailed structure of the big city; when Christa Wolf, the well-known East German half-dissident writer, took her small daughter to the East Berlin's high TV tower, from which one had a nice view over the prohibited West Berlin, the small girl shouted gladly: "Look, mother, it is not white over there, there are houses with people like here!" - as if discovering a

prohibited slum Zone... This is why the "de-structured" masses , poor and deprived of everything, situated in a non-

proletarized urban environment, constitute one of the principal horizons of the politics to come . If the principal task of the emancipatory politics of the XIXth century was to break the monopoly of the bourgeois liberals by way of politicizing the working class, and if the task of the XXth century was to politically awaken the immense rural population of Asia and

Africa, the principal task of the XXIth century is to politicize - organize and discipline - the "de-structured

masses" of slum-dwellers . Hugo Chavez's biggest achievement is the politicization (inclusion into the political life,

social mobilization) of slum dwellers; in other countries, they mostly persist in apolitical inertia. It was this political mobilization of the slum dwellers which saved him against the US-sponsored coup: to the surprise of everyone,

Chavez included, slum dwellers massively descended to the affluent city center, tipping the balance of power to his advantage. How do these four antagonisms relate to each other? There is a qualitative difference between the gap that separates the Excluded from the Included and the other three antagonisms, which designate three domains of what Hardt and Negri call

"commons," the shared substance of our social being whose privatization is a violent act which should also be resisted with violent means, if necessary: the commons of culture, the immediately socialized forms of "cognitive" capital, primarily language, our means of communication and education (if Bill Gates were to be allowed monopoly, we would have reached the absurd situation in which a private individual would have literally owned the software texture our basic network of communication), but also the shared infrastructure of public transport, electricity, post, etc.; the commons of external nature threatened by pollution and exploitation (from oil to forests and natural habitat itself); the commons of internal nature (the biogenetic inheritance of humanity). What all these struggles share is the awareness of the destructive potentials, up to the self-annihilation of humanity itself , if the capitalist logic of enclosing these commons is allowed a free run. It is this reference to "commons" which justifies the resuscitation of the notion of Communism - or, to quote Alain Badiou: The communist hypothesis remains the good one, I do not see any other. If we have to abandon this hypothesis, then it is no longer worth doing anything at all in the field of collective action. Without the horizon of communism, without this Idea, there is nothing in the historical and political becoming of any interest to a philosopher. Let everyone bother about his own affairs, and let us stop talking about it. In this case, the rat-man is right, as is, by the way, the case with some ex-communists who are either avid of their rents or who lost courage. However, to hold on to the Idea, to the existence of this hypothesis, does not mean that we should retain its first form of presentation which was centered on property and State. In fact, what is imposed on us as a task, even as a philosophical obligation, is to help a new mode of existence of the hypothesis to deploy itself. So where do we stand today with regard to communism? The first step is to admit that the solution is not to limit the market and private property by direct interventions of the State and state ownership. The domain of State itself is also in its own way "private": private in the precise Kantian sense of the "private use of Reason" in State administrative and ideological apparatuses: The public use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men. The private use of one's reason, on the other hand, may often be very narrowly restricted without particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment. By public use of one's reason I understand the use which a person makes of it as a scholar before the reading public. Private use I call that which one may make of it in a particular civil post or office which is entrusted to him. What one should add here, moving beyond Kant, is that there is a privileged social group which, on account of its lacking a determinate place in the "private" order of social hierarchy, directly stands for universality: it is only the reference to those Excluded , to those who dwell in the blanks of the State space, that enable s true universality . There is nothing more "private" than a State community which perceives the Excluded as a

threat and worries how to keep the Excluded at a proper distance. In other words, in the series of the four antagonisms, the one between the Included and the Excluded is the crucial one, the point of reference for the others; without it, all others lose their subversive edge: ecology turns into a "problem of sustainable development," intellectual property into a "complex legal challenge," biogenetics into an "ethical" issue. One can sincerely fight for ecology, defend a broader notion of intellectual property, oppose the copyrighting of genes, while not questioning the antagonism between the Included and the Excluded - even more, one can even formulate some of these struggles in the terms of the Included threatened by the polluting Excluded. In this way, we get no true universality, only "private" concerns in the Kantian sense of the term. Corporations like Whole Foods and Starbucks continue to enjoy favor among liberals even though they both engage in anti-union activities; the trick is that they sell products that contain the claim of being politically progressive acts in and of themselves. One buys coffee made with beans bought at above fair-market value, one drives a hybrid vehicle, one buys from companies that provide good benefits for their customers (according to the corporation's own standards), etc. Political action and consumption become fully merged. In short, without the antagonism between the Included and the Excluded, we may well find ourselves in a world in which Bill Gates is the greatest humanitarian fighting against poverty and diseases, and Rupert Murdoch the greatest environmentalist mobilizing hundreds of millions through his media empire. When politics is reduced to the "private" domain, it takes the form of the politics of FEAR - fear of losing one's particular identity, of being overwhelmed. Today's predominant mode of politics is post-political bio-politics - an awesome example of theoretical jargon which,

however, can easily be unpacked: "post-political" is a politics which claims to leave behind old ideological struggles and, instead, focus on expert management and administration, while "bio-politics" designates the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives as its primal goal. It is clear how these two dimensions overlap: once one renounces big ideological causes, what remains is only the efficient administration of life... almost only that. That is to say, with the depoliticized, socially objective, expert administration and coordination of interests as the zero-level of politics, the only way to introduce passion into this field, to actively mobilize people, is through fear, a basic constituent of today's subjectivity.

Now, Americans imagine the border as a line of demarcation – a trophy of colonialist ideology that conceals the immoral truths of our historyCarter, 12 – PhD., the University of Essex, Matt's research is principally concerned with the expression of the American West in US cinema. His doctoral thesis investigated the interrelations between history, myth, and ideology in North America by using the

Hollywood Western as its key primary source. He is also interested in the culture of the American Southwest, and his current research seeks to place the Western in a transnational context (“’I’m Just a Cowboy’: Transnational Identities of the Borderlands in Tommy Lee Jones’ The Three Burials of Melquiades Estrada”, 2012, http://ejas.revues.org/9845)As a historian, Limerick has long asserted the need for a more complex and more honest understanding of the borderlands. She argues that, for much of the twentieth century, Anglo-America has been “fixed on the definition of the frontier drawn from the imaginative reconstruction of the story of the United States and its westward expansion” (Limerick, Something 87). Like many scholars writing under the collective banner of the New Western History, Limerick seeks to deconstruct the “interpretive straightjacket” of Frederick Jackson Turner’s “Frontier Thesis” (Etulain 108). Interestingly, she points out that, despite the “spectre” presented by Turner, “North America has, in fact, had two strong traditions in the use of the term” (Limerick, Something 87). On the one hand, of course, there is the “idea of the frontier” which, as an “extremely well established … cultural common property,” pertains to a Turnerian ideal, a space “where white settlers entered a zone of ‘free’ land and opportunity” (Limerick, Something 87). On the other, she describes a much less familiar, though “much more realistic usage of la frontera,” which describes the cultural complexities and personal experiences along “the borderlands between Mexico and the United States” (Limerick, Something 87-88). As a concept, la frontera stands opposed to the frontier’s “imaginative reconstruction” by giving the lie to its grand narrative of optimism and of hardy pioneers transforming wilderness into civilisation. Instead, the concept exposes a darker, more complex “legacy of conquest” (using Limerick’s own terminology), including ethnic cleansing, expropriation, and environmental despoliation. Its story is driven less by dashing Anglo-American heroes on horseback than by brutal monopolists, exploiters, and warmongers – men whose twisted ideals left little room for morality. According to Limerick, it is this complex descriptive that constitutes the “real” history of the American West. Consequently, when it comes to a historical reassessment of the borderlands through la frontera, Limerick insists upon there being “no illusion of vacancy, of triumphal conclusions, or of simplicity” (Something 88).

This fear driven ideology Otherizes immigrants and Mexico to a political image Cisneros, 08 - Dr. Josue David Cisneros is Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication Studies. His research and teaching interests focus mainly on rhetoric, or situated, public, and persuasive communication. Dr. Cisneros’ research focuses on the ways in which social and political identities are rhetorically constituted and contested in the public sphere, and he specializes in issues of citizenship, race/ethnicity, Latina/o identity, and immigration (“Contaminated Communities: The Metaphor of "Immigrant as Pollutant" in Media Representations of Immigration”, 2008 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.4.cisneros.html)Popular rhetoric about immigration often operates by constructing metaphoric representations of immigrants that concretize the social "problem" and connote particular solutions. Scholars have identified discursive connections between the rhetoric of immigration and representations of other human problems such as crime or war. This essay identifies another metaphor present in popular media coverage of immigration, particularly visual images of immigrants. The metaphor of "immigrant as pollutant" present in news media discourse on immigration can have serious consequences for societal treatment of immigrants as well as the policies designed to respond to immigration . A "nation of immigrants,"

the United States has never been able to quell the fascination and fear with which it approaches migration. Though the country collectively celebrates the brave souls who populated the nation, America's inhabitants remain suspicious of the hundreds of thousands of individuals that cross into the country on a yearly basis. Both legal and illegal immigration have been a concern to the government and the public since the birth of the nation. Though the degree of popular obsession with immigration rises and falls, there is always an awareness that these strangers potentially bring with them monumental and threatening changes. Concern over immigration is evidenced not only in public discourse but also in the large body of scholarship on the phenomenon of immigration, including an attempt to understand how immigration as "problem" is constructed in mass media. To make sense of this complex phenomenon, scholars note, individuals approach immigration through the perspective of metaphor to [End Page 569] clarify the topic and to connect it with their personal experience. Much of our knowledge about how immigration is represented in media and popular discourse has centered on metaphors such as a crime wave or war as guiding tropes through which the "problem" of immigration is represented. In this essay, I identify another metaphor through which popular media represent immigration. Moreover, I contribute to our understanding of immigration rhetoric by paying careful attention to how visual images construct metaphoric representations of migrants. By comparing the visual and metaphoric images of immigration in recent news coverage to images of pollution from coverage of toxic waste spills, particularly the crisis at Love Canal, I sketch a heretofore underanalyzed metaphor of "immigrant as pollutant" present in the immigration debate. Not

only does this essay begin to illustrate another metaphor through which immigration is articulated, it also points to the need for more analysis of the visual rhetoric of immigration. Despite their contributions, however, these studies have two important limitations. First, many of these studies encounter a methodological shortcoming. Most research on the metaphoric representations of immigration focus solely on the text of stories in newspapers and magazines or transcripts of political speeches. Chavez's book examines magazine covers and their corresponding stories. Ono and Sloop do recognize how television news images contribute to public understandings of immigrants, yet neither work sufficiently examines the visual components of immigration rhetoric for the cooperative role they play in constructing metaphors of immigration. Attention to the visual elements of immigration rhetoric is important because of the centrality of images in modern public discourse, particularly news discourse. As Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites argue, "the widely disseminated visual image provides the public audience with a sense of shared experience that anchors the necessarily impersonal character of public discourse in the motivational ground of social life." Analyzing the ways immigration is constructed through the images, texts, and aural messages of news discourse illustrates another way in which immigration is articulated through visual metaphor. I look to reports on immigration from Fox News and CNN from September to December of 2005 to argue that, in addition to being conceived as a crime wave or invasion, immigration is framed metaphorically as a dangerous pollutant. This metaphoric construction of immigrant as pollutant can be unpacked by considering the images of undocumented immigrants, the images of the dangers posed by these immigrants, and the images of the government's response.

These cultural discourses determine policy towards the OtherVan Efferink, 10 (Leonhardt, MSc in Financial Economics at Erasmus University Rotterdam and an MA in 'Geopolitics, Territory and Security' at King’s College London. He is now working on a PhD with Royal Holloway’s (University of London), “Polar Partner or Poles Apart?” PSA Graduate Network Conference December 2010, http://www.psa.ac.uk/spgrp/51/2010/Ppr/PGC2_Van%20EfferinkLeonhardt_Polar_Partners_or_Poles_Apart_PSA_2010.pdf)The term ‘critical geopolitics’ had already been coined by the end of the 1980s (Dodds 2001). It usually refers to the approaches that emerged during the 1980s and which challenged traditional geopolitical theories (Dalby 1994). This stance explains why its proponents consider it critical, which according to Painter (1998, p. 144-145) “refers to a particular tradition in social sciences which questions the taken-for-granted assumptions that underpin conventional perspectives.” Ó Tuathail (1994, p. 525; 2006a) labels critical geopolitics “a heterogeneous movement of theoretical perspectives and agendas” straddling Political Geography and International Relations. It focuses on three research agendas:

examining the meanings of spatial concepts, deconstructing geopolitical traditions and deconstructing contemporary discourses (Ó Tuathail 2004a). Discourses play a key role within critical geopolitics, illustrated by Ó Tuathail’s observation (2006a, p. 1) that geopolitics is commonly understood as “discourse about world politics.” Ó

Tuathail and Agnew (1992) see discourses as a collection of rules used to give meaning to communication. They do not only enable people to write and speak, but also to read, listen and act in a meaningful way. Furthermore, discourses give texts, speeches and activities their meaning. Another of their qualities is that

they are not deterministic, but leave room for a reasoning process that eventually generates meaning. Finally, it is worth mentioning here that discourses are neither static as human practice constantly modifies them. Most critical geopolitical research aims to “deconstruct hegemonic geopolitical discourses and to question the relationships of power found in the geopolitical practices of dominant states” (Ó Tuathail 2000, p. 166).

Methodology Informed by poststructuralism, we assume that “representations [of identity] and policy are mutually constitutive and discursively linked” (Hansen 2006, p. 28). Consequently, a think tank aims for consistency between its policy advice (“policy”) and its institutional context (proxy for “identity”) by using representations. this assumption is in line with the claim of Heritage (2010a) that its ideology forms the basis of its policy advice. Moreover, Brookings (Brookings, 2010b) has made it perfectly clear that its activities are meant to foster international cooperation. The second assumption is related

to the first and concerns the position of the policy expert within a think tank: (Müller 2008, p. 326): “it is not the individual [i.e. policy expert] that structures and manipulates discourse but vice versa – discourses speak through the individual.” This assumption holds that the think tank’s institutional context (structure) conditions the autonomy of its policy expert to represent (agency).

Alternatively, we could say that that “[i ]n order to have their texts accepted as reasonable , geopoliticians [i.e. policy experts] have to draw upon discourses already granted hegemonic social acceptance [i.e. based on the think tank’s institutional context]” (Sharp 1993, p. 493). Our focus on institutional context is based on Dalby’s observation (1990a) that analysing geopolitical discourses requires an examination of the political circumstances, their sources and audiences and the process by which the discourse legitimises the authority of the source. In addition, Dodds (1994) suggests that texts about foreign policy are to be examined within several contexts such as the institutional setting. When interpreting text, we must consider the hermeneutics. According to Hans-Georg Gadamer (1989, p. 298), “the discovery of the true meaning of a text or a work of art is never finished; it is in fact an infinite process.” Gadamer was instrumental in the development of philosophical hermeneutics, which seeks to investigate the nature of human understanding. In his view, someone who analyses a text must be “aware of one’s own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s own [prejudices]” (ibid, p. 271-272). Our

discourse analysis focuses on representations, informed by Dodds’ observation that (1994, p. 188) “[r]epresentational practices have increasingly

been recognized as vital to the practices of foreign policy.” In addition, Agnew (2003, p. 7) argues that “certain

geopolitical representations underwrite specific policies .” Next to representations (“what is being said about Russia?”), we assign meaning to lines of text by looking into representational practices (“how are things being said about Russia?”). These practices are relevant because “when something is recognized as a representational practice rather than an authoritative description, it can be treated as contentious” (Shapiro 1989, p. 20). We use a definition of discourse based on poststructuralism (Campbell 2007, p. 216): “a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political... outcomes made more or less possible.” The usefulness of this definition also follows from its assumption that the think tanks’ representations are linked to both their institutional context (“identities”) and policy advice (“political outcomes”). Our study of discursive

practices is informed by the work of three critical geopolitical scholars. First, we discuss analogies, labels and metaphors (Ó Tuathail 2002, 2006).

Second, we search for cases of ‘geopolitical othering,’ identified by Dalby (1990a, p. 22/23) as “geopolitical processes of cultural dichotomizing, designating

identity in distinction from Others.” This representational practice seeks to create a dualism in which a representation of one

country means that the opposite is true for the other country. The practice implicitly suggests that the two countries have

an entirely different set of values, one being “right” and the other “wrong”. Finally, we investigate the use of narrative closure which could take the form of referring to common truisms and presenting the complex reality “in easy to manage chunks” (Sharp 1993, p. 494). The practice leads to binary simplicity as the practice avoids complexity and problems that do not generate conclusions in terms of right or wrong. As a result, it dehistoricises, degeographicalises and depoliticises knowledge.

The “Otherness” dictated by political and physical separation of the borders justifies real poverty and institutionalized violence Ramlow, 6 ((Todd R., “Bodies in the Borderlands: Gloria Anzaluda's and David Wojnarowicz's Mobility Machines,” MELUS, Volume: 31(3), Fall, p. 178. DAP)Throughout Wojnarowicz's travels, the same outcasts and queers who occupy Anzaldfia's la frontera populate his shadowy borderlands. Driving through the American southwest, Wojnarowicz draws our attention to the many Navajo men, Native American families, and Chicano teenagers who live in these borderlands, and whose lives are seemingly invisible to the normate culture that surrounds them. For t hese mestizaje , poverty and human misery are the spoils of their Otherness , and they are as close to and far from the normate as the "real world" is from the inside of one's car. Imagining the normate subject's response to scenes of abjection, Wojnarowicz asserts the norm's refusal to see the misery it causes, or to recognize its own role in that abjection. Owning a vehicle, you could drive by and with the pressure of your foot on the accelerator and with your eyes on the road you could pass it quickly .... The images of poverty would lift and float and recede quickly like the gray shades of memory so that these images were in the past before you came upon them. (Close 31) Wojnarowicz, of course, cannot make such a refusal, because he has himself experienced the violence and scorn of the normate. Elsewhere Wojnarowicz identifies with a Native Americanteenager who had disrupted the morning rush hour in an unnamed southwest city by turning into oncoming traffic and running down a white college student. While he doesn't necessarily condone such murderous violence, Wojnarowicz empathizes with the Native American boy's reaction to the institutionally validated murderous violence routinely perpetrated against cripples, queers, and mestiza/os: "I wondered why any of these things, like the kid in his camaro, are

Amnesty breeds economic Xenophobia by allowing America to become the home of migrants Salaita, 05 - Steven Salaita is assistant professor of Multicultural literature at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater (“Anti-ArabRacism: How Myth and patriotism Combine to Inhibit Democracy”, 2005, accessed via JSTOR)Yet perhaps the most crucial (and discomfiting) feature of imperative patriotism is its relationship with xenophobia. While imperative patriotism has a symbiotic moral association with colonial discourse, it is more disconnected from xenophobia because it does not actually arise from xenophobia, which is a phenomenon that, to a degree, has its roots in European contact with Indians, but more traditionally has resulted from animosity over ( perceived or real) economic disparity. On one level, xenophobia is a less vicious form of colonial discourse, but it more often results from a certain type of fear that is generated when people feel that their economic stability (or the possibility of it) is threatened—as, for instance, when laborers battle with immigrants over blue-collar jobs or when middle- to upper-class Whites complain to city councils about immigrants moving into their neighborhoods. Imperative patriotism, however, tends to inform xenophobia, a fact that is expressed in statements such as, "If you don't like America, go back to where you came from"; "If you don't agree with the United States, why don't you just leave?"; and "A real American works hard and doesn't complain." These statements insinuate that "American" is a stable, fixed identity rooted in a physical and cultural Whiteness for which many immigrants do not qualify. They also indicate that in xenophobia narrow political suppositions often govern social behavior: To dissent against the imagined mores of America is to forfeit identification as American. Leaving the United States then becomes the only logical option.

The ethical grounding for border exclusion rationalizes infinite violence – the affirmative maximizes ethics Nathan Smith April 10, 2012 Economics Assistant Professor Fresno Pacific UniversityAll Ethical Roads Lead to Open Borders http://openborders.info/blog/tag/joseph-carens/That’s a one-line summary of Joseph Carens’ article “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” first published in 1987. More exactly, Carens shows how three broad ethical theories– I prefer the term meta-ethics, but it’s an idiosyncratic term– namely, (1) Nozick’s, (2) Rawls’, and (3) utilitarianism, all imply a case for fully open borders or at least much more open immigration than rich countries permit today. That’s what I’ve always thought. At some point, I’d like to look through the 515 citations to see whether any counter-arguments have any strength. Carens’ job seems rather too easy, but it’s good that someone’s done it, and in a charming and easy to read style. Carens discusses, however, a “communitarian challenge” to the case for open borders, as argued by Michael Walzer.

Unlike Rawls and the others, Walzer treats the question of membership as central to his theory of justice, and he comes to the opposite conclusion about immigration from the one that I have defended: Across a considerable range of the decisions that are made, states are simply free to take strangers in (or not).[19] Walzer differs from the other theorists I have considered not only in his conclusions but also in his basic approach. He eschews the search for universal principles and is concerned instead with “the particularism of history, culture, and membership.”[20] He thinks that questions of distributive justice should be addressed not from behind a “veil of ignorance” but from the perspective of membership in a political community in which people share a common culture and a common understanding about justice. I cannot do full justice here to Walzer’s rich and subtle discussion of the problem of membership, but I can draw attention to the main points of his argument and to some of the areas of our disagreement. Walzer’s central claim is that exclusion is justified by the right of communities to self-determination.

Even Walzer makes enough concessions that one could use his theory as a platform for a case for much more open migration.

The right to exclude is constrained in three important ways, however. First, we have an obligation to provide aid to others who are in dire need, even if we have no established bonds with them, provided that we can do so without excessive cost to ourselves. So, we may be obliged to admit some needy strangers or at least to provide them with some of our resources and perhaps even territory.

But the notion that “communities have a right to self-determination” is a very dubious notion to begin with. First, what is a community? In fact, humanity does not consist of neatly separable communities, let alone communities that are neatly geographically separated. People have many identities and participate in many communities, and in varying degrees, but always to at least some extent, these communities overlap and interpenetrate one another geographically. Recent centuries have privileged national or citizen identity over other identities, sometimes with catastrophic results , but that is rather arbitrary. It fits patterns of human loyalty and efficient organization very poorly in some parts of the world. Anyway, even if communities are well-defined, who makes the decisions for the community– and to what extent may they use force to support them? The answers to such questions can only be vague and ad hoc at best, and they lend themselves very easily to the justification of limitless

violence . Communities and communities need to be understood in the framework of

individuals and individual rights, which are more real, more fundamental, and can be far more satisfactorily defined and understood.

This perceptive Hispanophobia renders an entire population as utility – valueless and ontologically deadWalsh, 10 - University College Dublin College of Arts and Celtic Studies, peer reviewed by Prof. Edward James & Dr. David Kerr (“The impact of anti-Mexican sentiment on American perceptions of Diego Rivera during the Great Depression”, August, 2010, http://www.ucd.ie/ibp/MADissertations2009/Walsh.pdf)‘I have left the best of my life and my strength here, sprinkling with the sweat of my brow the fields and factories of these gringos, who only know how to make one sweat.’90 These are the words of Juan Berzunzolo, one of millions of Mexican immigrants who lived and worked in the United States in the earlier part of the twentieth century. His words encapsulated the exploitation and bigotry that he and his labouring compatriots endured in a society that regarded them as an inferior race.91 To locate Rivera’s experience in the context of its racial backdrop gives another dimension to his reception in the United States. His race both hindered his success, as is shown by racist media reports in Chapter Five, and allowed his popularity to thrive, as will be shown in Chapter Four. While the 1930s celebrated the cult of the Indian and the vogue of Mexican culture, it was simultaneously a period of intense anti-Mexican sentiment in American society, which undoubtedly influenced the public’s perception of the Hispanic artist. The treatment of Mexicans in the United States in the period 1910-1940 cannot be synopsised or simplified, nor can it be said to have been endemic to all of society. Generalisations and overarching statements can be misleading and dangerous, thus caution must be exercised in the research of such emotive topics as racism and discrimination.92 3.1 Constructions of Race Racism does not exist of its own accord. Rather it is constructed by society to denote an undisputable differentiation between peoples, differences that

are in no way prescribed by the colour of skin.93 Created, and even imagined , to justify discrimination along racial lines, this invention of racial hierarchies has been ongoing since colonialism.94 The categorisation of people into social strata so defined by such an immediately discernible trait as skin colour allows for class-based delineations. Mae Ngai in her study of both Mexican and Japanese immigrants promotes her theory of the alien citizen, which captures the condition of being racially excluded and permanently foreign in your adopted country, regardless of citizenship. Through ‘legal racialisation’, immigrants were legally and socially exempt from ever participating as a citizen due to ‘a badge of foreignness that could not be shed’.95 Ngai concludes that: ‘“Foreignness” was a racialised concept that adhered to all Mexicans, including those born in the United States, and carried the opprobrium of illegitimacy and inferiority….The construction of “Mexican” into a onedimensional “commodity function and utility” devalued nearly everything that held meaning to Mexicans – the individual self, the family, culture, and political experience.’96 By systematically excluding from government those of a different ethnic background, the Anglo-Saxon (Anglo) ruling class, could retain power and ensure the social dominance of their own people. Initially those excluded were other European groups, such as the Irish and the Slavs, but later with the emergence of non-white groups in society, these Euro-Americans were assimilated into the larger white majority. Now race, rather than class or ethnicity, came to determine the social hierarchy. While Euro-Americans during the 1920s benefitted from the extrication of race and ethnic identity, the Mexicans’ race became explicitly conjoined with their ethnicity.97 Skin colour came to define what it meant to be Mexican.

The aff unpacking rejects the racist past of US immigration policyDoris Provine, 2008 , Professor, School of Justice & Social Inquiry, Arizona State U.Review of OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS, by Kevin R. Johnson. Law & Politics Book Review, Vol. 18 No. 2 (February, 2008) pp.106-108 http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/johnson0208.htmMoral arguments for open borders arise partly out of the nation’s past schizophrenia about immigration and its racism in developing and applying standards of admission. America congratulates itself for welcoming the world’s “huddled masses,” but has, in reality been quite consistently racist and classist in its policies , at least since 1875 when federal policy first took

shape. It has also tolerated and sometimes encouraged unauthorized immigration , and then

punished those who have come . Johnson briefly and tellingly reviews this history and current policy for racial and class bias, noting the lack of responsiveness of American courts to these issues. This unpacking of past and current policy as it has been implemented is an important strength of this provocative book. The choices the United States now faces, Johnson argues, are “painfully simple.” Regulated, but open, borders is the right policy, both because it rejects the racist past , and because it makes good economic sense. If the US does not accept immigrants, Johnson points out, the jobs will increasingly go abroad. Losing those low-paying jobs that many new immigrants currently occupy would have deleterious secondary effects that would harm communities. Johnson might have used meatpacking as an example – the industry was in decline until it began employing immigrant workers.

Vote affirmative to reject the feudal privilege of closed bordersJoseph H. Carens 2013 Prof of Political Science of the University of Toronto http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__academics__colloquia__legal_political_and_social_philosophy/documents/documents/ecm_pro_069497.pdf The Ethics of ImmigrationChapter 10 The Case for Open Borders (Book forthcoming – Jan 2014)In the first part of this book, I examined questions about immigration, citizenship and democracy within the framework of the conventional moral view that states are morally entitled to control admissions. In the past two chapters I have been exploring ways in which that right to control admissions was constrained by moral considerations that liberal democratic states often acknowledge, at least in principle. Now, however, I want to pose a more fundamental challenge. I want to call into question the fundamental assumption that states are morally entitled to restrict immigration. Let me begin by sketching the contours of this challenge. Borders have guards and the guards have guns. This is an obvious fact of political life but one that is easily hidden from view – at least from the view of those of us who are citizens of affluent democracies. If we see the guards at all, we find them reassuring because we think of them as there to protect us rather than to keep us out. To Africans in small, leaky vessels seeking to avoid patrol boats while they cross the Mediterranean to southern Europe or to Mexicans willing to risk death from heat and exposure in the Arizona desert to evade the fences and border patrols, it is quite different. To these people, the borders, guards, and guns are all too apparent, their goal of exclusion all too real. What justifies the use of force against such people? Perhaps borders and guards can be justified as a way of keeping out terrorists, armed invaders, or criminals. But most of those trying to get in are not like that. They are ordinary, peaceful people, seeking only the opportunity to build decent, secure lives for themselves and their families. On what moral grounds can we deny entry to these sorts of people? What gives anyone the right to point guns at them? To many people the answer to this question will seem obvious. The power to admit or exclude non-citizens is inherent in sovereignty and essential for any political community that seeks to exercise self-determination. Every state has the legal and moral right to exercise control over admissions in pursuit of its own national interest and of the common good of the members of its community, even if that means denying entry to peaceful, needy foreigners. States may choose to be generous in admitting immigrants, but, in most cases at least, they are under no moral obligation to do so. I want to challenge that view. In this chapter and the next, I will argue that, in principle, borders should generally be open and people should normally be free to leave their country of origin and settle in another. This critique of exclusion has particular force with respect to restrictions on movement from developing states

to Europe and North America, but it applies more generally. The Basic Challenge of Open Borders In the context of the modern state system, birthright citizenship in Western democracies is the moral equivalent of feudal class privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances. To be born a citizen of a rich state in Europe or North America is like being born into the nobility (even though many of us belong to the lesser nobility). To be born a citizen of a poor country in Asia or Africa is like being born into the peasantry in the Middle Ages (even if there are a few rich peasants and some peasants manage to gain entry to the nobility). Like feudal birthright privileges, contemporary social arrangements not only grant great advantages on the basis of birth but also legally restrict mobility, making it extremely difficult for those born into a socially disadvantaged position to overcome that disadvantage, no matter how talented they are or how hard they work. Like feudal practices, these contemporary social arrangements are hard to justify when one thinks about them closely. Reformers in the late Middle Ages objected to the way feudalism restricted freedom, including the freedom of individuals to move from one place to another in search of a better life – a constraint that was crucial to the maintenance of the feudal system. Modern practices of citizenship and state control over borders tie people to the land of their birth almost as effectively. Limiting entry to rich democratic states is a crucial mechanism for protecting a birthright privilege. If the feudal practices protecting birthright privileges were wrong, what justifies the modern ones? The analogy I have just drawn with feudalism is designed to give readers pause about the conventional view that restrictions on immigration by democratic states are normally justified.

1AC Environmental JusticeStatus quo border paradigms render the Other as useless – these racist delegations justify a plethora of environmental and health issues – toxic drinking water and anencephaly, in the name of preserving First World ontics. Welcome to Mexico! Bullard & Johnson, 2k - Robert Doyle Bullard is Dean of the Barbara Jordan-Mickey Leland School of Public Affairs at Texas Southern University (“Environmental Justice: Grassroots Activism and Its Impact on Public Policy Decision Making”, 2000, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 56, No. 3, http://www.unc.edu/courses/2005spring/epid/278/001/Bullard2000JSocIssues.pdf)Hazardous waste generation and international movement of hazardous waste pose some important health, environmental, legal, and ethical dilemmas. It is unlikely that many of the global hazardous waste proposals can be effectuated without first addressing the social. economic, and political context in which hazardous wastes are produced (industrial processes). controlled (regulations. notification and consent documentation). and managed (minimization, treatment. storage. recycling. transboundary shipment. pollution prevention). The "unwritten" policy of targeting Third World nations for waste trade received international media attention in 1991. Lawrence Summers, at the time he was chief economist of the World Bank. shocked the world and touched off an international scandal when his confidential memorandum on waste trade was leaked. Summers writes: Dirty' Industries: Just between you and me. shouldn't the World Bank be encouraging snore migration of the dirty industries to thc LDCs?" (Quoted in Grectipeace. 1993. pp. 1-2). Consumption and production patterns. especially in nations with wasteful "throw-away" lifestyles like the United States. and the interests of transnational corporations create and maintain unequal and unjust waste burdens within and between affluent and poor communities, states, and regions of the world. Shipping hazardous wastes from rich communities to poor communities is not a solution to the growing global waste problem. Not only is it immoral. but it should be illegal. Moreover, making hazardous waste transactions legal does not address the ethical issues imbedded in such transactions (Alston & Brown. 1993). Transboundary shipment of banned pesticides. hazardous wastes, toxic prod-ucts, and export of "risky technologies" from the United States, where regulations and laws are more stringent, to nations with weaker infrastructure, regulations, and laws smacks of a double standard (Bright. 1990). The practice is a manifestation of power arrangements and a larger stratification system in which some people and some places are assigned greater value than others. In the real world, all people, communities. and nations are not created equal. Some populations and interests are more equal than others. Unequal interests and power arrangements have allowed poisons of the rich to be offered as short-term remedies for poverty of the poor. This scenario plays out domestically (as in the United States. where low-income and people of color communities are dispropor-tionately affected by waste facilities and "dirty" industries) and internationally (where hazardous wastes move from OECD states flow to non-OECD states). The conditions surrounding the more than 1.900 maquiladoras (assembly plants operated by American. Japanese. and other foreign countries) located along the 2.000-mile U.S.-Mexico border may further exacerbate the waste trade (Sanchez. 1990). The maquiladoras use cheap Mexican labor to assemble imported components and raw material and then ship finished products back to the United States. Nearly a half million Mexican workers are employed in the maquiladoras. A 1983 agreement between the United States and Mexico required American companies in Mexico to return their waste products to the United States. Plants were required to notify the U.S. EPA when returning wastes. Results from a 1986 survey of 772 maquiladoras revealed that only 20 of the plants informed the EPA that they were returning waste to the United States, even though 86% of the plants used toxic chemicals in their manufacturing process (Juffers. 1988). In 1989. only 10 waste

shipment notices were filed with the EPA (Center for Investigative Reporting. 1990). Much of the wastes end up being illegally dumped in sewers, ditches. and the desert . All along the Lower Rio Grande River Valley. maquiladoras dump their toxic wastes into the river, from which 95% of the region's residents get their drinking water (Hernandez. 1993). In the border cities of Brownsville. Texas. and

Matamoras. Mexico the rate of anencephaly—babies born without brains—is four times the national average.

We should be affirming policies that avoid “waste imperialism,” where the First World uses the Third as a giant landfill, producing massive structural inequality while reproducing the myth of the “dirty, foreign” XenophobiaMannathukkaren 12 (Nissim, Associate Professor, International Development Studies, Dalhousie University, “Garbage as our alter ego”, Nov 3, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/garbage-as-our-alter-ego/article4059003.ece)

If there is one thing that is symptomatic of the modern human condition, but hardly recognised as such, it is garbage. Garbage is capitalism’s dark underbelly , its pathological alter ego. That is why we keep disavowing it, refusing to believe it exists. Vilappilsala standoff But the more we deny it, it rears its ugly head, as most recently, in Vilappilsala panchayat in Kerala where the standoff between the local people, who are opposed to the reopening of a waste treatment plant, and the State has left 2 lakh tonnes of solid waste lying unprocessed, threatening an environmental disaster. It is, therefore, remarkable that the current boisterous debate on foreign direct investment in multi-brand retail in India has completely ignored the question of garbage. By focusing only on the supposed virtues of waste reduction in perishable goods (like fruits and vegetables) brought about by the better storage facilities of retail conglomerates, the issue of the latter’s humongous ecological footprint (for example, in terms of sprawl, increase in driving, and the proliferation of non-biodegradable waste) has been bypassed . According to a report from The Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Washington, D. C., in the 20-year period from 1990, the same period in which Walmart grew to be a behemoth, the average number of miles that a U.S. household travelled for shopping increased by around 1000. And from 2005 to 2010, despite Walmart’s initiation of a reduced waste programme, its reported greenhouse gas

emissions shot up by 14 per cent. Big-box stores don’t just improve efficiency in consumption, they also increase consumption

manifold, which ultimately results in phenomenal amounts of trash . The garbage generated by Americans annually

reportedly amounts to 220 million tonnes, and 80 per cent of U.S. goods are used only once before being trashed. In the myth ologies of modernisation and development, we sing paeans to skyscrapers and nuclear plants. But there is no accompanying dirge about the costs we have had to pay for them. If there was, then we would have heard of Puente Hills — the largest active landfill/waste dump in the United States, which is a 1,365-acre monstrosity — as much as we have about the World Trade Center or the Empire State Building. It is ironical, Edward Humes tells us in his book Garbology: Our Dirty Love Affair with Trash, to call Puente Hills a “landfill,” for the garbage mountain has long ceased to fill a depression in the land and rises now an unbelievable 500 feet above the ground, a space capable of holding 15 million elephants. It takes, of course, a gargantuan effort, as Humes describes, to keep the toxic substance that leaks out of the 130-million tonne waste (which includes 3 million tonnes of soiled disposable diapers — another “important” invention of modern

life) from poisoning groundwater sources. Nevertheless, waste is seen , in popular development discourse as a “third world” problem , the ubiquitous mountains of garbage that blight the face of cities and towns in the poorer parts of the world — one of the first tasks that the newly-elected President in Egypt had was

cleaning up the garbage mess in Cairo. And the citizens of the third world have internalised this discourse, seeing themselves as part of the “dirty” developing world blissfully unaware of the cost at which a “clean” developed world is maintained . Thus the story of the Somali pirates plundering

the high seas has become a part of global lore but not that of Somalia being a (cheap) dumping ground for some of the most toxic garbage, including nuclear and medical waste, from Europe for the last two decades and more. As long as the streets are clean in Frankfurt and Paris, does it matter that children are born in Somalia without limbs? ‘Waste imperialism’ It is in this context of “waste imperialism” that the question of garbage needs to come out of its subterranean existence and occupy centre stage in any discussion on development, including FDI in retail. It is not accidental that dumping grounds, and waste treatment plants are invariably located in places where the most vulnerable and marginalised sections of the population live , whether in the developed or developing

worlds. Not surprisingly, garbage has become an important political tool in the present with garbage strikes and struggles around garbage taking place in various cities in the West and elsewhere. The contestation in Vilappilsala has been going on

since 2000 when the waste treatment plant opened with serious ecological impact. We would be living in a mythical world if we think that the problems of waste can be solved only with better rational planning, management or recycling . In the U.S., even after decades of environmental education, only around 24 per

cent of the garbage is recycled with nearly 70 per cent of it going into landfills. Simply throwing trash into the recycling bin hardly does anything to reduce the production of rubbish; on the contrary it might lull

us into a false sense of complacency as Heather Rogers, the author of Gone Tomorrow: The Hidden Life of Garbage

argues. This is because household waste constitutes a minuscule percentage of the total waste produced, the vast majority of which is constituted by waste from industrial processes. As she shows, the mantra of recycling and green capitalism has been adopted by corporations and big business because it is the least threatening of the options to profit margins — no wonder, the rate of production of goods and, consequently, trash has only increased. More importantly, in this “greenwashing,” the responsibility of cleaning up the environment is displaced from corporations to people themselves in their own individual, personal capacities. Economy of ‘zero waste’ To be sure, there are rare examples like Germany, which have nearly eliminated landfills, and recycle up to 70 per cent of the waste. But the fact that the Cröbern Central Waste Treatment Plant in Germany, one of the most sophisticated plants in the world (built at a cost of $ 135 million), has been allegedly involved in criminal garbage profiteering by illegally securing solid waste from Italy (to sustain the operations of the plant) shows how tenuous and fragile the economy of “zero waste” is. Ultimately, the problem of waste cannot be fathomed without recognising the order of capitalism, which is built on the relentless production of commodities and the philosophy of planned obsolescence, in which goods are built to have short shelf life. As Sarah Moore of the University of Arizona has pithily pointed out the contradiction: “Modern citizens have come to expect the places they live, work, play, and go to school to be free of garbage — to be ordered and clean. These expectations can never be fully met, however, precisely because the same processes of modernization that have produced them have also produced a situation in which garbage proliferates.” The “golden age of capitalism” is thus also the “golden age of garbage.” Just between 1960 and 1980, solid waste in the U.S. increased by four times. This is the exponential growth in garbage the world over, which has rendered the Pacific Ocean awash with plastic particles thus making plastic outnumber zooplankton at a shocking rate of 6:1. And this is the growth that has ironically made garbage and its disposal a multi-billion dollar business, and has made the mafia enter and control it, as in Italy. Developing countries like India, with almost non-existent waste disposal systems, catastrophically seek to move to the next

(superfluous) stage of consumption by imbibing the culture of Walmart. In this scenario, if justice for both human beings and nature has to be ensured, the alter ego of garbage can no longer be hidden under the carpet. It has to be confronted head on .

Specifically, the border represents a lens of political resistance – challenging environmental transnationalism spills-over and resists political conflictBandy, 97 - Ph.D. in Sociology @ University of California, Santa Barbara (“Reterritorializing Borders: Transnational Environmental Justice Movements on the U.S./Mexico Border”, 1997http://www.academia.edu/1354583/Reterritorializing_Borders_Transnational_Environmental_Justice_Movements_on_the_U.S._Mexico_Border, accessed via acadamia)“The border could represent a looking glass in which we see what the project of neoliberalism envisions for all of the Americas. Yet amongst these absurdities are emerging movements whose scope of political interest and practice of coalition are promising moments of a broad resistance to neoliberalism, enabled by the unique opportunities for a critical transnationalism that the border affords, and by the expansive critiques environmental justice can bring to bear on the crises of development. At a time when national borders seem ever more permeable, it is no accident that political borders of class, gender, and ethnicity seem ever more impregnable. But because of regional development regimes that highlight the borderless qualities of our natural environment and our transnational economy, and the coalitional practices that seem to result from their affinities to discourses of radical democracy and eco-populism, these movements have created a wide culture of solidarity in the struggles against the everyday consequences of an intensified, hemispheric political conflict.” When people talk about this period in history…they talk about the capitalist revolution sweeping in the world. They witness a growing awareness worldwide that states cannot direct economic activity, but must rely on private markets and competition to find the way forward. People will continue to speak with tremendous optimism about this period. They will marvel at how, if this capitalist revolution continues, this will have been the era during which 3 billion people got on a rapid escalator to modernity. When the history books are written that change will rank with the industrial revolution, and with the renaissance, in terms of its significance to human affairs. Because the Mexican model has been so widely watched, and so widely emulated, and is so salient in the

minds of investors, what happens in Mexico has implications that go far beyond Mexico, or even

Latin America . (former Chief Economist for the World Bank, Lawrence Summers, in Henwood 1995:3) If socialism is to arrive one day in North America, it is much more probable that it will be by virtue of a combined, hemispheric process of revolt that overlaps boundaries and interlaces movements….It is necessary to begin to imagine more audacious projects of coordinated action and political cooperation among the popular lefts in all the countries of the Americas. We are all, finally, prisoners of the same malign “American dream.” (Davis 1986:314)

The marco only survives due to the micro, just as policy is rooted in cultural movements, we must invigorate environmental justiceBandy, 97 - Ph.D. in Sociology @ University of California, Santa Barbara (“Reterritorializing Borders: Transnational Environmental Justice Movements on the U.S./Mexico Border”, 1997http://www.academia.edu/1354583/Reterritorializing_Borders_Transnational_Environmental_Justice_Movements_on_the_U.S._Mexico_Border, accessed via acadamia)Through this example of the private externalization of economic and environmental costs onto the working people and environments of Mexico, we are introduced to the lived conditions that have resulted from the last thirty years of neoliberalism in North America – a form of economic restructuring that entails export-oriented production, foreign investment, privatization, government downsizing, deregulation, currency devaluations, wage freezes, and lastly, “free trade.” But we are also introduced to the endeavors for forming dynamic trans-local movements to stem the tide of unfair or inequitable North American integration, including efforts for cross-cultural education, transnational solidarity networks for corporate accountability, and more global visions of environmental justice. Many leaders of this and other movements hope that with time and diligent work on a variety of political fronts, they may shape a multicultural and transnational arena in which integration is more radically democratic, environmentally sustainable, and economically secure. If the global hegemony of neoliberal economics, and particularly the disparity of North American integration, constitute a moment of cultural and economic crisis for the environment and working communities of our continent, they also provide an opening for increasing solidarity across the borders of our politics, our cultures, and our nations . Possibly no regional

context is as unique as the U.S./Mexico border in its representation of this current development crisis, with its liberalized relations between over- and under-developed nations, the power of corporate capital to challenge national sovereignty, and the decline of the welfare state as a potential guarantor of social and environmental sustainability. Further, the U.S./Mexico border is the historic site of a much discussed transcultural experimentation, in which the ambivalences of imperialism and hybridity have characterized everyday life. Although there is much discourse regarding these dynamics, there has been far too little discussion of those social/environmental movements and organizations that are uniquely positioned to understand and negotiate these changes. To better comprehend the relationships globalization has had with sustainability and environmental justice, and to chart the transnational alliances that may offer more radically democratic and sustainable alternatives, this study entails extended interviews with over twenty community environmental justice and labor movement organizers in the San Diego/Tijuana region. This investigation into the resistances to neoliberal development and its environmental impacts reveals a rich complexity of issues, including the mutual embeddedness of the global and the local, the relations between movement organizations and increasingly disempowered or disinterested states, the emergence of non-reactionary localisms, the practice of radical democracy as a basis for coalition, and transnationalisms not grounded in corporate power or the legacies of imperialism. And similar to other contexts, these movements reveal how the issues of environmental justice facilitate coalition-building between politically diverse groups of people of color, women, labor, and citizens of less developed nations, creating a dynamic and instructive transnational politics.

Now, any alternative makes extinction inevitable- social and environmental factors develop a cascade of destruction - only massive social reorganization of society can produce sustainable change and save the planetEhrenfeld, Rutgers biology professor, 2005 (David, “The Environmental Limits to Globalization”, Conservation Biology Vol. 19 No. 2, ebsco)The overall environmental changes brought about or accelerated by globalization are, however, much easier to describe for the near future, even if the long-term outcomes are still obscure. Climate will continue to change

rapidly (Watson 2002); cheap energy and other resources (Youngquist 1997; Hall et al. 2003; Smil 2003), including fresh water

(Aldhous 2003; Gleick 2004), will diminish and disappear at an accelerating rate; agricultural and farm communities

will deteriorate further while we lose more genetic diversity among crops and farm animals (Fowler & Mooney

1990; Bailey & Lappé 2002; Wirzba 2003); biodiversity will decline faster as terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems are damaged (Heywood 1995); harmful exotic species will become ever more numerous (Mooney & Hobbs 2000);

old and new diseases of plants, animals, and humans will continue to proliferate (Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention 1995-present; Lashley & Durham 2002); and more of the great ocean fisheries will become economically—and

occasionally biologically—extinct (Myers & Worm 2003). Although critics have taken issue with many of these forecasts (Lomborg 2001; Hollander

2003), the critics' arguments seem more political than scientific; the data they muster in support of their claims are riddled with errors, significant omissions, and misunderstandings of environmental processes (Orr 2002). Indeed, these environmental changes are demonstrably and frighteningly real. And because of these

and related changes, one social prediction can be made with assurance: globalization is creating an environment that will prove hostile to its own survival. This is not a political statement or a moral judgment. It is not the same as saying that globalization ought to be stopped. The enlightened advocates of globalization claim that globalization could give the poorest residents of the

poorest countries a chance to enjoy a decent income. And the enlightened opponents of globalization assert that the damage done by globalization to local communities everywhere, and the increasing gap it causes between the rich and the poor, far outweigh the small amount of good globalization may do. The debate is vitally important, but the fate of globalization is unlikely to be determined by who wins it. Al Gore remarked about the political impasse over global warming and the current rapid melting of the world's glaciers: “Glaciers don't give a damn about politics. They just reflect reality” (Herbert 2004). The same inexorable environmental reality is even now drawing the curtains on globalization. Often minimized in the United States, this reality is already painfully obvious in China, which is experiencing the most rapid expansion related to globalization. Nearly every issue of China Daily, the national English-language newspaper, features articles on the environmental effects of globalization. Will efforts in China to rein in industrial expansion, energy consumption, and environmental pollution succeed (Fu 2004; Qin 2004; Xu 2004)? Will the desperate attempts of Chinese authorities to mitigate the impact of rapid industrialization on the disastrously scarce supplies of fresh water be effective (Li 2004; Liang 2004)? The environmental anxiety is palpable and pervasive. The environmental effects of

globalization cannot be measured by simple numbers like the gross domestic product or unemployment rate. But even without such summary statistics, there are so many examples of globalization's impact, some obvious, some less so, that a convincing argument about its effects and trends can be made. Among the environmental impacts of globalization, perhaps the most significant is its fostering of the excessive use of energy, with the attendant consequences. This surge in energy use was inevitable, once the undeveloped four-fifths of the world adopted the energy-wasting industrialization model of the developed fifth, and as goods that once were made locally began to be transported around the world at a tremendous cost of energy. China's booming production, largely the result of its surging global exports, has caused a huge increase in the mining and burning of coal and the building of giant dams for more electric power, an increase of power that in only the first 8 months of 2003 amounted to 16% (Bradsher 2003; Guo 2004). The

many environmental effects of the coal burning include, most importantly, global warming. Fossil-fuel-driven climate change seems likely to result in a rise in sea level, massive extinction of species, agricultural losses from regional shifts in temperature and rainfall, and, possibly, alteration of major ocean currents, with secondary climatic change. Other side effects of coal burning are forest decline, especially from increased nitrogen deposition; acidification of freshwater and terrestrial ecosystems from nitrogen and sulfur compounds; and a

major impact on human health from polluted air. Dams, China's alternative method of producing electricity without burning fossil fuels, themselves cause massive environmental changes. These changes include fragmentation of river channels; loss of floodplains, riparian zones, and adjacent wetlands; deterioration of irrigated terrestrial environments and their surface waters; deterioration and loss of river deltas and estuaries; aging and reduction of continental freshwater runoff to oceans; changes in nutrient cycling; impacts on biodiversity; methylmercury contamination of food webs; and greenhouse gas emissions from reservoirs. The impoundment of water in reservoirs at high latitudes in the northern hemisphere has even caused a small but measurable increase in the speed of the earth's rotation and a change in the planet's axis (Rosenberg et al. 2000; Vörösmarty & Sahagian 2000). Moreover, the millions of people displaced by reservoirs such as the one behind China's Three Gorges Dam have their own environmental impacts as they struggle to survive in unfamiliar and often unsuitable places. Despite the importance of coal and hydropower in China's booming economy, the major factor that enables globalization to flourish around the world—even in China—is still cheap oil. Cheap oil runs the ships, planes, trucks, cars, tractors, harvesters, earth-moving equipment, and chain saws that globalization needs; cheap oil lifts the giant containers with their global cargos off the container ships onto the waiting flatbeds; cheap oil even mines and processes the coal, grows and distills the biofuels, drills the gas wells, and builds the nuclear power plants while digging and refining the uranium ore that keeps them operating. Paradoxically, the global warming caused by this excessive burning of oil is exerting negative feedback on the search for more oil to replace dwindling supplies. The search for Arctic oil has been slowed by recent changes in the Arctic climate. Arctic tundra has to be frozen and snow-covered to allow the heavy seismic vehicles to prospect for underground oil reserves, or long-lasting damage to the

landscape results. The recent Arctic warming trend has reduced the number of days that vehicles can safely explore: from 187 in 1969 to 103 in 2002 (Revkin 2004). Globalization affects so many environmental systems in so many ways that negative interactions of this sort are frequent and usually unpredictable. Looming over the global economy is the imminent disappearance of cheap oil. There is some debate about when global oil production will peak—many of the leading petroleum geologists predict the peak will occur in this decade, possibly in the next two or three years (Campbell 1997; Kerr 1998;

Duncan & Youngquist 1999; Holmes & Jones 2003; Appenzeller 2004; ASPO 2004; Bakhtiari 2004; Gerth 2004)—but it is abundantly clear that the remaining untapped reserves and alternatives such as oil shale, tar sands, heavy oil, and biofuels are economically and energetically no substitute for the cheap oil that comes pouring out of the ground in the Arabian Peninsula and a comparatively few other places on Earth (Youngquist 1997). Moreover, the hydrogen economy and other high-tech solutions to the loss of cheap oil are clouded by serious, emerging technological doubts about feasibility and safety, and a realistic fear that, if they can work, they will not arrive in time to rescue our globalized

industrial civilization (Grant 2003; Tromp et al. 2003; Romm 2004). Even energy conservation, which we already know how to implement both technologically and as part of an abstemious lifestyle, is likely to be no friend to globalization, because it reduces consumption of all kinds, and consumption is what globalization is all about . In a keynote address to the American Geological Society, a noted expert on electric power networks, Richard Duncan (2001), predicted widespread, permanent electric blackouts by 2012, and the end of industrial, globalized civilization by 2030. The energy

crunch is occurring now. According to Duncan, per capita energy production in the world has already peaked—that happened in 1979—and has declined since that date. In a more restrained evaluation of the energy crisis, Charles Hall and colleagues (2003) state that: The world is not about to run out of hydrocarbons, and perhaps it is not going to run out of oil from unconventional sources any time soon. What will be difficult to obtain is cheap petroleum, because what is left is an enormous amount of low-grade hydrocarbons, which are likely to be much more expensive financially, energetically, politically and especially environmentally. Nuclear power still has “important…technological, economic, environmental and public safety problems,” they continue, and at the moment “renewable energies present a mixed bag of opportunities.” Their solution? Forget about the more expensive and dirtier hydrocarbons such as tar sands. We need a major public policy intervention to foster a crash program of public and private investment in research on renewable

energy technologies. Perhaps this will happen—necessity does occasionally bring about change. But I do not see renewable energy coming in time or in sufficient magnitude to save globalization. Sunlight, wind, geothermal energy, and biofuels, necessary as they are to develop, cannot replace

cheap oil at the current rate of use without disastrous environmental side effects. These renewable alternatives can only power a nonglobalized civilization that consumes less energy (Ehrenfeld 2003b). Already, as the output of the giant Saudi oil reserves has started to fall (Gerth 2004) and extraction of

the remaining oil is becoming increasingly costly, oil prices are climbing and the strain is being felt by other energy sources. For example, the production of natural gas, which fuels more than half of U.S. homes, is declining in the United States, Canada, and Mexico as wells are exhausted. In both the United States and Canada, intensive new drilling is being offset by high depletion rates, and gas consumption increases yearly. In 2002 the United States imported 15% of its gas from Canada, more than half of Canada's total gas production. However, with Canada's gas production decreasing and with the “stranded” gas reserves in the United States and Canadian Arctic regions unavailable until pipelines are built 5–10 years from now, the United States is likely to become more dependent on imported liquid natural gas (LNG). Here are some facts to consider. Imports of LNG in the United States increased from 39 billion cubic feet in 1990 to 169 billion cubic feet in 2002, which was still <1% of U.S. natural gas consumption. The largest natural gas field in the world is in the tiny Persian Gulf state of Qatar. Gas is liquefied near the site of production by cooling it to −260°F (−162°C), shipped in special refrigerated trains to waiting LNG ships, and then transported to an LNG terminal, where it is off-loaded, regasified, and piped to consumers. Each LNG transport ship costs a half billion dollars. An LNG terminal costs one billion dollars. There are four LNG terminals in the United States, none in Canada or Mexico. Approximately 30 additional LNG terminal sites to supply the United States are being investigated or planned, including several in the Bahamas, with pipelines to Florida. On 19 January 2004, the LNG terminal at Skikda, Algeria, blew up with tremendous force, flattening much of the port and killing 30 people. The Skikda terminal, renovated by Halliburton in the late 1990s, will cost $800 million to $1 billion to replace. All major ports in the United States are heavily populated, and there is strong environmental opposition to putting terminals at some sites in the United States. Draw your own conclusions about

LNG as a source of cheap energy (Youngquist & Duncan 2003; Romero 2004). From LNG to coal gasification to oil shale to nuclear fission to breeder reactors to fusion to renewable energy, even to improvements in efficiency of energy use (Browne 2004), our society looks from panacea to panacea to feed the ever-increasing demands of globalization. But no one solution or combination of solutions will suffice to meet this kind of consumption. In the words of Vaclav Smil (2003): Perhaps the evolutionary imperative of our species is to ascend a ladder of ever-increasing energy throughputs, never to consider seriously any voluntary consumption limits and stay on this irrational course until it will be too late to salvage the irreplaceable underpinnings of biospheric services that will be degraded and destroyed by our progressing use of energy and materials. Among the many other environmental effects of globalization, one that is both obvious and critically important is reduced genetic and cultural diversity in agriculture. As the representatives of the petrochemical

and pharmaceutical industries' many subsidiary seed corporations sell their patented seeds in more areas previously isolated from global trade,

farmers are dropping their traditional crop varieties, the reservoir of our accumulated genetic agricultural wealth, in favor of a few, supposedly high-yielding, often chemical-dependent seeds. The Indian agricultural scientist H. Sudarshan (2002) has provided a typical example. He noted that Over the last half century, India has probably grown over 30,000 different, indigenous varieties or landraces of rice. This situation has, in the last 20 years, changed drastically and it is predicted that in another 20 years, rice diversity will be reduced to 50 varieties, with the top 10 accounting for over three-quarters of the sub-

continent's rice acreage. With so few varieties left, where will conventional plant breeders and genetic engineers find the genes for disease and pest resistance, environmental adaptations, and plant quality and vigor that we will surely need? A similar loss has been seen in varieties of domestic animals. Of the 3831 breeds of ass, water buffalo, cattle, goat, horse, pig, and sheep recorded in the twentieth century, at least 618 had become extinct by the century's end, and 475 of the remainder were rare. Significantly, the countries with the highest ratios of surviving breeds per million people are those that are most

peripheral and remote from global commerce (Hall & Ruane 1993). Unfortunately, with globalization, remoteness is no longer tenable. Here is a poignant illustration. Rural Haitians have traditionally raised a morphotype of long-snouted, small black pig known as the Creole pig. Adapted to the Haitian climate, Creole pigs had very low maintenance requirements, and were mainstays of soil fertility and the rural economy. In 1982 and

1983, most of these pigs were deliberately killed as part of swine disease control efforts required to integrate Haiti into the hemispheric economy. They were replaced by pigs from Iowa that needed clean drinking water, roofed pigpens, and expensive, imported feed. The substitution was a disaster. Haitian peasants, the hemisphere's poorest, lost an estimated $600 million. Haiti's ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide (2000), who, whatever his faults, understood the environmental and social effects of globalization, wrote There was a 30% drop in enrollment in rural schools… a dramatic decline in the protein consumption in rural Haiti, a devastating decapitalization of the peasant economy and an incalculable

negative impact on Haiti's soil and agricultural productivity. The Haitian peasantry has not recovered to this day…. For many peasants the extermination of the Creole pigs was their first experience of globalization. The sale of Mexican string beans and South African apples in Michigan and Minnesota in January is not without consequences.

The globalization of food has led to the introduction of “high-input” agricultural methods in many less-developed countries, with sharply increasing use of fertilizers, insecticides, herbicides, fungicides, irrigation pumps, mechanical equipment, and energy. There has been a correspondingly sharp decline in farmland biodiversity—including birds, invertebrates, and wild crop relatives—much of which is critically important to agriculture through ecosystem services or as reservoirs of useful genes (Benton et al. 2003). The combination of heavy fertilizer use along with excessive irrigation has resulted in toxic accumulations of salt, nitrates, and pesticides ruining soils all over the world, along with the dangerous drawdown and contamination of underground reserves of fresh water (Hillel 1991; Kaiser 2004; Sugden et al. 2004).

Although population growth has been responsible for some of this agricultural intensification, much has been catalyzed by globalization (Wright 1990). Aquaculture is another agriculture-related activity. Fish and shellfish farming—much of it for export—has more than

doubled in the past 15 years. This industry's tremendous requirements for fish meal and fish oil to use as food and its degradation of coastal areas are placing a great strain on marine ecosystems (Naylor et al. 2000). Other unanticipated problems are occurring. For instance, the Scottish fisheries biologist Alexander Murray and his colleagues (2002) report that infectious salmon anemia … is caused by novel virulent strains of a virus that has adapted to intensive aquacultural practices and has exploited the associated [ship] traffic to spread both locally and internationally…. Extensive ship traffic and lack of regulation increase the risk of spreading disease to animals raised for aquaculture and to other animals in

marine environments…. [and underscore] the potential role of shipping in the global transport of zoonotic pathogens. The reduction of diversity in agriculture is paralleled by a loss and reshuffling of wild species. The global die-off of species now occurring, unprecedented in its rapidity, is of course only partly the result of globalization, but globalization is a major factor in many extinctions. It accelerates species loss in several ways. First, it increases the numbers of exotic species carried by the soaring plane, ship, rail, and truck traffic of global trade. Second, it is responsible for the adverse effects of ecotourism on wild flora and fauna (Ananthaswamy 2004). And third, it promotes the development and exploitation of populations and natural areas to satisfy the demands of global trade, including, in addition to the agricultural and energy-related disruptions already mentioned, logging, over-fishing of marine fisheries, road building, and mining. To give just one example, from 1985 to 2001, 56% of Indonesian Borneo's (Kalimantan) “protected” lowland forest areas—many

of them remote and sparsely populated—were intensively logged, primarily to supply international timber markets (Curran et al. 2004). Surely one of the most significant impacts of globalization on wild species and the ecosystems in which they live has been the increase in introductions of invasive species (Vitousek et al. 1996; Mooney & Hobbs 2000). Two examples are zebra mussels (Dreissena

polymorpha), which came to the Great Lakes in the mid-1980s in the ballast water of cargo ships from Europe, and Asian longhorn beetles (Anoplophera glabripennis), which arrived in the United States in the early 1990s in wood pallets and crates used to transfer cargo shipped from China and Korea. Zebra mussels, which are eliminating native mussels and altering lake ecosystems, clog the intake pipes of waterworks and power plants. The Asian longhorn beetle now seems poised to cause heavy tree loss (especially maples [Acer sp.]) in the hardwood forests of eastern North America. Along the U.S. Pacific coast, oaks (Quercus sp.) and tanoaks (Lithocarpus densiflorus) are being killed by sudden oak death,

caused by a new, highly invasive fungal disease organism (Phytophthora ramorum), which is probably also an introduced species that was spread by the international trade in horticultural plants (Rizzo & Garbelotto 2003). Estimates of the annual cost of the damage caused by invasive species in the United States range from $5.5 billion to $115 billion. The zebra mussel alone, just one of a great many terrestrial, freshwater, and marine exotic animals, plants, and pathogens, has been credited

with more than $5 billion of damage since its introduction (Mooney & Drake 1986; Cox 1999). Invasive species surely rank among the principal economic and ecological limiting factors for globalization. Some introduced species directly affect human health, either as vectors of disease or as the disease organisms themselves. For example, the Asian tiger mosquito (Aedes albopictus), a vector for dengue and yellow fevers, St. Louis and LaCrosse encephalitis viruses, and West Nile virus, was most likely introduced in used truck tires imported from Asia to Texas in the 1980s and has spread widely

since then. Discussion of this and other examples is beyond the scope of this article. Even the partial control of accidental and deliberate species introductions requires stringent, well-funded governmental regulation in cooperation with the public and with business. Many introductions of alien species cannot be prevented, but some can, and successful interventions to prevent the spread of introduced species can have significant environmental and economic benefits. To give just one example, western Australia has shown that government and industry can cooperate to keep travelers and importers from bringing harmful invasive species across their borders. The western Australian HortGuard and GrainGuard programs integrate public education; rapid and effective access to information; targeted surveillance, which includes preborder, border, and postborder activities; and farm and regional biosecurity systems (Sharma 2004). Similar programs exist in New Zealand. But there is only so much that governments can do in the face of massive global trade. Some of the significant effects of globalization on wildlife are quite subtle. Mazzoni et al. (2003) reported that the newly appearing fungal disease chytridiomycosis (caused by Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis), which appears to be the causative agent for a number of mass die-offs and extinctions of amphibians on several continents, is probably being

spread by the international restaurant trade in farmed North American bullfrogs (Rana catesbeiana). These authors state: “Our findings suggest that international trade may play a key role in the global dissemination of this and other emerging infectious diseases of wildlife.” Even more unexpected findings were described in 2002 by Alexander et al., who noted that expansion of ecotourism and other consequences of globalization are increasing contact between free-ranging wildlife and humans, resulting in the first recorded introduction of a primary human pathogen, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, into wild populations of banded mongooses (Mungos mungo) in Botswana and suricates (Suricata suricatta) in South Africa. The known effects of globalization on the environment are numerous and highly significant. Many others are undoubtedly unknown. Given these circumstances, the first question that suggests itself is: Will globalization, as we see it now, remain a permanent state

of affairs (Rees 2002; Ehrenfeld 2003a)? The principal environmental side effects of globalization—climate change, resource exhaustion (particularly cheap energy), damage to agroecosystems, and the spread of exotic species, including pathogens (plant, animal, and human)—are sufficient to make this economic system unstable and short-lived. The socioeconomic consequences of globalization are likely to

do the same. In my book The Arrogance of Humanism (1981), I claimed that our ability to manage global systems , which depends on our being able to predict the results of the things we do, or even to understand the systems we have created, has been greatly exaggerated. Much of our alleged control is science fiction; it doesn't

work because of theoretical limits that we ignore at our peril. We live in a dream world in which reality testing is something we must never, never do, lest we awake. In 1984 Charles Perrow explored the reasons why we have trouble predicting what so many of our own created systems will do, and why they surprise us so unpleasantly while we think we are managing them. In his book

Normal Accidents, which does not concern globalization, he listed the critical characteristics of some of today's complex systems. They are highly interlinked, so a change in one part can affect many others, even those that seem quite distant. Results of some processes feed back on themselves in unexpected ways. The controls of the system often interact with each other unpredictably. We have only indirect ways of finding out what is happening inside the system. And we have an incomplete understanding of some of the system's processes. His example of such a system is a nuclear power plant, and this, he explained, is why

system-wide accidents in nuclear plants cannot be predicted or eliminated by system design. I would argue that globalization is a similar system, also subject to catastrophic accidents, many of them environmental—events that we cannot define until after they have occurred, and perhaps not even then. The comparatively few commentators who have predicted the collapse of globalization have generally given social reasons to support their arguments. These deserve some consideration here, if only because the environmental and social consequences of globalization interact so strongly with each other. In 1998, the British political economist John Gray, giving scant attention to environmental factors, nevertheless came to the conclusion that globalization is unstable and will be short-lived. He said, “There is nothing in today's global market that buffers it against the social strains arising from highly uneven economic

development within and between the world's diverse societies.” The result, Gray states, is that “The combination of [an] unceasing stream of new technologies, unfettered market competition and weak or fractured social institutions” has weakened both sovereign states and multinational corporations in their ability to control important events. Note that Gray claims that not only nations but also multinational corporations, which are widely touted as controlling the world, are being weakened by globalization. This idea may come as a surprise,

considering the growth of multinationals in the past few decades, but I believe it is true. Neither governments nor giant corporations are even remotely capable of controlling the environmental or social forces released by globalization, without first controlling globalization itself. Two of the social critics of globalization with the most dire predictions about its doom are themselves masters of the process. The late Sir James Goldsmith, billionaire financier, wrote in 1994, It must surely be a

mistake to adopt an economic policy which makes you rich if you eliminate your national workforce and transfer production abroad, and which bankrupts you if you continue to employ your own people…. It is the poor in the rich countries who will subsidize the rich in the poor countries. This will have a serious impact on the social cohesion of nations. Another free-trade billionaire, George Soros, said much the same thing in 1995: “The collapse of the global marketplace would be a traumatic event with unimaginable consequences. Yet I find it easier to imagine than the continuation of the present regime.” How much more powerful these statements are if we factor in the environment! As globalization collapses, what will happen to people, biodiversity, and ecosystems? With respect to people, the gift of prophecy is not required to answer this question. What will happen depends on where you are and how you live. Many citizens of the Third World are still comparatively self-sufficient; an unknown number of these will survive the breakdown of globalization and its attendant chaos. In the developed world, there are also people with resources of self-sufficiency and a growing understanding of the nature of our social and environmental problems, which may help them bridge the years of crisis. Some species are adaptable; some are not. For the nonhuman residents of Earth, not all news will be bad. Who would have predicted that wild turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo), one of the wiliest and most evasive of woodland birds, extinct in New Jersey 50 years ago, would now be found in every county of this the most densely populated state, and even, occasionally, in adjacent Manhattan? Who would have predicted that black bears (Ursus americanus), also virtually extinct in the state in the mid-twentieth century, would now number in the thousands (Ehrenfeld 2001)? Of course these recoveries are unusual—rare bright spots in a darker landscape. Finally, a few ecological systems may survive in a comparatively undamaged state; most will be stressed to the breaking point, directly or indirectly, by many environmental and social factors interacting unpredictably. Lady Luck, as always, will have much to say. In his book The Collapse of Complex Societies, the archaeologist Joseph Tainter (1988) notes that collapse, which has happened to all past empires, inevitably results in human systems of lower complexity and less specialization, less centralized control, lower economic activity, less information flow, lower population levels, less trade, and less redistribution of resources. All of these changes are inimical to globalization. This less-complex, less-globalized condition is probably what human societies will be like when the dust settles. I do not think, however, that we can make such specific predictions about the ultimate state of the environment after globalization, because we have never experienced anything like this exceptionally rapid, global environmental damage before. History and science have little to tell us in this situation. The end of the current economic system and the transition to a postglobalized state is and will be accompanied by a desperate last raid on resources and a chaotic flurry of environmental destruction whose results cannot possibly be told in advance. All one can say is that the surviving species, ecosystems, and resources will be greatly impoverished compared with what we have now, and our descendants will not thank us for having adopted, however briefly, an economic system that consumed their inheritance and damaged their planet so wantonly. Environment is a true bottom line—concern for its condition must trump all purely economic growth strategies if both the developed and developing nations are to survive and prosper. Awareness of the environmental limits that globalized industrial society denies or ignores should not, however, bring us to an extreme position of environmental determinism. Those whose preoccupations with modern civilization's very real social problems cause them to reject or minimize the environmental constraints discussed here (Hollander 2003) are guilty of seeing only half the picture. Environmental scientists sometimes fall into the same error. It is tempting to see the salvation of civilization and environment solely in terms of technological improvements in efficiency of energy extraction and use, control of pollution, conservation of water, and regulation of environmentally harmful activities. But such needed developments will not be sufficient—or may not even occur—without corresponding social change, including an end to human population growth and the glorification of consumption, along with the elimination of economic mechanisms that increase the gap between rich and poor. The environmental and social problems inherent in globalization are completely interrelated—any attempt to treat them as separate entities is unlikely to succeed in

easing the transition to a postglobalized world. Integrated change that combines environmental awareness, technological innovation, and an altered world view is the only answer to the life-threatening problems exacerbated by globalization (Ehrenfeld 2003b).

Imagination solves the environment – psychology (retag)Susan M. Koger & Deborah DuNann Winter, 3/12/2010, Ph.D. in Psychology and professor @ Willamette University, “The Psychology of Environmental Problems: Psychology for Sustainability”, Psychology Press, http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=M_wG9YJyWcEC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&ots=-eLQkVHO23&sig=zSSXZDXOgswimcn6Q7TMeHQyUnU#v=onepage&q&f=falseFrom a social psychological perspective, environmentally relevant behavior is a function of social influence. Norms, roles, and reference groups determine choices by influencing what people think of as appropriate behavior. Even though they are usually unaware of it, people imitate and are influenced by others in their reference group, as well as by messages from media. The consistency (or inconsistency) between people's attitudes toward environmental problems and their environmentally responsible behavior depends on their intentions, values, beliefs, and constraints on their behavior. When cognitive consistency, personal norms, and intentions are enhanced, proenvironmental behaviors can be promoted. People care about those inside their scope of justice, and make attribution errors about those they exclude, leading to environmental injustice. Relative to men, women care more about the environment, its impact on others, and the well-being of the biosphere. This gender difference most likely arises

out of women's differing roles, and leads to different levels of moral responsibility. Finally, research shows that wealth does not make people happier. Materialism, facilitated by a form of applied social psychology known as advertising, is depicting the planet's resources, as well the psychological well-being of its inhabitants. The good news is that insights from social psychology can help us redesign and optimize norms, reference groups, and social influence mechanisms that induce environmentally responsible behavior and reduce overconsumption. From a social psychological point of view, you can increase your own environmentally responsible behavior by deliberately avoiding situations with environmentally destructive norms, while simultaneously joining groups, cultivating activities, friendships, and commitments that support sustainability. If there is any single message from social psychology, it is that changes are much easier to make and keep if we put ourselves in social situations that support them. Our immediate reference groups of friends, relatives, and colleagues are enormously powerful social influence agents. As Kurt Lewin observed at the outset of social psychology, It is easier to change individuals formed into a group than to change any of them separately. As long as group values are unchanged the individual will resist changes. ... If the group standard itself is changed, the resistance which is due to the relation between the individual and the group is eliminated. (1959, p. 228) Ihus, understanding and changing environmentally relevant behavior requires paying attention to the immediate social context. Focusing on the situation in which behavior occurs rather than on deep-seated traits or personality patterns is also a fundamental principle of behavioral psychology, to which we now turn.

1AC AdvocacyThus, ___ and I ask you to imagine that the United States federal government implements an open-border policy toward the U.S.-Mexican border.

The border is constructed - Americans chose to imagine the failure of an open-border – these ideas are wrong and outdated – the EU proves Delacroix & Nikiforov, 09 - Jacques Delacroix is a professor of organizational analysis and management and the former director of international business studies in the Leavey School of Business at Santa Clara University (“If Mexicans and Americans Could Cross the Border Freely”, Summer 2009, http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_14_01_6_delacroix.pdf)

The bold open-border solution is not the subject of serious debate because Americans lack reference points from which to consider even its most predictable implications . In regard to open

borders, the collective American imagination may be dealing mostly in nightmarish caricatures. Yet a concrete precedent exists in the European Union, which for more than forty years has been progressively eliminating all internal barriers, including those that pertain to the free movement of persons. (We emphasize, though, that we do not propose that the European Union constitutes a general model of behavior for the United States. It should also be obvious that a study of the union’s experience with internal migrations does not imply admiration for its bureaucratic proclivities.) Between 1986 and 1992, ten countries of the European Union, some formerly vengefully nationalistic states, reached a situation in which practically any citizen of a union country may pull up stakes and go to live anywhere else in the union.2 The European Union grants citizens of newer members states the same privileges gradually, after a more or less extensive

waiting period, thereafter withholding only the right of suffrage in national elections. Anecdotal evidence of this policy’s effectiveness is all over the map of Europe. An English couple—of all people—runs their own cafe´ in deepest France. Paris apartment house concierges—at all times, a central cultural role in French society— today normally speak French with a Portuguese accent. Irishmen shoe horses in Seville. Real Italian restaurants run by real natives of Italy are everywhere.3 This kind of smooth integration is remarkable given that several of the member countries suffered grievously at the hands of other member countries within living memory. (In fact, the architects of this success belong to the very generation that experienced most of this intra-European aggression.) Nothing approaching such a legacy of hostility exists between the United States and Mexico. If it did, the resentment would belong on the Mexican side because of the 160-year-old Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo by which Mexico lost half of its territory.

We should abolish the visa approach for NAFTA countriesTim Cavanaugh, April 16, 2006 columnist for Reason's print edition Open the Borders: Forget guest workers—why should citizens of NAFTA countries need visas at all? http://reason.com/archives/2006/04/16/open-the-bordersThe solution to the immigration crisis, if there is such a crisis, does not rest in guest worker programs or higher visa quotas, but in the one possibility nobody is mentioning: eliminating visas altogether within the NAFTA countries, and allowing Canadians, Americans, and Mexicans with legitimate passports to travel freely among our three countries for any reason or for no reason. This was the early vision of Ronald Reagan, and it was certainly an implied outcome of the North American Free Trade Agreement. "NAFTA had an effect on the Mexican economy, in terms of encouraging campesinos to leave the farm and seek better opportunities," says Fred Tsao, policy director of the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant Rights, "but we've shut off the legal opportunities for people to do that." The pathetic aspect of this debate is that visaless NAFTA borders would not even be a novel step. They would be a partial return to the way things were in the golden age, when the Tancredos, the Sensenbrenners, and the Cavanaughs first fouled these shores. Anti-illegal-immigrant types who never tire of pointing out that their ancestors came here legally are making a hollow argument: Until fairly recently in American history, there

was no motive for illegal immigration; all a prospective American had to do was show up. It's a sign of a timid and tired nation that, in a period of economic expansion, we're not even willing to allow such an open system for our immediate neighbors and closest trading partners. "Guest worker provisions are an attempt to recapture some of the circularity that happened in the past, when people moved more freely between countries," says Tsao. "Whether that's going to work, I don't know."

1AC FramingThe best methodology to deteriorate the Other is to imagine a world absent the border – this process eliminates difference and creates an aesthetic that allows us to open-up and engage the Xenophobia circulated in the status quoKlahn, 93 – Norma Khlan, PhD Humanities, University of California @ Santa Cruz (“The Border: Imagined, Invented Or from the Geopolitics of Literature to Nothingness”, 1993, http://clrc.soe.ucsc.edu/sites/clrcweb/files/sites/default/files/WorkingPapers/05_Klahn.pdf)The eroding of unifying concepts of national identity both in the United States and in Mexico has made the border zone, once the periphery of both nations-states the center and the main item on the agenda. A hybrid culture has emerged which is rejected by both hegemonic centers who are still holding on the one hand to the 'American assimilationist dream' or on the other to the concept of 'the

raza cosmica'. 'The cosmic race,' imagined by Josa Vasconcelos, privileged a hybrid race, a 'mestizaje which

recognized the indigenous make-up of the Mexican .46 In effect, his post-revolutionary discourse helped consolidate a nationalist assimilative construct of the nation which defined itself as homogeneous and essentialist, and was founded on an inclusionary politics that erased difference .47 Post-1968 Mexican literature spoke to the heterogeneity of the Mexican people and explicitly and implicitly attacked the reified symbols of official Mexico used to maintain hegemony in that country. Those have been the images exported as folklore to the United States, images of revolutionary heroes, charros, mariachis, sarapes, pre-Columbian gods, mestizaje. cacti, Virgins of Guadalupe or the more eventually arrived icon Frida Kahlo. In themselves, their value is not disputed; it is their use that is questioned. Many of these images, however, were creatively appropriated and recycled by Chicanos and Mexicanos in the 70s and 80s. Symbols that homogenize Mexicans thus are used by some Chicanos to undermine and resist racist Anglo nationalist agendas, such as the English-Only Movement. Transculturated, or iranscreated,*

as Juan Flores and George Yudice would say, 48 these images open a space where identities within the nation-state are being recreated and transformed . Literarily and figuratively, Chicanos also

crossed the border to Mexico, and were mainly disillusioned. There was no going back to the Old Country that had originally invited them to abandon its oppressing conditions. In the 1940s, the cognitive dissonance of the Chicano, translated into questions of " Where do I belong?: and "How do I balance two worlds that reject me?", giving birth to the Pachuco--the Zoot Suiter--, an aesthetic imagining that became an ethic as Carlos Monsivais says,48 a search and the creation of a new and radical identity, rejected and repressed

in the United States and in Mexico. Octavio Paz in El laberinto S /a soledad (The Labyrinth of Solitude)first published in 1950, sees the Pachuco as an aberration; he is-indeed-unable to understand the process of ethnic self-valorization implied in this early social movement of contestation.80 The spaces, however, created by this identity crisis became the antecedents to the Chicano movements of the 70s. The search for identity took many forms. In their search for origins some crossed spatial borders and found little or nothing; many then crossed temporal borders reaching to the past and finding and founding

Aztlan, a utopian space from where a new identity could be constructed -- perhaps problematic-- but certainly establishing a point of departure. Others crossed and made a U-turn. However, the crossing back over the threshold did not provide the same feeling of coming home as in the Anglo traveller.

The border is a narrative constructed by imagination – to some, it is a fence – to others, it is a metaphorical dichotomy that bolsters societal exclusion that they can’t climb over - a critical interrogation is necessary to delineate self-identificationCarter, 12 – PhD., the University of Essex, Matt's research is principally concerned with the expression of the American West in US cinema. His doctoral thesis investigated the interrelations between history, myth, and ideology in North America by using the Hollywood Western as its key primary source. He is also interested in the culture of the American Southwest, and his current research seeks to place the Western in a transnational context (“’I’m Just a Cowboy’: Transnational Identities of the Borderlands in Tommy Lee Jones’ The Three Burials of Melquiades Estrada”, 2012, http://ejas.revues.org/9845)

Limerick presses the importance of the history of the borderlands as part of the complex cultural geography of the United States. “The [Anglo] American conquest of the borderlands [is] an essential element in the story of expansion,” she insists, “to be compared and contrasted with the conquest of Indians” (Limerick, Legacy 253-54). She further suggests that, for much of the twentieth century, “Hispanic history remained on the edges of Western American history” (Legacy 253-54). Her approach is one which seeks to highlight the cultural-ideological machinations that lay behind this elision from the “official” discourse, and which seeks to re-engage the reader with a Hispanic culture now in its “proper place at the centre of Western American history” (Legacy 255). 6With specific regard to la frontera, it is Limerick’s belief that “ the conquered and controlled borderland continued to exist only in the imagination . . . the Mexican border was a social fiction that neither nature nor people in search of opportunity observed” (Legacy 251). She draws our attention to the contemporary borderlands as a troubled region with ongoing “conflicts over the restriction of immigration, with disputes over water flow and environmental pollution”; ultimately, she describes “a zone where an industrialised nation shares a long land border with a nation much-burdened by poverty” (Limerick, Something 88). 7Anzaldúa’s poetic and highly personalised writing further illuminates Limerick’s descriptions of la frontera’s “legacy of conquest” by shifting the traditional parameters of historiographic concern. She displays a sense of the frustration and fear held by the local communities – the “little people” – among whom she lived and grew up and with whom she identifies her personal history. Her reminiscences of her childhood and self-identification with cultural otherness as a mestiza share pages with long passages of non-translated Spanish dialogue, thus ramifying the reality of the borderlands as linguistically polyglot, a “melting pot” of myriad cultures, identities, and voices – voices that have, themselves, invariably become subsumed under the “official” Anglo-American discourse. The result of her work is part poetry, part literary criticism, and part history. Of course, the fact that Anzaldúa does write in Spanish as well as English (and other indigenous languages such as Nahua) provides us with an analogue to Three Burials’ own dialogism. But this is not the only point of comparison. 8Anzaldúa writes from the perspective of an intellectual who is at once a woman, a Tejana, and a lesbian. Therefore, for her, borders are primarily cultural. Just as the border between the U.S. and Mexico defines the two nations in geo-political terms, so it symbolises the imagined borders separating cultural identities . Anzaldúa’s perspective is that of a member of several ethnicities who have suffered from discrimination and who continue to struggle for recognition. She also identifies herself as a Chicana, one of the “dispossessed,” whose ancestors “lost their land and, overnight, became foreigners” after the “white imperialist takeover” and who are now regarded as interlopers in their own land (Anzaldúa 28). In order to consolidate their hegemony, the Anglo-American population has either forgotten that the Chicanos once “owned” the country or else bluntly claim that the Southwest is theirs by right of conquest and is to be protected by force from the “incursion” of the Mexican “other.”

Embracing the imaginary despite political impossibility is desirable – the alternative is to legitimize deep unjustice though the judging spaceJoseph H. Carens 2013 Prof of Political Science of the University of Toronto http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__academics__colloquia__legal_political_and_social_philosophy/documents/documents/ecm_pro_069497.pdf The Ethics of ImmigrationChapter 10 The Case for Open Borders (Book forthcoming – Jan 2014)Why make an argument that we should open our borders when there is no chance that we will? Because it is important to gain a critical perspective on the ways in which collective choices are constrained, even if we cannot do much to alter those constraints. Social institutions and practices may be deeply unjust and yet so firmly established that, for all practical purposes, they must be taken as background givens in deciding how to act in the world at a particular moment in time. The feudal system, whose injustice I have presupposed above, was once deeply entrenched. So was the institution of slavery in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For a long time, there was no real hope of transcending those arrangements. Yet criticism was still appropriate. Even if we must take deeply rooted social arrangements as givens for purposes of immediate action in a particular context, we should

never forget about our assessment of their fundamental character. Otherwise we wind up legitimating what should only be endured.

Only through discursive resistance within a politics of ubiquity – can we challenge institutionalized knowledge production – solves on both the macro and micro levelMiller, 13 [Ethan Miller University of Western Sydney “Community Economy: Ontology, Ethics, and Politics for Radically-Democratic Economic Organizing” http://www.communityeconomies.org/site/assets/media/Ethan_Miller/Miller_Community-Economy.pdf]//BMitch Thus far I have sidestepped an important dimension in Gibson-Graham's concept of community economy. In one sense, the term is mobilized in the three ways that I have described above. In another, the term stands as a tentative proposal for “an alternative fixing of economic identity around a new nodal point” (Gibson-Graham 2006a, 78). This is to say that the community economy could itself become a “political project to unify [the] discursive terrain” of multiple diverse economies, challenging the hegemony of capitalocentric social formations: Articulating the multiple, heterogeneous sites of struggle, such a discourse could resignify all economic transactions and relations, capitalist and noncapitalist, in terms of their sociality and interdependence, and their ethical participation in being-incommon as part of a 'community economy'. (Gibson-Graham 2006a, 97) Here we see an aspiration to collapse the meta-ethical moment of CE2 into CE3's moment of politics and to pose a political articulation around the question of the exposure and negotiation of social interdependence. Such a move would politicize—and thus make explicit the potential antagonisms within—the Nancian distinction between “socially imploded generality” and “socially exposed particularity.” A community economy would be built by those who seek to sustain and struggle for spaces in which interdependence is visible and collectively negotiated, opposing processes of uncommoning or enclosure in all their forms. What does this look like as an organizing project? One might be tempted to imagine the formation of a coalition identified with “ethical exposure,” oriented around a commitment only to the question of ethics itself. Indeed, Gibson-Graham's aspiration is toward some kind of substantive linking, asking “how do we multiply, amplify, and connect these different activities?” (2006a, 80). Yet her counterhegemonic articulation of community economy is not meant to suggest the construction of anything resembling an organizationally-coherent movement. Her preferred theory of change is based, rather, on a “feminist political imaginary” inspired by “the complex intermixing of alternative discourses, shared language, embodied practices, self-cultivation, emplaced actions, and global transformation associated with second-wave feminism” (2006b, xxvii). Transformation occurs, in this view, through “ubiquity rather than unity” (2006a, xxiv), in “a vast set of disarticulated 'places'...related analogically rather than organizationally and connected through webs of signification” (2006b, xxvii). Community economy as a counterhegemonic discourse might thus link diverse projects of ethical exposure and negotiation “emotionally and semiotically rather than primarily through organizational ties” (2006b, xxiii). Is this not how capitalocentric hegemony was, in fact, established? While institutional articulation has clearly been essential for the rise of such a force, haven't the emotional and semiotic dimensions of capitalist discourse also been crucial in rendering noncapitalist practices, and potential spaces of collective creation and resistance, effectively invisible? Perhaps. Yet capitalist hegemonic articulations have been robustly positive in their content, never shying away from the common-being that CE1 demands we unwork, or from closing the ethical spaces that CE2 demands we open. Can the near-emptiness of a community economy meta-ethic generate the kind of identificatory power that a strong nodal point requires? Is there enough “family resemblance” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 179) between various instances of community economy (CE2) to enable politically effective connections to emerge across vast difference? These are questions to which a solidarity economy approach might answer “no.”

Our methodology resolves topic specific education – alternative framings of the border blur policy with juxtaposing rhetoric – understanding becomes delocalizedHeyman, 94 – PhD., Department of Sociology and Anthropology @ University of Texas El Paso (“The Mexico-United States Border in Anthropology: A Critique and Reformulation”, Vol. 1., 1994, http://intranet.library.arizona.edu/users/aengels/jpe/volume_1/heyman.pdf)The Border As Image One result of making border processes into policies is media publicity about the border. Those who sympathize with the underdog and favor dramatic alternatives to U.S. policies gravitate toward the border as an image that inverts the U.S. "state idea" (P. Abrams 1988). The border image suggests conflict, change, and interest in relatively poor and powerless Mexicans.

Academics then blur the inversion of policy with the inversion of a preceding generation's theories . The problem of this image of the border is not that science must be separated from politics; we are engaged, in part, in the study of politics . It is that when the border is condensed to an

image, and when this image symbolizes wide-ranging political or theoretical stances, understanding of the border becomes reductive and delocalized .1 Roger Rouse (1991; also see 1992), for example, opens his

article with three images, the longest and most sustained of which is the U.S. southern boundary fence and the corresponding words "the border." In fact, Rouse addresses long-term cyclical migration between interior western Mexico (Michoacan) and the San Francisco bay region, and he argues that migrants live within two different class relations in each place, actively deploying rural Mexican class-culture to limit their inclusion in U.S. working class discipline. An interesting point, but one lacking analytical reference to Mexico-U.S. boundary processes. Because the people happen to cross the boundary, Rouse (1991:15) uses the border as a metonym for the juxtaposition of two experiences in one life.

Traditional forms of political discussion are melancholic and nostalgic – conceptions of “political certainty” make us slaves to institutions and destroy our agencyGibson-Graham 06 [J. K. Gibson-Graham, University of Minnesota A Post-Capitalist Politics p. 5//BMitch

Nostalgia for old forms of political organization (like international movements of worker solidarity or unions that had teeth) and attachment to the political victories of yesteryear (such as the nationalization of industry or protection for key sectors) blinds us to the political opportunities at hand. “We come to love our left passions and reasons, our left analyses and convictions, more than we love the existing world that we presumably seek to alter” (W. Brown [1999, 21] paraphrasing Benjamin). Melancholia conserves and preserves, turning its hatred toward the new and blaming those—including poststructuralists and practitioners of identity politics (22)—who betray the old ideals. It is from this stance that place-based activism of the kind we advocate is seen as accommodationist and divisive. As a departure from the politics of the past, place-based movements are suspect and likely to be seen as already incorporated into the capitalist world order. Here we have not only the melancholic attachment to the traditional paranoid style of theorizing, but the melancholic impulse to separate from and punish those who stray and innovate. Again there is work to be done to melt the “frozen heart of the putative leftist,” where the “conservative, backward-looking attachment” to feelings, analyses, and relationships blocks any move toward present possibility and connection (W. Brown 1999, 22). To be a leftist is historically to be identified with the radical potential of the exploited and oppressed working class. Excluded from power yet fixated on the powerful, the radical subject is caught in the familiar ressentiment of the slave against the master. Feelings of hatred and revenge toward the powerful sit side by side with the moral superiority of the lowly (and therefore good) over the high and mighty (and therefore bad) (Newman [2000, 2] paraphrasing Nietzsche). Moralism provides an emotional shoring up of the reactive stance of the weak, “who define themselves in opposition to the strong” (3).11 With the dissolution in recent times of positive projects of socialist construction, left moralism has been energized by increasing investments in injury, failure, and victimhood (W. Brown 1995). When power is identified with what is ruthless and dominating, it becomes something the left must distance itself from, lest it be co-opted or compromised (Newman 2000). Fearing implication with those in power, we become attached to guarding and

demonstrating our purity rather than mucking around in everyday politics. Those who engage in such work may find themselves accused of betraying their values, sleeping with the enemy, bargaining with the devil—all manner of transgressions and betrayals. A moralistic stance fuels doubts about whether local economic experimentation can do anything but shore up a repressive state apparatus, or whether action research reproduces the power of the manipulative academic over the passive community. Focused on the glass half empty rather than half full, this angry and skeptical political sensibility is seldom if ever satisfied. Successful political innovation seems perpetually blocked or postponed because it requires an entirely new relation to power. It will need to escape power, go beyond it, obliterate it, transform it, making the radical shift from a controlling, dominating power to an enabling, liberating one (Newman 2000). But since distance from power is the marker of authentic radicalism and desire is bound up in the purity of powerlessness, the move to reinhabit power is deferred. If we are to make the shift from victimhood to potency, from judgment to enactment, from protest to positive projects, we also need to work on the moralistic stance that clings to a singular conception of power and blocks experimentation with power in its many forms. Widely present if not fully manifest in any person or pronouncement, this culture of thinking and feeling creates a political sensibility that is paradoxically “depoliticized.” The theoretical closure of paranoia, the backward-looking political certainty of melancholia and the moralistic skepticism toward power render the world e ff ectively uncontestable . The accompanying a ff ects of despair, separation, and resentment are negative and repudiating, inhospitable to adventure and innovation, at best cautious and lacking in

temerity. From our perspective, these stances are what must be “worked against” if we are to pursue a new economic politics . Thankfully those same theorists who have helped to identify the barely conscious contours of a habit of thinking that blocks possibility have also led us to potential strategies for loosening its hold over us. The practices of what Nietzsche called self-artistry or self-overcoming (Connolly 2002, 77; Newman 2000, 20) and Foucault called self-cultivation or care of the self are an important entry point for e ff ecting changes in thinking and being in the world. 12 If our goal as thinkers is the proliferation of di ff erent economies, what we most need is an open and hospitable orientation toward the objects of our thought. We need to foster a “love of the world,” as Arendt says, rather than masterful knowing, or melancholy or moralistic detachment. To do this, perhaps we need to draw on the pleasures of friendliness, trust, conviviality, and companionable connection. Our repertory of tactics might include seducing, cajoling, enrolling, enticing, inviting. There could be a greater role in our thinking for invention and playfulness, enchantment and exuberance. And we could start to develop an interest in unpredictability, contingency, experimentation, or even an attachment to the limits of understanding and the possibilities of escape. Shifting Stances How do we disinvest in what we are, what we habitually feel and do, and turn ourselves to a project of becoming? How do we work against mastery, melancholia, and moralism and cultivate capacities that can energize and support the creation of “other economies”? If we want other worlds and other economies, how do we make ourselves a condition of possibility for their emergence? Clearly there are powerful pressures that keep us thinking and feeling in the same old ways. But as Connolly points out, there are also countervailing pressures and possibilities . . . at work in the layered corporeality of cultural beings. Thinking bounces in magical bumps and charges across zones marked by differences of speed, capacity, and intensity. It is above all in the dicey relations between the zones that the seeds of creativity are planted. For thinking, again, is not harnessed by the tasks of representation and knowledge. Through its layered intra- and intercorporeality new ideas, theories, and identities are sometimes propelled into being. These new ideas, concepts, sensibilities, and identities later become objects of knowledge. Thinking is thus creative as well as representative, and its creativity is aided by the fact that the process of thinking is not entirely controlled by the agents of thought. (2002, 65–66) There are, he suggests, experimental practices that we can employ to reeducate ourselves, to convince our bodies to adopt fundamentally different attitudes “that we intellectually entertain as a belief,” thereby producing new a ff ective relations with the world (78). We can work in the conscious realm to devise practices that produce the kind of embodied, affect-imbued pre-thoughts that we want to foster. And in the

daily rehearsal of these practices we can hope that they will become part of our makeup, part of a cell memory that will increasingly assert itself without resort to conscious calling.13 Practicing Weak Theory, Adopting Reparative Motives, and Producing Positive Affect What if we believed, as Sedgwick suggests, that the goal of theory were not only to extend and deepen knowledge by confirming what we already know—that the world is full of cruelty, misery, and loss, a place of domination and systemic oppression? What if we asked theory to do something else—to help us see openings, to help us to find happiness, to provide a space of freedom and possibility? As a means of getting theory to yield something new, Sedgwick suggests reducing its reach, localizing its purview, practicing a “weak” form of theory that cannot encompass the present and shut down the future (2003, 134). Little more than description, weak theory couldn’t know that social experiments are already coopted and thus doomed to fail or to reinforce dominance; it couldn’t tell us that the world economy will be transformed by an international revolutionary movement rather than through the disorganized proliferation of local projects. Zen master Shunryu Suzuki reminds us that “[i]n the beginner’s mind there are many possibilities, in the expert’s mind there are few” (1970, 1). The practice of doing weak theory requires acting as a beginner, refusing to know too much, allowing success to inspire and failure to educate, refusing to extend diagnoses too widely or deeply.14 Weak theory can be undertaken with a reparative motive that welcomes surprise, entertains hope, makes connection, tolerates coexistence and o ff ers care for the new. As the impulse to judge or discredit other theoretical agendas arises, one can practice making room for others, imagining a terrain on which the success of one project need not come at the expense of another. Producing such spaciousness is particularly useful for a project of rethinking economy, where the problem is the scarcity rather than the inconsistency of economic concepts.15 Reparative theorizing can be called on to open our assessments of repudiated movements and practices, fostering affinities and even affiliations. We can choose to cultivate appreciation, taking heart, for example, from the ways that identity politics has opened doors to class politics, or the ways in which a politics of recognition is already also a politics of redistribution.16 We can practice relinquishing melancholic attachment to the past with its established narratives and entrenched blame. With a commitment to coexistence, we can work toward a way of thinking that might place us alongside our political others, mutually recognizable as oriented in the same direction even if pursuing di ff erent paths.17 Practicing weak theory allows us to deexoticize power, accepting it as our mundane, pervasive, uneven milieu. We can observe how we produce our own powerlessness with respect to the economy, for example, by theorizing unfolding logics and structural formations that close o ff the contestable arrangements we associate with politics. As we teach ourselves to come back with a beginner’s mind to possibilities, we can begin to explore the multiple forms of power, their spatialities and temporalities, their modes of transmission, reach and (in)e ff ectivity . A di ff erentiated landscape of force, constraint, freedom, and opportunity emerges and we can open to the surge of positive energy that suddenly becomes available for mobilization. In the last part of this chapter we present a reading of two films, showing how one, The Full Monty, portrays movements that sidestep the paranoia, melancholia, and moralism of traditional left thinking as exemplified in the other, Brassed Off.18 Our aim is to illustrate the stance that we feel needs to be cultivated for the task of imagining and enacting a postcapitalist politics. What follows, then, is an experiment in reading that might nudge us toward a different affective relationship to the world and its possibilities.

Absent the plan, debate is dominated by consultants, not policymakers: irresponsibly crafting marketing strategies, incapable of advocating social change. Only the affirmative can create responsible methodology.Mason, 13 (Arthur, Assistant Professor, Justice and Social Inquiry, School of Social Transformation, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences @ Arizona State U., “Cartel Consciousness and Horizontal Integration in Energy Industry” Cultures of Energy: Power, Practices, Technologies, 2013, pp. 126-129)The culture of power surrounding large-scale energy systems over the past century can best be described as forms of collusion whose decision-making authority relies on structural positions of bureaucratic- and capitalist-led industry organization. In this chapter, I depart from this model by drawing attention to the increasing role played in energy policy decision-making by one group of experts, intermediaries (consultants) whose authority is based not on their structural position but instead on their theoretical knowledge and independent stance within the energy sector. In the past, energy systems were highly regulated by a national political community in

which expertise was embedded as part of the originary political organizational form. Wrestling civilian control of nuclear power from the military, for example, resulted in the establishment of a core set of experts embedded within U.S. congressional politics. Atomic scientists and expectations of nuclear power as too cheap to meter were present in the popular imagination. However, the transparency of expertise was not autonomous from government nor did experts view themselves as independent of any sector of the industry. This is the case even after the 1970s, when expansion in the scope of conflict and interested publics led to bureaucratic fragmentation and reorganization of nuclear power. In fact, one need only draw attention to popular catchphrases of collusion and government capture throughout the twentieth century to realize that prior to restructuring of energy markets in the 1980s, the culture of power and political decision-making was based upon structural position in industrial organization. The notion of iron triangles or subgovernments, for example, draws attention to the closed-circle partnerships of industry leaders, congressional member, and technocratic elites involved in promoting nuclear power from the postwar years to the 1970s (Temples 1980). Managerial consensus reflects the backroom arrangements of public utility officials and industry leaders that results in expansion of electricity transmission from the Depression era to the restructuring of the 1980s (Hirsh 2001). Natural monopoly and negotiated settlements refer to growth of the natural gas industry to, in the case of the former, a government selection process, and in the latter, pre-agreements that forestall litigation among pipeline builders, natural gas producers, and distributors (Doucet and Littlechild 2006; Tussing and Tippee 1995). The government-sponsored project, as in the Manhattan Project that exemplifies an alliance of military and managerial expertise, was not limited to the advent of the nuclear era but inclusive of other federally sanctioned megaprojects (Rochlin 1994). Interest group may be included here, especially the forms of claims-making across civil and govermentental spheres to remediate environmental insult (Tugwell 1980; Wapner 1995). All such phrases call attention to a crucial feature of twentieth-century styles of collusion: the forces that influence and indeed authorize political and economic arrangements are based on decision-making authority in which possessors of theoretical knowledge are the dominated faction of the dominating group. Curiously, the most pervasive arrangement of collusion in which the dissembedding of expertise becomes transparent is the cartel. A cartel refers to a group of sellers whose intent is to fix prices and production outputs in concert to maximize wealth, usually by strategy of trial and error. The cartel arrangement is associated with oligopolistic industries in which the presence of few sellers facilitates coordination. Oligopoly means few sellers in the marketplace, often with strategic interaction among rival firms. While each firm may independently decide its strategy, its actions anticipate the reaction of rival firms. Among students of cartel theory, anticipation and reaction represents a "consciousness of interdependence" (Dibadj 2010:595). That is, even without intent to agree on specific conditions, oligopolies are marked by coordinated conduct across industries where prices are suspiciously similar or change in rapidly parallel ways (gasoline, airline tickets, cell phone rates, credit-card fees, movie tickets). This coordinated conduct has given rise to the phrase conscious parallelism, to describe a tacitly collusive conduct in which firms engage in parallel behavior in order to gain collusive profits but where a cartel is not set up explicitly. The absence of explicit agreement is consequential in antitrust law, where the cartel fulfills a "contract," "combination," or "conspiracy" requirement (section 1 of the Sherman Act). In the legal profession, conscious parallelism is restricted to "probable reactions of competitors" in setting their prices (Turner 1962). "Although it is hard to find a precise definition," conscious parallelism refers to "tacit collusion in which each firm in an oligopoly realizes that it is within the interests of the entire group of firms to maintain a high price or to avoid vigorous price competition, and the firms act in accordance with this realization" (Hylton 200373, emphases added). In this chapter, I highlight the role of independent experts in energy policy decision-making by focusing on the forms they employ for realizing interdependence among energy companies. I draw attention to representational strategies used by consultants (workshops, commodified forms of knowledge, expert advice) for translating information into knowledge that becomes the collective property of energy industry elites. I argue that the advisory services of firms such as Wood Mackenzie, Cambridge Energy, and others structure the location and content of high-level conversations within the newly privatized and globalized energy markets. Through mastery of skill gained through experience, competency in education and employment, the discrimination they perform as it pertains to judgment between knowledge claims based on one's involvement in certain social networks, consultants reduce the complexity of facts into the kinds of simplicity that can form the basis of decisionmaking. In so doing, experts disentangle themselves from political and economic rights in techno-economic decision-making by addressing, at least on the surface of things, reasons for adopting their advice in virtue of the things that they do and know rather than as

members of institutions. To characterize their role, I begin by outlining the ascendency of energy consultants and then identify media representations, such as brochures and advertisements produced by consultant firms, through which clients become witness to a detailed interplay of images about global modernity. These images establish a relation between consultants' intended audience (energy executives), those defined as outside this audience (energy consumers), and the future. Because of its resonance with risk, the future is open to contestation. Contestation is the norm in the energy decision-making arena where a cartel alliance and cartel-like consciousness are reconstructed continuously. The temporary stabilization of an alliance relies upon a sustained perception of the credibility of a given future. To be sustained, it is incumbent to replicate an image of the future that is both believable and authoritative.

Our imagination approach to the plan doesn’t mean we shouldn’t care about the border - we still think the border should be deconstructed, and we ask you to imagine that it does. If you think about the first time fiat was explained to you, you’ll realize that fiat is always mere imagination. We’ll still answer disads about our thought project, we just think that the discursive act of imagining is more important.

An ethics through fixed models and policy solutions are doomed to remaining in current dogma – only imaginative experimentation is able to resist commodification Gibson-Graham 06 [J. K. Gibson-Graham, University of Minnesota A Post-Capitalist Politics p. 87]//BMitchWe are proposing that a discourse of the community economy has the capacity to politicize the economic in new ways by resignifying • economy as a site of decision, of ethical praxis, instead of as the ultimate reality/ container/constraint; and • all economic practices as inherently social and always connected in their concrete particularities to the “commerce of being-together.” (Nancy 2000, 74) Resocializing (and repoliticizing) the economy involves making explicit the sociality that is always present, and thus constituting the various forms and practices of interdependence as matters for reflection, discussion, negotiation, and action. But where might we look for strategies for negotiating plurality and interdependence, the ethics of connection that make up the fabric of economy? How might we redress the positioning of “community” as an afterthought to the given of the “individual” in thinking about economic matters? And what might a nonfantastical, nonsingular vision of the community economy be? Here we are seeking the ethical coordinates for a political practice, not a model or a plan, nor “elements of a fixed ideology, a dogma that we have to subscribe to” (De Angelis 2003, 4). Nancy reminds us that Marx and Freud were two of the few thinkers who have attempted to “redress the relegation of the ‘plural’, ‘social’ or ‘communitarian’ dimension to the status of an addition to that of a primitive individual given” (2000, 44). Marx’s project of exposing the social nature of capitalist economic relations, especially the way in which exchange masked the social origins of surplus value, is central to our understanding of economic relations and thus to the task of resocializing the economy.10 His theory of surplus labor and Resnick and Wolff’s anti-essentialist Marxian analysis of the class process offer some conceptual tools for practically approaching economic being-in-common. A class process involves the production, appropriation, and distribution of surplus labor (in labor, product, or value form) and is but one way of representing and accounting for flows of labor in a society (Gibson-Graham, Resnick, and Wolff 2000a, 2001).11 Whether or not we acknowledge it, our own existence at every level can be seen as the effect of the labor of others. For our purposes, then, labor has an inessential commonality—“a solidarity that in no way contains an essence” (Agamben 1993, 19)—that might give us some purchase on economic being-in-common. If we wish to emphasize the becoming of new and as yet unthought ways of economic being, we might focus on the multiple possibilities that emerge from the inessential commonality of negotiating our own implication in the existence of others. An ethical praxis of being-in-common could involve cultivating an awareness of • what is

necessary to personal and social survival; • how social surplus is appropriated and distributed; • whether and how social surplus is to be produced and consumed; and • how a commons is produced and sustained. Negotiations around these key coordinates and the interactions between them could inform an ethics and politics of the community economy.12

Frameworks that solely result around policymaking construct binaries that create exceptionalist violence through political activity seeking to transform meanings of categories to develop “ideal” divisions.Sandoval, 00 (Chela, Assistant Professor of Critical and Cultural Theory for the Department of Chicano Studies at University of California, Santa Barbara, ... p. 18. ALM)True, it is the violence of colonial invasion and subjugation by race that opens this border between skin and mask, where faces shatter into the wretchedness of insanity, capitulation, or death. But this location, which is neither inside nor outside, neither good nor evil, is an interstitial site out of which new, undecidable forms of being and original theories and practices for emancipation, are produced. For example, the concept of “split consciousness” articulated by third world thinkers including W. E. B. Du Bois, James Weldon Johnson, Fanon, Audre Lorde, Gloria Anzaldúa, Paula Gunn Allen, and Trinh T. Minh-ha arises out of this location. These theorists see what they do as they do it from the dominant viewpoint as well as from their own, shuttling between realities, their identities reformatting out of another, third site. In this formulation, both the limits of insanity and the possibilities of emancipation are born out of the same horrors of subjugation. In both cases, movement—differential movement—is recognized as fundamental to advancing survival (or, as Bob Marley puts it, “exodus,”—the way out, liberation—is “movement of the people”). It is on such “movement” that the technologies that comprise the methodology of the oppressed depend: Fanon’s 1951 imposition of the image “black skin/white masks” on a white colonizing culture provided one means by which to interfere with and move the colonial relations between the races; his aim was to de- construct the kinds of citizen-subjects that colonialism produced. Indeed, the title Black Skin, White Masks suggests a “meta-ideological” operation: a political activity that builds on old categories of meaning in order to transform those same racialized divisions by suggesting something else, something beyond them. Fanon’s metaphor also enacts and is driven by a moral code that demands equality where none exists (black white, skins masks). And all these operations of meaning—which are identified in this chapter as the technologies of (1) deconstruction, (2) meta-ideologizing, and (3) democratics—these combined efforts to press upon consciousness, are accomplished by depending on the profound capacities of consciousness to enact another technology of the method, (4) differential movement through perceptual domains...which is required in order to both understand and to enact these meanings.

1AC Policy Version (Guest Workers)

1AC OtherizationWe begin this advantage with an introduction to our vision of the status quo. As “Americans,” we conceal ourselves from global conflict, war, genocide, and violence behind our television screens – we look through one lens to develop a scholarship and “Truth” of what is actually occurring.

In this process we subjugate what we are told – we integrate and process this information into our perspectives of the world

Specifically, the U.S.-Mexican border serves to constitute Mexicans as the, “dirty, foreign Other” through a politics of fear – mobilization is keyŽižek, 07 - Slavoj Žižek is a Slovene philosopher and cultural critic. He is a senior researcher at the Institute for Sociology and Philosophy, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, and a professor of philosophy and psychoanalysis at the European Graduate School (“Censorship Today: Violence, or ........ Ecology as a New Opium for the Masses”, Nov. 26, 2007,

http://www.lacan.com/zizecology1.htm) Last but not least, new forms of apartheid, new Walls and slums. On September 11th, 2001, the Twin Towers were hit; twelve years earlier, on November 9th, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. November 9th announced the "happy '90s," the Francis Fukuyama dream of the "end of history," the belief that liberal democracy had, in principle, won, that the search is over, that the advent of a global, liberal world community lurks just around the corner, that the obstacles to this ultra-Hollywood happy ending are merely empirical and contingent (local pockets of resistance where the leaders did not yet grasp that their time is over). In contrast to it, 9/11 is the main symbol of the forthcoming era in which new walls are emerging everywhere, between Israel and the West Bank, around the European Union, on the U.S.-Mexico border . So what if the new proletarian position is that of the inhabitants of slums in the new megalopolises? The explosive growth of slums in the last decades, especially in the Third World megalopolises from Mexico City and other Latin American capitals through Africa (Lagos, Chad) to India, China, Philippines and Indonesia, is perhaps the crucial geopolitical event of our times. It is effectively surprising how many features of slum dwellers fit the good old Marxist determination of the proletarian revolutionary subject: they are "free" in the double meaning of the word even more than the classic proletariat ("freed" from all substantial ties; dwelling in a free space, outside the police regulations of the state); they are a large collective, forcibly thrown together, "thrown" into a situation where they have to invent some mode of being-together, and simultaneously deprived of any support in traditional ways of life, in inherited religious or ethnic life-forms. While today's society is often characterized as the society of total control, slums are the territories within a state boundaries from which the state (partially, at least) withdrew its control, territories which function as white spots, blanks, in the official map of a state territory. Although they are de facto included into a state by the links of black economy, organized crime, religious groups, etc., the state control is nonetheless suspended there, they are domains outside the rule of law. In the map of Berlin from the times of the now defunct GDR, the are of West Berlin was left blank, a weird hole in the detailed structure of the big city; when Christa Wolf, the well-known East German half-dissident writer, took her small daughter to the East Berlin's high TV tower, from which one had a nice view over the prohibited West Berlin, the small girl shouted gladly: "Look, mother, it is not white over there, there are houses with people like here!" - as if discovering a prohibited slum Zone... This is why the "de-structured" masses, poor and deprived

of everything, situated in a non-proletarized urban environment, constitute one of the principal horizons of the politics to come . If the principal task of the emancipatory politics of the XIXth century was to break the monopoly of the

bourgeois liberals by way of politicizing the working class, and if the task of the XXth century was to politically awaken the immense rural population of Asia and Africa, the principal task of the XXIth century is to politicize - organize and discipline - the "de-structured masses" of slum-dwellers. Hugo Chavez's biggest achievement is the politicization (inclusion into the political life, social mobilization) of slum dwellers; in other countries, they mostly persist in apolitical inertia. It was this political mobilization of the slum dwellers which saved him against the US-sponsored coup: to the surprise of everyone, Chavez included, slum dwellers massively descended to the affluent city center, tipping the balance of power to his advantage. How do these four antagonisms relate to each other? There is a qualitative difference between the gap that separates the Excluded from the Included and the other three antagonisms, which designate

three domains of what Hardt and Negri call "commons," the shared substance of our social being whose privatization is a violent act which should also be resisted with violent means, if necessary: the commons of culture, the immediately socialized forms of "cognitive" capital, primarily language, our means of communication and education (if Bill Gates were to be allowed monopoly, we would have reached the absurd situation in which a private individual would have literally owned the software texture our basic network of communication), but also the shared infrastructure of public transport, electricity, post, etc.; the commons of external nature threatened by pollution and exploitation (from oil to forests and natural habitat itself); the commons of internal nature (the biogenetic inheritance of humanity). What all these struggles share is the awareness of the destructive potentials, up to the self-annihilation of humanity itself, if the capitalist logic of enclosing these commons is allowed a free run. It is this reference to "commons" which justifies the resuscitation of the notion of Communism - or, to quote Alain Badiou: The communist hypothesis remains the good one, I do not see any other. If we have to abandon this hypothesis, then it is no longer worth doing anything at all in the field of collective action. Without the horizon of communism, without this Idea, there is nothing in the historical and political becoming of any interest to a philosopher. Let everyone bother about his own affairs, and let us stop talking about it. In this case, the rat-man is right, as is, by the way, the case with some ex-communists who are either avid of their rents or who lost courage. However, to hold on to the Idea, to the existence of this hypothesis, does not mean that we should retain its first form of presentation which was centered on property and State. In fact, what is imposed on us as a task, even as a philosophical obligation, is to help a new mode of existence of the hypothesis to deploy itself. So where do we stand today with regard to communism? The first step is to admit that the solution is not to limit the market and private property by direct interventions of the State and state ownership. The domain of State itself is also in its own way "private": private in the precise Kantian sense of the "private use of Reason" in State administrative and ideological apparatuses: The public use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men. The private use of one's reason, on the other hand, may often be very narrowly restricted without particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment. By public use of one's reason I understand the use which a person makes of it as a scholar before the reading public. Private use I call that which one may make of it in a particular civil post or office which is entrusted to him. What one should add here, moving beyond Kant, is that there is a privileged social group which, on account of its lacking a determinate place in the "private" order of social hierarchy, directly stands for universality: it is only the reference to those Excluded, to those who dwell in the blanks of the State space, that enables true universality. There is nothing more "private" than a State community which perceives the Excluded as a threat and worries how to keep the Excluded at a proper distance. In other words, in the series of the four antagonisms, the one between the Included and the Excluded is the crucial one, the point of reference for the others; without it, all others lose their subversive edge: ecology turns into a "problem of sustainable development," intellectual property into a "complex legal challenge," biogenetics into an "ethical" issue. One can sincerely fight for ecology, defend a broader notion of intellectual property, oppose the copyrighting of genes, while not questioning the antagonism between the Included and the Excluded - even more, one can even formulate some of these struggles in the terms of the Included threatened by the polluting Excluded. In this way, we get no true universality, only "private" concerns in the Kantian sense of the term. Corporations like Whole Foods and Starbucks continue to enjoy favor among liberals even though they both engage in anti-union activities; the trick is that they sell products that contain the claim of being politically progressive acts in and of themselves. One buys coffee made with beans bought at above fair-market value, one drives a hybrid vehicle, one buys from companies that provide good benefits for their customers (according to the corporation's own standards), etc. Political action and consumption become fully merged. In short, without the antagonism between the Included and the Excluded, we may well find ourselves in a world in which Bill Gates is the greatest humanitarian fighting against poverty and diseases, and Rupert Murdoch the greatest environmentalist mobilizing hundreds of millions through his media empire. When politics is reduced to the "private" domain, it takes the form of the politics of FEAR - fear of losing one's particular identity, of being overwhelmed. Today's predominant mode of politics is post-political bio-politics - an awesome example of theoretical jargon which, however, can easily be unpacked: "post-political" is a politics which claims to leave behind old ideological struggles and, instead, focus on expert management and administration, while "bio-politics" designates the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives as its primal goal. It is clear how these two dimensions overlap: once one renounces big ideological causes, what remains is only the efficient administration of life... almost only that. That is to say, with the depoliticized, socially objective, expert administration and coordination of interests as the zero-level of politics, the only way to introduce passion into this field, to actively mobilize people, is through fear, a basic constituent of today's subjectivity.

Now, Americans imagine the border as a line of demarcation – a trophy of colonialist ideology that conceals the immoral truths of our historyCarter, 12 – PhD., the University of Essex, Matt's research is principally concerned with the expression of the American West in US cinema. His doctoral thesis investigated the interrelations between history, myth, and ideology in North America by using the Hollywood Western as its key primary source. He is also interested in the culture of the American Southwest, and his current research

seeks to place the Western in a transnational context (“’I’m Just a Cowboy’: Transnational Identities of the Borderlands in Tommy Lee Jones’ The Three Burials of Melquiades Estrada”, 2012, http://ejas.revues.org/9845)As a historian, Limerick has long asserted the need for a more complex and more honest understanding of the borderlands. She argues that, for much of the twentieth century, Anglo-America has been “fixed on the definition of the frontier drawn from the imaginative reconstruction of the story of the United States and its westward expansion” (Limerick, Something 87). Like many scholars writing under the collective banner of the New Western History, Limerick seeks to deconstruct the “interpretive straightjacket” of Frederick Jackson Turner’s “Frontier Thesis” (Etulain 108). Interestingly, she points out that, despite the “spectre” presented by Turner, “North America has, in fact, had two strong traditions in the use of the term” (Limerick, Something 87). On the one hand, of course, there is the “idea of the frontier” which, as an “extremely well established … cultural common property,” pertains to a Turnerian ideal, a space “where white settlers entered a zone of ‘free’ land and opportunity” (Limerick, Something 87). On the other, she describes a much less familiar, though “much more realistic usage of la frontera,” which describes the cultural complexities and personal experiences along “the borderlands between Mexico and the United States” (Limerick, Something 87-88). As a concept, la frontera stands opposed to the frontier’s “imaginative reconstruction” by giving the lie to its grand narrative of optimism and of hardy pioneers transforming wilderness into civilisation. Instead, the concept exposes a darker, more complex “legacy of conquest” (using Limerick’s own terminology), including ethnic cleansing, expropriation, and environmental despoliation. Its story is driven less by dashing Anglo-American heroes on horseback than by brutal monopolists, exploiters, and warmongers – men whose twisted ideals left little room for morality. According to Limerick, it is this complex descriptive that constitutes the “real” history of the American West. Consequently, when it comes to a historical reassessment of the borderlands through la frontera, Limerick insists upon there being “no illusion of vacancy, of triumphal conclusions, or of simplicity” (Something 88).

This fear driven ideology Otherizes immigrants to a political image and shapes flawed policiesCisneros, 08 - Dr. Josue David Cisneros is Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication Studies. His research and teaching interests focus mainly on rhetoric, or situated, public, and persuasive communication. Dr. Cisneros’ research focuses on the ways in which social and political identities are rhetorically constituted and contested in the public sphere, and he specializes in issues of citizenship, race/ethnicity, Latina/o identity, and immigration (“Contaminated Communities: The Metaphor of "Immigrant as Pollutant" in Media Representations of Immigration”, 2008 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.4.cisneros.html)Popular rhetoric about immigration often operates by constructing metaphoric representations of immigrants that concretize the social "problem" and connote particular solutions. Scholars have identified discursive connections between the rhetoric of immigration and representations of other human problems such as crime or war. This essay identifies another metaphor present in popular media coverage of immigration, particularly visual images of immigrants. The metaphor of "immigrant as pollutant" present in news media discourse on immigration can have serious consequences for societal treatment of immigrants as well as the policies designed to respond to immigration . A "nation of immigrants,"

the United States has never been able to quell the fascination and fear with which it approaches migration. Though the country collectively celebrates the brave souls who populated the nation, America's inhabitants remain suspicious of the hundreds of thousands of individuals that cross into the country on a yearly basis. Both legal and illegal immigration have been a concern to the government and the public since the birth of the nation. Though the degree of popular obsession with immigration rises and falls, there is always an awareness that these strangers potentially bring with them monumental and threatening changes. Concern over immigration is evidenced not only in public discourse but also in the large body of scholarship on the phenomenon of immigration, including an attempt to understand how immigration as "problem" is constructed in mass media. To make sense of this complex phenomenon, scholars note, individuals approach immigration through the perspective of metaphor to [End Page 569] clarify the topic and to connect it with their personal experience. Much of our knowledge about how immigration is represented in media and popular discourse has centered on metaphors such as a crime wave or war as guiding tropes through which the "problem" of immigration is represented. In this essay, I identify another metaphor through which popular media represent immigration. Moreover, I contribute to our understanding of immigration rhetoric by paying careful attention to how visual images construct metaphoric representations of migrants. By comparing the visual and metaphoric images of immigration in recent news coverage to images of pollution from coverage of toxic waste spills, particularly the crisis at Love Canal, I sketch a heretofore underanalyzed metaphor of "immigrant as pollutant" present in the immigration debate. Not only does this essay begin to illustrate another metaphor through which immigration is articulated, it also points to the need for more

analysis of the visual rhetoric of immigration. Despite their contributions, however, these studies have two important limitations. First, many of these studies encounter a methodological shortcoming. Most research on the metaphoric representations of immigration focus solely on the text of stories in newspapers and magazines or transcripts of political speeches. Chavez's book examines magazine covers and their corresponding stories. Ono and Sloop do recognize how television news images contribute to public understandings of immigrants, yet neither work sufficiently examines the visual components of immigration rhetoric for the cooperative role they play in constructing metaphors of immigration. Attention to the visual elements of immigration rhetoric is important because of the centrality of images in modern public discourse, particularly news discourse. As Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites argue, "the widely disseminated visual image provides the public audience with a sense of shared experience that anchors the necessarily impersonal character of public discourse in the motivational ground of social life." Analyzing the ways immigration is constructed through the images, texts, and aural messages of news discourse illustrates another way in which immigration is articulated through visual metaphor. I look to reports on immigration from Fox News and CNN from September to December of 2005 to argue that, in addition to being conceived as a crime wave or invasion, immigration is framed metaphorically as a dangerous pollutant. This metaphoric construction of immigrant as pollutant can be unpacked by considering the images of undocumented immigrants, the images of the dangers posed by these immigrants, and the images of the government's response.

Amnesty breeds economic Xenophobia by allowing America to become the home of migrants Salaita, 05 - Steven Salaita is assistant professor of Multicultural literature at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater (“Anti-ArabRacism: How Myth and patriotism Combine to Inhibit Democracy”, 2005, accessed via JSTOR)Yet perhaps the most crucial (and discomfiting) feature of imperative patriotism is its relationship with xenophobia. While imperative patriotism has a symbiotic moral association with colonial discourse, it is more disconnected from xenophobia because it does not actually arise from xenophobia, which is a phenomenon that, to a degree, has its roots in European contact with Indians, but more traditionally has resulted from animosity over ( perceived or real) economic disparity. On one level, xenophobia is a less vicious form of colonial discourse, but it more often results from a certain type of fear that is generated when people feel that their economic stability (or the possibility of it) is threatened—as, for instance, when laborers battle with immigrants over blue-collar jobs or when middle- to upper-class Whites complain to city councils about immigrants moving into their neighborhoods. Imperative patriotism, however, tends to inform xenophobia, a fact that is expressed in statements such as, "If you don't like America, go back to where you came from"; "If you don't agree with the United States, why don't you just leave?"; and "A real American works hard and doesn't complain." These statements insinuate that "American" is a stable, fixed identity rooted in a physical and cultural Whiteness for which many immigrants do not qualify. They also indicate that in xenophobia narrow political suppositions often govern social behavior: To dissent against the imagined mores of America is to forfeit identification as American. Leaving the United States then becomes the only logical option.

This perceptive Hispanophobia renders an entire population as utility – valueless and ontologically deadWalsh, 10 - University College Dublin College of Arts and Celtic Studies, peer reviewed by Prof. Edward James & Dr. David Kerr (“The impact of anti-Mexican sentiment on American perceptions of Diego Rivera during the Great Depression”, August, 2010, http://www.ucd.ie/ibp/MADissertations2009/Walsh.pdf)‘I have left the best of my life and my strength here, sprinkling with the sweat of my brow the fields and factories of these gringos, who only know how to make one sweat.’90 These are the words of Juan Berzunzolo, one of millions of Mexican immigrants who lived and worked in the United States in the earlier part of the twentieth century. His words encapsulated the exploitation and bigotry that he and his labouring compatriots endured in a society that regarded them as an inferior race.91 To locate Rivera’s experience in the context of its racial backdrop gives another dimension to his reception in the United States. His race both hindered his success, as is shown by racist media reports in Chapter Five, and allowed his popularity to thrive, as will be shown in Chapter Four. While the 1930s celebrated the cult of the Indian and the vogue of Mexican culture, it was simultaneously a period of intense anti-Mexican sentiment in American society, which undoubtedly influenced the public’s perception of the Hispanic artist. The treatment of Mexicans in the United States in the period 1910-1940 cannot be synopsised or simplified, nor can it be said to have been endemic to all of society. Generalisations and overarching statements can be misleading and

dangerous, thus caution must be exercised in the research of such emotive topics as racism and discrimination.92 3.1 Constructions of Race Racism does not exist of its own accord. Rather it is constructed by society to denote an undisputable differentiation between peoples, differences that

are in no way prescribed by the colour of skin.93 Created, and even imagined , to justify discrimination along racial lines, this invention of racial hierarchies has been ongoing since colonialism.94 The categorisation of people into social strata so defined by such an immediately discernible trait as skin colour allows for class-based delineations. Mae Ngai in her study of both Mexican and Japanese immigrants promotes her theory of the alien citizen, which captures the condition of being racially excluded and permanently foreign in your adopted country, regardless of citizenship. Through ‘legal racialisation’, immigrants were legally and socially exempt from ever participating as a citizen due to ‘a badge of foreignness that could not be shed’.95 Ngai concludes that: ‘“Foreignness” was a racialised concept that adhered to all Mexicans, including those born in the United States, and carried the opprobrium of illegitimacy and inferiority….The construction of “Mexican” into a onedimensional “commodity function and utility” devalued nearly everything that held meaning to Mexicans – the individual self, the family, culture, and political experience.’96 By systematically excluding from government those of a different ethnic background, the Anglo-Saxon (Anglo) ruling class, could retain power and ensure the social dominance of their own people. Initially those excluded were other European groups, such as the Irish and the Slavs, but later with the emergence of non-white groups in society, these Euro-Americans were assimilated into the larger white majority. Now race, rather than class or ethnicity, came to determine the social hierarchy. While Euro-Americans during the 1920s benefitted from the extrication of race and ethnic identity, the Mexicans’ race became explicitly conjoined with their ethnicity.97 Skin colour came to define what it meant to be Mexican.

Empirically, guest worker programs re-construct the immigrants’ role in societyJurado, 08 – PhD, University of Michigan (“ALIENATED CITIZENS: “HISPANOPHOBIA” AND THE MEXICAN IM/MIGRANT BODY”, 2008, http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/58455/kjurado_1.pdf?sequence=1)Alcaraz and Rivera maintain a sharp eye on the pulse of the nation and given their digitized media outlet, make them forces to contend with. The likelihood of future guest worker programs between the United States and Mexico make Rivera’s and Alcaraz’s web-based, creative political commentaries on stereotypes a relevant and necessary critique. Their work both highlights and challenges the long historical trajectory of hegemonic representations of the Mexican-Latina/o im/migrant body. During different historical moments, the Mexican im/migrant body has provided a contested, metaphoric landscape that has been discursively dehumanized by hegemonic discourses. This rhetoric of fear has changed little over the last century. Vestiges of the pseudo-scientific jargon of eugenics remain in contemporary anti-immigrant fears. Contemporary anti-immigrant, xenophobic rhetoric, while not sustained by any pseudo-science, nonetheless remains a powerful ideological force in social and juridical thought with very real repercussions that I analyze in each historical moment. In my dissertation I demonstrate that Latina/o authors and artists, past and present, have consistently and actively engaged these destructive constructions. Close readings of the representations provided by Latina/o cultural

workers in a variety of mediums and forums, will show how they have re-written, re-imagined and revisioned the maligned immigrant body. Their work in effect resurrects the element of humanity that is so often obscured by hegemonic discourses and rhetoric. At the heart of this analysis are the broader questions of rigid constructions of citizenship and national identity. This study maps the ways in which discourses of difference delineate and blur the distinctions between citizens and “aliens.” More importantly, the work of Latina/o authors and artists constitute vital counter-narratives that fill in the historical gaps, erasures and misconceptions that have continuously robbed Latina/os of inclusion into the national imaginary. I think of the cultural productions by Latina/os as discursive acts of resurrection in which the Mexican-Latina/o im/migrant body is restored to 24 un cuerpo entero, complete with the humanity so often obscured in hegemonic discourse.

A guest worker program is the best moral option – it deteriorates social and political subjugation through humanizing the OtherHing, 06 - Bill Ong Hing is a Professor of Law at the University of San Francisco and Professor Emeritus, U.C. California, Davis School of Law (“Deporting Our Souls”, Oct. 16th, 2006, http://worldtracker.org/media/library/College%20Books/Cambridge

%20University%20Press/0521864925.Cambridge.University.Press.Deporting.Our.Souls.Values.Morality.and.Immigration.Policy.Oct.2006.pdf)As a nation, the United States ought to do the right thing when it comes to undocumented immigrants. Given our long historical ties with Mexico, doing the right thing is especially in order in the case of Mexican migrants. We demonize the undocumented, rather than see them for what they are: human beings entering for a better life who have been manipulated by globalization, regional economies, and social structures that have operated for generations. We benefit from undocumented labor every day and in a vast range of occupations. The right thing to do is to develop a system to facilitate the flow of Mexican migrants to the United States who are seeking employment opportunities. Given the economic imbalance between the two nations, we know that the flow will continue – legally or otherwise. By legalizing the flow through a large guestworker program, we ease pressures at the border (thus freeing up personnel to concentrate on the serious challenge of looking for terrorists and drug smugglers), address the labor needs of employers, bring the undocumented out of the shadows, and end unnecessary border deaths that have resulted from current enforcement strategies.57 Doing the right thing requires us to humanize the guestworker upon whom we have come to rely. Thus, establishing a worker program must be done in a manner that provides the workers with hope for membership and respect from other Americans. A path toward legalization becomes a critical ingredient of any guestworker program. Only through that path can these individuals attain a sense of enfranchisement and freedom from political subjugation and servitude. Our moral, economic, social, and national security interests demand that we pursue such a program.

1AC Advantage 2

1AC PlanPlan: the United States federal government should implement a renewable, uncapped, portable guest worker visa for agricultural workers from Mexico.

1AC SolvencyGuest worker program solves farm labor shortages and border securityTodd Staples, The Express-News, 3-8-2013, "U.S. needs strong guest worker program," San Antonio Express-News, http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/article/U-S-needs-strong-guest-worker-program-4340209.phpLet's use pencil and paper to solve our immigration problem, rather than badges and bullets. This will enable our law enforcement to better focus on drug-running terrorists, with the net result being a more secure border and a better knowledge of who is really in our country. The real problem — and solution — when it comes to border security is more about policy than criminal

prosecution. It's about our broken immigration system that fails to provide a win-win for U.S. taxpayers and guest workers. Our nation needs to find a safe and legal way to welcome those willing to fill the jobs the domestic labor market has not filled. Let's be honest: No Americans are relocating to the Rio Grande Valley to pick grapefruit. In California,

strawberries are going unpicked. In Washington last year, apples were dropping to the ground. Why? Because we have too few workers to pick them.

Meanwhile, law enforcement is placed in the unworkable situation of having to treat all undocumented individuals hiding in the brush as though they are deadly threats. And while our federal, state and local

law enforcement personnel are capable of defending our communities from the drug cartels, they are grossly outnumbered by the combined

population of cartels and undocumented workers. With a viable mechanism in place to welcome guest workers, law enforcement officials could reasonably suspect that anyone still trying to enter our country in

a covert manner is either seeking to do harm or — at the very least — blatantly willing to flout our laws. Either way, that individual should be subjected to custody and the letter of the law, not bureaucratic guesswork and the loopholes of red tape.

CIR doesn’t solve the case – tanks the US ag industry and ensures agricultural offshoring that undermines US food securityDan Wheat, 6-28-2013, “Immigration passes Senate but faces steeper hill in House,” Capital Press, http://www.capitalpress.com/content/djw-immigration-062813Many agricultural groups issued laudatory statements about Senate passage of immigration reform, but a key ag lobbyist says he's growing less optimistic daily about any bill passing the House. "We saw Republicans in the House pay no attention to what the Senate does and no attention to what their leadership does with the Farm Bill," said Tom Nassif, president and CEO of Western Growers Association, Irvine, Calif. "Even though Speaker (John) Boehner voted for it his chairmen voted against it," Nassif said, "and I don't think the Farm Bill is as difficult to resolve as immigration." Others in the Agricultural Workforce Coalition are probably just as concerned as he is, he said. S. 744 passed 68-32 on June 27. If bills from both chambers aren't in a conference committee before the August congressional recess, there's a good chance immigration reform will die, Nassif said. Other issues like budgets and the debt ceiling will overshadow immigration for the rest of the year, and mid-term elections in 2014 make it unlikely anything will happen then, he said. If immigration reform fails, the exodus of vegetable producers from the American Southwest to Mexico, Latin America, the Middle East, South Africa and China will accelerate, he said. "If the U.S. wants to be a producing nation and feed its own without having to be dependent on foreign countries that may not like us and use food as a leverage point, immigration reform needs to happen," Nassif said. Agricultural components of the Senate bill remain unchanged since the bill was introduced, Nassif said. Key parts are a blue card or temporary legal status for experienced farmworkers and a new agricultural visa program to meet future labor needs, said Kristi Boswell, director of congressional relations for the American Farm Bureau Federation. Both of those elements are needed and the problem with tying legal status to future votes determining border security, as Rep. Paul Ryan, R-Wis., and others are talking about, is that it doesn't solve the urgent and immediate need of a shortage of farmworkers, Nassif said.

Even if CIR passes, it will include quotas on agricultural guest workers – ensures it can’t solve labor market needs or illegal immigration Helen Krieble, chair for Center for Opportunity, Protection and Fariness, 6-10-2013, “Senate's immigration 'gang' will bungle guest worker quotas,” Mercury News, http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_23429033/senates-immigration-gang-will-bungle-guest-worker-quotasThe latest Gang of Eight senators have proposed an immigration reform bill that could only have been drafted in secret, because anyone else could have told them their plan would never work. The 867-page bill would create another new government bureaucracy, the Immigration and Labor Market Research Bureau, headed by a political appointee and charged with determining the number of workers needed by a wide range of businesses in future years — as if any government agency could ever know that. And just to be sure the Gang of Eight pleased all its favorite interest groups, it didn't leave those decisions entirely to the new bureau, but instead wrote specific quotas into the law itself: Agriculture gets 337,000 visas; construction gets 15,000; high-tech industries get 115,000; other specifically named industries get 200,000. Small businesses that don't fit into these defined categories get none. Now the Gang of Eight is busily trying to silence opposition, declaring that skeptics will be left behind as this freight train leaves the station. Its members are working hard to defeat the dozens of amendments the bill was sure to face once others finally started reading it. A system in which government determines what types of businesses are eligible for visas, and how many workers they all need, cannot work. The current system — which nearly everyone agrees is badly broken — is based on that same flawed premise. That's why the number of H-2B seasonable workers is capped at 66,000, even though there are several million such workers in the U.S. (which is why most are working illegally). That's why the alphabet soup of visa programs includes A-3 visas for foreign diplomats, B-1 for nannies, H-1A for agricultural workers, P for athletes, and dozens of others. It's why we have F-1 visas for students, but J-1 for professors. It's a mess, and it's why we have more than 12 million people in the U.S. illegally. Why shouldn't all businesses, big and small, have a level playing field where employers and the free market — not government bureaucracy &mdsash; determine how many guest workers are needed? Even the all-powerful Gang of Eight can never repeal the law of supply and demand. If they only allow 200,000 guest workers and the economy needs 250,000, the rest will come illegally — perpetuating the very problem Congress is trying to solve.

Current H-2A visa fails – it’s too bureaucratic and only drives more illegal immigrationMcneill 09 [Jean Baker Mcneill;June 30, 2009; Ag JOBs Amnesty: The Wrong Way to Help American Agriculture; Senior Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation and Senior Professional Staff Member at United States Senate; http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/06/ag-jobs-amnesty-the-wrong-way-to-help-american-agriculture]The H-2A visa was designed as temporary, non-immigrant visa to allow foreign nationals to enter the U.S. and work on farms and in other seasonal jobs in order to fulfill the workforce needs of U.S. agriculture. Currently, however, only an estimated 75,000 workers are in the H-2A program. The reason: It is simply too bureaucratic and expensive for employers to use it effectively. The current method by which the Department of Labor calculates wages is flawed, resulting in inflated wages that are higher for H-2A workers than for American employees. Furthermore, employers must file paperwork with multiple departments, identify specific workers when filing a petition with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and then wait for months. This long process often means that workers are no longer available when the visas are granted. The H-2A program's problems reduce employers' incentives to hire employees legally. Often employers wind up hiring illegal immigrants as employees instead--making

illegal border crossings all the more attractive, because illegal immigrants know there will be work whey they get to the United States.

We don’t link to their exploitation DA – making the visas portable solves the problem and the impact is non-uniqueAlex Nowrasteh, 1-29-2013, "Immigration plan does only half the job," Reuters, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/01/29/immigration-plan-does-only-half-the-job/, accessed 5-10-2013Now unions say they oppose a guest-worker visa program to protect these workers from abuse. But unauthorized workers are going to come in any case, so preventing a guest-worker program can only place them in a black market - where employer abuse , backed up by the threat of deportation, is far worse. If unions are honestly concerned about guest-worker abuse, the solution is making the visa portable and not tied to one employer. A World War I guest-worker visa let guest workers quit their jobs and be hired by approved employers. Guest workers simply had to tell the government about their new employer after they were hired — not seek permission before switching jobs. The best labor protection is a worker’s ability to quit a job without legal sanction. If the government could create such a guest-worker visa program 100 years ago, there is no reason why it cannot be revived today. As long as there is economic opportunity here, immigrants — legal or not — will come. An immigration bill that does not create a vehicle for legal migrants to enter the country is not real reform.

Open Borders AFF – HSS - Case

XT Solvency – State

The law is key - the state controls the Otherizing identity that the public embracesNevins, 02 - Joseph Nevins, 2002, Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the "Illegal Alien" and the Making of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary, Publication: Routledge: New York, page number: 95-122.It is no mere coincidence that many of today’s “undesirables” are from groups previously excluded or marginalized for overtly racist criteria. While yesterday’s undesirables were distinguished by racial factors, today’s unwanted immigrants are marked by their legal status—or lack thereof. And given the power of “the law” as an ideological construct dividing good from evil in the contemporary United States, this very fact—in addition to their “otherness”—serves to marginalize these immigrants in the eyes of much of the public. Indeed, a striking feature of contemporary California is “the reassignment of Mexicans—especially the undocumented, non-English-speaking population—to the bottom of the new racial and ethnic hierarchy.” But again, the “illegal” is not a mere discursive cover for racism.

XT Solvency – Imagination

Orienting ourselves to the border via imagination allows for understanding of real world IRNewbury, 12 - Susanna Newbury is a Ph.D. candidate in the History of Art at Yale University (“Drawing a Line: Encounters with the U.S.-Mexico Border”, Nov. 13th, 2012, http://www.kcet.org/arts/artbound/counties/san-diego/us-mexico-border-geography.html)For example, in the work of Arthur Schott, a German immigrant who worked with the Boundary Survey following the Gadsden Purchase of 1853, the border was imagined as a negotiation between close-up and faraway.xvi While showing stone cairns in the foreground flanked by yucca, cholla, and other detailed desert specimens, his backgrounds are reduced to topography. In his drawings, Schott imagined sheer distance as a kind of perforation or absence--filling in the perfunctory gaps between points on a line left unseen, ridgelines and badlands receding toward a distant, barely visible monument. His pictures portraitized the landscape, making it intimate and knowable up close, while indicating the vastly expansive territory beyond. This, too, is a way of drawing a border. Not as a concrete monument, or linear index of politics, but as the art historian Robin E. Kelsey has argued, a line of sight, a permeable, visual world of first-person encounter that admits ambiguity, the border as a shifting field of landscape.xvii Today it is those very perforations and first-person encounters with landscape that occupy national concern. They are the same visibilities and invisibilities that surprised me as I headed through Yuma in 2010. From mounds to monuments, maps to drawings to photographs, today's militarized border has developed a popular identity as a prohibitive barrier, even as its geopolitical function is more that of regulator of movement. As the world around it grows more difficult to comprehend in terms of the coincidence between its physicality and its influence , the way we choose to imagine the border becomes all the more simplistic . xviii

Fences may mark the political line, but as in the case of the beige pickup, the radio, the cell phone, and line of sight that is the view, they are an absurd reduction of what it means to understand the politics of landscape.

Progressive imagination is developed through resistance to violent colonialism – these representations necessary to internalize the “real”Haiven et al, 10 - Max Haiven is a post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Mount Saint Vincent University in Halifax (“What is the radical imagination? A Special Issue”, Affinities: AJournal of Radical Theory, Culture, and Action, Volume 4, Number 2, Fall 2010, pp. i-xxxvii.)Aristotle disagreed, arguing that imagination was always an important part of how we comprehend the world and that works of the imagination like theatre could be important for creating and sustaining community and for the cultivation of full personhood. But for both Plato and Aristotle, the imagination was a passive organ of the mind, capable only of internalizing and reacting to the "real" world. This ancient debate had tended to rehearse itself time and again, most famously in the controversies over the value of the arts in modern Western society . But the idea of the imagination that underscored these more recent discourses had a slightly different origin. The European Enlightenment of the 18th century elevated the imagination to a new centrality. Early skeptical thinkers like David Hume and Rene Descartes suggested that our whole sense of reality was beholden to the imagination, that we could know nothing outside of our own minds and that our experience of causality, or the way we put our experience of the world into some sort of coherent, linear order, was a necessary fabrication. Immanuel Kant, on the other hand, took this conclusion as his starting point, suggesting that the imagination was the very fulcrum of reality itself and that the self-contained individualistic human mind was the centre of the universe. For Kant and later philosophers of the German Romantic period, the imagination was humanity's "divine spark — that quality of being that set humans apart from animals. It was out of the imagination that all other aspects of our mental life (and, therefore, social life) evolved, including reason, aesthetics and ethics.' For these thinkers, all of whom were wealthy, white men whose personal and institutional wealth and power stemmed (directly or indirectly) from exploitation, the imagination had taken on a life of its own, but it was certainly not a life unmarked by differences in power and privilege. Many stories remain to be told about how and where the Romantic notion of the imagination really originated. David Graeber, for one, has suggested that the European fascination with culture,

creativity and imagination was spurred by Europeans' often violent encounters with radically "other" cultures through colonialism ; cultures that, in many cases, posed an egalitarian model of social

organization against the rigid hierarchies of feudal and mercantilist Europe.

XT Solvency – Advocates

The United States should completely open the border to Mexican immigrants Laufer, 4 (Peter, winner of major awards for excellence in reporting, is an independent journalist, broadcaster and documentary filmmaker working in traditional and new media, the James Wallace Chair in Journalism at the University of Oregon School of Journalism and Communication, “Wetback Nation: The Case for Opening the Mexican-American Border,” ISBN 1-56663-592-6) Camila Reed-GuevaraOpening the border to the free passage of Mexicans who wish to come north is the only reasonable and long-term solution . Open the border to the people who are coming no matter what we do-people we

want and need, no matter how much we may say otherwise. Once the Mexicans travel north freely, the real bad guys can no longer hide in their shadows. Over time Mexicans and Americans will learn to blend, not Collide. And once Mexicans can again travel north freely, the U.S. government will know that the people in the tunnels and jumping the fences and running across the desert are the villains, not the fuel of the U.S. economy. There is no question that the U nited S tates' southern border will be more secure if law-abiding Mexicans are allowed to pass freely . At present the bulk of the huge Border Patrol force and budget is used for chasing Mexicans. Once Mexicans no longer feel the need to sneak north, most of them undoubtedly will be happy to register with American authorities and carry whatever documents the United States requires for them to move between the two countries via official ports of entry. After that change occurs, the Border Patrol and other U.S. government agencies will be facing a trickle instead of tidal wave of illegal border crossers. With their advanced detection equipment and huge staff, the Border Patrol will then be well prepared to arrest and detain most of those who still try to cross into the United States illegally. Because of the new neighbor- friendly policy, U.S. authorities will no longer be chasing Mexican workers needed and wanted in the north ; t hey can pursue unwanted-and potentially dangerous-border violators.

USFG should open the US-Mexico border- the EU proves open boarders workDelacroix and Nikiforov, 9 (Jaques, is a professor of organizational analysis and management and the former director of international business studies in the Leavey School of Business at Santa Clara University and Sergey, Sergey Nikiforov, a native of Russia, lives in Silicon Valley and works in business development, Summer 2009,“If Mexicans and Americans Could Cross the Border Freely,” http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_14_01_6_delacroix.pdf) Camila Reed-GuevaraIf Americans will not build a wall or repress employers of illegal immigrants, if they have no stomach for stopping illegal entrants by force of arms and even less for expelling the millions already living here peaceably, perhaps the time has come to consider coolly a bolder solution. This solution has the significant political and ethical merit of being generally in line with our generous history. It would consist in allowing Mexican nationals to come and go across our southern border , subject to ordinary law enforcement controls. The open border would be a neighborly solution, not a privileged path to citizenship. 1 This bold solution would deal at once with the issue of further immigration and the issue of illegal immigrants already in the country. The relevant precedent seems to us to be explicitly the situation that exists today throughout most of the European Union. Subject to conventional police checks, Dutch citizens may enter Italy at will and remain there indefinitely—and even open a sandwich shop in Palermo. More to the point, citizens of comparatively poor Greece may work in comparatively wealthy Germany as long as they wish and send all their money home. These Greek immigrants to Germany will likely never receive formal German citizenship, but they will enjoy most of the nonpolitical rights associated with citizenship.

We need an open border- it’s the best moral and safe decision Lee, 2/25 (John, US banker, “Secure the US-Mexico border: open it,” Open Borders: The Case, http://openborders.info/blog/secure-the-us-mexico-border-open-it/) Camila Reed-GuevaraThe Associated Press has a great story out on what a “secure” US-Mexico border would look like. It covers perspectives from various stakeholders on border security, with opinions running the gamut from “The border is as secure as it can ever be” to “It’s obviously incredibly unsafe.” I am not sure if the AP is fairly representing opinions on the border issue, but the reporting of how life on the border has evolved over time is fascinating. One thing that strikes me in this reporting is how casually drug smugglers/slave traffickers and good-faith immigrants are easily- conflated. Is a secure border one where people who want to move contraband goods or human slaves illegally cannot easily enter? Or is it one where well-meaning people can be indefinitely kept at bay for an arbitrary accident of birth? This passage juxtaposes the two quite different situations: And nearly all of more than 70 drug smuggling tunnels found along the border since October 2008 have been discovered in the clay-like soil of San Diego and Tijuana, some complete with hydraulic lifts and rail cars. They’ve produced some of the largest marijuana seizures in U.S. history. Still, few attempt to cross what was once the nation’s busiest corridor for illegal immigration. As he waited for breakfast at a Tijuana migrant shelter, Jose de Jesus Scott nodded toward a roommate who did. He was caught within seconds and badly injured his legs jumping the fence. Scott, who crossed the border with relative ease until 2006, said he and a cousin tried a three-day mountain trek to San Diego in January and were caught twice. Scott, 31, was tempted to return to his wife and two young daughters near Guadalajara. But, with deep roots in suburban Los Angeles and cooking jobs that pay up to $1,200 a week, he will likely try the same route a third time. The main thing that strikes me about the previously “unsecure” border near San Diego is that border patrol agents were overwhelmed by a mass of people until more staff and walls were brought to bear. But these masses of people almost certainly were comprised in large part, if not near-entirely, of good-faith immigrants. Smugglers and traffickers merely take advantage of the confusion to sneak in with the immigrants. If the immigrants had a legal path to entry, if they did not have to cross the border unlawfully , the traffickers would be naked without human crowds to hide in. If border security advocates just want to reduce illegal trafficking, demanding “border security” before loosening immigration controls may well be putting the cart before the horse. Even so, as I’ve said before, the physical reality of a long border means that human movement across it can never be fully controlled . Demanding totalitarian control as “true border security” is about as unrealistic as, if not even more so than an open borders advocate demanding the abolition of the nation-state. The AP covers some damning stories of peaceful Americans murdered by drug traffickers in the same breath as it covers someone trying to get to a job in suburban LA. Even if one insists that murdering smugglers and restaurant c ooks should be treated identically on account of being born Mexican, it is difficult to see how one can demand that the US border patrol prioritise detaining them both equally . Yet as long as US visa policy makes it near-impossible for most good-faith Mexicans who can find work in the US to do so, the reality of the border means that thousands of Mexicans just looking to work will risk their lives crossing the border, alongside smugglers and murderers. The more reasonable policy has to be one that will allow US border patrol to focus on catching the most egregious criminals. That means giving the good-faith immigrants a legal channel to enter the US on a reasonable timeframe, reducing the flow of unlawful border crossings. This is not just my opinion, but that of even a former (Republican) US Ambassador to Mexico (emphasis added): Tony Garza remembers watching the flow of pedestrian traffic between Brownsville and Matamoros from his father’s filling station just steps from the international bridge. He recalls migrant workers crossing the fairway on the 11th hole of a golf course – northbound in the morning, southbound in the

afternoon. And during an annual celebration between the sister cities, no one was asked for their papers at the bridge. People were just expected to go home. Garza, a Republican who served as the U.S. ambassador to Mexico from 2002 to 2009, said it’s easy to become nostalgic for those times, but he reminds himself that he grew up in a border town of fewer than 50,000 people that has grown into a city of more than 200,000. The border here is more secure for the massive investment in recent years but feels less safe because the crime has changed, he said. Some of that has to do with transnational criminal organizations in Mexico and some of it is just the crime of a larger city. Reform, he said, “would allow you to focus your resources on those activities that truly make the border less safe today.” It’s the view of those sheriffs who places themselves in harm’s way to fight those murderers and smugglers (emphasis added): Hidalgo County Sheriff Lupe Trevino points out that drug, gun and human smuggling is nothing new to the border. The difference is the attention that the drug-related violence in Mexico has drawn to the region in recent years. He insists his county, which includes McAllen, is safe. The crime rate is falling, and illegal immigrants account for small numbers in his jail. But asked if the border is “secure,” Trevino doesn’t hesitate. “Absolutely not.” “When you’re busting human trafficking stash houses with 60 to 100 people that are stashed in a two, three-bedroom home for weeks at a time, how can you say you’ve secured the border? ” he said. Trevino’s view, however, is that those people might not be there if they had a legal path to work in the U.S. “Immigration reform is the first thing we have to accomplish before we can say that we have secured the border,” he said. … In Nogales, Sheriff Tony Estrada has a unique perspective on both border security and more comprehensive immigration reform. Born in Nogales, Mexico, Estrada grew up in Nogales, Ariz., after migrating to the U.S. with his parents. He has served as a lawman in the community since 1966. He blames border security issues not only on the cartels but on the American demand for drugs. Until that wanes, he said, nothing will change. And securing the border, he added, must be a constant, ever-changing effort that blends security and political support – because the effort will never end. “The drugs are going to keep coming. The people are going to keep coming. The only thing you can do is contain it as much as possible . “ I say the border is as safe and secure as it can be, but I think people are asking for us to seal the border, and that’s unrealistic,” he said. Asked why, he said simply: “That’s the nature of the border.”Simply put, if you want a secure US-Mexico border , one where law enforcement can focus on rooting out murderers and smugglers , you need open borders . You need a visa regime that lets those looking to feed their families and looking for a better life to enter legally, with a minimum of muss and fuss. When only those who cross the border unlawfully are those who have no good business being in the US, then you can have a secure border .

Only through liberation of migrators and the breakdown of the oppressive border mindset can we truly break away from the biopolitical system that the west utilizes in everyday life Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 2K, Michael Hardt, Ph.D., is a professor of literature and Italian at Duke University and Antonio Negri, Ph.D., is an Italian Marxist sociologist, scholar, revolutionary philosopher and teacher, “The Empire”, http://www.angelfire.com/cantina/negri/hardt_negri_empire.txt) Joey

The legacy of modernity is a legacy of fratricidal wars, devastating "development," cruel "civilization," and previously unimagined violence. Erich Auerbach once wrote that tragedy is the only genre that can properly claim realism in Western literatur e, and perhaps this is true precisely because of the tragedy Western modernity has imposed on the world .

[5] Concentration camps, nuclear weapons, genocidal wars, slavery, apartheid: it is not difficult to enumerate the various scenes of the tragedy . By insisting on the tragic character of modernity, however, we certainly do not mean to follow the "tragic" philosophers of Europe, from Schopenhauer to Heidegger, who turn these real destructions into metaphysical narratives about the negativity of being, as if these actual tragedies were merely an illusion, or rather as if they were our ultimate destiny! Modern negativity is located not in any transcendent realm but in the hard reality before us: the fields of patriotic battles in the First and Second World Wars, from the killing fields at Verdun to the Nazi furnaces and the swift annihilation of thousands in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the carpet bombing of vietnam and Cambodia, the massacres from Sétifand Soweto to Sabra and Shatila, and the list goes on and on. There is no Job who can sustain such suffering! (And anyone who starts compiling such a list quickly realizes how inadequate it is to the quantity and quality of the tragedies.) Well, if that modernity has come to an end, and if the modern nation-state that served as the ineluctable condition for imperialist domination and innumerable wars is disappearing from the world scene, then good riddance! We must

cleanse ourselves of any misplaced nostalgia for the belle époque of that modernity . The ontological fabric of Empire is constructed by the activity beyond measure of the multitude and its virtual powers. These virtual, constituent powers conflict endlessly with the constituted power of Empire . They are completely positive since their "beingagainst" is a "being-for," in other words, a resistance that becomes love and community. We are situated precisely at that hinge of infinite finitude that links together the virtual and the possible, engaged in the passage from desire to a coming future.[15] This ontological relation operates first of all on space. The virtuality of world space constitutes the first determination of the movements of the multitude-a virtuality that must be made real. Space that merely can be traversed must be transformed into a space of life; circulation must become freedom. In other words, the mobile multitude must achieve a global citizenship. The multitude's resistance to bondage-the struggle against the slavery of belonging to a nation, an

identity, and a people, and thus the desertion from sovereignty and the limits it places on subjectivity-is entirely positive . Nomadism

and miscegenation appear here as figures of virtue, as the first ethical practices on the terrain of Empire. From this perspective the objective space of capitalist globalization breaks down . Only a space that is animated by subjective circulation and only a space that is defined by the irrepressible movements

(legal or clandestine) of individuals and groups can be real. Today's celebrations of the local can be regressive and even fascistic when they oppose circulations and mixture, and thus reinforce the walls of nation, ethnicity, race, people, and the like. The concept of the local, however, need not be defined by isolation and purity. In fact , if one breaks down the walls that surround the local (and thereby separate the concept from race, religion, ethnicity, nation, and people), one can link it directly to the universal. The concrete universal is what allows the multitude to pass from place to place and make its place its own. This is the common place of nomadism and miscegenation . Through circulation the common human species is composed, a multicolored Orpheus of infinite power; through circulation the human community is constituted. Outside every Enlightenment cloud or Kantian reverie, the desire of the multitude is not the cosmopolitical state but a common species.[16] As in a secular Pentecost, the bodies are mixed and the nomads speak a common tongue. In this context, ontology is not an abstract science. It involves the conceptual recognition of the production and reproduction of being and thus the recognition that political reality is constituted by the movement of desire and the practical realization of labor as value. The spatial dimension of ontology today is demonstrated through the multitude's concrete processes of the globalization, or really the making common, of the desire for human community. One important example of the functioning of this spatial dimension is demonstrated by the processes that brought an end to the Third World, along with all the glory and disgrace of its past struggles, the power of desires that ran throughout its processes of liberation, and the poverty of results that crowned its success. The real heroes of the liberation of the Third World today may really have been the emigrants and the flows of population that have destroyed old and new boundaries. Indeed, the postcolonial hero is the one who continually transgresses territorial and racial boundaries, who destroys particularisms and points toward a common civilization. Imperial command, by contrast, isolates populations in poverty and allows them to act only in the straitjackets of subordinated postcolonial nations. The exodus from localism, the transgression of customs and boundaries, and the desertion from sovereignty were the operative forces in the liberation of the

Third World. Here more than ever we can recognize clearly the difference Marx defined between emancipation and liberation.[17] Emancipation is the entry of new nations and peoples into the imperial society of control, with its new hierarchies and segmentations; liberation , in contrast, means the destruction of boundaries and patterns of forced migration, the reappropriation of space, and the power of the multitude to determine the global circulation and mixture of individuals and populations . The Third World , which was constructed by the colonialism and imperialism of nation-states and trapped in the cold war, is destroyed when the old rules of the political discipline of the modern state (and its attendant mechanisms of geographical and ethnic regulation of populations) are smashed . It is destroyed when throughout the ontological terrain of globalization the most wretched of the earth becomes the most powerful being, because its new nomad singularity is the most creative force and the omnilateral movement of its desire is itself the coming liberation. A new nomad horde, a new race of barbarians, will arise to invade or evacuate Empire. Nietzsche was oddly prescient of their destiny in the nineteenth century. "Problem: where are the barbarians of the twentieth century? Obviously they will come into view and consolidate themselves only after tremendous socialist crises."[8] We cannot say exactly what Nietzsche

foresaw in his lucid delirium, but indeed what recent event could be a stronger example of the power of desertion and exodus , the power

of the nomad horde, than the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the entire Soviet bloc? In the desertion from "socialist discipline," savage mobility and mass migration contributed substantially to the collapse of the system. In fact, the desertion of productive cadres disorganized and struck at the heart of the disciplinary system of the bureaucratic

Soviet world. The mass exodus of highly trained workers from Eastern Europe played a central role in provoking the collapse of the Wall .[9] Even though it refers to the particularities of the socialist state system, this example demonstrates that the mobility of the labor force can indeed express an open political conflict and contribute to the destruction of the regime . The counter-Empire must also be a new global vision, a new way of living in the world. This question can be approached initially from the other side by considering the policies of Empire that repress these movements. Empire does not really know how to control these paths and can only try to criminalize those who travel them, even when the movements are required for capitalist production itself. The migration lines of biblical proportions that go from South to North America are obstinately called by the new drug czars "the cocaine trail"; or rather, the articulations of exodus from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa are treated by European leaders as "paths of terrorism"; or rather still, the populations forced to flee across the Indian Ocean are reduced to slavery in "Arabia félix"; and the list goes on. And yet the flows of population continue. Empire must restrict and isolate the spatial movements of the multitude to stop them from gaining political legitimacy. It is extremely important from this point of view that Empire use its powers to manage and orchestrate the various forces of nationalism and fundamentalism (see Sections 2.2 and 2.4). It is no less important, too, that Empire deploy its military and police powers to bring the unruly and rebellious to order.[3] These imperial practices in themselves, however, still do not touch on the political tension that runs throughout the spontaneous movements of the multitude. All these repressive actions remain essentially external to the multitude and its movements. Empire can only isolate, divide, and segregate. Imperial capital does indeed attack the movements of the multitude with a tireless determination: it patrols the seas and the borders; within each country it divides and segregates; and in the world of labor it reinforces the cleavages and borderlines of race, gender, language, culture, and so forth. Even then, however, it must be careful not to restrict the productivity of the multitude too much because Empire too depends on this power. The movements of the multitude have to be allowed to extend always wider across the world scene, and the attempts at repressing the multitude are really paradoxical, inverted manifestations of its strength. This leads us back to our fundamental questions: How can the actions of the multitude become political? How can the multitude organize and concentrate its energies against the repression and incessant territorial segmentations of Empire? The only response that we can give to these questions is that the action of the multitude becomes political primarily when it begins to confront directly and with an adequate consciousness the central repressive operations of Empire. It is a matter of recognizing and engaging the imperial initiatives and not allowing them continually to reestablish order; it is a matter of crossing and breaking down the limits and segmentations that are imposed on the new collective labor power; it is a matter of gathering together these experiences of resistance and wielding them in concert against the nerve centers of imperial command. This task for the multitude, however, although it is clear at a conceptual level, remains rather abstract. What specific and concrete practices will animate this political project? We cannot say at this point. What we can see nonetheless is a first element of a political program for the global multitude, a first political demand: global citizenship. During the 1996 demonstrations for the sans papiers, the undocumented aliens residing in France, the banners demanded "Papiers pour tous!" Residency papers for everyone means in the first place that all should have the full rights of citizenship in the country where they live and work. This is not a utopian or unrealistic political demand. The demand is simply

that the juridical status of the population be reformed in step with the real economic transformations of recent years . Capital itself has demanded the increased mobility of labor power and continuous migrations across national boundaries. Capitalist production in the more dominant regions (in Europe, the United States, and Japan, but also in Singapore, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere) is utterly dependent on the influx of workers from the subordinate regions of the world. Hence the political demand is that the existent fact of capitalist production be recognized juridically and that all workers be given the full rights of citizenship. In effect this political demand insists in postmodernity on the fundamental modern constitutional principle that links right and labor, and thus rewards with citizenship the worker who creates capital . This demand can also be configured in a more general and more radical way with respect to the postmodern conditions of Empire. If in a first moment the multitude demands that each state recognize juridically the migrations that are necessary to capital, in a second moment it must demand control over the movements themselves. The multitude must be able to decide if, when, and where it moves. It must have the right also to stay still and enjoy one place rather than being forced constantly to be on the move. The general right to control its own movement is the multitude's ultimate demand for global citizenship. This demand is radical insofar as it challenges the fundamental apparatus of imperial control over the production and life of the multitude. Global citizenship is the multitude's power to reappropriate control over space and thus to design the new cartography.

XT Squo – Border Constructed

The wall is nothing more than a symbol- since its construction illegal immigration and costs have increasedNBW, 10 (No Border Wall, Independent researchers concerning the US-Mexico border, October 6th 2010, “THE BORDER WALL DOES NOT WORK,” No Border Wall, http://www.no-border-wall.com/walls-do-not-work.php) Camila Reed-GuevaraAll of the imagined benefits of the border wall flow from the assumption that if walls are built they will stop undocumented traffic from coming across. Politicians claim that building 700 miles of wall along our 1,933 mile long southern border, while ignoring the 3,987 mile long northern border and 12,479 miles of coastline will somehow allow the Department of Homeland Security to achieve the Secure Fence Act's goal, to "achieve and maintain operational control over the entire international land and maritime borders of the United States." In fact, the Border Patrol's own statistics show that the border walls have not brought about a decrease in illegal entries. The border patrol uses the number of border crossers apprehended in a given sector to gauge the overall number of attempted crossings. Apprehensions dropped dramatically between 2005, the year before the Secure Fence Act was passed, and 2007, the year after. But the decrease did not occur in areas where border walls had been built. On the contrary, the greatest reductions in apprehensions, which according to the Border Patrol would indicate a successful strategy for stopping undocumented immigration, were seen in sectors that did not have walls . Texas' Rio Grande Valley sector saw a 45.3% decrease in apprehensions, bringing them to a 15 year low. The Del Rio, Texas, sector saw a 66.5% decrease. Neither sector had an inch of border wall before 2008. In sectors such as Tucson, which saw walls built shortly after passage of the Secure Fence Act, the reduction in apprehensions began before any wall posts were erected. The areas that saw an increase in crossings were California's San Diego and El Centro sectors, both of which have had border walls for over a decade. At the same time that the unwalled border witnessed dramatic decreases in crossings, heavily fortified San Diego saw a 20.1% increase. Even before the passage of the Secure Fence Act, it was clear that border walls did not reduce the number of people entering the United States. The Congressional Research Service found that the number of border crossers apprehended nationally in 1992 was the same as the number apprehended in 2004, after walls in San Diego had been erected. They concluded that migrant traffic had simply shifted to more remote areas in Arizona and that "increased enforcement in San Diego sector has had little impact on overall apprehensions." Migrants were not stopped by border walls ; they simply went around them. Nothing More Than a Symbol Other researchers have studied the effectiveness of the border wall and border enforcement by analyzing how successful migrants are at getting through it. The Migrant Policy Institute found that 97% of undocumented immigrants eventually succeed in entering the United States, a number that has been unchanged since the first border walls went up in 1995. Wayne Cornelius, Director of the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University of California-San Diego told the House Judiciary Committee that according to his research. Tightened border enforcement since 1993 has not stopped nor even discouraged unauthorized migrants from entering the United States. Even if apprehended, the vast majority (92-97%) keep trying until they succeed. Neither the higher probability of being apprehended by the Border Patrol, nor the sharply increased danger of clandestine entry through deserts and mountainous terrain, has discouraged potential migrants from leaving home. Assertions by pundits and politicians that walls will allow the U.S. to "secure" its southern border are patently false. Spokespersons for the Border Patrol tend to describe it much more modestly. Del Rio, Texas, Border Patrol Chief Randy Hill said, "We're going to see steel barriers erected on the borders where U.S. and

Mexican cities adjoin. These will slow down illegal crossers by minutes ." Not stop crossers, or allow the Border Patrol to "achieve and maintain operational control" of the border, but slow them down by "minutes." As Border Patrol spokesperson Mike Scioli said, " The border fence is a speed bump in the desert ." Even Bush administration Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff said in 2007, "I think the fence has come to assume a certain kind of symbolic significance which should not obscure the fact that it is a much more complicated problem than putting up a fence which someone can climb over with a ladder or tunnel under with a shovel." Mile upon mile of border wall have been built, with no apparent thought given to efficacy, because the Secure Fence Act only mandated a mile count. There is no requirement that border walls have any measurable impact on immigration or smuggling, and in 2009 the Government Accountability Office found that the Department of Homeland Security had made no effort to determine whether or not walls were having any effect. Even the Border Patrol has questioned whether walls are being built in some locations for political, rather than operational, reasons. In a 2007 email obtained by the Center for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) through a Freedom of Information Act request, the Assistant Chief Patrol Agent for the Yuma sector asks, "will we be getting fence where we don't need it in our sector for the sake of putting up the required mileage?" The miles of unnecessary border wall that he referred to have since been built through the Imperial Sand Dunes of Southern California. Skyrocketing Costs Despite its "symbolic significance" and its possibly arbitrary placement, the border wall comes with a real price tag. In 2007 the Congressional Research Service estimated that the border wall could cost as much as $49 billion to build and maintain. Since then the costs of construction have risen dramatically. The A rmy C orps of E ngineers reported that the cost of building "pedestrian fences" has increased from an average of $3.5 million per mile to $7.5 million per mile . The cost of building vehicle barriers on the border is now $2.8 million per mile. Some sections of border wall are particularly expensive: the walls that have been inserted into the levees in south Texas averaged $12 million per mile; in California, a 3.5 mile section that involved filling in canyons cost taxpayers $57 million. In 2008, the Department of Homeland Security asked Congress to allocate an additional $400 million for border wall construction, because the $2.7 billion already spent was not enough to finish out the year. Why would members of Congress vote to spend billions of taxpayer dollars on border walls that do not work? Simply put, for members of Congress who do not live beside the border, and do not count on the votes of those who do, the border wall is an abstraction . The reality that the border wall has little or no impact on border crossings is irrelevant. The reality that more than 400 property owners have had their property condemned is irrelevant. The reality that federally designated wilderness areas and wildlife refuges have been severely impacted is irrelevant. The politicians who voted for border walls were voting for a symbol, something that could be used to give voters a false sense of security during election cycles, and nothing more.

XT Squo – Fear Politics

This is pathetic – an entire population is excluded by the ignorance and fear of difference Walsh, 10 - University College Dublin College of Arts and Celtic Studies, peer reviewed by Prof. Edward James & Dr. David Kerr (“The impact of anti-Mexican sentiment on American perceptions of Diego Rivera during the Great Depression”, August, 2010, http://www.ucd.ie/ibp/MADissertations2009/Walsh.pdf)The sudden ‘visibility’ of the Mexican community alarmed the Anglo majority and unearthed instinctive racist sentiments .105 Their presence posed new questions about the status of the Mexican within American society – where did they fit in? Americans feared the potential unassimilability of Mexicans into their way of life, due to differences in culture, food, religion, and even hygiene. In a society that harboured grave doubts about the wisdom of ethnic pluralism, the question of Mexican social integration was met with hostility.106 These sentiments were fuelled by the popularity for pseudo-scientific theories about the incompatibility of ethnic groups within society due to racial rather than cultural differences.107 Social commentators were aware of this situation. In 1930, Max Handman, a senior lecturer at the University of Texas, warned that American society ‘has no social technique for handling partly colored races’108 and noted confusion regarding the correct treatment of Mexicans in social situations, such as whether to allow them sit in white sections on public transport or to drink from white-only fountains.

Post 9/11 the US has sought after secure borders- obsession over the US Mexico border is a response to thatLaufer, 4 (Peter, the James Wallace Chair in Journalism at the University of Oregon School of Journalism and Communication, “Wetback Nation: The Case for Opening the Mexican-American Border,” ISBN 1-56663-592-6)I hail a cab at my oasis at the Marriott Palace in Zamalik along the Nile. I jam myself into the tiny and ancient Fiat taxi that's been repainted so many times it appears the car body is made out of enamel, not metal. We head out to the fashionable suburb of Maazir. The USAID fortress is up a blocked road in Maazir, looming like a cross between a Hyatt Regency and a maximum-security prison. Behind the barriers, the U.S. bureaucracy labors. The Cairo mission dishes out half a billion dollars in aid to Egypt each year, more than to any other country in the world, save Israel. I give up my passport, step through airportlike security, and make my way to a meeting with the administrators of the journalism training pro- We have a problem. Only fifteen of the twenty-tive students we se- lected to bring to the United States were granted visas by the U.S- government, and thirteen of the fifteen were women, creating an odd impabalnce in the classroom. A few months earlier when we submitted the twenty five names for clearance, young and unmarried Muslim men were being flagged for detailed background Checks by the American embassy in Cairo-- on instructions from the State Department in Washington- and the lag time for visas was interminable for most of the men in our group while they were being investigated. Washington was trying to make sure that no terrorists were granted visas. There was no such trouble for the women; all but one received a visa promptly. When the group-the thirteen women and two men-arrived at passport control at O’Hare airport in Chicago, the women all sallied through the gates with a cheery "Welcome to the United States" from im- migration officers. The two men were pulled from the line, ushered away for mug shots and fingerprinting, questioning and extra paperwork. Shortly after our students arrived in the United States, the Middle East was plagued with a series of suicide bombings perpetrated by women. “Don’t expect it to be easy for the women either this time," a USAID staffer tells me about our second group. Since the Sep tember 11 th attacks , she says, the rules are constantly changing as Washington scrambles, "Trying to figure out how to control U.S. borders . " Sometimes we issue

visas in the morning and have to hold the passports because the rules change before the Egyptians come to pick them up in the afternoon." Remember, according to most reports the September 11th hijackers all came to the United States legally, and only two overstayed their visas. USAID’s advice: invite 35 to 50 percent more journalists than we can accommodate for this next round, because that many probably will fail no secure approval. Imagine all the detailed work going on in Cairo regard- ing these fifty journalists, multiply that by all the exchange programs processed by this active USAID mission, add the rest ofthe USAID offices around the world, and factor in all the other foreigners seeking admission to the United States at consulates worldwide. It is an extraordinary bureaucratic operation. And it is understandable. The U.S. government wants to control the country's borders and decide who enters. Yet because of the dysfunctional attempts to control on the U.S.- Mexico frontier, all of this effort overseas is of questionable value . The people who are screened out can simply go to Mexico and walk into United States with all the farm workers and cooks, maids and me chanics. Many Middle Easterners could even pass as Mexicans, blending the swarthy dark haired crowd pushing north. If the U nited States really wants a secure post- 9/II border fixing the U.S.- Mexico boundary is a much more constructive goal than denying male journalists with hobs and close family connections at home in Egypt a two-month stay at an American erican university.

XT Squo – Biopolitics

And, affirm against necropolitics – the state uses its laws to justify systemic Otherization Sánchez, 11 - Ph.D. (University of Texas-Austin), Professor - Latin American Literature and Chicano Literature (“The toxic tonic: Narratives of xenophobia”, 2011, Latino Studies 9, 126–144, http://www.palgrave-journals.com/lst/journal/v9/n1/full/lst201111a.html)It is also crucial to bear in mind, in this regard, that the diagnosis of a “diseased” state always assumes a state of exception.17 In fact, as will be evident in what follows, this metaphorical threat or disease, the state of exception, has become the norm in US society (Agamben, 2005). Benjamin, too, points out that “the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule” (Benjamin, 1968, 257). Assuming the ostensible toxicity of immigrants to the US social body is, as previously noted, a misdiagnosis of the disease that results from globalized capitalism, a force that creates conditions that induce individuals to migrate in order to survive. The undocumented worker and other immigrants or immigrant-looking people in the United States today occupy a curiously ambiguous position; like the pharmakos, they are both outside and inside, both included and excluded. In many ways, the immigrant in the United States has functioned in part as the homo sacer that, according to Agamben, can be killed for his acts, but not sacrificed, that is, not killed by the state according to law (Agamben, 1998). The state, however, permits the killing of the homo sacer by others and in effect enables and propitiates it through discourses that identify and vilify the immigrant as a toxic pernicious presence. But matters can change radically with the creation of a state of exception, which is what ultimately defines the structure of sovereignty and the state's power to establish the law, validate itself by it, and yet go outside of it. And it is here that the danger lies for US Latino/as as

a collectivity. Under a state of exception, the state itself is involved in scapegoating, going outside its own set of laws, such as the Bill of Rights. There are, for example, laws in the United States against state intrusion into one's

private life, but during a state of exception the state can decree, as it has with the 2001 Patriot Act, that it can tap our phones, see what library books we check out, review what internet sites we visit and establish a variety of surveillance practices. Under G.W. Bush, the Office of Legal Counsel considered enhancing Presidential powers to enable the President to conduct unreasonable searches and sweeping warrantless surveillance of the population. Bush also struck down Posse Comitatus (which since the Civil War prevents deployment of military forces for domestic law enforcement) through the Defense Authorization Act of 2006, readily approved by Congress, that allows the President to send out troops for crowd control and to impose martial law on the civilian population. A full US Army Brigade (the First Brigade of the Third Infantry Division, 3000–4000 soldiers strong) stands ready to be deployed internally, under the command of the President and at his discretion (Wolf). Under President Obama, the Brigade continues to exist, intended to be used in homeland scenarios if deemed necessary. In tandem with the narratives of xenophobia, the material forces that the state can marshal against Latino/as should not be underestimated. There are indeed all too many signs that show the extent of our already living under a state of exception. The complexity of the situation, of course, produces contradictions; thus, for example, there is a standing policy against racial profiling, as is argued by those against Arizona's anti-immigrant law, but at the same time the Justice Department has considered allowing the FBI to investigate people in the United States that meet what is deemed a terrorist profile, like

Muslims, Arabs and others . García Hernández (2008) argues that already the 1976 federal decision US v. Martínez

Fuerte granted the Border Patrol the right to stop and question people of “apparent Mexican ancestry,” whatever that might be construed to be, within 100 miles of the border.18 Under a state of exception, the state itself sets up means, methods and locus for the punishment of the homo sacer, as in the construction of detention centers or concentration camps by the state. What the state has the power to do is not only to suspend the Posse Comitatus Act, but to kill, as noted by Mbembe (2003). Necropolitics,19 in the last instance, produces genocide and it is hegemonic power exercised by the state, or some other powerful entity, that determines who can live or die, who is human, who has rights, who will be bombed, and who is to be exterminated. The state, however, need not kill outright to be punitive, repressive or destructive; it also creates situations that make survival, in the sense of daily life, difficult or impossible for some by denying them, for example, access to work, to legal rights, to education and medical services. At the discursive level and working in tandem with state material practices is the state's channeling of the frustrations and resentments of the broader population onto a scapegoat, a simultaneously vulnerable and vilified “ other .”

An open border is the ethical solution to immigration policy- political freedom and economic opportunities are basic human rightsAppel 9, Jacob M Appel is a bioethicist and social critic, graduate of Harvard Law School and lecturer at Brown University (Jacob M, May 4, 2009, “The Ethical Case For An Open Immigration Policy” http://www.opposingviews.com/i/the-ethical-case-for-an-open-immigration-policy)nasokan

The United States had an “open door” policy for white immigrants from the nation’s founding until the passage of the Emergency Quota Act of 1921. As a result of the Naturalization Act of 1790, all “free white persons” of “good moral character” arriving on our shores were offered a short, simple path to full citizenship. In one of their often unheralded yet non-the-less remarkable contributions, the first generation of American statesmen welcomed Catholics ineligible for full citizenship in Great Britain, and Jews unable to naturalize in France. Over the next century, despite occasional bursts of nativist braying—most notably, the No Nothing Movement of 1854-1856—this nation remained largely faithful to those celebrated lines of the poet Emma Lazarus that are now inscribed upon the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty: Give me your tired, your poor / Your huddled masses yearing to breathe free. While this promise of welcome rang undeniably hollow for Africans and Asians—one of our greatest causes for national shame—the very essence of American “exceptionalism” was our open gate. ¶ As the issue of immigration returns to our national agenda, policy makers should remember that there is a third alternative to either deportation or amnesty for so-called “illegal” aliens: a return to the “open door” policy that built our nation. I do not have the professional expertise to speak to the economics of such an approach—although my personal intuition tells me that new immigrants will generate jobs rather than consume them—but the ethics of open borders are strikingly clear. Treating human beings differently, simply because they were born on the opposite side of a national boundary, is hard to justify under any mainstream philosophical, religious or ethical theory. ¶ That is not to say that all “birthrights” are unjust. For example, while being born into a particular family is the result of chance, the right to inherit some of one’s parents’ property serves useful and meaningful social purposes—such as encouraging mothers and fathers to work and save for their offspring. The “birthright” of nationality serves no such social purpose. In contrast, the freedom to travel and to settle where one wishes, in pursuit of political freedom or economic opportunity, is among the most basic of human rights. I am grateful that my grandfather was admitted to this country, fleeing Belgium in the days before World War II. I am horrified by the sealed borders that prevented boatloads other Jewish refugees from following him. From an ethical point of view, however, it is difficult to distinguish such political refugees—to whom we do grant asylum today—from the millions of economic refugees who seek freedom from abject poverty. The principal difference between the Irish peasants who once fled the potato blight on coffin ships, and the desperate Haitian rafters that our navy forcibly repatriates today, is bad timing.¶ Any reasonable “open door” immigration policy should still exclude those who pose a danger to our current citizenry: would-be terrorists, wanted felons, tuberculosis patients unwilling to accept treatment, etc. From an ethical standpoint, a liberal democracy might also restrict immigration should newcomers threaten to use the political process to dismantle existing freedoms—if, for example, ten million advocates of Taliban-style fundamentalism were to demand entrance into Luxembourg. Considering the size and diversity of our nation, any meaningful threat to American democracy from immigrants seems highly far-fetched.¶ This is not a policy proposal. I acknowledge that developing a functional, open borders regime could take several years, and might even require the progressive elevation of existing immigration quotas over time until the point where supply exceeded demand. That does not mean that open borders should not be the long-term goal of any ethical immigration policy. The modern version of Martin Luther King Jr’s “dream” is that any child, born into the poorest slums of Africa, Asia or Latin America, should have a right to claim those same freedoms and opportunities of American citizenship that far too many of us take for granted. In an era when we are divided in so many ways as a nation, this should be the sort of visionary policy to which all people—religious and secular, traditional and progressive, Native Americans and descendants of immigrants—can say, Yes We Can!

The border is more than just a geographic divider. It represents a split of humanity- It promotes “outsider” mentality and biopolitics.Giorgi and Pinkus 6, Gabriel Giorgi is a professor at New York University and Karen Pinkus is an ecologist from Cornell University (Gabriel and Karen, summer 2006, “Zones of Exception: Biopolitical Territories in the Neoliberal Era” http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20204129.pdf?acceptTC=true)nasokan

Contemporary discourses on economic, social, and cultural exclusion are deeply associ ¶ ated, especially in the media, with images of militarized, fiercely controlled borders and ¶ coastlines, as well as with recurrent commonplaces about the widening gap between rich ¶ and poor, between the "privileged" and "wretched." But however much these boundar ¶ ies and these social maps can be presented as fixed in order to satisfy the anxieties of the ¶ audience (anxieties, in turn, systematically reproduced and stimulated by the media), they ¶ are also extremely precarious and unstable. The very insistence on phrases such as "for ¶ tress Europe," the proposals for a "double" or "triple fence" on the US-Mexico border, or ¶ the claims for more security and vigilance in upper- and middle-class neighborhoods in ¶ the cities?all are symptomatic of defensive reactions to an increasingly unstable econo ¶ my of inclusion/exclusion and inside/outside. It is as if the effort to reinforce the borders ¶ between territories and between groups and populations were menaced not only by the ¶ quantitative increase of people trying to cross borders or of poverty and "social danger," ¶ but also, and perhaps more decisively, by the closeness or immediacy of an "outside" that ¶ should be kept out, fenced, constantly pushed away?an "outside" thus that cannot be ¶ understood exclusively in spatial or territorial terms, but that points toward an economy ¶ where territories, politics, and life intertwine in specific ways. Our media are character ¶ ized by a rhetorics of emergency: images of packed migrants in the Centers of Temporary ¶ Permanence being prepared to be returned to their countries of origin, or directly?as in ¶ Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish cities in North Africa?being physically rejected, and in ¶ some cases killed, by border patrols; of indigents increasingly visible and present (and ¶ thus persecuted) in cities throughout the globe. The concurrent instability and violence ¶ rupturing different territorial and social boundaries point toward a dynamic in which what ¶ takes place is not only a social conflict between rich and poor, or between privileged and ¶ unprivileged, but also a tension?and an ambivalence?at the level of the inscription of ¶ bodies, and of life itself, in the social and political order. ¶ The "outside," then, although represented and "materialized" in spatial terms, seems ¶ to point toward to another dimension that is not exclusively territorial, geopolitical, or ¶ cultural, but fundamentally biopolitical: the dimension or the level at which human life is ¶ inscribed, constituted, recognized, and defined within a given sociopolitical order. What ¶ is deployed through the rhetorics and the politics of borders and boundaries, what the me ¶ dia stages in the spectacle of the territorial security and perpetual danger, be it at a trans ¶ national or an urban scale, is a split or division at which "human life" is separated from ¶ the unrecognizable, the residual, life reduced to its "merely biological" status?"bare ¶ life," to use Agamben's expression, which is in many ways identified with the diverse ¶ forms of poverty and indigence so deeply intensified in the neoliberal era. ¶ National or continental borders are, as we currently see both in Europe and the US, ¶ constantly redrawn, pushed further and further from the "inside," to contain the so-called "flows" or "waves" of migrants.1 At the same time, urban landscapes throughout the ¶ planet are reshaped by rapidly changing maps of safety and risk, due to the "sudden" ¶ outbreaks of social violence and criminality and the reinforced claims for security and ¶ "safety zones." All these dislocations of the maps of "security" and "containment" show ¶ to what extent the distinction between inside/outside has become more ambivalent, more ¶ fractured, and thus more defensive and paranoid. This ambivalence and this internal frac ¶ ture, we want to suggest, has to do with the biopolitical dimension from which such dis ¶ locations originate. As the "outside" becomes more proximate and immediate, violence ¶ intensifies. At the same time, it forces a redrawing of the very boundaries of the political.

There is no visibility for the migrant in the status quo. The plan shifts away from the biopolitics of the border and promotes change that is otherwise impossibleBoyce 12, Geoffrey is the author of Normalizing Noncompliance: Militarization and Resistance in Southern Arizona and writer for Arizona Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies (Geoffrey, Spring 2012, “BEYOND THE SOVEREIGN GAZE” https://journals.uair.arizona.edu/index.php/azjis/article/view/16007/15963)nasokanThis paper is concerned with the ways that visibility and aesthetics become central to the operation of ¶ biopolitics: the sorting and management of the biological life of a population as the central object of ¶ governance. 1 This question is explored through a consideration of U.S. / Mexico boundary enforcement, and ¶ activist efforts to challenge the deadly outcomes of U.S. policy. In the process, scholarly interpretations of ¶ the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben are placed in dialogue with work that touches on the theme of ¶ visibility, phenomenology and aesthetics. The conclusions in this paper are provisional: they are meant to¶ suggest further areas for inquiry and reflection, and to gesture toward ways that empirical research might¶ better deploy the largely-axiomatic philosophical concepts derived from Agamben’s ouvre. In the post-September 11 period, Giorgio Agamben’s work has become a regular touchstone for the¶ scholarly theorization of warfare and geopolitics. Such efforts have attended to the ‘securitization’ of¶ governance policy,2 the treatment of

military detainees in the ‘war on terror,’3 and policies targeting¶ unauthorized migrants and refugees as ‘threats’ to domestic and international security.4 Yet Agamben’s ideas are cumbersome to work with for social scientific purposes, largely because his¶ intention is to describe the immanent association between, for example, law and exception – rather than to¶ comment on concrete historical events.5 The trans-historical orientation of Agamben’s work lends itself ¶ poorly to empirical instrumentalization; instead, his purpose is to gesture toward the pitfalls, limitations and ¶ underpinnings of a politics anchored in sovereignty, and to demand an ethical orientation detached from its ¶ fold. ¶ In this paper I use Agamben’s ideas as a point of departure because, as suggested above, they are¶ useful for shedding light on the condition of sovereignty and its biopolitical presentation. Thus, I largely¶ accept Agamben’s arguments (borrowed from Carl Schmitt)6 that would position the decision over the life¶ and death of the population as immanent to and axiomatically attached to the performance of sovereignty. I ¶ believe that this condition is, in principle, characteristic of everyday practices of governance and statecraft ¶ along the United States’ border with Mexico, and the positioning of such practices as a sovereign imperative.¶ What I intend to reflect upon is precisely how such practices unfold. Below, I argue that visibility – ¶ phenomenal appearance – becomes a primary medium via which biopolitical governance becomes ¶ operationalized. Thus, the state invests considerable resources and technology to render visible information ¶ about those crossing through and residing within its territory. In the context of immigration, the purpose of ¶ such efforts is to identify and remove unauthorized bodies through detention, deportation and various other methods of territorial exclusion. This effort, I believe, corresponds to an imperative that Donna Haraway¶ describes as the “sovereign gaze” 7 – a “desire for omniscience through total vision,”8 with the state’s¶ objective to realize an aesthetic correspondence between its territorial representation and a body politic¶ assumed in its usage “to be virtual, total, and always already there”.9 At the same time, such sovereign territorialization is always aspirational, and may be challenged via ¶ the reappearance of unauthorized bodies in the public domain, in order to advance dissident and counterhegemonic ¶ political claims. The loss of visibility in the object of governance produces instability in its ¶ outcome – unquantifiable variables that confound efforts to optimally manage risk. Undocumented and ¶ unauthorized corporeal presence, in turn, produces tension by exposing the fiction of sovereign omnipotence. ¶ I believe that it is precisely this tension that fuels conflict between state actors and social movements related ¶ to the condition of mixed or non-status immigrants. In the U.S. / Mexico borderlands, this conflict is ¶ exacerbated by the frequently deadly outcomes of U.S. policy.

There is a constantly escalating need for security justified by the presence of the “illegitimate”-This promotes biopoliticsBoyce 12, Geoffrey is the author of Normalizing Noncompliance: Militarization and Resistance in Southern Arizona and writer for Arizona Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies (Geoffrey, Spring 2012, “BEYOND THE SOVEREIGN GAZE” https://journals.uair.arizona.edu/index.php/azjis/article/view/16007/15963)nasokanIn the aftermath of the terror attacks of September 2001, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization¶ Service was re-organized into a series of separate agencies and incorporated into the newly formed¶ Department of Homeland Security. Framing the border as among the ‘front lines’ of the global war on ¶ terror 10, this re-organization assigned the U.S. Border Patrol the primary mission of “keeping terrorists and ¶ their weapons out of the U.S.”.11 It also positioned policing against immigrants, contraband and terrorists¶ alike as problems related to perceived coterminous vulnerabilities vis-à-vis territorial sovereignty and¶ national security.12¶ The U.S./Mexico border, following these developments, has assumed increasing prominence in ¶ national security discourse and policy precisely because it represents the territorial-juridical division between ¶ the inside and outside of the nation-state, between ‘security’ and ‘anarchy’, ‘norm’ (law) and its exception.13¶ In this sense, the border performs at least two functions: In addition to a territorial line of demarcation, the ¶ border marks a fundamental biopolitical distinction between life that (literally) counts in the registry of the¶ nation-state, and life that does not.

Birth marks the primary and permanent moment of distinction, whereby¶ the political-territorial orientation of the subject is fixed to one or another sovereign state, signifying “an¶ entry into a world where the nation, the state, territory, and citizenship preemptively set the basis by which¶ one is recognized as human”.14¶ Thus, at the international border, we see the operation of a “sovereign decision” in the classic ¶ Schmittian sense, in which what is adjudicated is the

very question of whether an individual has a status before the law, and therefore may enter sovereign territory, or whether s/he may not.15 Within this ¶ biopolitical syllogism the ‘citizen’ becomes synonymous with mobility – s/he may move freely in space – ¶ and the border acts as a sorting mechanism, restricting or eliminating the circulation of ‘illegitimate’ ¶ bodies. 16 Thus, alongside technologies like retina scans and biometric identification systems – meant to¶ police, contain and prevent unauthorized entry – have come a suite of technologies and infrastructure¶ improvements meant to facilitate authorized movement for those subjects recognized by the state as¶ legitimate.17 For many aspiring entrants, this regulation of movement reaches an extreme in the form of the¶ ban: raw exclusion that, to the extent that it is juridical, is also meant to be territorial.¶ Yet if the sovereign reserves the right to decide whether one may enter the territory or be granted¶ political recognition, what of s/he who enters the territory without inspection or despite his or her formal¶ juridical exclusion? Every day thousands of individuals do so, and estimates vary of between 11 and 14¶ million undocumented residents who have integrated into the social, cultural and economic fabric of the¶ country.18 Once beyond the border (and the hundred-mile buffer that defines the Border Patrol’s primary¶ jurisdiction), unauthorized immigrants are frequently subject to much less restrictive surveillance and¶ enforcement, and are able to integrate into society relatively unencumbered. Exclusion, if it is to be actual ¶ rather than virtual, depends on visibility – that is, the capacity of the agents of the state to detect and detain ¶ unauthorized individuals.19 The very nature of being undocumented makes the presence and location of unauthorized individuals difficult to detect, and their capture difficult to enact, enabling sustained territorial ¶ presence. In response to these challenges, DHS has implemented a suite of programs, laws and technologies¶ that “scale down” interior immigration enforcement to non-federal authorities such as states, counties and¶ municipalities.20 These programs include 287(g) agreements and the “Secure Communities” program, which¶ facilitate cooperation between non-federal law enforcement with federal immigration authorities by enabling¶ the former to comb through those they apprehend, in order to check their status against federal immigration¶ databases. Through this process hundreds of thousands of individuals have been placed into immigration¶ proceedings as a result of minor traffic violations and various other kinds of police interaction – resulting in¶ historic rates of detention and deportation under the Obama administration.21¶ Nevertheless, as anxieties about the scale of undocumented presence have proliferated in popular ¶ discourse, there has, in the national imaginary, developed a fixation on the border as the most important site ¶ of perceived territorial vulnerability, and a belief that the solution to unauthorized immigration can and ¶ should be its prevention at the boundary itself. 22 Such beliefs continue to be mobilized to justify massive ¶ investment in boundary enforcement infrastructure, personnel and technology, spending for which increased ¶ more than three- fold over the course of the past decade (to more than $4.6 billion for FY 2011).23 Yet these¶ beliefs also represent a fantasy or desire for a neat separation between the inside and outside of national space, in a topographical and cultural landscape that offers anything but. It is to the tensions engendered by¶ this reality that I now turn.

And this biopolitics justify genocidal practices- Provides reasoning for the destruction of the OtherSavage 7, Rowan is a writer for the Journal of Historical Sociology (Rowan, September 25, 2007, ““Disease Incarnate”: Biopolitical Discourse and Genocidal Dehumanisation in the Age of Modernity” http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6443.2007.00315.x/full)nasokanWith the inception of modernity, various discourses emerged centring around ideals of integrity and homogeneity. These converged to form a discourse of biopolitics; under certain conditions, in otherwise widely different circumstances, this discourse provided both a literal reason and a metaphorical rhetoric calling for the destruction of alien Others, each of which served the same motivatory and legitimatory purpose at different registers. The first worked at the scientific-intellectual-political level; the second at the emotional-populist level. Thus emerged an entirely novel medicalised and militarised discourse which allowed for “genocide” to be conceivable; and which, furthermore, eased the path for its enactment by the legitimisation and justification of the acts of perpetrators through the dehumanisation of victims. This dehumanisation “primes” the society or the perpetrator group, and provides one motivation for destruction, one reason to follow the “twisted path” to genocide. Once that end is reached, dehumanising discourse continues, as perpetrators and bystanders justify their acts to themselves and to others. In the final stages of genocide, this rhetoric is literally imprinted on the bodies of the victims; they are forced to live under conditions “which (re)produce their essentialized identity”. In the cases examined here, the disease-ridden, dehumanised state to which victims are reduced makes genocide “seem like a justifiable ‘purification’ process” for the protection of the national body.”202¶ Many factors motivate genocide, and

many different categorisations and metaphors are used to understand outgroups as undesirable or as legitimate targets for destruction. But without the specifically modern, essentialist concept of a group as extraneous and as indelibly wrong, genocide as we know it is conceptually unthinkable. Not all episodes of genocide demonstrate the specific biomedical discourse which is apparent in the cases examined in this paper; neither does every episode which employs the discourse of modernity employ its techniques.203 But such discourse is a common factor in otherwise diverse episodes, and for this reason deserves deeper consideration than it has thus far been accorded.¶ This work has been intended to expose the features of biopolitical dehumanisation in genocide, both as a common factor and as an essential aspect of the process when it is present. In doing so I have attempted to weave together a number of seemingly disparate theoretical and historical threads to create a synthesis which allows this subject to be understood as a coherent and influential narrative of exclusion, rather than glimpsed in scattershot fashion.¶ The twentieth century is bookended by two of the cases I have examined (namely, genocides in Asia Minor, and in the former Yugoslavia). In Zimbabwe in 2005 President Robert Mugabe began a campaign to clear “slum” areas, ostensibly to crack down on illegal housing, and as an effort to prevent the spread of disease (it should be noted that the targeted sections of society form much of Zimbabwe's internal opposition). The campaign is named Operation Murambatsvina, Shona for “Drive Out Trash”. There is no reason, in other words, to think that the discourse I have examined has lost its power in the contemporary period. In societies and cultures which remain wedded to a particular convergence of cultural and social models provided by modernity – in which biopolitical language and imagery is available for use in a vocabulary of exclusion – the presence of this rhetoric in its typical manifestations should be viewed as a danger sign. In this work I have traced the way in which biopolitical dehumanisation in the modern era became a lethal self-fulfilling prophecy; but for as long as the discursive formations of any society provide this rhetoric as a viable manifestation of exclusory practice, biopolitical dehumanisation will continue to play an integral role as a mechanism of genocide.

As hierarchies evolve there is increased separation-this causes subjugation, exploitation, oppression, and eugenicsSavage 7, Rowan is a writer for the Journal of Historical Sociology (Rowan, September 25, 2007, ““Disease Incarnate”: Biopolitical Discourse and Genocidal Dehumanisation in the Age of Modernity” http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6443.2007.00315.x/full)nasokanThe new biological science, which created a hierarchical taxonomy of races, and of biological “worth”, provided such legitimisation. The consequences were different for different groups, but, for the most part, race science and eugenics justified the contemporary power dynamics of European-ruled society.42 The distribution of privilege as reflected in the domination of upper-class, educated white males over women and over the lower classes reflected the natural order; African peoples were “natural slaves”; and indigenous people of all varieties were doomed to extinction.43 Indeed, these latter two were closer to monkeys than to the white males standing at the apex of the pyramid.44 Samuel George Morton (1799–1851), a distinguished American scientist and physician, instituted the “science” of craniometry: “Morton set out to rank races by the average sizes of their brains”.45 Paul Broca (1824–1880), a French physician and anthropologist, continued this work, amassing huge amounts of anthropometrical data “demonstrating” natural racial hierarchy.46¶ These conceptions justified and legitimised subjugation, exploitation and oppression. At times, they also justified and legitimised extermination, as in the case of colonised peoples who stood in the way of “civilisation”. But they did not motivate it. Inferior groups had their place in the proper order of things. Some groups, however, had no useful role to play in the great march of human progress. Their presence, indeed, represented a direct threat to the competitiveness of the nation-state within which they were found, as well as a more generalised threat to the entire human race as such. The dangers of miscegenation (a term coined in 1863) were heralded by the leading scientists of the day, such as the naturalist Louis Agassiz, who argued that, for the nation, race mixing meant emasculation.47¶ Charles Darwin presented his revolutionary theory of evolution in 1859. Proponents of evolutionary ethics agreed that, in light of evolutionary theory, contemporary moral norms had to be re-examined. Willibald Hentschel voiced a common opinion when he wrote to a fellow eugenics enthusiast: “[t]hat which preserves health is moral. Everything that makes one sick or ugly is sin.”48 Darwin's theory summoned up a Nietzschean vision of perpetual struggle for existence, in which, moreover, the victor was advancing the cause of humanity through “the unsparing destruction of all degenerates and parasites”49: this concept could be summed up in the phrase “evolutionary progress as highest good”.¶ While England and the United States of America read Darwinism optimistically, as a justification for their laissez-faire free-market policies, Germany, a newly created nation which had come up short in the struggle for overseas colonies and which was torn by political struggle, stressed the need for state intervention to stop degeneration in the face of democracy and social welfare policies.50 In Germany, Darwinism came to mean the survival of the fittest race, rather than the survival of the fittest individual.51 One way to promote evolutionary progress was to engage in artificial selection: humans should make reproductive choices to further evolutionary progress. This perspective came to be known as eugenics.

XT Squo – Militarism

The status quo’s militaristic approach serves as a death trap – not as a deterrence factorHing, 06 - Bill Ong Hing is a Professor of Law at the University of San Francisco and Professor Emeritus, U.C. California, Davis School of Law (“Deporting Our Souls”, Oct. 16th, 2006, http://worldtracker.org/media/library/College%20Books/Cambridge%20University%20Press/0521864925.Cambridge.University.Press.Deporting.Our.Souls.Values.Morality.and.Immigration.Policy.Oct.2006.pdf)The fear-based strategies can become deadly. Beginning in 1994, the Clinton administration implemented Operation Gatekeeper, a strategy of “control through deterrence” that involved constructing fences and militarizing the parts of the southern border that were the most easily traversed. Instead of deterring migrants, their entry choices were shifted to treacherous terrain – the deserts and mountains. The number of entries and apprehensions were not at all decreased, and the number of deaths because of dehydration and sunstroke in the summer or freezing in the winter dramatically surged. In 1994, fewer than 30 migrants died along the border; by 1998, the number was 147; in 2001, 387 deaths were counted; and by2005, 451 died. The pattern continued in 2006.Given the risks, why do migrants continue the harrowing trek? The attraction of the United States is obvious. The strong economy pays Mexican workers, for example, eight to nine times more than what they can earn in Mexico. For many, it’s a matter of economic desperation, and some observers think that migrants would continue to come

even if we mined the border. In a sense, they do not have a choice . Besides, jobs are plentiful here, because a variety of industries rely on low-wage migrant workers. They may know the risks but figure that the risks are outweighed by the benefits of crossing. Motivations for continued migration call into question the likely effectiveness of the expansion of Operation Gatekeeper if the goal is to discourage bordercrossers. Beyond the economic situation in Mexico, a socioeconomic phenomenon is at play. The phenomenon is the long, historical travel patterns between Mexico and the United States, coupled with the interdependency of the two regions. Migration from Mexico is the manifestation of these economic problems and social phenomena. The militarization of the border does nothing to address these phenomena. Instead, it is killing individuals who are caught up in the phenomena. And yet we condone this enforcement strategy knowing that needless deaths will continue.

XT Squo – Dehum

Status quo framings of immigrants serves to dehumanize and bolster dominant ideologies-this could also be a great alt solvency card if read as a kritikCisneros, 08 - Dr. Josue David Cisneros is Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication Studies. His research and teaching interests focus mainly on rhetoric, or situated, public, and persuasive communication. Dr. Cisneros’ research focuses on the ways in which social and political identities are rhetorically constituted and contested in the public sphere, and he specializes in issues of citizenship, race/ethnicity, Latina/o identity, and immigration (“Contaminated Communities: The Metaphor of "Immigrant as Pollutant" in Media Representations of Immigration”, 2008 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.4.cisneros.html)Rhetorical theory and cognitive science teach us that metaphors are more than linguistic ornamentation; they are “significant rhetorical tools that affect political behavior and cognition.”4 Metaphors create conventional understandings by connecting phenomena with familiar cultural assumptions and experiences.5 Not only are they essential cognitive tools, but metaphors participate in creating fundamental understandings of texts and the rhetorical contexts in which they are situated.6 Metaphors are cultural indices with which “Americans build their commonplace understanding[s]” and attitudes.7 Scholars have mapped the historical metaphors used to talk about the immigration “problem” as a means to identify the underlying cultural assumptions of these representations. Mark Ellis and Richard Wright offer examples of metaphors that encapsulate different perspectives on the assimilation of immigrants into American society such as the “melting pot,” the “quilt,” the “kaleidoscope,” or the “salad bowl.” They describe how metaphors of immigration serve as conceptual tools with which scholars build research, society establishes group relationships, and government creates public policy: Metaphors] represent competing views, some more distinct than others, of the consequences of immigration, interethnic contact, and societal coherence. In using metaphors . . . we run the risk of being confined to particular ways of interpreting immigration and demographic trends. As they become entrenched in theoretical discourse, they influence how we formulate our hypotheses about the impacts of immigration and ethnic group behavior—about how different immigrant groups fit into U.S. society.8 As repositories of cultural understandings, metaphors are some of the principal tools with which dominant ideologies and prejudices are represented and reinforced. For example, as George Lakoff and Sam Ferguson note, the framing of immigration discourse in the terms of “illegal aliens,” “border security,” and “amnesty” “focuses entirely on the immigrants and the administrative agencies charged with overseeing immigration law.” This

framing is “NOT neutral” but “ dehumanizes” immigrants and “pre-empts” a consideration of “broader social and

economic concerns” (such as foreign economic policy and international human rights).9 The task, then, is to examine the ways in which conventional understandings of immigration are made concrete through metaphor. Examining these discursive representations can “unmask or demystify” dominant assumptions about immigrants, assumptions that can have potentially deleterious effects on social relations.10 Before discussing these contemporary metaphoric representations or their ideological implications, however, I review the extant literature on metaphors of immigration.

Fear politics create immoral policies - dehumanizes the OtherHing, 06 - Bill Ong Hing is a Professor of Law at the University of San Francisco and Professor Emeritus, U.C. California, Davis School of Law (“Deporting Our Souls”, Oct. 16th, 2006, http://worldtracker.org/media/library/College%20Books/Cambridge%20University%20Press/0521864925.Cambridge.University.Press.Deporting.Our.Souls.Values.Morality.and.Immigration.Policy.Oct.2006.pdf)The age of hysteria over immigration in which we live leads to tragic policies that challenge us as a moral society. Policies that are unnecessarily harsh – that show a dehumanizing side of our character – are senseless. They bring shame to us as a civil society. When I meet and speak with immigrants – documented and undocumented – I find decent, hardworking folks who have traveled to join relatives or to work, or, in the case of refugees, fled here seeking freedom. I find individuals who want to be Americans and who definitely want their children to be Americans. If we were in their shoes (in fact, many of our parents or grandparents were in their shoes), then I am confident that we would want to be treated with simple, human respect. In the chapters that follow, I set forth some of the major immigration issues that are up for debate and that likely will be debated for years to come. These are the issues related to undocumented immigration, the deportation of long-time residents, kinship versus employment-based immigration, national security, and

how and why we should be integrating new immigrants . In the process, my hope is that the venom toward

immigrants be put aside while the issues are considered. The debate over these issues provides our nation an opportunity to shed the cold side of our character and demonstrate the human values of which we are proud. I believe that the vast majority of Americans not only understand the value that immigrants bring to our shores but also believe that our energy is better spent following reasonable approaches that will not shame and embarrass us later. We will be better for doing so, and, with the right approach, we can invite newcomers to step forward and take on their American responsibilities as well.

Feminism Add On

The border acts as a symbol of masculinity through the practices of individuals and institutions – the border patrol’s male active gaze hunts feminized immigrants who await apprehensionSusan P. Mains, 2/11/08, Ph.D. in Geography, Chapter 7. Maintaining National Identity at the Border: Scale, Masculinity, and the Policing of Immigration in Southern California, Geographies of Power: Placing Scale, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470773406.ch7/summary, CBJust as space, representation, and identity are interrelated and bound together through an ongoing process of discipline and negoti ation, so too is scale. Scale is part of a discursive process that situates identities, people, and places as part of an overarching framework within which scale itself is also reconfigured. Scale is represented through the practices of individuals (a Border Patrol agent) and insti tutions (the INS), and is relational it changes meaning in different contexts.6 Hence, an exploration of the ways in which codes of gender, sexuality, and race are depicted and contested in relation to immigration illustrates the ways in which identity, representation, and scale are intricately interlinked. Thus, the nation and its protec tion are frequently situated within a patriarchal and heterosexual discourse of scale opposites working to reproduce unequal rela tions of power and community in which the imagined national community and its territory are feminized in popular representations and are represented as being in need of protection and guidance through masculinist institutions such as the federal government, the courts, and the Border Patrol. Such discourses of national identity throw up significant dichotomies around scale in that attention is often shifted towards monitoring individual female bodies many and-immigrant and white supremacist groups, for instance, have ex pressed concern that nonwhite immigrant women's higher fertility rates may lead them to out-reproduce the US-bom European-American population while masculinity becomes naturalized as an institu tional and national norm. Masculinity exists at a general scale and at the same time reproduces scale as a gendered trope. Discipline and masculinity become the representational and material modes through which scale, identity, and power are reinforced. The significance of the Border Patrol, then, is not simply that it is a visible presence at the border (and beyond) but that the process of defending and securing at the national scale "America" is inter woven with concepts of masculinity. Hence, concerns about US sov ereignty and Mexican immigration commonly draw upon notions of masculinity by making links between strong male agents on patrol, enforcing boundaries and national sovereignty, and the protection of a robust community (and underneath this a virile US political econ omy). The Border Patrol agent, therefore, is not only representative of the INS but is also a key gauge through which the strength, achieve ments, and vigilance of an "American" identity can be measured. Border Patrol agents attempt to protect US territory and morality from Mexican incursions, and rely on their individual efforts to ne gotiate constructions of masculinity. The Border Patrol is seen as being an active symbol both of the US government and of potential local and international threats to US territorial integrity and, hence, identity. Through this mode of scalar representation, masculinity is a nodal signifier for strength and the clear delineation and mainten ance of borders. Equally, recruitment materials for the Border Patrol highlight mas culinist concepts of rigor, opportunity, and physical challenge. One brochure, for instance, states: "It's the kind of job that will challenge you on every level physically as well as mentally. It's not a career for everybody." Indeed, as Patrol Agent Gloria

Chavez stated during an interview, this image of a physically and mentally strong individ ual, which relies upon traditional gender roles, means that for her and many other women "(ilt has been a challenge, being female, [which is the case) in general, in law enforcement. It requires a bit of extra effort. The agency has accepted women and we're being treated equally as men (because] it's the federal law and county law (but] a lot of male agents don't feel secure enough with you assisting them" (fieldnotes, San Diego, July 1998). Likewise, the endurance and dyna mism of potential agents are constantly emphasized in INS literature: "One of the most important activities of a Border Patrol Agent is line watch. This involves patrolling the areas along the US border, par ticularly between the US and Mexico. This is rigorous outdoor work, often in isolated areas and under extreme weather conditions" (US Border Patrol 1997). Similar to practices in mainstream Hollywood cinema examined by Mulvey (1989), the border, then, is depicted in a system of representation wherein the agents' gaze is a male active one hunting the feminized immigrants who await apprehension. Agents are part of the spectacle and sport of masculinity, but at the same time are given leeway to control the direction of the action.

The border reproduces the conflation of individual identity with national identity enabling the maintenance of hegemonic gender codes and systems of privilege – only an interrogation of the system of borders can solveSusan P. Mains, 2/11/08, Ph.D. in Geography, Chapter 7. Maintaining National Identity at the Border: Scale, Masculinity, and the Policing of Immigration in Southern California, Geographies of Power: Placing Scale, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470773406.ch7/summary, CBSignificantly, the reproduction of national identities (i.e., maintain- ing the United States's "American-ness") through individual agents' everyday practices and discipline is represented as part of a "team effort" for the greater good. This representation runs parallel to dis- courses of masculinity and nationalism found in mainstream media representations of sport in which concerns about national unity, the family, and heroism - concerns which function on a variety of scales — are, quite literally, played out on the sports held (and the border fence). As Kibby (1998: 24) explains in relation to the film Field of Dreams: While the film can be read in specifically American terms, for inter- national audiences it dealt with global concerns of failed fathering and declining patriarchal power. Field of Dreams, like the other revisionist sports films of the period, worked in tandem with Robert Bly's men's movement and vague projects of recapturing an archetypal masculinity through a recuperation of father-son relationships. |Thus, the) first two words spoken in Field of Dreams are "My father." Baseball is a meta- phor for traditional masculine values, for a time when sons conformed to the practices of their fathers, and one man's personal vision can restore the father in various symbolic representations. The willingness of Ray Kinsella to pursue his personal vision enables an erasure of eighties conflicts in lived masculinities, conflicts arising out of urban- ization, immigration, feminism, civil rights, and economic downturn. 1 would argue that the team spirit suggested in Border Patrol recruit- ment materials suggests a similar nostalgia for a form of identity, nation, and geography that is simplified (i.e., where there are clearly identifiable divisions between the national space of the United States and the national space of Mexico, rather than a hybridized mestizo "border region" which overlaps these spaces) and based on a re- presentation of an imagined "American" past, for, as Kibby (1998: 23) points out, "nostalgia... is a response to a fear of change, either actual or impending, it represents concern over, or denial of, the future." Such a

past landscape of authority and policing enables the main- tenance of hegemonic gender codes and facilitates continuation of existing systems of privilege. To call such codes into question necessarily requires an interrogation of the system through which individual, national, and international identities and borders are re- produced. As I have noted elsewhere (see Mains 2000), such a desire to reinforce the Border Patrol as guardians of the nation encourages a greater intensity of policing and aggressive surveillance that may also be seen as a response to the increasing visibility of immigrants in the US. Thus, as Andreas (2000: 142) notes in relation to immigra- tion policy: The narrative that dominates much of the official policy debate in the United States, for example, characterizes borders as under siege by clandestine transnational activities, with the smuggling of drugs and migrants drawing most of the attention. It is a nostalgic narrative: it assumes that borders once constituted effective shelter. For those who consider them now "out of control," the narrative provides a rallying cry to "regain control."

Poverty Add On

Open borders are key to solve global povertyWilcox, 9 (Shelley, Associate professor at San Francisco State University in the Philosophy department, “The Open Borders Debate on Immigration,” The Author Philosophy Compass 4/1 (2009), 1–9, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00230.x, San Francisco State University, Journal Compilation ª 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd http://online.sfsu.edu/swilcox/Swilcox/Shelleys_webpage_files/Wilcox,%20The%20Open%20Borders%20Debate%20on%20Immigration.pdf) A second line of response to the conventional view on immigration argues that liberal democratic societies are obligated to admit needy immigrants as a partial response to real world global injustices, such as poverty and human rights violation s . Proponents of this view contend that liberal states have far broader duties to admit immigrants than the conventional view acknowledges, without defending a right to freedom of international movement. I will discuss two such nonideal arguments. The first, the global poverty argument, contends that affluent states should maintain open borders because migration is an effective way of mitigating global poverty. This argument rests on two basic claims: (a) members of affluent societies have strong obligations to mitigate global poverty ; and (b) policies favoring open borders are an effective means for fulfilling these obligations, at least in many cases. Arguments for the first of these claims take two broad forms, depending on the general theoretical orientation of their advocates. The first conceptualizes the duty to mitigate global poverty as a humanitarian moral obligation . Proponents, such as Peter Singer, typically argue that individuals are obligated to alleviate severe poverty, regardless of the nationality or geographical location of those affected, provided they can do so without comparable sacrifice.15 Such philosophers usually attempt to establish that mitigating global poverty is a moral obligation, not simply an act of charity or supererogationas traditionally understood. The second type of argument maintains that affluent societies are obligated to transfer some of their wealth to poor societies based on principles of global distributive justice. Some proponents, such as Charles Beitz, attempt to establish that liberal egalitarian principles, particularly redistributive principles, should be applied at the global level.16 Others understand global redistributive obligations primarily as compensatory duties. For instance, Thomas Pogge argues that affluent societies are obligated to transfer some of their wealth to poorer societies because these affluent societies are at least partly responsible for that poverty.17 If these arguments are successful, they establish that members of affluent societies have strong obligations to mitigate global poverty. Many strategies for fulfilling these obligations have been offered, including direct transfers of material aid and the implementation of an international taxation scheme or a global resource dividend. However, some theorists argue that open

borders policies should serve as at least a partial alternative to these strategies . Frederick Whelan gives several reasons for favoring open borders over foreign aid.18 First, while traditional aid is frequently wasted through inefficient administration, spent on ill-conceived projects, or diverted by corrupt elites, opportunities for immigration would directly benefit those individuals who take advantage of them. Second, because open immigration is a collective response to global poverty, it would not place an unfair burden on some affluent individuals. Finally, unlike traditional aid, more open immigration policies would expand the

scope of human liberty as well as minimizing economic inequalities, and thus such policies are more consistent with the traditional commitments of liberalism.

Human Rights Add On

The US should open its borders- migration is a basic human rightWilcox, 9 (Shelley, Associate professor at San Francisco State University in the Philosophy department, “The Open Borders Debate on Immigration,” The Author Philosophy Compass 4/1 (2009), 1–9, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00230.x, San Francisco State University, Journal Compilation ª 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd http://online.sfsu.edu/swilcox/Swilcox/Shelleys_webpage_files/Wilcox,%20The%20Open%20Borders%20Debate%20on%20Immigration.pdf) Some liberal egalitarian thinkers, most notably Joseph Carens, have raised a broad challenge to the conventional view.6 In contrast to Walzer, they maintain that a consistent application of liberal principles implies not that liberal states have broad authority to regulate immigration, but rather that such states have a prima facie duty to maintain open borders. In his early work, Carens defends this view by arguing that the three main theoretical approaches to liberalism – utilitarianism, liberal egalitarianism, and libertarianism – all imply that liberal states should

maintain open borders .7 Of these approaches, Carens is most interested in Rawlsian liberal egalitarianism. According to his cosmopolitan reading of Rawls, parties in the original position are to choose principles of justice that apply globally rather than in the context of the nation-state. Carens argues that parties in this global original position would identify freedom of international movement as a basic liberty, possessed by all persons . He concludes that since freedom of international movement includes the right to immigrate to the country of one’s choice, liberal states have a prima facie duty to maintain open borders.8 More recently, Carens has developed two additional arguments in support of open borders.9 These arguments forego specifically Rawlsian concepts, drawing instead on general liberal egalitarian ideals. The first contends that the liberal commitment to freedom implies a basic human right to free international movement. The argument rests on an analogy between free mobility within a nation-state and free international mobility. Carens begins by acknowledging that free internal mobility is an important liberal freedom. Liberals believe that ‘people should be free to pursue their own projects and to make their own choices about how to live their lives so long as this does not interfere with the legitimate claims of other individuals to do likewise’ (‘Migration and Morality’ 26). Thus, since restrictions on internal movement would unjustly curtail such freedom, free internal mobility is widely recognized as a basic right of liberal citizenship. Carens then argues that the ability to move across state borders is an equally important freedom because , in his view, every reason an individual might have for moving within a country could also apply to moving across state borders. To name just a few: one might want a job; one might fall in love with someone from another country; one might belong to a religion that has few adherents in one’s native state and many in another; one may wish to pursue cultural opportunities that are only available in another land (‘Migration and Morality’ 28). It follows, Carens contends, that liberals should regard freedom of international movement as a basic human right. Moreover, he concludes, because this right includes a general right to immigrate, liberal states have a prima facie duty to maintain open borders. Carens’ second argument for open borders draws upon the liberal egalitarian ideals of moral equality and equal opportunity. At minimum, these ideas require that rights and desirable social positions be distributed on the basis of people’s capacities and talents, not according to unchosen, morally arbitrary characteristics, such as race and sex. However, Carens believes that citizenship is just

as morally arbitrary as these characteristics because people no more choose their parentage or place of birth than their sex or race. It follows, he argues, that citizenship status is not an appropriate basis for distributing rights and social positions. Yet immigration restrictions do just this: they prevent a group of people, foreign nationals, from accessing the rights and social positions available to citizens. Thus, since such citizenship-based exclusions are as morally offensive as other more widely recognized forms of discrimination, states should

maintain open borders . Carens believes that these arguments establish a strong presumption for open borders. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that certain limitations on immigration may sometimes be justified. Following Rawls, Carens maintains that liberties can justifiably be restricted for the sake of preserving the interests that they protect. It follows that limitations on particular liberties, including freedom of international movement, are legitimate if they are necessary to preserve important freedoms in the long-run. However, because such limitations involve overriding a basic right, they can be justified only by the strongest of reasons and only on the basis of rationales that are compatible with liberal egalitarian commitments. Carens suggests that states may legitimately limit immigration insofar as is necessary to maintain public order, ensure national security, and protect liberal institutions from erosion by immigrants with illiberal political values.10

Open borders are the most ethical choice for US border policy Pevnick, 2008 (Ryan, Ph.D. from the University of Virginia’s Department of Politics, Assistant Professor of Politics at NYU, fall 2008, “Chapter 3: Assessing the Case for Open Borders,” University of Virginia, http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9574/jobtalkpaper.pdf) It is perhaps difficult to imagine, but during the country’s early years a policy of nearly open borders prevailed. Immigrants were an important source of labor for a fast expanding country busy developing and pushing into frontier territory. The few immigration-related laws passed prior to the Civil War did little to restrict the flow of immigrants (pertaining instead to naturalization and record-keeping). Although almost a century has passed since the United States first developed a comprehensive immigration policy (as opposed to laws meant just to exclude particular racial or national groups), the idea of the U nited S tates as opening a golden door for the world’s tired and poor retains a foothold in political and popular discourse . Moreover, in arguments regarding the ethics of immigration policy, many analysts advocate open borders (Ackerman 1980, Carens 1987 and 1992, Cole 2000, Dummett 2001, Lomasky 2001, Pritchett 2006, Wall Street Journal 1984). As we saw in the Introduction, Joseph Carens insists that: The current restrictions on immigration in Western democracies —even in the most open ones like Canada and the United States—are not justifiable. Like feudal barriers to mobility, they protect unjust privilege…. What is not readily compatible with the idea of equal moral worth is the exclusion of those who want to join. (Carens 1987, 270) Likewise, Michael Dummett argues that: All states ought to recognize the normal principle to be that of open borders, allowing all freely to enter and, if they will, to settle in, any country that they wish. (Dummett 2001, 80) Positions of the sort advocated by 0Carens and Dummett are defended in three main ways. It is claimed that open borders are (i) a requirement of distributive justice, (ii) necessary to maximize overall productivity and (iii) required in order to protect individuals’ right to free movement.

Ethically superior by analogy to political refugeesJacob M Appel May 04, 2009 J.D. - Harvard, Instructor - Brown University

The Ethical Case for an Open Immigration Policy http://www.opposingviews.com/i/the-ethical-case-for-an-open-immigration-policy#As the issue of immigration returns to our national agenda, policy makers should remember that there is a third alternative to either deportation or amnesty for so-called “illegal” aliens: a return to the “open door” policy that built our nation. I do not have the professional expertise to speak to the economics of such an approach—although my personal intuition tells me that new immigrants will generate jobs rather than consume them—but the ethics of open borders are strikingly clear. Treating human beings differently, simply because they were born on the opposite side of a national boundary, is hard to justify under any mainstream philosophical, religious or ethical theory. That is not to say that all “birthrights” are unjust. For example, while being born into a particular family is the result of chance, the right to inherit some of one’s parents’ property serves useful and meaningful social purposes—such as encouraging mothers and fathers to work and save for their offspring. The “birthright” of nationality serves no such social purpose. In contrast, the freedom to travel and to settle where one wishes, in pursuit of political freedom or economic opportunity, is among the most basic of human rights. I am grateful that my grandfather was admitted to this country, fleeing Belgium in the days before World War II. I am horrified by the sealed borders that prevented boatloads other Jewish refugees from following him. From an ethical point of view, however, it is difficult to distinguish such political refugees—to whom we do grant asylum today—from the millions of economic refugees who seek freedom from abject poverty.The principal difference between the Irish peasants who once fled the potato blight on coffin ships, and the desperate Haitian rafters that our navy forcibly repatriates today, is bad timing.

Normal means limits don’t gut ethicsJacob M Appel May 04, 2009 J.D. - Harvard, Instructor - Brown UniversityThe Ethical Case for an Open Immigration Policy http://www.opposingviews.com/i/the-ethical-case-for-an-open-immigration-policy#Any reasonable “open door” immigration policy should still exclude those who pose a danger to our current citizenry: would-be terrorists, wanted felons, tuberculosis patients unwilling to accept treatment, etc. From an ethical standpoint, a liberal democracy might also restrict immigration should newcomers threaten to use the political process to dismantle existing freedoms—if, for example, ten million advocates of Taliban-style fundamentalism were to demand entrance into Luxembourg. Considering the size and diversity of our nation, any meaningful threat to American democracy from immigrants seems highly far-fetched.

Open Borders AFF – HSS – 2AC

2AC T/Framework1. We meet -

a. The advocacy is a competitive policy solution

b. Imagining is a form of fiat – YOU GET TO READ DISADS TO ENACTING & IMPLEMENTING THE PLAN, but you have to prove they supersede our ethics arguments – also, any imagination must reset both attitudinal and structural inherency in the USFG – it’s the NEG’s burden to prove a link

c. More evidence - the judge uses fiat as a method of imagination –if we prove that our imagination is net-better than the status quo imagination, the AFF should win

Mancuso and Shors, 93 – ex-debate coaches @ University of Michigan (“The Critique: Skreaming Without Raising Its Voice”, 1993, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/ShorsMancuso1993.htm)"Fiat" is a meaningless construct. Affirmative plans are never really implemented, and voting for a plan to gain an advantage is illogical. After all, why vote affirmative if nothing really changes? By implication, therefore, the Critique theory maintains that given that plans are never implemented, it is useless to discuss the benefits of what would happen were plans really to be implemented. (2) Debates should instead be focused on rejecting ideas which unwittingly uphold questionable institutions, language, ideology, or worldviews. What perhaps most distances the Critique from other debate arguments is its refusal to consider the alternative to that which is being critiqued. For the Critique advocate, the job of the debater is to reject, not to embrace. The first claim made by Critique advocates is (pardon the pun) not a unique one, in that no policy debate advocate believes that by

voting affirmative he/she actually changes the world. Policy debate advocates simply view "Fiat" as imagining their policy in existence, to obviate the need to consider whether or not their policy would be done.

2. Counter-interpretation – Evaluate the affirmative imaginary apart in opposition to the SQ imaginary, instead of through the lens of the SQ imaginary. Constitutional quibbles with the Voting Rights Act enforcement formulas do not refute MLK’s dream. Offense that defends the SQ imaginary from the plan imaginary is relevant, but offense showing the plan is politically infeasible under the SQ imaginary is not. All arguments below are reasons to prefer.

3. Very few of us will become policymakers – however, we all have positions as social critics – voting AFF advocates for a social hope for real world change

McGee et al, 97 - Professor and Department Chair at College of Charleston Associate Professor and Department chair at Spalding University Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at Texas Tech University (“Policy Debate as Fiction: In Defense of Utopian Fiat”, 1997, http://www.cedadebate.org/cad/index.php/CAD/article/view/214/198)Snider argued several years ago that a suitable paradigm should address "something we can ACTUALLY DO as opposed to something we can MAKE BELIEVE ABOUT" ("Fantasy as

Reality" 14). A utopian literature metaphor is beneficial precisely because it is within the power of debaters to perform the desired action suggested by the metaphor, if not always to demonstrate that the desired action is politically feasible. Instead of debaters playing to an audience of those who make public policy, debaters should understand themselves as budding social critics in search of an optimal practical and cultural politics. While few of us will ever hold a formal policy-making position , nearly all of us grow up with the social and political criticism of the newspaper editorial page, the high school civics class, and, at least in homes that do not ban the juxtaposition of food and politics, the lively dinner table conversation. We complain about high income taxes, declining state subsidies for public education, and crumbling interstate highways. We worry about the rising cost of health care and wonder if we will have access to high-quality medical assistance when we need it. Finally, we bemoan the decline of moral consensus, rising rates of divorce, drug use among high school students, and disturbing numbers of pregnant teen-agers. From childhood on, we are told that good citizenship demands that we educate ourselves on political matters and vote to protect the polis; the success of democracy allegedly demands no less. For those who accept this challenge instead of embracing the political alienation of Generation X and becoming devotees of Beavis and Railhead, social criticism is what good citizens do. Debate differs from other species of social criticism because

debate is a game played by students who want to win. However, conceiving of debate as a kind of social criticism has considerable merit . Social criticism is not restricted to a technocratic elite or group of elected officials. Moreover, social criticism is not necessarily idle or wholly &constructive. Instead,

such criticism necessarily is a prerequisite to any effort to create policy change , whether that

criticism is articulated by an elected official or by a mother of six whose primary workplace is the home. When one challenges the status quo, one normally implies that a better alternative course of action exists. Given that intercollegiate debate frequently involves exchanges over a proposition of policy by student advocates who are relatively unlikely ever to debate before Congress, envisioning intercollegiate debate as a specialized extension of ordinary citizen inquiry and advocacy in the public sphere seems attractive. Thinking of debate as a variety of social criticism gives debate an added dimension of public relevance.

4. Should indicates “desirability” – that’s OED,11 (http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/should?region=us) Implementation hypothetical begs should-would questions – the affirmative isn’t responsive for intervening actors

Joseph H. Carens 2013 Prof of Political Science of the University of Toronto http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__academics__colloquia__legal_political_and_social_philosophy/documents/documents/ecm_pro_069497.pdf The Ethics of ImmigrationChapter 10 The Case for Open Borders (Book forthcoming – Jan 2014)In this chapter and the next, I will conduct the analysis at the level of ideal theory, asking only what justice requires in principle. For the purposes of that discussion, I will set aside worries about the second order question or what to do if some people or some states are unwilling to do what justice requires, focusing instead on the first order question of what justice does require. At the same time, I will not define the parameters of the inquiry so narrowly as to eliminate the basic questions that animate the debate over closure. So, for example, I will discuss the role that national security can play in justifying restrictions on immigration (rather than assume that there would be no national security problems in a world in which everyone acts justly) because national security is widely seen as one of the most important reasons why states may legitimately restrict entry. On the other hand, I will not spend time discussing the question of whether one state should open its borders if others refuse to do so because the most important question of principle is whether democratic states should generally be open, not how some who seek to act justly should respond to the moral failures of others. In practice, as I have already acknowledged, no affluent democratic state in the contemporary world will open its

borders. So, we are unlikely to gain much insight into practical matters of policymaking by working through a hypothetical question about how one imaginary democratic state should behave if its leaders (and population) were persuaded by my arguments about what justice requires with respect to open borders. 1 I do not mean to suggest that my discussion of principles has no implications for action, however. I will explore these implications in the final chapter.

5. Resolved is to “reduce by mental analysis”, that’s Random House, 11 (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolve) - resolving the moral question of the aff is critical to avoid legitimizing feudal slavery

Joseph H. Carens 2013 Prof of Political Science of the University of Toronto http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__academics__colloquia__legal_political_and_social_philosophy/documents/documents/ecm_pro_069497.pdf The Ethics of ImmigrationChapter 10 The Case for Open Borders (Book forthcoming – Jan 2014)Chapter 10 The Case for Open Borders (Book forthcoming – Jan 2014)Why make an argument that we should open our borders when there is no chance that we will? Because it is important to gain a critical perspective on the ways in which collective choices are constrained, even if we cannot do much to alter those constraints. Social institutions and practices may be deeply unjust and yet so firmly established that, for all practical purposes, they must be taken as background givens in deciding how to act in the world at a particular moment in time. The feudal system, whose injustice I have presupposed above, was once deeply entrenched. So was the institution of slavery in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For a long time, there was no real hope of transcending those arrangements. Yet criticism was still appropriate. Even if we must take deeply rooted social arrangements as givens for purposes of immediate action in a particular context, we should never forget about our assessment of their fundamental character. Otherwise we wind up legitimating what should only be endured.

6. USFG

a. Means the peopleHoward, 2005 (Adam, “Jeffersonian Democracy: Of the People, By the People, For the People,” http://www.byzantinecommunications.com/adamhoward/homework/highschool/jeffersonian.html, 5/27)Ideally, then, under Jeffersonian Democracy, the government is the people , and people is the government . Therefore, if a particular government ceases to work for the good of the people, the people may and ought to change that government or replace it . Governments are established to protect the people's rights using the power they get from the people.

b. Treating USFG as legit validates the affJoseph H. Carens 2013 Prof of Political Science of the University of Toronto http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__academics__colloquia__legal_political_and_social_philosophy/documents/documents/ecm_pro_069497.pdf The Ethics of ImmigrationChapter 10 The Case for Open Borders (Book forthcoming – Jan 2014)Now let me outline the positive case for open borders. I start from three basic interrelated assumptions. First, there is no natural social order. The institutions and practices that govern human beings are ones that human beings have created and can change, at least in principle. Second, in evaluating the moral status of alternative forms of political and social organization, we must start from the premise that all human beings are of equal moral worth. Third, restrictions on the freedom of human beings require a moral justification. These three assumptions are not just my views. They undergird the claim to moral legitimacy of every contemporary democratic regime. The assumption that all human beings are of equal moral worth does not mean that no legal distinctions can be drawn among different groups of people, nor does the requirement that restrictions on freedom be justified mean that coercion is never defensible. But these two assumptions, together with

the assumption that the social order is not naturally given, mean that we have to give reasons for our institutions and practices, reasons that take a certain form. It is never enough to justify a set of social arrangements governing human beings to say that these arrangements are good for us, without regard for others, whoever the “us” maybe. We

have to appeal to principles and arguments that take everyone’s interests in to account or that explain why the social arrangements are reasonable and fair to everyone who is subject to them.

7. The NEG’s appeals to predictability is a conservative strategy in order to maintain status quo power relations which destroys students’ abilities to think critically

Delgado, 92 Richard Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D, University of California at Berkeley, 1992 “ESSAY SHADOWBOXING: AN ESSAY ON POWER”, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 813, Lexis)

It is important to know when we are being gulled, manipulated, and duped. n1 It is even

more important to know when we are unwittingly doing this to ourselves -- when we are using shopworn legal scripts and counterscripts, going around endlessly in circles, getting nowhere. n2 Understanding how we use predictable arguments to rebut other predictable arguments in a predictable sequence -- "The plaintiff should have the freedom to do X," "No -- the defendant should have the security not to have X done to her"; "The law should be flexible, permitting us to do justice in particular cases," "No -- the law must be determinate; only bright-line rules are administrable and safe" n3 -- frees us to focus on real-

world questions that do matter. We can begin to see how the actions we take as lawyers, law students,

and legal scholars advance or retard principles we hold dear. n4 We can see where the scripts come from and, perhaps, how to write new and better ones. <Continues…>

Underlying these stylized debates about subjective versus objective standards is a well-hidden issue of cultural power, one neatly concealed by elaborate arguments that predictably invoke predictable "principle." n25 These arguments invite us to take sides for or against abstract values that lie on either side of a well-worn analytical divide, having remarkably little to do with what is at stake. The arguments mystify and sidetrack, rendering us helpless in the face of powerful repeat players like

corporations, human experimenters, action-loving surgeons, and sexually aggressive men. n26 How does this happen? Notice that in

many cases it is the stronger party -- the tobacco company, surgeon, or male date -- that wants to apply an objective standard to a key event. n27 The doctor wants the law to require disclosure only of the risks and benefits the average patient would find material. n28 The male partygoer wants the law to ignore the woman's subjective thoughts in favor of

her outward manifestations. n29 The tobacco company wants the warning on the package to be a stopper. Generally, the law complies. What explains the stronger party's preference for an objective approach, and the other's demand for a more personalized one? It is not that one approach is more principled, more just, or even more [*818] likely to produce a certain result than the other. Rather, in my

opinion, the answer lies in issues of power and culture. It is now almost a commonplace that we construct the social world. n30 We do this through stories, narratives, myths, and

symbols -- by using tools that create images, categories, and pictures. n31 Over time, through repetition, the dominant stories seem to become true and natural, and are accepted as "the way things are." n32 Recently, outsider jurisprudence n33 has been developing means, principally " counterstorytelling ," to displace or overturn these comfortable majoritarian myths and narratives . n34 A well-told counterstory can jar or displace the dominant account. n35 The debate on objective and subjective standards touches on these issues of world-making and the social construction of reality. Powerful actors, such as tobacco companies and

male dates, want objective standards applied to them simply because these standards always, and already, reflect them and their culture . These actors have been in power; their subjectivity long ago was deemed "objective" and imposed on the world. n36 Now their ideas about meaning, action, and fairness are built into our culture , into our view

of malefemale, doctor-patient, and manufacturer-consumer relations. n37 <continues> I began by observing that law-talk can lull and gull us, tricking us into thinking that categories like objective and subjective, and the stylized debates that swirl about them, really count when in fact they either collapse or appear trivial when viewed from the perspective of cultural power. If we allow ourselves to believe that these categories do matter, we

can easily expend too much energy replicating predictable, scripted arguments -- and in this way, the law turns once- progressive people into harmless technocrats . n70

8. We link turn education – imagination reinforces deeper engagement and understanding

Heath, 08 - Gregory Heath is a British poet, short story writer and novelist (“Exploring the Imagination to Establish Frameworks for Learning”, Jan. 18th, 2008, http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11217-007-9094-7.pdf)The account of the imagination that as been mapped out in this paper provides a pathway to understanding the transformative quality of learning. It is that quality of learning with which we are familiar that leads us to see the familiar in new and previously unimagined ways. At the same time, it is the quality that transforms the learner to have an expanded capacity for new dimensions of experience. We might say that it is the capacity to become a new person through the imaginative learning process. Good teachers at all levels already appreciate this dimension of learning and imbed it in their practice. The purpose of this paper has been to provide an account of how this personal transformation is possible. Both the inventive and the radical imagination are important to learning. But, as has been argued, the radical imagination gives a new dimension to understanding the importance of the imagination for learning. It is the account of the radical imagination, as amplified through the discussion of Husserl and Wittgenstein, which leads to an account of how learning can be a transformation of the learner. Radical imagination transforms not just the person’s experience but their state of being as an ‘‘experiencer’’ . It is not just the content of experience that is changed but the whole quality of experience, and possibly of understanding and feeling as well. It is that quality of learning that transforms not just knowledge but the knower. The implications for teaching reinforce many of the familiar paradigms that stress the importance of constructing new worlds of experience for the students, such as mentoring and learning by experience which allows for large measures of self-directed activity. But also the radical imagination offers the potential to use new forms of learning and teaching aimed in an open ended way at personal growth and transformation. The window is open not just to the epistemological but to the ontological dimensions of learning. As such it becomes important to ‘‘think with’’, and ‘‘think beyond’’ the teacher and to move from ‘‘seeing as’’ to ‘‘being as’’. In this sense Maxine Greene is correct in emphasising the importance of releasing the imagination and, for instance not just ‘‘promoting’’ or stimulating the imagination. What this paper has attempted to do is to put an ontological underpinning to an account of how the imagination might be released.

9. Their fairness standard justifies voting affJoseph H. Carens 2013 Prof of Political Science of the University of Toronto http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__academics__colloquia__legal_political_and_social_philosophy/documents/documents/ecm_pro_069497.pdf The Ethics of ImmigrationChapter 10 The Case for Open Borders (Book forthcoming – Jan 2014)In many ways, I agree with this line of argument. I agree, for example, that reducing international inequalities and, especially, eliminating extreme poverty, are more urgent and more fundamental moral tasks than opening borders. Of course, not everyone shares this view of global justice. In the next chapter, I will also consider the argument that the obligations that any political community has to outsiders are much more limited than this account of global justice or my own argument for open borders maintains. For the moment, however, let’s proceed on the assumption that this egalitarian view of global justice has merit (as I think is indeed the case). As I have explained above, I am concerned in this chapter, primarily with questions of fundamental principle rather than questions about strategies for action. At the level of principle, there is no conflict between open borders and a view of global distributive justice that requires great reductions in the inequalities between states. On the contrary, these ideals fit well together. Significant reductions in the inequalities between states would transform open borders from a critical but unrealisable ideal into a feasible arrangement, precisely because reducing inequality would reduce the pressure to move and eliminate fears of open borders creating vast dislocations. 21 Free movement ought therefore to be seen as part of global distributive justice. It would be an important institutional feature of a just world. In the last chapter, I will argue that, even as a practical matter, trying to open borders as much as possible, within certain normative constraints, will generally contribute to, rather than impede, efforts to promote global justice in the contemporary world. For the moment, however, let’s stick to questions of principle. Those who would dismiss the importance of open borders because of its secondary importance for the task of reducing international inequalities miss two important points at the level of principle. First, the argument for open borders makes a crucial contribution to the critique of international

inequality because it makes it harder for rich states to claim that they bear no responsibility for the persistence of inequality and the plight of the poor. Second, in a context of international inequality, freedom of movement is an important moral goal because of its contribution to equality of opportunity, quite apart from its effects on the overall level of inequality. Consider first what one might call the heuristic function of the open borders argument, i.e., the way it brings home to us our own complicity in the maintenance of global inequality and poverty. The current division between rich and poor states can persist in its current form only because the rich states feel entitled to restrict the entry of people from poor states. Restrictions on migration are a linchpin of the modern state system. They enable it to function despite these vast inequalities. People disagree about the causes of global poverty and inequality and about the viability of alternative ways of addressing these problems. How can we be sure that money spent on development will be well spent rather than wasted, that it will help poor people rather than line the pockets of corrupt elites, that it will improve conditions rather than make things worse? And to what extent are we really responsible, either causally or morally, for the difficulties people elsewhere face? Questions of this sort are sometimes self-serving rationalizations for avoiding constructive action, but not always. There are serious critics of almost every approach to development and genuine disagreement about the causes of, and moral responsibility for, inequalities. 22 In the context of this dispute over the causes of and cures for global inequality, arguing for open borders draws attention to the fact that at least some of the people who are poor remain poor because we will not let them in. We use coercion every day to prevent people from achieving a better life. We cannot evade our responsibility for that. 23 We know how to admit immigrants. Despite occasional political rhetoric that the boat is full, no democratic state in Europe or North America can pretend that it could not take in many, many more immigrants than it does now without collapsing or even suffering serious damage. 24 Opening borders might not be the best way to address these problems, but the open borders argument takes away any justification for complacency and inaction. What about the possibility that free movement will increase international inequality rather than reduce it? That is an important question that usually focuses on the claim that letting talented, and especially well educated, people move from poor states to rich ones harms the efforts of poor states to develop themselves (the so-called ‘brain drain’ argument). I have already touched on this argument in chapter eight and will return to it again in the final chapter. Let me just say here that it would not be plausible to suggest that rich states are keeping their borders closed to help poor states or that closure is the best form of assistance. Second, even if free movement did little or nothing to reduce overall inequality (though I think that is implausible), it would still be an important moral goal. To return to my initial analogy, defenders of feudalism could plausibly have argued (and indeed some did) that opening careers to talents would do nothing to benefit most peasants. Vast social inequalities persisted after the end of feudalism, but that did not make the abolition of feudal birthright privileges morally unimportant. This change made positions in social hierarchies less dependent on the social circumstances of a person’s birth and more dependent on the individual’s personal capacities and efforts. 25 Ending the formal barriers to equality of opportunity created by restrictions on immigration

would not a cure-all either, but it would clearly contribute to global equality of opportunity and so would be a significant moral advance over an arrangement like the current one that generates such barriers.

10. Lit and rez checks abuse – immigration and the border are core issues and discussed

11. Reasonability first – no objective measure to decide policy debates – don’t vote us down because we set a different model

2AC DA FrontlinePlan focus first – focusing on the nuts and bolts causes co-option

Actualization is not the standard—the point of the AFF is to imagine potentiality. Focusing debate around the effects of the proposal is the worst possible engagementLewis, 12 – PhD., University of California at Los Angeles (“The Architecture of Potentiality: Weak Utopianism and Educational Space in the Work of Giorgio Agamben”, July 2012, Vol. 23, No. 2, http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-312617982/the-architecture-of-potentiality-weak-utopianism#articleDetails)Italian critical theorist Giorgio Agamben is well known for his rigorous attempts to redefine political, aesthetic, and theological concepts through messianic categories. For Agamben, the messianic is not concerned with perpetual waiting for a savior to come and redeem the world. Rather, it concerns the radically open potentiality for action within the contemporary moment. While the temporality of the messianic moment has been emphasized both by Agamben and by the vast secondary literature that has provided ample reflections on his body of work, the important concept of messianic space has not been given equal treatment. Space and time must be thought together if we are to appreciate the unique qualities of Agamben's notion of utopianism. For critics such as Dominik LaCapra, Agamben's political and social theories have been rejected precisely because they embody an "ecstatic, anarchistic utopia that remains terra incognita and whose relevance to present problems or commitments is left utterly blank" (2007, 155). At the same time, supporters such as Carlo Salzani argue that Agamben's theory of the coming community and his emphasis on "a messianic notion of politics, which renounces representation and upsets the temporality of political imaginary" (2012, 214), are decisively anti-utopian. For Salzani, Agamben undermines the very idea of the utopian imagination, which is predicated on the construction of images of the future. In this essay, I will argue that both LaCapra and Salzani fail to properly understand the relationship between messianic space and time and utopia. The spatial and temporal dimensions of messianic utopianism are not so much about positing a model for a future perfection (as with many classical

utopias). Nor are they about revealing the inherent, ideological limitations of our imagination to think utopianism (as Jameson [2005] argues). Rather than utopian or antiutopian, I suggest a third category, an impossible suture between the two. Key to this impossible suture is what I will refer to as weak utopianism. As opposed to Keith Booker's reading of weak utopianism as a mode of "anti-utopianism" (2002, 29), I suggest that it is a form of utopian thought informed by messianic temporality and spatiality that is situated between everyday chronology and the end of time. In this sense, Agamben's utopianism is, like pensiero debole as such, a weak thought, or a utopianism as not utopianism. If strong utopianism builds blueprints in order to actualize or concretize the potentiality of the utopian imagination, then weak utopianism resists constructing such blueprints in order to live within the potentiality of the present. The notion of weak utopianism that I will develop throughout this article is, importantly, connected directly with the question of education. For Agamben, the action that, more than any other, represents the messianic moment is the act of studying, or studious play. The temporality of weak utopianism is not simply the messianic time of the now but also the temporality of perpetual study, where the student holds judgment in suspension in order to experience the potentiality of thought itself without destination or determination. Likewise the space of weak utopianism can be thought of as an educational space--a space wherein thought experiences itself as a pure means. Messianic space is a clearing that offers the slightest of adjustments within the cartography of the present through which thought as thought can appear. In conclusion, I will illustrate the educational importance of weak utopianism through an example taken from school architecture. This example is not simply an illustration of how weak utopianism can be applied to education but should be read as exemplifying the educational space and time of weak utopianism as such. Here utopianism does not result in an image of the future but, rather, in the decompletion of the present in the name of a potential freedom. Weak Utopianism and the Messianic Weak utopianism is the experience of the potentiality of utopianism without the command to make this utopianism a determinate, materialized form or shape. As such, Agamben's rethinking of the messianic provides the most immediate education in human potentiality that is available. From De Anima, Agamben argues that Aristotle enables us to think two kinds of potential: generic and effective. A generic

conceptualization of potentiality explains how a child is able to grow up to be a particular type of person with a particular occupation (a statesman, for example). Through education, the child suffers an "alteration (a becoming other) through learning" (Agamben 1999, 179), where "the passage from the act implies an exhaustion and destruction of potential" (Agamben 2005b, 136). In terms of educational renewal, the student must suffer an alteration that

destroys the not yet in order to fully actualize a latent potentiality. Yet to fully actualize potentiality is to destroy it. In this schema , potentiality becomes subordinate to actuality --it is in some senses what makes the actual possible but also what

must be eliminated in order for the passage to the act to be complete. Potentiality is sacrificed in the process of actualizing generic potentiality.

Deontological principles first – other interpretations are assigned no moral value trumping policy success and bolstering our impactsFreeman 94 – Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D. Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, “Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the Priority of Right,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)The priority of right asserts then that the reasons supplied by moral motives-principles of right and their institutional requirements-have absolute precedence over all other considerations. As such, moral motives must occupy a separate dimension in practical reasoning. Suppose then a supplementary stage of practical reasoning, where the interests and pursuits that figure into ordinary deliberation and which define our conception of the good are checked against principles of right and justice. At this stage of reasoning, any ends that directly conflict with these moral principles (e.g., racist ends or the wish to dominate others), or whose pursuit would undermine the efficacy of principles of right (e.g., desires for unlimited accumulation of wealth whatever the consequences for others), are assigned no moral value, no matter how intensely felt or important they may otherwise be. Being without moral value, they count for nothing in deliberation. Consequently, their pursuit is prohibited or curtailed by the priority given to principles of right. The priority of right then describes the hierarchical subordination in practical deliberation of the desires, interests, and plans that define a person's rational good, to the substantive demands of principles of right.32 Purposes and pursuits that are incompatible with these principles must be abandoned or revised. The same idea carries through to social and political deliberations on the general good. In political deliberative procedures, the priority of right means that desires and interests of individuals or groups that conflict with the institutional requirements of principles of right and justice have no legitimate claim to satisfaction, no matter how intense peoples' feelings or how large the majority sharing these aims. Constitutional restrictions on majority rule exhibit the priority of right. In democratic procedures, majorities cannot violate constitutional rights and procedures to promote, say, the Christian religion, or any other aspect of their good that undermines others' basic rights and opportunities. Similarly, the institutional requirements of Rawls's difference principle limit, for example, property owners' desires for tax exemptions for capital gains, and the just savings principle limits current majorities' wishes to deplete natural resources. These desires are curtailed in political contexts, no matter how intense or widely held, because of the priority of principles of right over individual and general good.33 The priority of right enables Rawls to define a notion of admissible conceptions of the good: of those desires, interests and plans of life that may legitimately be pursued for political purposes. Only admissible conceptions of the good establish a basis for legitimate claims in political procedures (cf. TJ, p. 449). That certain desires and pursuits are permissible, and political claims based on them are legitimate, while others are not, presupposes antecedently established principles of right and justice . Racist conceptions of the good are not politically admissible; actions done in their pursuit are either prohibited or discouraged by a just social scheme, and they provide no basis for legitimate claims in political procedures. Excellences such as knowledge, creativity, and aesthetic contemplation are permissible ends for individuals so long as they are pursued in accordance with the constraints of principles of right. Suppose these perfectionist principles state intrinsic values that it is the duty of everyone to pursue. (Rawls leaves this question open. cf. TJ, p. 328.) Still, they cannot supply a basis for legitimate political claims and expectations; they cannot be appealed to in political contexts to justify limiting others' freedom, or even the coercive redistribution of income and wealth (cf. TJ, pp. 331-32). This is because of the priority of right over the good. Now return to Kymlicka's argument. Kymlicka says both Rawls and utilitarians agree on the premise of giving equal consideration to everyone's interests, and that because utilitarians afford equal consideration, "they must recognize, rather than deny, that individuals are distinct persons with their own rightful claims. That is, in Rawls's classification, a position that affirms the priority of the right over the good" (LCC, p. 26). Since "Rawls treats the right as a spelling-out of the requirement that each person's good be given equal consideration," there is no debate between Rawls and utilitarians over the priority of the right or the good (LCC, p. 40).

Our moral standards outweigh the dystopian possibility of nuclear war - the utility of a society only has value when its individuals are treated with dignity. A free society that sacrifices some of its own individuals to prevent human extinction is morally corrupt.Shue 89 – Professor of Ethics and Public Life, Princeton University (Henry, “Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint, pp. 141-2)Given the philosophical obstacles to resolving moral disputes, there are at least two approaches one can take in dealing with the issue of the morality of nuclear strategy. One approach is to stick doggedly with one of the established moral theories constructed by philosophers to “rationalize” or “make sense of” everyday moral intuitions, and to accept the verdict of the theory, whatever it might be, on the morality of nuclear weapons use. A more pragmatic alternative approach assumes that trade-offs in moral values and principles are inevitable in response to constantly changing threats, and that the emergence of novel, unforeseen challenges may impel citizens of Western societies to adjust the way they rank their values and principles to ensure that the moral order survives. Nuclear weapons are putting just such a strain on our moral beliefs. Before the emergence of a nuclear-armed communist state capable of threatening the existence of Western civilization, the slaughter of millions of innocent human beings to preserve Western values may have appeared wholly unjustifiable under any possible circumstances. Today, however, it may be that Western democracies, if they are to survive as guardians of individual freedom, can no longer afford to provide innocent life the full protection demanded by Just War morality. It might be objected that the freedoms of Western society have value only on the assumption that human beings are treated with the full dignity and respect assumed by Just War theory. Innocent human life is not just another value to be balanced side by side with others in moral calculations. It is the raison d’etre of Western political, economic, and social institutions. A free society based on individual rights that sanctioned mass slaughter of innocent human beings to save itself from extinction would be “morally corrupt,” no better than soviet society, and not worth defending. The only morally right and respectable policy for such a society would be to accept destruction at the hands of tyranny, if need be. This objection is partly right in that a society based on individual rights that casually sacrifices innocent human lives for the sake of common social goods is a contradiction in terms. On the other hand, even Just War doctrine allows for the unintentional sacrifice of some innocent human life under certain hard-pressing circumstances. It is essentially a consequentialist moral doctrine that ascribes extremely high – but not absolute – value to innocent human life. The problem for any nonabsolute moral theory, of course, is where to draw the line.

Utilitarianism promotes inequity and inherently Otherizes against minorities - slavery Odell, 04 – University of Illinois is an Associate Professor of Philosophy (Jack, Ph.D., “On Consequentialist Ethics,” Wadsworth, Thomson Learning, Inc., pp. 98-103)A classic objection to both act and rule utilitarianism has to do with inequity, and is related to the kind of objection raised by Rawls, which I will consider shortly. Suppose we have two fathers-Andy and Bob. Suppose further that they are alike in all relevant respects, both have three children, make the same salary, have the same living expenses, put aside the same amount in savings, and have left over each week fifteen dollars. Suppose that every week Andy and Bob ask themselves what they are going to do with this extra money, and Andy decides anew each week (AU) to divide it equally among his three children, or he makes a decision to always follow the rule (RU) that each child should receive an equal percentage of the total allowance money. Suppose further that each of his children receive five degrees of pleasure from this and no pain. Suppose on the other hand, that Bob, who strongly favors his oldest son, Bobby, decides anew each week (AU) to give all of the allowance money to Bobby, and nothing to the other two, and that he instructs Bobby not to tell the others, or he makes a decision to follow the rule (RU) to always give the total sum to Bobby. Suppose also that Bobby gets IS units of pleasure from his allowance and that his unsuspecting siblings feel no pain. The end result of the actions of both fathers is the same-IS units of pleasure. Most, if not all, of us would agree that although Andy's conduct is exemplary, Bob's is culpable. Nevertheless, according to both AU and RU the fathers in question are morally equal. Neither father is more or less exemplary or culpable than the other. I will refer to the objection implicit in this kind of example as (H) and state it as: ' (H) Both act and rule utilitarianism violate the principle of just distribution. What Rawls does is to elaborate objection (H). Utilitarianism, according to Rawls, fails to appreciate the importance of distributive justice, and that by doing so it makes a mockery of the concept of "justice ." As I pointed out when I discussed Russell's views regarding partial goods, satisfying the interests of a majority of a given population while at the same time thwarting the interests of the minority segment of that same population (as occurs in societies that allow slavery) can maximize the general good, and do so even though the minority group may have to suffer great cruelties.

Rawls argues that the utilitarian commitment to maximize the good in the world is due to its failure to ''take seriously the distinction between persons."· One person can be forced to give up far too much to insure the maximization of the good, or the total aggregate satisfaction, as was the case for those young Aztec women chosen by their society each year to be sacrificed to the Gods for the welfare of the group.

2AC No Imagine CP FrontlineCP doesn’t solve and imagination discourse is key

a. Method – the only way to challenge SQ Otherization is through a thought process of imagination – it allows for a short circuit to deconstruct the soverign-esque ideology within self-agency – that’s Klahn

More evidence - Status quo framings of immigrants serves to dehumanize and bolster dominant ideologiesCisneros, 08 - Dr. Josue David Cisneros is Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication Studies. His research and teaching interests focus mainly on rhetoric, or situated, public, and persuasive communication. Dr. Cisneros’ research focuses on the ways in which social and political identities are rhetorically constituted and contested in the public sphere, and he specializes in issues of citizenship, race/ethnicity, Latina/o identity, and immigration (“Contaminated Communities: The Metaphor of "Immigrant as Pollutant" in Media Representations of Immigration”, 2008 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.4.cisneros.html)Rhetorical theory and cognitive science teach us that metaphors are more than linguistic ornamentation; they are “significant rhetorical tools that affect political behavior and cognition.”4 Metaphors create conventional understandings by connecting phenomena with familiar cultural assumptions and experiences.5 Not only are they essential cognitive tools, but metaphors participate in creating fundamental understandings of texts and the rhetorical contexts in which they are situated.6 Metaphors are cultural indices with which “Americans build their commonplace understanding[s]” and attitudes.7 Scholars have mapped the historical metaphors used to talk about the immigration “problem” as a means to identify the underlying cultural assumptions of these representations. Mark Ellis and Richard Wright offer examples of metaphors that encapsulate different perspectives on the assimilation of immigrants into American society such as the “melting pot,” the “quilt,” the “kaleidoscope,” or the “salad bowl.” They describe how metaphors of immigration serve as conceptual tools with which scholars build research, society establishes group relationships, and government creates public policy: Metaphors] represent competing views, some more distinct than others, of the consequences of immigration, interethnic contact, and societal coherence. In using metaphors . . . we run the risk of being confined to particular ways of interpreting immigration and demographic trends. As they become entrenched in theoretical discourse, they influence how we formulate our hypotheses about the impacts of immigration and ethnic group behavior—about how different immigrant groups fit into U.S. society.8 As repositories of cultural understandings, metaphors are some of the principal tools with which dominant ideologies and prejudices are represented and reinforced. For example, as George Lakoff and Sam Ferguson note, the framing of immigration discourse in the terms of “illegal aliens,” “border security,” and “amnesty” “focuses entirely on the immigrants and the administrative agencies charged with overseeing immigration law.” This

framing is “NOT neutral” but “ dehumanizes” immigrants and “pre-empts” a consideration of “broader social and

economic concerns” (such as foreign economic policy and international human rights).9 The task, then, is to examine the ways in which conventional understandings of immigration are made concrete through metaphor. Examining these discursive representations can “unmask or demystify” dominant assumptions about immigrants, assumptions that can have potentially deleterious effects on social relations.10 Before discussing these contemporary metaphoric representations or their ideological implications, however, I review the extant literature on metaphors of immigration.

b. Environmental Justice – CP affirms status quo ideologies towards the 3rd world – this renders society to an environmental hell

c. Understanding DA - orienting ourselves to the border via imagination allows for understanding of real world IR

Newbury, 12 - Susanna Newbury is a Ph.D. candidate in the History of Art at Yale University (“Drawing a Line: Encounters with the U.S.-Mexico Border”, Nov. 13th, 2012, http://www.kcet.org/arts/artbound/counties/san-diego/us-mexico-border-geography.html)For example, in the work of Arthur Schott, a German immigrant who worked with the Boundary Survey following the Gadsden Purchase of 1853, the border was imagined as a negotiation between close-up and faraway.xvi While showing stone cairns in the foreground flanked by yucca, cholla, and other detailed desert specimens, his backgrounds are reduced to topography. In his drawings, Schott imagined sheer distance as a kind of perforation or absence--filling in the perfunctory gaps between points on a line left unseen, ridgelines and badlands receding toward a distant, barely visible monument. His pictures portraitized the landscape, making it intimate and knowable up close, while indicating the vastly expansive territory beyond. This, too, is a way of drawing a border. Not as a concrete monument, or linear index of politics, but as the art historian Robin E. Kelsey has argued, a line of sight, a permeable, visual world of first-person encounter that admits ambiguity, the border as a shifting field of landscape.xvii Today it is those very perforations and first-person encounters with landscape that occupy national concern. They are the same visibilities and invisibilities that surprised me as I headed through Yuma in 2010. From mounds to monuments, maps to drawings to photographs, today's militarized border has developed a popular identity as a prohibitive barrier, even as its geopolitical function is more that of regulator of movement. As the world around it grows more difficult to comprehend in terms of the coincidence between its physicality and its influence , the way we choose to imagine the border becomes all the more simplistic . xviii

Fences may mark the political line, but as in the case of the beige pickup, the radio, the cell phone, and line of sight that is the view, they are an absurd reduction of what it means to understand the politics of landscape.

d. Fear of politics DA –attempts to solve moral problems without hypo testing the net-result of policies bolsters a fear-based ideology - an entire population is excluded by the ignorance and fear of difference

Walsh, 10 - University College Dublin College of Arts and Celtic Studies, peer reviewed by Prof. Edward James & Dr. David Kerr (“The impact of anti-Mexican sentiment on American perceptions of Diego Rivera during the Great Depression”, August, 2010, http://www.ucd.ie/ibp/MADissertations2009/Walsh.pdf)The sudden ‘visibility’ of the Mexican community alarmed the Anglo majority and unearthed instinctive racist sentiments .105 Their presence posed new questions about the status of the Mexican within American society – where did they fit in? Americans feared the potential unassimilability of Mexicans into their way of life, due to differences in culture, food, religion, and even hygiene. In a society that harboured grave doubts about the wisdom of ethnic pluralism, the question of Mexican social integration was met with hostility.106 These sentiments were fuelled by the popularity for pseudo-scientific theories about the incompatibility of ethnic groups within society due to racial rather than cultural differences.107 Social commentators were aware of this situation. In 1930, Max Handman, a senior lecturer at the University of Texas, warned that American society ‘has no social technique for handling partly colored races’108 and noted confusion regarding the correct treatment of Mexicans in social situations, such as whether to allow them sit in white sections on public transport or to drink from white-only fountains.

Perm do both – process focus is keyOenen, 06 - senior lecturer in the department of philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “A Machine That Would Go of

Itself: Interpassivity and Its Impact on Political Life,” Theory and Event, 2006 (Project Muse)

This metaphor signifies of course that the hierarchical relation between government and citizens is being replaced by one of 'equal standing' – conjunctive instead of subjunctive, we might say. But it also

symbolizes how the 'interest' in politics itself is changing. The 'locus' of involvement with politics shifts from the 'product', or social praxis that it aims to realize, towards the earlier phases of

preparation, consultation and policy-formation. This shift implicit in the growth of 'interactivity' serves the interests of both parties involved in political life. In the official rhetoric,

interactivity strengthens the involvement of citizens in politics, by committing them not only to the results of the political process but also to that process itself. In this way they become 'co-producers of policy', dedicated citizens so to speak. In turn, government is able to 'fine tune' its policies and in general stay in close contact

with its citizens, enabling it to reach its objectives in a more precise and secure way. More realistically, citizens become interactive because they see this as a better option to safeguard their (partial) interests than the traditional

options of party membership or voting behavior. They feel that interactivity will let their voice more forcefully be heard. Or even more straightforwardly, their attitude towards politics in general is one of 'what is in it for me?' In such a self-centered view, politics appears primarily as an institution that may facilitate one's own

plans and preferences, rather than as a process of collective will formation furthering socially desirable practices. Government, in turn,

sees interactivity as an effective way of 'polling' views and interests, which are usually better accommodated in an early stage of

policy formation than in later stages, that may involve troublesome renegotiations, or protracted litigation. But more importantly,

the official view or 'ideology' underwriting interactivity denies that a shift in political interest is taking place . It suggests that the interest of both citizens and government in what politics 'produces' – some form of collective good – is enhanced and supplemented by an increased interest in

the process of policy formation. Against this 'win-win' view, I want to suggest that the increase in involvement in the political process, the sphere of policy formation, goes along with a loss of involvement in the 'product' of the process. The point here is not merely that people lack sufficient time or means to be involved in both

process and result. Rather it seems that people nowadays feel more attached to the process than to its eventual product. Being actively

involved in the process has acquired a sense and meaning of its own, that may compete with, or actually override, the interest in what

the process aimed to realize. In other words, what the process now mainly realizes, its main 'product', is involvement with itself.

Perm do the CP – only the perm is possible – imagination shapes potential policymaking – it’s not the AFF’s burden to defend certaincy/immediacy of our imagination – the process can only be a byproduct of our thought process

2AC K FrontlineCase outweighs and turns the impact – Otherization is the root cause of serial policy failure and creates social identities that are ontologically dead

Prefer our epistemological method – we must have a systemic view of critical globalization studies that recognizes the interconnectedness of social relationsRobinson 06 Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara (William I., Critical Globalization Studies, Chapter 2, “Critical Globalization Studies”, ed by R Richard P Appelbaum, http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/robinson/Assets/pdf/crit_glob.pdf SW) CGS = critical globalization studiesA CGS therefore requires dialectical thought at the level of epistemology, as a way of knowing. In epistemological terms, dialectics means a dialogue seeking truth through exploration of contradictions and through identifying the internal relations that bind together diverse and multifaceted dimensions of social reality into an open totality. In the dialectical approach the different dimensions of our social reality do not have an ‘‘independent’’ status insofar as each aspect of reality is constituted by, and is constitutive of, a larger whole of which it is an internal element. An internal relation is one in which each part is constituted in its relation to the other , so that one cannot exist without the other and only has meaning when seen within the relation, whereas an external relation is one in which each part has an existence independent of its relation to the other (Ollman, 1976). Viewing things as externally related to each other inevitably leads to dualist constructs and false dichotomies (e.g., political economy versus culture, the local/national and the global). The distinct levels of social structure—in this case, global social structure—cannot be understood independent of each other, but neither are these levels reducible to any one category. They are internally related, meaning that they can only be understood in their relation to each other and to the larger social whole.

Perm do both – if the alternative is able to overcome the status quo, it is able to overcome the residual links to the AFF

Alt fails by itself – advocacy within re-foundation is necessaryWalsh, 2012 (Catherine, “The Politics of Naming”, Cultural Studies, 26.1, Project Muse)Such call for re-founding does not to simply add diversity to what is already established , but rather to rethink, rebuild and inter-culturalize the nation and national culture, and with in the terrains of knowledge, politics and life-based visions. It is this understanding of the inter-cultural that is of interest. Concretely, we are interested in the spaces of agency, creation, innovation and encounter between and among different subjects, knowledges , practices and visions. Referring to our project of Cultural Studies as (inter)Cultural Studies, enables and encourages us to think from this region, from the struggles, practices and processes that question Eurocentric, colonial and imperial legacies , and work to transform and create radically different conditions for thinking, encountering, being and coexisting or co-living

We link turn the kritik – by challenging Xenophobia, we challenge the binaries and racist labeling of “capital” of Mexican immigrants – any alternative exhorts both psychological and physical violenceSánchez, 11 - Ph.D. (University of Texas-Austin), Professor - Latin American Literature and Chicano Literature (“The toxic tonic: Narratives of xenophobia”, 2011, Latino Studies 9, 126–144, http://www.palgrave-journals.com/lst/journal/v9/n1/full/lst201111a.html)In so doing, capital dispossesses and displaces workers that then need to migrate in search of subsistence. According to United Nations Population Statistics, in 2005 there were about 191 million international migrants. In many cases, those staying behind in dysfunctional economies, the Mexican case is but one of many, survive strictly on the remittances sent by those emigrating to more

developed regions.7 Thus, in its search for an increasingly globalized spatial fix, capital crosses borders and generates migration , producing a mobile circuit of labor that it attracts north, exploits by

paying low wages, and uses against organized labor in the United States and abroad. Within this cycle, it appears ironic that the very states, be

they the United States or in Europe, that give rise to this migration from the south and create a subservient, poorly paid and badly serviced labor sector within their own countries, then turn around and engage in xenophobic practices against these very immigrants. Evidence of this can be found in the immigration raids that have

been carried out, for example, throughout the United States,8 as well as in numerous other “developed” nations.9 These contradictory state policies are in part a response to domestic pressures, especially during a period of recession, massive lay-offs

and high unemployment. Political factors and the appeasement of a public suffering from deindustrialization and recession are undoubtedly linked to state-sanctioned scapegoating. In a nation-state where there are millions of undocumented workers, raiding workplaces and prosecuting hundreds, militarizing the border, building fences, and harassing those that fit a particular racial profile as

“illegal immigrants” are only a few indicators of the state-initiated scapegoating practices generated to show commitment to stopping the flow of undocumented immigration while diverting attention from the issues. The benefits are twofold: the government provides a channeling of the populace's discontent with an identifiable target, while also appearing to be actively involved in solving the

problems. Capital has always sought fixes, spatial and demographic. The immigrant as scapegoat is thus, on the one hand, the product of capital , but so is the narrative of xenophobia, directed at the scapegoat. The linchpin of modern xenophobia is thus capital. In what way, then, is recent scapegoating of immigrants different from that of the nineteenth century? The narrative of xenophobia has clearly been a constant throughout US history, but scapegoating of immigrants today is in several ways more widespread and insidious, as the state stands idly by while a significant segment of the population that contributes to the economy with its labor and taxes is denied protection and social rights.10 Not only are right-wing groups, Tea Party Activists (Cooper, 2010, A4) and vigilante groups like the Minutemen creating hysteria over Latino/a immigration, but so are the federal government, State governments and municipalities that have adopted measures that harass Latino/as, native and immigrant alike, challenge automatic US citizenship for children of undocumented immigrants, and feed this hysteria while fomenting nativism. The increase in state-sanctioned activities against immigrants today11 is in some respects not unlike state actions in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century11 to exclude Asians (Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos and Asian Indians) from immigrating, keeping them as well from attaining citizenship or holding property. Asian immigrants, however, suffered hostility, harassment, mob violence and evictions largely at the

hands of miners, trade unionists, political parties, construction workers and city/town governments. Saxton reminds us that the role of the federal government during this period “was confused” and “in some respects contradictory,” passing the Exclusion Act of 1882 and the permanent Chinese Exclusion Act of 1902, yet intending, according to the historian, to halt further Chinese immigration without affecting those Chinese already living in the West (Saxton, 1995, 230, 249). Likewise, exclusion of Japanese students from San Francisco schools in 1906 and assaults on Japanese residents were contested by the federal government, although – contradictorily – in 1924 it passed the Alien Exclusion Act that not only excluded the Japanese but also prohibited their owning land (Saxton, 1995, 254–257). After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, war hysteria led to Executive Order 9066 in 1942 ordering the concentration of the US Japanese-origin population in internment camps; some 120,000 were forced to abandon their homes until 1945 when they were allowed to return.12 These seemingly

contradictory governmental practices have long been evident in the United States. The state, when it wasn’t itself militarily involved in nineteenth

century violence against Indians or strikers, turned a blind eye to the lynching of “foreign” miners during the Gold

Rush, the lynching of Blacks, the lynching of Mexicano Tejanos, the raids on Nuevomexicano farmers and the beating of striking workers.13 The state continued or allowed many of these practices to continue well into the twentieth century, in which the lynching of African Americans was still common practice, the Japanese were herded off into reservations, and political dissidents were arrested and blacklisted under

McCarthyism. Mexican immigrants were deported en masse in the 1930s and 1950s, decades of economic turmoil as well,

and, not unrelatedly, decades of raids and deportations of the Mexican origin population, including US citizens of Mexican-origin, in Arizona and throughout the Southwest.14 Today, the state, in collusion with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, imposes structural adjustment policies and free trade agreements on the global south that produce unemployment, dispossession, privatization of public services and emigration, drawing the unemployed to this country to work as low-wage labor while denying them the most

basic rights and benefits. Once here the displaced and undocumented Mexican and other Latino/a immigrants

are subjected, not to exclusion per se, but to imprisonment, expulsions and harassment, not from vigilante

groups and labor unions, but at the hands of the state itself. The “long arm of US law” currently operates 22 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) immigrant detention centers in Texas, California and Arizona (63 detention centers nationwide) and houses people in hundreds of other jails or prisons, sites that share many of the traits of concentration camps (Taxin, 2009, B4). What thus appears contradictory is in fact quite logical; the nation-state's logic allows for local violence against these transnational workers that serve as scapegoats as long as it doesn’t infringe upon federal

jurisdiction. At the same time, the federal government itself engages in border violence, raids and incarceration in matters that it deems under its purview. The latest instance of this xenophobia narrative is, of course, the Arizona SB1070 law. The specific details of the Arizona example require review, as they point to how xenophobia becomes an attractive and viable narrative for right-wing politicians like SB1070 author Russell Pearce. But before getting there, we need to recall that xenophobia, while focusing on the harassment and extirpation of foreigners from particular territories, is a process that also allows natives to be concomitantly subjected to estrangement, to being foreignized, as Seguín, the native Tejano, well put it when he called himself a foreigner in his native land (Seguin, 1858, 177–182). Native Americans were foreignized since the seventeenth century and pushed out of their territories; in fact, many tribes are legally recognized as sovereign Indian nations, although Supreme Court Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia (1823) in a feminizing turn of phrase called them “domestic dependent nations” (Banner, 2005, 220). Native Americans were not granted citizenship until 1924, that is, to Indians born after that date, and it was not until the Nationality Act of 1940 that all Native Americans were granted citizenship, although even then they were foreignized in some states and not granted full voting rights until 1948 (Haney Lopez, 1996, 41). Citizenship is thus a variable construct, a right that can be granted or taken away. In the case of xenophobia, particular foreigners, definitely not all foreigners, and even native-born individuals that are foreignized can be disenfranchised and made into scapegoats, into outsiders, and assigned the role of culprits to be ousted by the majority. Often the narrative of scapegoating is deemed universal, and much has been written on the subject, by Derrida (1981), by Girard (1986, 1977), among others. I would like to question the premise that naturalizes the practice of scapegoating and views it as a species problem, that is, as innate to human beings; it is instead, I argue, inherently in each instance a socio-political problem that arises out of specific historical conditions. In each and every case of scapegoating the circumstances are different; the conditions that give rise to them are different, and the state, in modern times in particular, has specific ties to the practice of scapegoating or, more

precisely, to the production of a given xenophobia narrative. Interestingly, within the current US context, the figure of the scapegoat is decidedly fluid ; it can take the form not only of the immigrant , but also of those perceived by

hegemonic forces as internal or domestic threats (the so-called gang member, the HIV or TB positive patient, the political activist, the racialized and gendered other, as well as the poor and homeless). My focus here, however, is on the immigrant, especially the undocumented

immigrant in the US context. This narrative of scapegoating “illegals” – elevating an adjective to noun status – this xenophobia, is, in these times, so obvious and pervasive, so much a part of the “conventional wisdom,” that it becomes internalized to the point that scapegoating occurs within our own Latino/a communities, as we strike out against each other, pitting one generation or one ethnic group against another. Whether from without or internally directed, scapegoating brings

out and enables police brutality, murderous acts and dehumanization, often resulting in self-hate and psychological trauma.

Our method and scholarship uniquely outweighs – progressive imagination is developed through resistance to violent colonialism – these representations necessary to internalize the “real”Haiven et al, 10 - Max Haiven is a post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Mount Saint Vincent University in Halifax (“What is the radical imagination? A Special Issue”, Affinities: AJournal of Radical Theory, Culture, and Action, Volume 4, Number 2, Fall 2010, pp. i-xxxvii.)Aristotle disagreed, arguing that imagination was always an important part of how we comprehend the world and that works of the imagination like theatre could be important for creating and sustaining community and for the cultivation of full personhood. But for both Plato and Aristotle, the imagination was a passive organ of the mind, capable only of internalizing and reacting to the "real" world. This ancient debate had tended to rehearse itself time and again, most famously in the controversies over the value of the arts in modern Western society . But the idea of the imagination that underscored these more recent discourses had a slightly different origin. The European Enlightenment of the 18th century elevated the imagination to a new centrality. Early skeptical thinkers like David Hume and Rene Descartes suggested that our whole sense of reality was beholden to the imagination, that we could know nothing outside of our own minds and that our experience of causality, or the way we put our experience of the world into some sort of coherent, linear order, was a necessary fabrication. Immanuel Kant, on the other hand, took this conclusion as his starting point, suggesting that the imagination was the very fulcrum of reality itself and that the self-contained individualistic human mind was the centre of the universe. For Kant and later philosophers of the German Romantic period, the imagination was humanity's "divine spark — that quality of being that set humans apart from animals. It was out of the imagination that all other aspects of our mental life (and, therefore, social life) evolved, including reason, aesthetics and ethics.' For these thinkers, all of whom were wealthy, white men whose personal and institutional wealth and power stemmed (directly or indirectly) from exploitation, the imagination had taken on a life of its own, but it was certainly not a life unmarked by differences in power and privilege. Many stories remain to be told about how and where the Romantic notion of the imagination really originated. David Graeber, for one, has suggested that the European fascination with culture,

creativity and imagination was spurred by Europeans' often violent encounters with radically "other" cultures through colonialism ; cultures that, in many cases, posed an egalitarian model of social

organization against the rigid hierarchies of feudal and mercantilist Europe.

A2 US labor/wages disadsOpen borders is better for US labor than SQDoris Provine, 2008 , Professor, School of Justice & Social Inquiry, Arizona State U.Review of OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS, by Kevin R. Johnson. Law & Politics Book Review, Vol. 18 No. 2 (February, 2008) pp.106-108 http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/johnson0208.htmWhat about the impact of open borders on American labor? The current system, Johnson points out, is worse than a properly managed system of open borders. Under the current policy, which does not legally acknowledge the presence of workers who have settled without authorization, the United States has developed a large secondary labor market. More than one-half of the growth of the labor force in the past [*107] decade is made up of these workers. They are vulnerable to exploitation from employers and from criminals who prey upon them. They pay taxes, including, in many cases, income tax, but get virtually nothing in return. While this is, in a certain sense, a good deal for American citizens, it is unfair and has many negative consequences for everyone. A better solution, Johnson argues convincingly, is enhanced workplace standards for all workers, with transfer payments to workers displaced by immigrants. The money for such a program would come from the employers who benefit from immigrant labor. Johnson is not alone in seeing the value of recognizing the presence of unauthorized workers. The AFL- CIO has reversed its earlier opposition to unauthorized workers and now seeks to include all workers in its membership.

A2 TerrorismOpen borders maximizes security Doris Provine, 2008 , Professor, School of Justice & Social Inquiry, Arizona State U.Review of OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS, by Kevin R. Johnson. Law & Politics Book Review, Vol. 18 No. 2 (February, 2008) pp.106-108 http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/johnson0208.htmNo book could be more timely than Kevin Johnson’s OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS. An unprecedented movement is occurring in states and municipalities across the nation to control the flow of immigrants without authorization, and the issue has become a primary focus of the presidential campaign. Johnson’s focus, however, is not on the current imbroglio, but on the reasons why it exists. He makes a convincing argument for a policy of open borders, if not with the world, then within North America. Open borders, he asserts, is the only sensible policy in this era of globalization. The argument for open borders can be made on utilitarian and moral grounds. Johnson addresses both, but stresses the reasons why it makes good economic sense to open the borders to people who seek work in the United States. He starts from the position that the inflow of foreign labor is not only needed – it is unstoppable. So the United States should drop the pretense of immigration control, with its harsh quotas, inadequate walls and stop points, long waiting lines, and detailed inquiries into the background of applicants in favor of a straightforward, easily administered visa program that presumes eligibility to enter. Entrants would immediately become legal permanent residents. There would be no temporary workers or other conditional or short-term admissions. The only grounds for exclusion would be danger to American security, which would exclude those with dangerous communicable diseases, terrorists, and criminals likely to re-offend. The burden of proof would be on the government to exclude, and there would be a right to appeal. Would such a policy “open the floodgates” to an unmanageable flow of immigrants? Johnson acknowledges that this is a common concern, but he dismisses it with examples of people from poverty-stricken areas who could migrate freely under current law (e.g., Puerto Rico, Mississippi), but do not. He cites the European Union as a relevant case in point. Despite some initial fears, there has been no dramatic inflow of Bulgarians or Romanians into Western Europe, he asserts.

Eliminating visas solves Tim Cavanaugh, May 23, 2006, Reason magazine Web editorhttp://articles.latimes.com/2006/may/23/opinion/oe-cavanaugh23 No border, no problem. Let's live up to the promise of NAFTA and allow a free flow of people in North America.AMONG THE MANY measures and half-measures that are being proposed to solve the crisis of illegal immigration, there have been some real doozies: a 700-mile wall to keep people out (or in?); a temporary guest-worker program that may end up harming both American and Mexican employees; even a scheme for the largest mass deportation in U.S. history. But here's one good idea you won't hear about. Let's allow the North American Free Trade Agreement to live up to its promise and permit citizens of Canada, the United States and Mexico to move and work freely among the three countries. If that sounds crazy, it's only because a century's worth of regulatory corrosion and toxic bureaucracy have made us forget that this is how things used to be. For most of American history, immigration was either open or so lightly regulated that the

United States was effectively open to everybody. A policy of borders without visas would in fact be \o7more\f7 restrictive and formal than the system that applied through much of American history because it would depend on proper identification -- either a passport or some other recognized papers -- to cross from one country into the other. There are two objections to an open border policy: national security and economics. One is specious; the other is based on ignorance of the way free markets work and free people behave. First, national security. After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, this line of thinking goes, we cannot afford any laxity at our borders. This case breaks down on logic, facts and history. We already have laxity at both our northern and southern borders. If you believe undocumented immigrants are a security threat, things could not be more dangerous than they are now, because the near-impossibility of entering the United States legally drives thousands of people to cross the border in secret. Free movement would be \o7more\f7 secure than our current system, removing Mexican workers' incentive to swim across the Rio Grande and allowing U.S. Customs and Border Protection to track everybody who's entering the country legitimately, with 100% assurance that anybody who crosses the border in secret is up to no good. In any event, there is extremely scant evidence, from either current events or history, that the Mexican border presents a military or terrorist threat. The would-be millennium bomber was apprehended entering from Canada, not Mexico. None of the 9/11 hijackers came through Mexico. The United States fought wars throughout the 20th century (including World War I, during which Germany made strenuous efforts to turn Mexico against the U.S.) without having to fear a serious national security threat on its southern border. If opponents think an open border policy would threaten our national security, they need more than vague omens about the number of Shiites active in South America to prove it. The economic argument -- that open immigration would overburden U.S. laws and infrastructure -- presumes that all immigrants would settle permanently. In fact, an open borders policy encourages almost as many immigrants to go back home as to stay. Without the risk of being unable to reenter the United States, millions of undocumented workers would be free to return to Mexico. Again, the argument from history is strong. U.S. immigration authorities in the early 1920s estimated that only half of Mexican immigrants were settling in the country for more than six months at a time. Migrants entered and left as their own circumstances demanded. This pattern held even for European immigrants; roughly one-quarter to one-third eventually returned to their native lands between 1880 and 1920 -- a time when transatlantic travel was infinitely harder and more dangerous than it is today.

A2 Schmitt KSchmitt’s approach cannot account for the post cold war eraCarlo Galli 2010 History of Political Thought, University of Bologna.Elisabeth Fay is a doctoral candidate in the field of Italian, in the Department of Romance Studies of Cornell University. CR: The New Centennial Review > Volume 10, Number 2, Fall 2010 (Muse)As far as analytic effectiveness is concerned, the most typical categorial apparatuses in Schmitt's thought are not fully adaptable to the phenomenology of global war, as Schmitt himself implies during his

last phase of production (particularly in Theory of the Partisan). In fact, Schmitt himself explains that absolute enmity is not "political," and that consequently it is absolute disorder, because it refers instead to a concrete situation that contains a possibility of order, to an immediate polemical and identitary use of

religion that does not follow the cuius regio eius religio principle or any other regulating or stabilizing principle. There are other instances in which the phenomena of global war exist outside of Schmittian historical and intellectual horizons: here we do not find "political theology" but "extreme theology"; the differences in power across the planet do not define the greater spaces; the terrorist is not a partisan because he is neither telluric, spatial, nor defensive; further incompatibility between partisan and terrorist can be seen in the latter's absolute and systematic irregularity, his nihilism toward himself, and his exception devoid of rule. The modern era was born of the opening of oceans, whereas the global era was born of the opening of land, an opening that occurred at the close of the opposition between East and West. Global mobilization is not imbalance (in favor of the techno-naval) between land and sea, but rather the confusion of the two within a different type of space. Global war is not "total war" because it presents a more complex spatiality with regard to the interchange between military and nonmilitary levels, and above all, because, contrary to what Schmitt thinks , it is not the political act of a unified political entity (be it state or Empire) that knowingly takes it on, thereby giving it meaning through that entity's own political existence. Global war is, rather, the uncontrolled violence of a plurality of subjects whose motivations and strategies are, at last analysis, undetermined. The global age does not display a Zentralgebiet from which some power may neutralize conflicts—it has no such territory precisely because power does not know the "political," which, when deployed in a sovereign and decisionist manner, can generate order.

Global war is a struggle that cannot be oriented to a katechon . Thus, global war cannot be totally understood through Schmittian [End Page 18] categories. It is subtly but decisively something "other," something postmodern. If we look closely, we see that Schmitt is talking about something else. His thought runs counter to this conflictual universalism with its technological, ideological, juridical, and moralistic origins that serve a unified political power: Schmitt instead thinks of ideological terrorism in the service of the communist Empire, of the League of Nations, and of the 'just wars' of England and the United States. He had certainly foreseen phenomena of madness in these universalisms, and he feared them from the conception of his thought, which is centered on a determinate political conflict existing within spatial politics and oriented to concreteness and political unity (again, even when

poststatual). The complexity of today's world is necessarily lost on Schmitt, given that he was able to observe it only at the beginning of the crisis of modern sovereignty's conceptual architecture, and given that he ignored the more advanced challenges (biopolitical power) as well as the spaces of action opened by globalization, such as the dialectic between worldwide society (the cosmopolitan universe of social forces) and international society (the macropolitical functions of states and empires). He could have known nothing of multilevel governance, neomedievalism, nor of the complex spaces and political forms that are not hierarchical and Westphalian, but multilateral and characterized by widespread political power: hypotheses no more risky than those offered by the neoimperialists.14

Schmitt’s approach cannot stabilize the current order – his categories are historically boundCarlo Galli 2010 History of Political Thought, University of Bologna.Elisabeth Fay is a doctoral candidate in the field of Italian, in the Department of Romance Studies of Cornell University. CR: The New Centennial Review > Volume 10, Number 2, Fall 2010 (Muse)If we leave aside the analytical perspective of Schmittian political thought, and move on to the organizational perspective, the problem becomes one of understanding if the attempts to respatialize war, to reduce the complexity of the global age, to interrupt the short-circuit that exists between local and global—if these attempts, conducted with realistic presuppositions (or with the conceit of power's continuing morphogenetic function) stemming from a direct, meaningful knowledge of Schmitt's texts15 (or, as is more likely, from a direct relationship with the pragmatist juridical tradition and realistic political science) have any possibility of being effective and forming political order. To put it another way, can global war be a constituent conflict? Can the [End Page 19] confusion between war and peace, law and violence, be the origin of a new political form? Or, philosophically, is an image of the World still possible? With regard to the constitution, formal or informal, of a territorial Western Empire headed by the United States, it is important to note that it is precisely this morphogenetic use of internal and external force that is being radically called into question today. Organizing formally sovereign states in hierarchical, imperial relationships is as difficult as preventing the enemy "barbarians" from breaching the empire's borders. Furthermore, the essential element of globalization is a worldwide economic development that, with the reciprocal interconnection it has developed, does not lend itself to the control and confinement that the imperial hypothesis implies. Even in the state's internal sphere, the relation between exception and normality (always absent, yet always already present as an ideal around which to organize) does not institute a concrete order, and only manages to conjure up a trick of the eye: enemies and friends are actually ghosts and projections, who feed on desiderata and aggressive nostalgia . This internal mobilization is the only stability that the state is currently able to supply, evidently because it is incapable of giving form to its own internal space, incapable of making internal space distinct from the external and from its own contradictions. In this way, the probable organizational responses coming out of Schmittian categories are not productive . It

seems that attempts to form order based on resolution, exception, restoration of space, and the creation of borders are diluted and even liquefied in globalization. It seems, therefore, that new stabilizing responses are necessary, but that above all we must begin asking new questions about political categories oriented toward different horizons than those offered by Schmitt. It is certainly true that Schmitt's thought can be used today to demystify the universalistic ideologies of the just war or the war for democracy, or to demonstrate the indirect political value of such wars to the United States. Similarly, we can clearly see that the juridical universalism on which the United Nations were founded is an attempt to legalize and reconcile international politics, but ends up being little more than a manifestation of the desire for humanistic rationalization in the global age, a desire to believe in [End Page 20] the theory of human rights and the equality of sovereign states (which maintain their phantasmal existence only within the United Nations). Thus, this juridical universalism does not depart from the modern nexus—completely ineffective today—between individualism, statism, and universalism. In conclusion, Schmitt's thought is partially effective today, in its pars destruens, as a possible (but not unique) antiuniversalist strategy. But in the pars construens—in the combination of decision and concreteness at the interior, and of war and spatiality at the exterior—it seems confused and inapplicable . It is not enough for Schmitt to think radical conflict and spatialized political order (of the Empire) for us to understand effectively the conflicts and demands of today's order through his thought. In the global age the challenge of planetarische Industrie-Nahme, of unchecked technological enterprise

on a world scale, has extended and intensified qualitatively, to the point that the very terms of the problem and its possible solutions have changed . One of these possible outcomes is a radical disorientation of the world by a capitalism unwilling to tolerate its own submission to the constraints imposed by the spatial and territorial logic of the imperial

greater spaces. Therefore, we must recognize that, despite its appearance, politics today does not allow itself to

be interpreted or organized: not in a modern individualist or statist manner, and not within Schmittian

coordinates . Schmitt's thought is concerned with an end and with the genealogical deconstruction and reconstruction of an

era. What we need today is a beginning—a beginning that, in this era of absolute enmity and paradoxical spatiality, would not consist in identifying an enemy , or in entrusting the constituent role of order to war, or in imagining that the katechon is the sovereign monopoly of resolution at the interior and the balance of greater spaces at the exterior. In short, it is not

with ideological "pacifism" but rather with "realism" that we maintain that global war will not turn back into modern war. As Schmitt himself said, historical truths are such only once .

Open Borders NEG – HSS - Case

1NC Otherization

1NC Front Line

Ethics do not require fully open bordersShelley Wilcox 2009 Associate Professor of philosophy at San Francisco State University Philosophy Compass 4/1 (2009): 1–9, The Open Borders Debate on Immigration http://online.sfsu.edu/swilcox/Swilcox/Shelleys_webpage_files/Wilcox,%20The%20Open%20Borders%20Debate%20on%20Immigration.pdf 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00230.xGlobal migration raises several important ethical issues. One of the most significant is the question of whether liberal democratic societies have strong moral obligations to admit immigrants. However, despite the theoretical and practical importance of this question, it has received little attention by philosophers. Those philosophers who have addressed immigration have typically defended the conventional view on immigration, which maintains that liberal states have broad discretion over immigration policy. According to this position, such states will typically admit immigrants whose talents, assets, characteristics, or skills are perceived to be in the national interest, but they are morally free to restrict immigration as they see fit, with few exceptions. Recently, however, some liberal egalitarians have begun to challenge this conventional view in two lines of argument. The first, defended most prominently by Joseph Carens, maintains that immigration restrictions are inconsistent with basic liberal egalitarian ideals, including freedom, equal opportunity, and moral equality. It follows, argues Carens, that liberal states have a prima facie duty to maintain open borders, welcoming all prospective immigrants who seek admission. The second line of argument, advanced by Frederick Whelan and myself, contends that affluent, liberal democratic societies are morally obli- gated to admit needy immigrants as a partial response to real-world global injustices, such as poverty and human rights violations. We conclude that liberal states have much broader duties to admit immigrants than the conventional position implies, yet without defending open borders per se.

Their ontology of garbage constructs the slum as separate, turns the affMiguel A. Palomino 2007 Facultad Teológica LatinoamericanaStudies in World Christianity 13.1 (2007) 95-96 Review of Mark Kramer. 2006. Dispossessed. Life in Our World's Urban Slums. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis BooksDispossessed, Mark Kramer's first book, relates the story of real families that struggle with poverty and other social ills in five densely populated cities: Manila, Nairobi, Mexico City, Bangkok, and Cairo. He devotes a chapter to each city, underscoring the fact that though 'one billion people – or one in every three urban residents – now live in an urban slum,' most of us in developed nations still do not comprehend that half of the world lives on less than US$2.00 a day. Kramer, a journalist and social advocate, states from the beginning the intentions of his book. First, he introduces us not just to cities but to the people who live and die in these settlements. By doing so, he 'puts names and faces to issues that affect millions of residents'. Second, he points out the most serious problems these people have yet to overcome: land rights, living conditions, informal economy, evictions, demolitions and so forth. He does not elaborate on these pressing issues, but cites other authors such as the renowned Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, who is working worldwide to integrate informal neighbourhoods into the formal sector. The sociological and journalistic research done for this book makes it reliable and convincing to any one interested in global urbanisation. Kramer spent two to four weeks with each person and family he interviewed. He met Sammy and Joanne Seares in Balic-Balic, the Sampaloc district of Manila, a young couple with two children who constantly fears eviction (chapter 2). He talked with Imbumi Makuko, resident of Kibera, Kenya's largest community with at least 600,000 people, who through his nongovernmental organisation is developing churches and training clergy, giving them with resources on leadership, advocacy and social justice matters (chapter 3). In Mexico City he stayed with Aline, a mother of two boys, and met Letty and her family who live in Cartolandia (Land of Cardboard Boxes), Lomas de San Isidro, a colonia where disputes over landownership prevent its settlers to progress from progressing (chapter 4). In Bangkok, Sunee, a mother of one, hosted him warmly servingtheir meals on the floor of her home. There, Kramer met Yung and other residents of Klong Toey, a slum near the city where most people work for themselves as part of an underground economy, both illegal (prostitution, drugs) and legal (street vendors, small construction work), that characterises the informal sector in poor cities (chapter 5). In Cairo he met Ezzat Naim Guindly who lives in Mokattham, a massive illegal settlement in the city, where garbage is its most valuable material resource, but at the same

[End Page 95] time the cause of disease, pollution and emotional trauma (chapter 6). The last chapter suggests ways for serving the urban poor. In Krame's words: 'If you reside in a developed nation and you truly wish to help the people you've read about, you must first personalise their suffering, take it on as your own. You must also reflect on how your own actions – your purchases, attitudes, and lifestyle – may, in fact, fuel their suffering. Only then can you act effectively to help the poorest of the poor in urban slums.' Mark Kramer has contributed enormously to a better understanding of the conditions in which the world's urban poor live today. By letting them speak for themselves, Kramer has discredited misconceptions and stereotypes that are usually thrust upon them. Dispossessed no doubt will be appreciated by those working with NGOs and social work in urban areas.

Carens is wrong- Immigration is not a basic human rightWilcox, 9 (Shelley, Associate professor at San Francisco State University in the Philosophy department, “The Open Borders Debate on Immigration,” The Author Philosophy Compass 4/1 (2009), 1–9, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00230.x, San Francisco State University, Journal Compilation ª 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd http://online.sfsu.edu/swilcox/Swilcox/Shelleys_webpage_files/Wilcox,%20The%20Open%20Borders%20Debate%20on%20Immigration.pdf) While Carens’ arguments for open borders have been enormously influential, they have also been subject to a number of objections. I will discuss two here. The first contends that Carens overstates the moral importance of free international mobility, and thus fails to establish that freedom of international movement is a genuine human right.11 A prominent version of this objection, offered by David Miller, rests on the distinction between basic interests and bare interests.12 A basic interest is one that is so vital that it should be protected by a right. A bare interest, on the other hand, is a legitimate interest, but it is generally not important enough to deserve such protection. Carens suggests that the interest in free international mobility is a basic interest on the grounds that it is equally as important as the interest in free mobility within a nation-state. Miller counters that while this may be true in certain cases, the analogy between free internal mobility and free international mobility does not hold in general. He acknowledges that individuals have a basic interest in being able to move freely within the borders of their country of citizenship. Some persons also have a basic interest in free international mobility, suggests Miller, provided that immigration is the only way to escape persecution or avoid starvation. Such individuals may have a right to move to some state where their basic rights can be secured, if not the state of their choice. However, Miller insists that most persons have only a bare interest in free international mobility. For instance, they may wish to move to another country in order to participate in a culture that does not exist in their home country. As long as their basic rights are being secured by their own government and they have an adequate range of opportunities in their home country – that is, a reasonable choice of occupations, cultural activities, and so on – then their interest in moving to a new country does not warrant protection as a right . Thus, he concludes, the right to freedom of international movement is at best a remedial right of those persons whose basic rights cannot be secured in their home country ; it is not a basic human right as Carens contends.13

Turn: borders are good because they limit state control over individuals- it’s moralWilcox, 9 (Shelley, Associate professor at San Francisco State University in the Philosophy department, “The Open Borders Debate on Immigration,” The Author Philosophy Compass 4/1 (2009), 1–9, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00230.x, San Francisco State University, Journal Compilation ª 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd http://online.sfsu.edu/swilcox/Swilcox/Shelleys_webpage_files/Wilcox,%20The%20Open%20Borders%20Debate%20on%20Immigration.pdf) A second objection, offered by Michael Blake, takes issue with Carens’ suggestion that immigration restrictions violate the ideal of moral equality.14 Blake acknowledges that citizenship, like race and ethnicity, is morally arbitrary in the sense that all are produced by factors over which we have no control. However, he denies that citizenship is morally irrelevant, as Carens suggests. On the contrary, argues Blake, citizenship is morally signifi- cant because it marks out the boundaries of the state’s authority ; that is, the state has coercive authority over citizens that it does not have over foreigners. In liberal states, state authority must be justified to those who are subject to it. However, since foreigners are generally not subject to the authority of states other than their own, they are not entitled to this same justification. This explains why liberal states may withhold certain rights from foreigners without affronting their status as moral equals. Certain rights, suggests Blake, arise from the need to justify state authority. If a state is to be authorized to exercise coercive power, it owes some substantive protections and guarantees, in the form of rights, to those who are subject to this power. However, since foreigners generally do not live under authority of the state in question, that state owes no such guarantees to them. Blake gives the example of political rights. No liberal state is legitimate unless it grants political rights to citizens, yet such states need not extend these same political rights to foreigners. Blake contends that specific guarantees of liberty, including the right to free mobility, also arise from the need to justify state authority. Liberal states cannot deny free mobility to their citizens and expect them to accept its authority. However, such states need not grant admission to foreigners because they have no claim to such justification. Thus, Blake concludes, liberal states may legitimately restrict

immigration without violating the ideal of

The aff misunderstands the slum – we should embrace slums to de-center neoliberalism – the dystopia of the aff undermines liberatory potentialLisa Brawley 2008 Vassar College Criticism > Volume 50, Number 1, Winter 2008 Review of Planet of Slums by Mike Davis. London: Verso, 2006.At its best, the secondhand dystopia of Planet of Slums aims to recalibrate the political agendas of a floundering left project and to place the “global catastrophe of urban poverty” at the center of left struggles against the devastations of global capitalism. It insists that a central tactic of that struggle must be to de-legitimate and decenter neoliberalism as a political project with global ambitions. (This is also the critical force of Davis’s more recent edited volume, Evil Paradises: Dreamworlds of Neoliberalism, also from Verso.) In this way, Davis can be seen to offer a counter-apocalyptic to visions of planetary meltdown that mobilize the emerging political movement to address climate change. Davis’s dark portrait of the ongoing political catastrophe of global poverty intervenes to insist that the planetary threat posed by global warming is less an ecological problematic than a political ecological one. Finally, Davis’s account

of the mass production of slum urbanization very powerfully serves to reorder the priorities of those who study the forces and trajectories of contemporary urbanization, interrupting discussions of “iconic architecture” and “smart growth,” and placing cities of the Global South at the center rather than the periphery of the study of the city. Davis’s vivid critical appraisal stops short of grasping the world as anything other than a closed system, careening inexorably toward violent collapse. And thus, at its worst, the secondhand dystopia of Planet of Slums can be seen to confirm the modernizer’s lament: to urge a more thoroughgoing development, to corroborate the premises of those who would wage war on global poverty, to advocate a more efficient incorporation of the world’s poor as the solution to their marginalization within global capitalism, and to [End Page 158] (tacitly) ratify the conception of historical transformation embedded within a modernizing trajectory. One could invoke Fredric Jameson to diagnose the closed circle of Davis’s critique: “radical alternatives, systemic transformations, cannot be theorized or even imagined within the conceptual field governed by the word ‘modern.’” Jameson continues: “What we really need is a wholesale displacement of thematics of modernity by the desire called Utopia.”1 What, then, is one to make of the desire called Dystopia?

Slum-sensationalization is dangerous & negates their impactsAlan Gilbert 2009 Professor of Geography - University College LondonSAIS Review > Volume 29, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2009 Extreme Thinking About Slums and Slum Dwellers: A Critique (Project Muse)At the same time, new recipes for better urban management are appearing every day. ‘Developmentalists’ are advertizing their remedies for preventing the proliferation of slums. Multinational agencies are issuing new compilations of best practices. The world is not in danger, providing that it pays heed and takes the new medicine. Two examples of such panacea are:

“. . . Decentralization and democratisation transformed the entire face of governance in the region [Latin America]. Implemented in various combinations in different countries, these trends have triggered a revival of popular participation at the local level and the rise in importance of local governments in national affairs.”3 “It is in the interest of governments to extend mortgage markets down the income scale, as homeownership is beneficial economically, socially and politically.” This will improve the secondary housing market and lead to faster rates of housing extension and improvement. “Small housing loans, disbursed through housing microfinance institutions, are some of the most promising developments in housing finance during the last decade. They are suitable for extending existing dwellings, building on already serviced land, adding rooms (often for renting out), adding facilities such as toilets and house improvements within neighbourhood or slum upgrading. They tend to reach much further down the income scale than mortgage financing.”4

Neither of the above quotes is a wholly accurate reflection of reality. Each illustrates the current tendency of writers to exaggerate either the ills to be cured or the solutions available to cure them. To increase its explanatory power, each observation has been stretched so that it applies to most parts of the world. This is dangerous insofar as the world’s extreme diversity [End Page 36] means that few generalizations are likely to fit. In the words of Marcuse and van Kempen, “There is, then no standard pattern, no ‘The Globalised City’, no single new spatial order within cities all over the world. The patterns produced by the processes summarized as ‘globalisation’ are quite varied. . . .”5 Too many generalizations of dubious value are being made about Third World cities and about slums in particular. Although much of the over-generalization, even trivialization, is being committed by non-academics, it is clear that too many social scientists are guilty of doing the same. A recent academic conference, for example, was premised on the belief that global processes are in some ways making cities more extreme.6 That argument is true in the sense that most cities in the world are becoming more unequal.7 But at the same time, urban elites and even the middle classes are living in increasingly similar ways (car dependency, use of computers and the Internet, vacations in foreign countries, purchase of second homes, etc.). Certain cultural practices, notably in the form of cars, music, film, food and sport, are spreading across the globe and what is fashionable in London may well be equally fashionable in Shanghai. Note too that thirty percent of the population of London are from ethnic minorities. As such, London, in comparison with numerous cities around the globe, is much less different, and therefore, less extreme, than it has ever been. Conventional wisdom dictates that if inequality within urban areas is growing, it is possible that urban life today displays more extremes than previously. However, if cities across the globe are becoming more similar, even in the patterns of their inequality, perhaps there are fewer extremes than previously expected. Many of the extreme situations depicted

in the literature owe more to our interpretation than to reality; a post-modern interpretation if ever there was one. As such, over-generalization is at the root of many of our discoveries of ‘extreme cities’ and nowhere is this better illustrated than in the literature on slums and urban poverty.

Slum Rep’s Exts

We control uniqueness – their exaggerations are a net link turnAlan Gilbert 2009 Professor of Geography - University College LondonSAIS Review > Volume 29, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2009 Extreme Thinking About Slums and Slum Dwellers: A Critique (Project Muse)But, if London and Delhi today are more ‘extreme’ than they were thirty years ago, this is not a wholly negative outcome. Insofar as greater inequality has been brought about by the arrival of migrants, it means that many people who once lived in poor rural areas now have the opportunity to live better lives than if they had they remained in the countryside. Are most of the poor of Delhi poorer than they would have been had they stayed where they were?36 Have not urban living conditions generally improved in terms of water provision, access to television and mobility? Are the poor arrivals in London, many of whom have migrated long distances to share in the benefits of globalisation, worse off even if their arrival has produced some of the symptoms of poverty (e.g., tuberculosis) that we had assumed had long ago disappeared? As always, the locals lament that migrants cause problems while benefiting from the cheap labour that they offer. As always, migrants continue to move to richer places, find some kind of employment and send back money to their relatives back home. Of course, the worry remains that our cities today contain too many extremes and that too little effort is made to reduce them. But, nor should [End Page 46] we doubt that the problems are being sensationalised. It may be that in African cities more people are living in areas without water and sanitation than ever before, but proportionately the numbers are declining and, in South Africa, many real improvements have been made since 1994. Extreme cities have in large part been created by our increasing willingness to generalise and forgo perspective. Neither local success stories nor local horrors should be turned into worldwide phenomena. The existence of ‘model’ cities like Curitiba and Bogotá is welcome and the progress that has been made in terms of public transportation, urban planning and service delivery should be applauded. But those models are hardly a sign that every city can be run properly any more than the exploitation of most

children is normal practice in every third world city. How ‘research’ is to escape from the current position is difficult to say. It is up to academics to communicate and proselytise more successfully, but at the same time to forgo over-generalization, to act more responsibly in the role of consultants and to avoid verbal pollution. It is also essential that academics try to correct the trivializations and generalizations of others. They need to expand their influence on policy and over the general public. Should they fail, it will be problematic both for academia and for the world at large. After all, neither the proliferation of polemical tracts nor the uncritical repetition of fashionable ideas is likely to improve urban policy and any failure to design better policies may well produce even more extreme cities. It is hardly extreme to suggest that the urban poor do not deserve that.

Slum-sationalizing invites academic incoherence and embrace of dangerous solutionsAlan Gilbert 2009 Professor of Geography - University College LondonSAIS Review > Volume 29, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2009 Extreme Thinking About Slums and Slum Dwellers: A Critique (Project Muse)The proliferation in writing has had numerous consequences, one of which is to encourage over-generalization about cities (and indeed about much else). The causes are as follows: [End Page 43] (1) Narrowing areas of expertise One consequence of so much being written about almost everything is that no one, academic or policymaker, can possibly keep up with the flood of new writing and sources of information. On-line searches help considerably but produce so many references that we are soon overwhelmed. How do we edit the selection? We do it perhaps regionally, cutting out areas of the world, which we perceive to be irrelevant to our interests or where we know we lack experience to understand what is going on. Urban specialists in the U.K. or U.S. rarely read what is written about other countries, and almost never when it is written in a strange foreign language.33 Qualitative researchers

automatically eliminate quantitative work, economists the work of noneconomists, socialists the work of non-socialists, etc. Searches are narrowed down further by ignoring the literature than is more than, say, five years old. The last approach is defensible on the grounds that innovative new channels of enquiry open up and technology and ways of thinking change. However, it is indefensible when ‘new’ ideas are reinvented by a new generation that is ignorant of what has already been produced. The proliferation of literature is limiting rather than expanding our horizons—there is only enough time to read more than a fraction of what is published and hence many people are forced to read more and more narrowly. A lack of sufficient perspective may lead to the discovery of dangerous answers; ‘new’ solutions may be invented when they have already been tried and have failed. (2) The blurring of roles The development banks, NGOs, charities, serious journalists, and academics are increasingly occupying the same ground. All UN agencies now produce ‘scholarly’ reports, often in competition with one another. Some of these reports are written by academics and more academics are doing ‘research’ of a form that used to be called consultancy. Indeed, academics are frequently crossing new frontiers; they work for the development banks and for aid agencies, assist charities and write for newspapers or appear on the radio. Meanwhile, former activists and policy makers enter academia, often at the end of their careers. Journalists do in-depth pieces, which tend to be much more widely read than most academic output. This cross-fertilisation is tending to produce similar kinds of publication. Insofar as this encourages academics to write prose in the style of good journalists, that is to be welcomed. However, there are many dangers. One comes when academics adopt the sensationalism and shortcuts of the media. Another threat is the censorship applied by outside agencies to the objectivity of the academic report. Most non-academic organizations have a line, which they want their consultants to follow. Often they insist on their [End Page 44] commissioned research following that line, sometimes pressure is exercised delicately, often it is not. (3) Competing for attention If we all suffer as readers because so much is published which we lack the time to read, likewise we also suffer as producers. All academics want their output to be read and with citation indices and audience ratings now becoming compulsory elements in academic life, they are encouraged to research and write in ‘relevant’ areas. Perhaps grand generalizations flourish in such an environment? Academics want to stand out from the crowd and one way of doing so is to exaggerate their case. One common form of exaggeration is to discover what happens in one place and to argue that this is occurring everywhere. So globalisation, a la South China, is generalised as a problem or a solution in every part of the ‘South.’ The maquila plants of northern Mexico are a problem because they do not provide adequate salaries or maintain satisfactory environmental standards. Meanwhile in-bond plants are the supposed answer to unemployment in most of the Caribbean and even in Africa. Similarly, social polarisation, in the form of gentrification or U.S.-style gated communities, has become a universal problem even though it is comparatively rare in most parts of Europe and has not become a key problem even in the socially divided cities of Latin America. Urban crime is seemingly on the increase in every region across the globe, even when we know that most forms of crime have fallen in London, New York and even Bogotá and were never terribly high in the Middle East, Chile or Korea.34 While these phenomena are undoubtedly real, too often discussion of them so lacks perspective and omits mention of the exceptions. As a result, extreme cities have become the norm across the globe. Conclusion That the world is hugely unequal and that one manifestation of this inequality has been the simultaneous emergence of immensely rich and immensely poor urban areas is undeniable. It is shameful that there are billions of very poor people in the world today and that in combination with increasing urbanisation this has produced a higher proportion of people living in squalid urban areas. Urban poverty is a vital area for study and the growing interest shown by development agencies and the media should be welcomed. However, it seems that of the information and research that is reaching this wider public is either distorted or exaggerated. Recent discussion of the problem of slums is a clear example. Without for one moment denying that urgent action should be taken to improve living conditions for the poor, in particular by providing safe water, improving [End Page 45] sanitary conditions, reducing environmental risk, and affording some measure of tenure security, is some of the rhetoric that is coming from academics, journalists, charities, and the UN actually helpful? Far too much of this writing is arguably following a similar line and is insufficiently critical of received wisdom.

Squo improving

The status quo relations through the border are managing real crises-Bilateral efforts checkCamuñez 12, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Market Access and Compliance (Michael, October 5, 2012, “The Untold Story About the U.S.-Mexico Border” http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/10/05/untold-story-about-us-mexico-border)nasokan

Violence. Narco-trafficking. Illegal Immigration. A place of great insecurity. Listen to the national media and these are the

images they would have you believe define and characterize the U.S.-Mexico Border. It’s true, Mexico is confronting serious security challenges and is working hard to tackle them, making progress each day in part with the assistance of the United States. But the benefits derived from scale and magnitude of our economic partnership with Mexico—still one of the best performing and fastest growing economies in the G20 and

OECD—literally dwarf those challenges. And that’s a story that’s well worth remembering.¶ That’s why earlier this week in Tempe, Arizona, I convened and, together with Arizona State University’s Center for Trans-border Studies, co-hosted a bi-national conference focused on the commercial importance of the border region. The conference, entitled “Realizing the Economic Strength of Our 21st Century Border: Trade, Education, and Jobs,” brought together a diverse and distinguished group of leaders from academia, the private and public sector leaders, and members of civil society from throughout the border region. Our goal was two-fold: to identify and share strategies that will promote economic growth and job creation through increased trade; and to raise awareness and build consensus concerning the economic contribution of the border region to the U.S. and Mexican economies. In short, the conference was about changing the narrative about the U.S.-Mexico border by telling the full story about how and why the border region is a key driver of our global competitiveness and shared prosperity. As evidenced in a recent Arizona

Republic editorial highlighting the conference, our efforts are already paying off.¶ I’ve previously written extensively about how the border region is vital to the U.S.-Mexico commercial relationship, which is one of the most dynamic economic partnerships in the world. In 2011, two way trade in goods and services between the U.S. and Mexico exceeded a staggering half trillion dollars. U.S. exports to Mexico totaled close to $200 billion, exceeding our exports to Brazil, Russia, India and China combined! According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, approximately 6 million U.S. jobs depend on trade with our southern neighbor. Six million jobs!¶ And what happens on the border doesn’t solely affect border towns and border states. More than 20 U.S. states count Mexico as their first or second largest export market, and 28 states did more than $1 billion in trade with Mexico in 2011. ¶ Manufacturers in Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Illinois and throughout America depend on integrated U.S.-Mexico supply chains to bring components, supplies and finished goods back and forth across the border every day, sustaining millions of jobs in factories around the country. And this doesn’t even get to the nearly 13.5 million Mexican tourists who traveled to the U.S. in 2011 and spent $9.2 billion supporting the U.S. economy.¶ Given the importance of this powerful relationship, the Obama Administration launched the Border Export Strategy to highlight the significance of the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship and, more specifically, the vibrant, diverse, and talented communities that make up the border region. This week’s conference, which was attended by more than 250 leaders from both countries, is a key element of that strategy, which in turn supports the President’s National Export Initiative, the aim of which is to double U.S. exports by the end of 2014.¶ The conference also advanced the 2010 joint declaration by Presidents Obama and Calderon on 21st Century Border Management, which is designed to enhance economic competitiveness while augmenting our nation’s security and public safety by supporting a bilateral border master plan process for infrastructure projects in order to increase capacity; expand trusted traveler and shipper programs; and explore opportunities for pre-clearance, pre-inspection, and pre-screening processes for commercial goods and travelers.

Squo improving- Social unrest and Latin American programs bridge the gap of inequalitySchiel 12, Rebecca Schiel is a graduate student in the International Relations Program at the University of Massachusetts Boston (Rebecca, December 10, 2012, “Globalization and Social Equality” http://blogs.umb.edu/paxblog/2012/12/10/globalization-and-social-equality/)nasokan

The Economist published a special report on inequality and the new progressivism and it highlighted some very interesting and counterintuitive trends in inequity in the global environment. ¶ The report claims that while the largest inequality gaps have occurred in emerging states, the sharpest declines in inequality have also taken place there. This reversed pattern of growth in the past few decades (from richer countries to poorer ones) has narrowed global inequality while at the same time increasing inequality within individual states. Aside from the market forces at work in emerging economies, governments have taken notice of growing social unrest and attention paid to gross inequality.¶ From the Arab Spring to the banking bailouts in the US the evidence of popular unrest over inequality is mounting. Governments are forced to take notice not only because inequality can cause wastefulness, but also because the poor masses will not stay dispossessed for long. And while different parts of the world view and measure inequality differently, the primary objective is to raise all boats. The report provides case studies of states/regions and their specific efforts within education and government sponsored programs aimed at eliminating inequality. Asia (China and India) and Latin America (Brazil) and their varying degrees of success and the areas of their failures are reported on below.¶ China experienced growth at break-neck speeds over the last 30 years and with that came unprecedented levels of inequality. Part of this trend toward unparalleled inequality has had to do with the urbanization of the workforce and the ensuing prosperity that has come to those leaving agriculture. China has taken notice that the focus of globalization on technology and innovation will primarily benefit the skilled and educated workforce and as such they have chosen to educate their urban populations. However, China is still experiencing inequality at higher levels than most other places. One of the main reasons for this inequity is the rampant cronyism in the Chinese government. The other problem adding to inequality in China is the outdated Hokou system. Those registered as rural rather than urban are at a huge disadvantage in education, housing, and employment opportunities.¶ In the case of India, one is able to see not just the rampant inequality but also the great strides made in bridging the gap. The juxtaposition of these descriptions makes clear the relative quality of iniquity; sometimes the difference between a mud house and a brick house makes all the difference. The Indian government has taken up a program of rural employment whereby a wage floor is guaranteed and unemployment is being tackled. While incomes for average Indians have doubled in the last two decades, inequality has also grown. Additionally, India has experienced increased social mobility that has come from government sponsored education and infrastructure, two areas that are notoriously lacking in the slums of India. Not only has absolute mobility increased in India but so has relative mobility. In other words, parents’ economic standing has a lesser effect on the opportunities of their children. However, there are still stumbling blocks for India; among them are a lack of infrastructure, lack of basic education and attendance, and government programs that are effectively working against the poor (such as resource subsidies).¶ Brazil paints a much more positive picture. As the report points out Latin America traditionally had the most unequal societies but recently that trend has changed. Over the last 10 years, incomes in Latin America have exploded which has helped the poor to catch up with the rich thus bridging the inequality gap somewhat. And even though Latin America did not experience the same rapid growth of Asia (Latin America experienced growth at about ½ the rate of Asia) its poverty rate fell by almost 1/3 in the same time span. The success is largely due to government programs aimed at lessening the wage gaps for the poorest and a focus on education has created more literate and mid-skilled workers. Furthermore, an emphasis on rule of law in formerly lawless slums has created growth and prosperity where some never thought possible.

Democracy solves

Democracy spread in the squo solves-Makes the impacts impossible and spreads the acceptance of pluralism in societyLagon 11, Mark P. Lagon is a adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and for the United Nations (Mark P. February 2011, “Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States and the International Community” http://www.cfr.org/democratization/promoting-democracy-whys-hows-united-states-international-community/p24090)nasokan

Furthering democracy is often dismissed as moralism distinct from U.S. interests or mere lip service to build support for strategic policies. Yet there are tangible stakes for the United States and indeed the world in the spread of democracy—namely, greater peace, prosperity, and pluralism . Controversial means for promoting democracy and frequent

mismatches between deeds and words have clouded appreciation of this truth.¶ Democracies often have conflicting priorities, and democracy

promotion is not a panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in international relations is that established democracies never go to war with one another. Foreign policy “realists” advocate working with other governments on the basis of interests, irrespective of character, and suggest that this approach best preserves stability in the world. However, durable stability flows from a domestic politics built on consensus and peaceful competition, which more often than not promotes similar international conduct for governments.¶ There has long been controversy about whether democracy enhances economic development. The dramatic growth of China certainly challenges this notion. Still, history will likely show that democracy yields the most prosperity. Notwithstanding the global financial turbulence of the past three years, democracy’s elements facilitate long-term economic growth. These elements include above all freedom of expression and learning to promote innovation, and rule of law to foster predictability for investors and stop corruption from stunting growth. It is for that reason that the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the 2002 UN Financing for Development Conference in Monterey, Mexico, embraced good governance as the enabler of development. These elements have unleashed new emerging powers such as India and Brazil and raised the quality of life for impoverished peoples. Those who argue that economic development will eventually yield political freedoms may be reversing the order of influences—or at least discounting the reciprocal

relationship between political and economic liberalization.¶ Finally, democracy affords all groups equal access to justice—and equal opportunity to shine as assets in a country’s economy. Democracy’s support for pluralism prevents human assets—including religious and ethnic minorities, women, and migrants—from being squandered. Indeed, a shortage of economic opportunities and outlets for grievances has contributed

significantly to the ongoing upheaval in the Middle East. Pluralism is also precisely what is needed to stop violent extremism from wreaking havoc on the world. ¶ Evolving U.S. Policy ¶ To say there are major interests in democracy’s “enlargement”—that central concept in both national security strategy blueprints of the Clinton presidency—does not settle what role the United States should play and what policy tools are appropriate. These are the questions not of why but of

how. A look at waves of U.S. policy since World War II offers apt lessons.¶ After World War II, the United States played a significant role in deepening and widening democracy in Western Europe. The United States encouraged European integration to stabilize the West European democracies, and NATO was a bulwark within which Italy, West Germany, Portugal, and Spain democratized. Later, after the Cold War, the twin institutions of NATO and an integrated Europe together created powerful incentives for emerging East European democracies to join Western multilateral institutions. ¶ Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, however, frequently led the United States to support illiberal governments. (President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s revealing quip about Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza—“He may be a bastard, but he’s our bastard”—too often became U.S. policy during the Cold War years.) Eventually, a consensus emerged in the 1980s—arguably President Ronald Reagan’s greatest legacy—that the United States had strategic interests in urging its autocratic Latin American and East Asian allies toward democracy. And so, in the 1980s, the United States supported land reforms in El Salvador that were deeply unpopular among ruling elites; facilitated the departure of General Augusto Pinochet as Chile’s leader; and pushed Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines in the direction of veritable electoral democracy.¶ After 9/11, President George W. Bush elevated democratization in the Middle East as a strategic priority. This apt aim, however, was undermined by several factors: the association of democracy promotion with military intervention in Iraq (which did not yield democracy with ease); the use of harsh counterterrorism measures that undercut the symbolism of freedom; the tendency to flinch when likely winners of elections were worrisome (such as in the Palestinian territories); and the failure to meet democracy rhetoric with action in places like Egypt and Pakistan.¶ The protests sweeping the Middle East in early 2011, which have so far caused the ouster of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and rocked the government of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, are now confronting President Barack Obama with a familiar challenge. In Egypt, the United States appears to face a classic dilemma: how to handle the potential demise of a friendly autocrat in a strategically important country. On the one hand, President Obama is under pressure to offer more vocal support to those demanding democracy on the streets of Cairo and call for an early change of leadership. On the other, many argue that President Mubarak has protected American interests in the Middle East for thirty years, and there is no guarantee that a new democratic government in Egypt would do the same if the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood should be elected.¶ President Obama’s struggle to reconcile these pressures comes after he began his term distancing himself from Washington’s mixed democracy-promotion legacy. His failure to embrace Iran’s inspiring Green Movement in the summer of 2009—presumably to keep a door open for dialogue on Iran’s nuclear program—was a clear indication of the Obama administration’s more realist turn. Now several signals indicate greater comfort with the bipartisan democracy consensus of the Reagan, Clinton, and

George W. Bush presidencies. These include President Obama’s 2009 Nobel Laureate address; Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s unveiling of

another U.S. fund to help besieged human rights defenders; and President Obama’s 2010 address to the UN General Assembly, where he said, “There is no right more fundamental than the ability to choose your leaders and determine your destiny.” A record of implementation now needs to follow these public statements, whether in Egypt or any number of countries where democracy is absent or at risk—and where long-term U.S. interests are abundantly at stake.

Visa-Bad Turns (depends on CX)

Visas are a tool used to maintain the border - that ultimately forces immigrants to a “no man’s land,” where they are rejected by both countriesRamlow, 6 ((Todd R., “Bodies in the Borderlands: Gloria Anzaluda's and David Wojnarowicz's Mobility Machines,” MELUS, Volume: 31(3), Fall, p. 178. DAP)Wojnarowicz's Close to the Knives: A Memoir of Disintegration furthers and complicates Anzaldi6a's notions of the borderlands and crip-queer-mestiza/o subjectivity, as well as the connections she forges between the cripple, the queer, and the mojado. In Close to the Knives, the section titled "In the Shadow of the American Dream: Soon This Will All Be Picturesque Ruins"

chronicles Wojnarowicz's physical journeying through the southwestern United States, his

own crip-queer-mestizo consciousness, and his life in the borderlands. These borderlands are, as the section title announces, literally "in the shadow of the American Dream," outside of a normative national fantasy of community and identity. Wojnarowicz echoes Anzaldua, who at the end of Borderlands/La Frontera exhorts a dominant Anglo culture to "[a]dmit that Mexico is your double, that she exists in the shadow of this country"

(86). For both Anzalduia and Wojnarowicz, Mexico functions less as a physical entity and more as an abstract principle of sexual, physical, and cultural otherness abjected from a normate America. Once again, we can see the desire to keep these entities separate, to maintain distinction and stave off contagion in the military fencing stretching across the US-Mexico border today.

Temporary worker quotas creates a binary of “legal” versus “illegal,” which justifies the militarization of immigrants that are considered “illegal.”Johnson, 04 (Kelli Lyon, Director, Center for Civic Engagement Associate Professor of English Miami University Hamilton, “Violence in the Borderlands: Crossing to the Home Spaces in the Novels of Ana Castillo,” Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Volume: 25(1), p. DAP)

In borderland spaces , we can see what law does in American history and American culture. In some

legal scholarship, law plays the role of tagalong, following changes in society that are seen as more fundamental.6 Law's role in border regions makes apparent that the relationship between law and society is more dynamic. Mae Ngai demonstrates this in her book Impossible Subjects, showing the ways law produces categories that then are seen as social problems in need of legal regulation.7 The transnational labor market at the U.S.–Mexico border appears, not as a natural phenomenon, but fueled by labor needs of large-scale agriculture in the west, and by legal restrictions on Asian immigration to the United States.

Once immigration was funneled into the bracero temporary worker program or through restrictive immigration quotas, preexisting migration outside these bounds became "illegal." At the same time, the border itself, a fluid, transnational space, was militarized and patrolled. Through legal and policy developments, the problem of "illegal" immigration is structured and produce d . In this example, law does not respond to natural forces outside the law; instead it responds to a social context constructed, in part, through law.

Temporary worker visa only commit violence to the people on the borderlands and hurt their identitiesCamacho, 08 (Alicia Schmidt Camacho, Professor of American Studies at Yale, Migrant Imaginaries: Latino Cultural Political in he US and Mexico Borderland 2008 pg 64)Galarza viewed braceros as a threat to the livelihood of U.S.-born farmworkers. Claims for inter-American friendship and national progress, he knew, acted as a powerful sanction for racial and class discrimination against both migrants and U.S.-born Mexicans. The importation of

“indentured aliens” as farm- workers was less a resolution to the problems of unequal development in the Mexico-U.S. borderlands than an expansion of a neocolonial caste system within the globalizing agricultural economy. As such, the presence of thousands of imported workers in labor camps, or encamped outside Mexican recruitment centers, recalled the longer history of racialized class struggle both within Mexico and in the agricultural labor market. The specter of hundreds of thousands of these “production men” — mere arms detached from the enfranchised body of the citizen— crossing into the United States revealed the lineaments of class racism in the transborder society. For Mexican Americans, the Bracero Program forced a reckoning with far more than their economic vulnerability in the United States: it revealed, once again, their own alienated status within the nation. The mass arrival of braceros increased Mexican American ambivalence toward the migrant newcomers, with whom they shared ethnic ties, class identity, and a history of racial discrimination. While intellectuals like Galarza exposed capitalist modernization as a racializing project, Mexican Americans contested the conversion of their vibrant laboring culture into nothing more than an “input factor.”

Exclusion, otherization, and alienation are inevitable. The strange and unknown will permeate these notions- The aff does little to remedy the separation induced by the universe, systems, or oneselfKaufmann 80, Philosopher and poet who had a Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion from Harvard University (Walter 1980, “The Inevitability of Alienation” http://www.jstor.org/stable/40369321 JSTOR)nasokan

We must ask not only from whom or what a person or group is ¶ supposed to be alienated but also what would constitute the absence ¶ of this alienation. Self-consciousness involves a sense of what is other ¶ - alienum in Latin. If anyone literally found nothing human alien to ¶

himself, he would be totally lacking in any sense of selfhood. (Terence's ¶ beautiful line, Homo sum; humani nil a me alienum puto - I am a man, ¶ and I hold nothing human strange to me - refers not to the total absence ¶ but to the overcoming of a sense of strangeness: a triumph that involves ¶ imagination and understanding, not imbecility.) If anyone could not tell ¶ a strange hand from his own and actually experienced one just as he ¶ did the other, we might as well say that he experienced his own hand ¶ as strange and was alienated from himself and specifically from his ¶ own body. ¶ Have we illicitly confounded otherhood and strangeness? A person ¶ of whom I realize that he is other than myself need not seem strange ¶ to me. He may be a familiar sight - no stranger nor strange to me: ¶ "I know him", But how well do I know him? I simply do not care ¶ enough to think about the 99 % of him that is for me terra incognita. ¶ We are strangers but not sufficiently interested to realize it or be bothered ¶ by it, and one might well hesitate to speak of alienation or estrangement ¶ in such cases lest one be taken to imply that there was a prior state ¶ of closer rapport. ¶ Now suppose that I am suddenly struck by the fact that I hardly ¶ know this person. This could happen as we began to talk to each other. ¶ I might never have hesitated to say "I know him"; but now that I ¶ actually got to know him at least a little better I might come to feel ¶ that I really do not know him at all and that he is quite strange. ¶ This paradox may seem to be reducible to the double meanings of ¶ "know" and "strange". As Hegel pointed out, what is bekannt or known ¶ by acquaintance and hence familiar is not necessarily erkannt or known ¶ in the sense of being comprehended. But that is not all. Familiarity ¶ actually obstructs knowledge, and comprehension involves the overcoming ¶ of a sense of strangeness. This point, too, is central in Hegel's thought. ¶ Another image may make it clearer. It is hard to see in perspective ¶ and comprehend what is very close to us: comprehension requires some ¶ distance and consists in a triumph over distance. It is often easier to ¶ understand the problems of others than our own. In these cases, of ¶ course, emotional involvement does its share to blind us. But the same ¶ phenomenon can be observed

when a play, a painting, or some piece ¶ of music is exceedingly familiar to us: we lack distance and must become ¶ alienated if we would comprehend it. ¶ Plato and Aristotle remarked that philosophy begins in wonder or ¶ perplexity. We could also say that it begins when sometime suddently ¶ strikes us as strange - or that philosophy is born of estrangement. It ¶ need not be alienation from other human beings; it could be estrange- ¶ ment from oneself or the universe. Or a belief or system of beliefs, a moral conviction or a code that we had taken for granted may suddenly ¶ seem strange to us. Such alienation need not be a merely intellectual ¶

event; it may involve a deep estrangement from the faith and morals ¶ of our society. ¶ It may seem to be a reductio ad absurdum to speak of alienation ¶ when a child begins to ask questions about all sorts of things that but ¶ a few months earlier had not struck him as at all strange and that ¶ most Philistines would not dream of questioning. For it is clearly the ¶ child that does not ask questions that one has to worry about, and ¶ alienation of this type is a symptom of mental health, while lack of it ¶ is pathological. Those who assume that alienation is by definition ¶

regrettable would not think of applying the term to a healthy child. ¶ But adolescence is our second childhood; and when students start asking ¶ questions about their schools and the societies in which they live, it is ¶ often said that they are alienated. A healthy child ought not to be ¶ satisfied with the reply that this is simply how things are. Should an ¶ adolescent be content with such an answer? ¶ Some people, no doubt, would apply the term to adolescents only ¶ by way of registering regret or disapproval. But in purely descriptive ¶ terms, the adolescent who gains a sense of distance experiences a gulf ¶ between himself and all sorts of things and people, and he feels ¶ estranged. The curiosity of the small child that asks questions is not ¶ so regularly accompanied by a deep sense of alienation.

Biopower is inevitableWright 8, (Nathan, Fellow at the Centre for Global Political Economy, “Camp as Paradigm: Bio-Politics and State Racism in Foucault and Agamben”, http://ccjournal.cgu.edu/past_issues/nathan_wright.html)

Perhaps the one failure of Foucault’s that, unresolved, rings as most ominous is his failure to further examine the problem of bio-political state racism that he first raises in his lecture series, Society Must Be Defended. At the end of the last lecture, Foucault suggests that bio-power is here to stay as a fixture of modernity. Perhaps given its focus on the preservation of the population of the nation it which it is practiced, bio-power itself is something that Foucault accepts as here to stay. Yet his analysis of bio-politics and bio-power leads inevitably to state-sanctioned racism, be the government democratic, socialist, or fascist. As a result, he ends the lecture series with the question, “How can one both make a bio-power function and exercise the rights of war, the rights of murder and the function of death, without becoming racist? That was the problem, and that, I think, is still the problem.” It was a problem to which he never returned. However, in the space opened by Foucault’s failure to solve the problem of state racism and to “elaborate a unitary theory of power” (Agamben 1998, 5) steps Agamben in an attempt to complete an analysis of Foucauldian bio-politics and to, while not solve the problem of state racism, at least give direction for further inquiry and hope of a politics that escapes the problem of this racism

1NC Hispanophobia

Advocacy Impossible

The border is a social construct --will remain even if it is physically removed. Politics and the social media are intrinsically tied to the constructionRodriguez 2, Department of Sociology at University of Texas at Austin (Nestor P. "The Social Construct of the U.S.-Mexico Border" http://adelasu.tripod.com/papers/Annotation01-usmexborder.pdf)nasokanThe border that separates Mexico and the United States is a social construct, that is, it is ¶ fictitious and yet has very real consequences. It is fictitious because what separates Mexico and ¶ the United States are not mountains, oceans, rivers or walls (although some parts are in fact ¶ delineated by rivers and walls). Rodriguez explains that "it is the daily reproduction of ideas and ¶ myths that socially construct borders." There is nothing real, true, or valid about the line, which ¶ was politically decided, which separates two very distinct worlds. Yet, the border is a fictitious ¶ line that represents hope, death, work, enslavement, opportunities, humiliation, chance, ¶ oppression. The U.S.- Mexico border is a fictitious line that becomes real when one tries to move ¶ from one side to the other; it becomes a reality when you move from one world to the other.¶ The social construction of the U.S.-Mexico border did not have serious consequences, ¶ until the 1980’s. It used to be common for people to cross the border without major ¶ consequences. However, as politicians and the media began to exploit ideas and myths of an ¶ unsettling flux of immigrants to the north, the realities of the border have changed. As¶ Rodriguez explains, “according to this [new] social construction, the country is facing a bordercontrol crisis that threatens society’s capacity for social integration.” This new reality of the ¶ border has been supplied, promoted and advanced by (1) the continuous visits to the border by ¶ politicians, (2) the constant affirmations of public figures that claim that immigrants abuse the ¶ system, and (3) the various reports that rationalize anti-immigrant reports. Moreover, the social ¶ construction of the Latino and Asian new immigrants as “aliens” who are innately different to ¶ the past European immigrants perpetuate the construction of the border as a dangerous zone of ¶ invasion.

Identity Politics Turn

Establishment and preservation of a Mexican Identity is crucial to Identity politics-The plan would just absorb migrants into the collective of the Western perspectiveHoy 82, Terry Hoy author of “The Review of Politics” and works for the Cambridge University Press citing Octavio Paz*, Mexican writer, poet, diplomat and winner of the Nobel Prize for literature in 1990 (Terry, July 1982, “Octavio Paz: The Search for Mexican Identity” http://www.jstor.org/stable/1407050)nasokanThe question of national identity has been a central theme in ¶ Mexican thought since the Revolution of 1910. The writings of ¶

Octavio Paz, one of Mexico's most prominent literary figures, are ¶ an important and provocative locus for this question. The con- ¶ tribution of Paz to an analysis of Mexican identity must be seen in ¶ the broader context of an intellectual revolution in Mexico. This ¶ began in the late 1920's and was directed against the prevailing ¶ philosophical romanticism represented by Antonio Caso and Jose ¶ Vasconcelos.1. This was, in part, a protest against the anti- ¶ intellectualism inherent in an "aesthetic-intuitive" approach of ¶ these writers. But it was also the demand for a philosophital ¶ perspective more relevant to an emerging Mexican nationalism ¶ already being articulated in literature and art. The writings of the ¶ Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset were of crucial importance ¶ in influencing Mexican philosophy towards realism. The key con- ¶ cept taken from Ortega was that of "historical perspectivism": the ¶ view that reality cannot be grasped independently of the point of ¶ view from which it is being observed. Perspectives do not distort ¶ reality; they constitute it. Philosophy, then, is changed from ¶ something abstract and eternal to something concrete and ¶ historical. Ortega's historical perspectivism became the inspira- ¶ tion for Mexican thinkers who wished to develop a national ¶ philosophy and a concept of "Mexicanidad." ¶ One of the more influential pioneers in the department of a ¶ philosophy of Mexican identity was Samuel Ramos, who ¶ acknowledged his indebtedness to Ortega's emphasis upon the ¶ understanding of man in his concrete historical circumstances. ¶ Just as there is a Chinese perspective that is as fully justified as the ¶ Western , so by the same token there must be a Mexican point of ¶ view that is as fully justified as the European.2 In his book, Profile ¶ of Man and Culture in Mexico, Ramos sought to develop a ¶ psychoanalysis of Mexican character. Mexico's problems, Ramos ¶ contends, have been the result of imitation of European models without being able to overcome the legacy of revolutions, dictator- ¶ ships and economic stagnation. Mexican history is the expression ¶ of a collective inferiority complex stemming from the results of the ¶ Spanish conquest, racial mixture and a disadvantageous ¶ geographical position. In hiding their inferiority, Mexicans have ¶ resorted to unhealthy compensations including aggressive asser- ¶ tions of power that have isolated Mexicans from one another and ¶ prevented the attainment of a sense of community. As a solution ¶ to this problem, Ramos called for a greater self-consciousness of a ¶ uniquely Mexican identity, and the need for an educational ¶ system with a humanistic orientation that would counter the ¶ materialistic civilization stemming from North American in- ¶ fluence. 3 While Ramos was an intellectual leader in the effort to ¶ develop a national philosophy more effectively geared to Mexican ¶ circumstances, he was vulnerable to the charge that he remained ¶ attached to a type of utopian thinking evident, for example, in his ¶ concept of a "New Humanism" as a moral community founded on ¶ "existence as charity." Ramos, in short, did not find a way to ¶ bridge the gap between the values to which he was attached and ¶ the concrete political-economic circumstances of Mexican ¶ society.4 ¶ Octavio Paz carries on the psychoanalytic approach to the ¶ Mexican character pioneered by Ramos. But he develops this in ¶ closer relationship to the concrete realities of Mexican historical ¶ developments and its contemporary economic-political problems. ¶ He also emphasizes Mexican identity in a broader context of ¶ Latin American and Third World political development.

Further engagement would only force assimilation on migrant populationsEmbrick 8, David G. Embrick (2008 publication, “US AND THEM” http://www.sagepub.com/healeyregc6e/study/chapter/encycarticles/ch01/EMBRIC~1.PDF)nasokanAssimilation refers to the process by which people or ¶ groups voluntarily adopt or are forced to adopt the ¶ language and cultural norms and values of another ¶ group. In most

cases, the minority group is expected ¶ to conform to normative practices and ideals associated with the majority group. Those who refuse to ¶ assimilate to the larger culture, such as immigrants ¶ who choose to retain their cultural practices and language, are typically viewed as “anti-American” or¶ somehow different from “typical Americans.”¶ Whether people are allowed to assimilate into the¶ dominant culture largely depends on the whether they¶ will fit into the political, social, and economic desires¶ of the dominant group, a group that has historically¶ been (and continues to be) made up of European White¶ ethnic groups. In the United States, for example, ¶ Native Americans, African Americans, and Mexican ¶

Americans have lived in the United States much longer ¶ than most European American groups. Unfortunately, ¶ instead of being viewed as the normative culture (or ¶ part of the normative culture), these groups continue to ¶ be viewed as “others” who have cultures different from ¶ that of “Americans” or “White” culture.

That internal link turns racismEmbrick 8, David G. Embrick (2008 publication, “US AND THEM” http://www.sagepub.com/healeyregc6e/study/chapter/encycarticles/ch01/EMBRIC~1.PDF)nasokanThere have been numerous studies on the relationship ¶ between minority group size and racial prejudice and ¶ discrimination. As some scholars have suggested, ¶ when the dominant group perceives a “racialized ¶ threat” from a minority group, even if the threat is ¶ unfounded, there is increased prejudice against the ¶ minority group. Other research indicates that typically, the dominant group’s prejudice against minority ¶ and immigrant groups increases during economic ¶ downturns, when the majority may blame them for ¶ perceived loss of jobs, economic insecurities, and ¶ threat of job competition. During such times, there ¶ may be an increase in the “us versus them” mentality. ¶ Recent debates indicate that there is no clear consensus on the future of race relations in the United States.¶ According to some scholars, future race relations in the¶ United States will largely remain a Black/White issue.¶ Other scholars, however, argue that the United States is becoming a multiracial society similar to many South¶ American countries. These researchers conclude that ¶ the United States will be further racially stratified, with ¶ White groups at the top, groups such as those who identify themselves as multiracial serving as a buffer group ¶ in the middle, and darker-skinned groups at the bottom ¶ of the racial hierarchy.

Identity Politics Extensions

The collective psyche that the plan promotes is subjugating- Forces migrants into positions of inauthentic beingKroeker 9, Jake Kroeker citing Martin Heidegger (April 10, 2009, “The Subject/Object Dichotomy in Philosophy” http://www.thegrandpatchwork.com/subjectobject.htm)nasokan

Heidegger also utilizes a subject-object dichotomy in his metaphysical theory of how a being interacts with the world. Heidegger distinguishes between the “I am” and “it is” (lecture). According to Heidegger, the self can be either the subject or an object, depending on the circumstances or mode of being that person is in. The subject can become an object when it is immersed in the collective psyche or when a person does not want to be different from the crowd and thus follows the collective masses blindly (Kaufman, 1975; Richardson, 1963; lecture).¶ Heidegger would probably say that those living in a Marxist or communist country would be more likely to see themselves as objects (author’s interpretation). The term for the subject becoming an object is reification, which is to become a thing or to live in the world as an object (lecture). Heidegger calls the objective self in this reified state Das Man, being in the mode of inauthentic being or Fallenness

(Kaufman, 1975; lecture). This is where Sartre is similar to Heidegger because Sartre’s concept of Self Deception could be considered like this Das Man mode of being because if one takes on roles in society (like a waiter) and if that person believes that this title sum them up as a whole, this would turn that subject into an object, an instrument, or a mere machine (lecture; Solomon, 1974).

1NC Environmental JusticeSQUO solves – new environmental improvement projects from Border 2012 initiativeEPA 1/30/09, “US-Mexico Border”, http://www.epa.gov/SoCal/border.htmlWith funding from the Border 2012 program, the communities of Quitovac (Sonora, Mexico) and San Antonio de Necua (Baja California, Mexico) completed construction of their water systems. The new system at Quitovac serves a boarding school for 100 O'odham children. The Mexican government is now extending electricity to the community and has committed to upgrade homes to provide indoor plumbing, and the Pan American Health Organization is providing a health clinic. The Pala Band of Mission Indians completed an EPA-funded assessment of the drinking water for seven indigenous communities in Baja California. This assessment revealed significant drinking water contamination in six of the seven indigenous communities. As a result, Border 2012 provided $66,000 for drinking water infrastructure improvements for two of the indigenous communities, and Mexico committed to providing $900,000 for water and other infrastructure improvements for 102 homes in Baja California indigenous communities. In addition, the Pala Band of Mission Indians received Border 2012 resources to fund training and capacity building for the operation and maintenance of two new water treatment systems in the Baja California communities of San Jose de la Zorra and San Antonio Necua. $100,000 has been added to these ongoing projects that will improve water infrastructure for five indigenous communities in the Baja California Border Region including San Antonio Necua, San Jose de la Zorra, and Santa Catarina. Drinking water distribution lines have been constructed and operation and maintenance training has been conducted for workers at San Antonio Necua and San Jose de la Zorra.

SQUO solves – new border initiative aimed at the environmentUS Embassy 7/19/13, “US Offers Grants for US-Mexico Environmental Program”, US Embasy IIP Digital, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2013/07/20130719279207.htmlWashington — The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is holding workshops in the United States and Mexico in July and August as it seeks to award $884,000 in grants for environmental projects in the U.S.-Mexico border region in Texas and New Mexico. The funds will be awarded under the Border 2020 U.S.-Mexico Environmental Program, in coordination with the Border Environment Cooperation Commission. All proposals must be submitted by August 29, 2013. EPA said it will award grants to projects that reflect the goals of the Border 2020 program, especially those supporting work in the Texas-New Mexico border region. Project types, the agency said, include improving air quality monitoring networks, developing applications for reusing water, developing bilingual outreach campaigns to stop illegal dumping, updating sister-city plans, improving understanding of each country’s compliance and enforcement roles, and others. Greater consideration will be given to proposals that leverage other resources and demonstrate measurable results, EPA said.

Border key to water infrastructure projects- Continues to address regional environmental needsEPA 11, Environmental Protection Agency 2011 report (2011 report, “U.S.-Mexico Border Water Infrastructure Program” http://water.epa.gov/infrastructure/wastewater/smallruralsystems/upload/EPA_SCB_USMB_report_FINAL.pdf)nasokan

The U.S.-Mexico Border Region is a ¶ dynamic area where public health and ¶ environmental challenges are ¶ interconnected, populations ¶ intermingle, and water resources are ¶ shared by both countries. The EPA ¶ U.S.-Mexico Border Water ¶ Infrastructure Program works ¶ collaboratively to address critical ¶ public health and environmental ¶ problems at the source by providing ¶ often first-time drinking and ¶ wastewater services to underserved ¶ communities. ¶ Since 1997, EPA investments of $571 ¶ million in grant funding have ¶ leveraged more than $1.1 billion in ¶ funding from other sources. Through ¶ cross-agency collaboration, the Border Program has funded 97 ¶ projects with total construction costs ¶ of more than $1.7 billion, benefiting ¶ 8.5 million people. Seventy eight ¶ projects have been completed, ¶ including 13 completed in fiscal year ¶ 2011 (FY11).¶ The program protects public health ¶ and the environment by providing ¶ essential drinking water and ¶ wastewater services to underserved ¶ communities, funding projects that ¶ otherwise would be financially ¶ infeasible. The program has helped ¶ border communities gain access to ¶ these basic and essential services; ¶ yet, the documented need for ¶ additional assistance remains critical. As part of the FY11/12 funding cycle, ¶ EPA sponsored a series of workshops to ¶ help communities evaluate funding ¶ options to support their infrastructure ¶ needs. Federal and state agencies, ¶ including US Departments of Agriculture ¶ (USDA) and Housing and Urban ¶ Development (HUD), participated in ¶ these workshops and provided ¶ information about their funding programs. ¶ EPA received 200 applications with a ¶ total estimated construction cost of $800 ¶ million. ¶ Through EPA’s prioritization process, 23 ¶ of these projects have been selected as ¶ candidates to receive funding for ¶ planning and development. As ¶ construction funds become available, ¶

EPA will fund those projects that address ¶ the most urgent public health and ¶ environmental needs.

1NC ImaginationImagination can’t liberate – it is obedient to the larger culture Douglas Robillard, Jr. 2002 Philander Smith CollegeMFS Modern Fiction Studies 48.2 (2002) 501-503 Review of Sarah Gordon. Flannery O'Connor: The Obedient Imagination. Athens: U of Georgia P, 2000 The publication of Sarah Gordon's latest book is an important event in Flannery O'Connor studies. Gordon's O'Connor credentials are unimpeachable. Since 1973, she has taught at O'Connor's alma mater in Milledgeville, Georgia. In 1973 she also undertook the position of associate editor at The Flannery O'Connor Bulletin, and in 1983, she became editor. Her close proximity to the scenes of O'Connor's life and her access to the author's extensive manuscript collection at Georgia College and State University in Milledgeville ensure that hers is an informed opinion. Clearly The Obedient Imagination is the work of a top scholar in the field. The book provides Gordon with a chance to reflect on her extensive scholarly career. She notes that, over the past thirty years, her critical view has expanded as trends in literary theory have changed; consequently, her reactions to and perceptions of O'Connor have changed over time as well. At the time that she started her teaching career, she worked firmly within the framework of New Criticism. For Gordon, this initial critical approach has been supplemented by her exposure to feminist criticism, reader response criticism, and the dialogic theory of Bakhtin. Rather than adopting one theory of criticism to the exclusion of others, Gordon blends her approaches. However, the book does favor a feminist view of O'Connor, which is reflected in the phrase, "the obedient imagination." [End Page 501] Gordon's lengthy career has led her to formulate some fundamental questions regarding O'Connor's work and art. She wonders why it is that O'Connor's world view seems so unremittingly bleak; why O'Connor is relentlessly satirical in her treatment of characters, and whether her use of satire is cruel; why women in particular and the feminine in general are such targets for O'Connor's ridicule; why she presents African Americans as marginal characters, and whether this depiction reflects racist attitudes on O'Connor's part. In answering these questions, Gordon presents the thesis that O'Connor's imagination was "obedient" to the patriarchal modes of thought and art of her time. By "obedient imagination," Gordon means that O'Connor's free-ranging imagination was reined-in by her adherence to Catholic teachings. Indeed, Gordon identifies one source of O'Connor's power as a writer in the tension between her formidable imagination and the restrictions imposed by the Church. However, Gordon's concerns extend further than O'Connor's relationship with the Church. For Gordon, O'Connor's imagination is "obedient" in that it obeys the promptings of a patriarchal academic and literary culture. She sees O'Connor's renowned "unladylike" treatment of her subject matter as rooted in the ideas and attitudes of the male writers and critics of her time. Citing influences on O'Connor such as the Fugitive Poets, T. S. Eliot, Nathanael West, and James Thurber, Gordon suggests that O'Connor internalized their opinions of women and literature. From the Fugitives, Gordon sees the influence of New Criticism in O'Connor's essays on writing. From Eliot, she identifies O'Connor's use of "waste land" imagery in her novels and stories. From West and Thurber, she suggests that O'Connor adopted the attitude of misogyny with a sharp satirical edge. Gordon observes that O'Connor's apparent hostility to the feminine and female is rooted in her unquestioning acceptance of the male-dominated literary tradition of her time. From Eliot and the New Critics, suggests Gordon, O'Connor learned to devalue women's literary efforts. Her disdain for "women's fiction" and her adoption of the hard-boiled "masculine" style of fiction, with its emphasis on male experience and characters, emerge from this exposure to patriarchal literary criticism. Gordon singles out Margaret Mitchell's Gone With the Wind as an example of the type of "women's fiction" that O'Connor ridiculed in her own work. [End Page 502] In all, The Obedient Imagination is a thoughtful look into the work and career of Flannery O'Connor. On completing it, the reader may well wonder about the concept of the "obedient imagination"; after all, what human being's imagination is not obedient, at least initially, to the dictates of its time and locale?

Their attempt to separate imagination & action is a false dichotomy –imagination is foundational, so unfolding to policy implication is part of it C. Jeffery Kinlaw 2005 McMurry UniversityJournal of the History of Philosophy 43.4 (2005) 494-495 Review of Jennifer Ann Bates. Hegel's Theory of Imagination. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004Bates has made an important contribution to scholarship on the early Hegel. She demonstrates successfully the centrality of the imagination (Einbildungskraft) in Hegel's account of cognitive powers involved in the representation of experience—from simple intuitions to communicative thought—as that account develops through his successive lectures on Geistesphilosophie leading up to the publication of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Equally important, Bates provides an introduction to Hegel's initial and often obscure work in epistemology abstracted from

later analyses of the socially and historically mediated forms of consciousness encountered in the Phenomenology. Bates's overall aim is ambitious: she argues that the imagination, since it lies at the basis of all representational thought, is intrinsic to any form of consciousness and thus becomes the overarching, though insufficiently acknowledged, theme of the Phenomenology. In short, she claims to establish that the rational progression of the Concept is the imagination. Bates' book is divided into two parts. Part One, consisting of five chapters and entitled "Subjective Authentication," traces the development of Hegel's theory of representation and shows the central role of imagination in that theory. Part Two, entitled "Objective Authentication," contains two chapters, the first devoted to the imagination in Hegel's [End Page 494] aesthetics and his critique of romanticism, the second to the place of imagination in the Phenomenology. Chapter One discusses Hegel's Schellingean period and indicates how imagination is intrinsic to the original unfolding of the Absolute as nature and intellect. Chapter Two offers a careful exegesis of the difficult Fragment 17 in the 1803/04 lectures on Geistesphilosophie. Here Bates indicates the theme prominent within all of the early lectures: the imagination is intrinsic to all intentionality whereby something is identified as something. Chapter Three turns to the full 03/04 lectures and the levels of cognitive processes Hegel explicates as necessary for transforming initial intuitions into thoughts communicable within a shared linguistic community. Chapter Four focuses on the 05/06 Geistesphilosophie lectures and Hegel's there expanded and more nuanced treatment of imagination. Bates explores how imagination is implicated in all levels of cognitive function: intuition and shaping of mental images, recollection of previously retained images, and formation of names and linguistic expressions—in sum, imagination is operative within all cognitive activities terminating in intentional thought or action . Herein lay Bates' opportunity to

chronicle the emergence of Hegel's assault on immediacy or the given. Unfortunately, she fails to take sufficient advantage of the opportunity. She moves toward confronting the issue by noting that Hegel fails to explore adequately the ultimate source of intuitions, though he does defend the claim that consciousness "creates" space and time and thereby determines all objects of experience. How consciousness determines objects in a way that eliminates the given she does not explore. Bates does indicate that imagination is consciousness's first reflective act, the initial "inwardizing" inherent within intuition. But if intuition is reflected, does not this suggest that Hegel already had outlined his critique of immediacy? There are no citations in Bates's book of standard scholarship on this issue—for instance, Sellars, McDowell, Pippin, Pinkard, Forster. Chapter Five explores Hegel's mature account of imagination in his 1830 Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Again, Bates shows that the dialectic within which consciousness unfolds—from rudimentary images within incipient memory to fully articulated thought—is the inwardizing progression of imagination. What remained implicit in the 05/06 lectures is explicit here: there is no private meaningfulness; the identification of anything meaningful presupposes an inter-subjective arena of communicability.

Open Borders NEG – HSS – Off Case

Framework HelpIgnoring the political barriers to open borders harms understandingDoris Provine, 2008 , Professor, School of Justice & Social Inquiry, Arizona State U.Review of OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS, by Kevin R. Johnson. Law & Politics Book Review, Vol. 18 No. 2 (February, 2008) pp.106-108 http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/johnson0208.htmThe argument for open borders is nevertheless appealing and interesting, raising, for the sympathetic reader the question of how one might begin to persuade others to welcome immigrants. Johnson’s strategy of citing and then countering arguments against open borders is powerful and helpful. He made a good strategic choice in focusing on the rationality of opening borders and not dwelling on the psychological reasons, including racism and xenophobia, that make so many Americans uneasy about immigration. But he might have talked more about the political obstacles that stand in the way of open borders and the costs of such a policy. What is it about this system of government that allows such flagrantly unworkable policies to be set in place, and defended? The ill-planned, unmanageable, and racist War on Drugs comes to mind as a parallel case.

We need a full range of policy args to counter the exaggerations from supportersDoris Provine, 2008 , Professor, School of Justice & Social Inquiry, Arizona State U.Review of OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS, by Kevin R. Johnson. Law & Politics Book Review, Vol. 18 No. 2 (February, 2008) pp.106-108 http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/johnson0208.htmAt times, this book makes for frustrating reading. Perhaps because it is organized like a legal brief for open borders, the text is repetitive and occasionally didactic. Johnson exhorts the reader to see the right to migrate as a basic civil right without seriously exploring the possible consequences. He is too quick to dismiss the prospect of significantly increased migration from the poorest nations under an open-borders policy. While he does, repeatedly, acknowledge the importance of governmental efforts to integrate immigrants and criticize the US for not doing more to create English classes and other assimilative programs, he never reaches the problem of costs or planning. At times he appears curiously out of touch with how poor the current social support system is in the United States. He expresses dismay, for example, that unauthorized workers do not have free health care, without noting that many American citizens also lack such coverage. More damaging to his arguments are occasional exaggerations. He describes human trafficking as a major business in the United States, though the number of cases he cites is small. He conflates trafficking, which involves an element of deceit, with human smuggling. He is overly harsh in his criticism of American refugee policy as racist and stingy.

Their aff is argument from principle – what policy is appropriate in our current situation is a separate questionJoseph H. Carens 2013 Prof of Political Science of the University of Toronto http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__academics__colloquia__legal_political_and_social_philosophy/documents/documents/ecm_pro_069497.pdf The Ethics of Immigration

Chapter 10 The Case for Open Borders (Book forthcoming – Jan 2014)Chapter 10 The Case for Open Borders (Book forthcoming – Jan 2014)I want to start by clarifying the nature of my discussion in this chapter. When I argue for open borders, I am not making a policy proposal that I think might be adopted (in the immediate future) by presidents or prime ministers or public officials charged with making immigration policy. I have noted at various points throughout this book that there can be an important differences between what one thinks is right as a matter of principle (which has been the primary focus of the book) and what one thinks is the best policy in a particular context, given existing political dynamics, the range of feasible options, the effects on other policies, and so on. As we saw in the last chapter, the gap between principle and policy is particularly wide when we focus on refugees. When it comes to the question of open borders, that gap becomes a chasm. From a political perspective, the idea of open borders is a non-starter. Most citizens of states in Europe and North America are already worried about current levels of immigration and about their states’ capacities to exclude unwanted entrants. They feel that their states are morally entitled to control immigration (for the most part) and they would see open borders, if anyone actually proposed it, as deeply contrary to their interests. Any political actor advocating such a view would quickly be marginalized (and so none will).

Schmitt K

1NC shell

[link]

The impacts are totalizing war from universal claims about humanityCelermajer 07 (Danielle Celermajer, Professor of Human Rights at University of Sydney, “If Islam is our other, who are 'we'?”, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3359/is_1_42/ai_n29344394/?tag=content;col1, Autumn, 2007)

The moral tenor of the moment recalls Carl Schmitt's warning that war conducted in the name of humanity is the most dangerous, and potentially inhuman, war of all (Schmitt 1996). War, Schmitt argued, is the modus operandi of sovereign States, because their essential dynamic is political, and politics finds its grammar in the distinction between friend and enemy. I nternational r elations are not and cannot be rendered subordinate to a morally-based international law because 'right' and 'good' belong to the realms of law and morality --independent

realms that ultimately have no authority over the political . […] Understood in this way, the gravest danger

does not arise when politics is unleashed to act outside the jurisdiction of law and morality, but when a State claims that its war transcends the realm of politics altogether and stakes its justification in the realms of law (just and unjust) and morality (right and wrong). The most dangerous State is not the one that declares openly that it

is acting in its own partisan State interests, against other partisan State interests, but the one that performatively assumes the mantle of universalistic abstractions like 'humanity' . This is because, far from actually

domesticating the sadistic tendencies of politics, such rhetorical depoliticization and false neutrality remove all constraints that the dialogical relationship with the enemy itself entails . This claim to a

transcendent war has , in Schmitt's words, "... incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality, of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity" (Schmitt 1996:57). Thus, whereas wars between sovereigns entail a certain basic equality of political right, the sovereign who, "... tries to identify itself with humanity ...", or, as Schmitt observed, with a range of other grand justifications, including peace, justice, progress, or civilization, monopolizes and 'usurps' these universal attributes and denies them to the enemy . This depoliticizing ruse is, of course, an intensely political move that Schmitt, paraphrasing Proudhon, unmasked in the harshest realist terms--"[H]e who invokes the word 'humanity', wants to cheat."

The alternative is to affirm a pluralistic society – the Other is an inevitable part of our life – accepting differences is a better model to limit inevitable violence instead of the forceful inclusion of the Other into a fictional global society Prozorov 06 (Sergei, Professor of International Relations at Petrozavodsk State University, Russia, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism,” Millenium Vol 35 no 1, December 2006, 75-99, dml)

Schmitt’s deconstruction of liberal universalism focuses on the concept of humanity that is crucial in the liberal displacement of the friend–enemy distinction and the consequent foreclosure of

enmity. For Schmitt, despite its self- proclaimed appreciation of pluralism, liberalism is essentially a monistic ideology which supplants the concrete pluralism of the sovereign states’ system by abstract individualism, which is after all reducible to the monistic category of humanity: The pluralistic theorists, for the most part, speak a highly individualistic language when it comes to the most decisive points of their arguments. … Ethical individualism has its correlate in the concept of humanity. But just that is quintessential universalism and monism, and

completely different from a pluralistic theory.40 Contrary to frequent misunderstandings, Schmitt’s seminal critique of liberal pluralism is not itself anti-pluralistic, but rather aims at restoring, in the conditions of the monistic

universalisation of the concept of humanity, the pluralism that is the ontological condition of the

existence of international politics . As Schmitt famously argues in The Concept of the Political,41 the political world is, ontologically, a pluriverse not a universe, i.e. its pluralism is not something to be fostered through liberal institutional designs, but something that is always present from the outset, in the form of concrete, spatially delimited polities, and thus creates the very possibility of

international politics as we know it: In a spiritual world ruled by the law of pluralism, a piece of concrete order is more valuable than any empty generalisations of a false totality. For it is an actual order, not a constructed and imaginary abstraction. … It would be a false pluralism, which played worldcomprehending totalities off against the concrete actuality of such plural orders.42 Schmitt’s concern with the liberal effacement of pluralism in the name of cosmopolitan humanity does not

merely seek to unravel hypocrisy or ridicule inconsistency but has more serious implications in the context of the transcendental function of enmity that we have introduced above. For Schmitt, the ‘ pluriversal’ structure of international relations accords with his political ontology that affirms the ineradicability of difference , from which, as we have discussed, Schmitt infers the ever-present ‘extreme

possibility’ and the demand for the decision on the enemy. Moreover, the actual pluriversal structure of international relations satisfies the criterion of equality between the Self and the Other by precluding the emergence of a global hierarchy , whereby a particular ‘concrete order’ lays a claim to represent humanity at large. While this pluralism does n o t hing to eliminate the ‘most extreme possibility’ of violent conflict, it may be said at least to suspend it in its potentiality by retaining the possibility that the ‘existentially different and alien’ might not bec ome the enemy simply by remaining outside the ‘concrete order’ of the Self and thus positing no actual existential threat . Moreover, as long as the boundary between the Self and the Other is present, there remains

a possibility that whatever conflicts may ensue from the irreducible ontological alterity, they may be resolved on the basis of the mutually recognised sovereign equality of the Self and the Other in the domain of the international, which by definition is effaced by any political unification of humanity.43 Thus, for

Schmitt ‘it is an intellectual historical misunderstanding of an astonishing kind to want to dissolve these plural political entities in response to the call of universal and monistic representations, and to designate that as pluralist’.44 However, this dissolution of actually existing pluralism is not a mere misunderstanding, a logical fallacy of presupposing the existence of the unity that is yet to be established. In an invective that we consider crucial for understanding Schmitt’s critique of liberal ultra-politics, Schmitt approaches liberal monism with an almost existential trepidation: ‘What would be terrifying is a world in which there no longer existed an exterior but only a

homeland , no longer a space for measuring and testing one’s strength freely.’45 Why is a world in which there is ‘only a homeland’, a Wendtian ‘world state’, posited as outright terrifying, rather than objectionable on a variety of political, economic, moral or aesthetic grounds? The answer is evident from the perspective of Schmitt’s ontology of alterity and the affirmation of the ‘extreme possibility’ of existential negation. If alterity is ontological and thus ineradicable in any empirical sense, then the establishment of a ‘domesticated’ world unity , a

global homeland, does nothing to diminish the danger of the advent of the Other, but , on the contrary,

incorporates radical alterity within the ‘homeland’ of the Self so that the ever-present possibility of violent death can no longer be externalised to the domain of the international . The monistic disavowal of alterity, of the ‘existentially different and alien’, is thus terrifying as it enhances the ‘ most extreme possibility’ of killing and being killed . Schmitt’s objection to the liberal monism of the ‘homeland of

humanity’ is therefore two-fold. First, the effacement of ontological pluralism, which subsumes radical alterity under the ‘universal homeland’, must logically entail the suppression of difference through the establishment of a world autocracy that would no longer be political due to its disavowal of the constitutive criterion of enmity. ‘The day world politics comes to the earth, it will be transformed in a world police power.’46 This ominous prophecy finds a perfect contemporary illustration in Wendt’s argument on the effacement of political enmity in the world state: ‘Since even a world state would not be a closed system, it would always be vulnerable to temporary disruptions . However, a world state would differ from anarchy in that it would constitute such disruptions as crime, not as politics or history. The possibility of crime may always be with us, but it does not

constitute a stable alternative to a world state.’47 Thus, struggles against hegemony or domination, which indeed have constituted politics and history as we know them, are recast as a priori criminal acts in the new order of the world state, calling for global police interventions rather than interstate war. ‘The adversary is no longer called an enemy, but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be

an outlaw of humanity .’48 The exclusionary potential of universalism is evident: theoretically, we may easily envision a situation where a ‘world state’ as a global police structure does not represent anything but itself; not merely anyone, but

ultimately everyone may be excluded from the ‘world unity’ without any consequences for the continuing deployment of this abstract universality as an instrument of legitimation. In Zygmunt Bauman’s phrase, ‘the “international community” has little reality apart from the occasional military operations undertaken in its name’.49 Thus, for Schmitt, if the monistic project of liberalism ever succeeded, it would be at the cost of the transformation of the world into a terrifying dystopia of a self-immanent, totally administered world without an outside and hence without a possibility of flight. At the same time, the practical implementation of such

a project is hardly conceivable as encountering no resistance. The project of world unity and the effacement of exteriority

is therefore bound to have its own enemies , insofar as alterity is ontologically ineradicable. Letting the Other into the global ‘homeland’ does not eliminate the ‘most extreme possibility’ of violent conflict but makes it impossible to manage i t through the pluralistic disjunction of the Self and the

Other. In the world in which there is ‘only a homeland’, radical alterity has no place, both literally and

figuratively. In this setting, conflict appears no longer merely possible but actually inevitable , as the Other is certain to resist its violent inclusion into the homeland of liberal humanity. Yet, having disposed of

genuine political pluralism, liberalism finds itself lacking in any instruments to protect its universal homeland other than the absolute existential negation of the Other that parallels the conceptual

negation of alterity in liberal monism. Thus, the universalisation of the liberal disposition to embrace the entire

humanity actualises the ‘most extreme possibility’ either by exposing the Self to the resentful violence of the Other

or by annihilating the Other to eliminate the former existential threat . It is here that enmity,

foreclosed in the symbolic register of liberalism with its monistic universalism, returns with a vengeance, since the sole consequence of the deployment of the concept of humanity as the referent of the liberal political project is the inevitable designation of the adversaries of this project in terms of the negation of humanity as, in a strict sense, inhuman beings: When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent. At the expense of its opponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the same way as one can misuse peace, justice, progress and civilisation in order to claim these as one’s own and to deny the same to the enemy.50 Indeed, denial is a central category in the discursive transformation of the enemy into the foe – through manifold gestures of denial the enemy is reduced to the purely negative figure that reminds us of Agamben’s homo sacer , a

bare life that is both worthless and undesirable: ‘The enemy is easily expropriated of his human quality. He is declared an outlaw of humanity. … The absolute enemy encounters an undivided humanity that regards him as already always

proscribed by God or by nature.’51 The effect of the liberal foreclosure of enmity, i.e. its bracketing off from the political discourse, is ironically the de- bracketing of violence , its deregulation and

intensification, whereby the enemy is absolutised as the inhuman monster , ‘the negative pole of the distinction, [that] is to be fully and finally consumed without remainder’.52 In line with Zizek’s diagnosis of ultra-politics, depoliticisation brings about nothing other than an extreme politicisation, which can no longer be contained within the symbolic dimension of potentiality but must pass into the actuality of existential negation: “Depoliticisation is a political act in a particularly intense way.”53 It is thus the liberal ‘peace project’ itself that produces its own opposite or perhaps reveals its own essence in the guise of its antithesis.

1NCThe border won’t change – and as the AFF spurs a discussion of imagination and social movement – binaries are constructed and become more resilient – to preserve sovereignty, WE have a morale to frame immigrants as the enemy Shaw, 08 - Assistant Professor at the School of Information and Library Science at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (“Border Hacks: Electronic Civil Disobedience and the Politics of Immigration”, December 12th, 2008, http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~ryanshaw/nmwg/BorderHacks.pdf - this card is sooo racist)Through an analysis of border disturbance actions initiated by the Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT)—along with a succession of works situated on the line between artistic and political statements, particularly projects featured in the inSite_05 festival—we will trace the contours of a new front in the battle over immigration and mobile labor populations. Instead of celebrating the crossing of literal and figurative borders (of disciplinary boundaries, genre, language, gender, race, sexuality), as has been the case within cultural criticism in recent decades, these projects serve as a reminder of the material border’s irreducibility. No articulation of a space in between, of a third term, of any

spatial or geometric metaphors for hybridity, can overcome the material fact of the new Iron Curtain . Reminiscent to some extent of the cultural nationalisms of Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire, such thinking marks a

moment of anticolonial art practice: the aim is not to theorize liminality but to force a rupture in the binaries of interiority and exteriority, here and there, native and alien, friend and enemy. The radical dichotomies integral to the war on terror—“you’re either with us or against us”—find their counterpart in

art practices that themselves depend on the solidarity of the “we” against the “them .” A fence has been built, binaries constructed , and these artists intend to overturn them. Their struggle, while embedded in a

binary, rather than a hybrid, cultural logic, nevertheless suggests a reconfigured notion of oppositionality. As we will see, both the we and the them in these artists’ projects and practices are understood to be diffuse, networked, and temporarily,

rather than territorially, situated. The imaginary of the new world order maintains territorial divisions as metaphysical divisions , informed as it has been in the last few decades by texts such as Samuel

Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, whose familiar thesis about civilizational identities and differences naturalizes the U.S.–Mexico border, demarcating the putatively archaic and primal divisions between Anglo and Latino.22 But we must push further to recognize that the articulation of the U.S.–Mexico border in terms of friend versus enemy is a hallmark of our Schmittean moment. Friend and enemy are not for Carl Schmitt private, individual, emotional, or

psychological categories. It is not my enemy but our enemy . That is, “the enemy is solely the public enemy,” and it is the defining of the enemy that unites “us” against “them.”23 In times of crisis, in a state of emergency, Schmitt claims, a political community must decide who is different or threatening enough to warrant the designation “enemy”; enemies, then, are those who threaten a community’s security and economic prosperity. Friends are those who are sufficiently loyal and obedient to the commands of the sovereign, those who are willing to risk their lives in the defense of a community. It is in these morally absolutist terms that migrants, “illegals,” have been figured not only as a contaminant of the social body but as a sinister threat to the political community in the United States. That citizens assume the responsibility of making sovereign decisions about the normal and abnormal, trusted and untrusted, is another hallmark of our current moment. It is not simply that citizens have been incorporated into the war on terror but that citizens assume the role of proxy sovereigns. As Judith Butler notes in Precarious Life, “when the alert goes out, every member of the population is asked to become a ‘foot soldier’ in the war on terror.”24 And as Giorgio Agamben observes in his analysis of the “state of exception,” “every citizen seems to be invested with a floating and anomalous imperium.” 25 With the U.S.–Mexico border written under the sign of national security, we have seen paramilitary and vigilante organizations such as the Minutemen claim the right to make sovereign decisions about friend and enemy. We have also seen gubernatorial plans to broadcast live surveillance footage from the Texas border, allowing not just citizens but all Web users to report supposed illegal crossings to an emergency hotline.26 It is in these terms that we can revisit the DoEAT intervention: their Wanted sign directly invites citizens to be proxy sovereigns insofar as illegals are enemies in the war on terror. It reminds us that we are all invited to become—at times it seems almost required to become—proxy sovereigns. In an

updating of Cold War logics, we are invited to join the search for the enemy within . How, then, are enemies contained and managed as the U.S. national security state evolves? In January 2006 the Department of Homeland Security awarded a $385 million contract to the Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg Brown and Root for the construction of new immigrant detention centers for future states of emergency: “The contract, which is effective immediately, provides for establishing temporary detention and processing capabilities to augment existing ICE Detention and Removal Operations Program facilities in the event of an emergency influx of immigrants into the U.S., or to support the rapid development of new programs. . . . The contract may also provide migrant detention support to other U.S. Government organizations in the event of an immigration emergency.”27 It is not difficult to imagine parallels with the World War II Japanese internment camps or to guess at the countries of origin of possible future detainees. Moreover, we do not need to be excessively paranoid to recognize the great ambiguities of the phrase “new programs.” So let us call these planned detention centers what they are—camps—and thereby turn to Agamben’s articulation of the concept of homo sacer, that which can be eliminated or killed but not sacrificed. The war on terror has necessitated extensive critical commentary on homo sacer, particularly in relation to camps and other contemporary states of exception, so it is perhaps sufficient to note only that sacred life is the human body separated from its normal political circumstances. Immigrants become “sacred” in these terms at the moment of crossing the border, becoming “illegal” and “enemy.”

Their attempt to include the Other feeds the depoliticized world order, justifying endless wars in the name of peace Pourciau, 6 (Sarah, Johns Hopkins University, “Bodily Negation: Carl Schmitt on the Meaning of Meaning” MLN 120.5, Project Muse MGE)The potential for spilling real blood defines the concept of the political in its "original existential sense" by tying it definitively to that which indisputably exists. By thus affirming a notion that offers up for affirmation nothing beyond an irrefutable reality, Schmitt performs what looks like the ultimate reactionary gesture. It is difficult to imagine a definition of the political more purely "formal" than the one presented here, more devoid of precisely the kind of normative "content" his critics have so often endorsed as the only escape from an occasionalist decisionism . Nonetheless, a peculiar fate befalls his language the moment he begins to argue for the relation between politics and war: it lapses into the normative category of justification. To demand seriously of human beings that they kill others and be prepared to die themselves so that trade and industry may flourish for the survivors or that the purchasing power of subsequent generations may grow is sinister and crazy.... War, the readiness of combatants to die, the physical killing of human beings who stand on the side of the enemy—all this has no normative meaning, but an existential meaning only.... If such physical annihilation of human life does not proceed from the existential assertion of one's own form of existence in the face of

an equally existential negation, then it cannot be justified . Neither can war be rationalized by recourse to ethical and juristic norms. If there really are enemies in the existential sense intended here, then it makes sense, but only political sense, to repel them physically where necessary and to fight them . (48-49, translation modified)

The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s ethics of obligation and inclusion. Only endorsement of enmity opens political space for pluralization of political difference, ending the perpetuation of violence.Odysseos 08, Dr. Louiza Odysseos, University of Sussex Department of International Relations, “Against Ethics? Iconographies of Enmity and Acts of Obligation in Carl Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan,” Practices of Ethics: Relating/Responding to Difference in International Politics Annual Convention, International Studies Association, 2008//MCThe paper ends with a discussion of obligation. Outlining the contours of a notion of political, rather, than ethical obligation, however, may require some explicit distancing from the now-familiar accounts that have oriented critical ‘ethical’ endeavours for some time. So we ask again

the ethical question which has haunted us: from whence does obligation originate? Were we to be still enthralled by a Levinasian or generally any ‘other-beholden’ thought of being ‘hostage’ to the other, we might say that the face to face encounter installs obligation before representation, knowledge and other ‘Greek’ relationalities (Levinas 1989: 76–77; Odysseos 2007a: 132-151).Caputo, however, warns us off this kind of commitment to a notion of perfectible or total obligation. He asks that we recognise that ‘one is always inside/outside obligation, on its margins. On the threshold of foolishness. Almost a perfect fool for the

Other. But not quite; nothing is perfect’ (1993: 126). The laudable but impossible perfectibility of ethics and ethical obligation to the other must be rethought. This is because ‘one is hostage of the Other, but one also keeps an army, just in case’ (ibid.).Caputo is not speaking as a political realist in this

apparently funny comment. He is pointing, I suggest, to the centrality of politics and enmity. Obligation is not to the other alone; it is also to the radical possibility of openness of political order, which allows self and other to be ‘determined otherwise’ (Prozorov 2007a). Analytically, we also want to know the tactics and subjective effects of being directed towards enforced freedom . In this

way, we might articulate a political and concrete act obligation that is inextricably tied to freedom that is not ‘enforced’, that is not produced for us, or as ‘us’ .With Schmitt, one might say that

obligation points practically (i.e. politically) to the‘relativisation of enmity’. Obligation may not,

however, be towards the enemy as such, for the enemy is the pulse of the political – so long as the enemy is relative (yet can be killed) in the order, the openness of the order can be vouched safe in the disruption of the absolutism of its immanence (Ojakangas 2007; Schmitt 1995a). We might, then, recast Schmitt’s conception of the political (which he regards as coming into being in the decision which distinguishes between friend and enemy) through his later emphasis in Theory of the Partisan on the politically normative significance of the relativisation of enmity. In other words, we

might say that what needs to remain possible is the constant struggle ‘between constituent and constituted power’(Beasley-Murray 2005: 221) in both society and also world order.It is important to identify the ethical and governmental project of enforced freedom because doing so allows us to think of obligation as related to a different freedom: freedom as resistance (not freedom as an attribute). Prozorov

suggests that an ‘ontology of concrete freedom’ relies on ‘freedom of potentiality of being other wise’,of being able to ‘to assert one’s power as a living being against the power, whose paradigm

consists in the “care of the living”’ (2007a: 210-211). This assumes, however, first, that resistance lies in the ‘refusal of biopolitical care that affirms the sovereign power of bare life’ ((Prozorov 2007a: 20) and, second, that there is a sort of ‘radical freedom of the human being that precedes governmental care’ (Prozorov2007a: 110). I argue in conclusion, however, that freedom as resistance is still too limited; it may still be, despite all attempts, lured back to a thinking of an essence: of that prior state of pre-governmental production of subjectivity, which in actuality does not exist. Rather,

Foucault’s brief intervention on the issue of obligation (2001b) through the International Committee against Piracy points to ‘a radically interdependent relationship with practices of governmentality’ (Campbell 1998: 516) to which we are all subjected, here understood in the proper Greek sense of our subjectivity being predicated on governmental

practice (cf. Odysseos 2007a: 4). ‘We are all members of the community of the governed and thereby obliged to show mutual solidarity’, Foucault had argued, as against obligation understood within modern humanism

(Foucault 2001b: 474; emphasis added). This obligation which he invokes simply exists (es gibt), as Heidegger might say. We would add that Schmitt’s account of the transition from ‘real’ to ‘absolute’ enmity in the twentieth century and his demand that ‘the enemy is not something to be eliminated out of a particular reason, something to be annihilated as worthless..’ must be read in this way

(Schmitt2004: 61): as speaking for the need to ward off the shutting down of politics. That is why Schmitt’s two iconographies rest precisely on two extremes: the mythic narratives of an order open to enmity as its exteriority, which guarantees pluriversal openness, on the one hand, and the absolute immanence of order where ‘absolute enmity driv[es] the political universe’ on the other

hand (Goodson 2004b: 151).This is a notion of a world-political obligation that ‘is a kind of skandalon for ethics, which

makes ethics blush, which it must reject or expel in order to maintain its good name…’ (Caputo

1993: 5). This obligation is articulated for the openness that enmity brings; it attends to the other as enemy by allowing, against ethics, for the continued but changeable structurations of the field of politics, of politics as pluriverse.

2NC Alt SolvencyOnly the alternative can limit war and prevent violent asymmetry and discriminationRasch, 05 - Ph.D and Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University (William, “Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle”, South Atlantic Quarterly Spring, 104(2): 253-262 Duke SW)How is this possible? Despite its internal self-differentiation, Europe still saw itself as a unity because of a second major distinction, the one between Europe and the New World, where New World denotes the entire non-European world, but especially the newly ‘‘discovered’’ regions of the globe following Columbus’s three voyages. This distinction was asymmetrical; on the one side we find Christianity and culture, on the other only pagan ‘‘barbarians.’’ How did Europeans mark this di ff erence between a self-differentiated ‘‘us’’ and a homogenous ‘‘them’’? Through violence. Only now, violence was

regulated hierarchically by the traditional ‘‘just war’’ doctrine. Schmitt clearly marks the di ff erence between symmetrical and asymmetrical modes of warfare (thus the difference between warfare ‘‘this side’’ versus

the ‘‘other side’’ of so-called amity lines that separated Old Europe from the New World) as the di ff erence between wars fought against ‘‘just enemies’’ and those fought for a ‘‘just cause.’’ The former recognize a commonality among combatants that allows for reciprocity; the latter does not. Wars fought against enemies one respects as occupiers of the same cultural ‘‘space,’’ no matter how subdivided, allows for the desirable constraints on the conduct of war. Wars fought against infidels, pagans, and barbarians, whether these barbarians deny the one God, the laws of nature, the truth of reason, or the higher morality of liberalism, are wars fought against those who are not to be respected or accorded the rights granted equals. 8 To be in possession of truth, no matter how much that truth is debated internally, allows one to stand over against the other as a conglomerated unity. This self-differentiated unity can assume the restrained and restraining order of civilization because it has inoculated itself against outbreaks of ‘‘natural’’ and lawless violence by displacing them in the New World. America, as Hobbes and others imagined it, was the preeminent site of the feared state of nature; thus Europe was spared any recurrence of the civil wars that had previously ravaged it. What Schmitt describes as an enviable achievement—that is, the balanced order of restrained violence within Europe—presupposed the consignment of unrestrained violence to the rest of the world. That is, desired restraint was founded upon sanctioned lack of restraint. If Schmitt, by concentrating on the development of European international law after the religious civil wars, highlights an admirable local result of a disagreeable global process, this can be attributed to his explicit Eurocentrism. But even non-Eurocentrics may be dismayed by the twentieth-century reintroduction of unrestricted violence within Europe itself. The epitome of this return of the repressed may be the midcentury death camp, as Giorgio Agamben maintains, 9 but its initial breakthrough is the Great War of the century’s second decade. For how else can one explain that a traditional European power struggle that started in 1914 as a war fought for state interest should end in 1918–19 as a war fought by ‘‘civilization’’ against its ‘‘barbarian’’ other? And how else can one explain that we have been so eager to replicate this distinction in every war we have fought ever since? If, in other words, we are rightly horrified by the distinction between civilized and uncivilized when it is used to describe the relationship of Old Europe and its colonial subjects, and if we are rightly horrified by the distinction between the human and the in- or subhuman when it is used to discriminate against blacks, Jews, Gypsies, and other so-called undesirables, then why do we persist today in using these very distinctions when combating our latest enemies? Is it merely ironic or in fact

profoundly symptomatic that those who most vehemently a ffi rm universal symmetry (equality, democracy) are also more often than not the ones who opt for the most asymmetrical means of locating enemies and conducting war—that is, just wars fought for a just cause? But how are we to respond? For those who say there is no war and who yet find themselves witnessing daily bloodshed, Adornoian asceticism (refraining from participating in the nihilism of the political) or Benjaminian weak, quasi, or other messianism (waiting for the next incarnation of the historical subject [the multitudes?] or the next proletarian general strike [the event?]) would seem to be the answer. To this, however, those who say there is a war can respond only with bewilderment. Waiting for a ‘‘completely new politics’’ 10 and completely new political agents, waiting for the event and the right moment to name it, or waiting for universal ontological redemption feels much like waiting for the Second Coming, or, more accurately, for Godot. And have we not all grown weary of waiting? The war we call ‘‘the political,’’ whether nihilist or not, happily goes on while we watch Rome burn. As Schmitt wrote of the relationship of early Christianity to the Roman Empire, ‘‘The belief that a restrainer holds back the end of the world provides the only bridge between the notion of an eschatological paralysis of all human events and a tremendous historical monolith like that of the Christian empire of the Germanic kings’’ (60). One does not need to believe in the virtues of that particular ‘‘historical monolith’’ to understand the dangers of eschatological paralysis. But as Max Weber observed firsthand, ascetic quietude leads so often, so quickly, and so effortlessly to the chiliastic violence that knows no bounds; and as we have lately observed anew, the millennial messianism of

imperial rulers and nomadic partisans alike dominates the contemporary political landscape. The true goal of those who say there is no war is to eliminate the war that actually exists by eliminating those Lyons and Tygers and other Savage Beasts who say there is a war. This war is the truly savage war. It is the war we witness today.

No amount of democratization, pacification, or Americanization will mollify its e ff ects, because democratization, pacification, and Americanization are among the weapons used by those who say there is no war to wage their war to end all war. What is to be done? If you are one who says there is a war, and if you say it not because you glory in it but because you fear it and hate it, then your goal is to limit it and its e ff ects , not eliminate it, which merely intensi fies it, but limit it by drawing clear lines within which it can be fought, and clear lines between those who fight it and those who don’t, lines between friends, enemies, and neutrals, lines between combatants and noncombatants. There are, of course, legitimate doubts about whether those ideal lines could ever be drawn again; nevertheless, the question that we should ask is not how can we establish perpetual peace, but rather a more modest one: Can symmetrical relationships be guaranteed only by asymmetrical ones? According to Schmitt, historically this has been the case. ‘‘The traditional Eurocentric order of international law is foundering today, as is the old nomos of the earth. This order arose from a legendary and unforeseen discovery of a new world, from an unrepeatable historical event. Only in fantastic parallels can one imagine a modern recurrence, such as men on their way to the moon discovering a new and hitherto unknown planet that could be exploited freely and utilized effectively to relieve their struggles on earth’’ (39). We have since gone to the moon and have found nothing on the way there to exploit. We may soon go to Mars, if current leaders have their way, but the likelihood of finding exploitable populations seems equally slim. Salvation through spatially delimited asymmetry, even were it to be desired, is just not on the horizon. And salvation through globalization, that is, through global unity and equality, is equally impossible, because today’s asymmetry is not so much a localization of the exception as it is an invisible generation of the exception from within that formal ideal of unity, a generation of the exception as the di ff erence between the human and the inhuman outlaw , the ‘‘Savage Beast, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security.’’ We are, therefore, thrown back upon ourselves, which is to say, upon those artificial ‘‘moral persons’’ who act as our collective political identities. They used to be called states. What they will be called in the future remains to be seen. But,

if we think to establish a di ff erentiated unity of discrete political entities that once represented for Schmitt ‘‘the highest form of order within the scope of human power,’’ then we must symmetrically manage the necessary pairing of inclusion and exclusion without denying the ‘‘forms of power and domination’’ that inescapably accompany human ordering. We must think the possibility of roughly equivalent power relations rather than fantasize the elimination of power from the political universe. This, conceivably, was also Schmitt’s solution. Whether his idea of the plurality of Großräume could ever be carried out under contemporary circumstances is, to be sure, more than a little doubtful, given that the United States enjoys a monopoly on guns, goods, and the Good, in the form of a supremely effective ideology of universal ‘‘democratization.’’ Still, we would do well to devise vocabularies that do not just emphatically repeat philosophically more sophisticated versions of the liberal ideology of painless, e ff ortless , universal equality. The space of the political will never be created by a bloodless, Benjaminian divine violence. Nor is it to be confused with the space of the simply human. To dream the dreams of universal inclusion may satisfy an irrepressible human desire, but it may also always produce recurring, asphyxiating political nightmares of absolute exclusion.

2NC AT: PermFraming politics with an ethical theology destroys the political – the alternative must stand alone.Rasch 4 (William Rasch, Ph.D and Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, “Sovereignty and its Discontents”, Birkbeck Law Press, pg. 33-4)In opposition to the near universal pressure to abolish the pesky complexity of the political, the aim of this volume is to reject every resurrection of eschatological desire, and to affirm conflict as the necessary and salutary basis of political life . To this end, the work of Carl Schmitt can be of considerable help. One must be clear, however, that the term most often associated with his thought – namely political theology – is not a term that can be sensibly used to describe his own best work. When, in 1922, Schmitt writes that ‘all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts’ (Schmitt, 1985b, p 36), he makes an analogous claim about the modern political

state to the one Max Weber had already made nearly two decades earlier about the modern money economy.2 Just as wealth, industriously achieved, serves as a sign of grace for the Puritans in early modern Europe

(and the Massachusetts Bay Colony), so too the sovereign, as a mortal God, mimics divinity. But God and grace soon become mere power and market value, and Schmitt’s and Weber’s emphases center on the necessities of this secularization, on the profane, not the sacred, on the political and the economic, not the theological. Their focus is on the butterfly, so to speak, not the caterpillar. Schmitt and Weber, each in their own way, may have recoiled from the effects of neutralization and rationalization, even preached the occasional Jeremiad against the vacuous sterility of the modern wasteland, but, as both recognized and clearly stated, by at least the end of the eighteenth

century neither the monopolization of power nor the accumulation of wealth were thought to guarantee salvation, or even hint at special dispensation when it came to God’s favors. If capitalism was born from the spirit of Protestantism, it was, for all that, capitalist, not Calvinist. And if the concepts of

the modern theory of the state still carried the traces of their ethereal origin, they were nonetheless political concepts, and these traces had been thoroughly profaned. In short, the political for Schmitt was no more theological than money was for Weber. And it made absolutely no sense to be nostalgic for an imagined other space or fulfilled time in which the sacred and the profane were united. Indeed, it was for the autonomy of the political against the prevailing political theologies, the religions of humanity called socialism and liberalism, that Schmitt waged his conceptual warfare. Thus, if one wants to insist on referring to Schmitt as a political theologian, it is because he made a religion out of the political – out of the distinction, that is, between the theological and the political – and not because he sought either the spirit or the authority of the divine in the power and violence that is the mundane world of politics. It behooves us, therefore, to examine, briefly, the nature of this autonomy before we move on to the more detailed examinations of the structure of the political in the chapters that follow.

There is either a friend/enemy distinction, or an independent political – impossible for bothMoreiras 04 (Alberto Moreiras, academic and cultural theorist, Director of European Studies at Duke, 2004, “A God without Sovereignty. Political Jouissance. The Passive Decision”, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3, p. 79-80)The friend/enemy division is peculiar at the highest level, at the level of the order of the political. This peculiarity ultimately destroys the understanding of the political as based on and circumscribed by the friend/enemy division. The idea of an order of the political presupposes that the enemies of the order as such—that is, the enemy configuration that can overthrow a given order, or even the very idea of an order of the political—are generated from the inside: enemies of the order are not properly external enemies. This is so because the order of the political, as a principle of division, as division itself,

always already regulates, and thus subsumes, its externality: externality is produced by the order as such, and it is a function of the order. Or rather: a principle of division can have no externality. Beyond the order, there can be enemies, if

attacked, but they are not necessarily enemies of the order: they are simply ignorant of it. At the highest level of the political, at the highest level of the friend/ enemy division, there where the very existence of a given order of the political is at stake, the order itself secretes its own enmity. Enmity does not precede the order: it is in every case produced by the order. The friend/enemy division is therefore a division that is subordinate to the primary ordering division, produced from itself. The friend/enemy division is therefore not supreme: a nomic antithesis generates it, and thus stands above it. The order of the political rules over politics. The political ontology implied in the notion of an order of the political deconstructs the political ontology ciphered in the friend/enemy division, and vice versa. They are mutually incompatible. Either the friend/enemy division is supreme, for a determination of the

political, or the order of the political is supreme. Both of them cannot simultaneously be supreme. The gap between them is strictly untheorizable. If the friend/enemy division obtains independently of all the other antitheses as politically primary, then there is no order of the political. If there is an order of the political, the order produces its own political divisions.

Link

The aff destroys the idea of sovereigntyKirkpatrick 10, Erika Marie Kirkpatrick bachelors from Memorial University in Political Science and now social analyst for Memorial University Political Science Journal (Erika Marie, 2010-2011, “The Minuteman Project: Affective Entrepreneurship and the Securitization of the ¶ US/Mexico Border” http://research.library.mun.ca/338/3/minuteman_project.pdf)nasokan

The phenomenon of undocumented, cross border migration is not unique to the United States. ¶ Elsewhere in the world, particularly in Europe, states have made immigration a national security ¶ issue – they have securitized immigration (Bigo, 2002). Also not unique to the United States is ¶ popular backlash against the presence of undocumented migrants and refugees – as evidenced in ¶ news stories about the rise of right wing parties with anti-immigration platforms in Europe. What ¶ is unique about the American example is the rise of organized vigilante forces whose primary ¶ aim is to patrol the US/Mexico border with the explicit goal of stopping undocumented migrants ¶ when they encounter them, as well as disseminating affectively imbued information about the ¶ potential threat of said migrants .¶ This paper has insisted that taking affect seriously in investigating the phenomenon of ¶ border patrol vigilante groups – like the Minuteman Project – has necessitated a reconsideration ¶ of the relationship of the theoretical category of sovereignty to securitization theory –¶ specifically to the role of the securitizing actor. Investigating a vigilante group`s leader, whose ¶ raison d`être is to secure a border between two states, meant that it was crucial for this paper to ¶ focus on the theorizing of borders and bordering processes. In the above, the intersubjective ¶ nature of borders has been considered at length specifically the author has focused on the ways in ¶ which bordering processes are dependent upon the friend/enemy distinction that Schmitt ¶ identified as the essence of the political. The focus on borders also served as a way of getting to ¶ the heart of the issue of sovereignty , with which this paper was principally

concerned, through a ¶ consideration of borders as a locus of sovereignty – and ‘the decision.’¶ The relationship of the border to sovereignty has been identified above as the place where ¶ the exception is made visible. Although this ‘decision’ on the exception – the designation of the ¶ enemy – has traditionally been the prerogative of the sovereign, the author has argued here, ¶ following Doty, that the citizen-actor as vigilante may indeed decide the exception when they are ¶ faced by a perceived failure of sovereign power. This paper has identified this action as being a ¶ downward movement of sovereignty – temporary by its very nature, and contingent upon ¶ affectively imbued perceptions of failure and frustration with the perceived inability of the sovereign to restore the ‘normal order’ or indeed reverse the ‘normal order’ to a prior state of ¶ normalcy

The border establishes friend/enemy distinctions- Empirics prove that without it we are subject to state violenceWP 10, Wordpress (August 3, 2010, “Play and state violence at the ‘porous borders’” http://southissouth.wordpress.com/2010/08/03/play-and-state-violence-at-the-porous-borders/)nasokan

You hear the notion of ‘porous borders’ shuffled around frequently these days, viz. reactionary commentators portraying the U.S.-Mexico border (especially the Arizona-Mexico border) as a lawless, erratic and potentially violent frontier. Though it sits as one of the most heavily militarized borders in

the world, one deeply fraught with violence and death for would-be Latino migrants* the imagined flexibility of the

border has invited serious attempts at legalizing racism and even hate-fueled murder.¶ But

unlike the U.S.-Mexico border which separates actual states—and a state necessarily implies friend/enemy distinctions like borders—in Brazil, Palestine/Israel and occupied Afghanistan walls and other visible/invisible dividers act as progenitors of state violence and serve to uphold ‘apartness.’ I’d like to look at the notion of play as a (positive) form of border porosity in non-state borders.¶ I took the first picture above near the Dona Marta wall, a now complete project that was proposed as an ‘eco-barrier’ to protect the Atlantic forest from the wrath of the poor and lower-income who live in the slum (within the community the slum is called Santa Marta, and the barrier the ‘Gaza wall’). While the press, especially Istoe and O Globo, clamored to stamp their note of approval for

the project, which has since been expanded to nearly 20 other slum communities, the wall as a stigmatized symbol (and what wall doesn’t carry an immediate stigma) has garnered unfavorable press as well. What surprised me most about the ‘Gaza wall’ was how truly porous it is: at a little over five or six feet high I could have jumped over it, and many men and boys did so to collect fruit. And of course, standing on the top of giant boulders near the comparatively diminutive wall were young boys flying kites. Their faces carried looks of intense concentration and focus on the kites, which outstretched in the open sky seemed to forecast an aerial porosity with a near-mythical ability to melt power.

2NC A2: Schmitt=Nazi

alt rejects and turns that – nazi’s goal was to assimilate the population into one perfect being based on moral grounds – alternative is recognize that difference is inevitable and washing over that is bad – alt affirms that pluralistic society

just cause he was a nazi doesn’t prove the k is bad – he is separate Zarmanian, 06 – University of Milan (Thalin, “Carl Schmitt and the Problem of Legal Order: From Domestic to International”, Leiden Journal of International Law, 19 (2006), pp. 41-42)

The mere fact of Schmitt’s being one of the most controversial figures of the twentieth century, the object of fierce hatred and enthusiastic admiration, speaks for the extremely disconcerting power of his thinking. In his lifelong struggle to define the essence of legal order and, consequently, of political obligation, Schmitt strove constantly towards comprehending the depths of political modernity. Schmitt’s striving led him to denounce its ‘dark side’ and to acknowledge the lack of foundation of any political order. Schmitt thereby challenged every ideology, among them liberalism, which promises definitive peace and order, both domestically and internationally. Such intellectual bravery contrasts, as in the case of Heidegger, with Schmitt’s human meanness. He proved unable to live up to his own theories , and himself transformed his own ideas into ideology when he became an active supporter of Nazism. Schmitt’s reaction to his own ideas, however, is

shared by many of his critics, past and present. Some of the scholarly and common literature about Schmitt seems more directed at bypassing ‘the challenge of C. Schmitt’2 than towards facing it.3 Most scholarship on Schmitt is devoted to the effort of setting him within the stream of political Catholicism, right-wing conservatism, fascist anti-liberalism, political realism, and, most of all, Nazism. Although part of this scholarship has led to deeper historical insight into Schmitt’s life and thought, the attempt to reduce Schmitt’s work to one ideology or school of thought has led to a biased interpretation of his works. This bias, in turn, has given rise to many simplifications and misinterpret- ations. The bias is especially apparent in those who have tried to read Schmitt’s writings in the light of his support for Nazism . Some have ended up by reading even his previous work in the light of this support, to the extent that they argue that Schmitt’s theories of the imperial and Weimar years would necessarily lead to this choice.4 Schmitt’s internationalist texts, written after 1936, when – despite his continuing efforts to appear as the legal ideologue of the

regime – he was dismissed by the Nazi establishment because his theories seemed too distant from Nazi orthodoxy , have long been ignored or considered an unworthy expression of Nazi views.

Nazism and his philosophy were separate – Nazis rejected his work and he had to revise is work during the regime to not seem too radical Zarmanian, 06 – University of Milan (Thalin, “Carl Schmitt and the Problem of Legal Order: From Domestic to International”, Leiden Journal of International Law, 19 (2006), pp. 43)

Galli warns against the theses according to which, given the continuity between his Weimar years and Nazi years, Schmitt’s support for Nazism was the inevitable result of his theories of the Weimar period, since nothing in his work actually suggests a necessary transition from his anti-liberalism to totalitarianism and Nazism . Galli maintains instead that Schmitt’s Nazism was more a consequence of his personal than his intellectual history , and that during his Nazi years (1933–6) Schmitt did not actually produce any original work but rather used his previous output, properly revised and ‘decorated’, to please the new regime and to gain recognition as a Kronjurist

within it. Nazism had little influence on Schmitt’s theoretical perspective , which also explains why his Nazi orthodoxy was contested even within Nazi circles and within the regime. Galli, supra note 1, at 839.

Even if they are right – Nazism is dead and the alt isn’t going to save it – their fears are based off of liberal biases Piccone and Ulmen 02 (Paul and Gary, Ph.D. SUNY Prof. at Washington University, St. Louis and writer Telos press, “Uses and abuses of Carl Schmitt”, http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/piccone_ulmen.htm, 2002, LEQ)

While there are very good reasons to criticize Schmitt and others like him for making terrible political choices in the 1930s, over half a century after the defeat of fascism and Nazism these judgments should not remain obstacles to objective evaluations of their ideas . This has not been the case within "politically correct," universalist, managerial-

liberal perspectives. To the extent that, for managerial-liberal thought , fascism and Nazism remain permanent possibilities whenever capitalist development stalls, any conservative thought is a potential threat not only to "progress " and "emancipation," but also to liberal legal frameworks that allow this "progress" and "emancipation" to take place through democratic means. This universalization and inflation of the power of historically specific concepts helps explain both the extraordinary hostility toward Schmitt (and other influential conservative scholars), and why his ideas have generated so much academic interest for a thinker whose work, for the most part, remains inextricably rooted in the German political realities between the two world wars. In creating false fears concerning its contemporary political relevance , these critics have also prevented the articulation of the kind of legitimate criticism that Schmitt's work warrants, as well as an appreciation of his contributions to political philosophy and the history of legal thought .

Schmitt’s Nazism doesn’t ruin his arguments – his works have a fundamental truth. Don’t stick us to Schmitt we didn’t read.Rasch 4 (William Rasch, Ph.D and Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, “Sovereignty and its Discontents”, Birkbeck Law Press, pg. 33-4)

That Schmitt’s most zealous apologists, on both the right and the left, may fairly be accused of minimizing his most egregious and shameful failings – eg his anti-Semitism and his open attempts to legitimize Hitler’s regime in the mid-1930s – is not to be denied. A defensiveness about Schmitt, born of a frustration with inept or deliberate misreadings, can easily turn into polemical aggression. Nevertheless, as tainted as Schmitt’s arguments may be, tainted by interest and tainted by affiliation, neither their structure nor their continued relevance can be so simply dismissed. The point, or points, he makes against progressive, universalist doctrines have been made, in various registers, by conservative and leftist critics alike, most recently by French

thinkers like Jean- François Lyotard. Schmitt’s quarrel with America’s post-1917 role as ‘arbiter of the world’

[Schiedsrichter der Erde] (Schmitt, 1988b, p 196) centers on the presumptuous and deceptive nature inherent in any particular instance that designates itself to be the carrier of the universal principle. In Lyotard’s view, the particular application of the universal, the particular enunciation of the rights of man, say, or the universal proletariat, always carries with it the potential for terror. Noting the ‘aporia of authorization’ in the fact that a particular people – his example: the French in 1789 – assumed the position of declaring a universal right, Lyotard asks: Why would the affirmation of a universal normative instance have universal value if a singular instance makes the declaration? How can one tell, afterward, whether the wars conducted by the singular instance in the name of the universal instance are wars of liberation or wars of conquest? (Lyotard, 1993, p 52) Schmitt would recognize these as the right questions to ask; would recognize them, in fact, as his own questions.13 They go to the heart of the nature and possibility of conflict (which is to say – of politics), for wars conducted in the name of the universal normative instance are wars fought to end all wars, conflicts conducted in the name of the self-transcendence of all conflict. But what if, afterward, we find out that the heaven of consensus and reconciliation turns out to be a realm in which conflict has been outlawed in the name of the Good, the Efficient, the Comfortable? In a world where conflict has been outlawed, how is opposition to be staged? As uncoerced agreement?

Neolib K LinksCorporations benefit most from open bordersDoris Provine, 2008 , Professor, School of Justice & Social Inquiry, Arizona State U.Review of OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS, by Kevin R. Johnson. Law & Politics Book Review, Vol. 18 No. 2 (February, 2008) pp.106-108 http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/johnson0208.htmBut ultimately, one comes away from this book with the sense that the question Johnson raises is bigger, and tougher, than the answer that he provides. The United States, after all, is not the only nation resistant to the idea of opening its borders. Immigration is a volatile issue because it challenges national governments to defer to market forces. Advocacy for open borders makes for a curious result: Johnson’s most ardent supporters are likely to be corporations and businesses looking for easier access to cheap labor. This book encourages a broader discussion than is currently circulating in American politics, one that looks to the foundations of immigration policy and imagines a major overhaul.

Open borders is the core of exceptionalism, and doing it selectively is racistJacob M Appel May 04, 2009 J.D. - Harvard, Instructor - Brown UniversityThe Ethical Case for an Open Immigration Policy http://www.opposingviews.com/i/the-ethical-case-for-an-open-immigration-policy#The United States had an “open door” policy for white immigrants from the nation’s founding until the passage of the Emergency Quota Act of 1921. As a result of the Naturalization Act of 1790, all “free white persons” of “good moral character” arriving on our shores were offered a short, simple path to full citizenship. In one of their often unheralded yet non-the-less remarkable contributions, the first generation of American statesmen welcomed Catholics ineligible for full citizenship in Great Britain, and Jews unable to naturalize in France. Over the next century, despite occasional bursts of nativist braying—most notably, the No Nothing Movement of 1854-1856—this nation remained largely faithful to those celebrated lines of the poet Emma Lazarus that are now inscribed upon the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty: Give me your tired, your poor / Your huddled masses yearing to breathe free. While this promise of welcome rang undeniably hollow for Africans and Asians—one of our greatest causes for national shame—the very essence of American “exceptionalism” was our open gate.

Politics LinksThe plan would be politically impossible in the current climateDoris Provine, 2008 , Professor, School of Justice & Social Inquiry, Arizona State U.Review of OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS, by Kevin R. Johnson. Law & Politics Book Review, Vol. 18 No. 2 (February, 2008) pp.106-108 http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/johnson0208.htmJohnson acknowledges that, however sensible, an open-borders policy is not likely to be adopted soon. The 2001 attack on the World Trade Center ended promising movements toward a more generous policy concerning Mexican immigration. Arguably, the prospects [*108] for opening borders have grown worse since this book was published. Johnson assumes, for example, that policy makers could build upon the success of NAFTA and create open borders at this level as a second-best option. NAFTA, however, is under attack, with prospects for expansion quite bleak at this time.

And the border is a key issue to the passage of CIR-Plan would kill the border and any chance of CIR passingWillis and Riley 7/15, Henry Willis is director of the RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center, and Jack Riley is vice president and director of the National Security Research Division at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corp. *RAND is a non-profit global policy think tank. (Henry and Jack, July 15, 2013, “Border Security Is Key to Immigration Reform” http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/07/border-security-is-key-to-immigration-reform.html)nasokan

As Congress moves forward with long-sought immigration reform legislation, the matter of border security — always in the background — has now returned to the fore. ¶ With the Senate passing a sweeping

compromise package last month and the House beginning to grapple with the issue, two important aspects of border security bear continued attention. First, border security strategy must be developed as one part of a holistic system of immigration management. Second, any progress on improving this system is reliant on having concrete and sensible objectives and measures of success. ¶ In earlier stages of debate, some lawmakers, led by Republican Sen. John Cornyn of Texas, argued that comprehensive immigration reform should not progress until border security is first achieved. This position begs the obvious question: What defines a secure border?¶ Cornyn's definition — that U.S. borders are secure when authorities are able to apprehend 90 percent of all would-be illegal entrants — failed to convince his colleagues, and his amendment was defeated. But the real problem with this and other proposed amendments was that they focused on only one of the many complex factors that lead people to attempt to illegally enter the United States. Such decisions certainly are influenced by how difficult the journey across the border is and how likely they are to be caught. But this is not the only factor.¶ Studies of illegal border crossing activity and illegal migrant populations document that decisions to cross the border illegally are influenced by the consequences of getting caught and, importantly, on the quality of job opportunities on both sides of the border. Logically, the decision could also be affected by other options that are available, such as pathways to jobs in the United States through legal entry. Thus, solving the border security problem requires more than fences and Border Patrol agents.¶ Instead of focusing narrowly on apprehension on the border, approaches to border security should use all means available. For example, the amendment shepherded to passage by Republican Sen. Bob Corker of Tennessee

highlights the importance of other tools. In addition to expanding physical security and patrols, Corker calls for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to improve awareness of entry and exit data and to enhance employer verification. ¶ Holistic approaches like this may not only be a more appropriate response to the

problem, they may also be more efficient.¶ One potentially effective method of border control is to address the economic incentives that drive both legal and illegal immigration. This could center on enhanced employment verification, which would affect demand on both sides of the equation, employers and migrants. The United States' current approach to employer verification, a voluntary program called eVerify, is not without its critics. The program has been slow to enroll new businesses, has proved imperfect at identifying undocumented workers, is costly for small businesses to administer and raises civil liberties and privacy concerns. However, at least

some of this criticism relates to failure to consider employer verification as part of an overall system of immigration reform.¶ More than two decades ago RAND research demonstrated that when addressing drug smuggling, both supply and demand are important, but that decreasing demand for illegal drugs through treatment and prevention was more effective. The same may hold true for illegal migration; reduce the demand for U.S. jobs and you reduce illegal border jumping. Thus immigration reform must also consider how to reduce the demand for illegal immigrants in labor markets. Fortunately, the latest amendments to the border security bill begin to recognize the potential of this policy lever.¶ At the same time, the U.S. ultimately needs better metrics to truly know whether border security is improved or immigration reform is working as intended. On this point, both Sens. Cornyn and Corker appear to agree.¶ In a submission to the Congressional Record titled, "What They are Saying About Border Security Metrics," Sen. Cornyn gathers support for empirically based, measurement-driven, quality improvement and strategic planning. Consistent with this focus on metrics, both the amendments proposed by Cornyn and Corker emphasized the importance of better reporting and analysis of how policy changes and resources are leading to desired border security and immigration policy outcomes.¶ Solving the United States' complex immigration problems requires using all policy tools and measuring the effects of reform immediately. By adopting these principles now, Congress can give the United States an opportunity to improve immigration policy as it learns more about what parts of reform are working and which are not.

Open borders is a political non-starterTim Cavanaugh, April 16, 2006 columnist for Reason's print edition Open the Borders: Forget guest workers—why should citizens of NAFTA countries need visas at all? http://reason.com/archives/2006/04/16/open-the-bordersWhen asked about visaless borders, every person I interviewed for this article gave two replies: that we need to be realistic about our options, and that the guest-worker compromise will be more fair than what we have now. The first of these answers is half-right: In the current political climate, the idea of eliminating visa requirements with Canada and Mexico seems as heretical as the notion of pasteurization or a sun-centered solar system.

Their argument from principle is politically non-viable – the plan is sufficient to marginalize ObamaJoseph H. Carens 2013 Prof of Political Science of the University of Toronto http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__academics__colloquia__legal_political_and_social_philosophy/documents/documents/ecm_pro_069497.pdf The Ethics of ImmigrationChapter 10 The Case for Open Borders (Book forthcoming – Jan 2014)I want to start by clarifying the nature of my discussion in this chapter. When I argue for open borders, I am not making a policy proposal that I think might be adopted (in the immediate future) by presidents or prime ministers or public officials charged with making immigration policy. I have noted at various points throughout this book that there can be an important differences between what one thinks is right as a matter of principle (which has been the primary focus of the book) and what one thinks is the best policy in a particular context, given existing political dynamics, the range of feasible options, the effects on other policies, and so on. As we saw in the last chapter, the gap between principle and policy is particularly wide when we focus on refugees. When it comes to the question of open borders, that gap becomes a chasm. From a political perspective, the idea of open borders is a non-starter. Most citizens of states in Europe and North America are already worried about current levels of immigration and about their states’ capacities to exclude unwanted entrants. They feel that their states are morally entitled to control immigration (for the most part) and they would see open borders, if anyone actually proposed it, as deeply contrary to their interests. Any political actor advocating such a view would quickly be marginalized (and so none will).

Gradualism CPThe USFG should progressively elevate visa quotas above demand

CP solve – aspiration is keyJacob M Appel May 04, 2009 J.D. - Harvard, Instructor - Brown UniversityThe Ethical Case for an Open Immigration Policy http://www.opposingviews.com/i/the-ethical-case-for-an-open-immigration-policy#This is not a policy proposal. I acknowledge that developing a functional, open borders regime could take several years, and might even require the progressive elevation of existing immigration quotas over time until the point where supply exceeded demand. That does not mean that open borders should not be the long-term goal of any ethical immigration policy. The modern version of Martin Luther King Jr’s “dream” is that any child, born into the poorest slums of Africa, Asia or Latin America, should have a right to claim those same freedoms and opportunities of American citizenship that far too many of us take for granted. In an era when we are divided in so many ways as a nation, this should be the sort of visionary policy to which all people—religious and secular, traditional and progressive, Native Americans and descendants of immigrants—can say, Yes We Can!

The SQ is a delay CPDoris Provine, 2008 , Professor, School of Justice & Social Inquiry, Arizona State U.Review of OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS, by Kevin R. Johnson. Law & Politics Book Review, Vol. 18 No. 2 (February, 2008) pp.106-108 http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/johnson0208.htmThe current failed policy, Johnson asserts, resembles the Prohibition era, when government attempted to stop the purchase of alcoholic beverages. Immigration controls are just as unworkable and just as out of step with current realities, Johnson argues. The world is shrinking and people everywhere are more aware of opportunities elsewhere. International law is increasingly protecting persons who migrate. The US is out of step with the realities of immigration in the modern world, Johnson asserts. The current system of exclusion will eventually be dismantled in his view: “Some day, borders as we know them today will be as antiquated as covered wagons, the use of leeches, and mimeograph machines.”

Guest Worker CP

Guest Worker CP 1NC

Plan: the United States federal government should implement a renewable, uncapped, portable guest worker visa for agricultural workers from Mexico.

Empirically, guest worker programs re-construct the immigrants’ role in societyJurado, 08 – PhD, University of Michigan (“ALIENATED CITIZENS: “HISPANOPHOBIA” AND THE MEXICAN IM/MIGRANT BODY”, 2008, http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/58455/kjurado_1.pdf?sequence=1)Alcaraz and Rivera maintain a sharp eye on the pulse of the nation and given their digitized media outlet, make them forces to contend with. The likelihood of future guest worker programs between the United States and Mexico make Rivera’s and Alcaraz’s web-based, creative political commentaries on stereotypes a relevant and necessary critique. Their work both highlights and challenges the long historical trajectory of hegemonic representations of the Mexican-Latina/o im/migrant body. During different historical moments, the Mexican im/migrant body has provided a contested, metaphoric landscape that has been discursively dehumanized by hegemonic discourses. This rhetoric of fear has changed little over the last century. Vestiges of the pseudo-scientific jargon of eugenics remain in contemporary anti-immigrant fears. Contemporary anti-immigrant, xenophobic rhetoric, while not sustained by any pseudo-science, nonetheless remains a powerful ideological force in social and juridical thought with very real repercussions that I analyze in each historical moment. In my dissertation I demonstrate that Latina/o authors and artists, past and present, have consistently and actively engaged these destructive constructions. Close readings of the representations provided by Latina/o cultural

workers in a variety of mediums and forums, will show how they have re-written, re-imagined and revisioned the maligned immigrant body. Their work in effect resurrects the element of humanity that is so often obscured by hegemonic discourses and rhetoric. At the heart of this analysis are the broader questions of rigid constructions of citizenship and national identity. This study maps the ways in which discourses of difference delineate and blur the distinctions between citizens and “aliens.” More importantly, the work of Latina/o authors and artists constitute vital counter-narratives that fill in the historical gaps, erasures and misconceptions that have continuously robbed Latina/os of inclusion into the national imaginary. I think of the cultural productions by Latina/os as discursive acts of resurrection in which the Mexican-Latina/o im/migrant body is restored to 24 un cuerpo entero, complete with the humanity so often obscured in hegemonic discourse.

Avoids politicsJohnson, 13 (Fawn, correspondent, May 29th, “Republican Platform Calls for Guest-Worker Program,” National Journal, http://www.nationaljournal.com/2012-conventions/republican-platform-calls-for-guest-worker-program-20120821)Republicans are attempting to balance their party's disparate opinions on immigration by taking a tough stance on illegal immigrants in the United States while at the same time calling for a new temporary foreign worker program. The Republican National Committee's 2012 platform on immigration, adopted on

Tuesday, calls for a "legal and reliable source of foreign labor through a new guest-worker

program . " "It wasn't even attacked," crowed Brad Bailey, a Texas restauranteur who lobbied heavily for the inclusion of a

guest-worker program in the document. Bailey was expecting immigration hard-liners to go after the proposed temporary worker program because a standard GOP campaign line says that illegal immigrants are taking jobs from Americans. Businesses dispute that statement, saying there are many jobs (like roofing and fruit-picking) that Americans won't do. The Republican platform also seeks long-term detention for "dangerous but undeportable aliens" and proposes to make gang membership a deportable offense. It is typical of electoral policy platforms to be vague on details--this isn't legislation, after all. It's the tone that counts. Note the crime-related wording when it comes to gangs and detention, reinforcing an idea important to Republicans: that they are tougher on illegal immigration than President Obama. "Complaining about the problem is no longer working. Republicans need to lead in repairing our nation's immigration policy, " Bailey said on Monday in an e-mail to supporters of a guest-worker program. The Hispanic vote is in play in the general election, and how Republicans handle the immigration question will be a critical factor in determining whether conservative Hispanic voters can be convinced to cast their votes for Mitt

Romney. Hispanics as a group tend to be more conservative than traditional Democrats; half identify themselves as "independent , " according to a recent Gallup poll. But two-thirds of them voted for President Obama in 2008, in part because he promised to push for a broad immigration overhaul that would create a path to citizenship for some illegal immigrants . Some Republican strategists worry

that harsh rhetoric from Republicans about immigration will scare those independent Hispanics away. The inclusion of a guest-worker program in the GOP platform marks a victory for business-oriented Republicans who are worried that a strict "enforcement-only" approach to immigration will ruin certain industries, such as agriculture, which relies heavily on undocumented immigrant labor. "It was brutal," said Bailey, the founder of the free-market nonprofit group The Texas Immigration Solution, who is lobbying aggressively for businesses' access to foreign labor at the Republican National Convention. "I'm a rookie. I didn't know anybody. I was stopping people during bathroom breaks." Bailey is flaming a tinder box within a party that has struggled for years with its commitment to "the rule of law," which sometimes conflicts with businesses' consistent use of immigrant labor--both legal and illegal. With some 12 million illegal immigrants working in the United States, it is difficult to imagine the government committing the resources to extricating all of them. Yet Republicans chafe at any policy that would ease off on punishment for immigration violations. "We are a party that recognizes that illegal means illegal," said Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach, a platform committee member and outspoken immigration hard-liner who was the brains behind Arizona's tough immigration law. "If you want to open a job tomorrow, you can remove an illegal immigrant today." Kobach's considerable influence was on display at the Republican platform committee meeting on Tuesday, as he shot down several suggestions from other members who questioned the necessity of mandating electronic verification of workers or asked for market-based quotas on foreign workers. At Kobach's request, the committee added language to the platform calling for mandatory electronic verification of workers, a border fence, and an end to "sanctuary cities" and in-state tuition for illegal immigrant college students. Bailey knew he was fighting an uphill battle when he brought his proposal for a temporary worker program to the Republican convention. He is one of many business leaders who say enforcement-minded Republicans should adopt a broader view

of immigration to acknowledge their need for labor. Many business leaders want more than a guest-worker

program. Texas has advocated work visas for undocumented immigrants who are already in the country. But that idea goes too far for GOP members who are squeamish about giving any legal status to illegal aliens. "When you are sitting in the back of the room and have no relationships with anyone on the subcommittee, you are fighting an uphill battle," Bailey wrote in his e-mail. "We understand that this is NOT a perfect document. But sometimes in life and in politics we have to compromise and negotiate."

Guest Worker CP Ext’s

A guest worker program is the best moral option – it deteriorates social and political subjugation through humanizing the OtherHing, 06 - Bill Ong Hing is a Professor of Law at the University of San Francisco and Professor Emeritus, U.C. California, Davis School of Law (“Deporting Our Souls”, Oct. 16th, 2006, http://worldtracker.org/media/library/College%20Books/Cambridge%20University%20Press/0521864925.Cambridge.University.Press.Deporting.Our.Souls.Values.Morality.and.Immigration.Policy.Oct.2006.pdf)As a nation, the United States ought to do the right thing when it comes to undocumented immigrants. Given our long historical ties with Mexico, doing the right thing is especially in order in the case of Mexican migrants. We demonize the undocumented, rather than see them for what they are: human beings entering for a better life who have been manipulated by globalization, regional economies, and social structures that have operated for generations. We benefit from undocumented labor every day and in a vast range of occupations. The right thing to do is to develop a system to facilitate the flow of Mexican migrants to the United States who are seeking employment opportunities. Given the economic imbalance between the two nations, we know that the flow will continue – legally or otherwise. By legalizing the flow through a large guestworker program, we ease pressures at the border (thus freeing up personnel to concentrate on the serious challenge of looking for terrorists and drug smugglers), address the labor needs of employers, bring the undocumented out of the shadows, and end unnecessary border deaths that have resulted from current enforcement strategies.57 Doing the right thing requires us to humanize the guestworker upon whom we have come to rely. Thus, establishing a worker program must be done in a manner that provides the workers with hope for membership and respect from other Americans. A path toward legalization becomes a critical ingredient of any guestworker program. Only through that path can these individuals attain a sense of enfranchisement and freedom from political subjugation and servitude. Our moral, economic, social, and national security interests demand that we pursue such a program.

Guest worker program solves farm labor shortages and border securityTodd Staples, The Express-News, 3-8-2013, "U.S. needs strong guest worker program," San Antonio Express-News, http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/article/U-S-needs-strong-guest-worker-program-4340209.phpLet's use pencil and paper to solve our immigration problem, rather than badges and bullets. This will enable our law enforcement to better focus on drug-running terrorists, with the net result being a more secure border and a better knowledge of who is really in our country. The real problem — and solution — when it comes to border security is more about policy than criminal

prosecution. It's about our broken immigration system that fails to provide a win-win for U.S. taxpayers and guest workers. Our nation needs to find a safe and legal way to welcome those willing to fill the jobs the domestic labor market has not filled. Let's be honest: No Americans are relocating to the Rio Grande Valley to pick grapefruit. In California,

strawberries are going unpicked. In Washington last year, apples were dropping to the ground. Why? Because we have too few workers to pick them.

Meanwhile, law enforcement is placed in the unworkable situation of having to treat all undocumented individuals hiding in the brush as though they are deadly threats. And while our federal, state and local

law enforcement personnel are capable of defending our communities from the drug cartels, they are grossly outnumbered by the combined

population of cartels and undocumented workers. With a viable mechanism in place to welcome guest workers, law enforcement officials could reasonably suspect that anyone still trying to enter our country in

a covert manner is either seeking to do harm or — at the very least — blatantly willing to flout our laws. Either way, that individual should be subjected to custody and the letter of the law, not bureaucratic guesswork and the loopholes of red tape.

Making the visas portable solves exploitationAlex Nowrasteh, 1-29-2013, "Immigration plan does only half the job," Reuters, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/01/29/immigration-plan-does-only-half-the-job/, accessed 5-10-2013

Now unions say they oppose a guest-worker visa program to protect these workers from abuse. But unauthorized workers are going to come in any case, so preventing a guest-worker program can only place them in a black market - where employer abuse , backed up by the threat of deportation, is far worse. If unions are honestly concerned about guest-worker abuse, the solution is making the visa portable and not tied to one employer. A World War I guest-worker visa let guest workers quit their jobs and be hired by approved employers. Guest workers simply had to tell the government about their new employer after they were hired — not seek permission before switching jobs. The best labor protection is a worker’s ability to quit a job without legal sanction. If the government could create such a guest-worker visa program 100 years ago, there is no reason why it cannot be revived today. As long as there is economic opportunity here, immigrants — legal or not — will come. An immigration bill that does not create a vehicle for legal migrants to enter the country is not real reform.