Case

Stability Adv.

1nc Stability Adv.QCG talks will succeedThe Kabul Times 2/9/2016 (Optimisms on QCG Peace Talks’ Success, http://thekabultimes.gov.af/index.php/opinions/politics/9730-optimisms-on-qcg-peace-talks%E2%80%99-success.html @yangtri 7/12/16)

The third round of the QCG meeting held in Pakistan’s capital city Islamabad has accompanied verbal meme among both the Afghans including experts, waiting for the final round slated for February 23, in Kabul to result in a free violence country. The Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) meetings involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, the U.S. and China to restore a lasting peace in

the war-torn country, received optimism from both the Afghans and the political experts, saying the third round held in the

neighboring Pakistan could be different with those concluded unproductive in the past. The next and fourth round is expected to be held in Kabul, where after at least one week, both the Afghan government and the Taliban representatives are expected to set a

visa vise peace discussion; a final effort could collect optimisms from the people and the political analysts. The government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has insisted on any peace deal with the government armed opposition to be set without their preconditions may negate the women rights and the last nearly one and half a decade’s achievements. Jawid Kohistani, a political and military

analyst believed that the fresh deal related to peace talks was expected to reach a positive consequence as this round seems something different with those in the past , as the QCG member countries vowed to do their best to convince the Taliban to sit around a negotiation table or face a repressing respond from them . “They (the four members) have done their responsibility for what they had assumed to help the process get success and that the Taliban’s representatives to arrange a face-to-face peace talks with the government, under a categorical Afghan lead process,” said Kohistani who added the Pakistan’s

view had changed much for peace in its neighbor further than the past. Another expert, Muradi expressed a strong optimism over the ongoing series of the peace talks through the meetings of the quadrilateral coordination meetings , saying

this wouldn’t be empty of a positive result. He said something caused deadlock to peace deals would be helped tackled through the meetings of the QCG, while in Kabul’s round, both Afghan and Pakistani sides should talk on how to remove those cases brought stalemates

before peace success in Afghanistan. A number of Afghan parliament members, while expressing pleasure over the peace talks going on in the QCG meetings, but once again asked the Pakistan to honestly step up in this field and do its best to restore a lasting peace in both countries

Status quo solve – Pakistan is making changes to fight terrorism now.Rashid, 2015 (Ahmed, former Pakistani Militant and a journalist and best-selling foreign policy author of several books about Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, “Can China Replace the US in Stabilising Afghanistan?” Diplomaatia April Accessed, 7/4/2016, http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/can-china-replace-the-us-in-stabilising-afghanistan/ JJH)

The central question is whether the army will seriously confront extremism or continue to play its familiar double game. That game has meant accepting some of the West’s demands to fight terrorism while selectively supporting some militant groups, especially those fighting India. Visiting Islamabad on 13 January, US Secretary of State John Kerry made it clear that he wanted concrete reforms and would no longer trust assurances. In the National Action Plan, the army and the government jointly articulated for the first time a common programme against extremism, but the army must first confront and get rid of some of its contradictory policies. For years the military has followed a policy of distinguishing between “good” and “bad” Taliban —the bad being those who attack the army, while the good include the Afghan Taliban who kill only Americans or fellow Afghans. General Sharif now repeatedly says that all terrorists will be treated alike . Recently, acting like a de facto foreign minister, he has visited London, Washington, Kabul, Beijing and the Arabian Gulf states to deliver the same message. This is the closest the army will come to admitting or apologising for its past policies. No public acknowledgements will be made. The army leaders have also begun a long-overdue process to improve relations with Afghanistan and gain the trust of its new president, Ashraf Ghani. The Pakistani army is loathed by the Afghans for supporting the Afghan Taliban in the past and allowing its leader, Mullah Omar, to remain in Pakistan ever since 11

September. General Sharif claims that he is now looking at ways to set up talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government, end the Taliban’s sanctuary in Pakistan, and so end the war in Afghanistan. In return he wants to eliminate the bases that the Pakistani Taliban have set up in Afghanistan . China , Pakistan’s closest ally, is secretly and critically involved in these arrangements . It recently welcomed a Taliban delegation in Beijing and urged its members to open talks with President Ghani. It has also got tough with the Pakistani army because hundreds of Chinese Muslims (Uighurs) are fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan and launching attacks in China’s Xinjiang region. However, relations with India remain extremely tense—partly because the right-wing government in New Delhi refuses to talk to Pakistan, but largely because many of the most dangerous enemies of the Indian army are established in the Pakistani province of Punjab, which borders India. According to the Pakistani interior minister, 95 groups in the Punjab—many of them armed and trained in the past by the Pakistani army’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—are determined to wage endless jihad against India and retake the disputed territory of Kashmir.

CPEC secure now- the army already protects itHaider 6/2/16—Mateen Haider is a writer for Dawn, 2016 (“Army aware of hostility against CPEC, will protect it at any cost: Gen Raheel”, Accessed 7/9/16, Available online at http://www.dawn.com/news/1262298)

RAWALPINDI: Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif on Thursday stated the Pakistan Army is aware of all hostility being perpetrated against the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor ( CPEC ). He added the CPEC project will transform the lives of people of Pakistan. "We are ready to pay any price to turn this long cherished dream into reality,” said the COAS, speaking at a conference held at the General Headquarters (GHQ). The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) added the participants were given a comprehensive briefing on the prevailing internal and external security situation of the country. Participants also held exhaustive discussion on professional matters. “The Pakistani nation has been a victim of terrorism for over a decade and has sacrificed a lot, but we have turned the tide primarily due to the resilience displayed by the whole nation and professionalism of our armed forces .” The country’s top general added the Pakistan Army will always fulfill the expectations of the Pakistani nation. The COAS also emphasised on the quality and speed of rehabilitation and resettlement work in FATA for the TDPs timely return. The latest statement by the country's top general comes at a time when the government has aired confessions of captured Indian and Afghan spies. CPEC: Background The CPEC is a 3,000-kilometer network of roads, railways and pipelines to transport oil and gas from Gwadar Port to Kashgar city, northwestern China's Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region. Proposed by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang during his visit to Pakistan in May 2013, the CPEC will act as a bridge for the new Maritime Silk Route that envisages linking three billion people in Asia, Africa and Europe. An official agreement on the corridor was signed between the two countries in May last year during President Xi Jinping's historic visit to Pakistan. A flagship project of the Belt and Road initiative as well, the CPEC intends to revive the ancient Silk Road with a focus on infrastructure, and constitutes the strategic framework of bilateral cooperation. The project links China's strategy to develop its western region with Pakistan's focus on boosting its economy, including the infrastructure construction of Gwadar Port, together with some energy cooperation and investment programs. It also involves road and railway construction including an upgrade of the 1,300-km Karakoram Highway, the highest paved international road in the world which connects China and Pakistan across the Karakoram mountains. The CPEC will reduce China's routes of oil and gas imports from Africa and the Middle East by thousands of kilometers, making Gwadar a potentially vital link in China's supply chain. General Raheel during the conference expressed satisfaction on the pace of TDP return. He also paid tribute to the unwavering support shown by the tribes in the tribal areas.

Alt causes to CPEC failureSmall, 2/10/2016 (Andrew, transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, “CPEC — Corridor of uncertainty” Herald Accessed 7/5/2016 http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153330/cpec-corridor-of-uncertainty JJH)

At the beginning of 2015, the focus of debate over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was whether it would go ahead at all. The history of economic relations between China and Pakistan had been routinely disappointing. Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, kept putting off his visit to Islamabad. The fantastical dollar figures being thrown around by the Pakistani government seemed to be plucked from thin air. Even after Xi finally showed up in April 2015, the global reaction to the announcements of 46 billion dollars worth of projects was one of pervasive scepticism. We had seen these large numbers being announced before, with very little of it translating into action on ground. Yet, moving into 2016 , while many questions and doubts remain, these are now more concerned with “how” rather than “if” the CPEC will happen. What are the debt implications for the Pakistani economy? Will Punjab be the disproportionate beneficiary? What will be the local impact of the projects? Which route will be completed first? Does the government have the capacity to build a set of projects on as grand a scale as the CPEC includes? Even when there are no ready answers to these questions, the very fact that these are being asked reflects a genuine step forward. The political battles around the CPEC are an indication of the fact that there is actually something to fight over. These are far preferable problems to wrestle with than the persistently weak levels of Chinese investment in the past. There is a tangible push to get the first round of projects completed in the next two years – roads, power plants, port development and special economic zones – to demonstrate meaningful progress by the time the next Pakistani elections become due in 2018. But the challenges that these plans face are formidable, and hang over not just the CPEC, but the entire ‘O ne B elt, O ne R oad ’ Silk Road initiative of which the corridor forms a part . If China simply attempts to externalise the development model that it has pursued domestically, it may leave some valuable infrastructure behind but it will also create a set of political pressures that risk undermining much of the purpose of the venture. The first issue is transparency . The opaque fashion in which many of the projects are being pursued may be viable for a few billion dollars worth of investment but it is not tenable on the huge scale envisaged by the CPEC. When Pakistan’s central bank governor publicly states that he does not understand the composition of financing for the projects , we have a real problem . Routine accusations that one route or another for the corridor is being favoured are easy to make when it is so difficult to figure out what is really going on. While no one expects the details of every deal to be made public, greater clarity on routes, timetables and figures would do much to allay these concerns. The second issue is social impact . China hopes that all these new investments will have a politically stabilising effect in its western neighbourhood. But without serious efforts to ensure demonstrable local benefits , the danger is that the influx of investment will exacerbate existing political and social grievances and divisions rather than reducing them. For the CPEC, this risk is perhaps most obvious in Balochistan, though the planning for the scheme as a whole has not given sufficiently prominent attention to issues ranging from job creation to education and training. Even if a national-level political consensus has been built behind the CPEC, community buy-in and sustained support at the grass-roots level will be equally important. Again, this is hardly an insoluble problem. Diverting even a small fraction of the CPEC financing towards local schools and hospitals, and coming up with projected employment figures that are as striking as the overall investment numbers, will go a long way in addressing this.

Political reform and resolving terrorism within Pakistan are a prerequisite to resolving economic instabilityAhluwalia 15—Montek Singh Ahluwalia is the Federal Minister of Planning, Development & Reforms and Deputy Chairman Planning Commission of Pakistan (“Peace, stability, reforms — prerequisite for development”, July 28th, Accessed 7/14/16, Available online at https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/53284-peace-stability-reforms-%E2%80%94-prerequisite-for-development#, JRR)

After a gloomy economic performance of several years, Pakistan entered into the economic stabilisation phase in the last two years due to prudent policies, introduced by Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government after coming to power in May 2013. Pakistan’s economy was literally in Intensive Care Unit (ICU) when PML-N assumed the charge of government because all economic indictors were showing sharp downward trends. The growth rate, inflation, foreign direct investment, foreign exchange reserves and above all the international credit rating of the country; all were rolling fast on the downward slide. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his team had the first and formidable challenge to stop the economic downslide. In a short period of two years, by the grace of Almighty, the present government successfully managed to arrest the negative slide in economy by pushing it into stabilisation phase. One should not remain in quandary over this economic stabilisation when international Credit Rating Agency Moodi and international media outlets are commending Pakistan over this recovery. One must be mindful about the enormous challenges that came in the way of achieving economic stabilisation when terrorism was raging fire across the country and law & order situation was not up to the mark. This great achievement wouldn’t be possible if the government had not followed prudent policies and good governance despite odds of various sorts. Is economic stabilisation the final goal? No, it is not. The economy is now in takeoff phase and on the runway for takeoff. What does economy need for smooth takeoff and how can greater agenda of development be achieved. The worldwide successful stories of development explicitly tell about three factors, which are believed to be panacea of development. These are peace, stability and reforms that put a nation or a county on trajectory of development and prosperity. We need to understand that development can’t take place without harmonizing peace, stability and reforms. A peaceful country is an attractive destination for investment. A disturbance in law & order is frightening enough for investors to shy away from the country. Likewise stability; both political and economic is a pre-requisite for development. This is a common lesson from the experiences of all successful nations. We have China, our time-tested and all-weather friend next door. The marvelous success of China to emerge as the leading economy of the world is a glaring example of how peace, stability and reforms translated into accelerated development that China is experiencing. The peaceful environment, consistent economic policies and necessary reforms to keep pace with the fast changing global trends resulted in the birth of new China. In a relatively short time, the Chinese people have emerged from the darkness of utter poverty and deprivation into shining example a transformational change within a generation. Geography made Pakistan and China neighbours and luckily both have cordial relations that have now transformed into geo-economic partnership after launching of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project. At a time when Pakistan is poised to benefit enormously from 46 billion dollar Chinese investment , the neighbouring country offers more for Pakistan in the form of its successful development story, from which many lessons can be learnt. The present government has adopted a transformational agenda of Pakistan Vision 2025 to help Pakistan leap into the ranks of middle income growing economies by deepening structural reforms in political and economic sectors and leveraging its youth bulge. An environment of peace and security is a prerequisite to creating peaceful conditions for sustained economic growth and prosperity . The specter of conflict,

however, both domestic and regional, threatens to stymie Pakistan’s efforts. The last decade has seen an implosion of various internal security crises in Pakistan. Various conflict fault lines - militancy, terrorism, sectarianism, insurgency and regional disparities mark Pakistan’s societal fabric creating hurdles in its path to progress. Absence of conditions of peace can not only slow Pakistan’s growth trajectory, they can also deeply impact lives of ordinary Pakistanis by pushing them further down into poverty. The Planning Commission of Pakistan mandated with the development across the country identified the link between peace & stability and development in its Vision 2025. Led by this vision, Planning Commission set up a Peace & Development Unit to raise awareness on the subject, integrate peace and stability and also conduct assessment studies on peace and conflict in the country for policymakers and public. In the words of legendary Nelson Mandela “Peace is the greatest weapon for development that any person can have”. The visionary approach of great Mandela applies both to individuals and nations. We can also draw lessons from Mandela’s words that peace is the only way forward for us to move towards development. Unfortunately, we remained entangled in unnecessary disputes and conflicts that had direct bearing on development. Pakistan paid a heavy price for becoming a party in disputes in the shape of colossal human lives loss and huge economic decay. Pakistan can’t afford more disputes and advocates a policy of peaceful co-existence. This is part of development agenda of the present government, which aspires for peaceful environment in the region and world at large. The policy of maintaining cordial relations with the all countries of region is outcome of development agenda that peace in the region can usher into era of prosperity of entire region. After ensuring peace in the country and advocating it in the region, stability is another pillar that Pakistan needs to raise the structure of sustained and inclusive economic development . Inconsistency in policies particularly economic cost Pakistan heavily when regimes change in the past abandoned even prudent and vibrant economic policies. Pakistan needs consistency in policies and present government believes strongly in it that without having consistency in the policies, it can’t attract foreign direct investment or sustain the growth in exports, which are the two key factors for economic development in any part of the world. Therefore, government has followed a policy of inclusiveness and participation in key policies. Example of which are consensus on National Action Plan against terrorism and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The third pillar i.e. reforms has assumed critical role in development equation. Today, world is witnessing unprecedented change. Explosion of knowledge is taking place with exceptional growth. Keeping pace with emerging trends and challengers through reform of internal capabilities because alignment between capabilities and new challenges is key to success Cumbersome regulatory framework and red-tapism blocked the way of Pakistan’s economic development in the past. Reforms in various sectors are required to align with the fast changing needs of the economic development. If we glued with the policies of colonial era or of 50s, 60s, 70s or 80s, we are bound to end up with failure. Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) introduced the economic reforms in 90s during its first government. Unfortunately these reforms couldn’t bear the desired goals due to political instability and later on Martial Law regime couldn’t keep pace with the development. The economic reforms were effectively followed by our neighbouring country India, which overtook us in growth. But we couldn’t take advantage of them despite being pioneers due to instability and lack of continuity. The government has embarked upon an ambitious agenda of reform to modernise public sector into high performance service provider. However, reforms require environment of continuity as they bear fruits in medium and long term. Pakistan - homeland of almost 200 million people - bestowed with the immense natural and human resources is unluckily placed in the lowest bracket of social indicators. The state of health, education, social justice etc is in tatters. The under-development on the economic front is the real cause behind this poor state of social issues. One question often strikes the mind; whether we Pakistanis are destined to live like poor creatures. Of course, not. We have the power to change our fate. This fate-change can be made possible only after we realise that economic development should be foremost agenda of each and everyone. Today, with peace, stability and reform thrust, we can overcome all challenges

American scholar Stephen Cohan once remarked; “Pakistan is not failed but crawling nation”. We can prove his judgement wrong by leapfrogging on the economic front by showing 7% growth rate of economy. We have broken the barrier of 4% growth rate after six years. If we continue to follow path of peace, stability and reform with consistency we can achieve 7% growth rate by 2018. Likewise, we need to cross $150 billion mark in exports by 2025 if we have to translate our dreams into reality. But to do so, we need to show parochial politics, overcome petty differences and think positive about our future.

Russia is non-interventionist in Central Asia – they won’t resort to escalationMatveeva 13 – Anna Matveeva, member of the Russia and Eurasia Security Research Group, headed the Research Secretariat of the international Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, 2013, (“Russia's changing security role in Central Asia,” European Security, February 6, Available online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2013.775121, Accessed 7-14-2016, SAA)

Although pursuing an active policy, Moscow regards Central Asia more as a threat to be contained than an opportunity for expansion. Domestic factors, such as anti-immigration pressures and fight against drug proliferation feed threat perceptions emanating from the region and act against integration. In this paradigm, Kazakhstan appears an exception, but in Russian designation, the country is not really ‘Central Asia’ given its Eurasian character. Kyrgyzstan is on the borderline, and although Moscow shares a certain cultural affinity with it, it is reluctant to take on board the country's troubles. The primary security issue for the Russian leadership is the stubborn insurgency in the North Caucasus. Thus, Central Asian security will remain a secondary priority, unless developments there threaten Russia directly or a clear connection between the North Caucasian militancy and the region of Central Asia and Afghanistan is established. Intervention beyond Russia's borders is not ruled out in Moscow, but it has to have compelling reasons for it and backing by international legitimacy would be essential . Overall, the non-intervention doctrine is gaining popularity in Russia's emerging approach to the CIS and in international affairs more broadly. This approach is likely to affect other flashpoints, such as a potential escalation in Nagorno Karabakh. Central Asia is the only region so far where some semblance of Russia-driven multilateral cooperation and alliance-building over a common agenda is possible. Still, these are fairly low foreign policy aspirations which allow maintaining symbolic stakes and a status in regional affairs without investing significant resources or risk-taking. Russia, as well as China, finds it easier to elaborate common positions in multilateral format on wider issues in international affairs than to painstakingly resolve intra-regional disputes. President Putin's May 2012 decree ‘On Measures to Implement the Russian Federation Foreign Policy’ talks about promotion of multilateral cooperation in socio-economic, humanitarian, law-enforcement and other sectors, and does not launch any new far-reaching projects, especially in the security sphere. As commented by Patrick Armstrong (2012), ‘this is a country that wants a quiet life so it can develop its economy.’ Although Putin insists that Russian foreign policy does not imply isolation,22 in essence, his foreign policy stances have hardened and became less cooperative in the past few years. In the choice of whether Russia is the power responsible for regional security, – which may necessitate an intervention; – or whether it seeks to concentrate on its own interests, narrowly understood, Moscow is inclined towards the latter option. Thus, caution rather than assertion of dominance is likely to guide its security policy towards Central Asia in the coming period. As a ‘Russia-First’ strategy appears to be gaining momentum, international policy-makers need to consider what alternatives for management of a crisis of any considerable proportions in Central Asia exist. In the worst-case scenario, a security vacuum might be emerging on the borders of Afghanistan, as the coalition's withdrawal nears.

No threat to Pakistani nukes from terrorists – previous attacks on bases, separate systems, US funding provesSiddique 12 — Abubakar Siddique, journalist specializing in coverage of Afghanistan and Pakistan. He now edits RFE/RL's "Gandhara" website. He has spent the past fifteen years researching and writing about security, political, humanitarian and cultural issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Pashtun heartland where he was born. In addition to his reporting, Siddique has spoken at Western think tanks and has contributed articles, chapters and research papers to a range of publications, 2012 (“How Safe is Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal?”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, August 19th, Accessed Online at http://www.rferl.org/content/how-safe-is-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal/24681549.html, Accessed 07-13-16, SP)

The country's military, which controls the nuclear arsenal, has suffered numerous embarrassing attacks on key bases in recent years. In May 2011, at least two naval surveillance aircraft were destroyed and 10 people were killed when militants stored the Mehran naval bases in the southern seaport city of Karachi. In October 2009, militants stormed the headquarters of the Pakistani military in Rawalipini close to Islamabad. They took scores of hostages, who were freed after nine attackers were killed in a nearly 20-hour gun battle. Retired Pakistani Brigadier-General Asad Munir, who formerly served in the senior ranks of the military's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, says that all nuclear installations -- whether civilian or military -- are guarded with elaborate security arrangements . He says that Western countries' concerns that nuclear weapons could fall into the wrong hands have been put to rest . "They know it. They have been here, they have seen the system. They know that it is not easy. It is almost impossible [to breach the nuclear security]. Otherwise they would have taken action. The people who matter know that nobody is in a position to take these installations and take away nukes," Munir said. The UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, considers Pakistan's nuclear program safe and secure. Islamabad has established an elaborate nuclear security apparatus called the Strategic Plans Division . It reportedly keeps the fissile core of Pakistan's nuclear warheads separate from their delivery systems. Islamabad has received some $100 million in U.S. assistance since 9/11 to improve its nuclear safety . Pakistan has reportedly developed its own technologies to prevent accidents and to implement an elaborate system of checks and balances. And as Munir notes, those measures are backed by a strong human deterrent. " As long as the Pakistani army is there, there is no threat to the nuclear weapons. Not even 1 percent, " Munir said.

No one would use a nuke, even if they got oneLeonard WEISS, visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and a member of the National Advisory Board of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, former professor of applied mathematics and engineering at Brown University and the University of Maryland, 15 (“On fear and nuclear terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2015, Vol. 71, No. 2, p. 75-87)

Are terrorists even interested in making their own nuclear weapons? A recent paper (Friedman and Lewis, 2014) postulates a scenario by which terrorists might seize nuclear materials in Pakistan for fashioning a weapon. While jihadist sympathizers are known to have worked within the

Pakistani nuclear establishment, there is little to no ev idence that terrorist groups in or outside the region are seriously trying to obtain a nuclear capability . And Pakistan has been operating a uranium enrichment plant for its weapons program for nearly 30 years with no credible reports of diversion of HEU from the plant .

There is one stark example of a terrorist organization that actually started a nuclear effort: the Aum Shinrikyo group. At its peak, this religious cult had a membership estimated in the tens of thousands spread over a variety of countries, including Japan; its members had scientific expertise in many areas; and the group

was well funded. Aum Shinrikyo obtained access to natural uranium supplies, but the nuclear weapon effort stalled and was abandoned . The group was also interested in chemical weapons and did produce sarin nerve gas with which they attacked the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 persons. Aum Shinrikyo is now a small organization under continuing close surveillance.

What about highly organized groups , designated appropriately as terrorist, that have acquired enough territory to enable them to

operate in a quasi-governmental fashion, like the Islamic State ( IS )? Such organizations are certainly dangerous, but how would nuclear terrorism fit in with a program for building and sustaining a new caliphate that would restore past glories of Islamic society, especially since , like any organized government, the I slamic S tate would itself be vulnerable to nuclear attack? Building a new Islamic state out of radioactive ashes is an unlikely ambition for such groups. However, now that it has become notorious, apocalyptic pronouncements in Western media may begin at any

time, warning of the possible acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by IS. Even if a terror group were to achieve technical nuclear proficiency, the time, money, and infrastructure needed to build nuclear weapons creates significant risks of discovery that would put the group at risk of attack. Given the ease of obtaining conventional explosives and the ability to deploy them, a terrorist group is unlikely to exchange a big part of its operational program to engage in a risky nuclear development effort with such doubtful prospects . And, of course, 9/11 has heightened sensitivity to the need for protection, lowering further the probability of a successful effort.

Party adaptation ensures stabilityLampton 14 (DAVID M., George and Sadie Hyman Professor of China Studies and Director of SAIS-China at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2014, "How China Is Ruled", http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140344/david-m-lampton/how-china-is-ruled)

THE FRACTURED SOCIETY These changes in individual leadership style have coincided with another tectonic shift: the pluralization of China’s society , economy, and bureaucracy . During the Mao era, leaders asserted that they served only one interest -- that of the Chinese masses. The job of the government was to repress recalcitrant forces and educate the people about their true interests. Governance was not about reconciling differences. It was about eliminating them. Since Mao, however, China’s society and bureaucracy have fragmented , making it harder for Beijing to make decisions and implement policies. To deal with the challenge, the Chinese government , particularly since Deng, has developed an authoritarian yet responsive system that explicitly balances major geographic , functional, factional, and policy interests through representation at the highest levels of the CCP. Although the pathways for political self-expression remain limited, and elite decision-making opaque, China’s rulers now try to resolve, rather than crush, conflicts among competing interests , suppressing such conflicts only when they perceive them to be especially big threats. They have attempted to co-opt the rank and file of various constituencies while cracking down on the ringleaders of antigovernment movements. Many of China’s powerful new interest groups are economic in nature. Labor and management now clash over working conditions and pay. Likewise, as Chinese businesses come to look more like Western corporations, they are only partially submissive to party directives. For example, as the scholar Tabitha Mallory has pointed out, the fishing industry has become increasingly privatized -- in 2012, 70 percent of China’s “distant-water” fishing companies were privately owned -- making it far harder for the central government to prevent overfishing. Meanwhile, in the state-owned sector, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, or CNOOC, is supporting policies that favor more assertiveness in the South China Sea, where significant hydrocarbon deposits are thought to lie, and it has found common ground with the Chinese navy, which wants a bigger budget and a modernized fleet. On issues both foreign and domestic, interest groups have become increasingly vocal participants in the

policy process. China’s bureaucracy has adapted to the proliferation of interests by becoming more pluralized itself . Officials use forums called “leading small groups” (lingdao xiaozu) to resolve fights among squabbling organizations and localities , and vice premiers and state councilors spend much of their time settling such disputes. Meanwhile, provinces, big cities such as Shanghai, and industrial and commercial associations increasingly rely on representatives in Beijing to promote their interests by lobbying national decision-makers -- a model that has been replicated at the provincial level as well. PEOPLE POWER Mao almost never allowed public opinion to restrain his policies; the popular will was something he himself defined. Deng, in turn, did adopt reforms, because he feared that the CCP was close to losing its legitimacy, yet he only followed public opinion when it comported with his own analysis. Today, in contrast, almost all Chinese leaders openly speak about the importance of public opinion, with the goal being to preempt problems . In August 2013, for instance, the state-run newspaper China Daily reminded readers that the National Development and Reform Commission had issued regulations requiring local officials to conduct risk assessments to determine the likelihood of popular disturbances in reaction to major construction projects and stated that such undertakings should be shut down temporarily if they generated “medium-level” opposition among citizens. China has built a large apparatus aimed at measuring people’s views -- in 2008, the most recent year for which data are available, some 51,000 firms, many with government contracts, conducted polling -- and Beijing has even begun using survey data to help assess whether CCP officials deserve promotion. “After Deng, there has been no strongman, so public opinion has become a kind of civil society,” one pollster, who has seen more and more of his business come from the central government, told me in 2012. “In the United States, polling is used for elections, but in China, a major use is to monitor government performance.”

Ext. Squo Solves TerrorActions against the talibanRunde, 8/3/2015 (Daniel, William Schreyer Chair and Direct the Project on US Leadership and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies., “Pakistan: The Next Colombia Success Story?” Forbes Accessed 7/5/16 http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielrunde/2015/08/03/pakistan-the-next-colombia-success-story/#537858a43b60 JJH)

Pakistan’s improving security dynamic is the first change to note. It is hard to understate the before-and-after effects of the Taliban’s horrendous December 2014 attack on a military-owned elementary school in Peshawar that killed 145 people, including 132 schoolchildren aged eight to eighteen. Almost immediately after the attack, the military responded in force by taking out 157 terrorists via air strikes and ground operations in the North Waziristan and Khyber tribal areas adjacent to Peshawar. What has not sunk into international perceptions about the country is the tangible consensus among government, military, and Pakistani citizens against violent terrorists including the Pakistani Taliban and the alphabet soup of other terrorist groups in and around the country. Pakistan will continue to experience attacks by fringe groups, but policymakers and investors need to stop operating as if the Pakistani Taliban is at Islamabad’s doorstep.

Government is improvingRunde, 8/3/2015 (Daniel, William Schreyer Chair and Direct the Project on US Leadership and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies., “Pakistan: The Next Colombia Success Story?” Forbes Accessed 7/5/16 http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielrunde/2015/08/03/pakistan-the-next-colombia-success-story/#537858a43b60 JJH)

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is governing with a competent cabinet , a majority coalition, and is working in tandem with the military to deliver peace and security . Sharif was elected in Pakistan’s transition of power between democratically elected governments in April 2013 and so far, he has demonstrated enough of a commitment to democracy . For much of last year, Sharif exercised restraint against an active opposition that led a crippling 162-day sit-in in front of the National Assembly to contest the 2013 election results. Instead of opting for an aggressive approach, Sharif wisely deferred to an independent election mission to verify the results, which recently ruled in favor of his party . The military, at the request of the Prime Minister, encouraged the crowds to disperse peacefully. The military’s decision not to use force against protesters – or the sitting prime minister – suggests that Pakistan could be on its way to further consolidating its fragile democracy.

Pakistan is moving away from terrorism in the SQUOAli 16 – Ghulam Ali, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for Pakistan Studies, Department of South Asian Studies, Peking University, 2016, (“Pakistan inches towards stability,” East Asia Forum, January 26, Available online at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/01/26/pakistan-inches-towards-stability/, Accessed 7-5-2016, SAA)

After a dramatic end to 2014, Pakistan has gradually moved towards greater political and economic stability. This has been largely due to its successes in reducing terrorism, which injected new hopes about the country’s ability to handle crises . The turning point was the December 2014 terrorist attack on the Army Public School (APS) in which over 150 people, mostly children, were killed. Before the APS attack, protests by the opposition party, Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf, against vote rigging in the 2013

elections had entered a fifth month — putting considerable pressure upon the government. The tragedy at APS not only led to the end of those protests but united Pakistan. The government convened an All Party Conference, which approved a National Action Plan (NAP) aimed at intensifying the county’s fight against terrorism. The 20-point NAP remained at the centre of the government’s actions throughout 2015. The Pakistan Army increased operations against militants in the Tribal Areas. By the end of the year , there was a notable decline in terrorist attacks. This was due, in part, to the removal of a moratorium on the death penalty and the establishment of military courts to allow for fast-tracked trials of terrorists. But an even more significant outcome of the APS incident was a fundamental change in the perception of Pakistani people and ruling elite towards the religious extremism. Following the attack, there was widespread anger across the country, which enabled the government and key institutions such as the Supreme Court and the military to take more effective measures to address the challenge of extremism. Crucially, in the wake of the APS attack the Pakistan Army stopped differentiating between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban and intensified operations against them across the board. At the same time, debates over the appropriate role of proxies, such as jihadi groups and the Taliban, in furthering Pakistan’s foreign policy goals gained momentum. The low level of sympathy for religious fundamentalists that had previously existed in Pakistani society due mainly to ignorance and fear began to disappear. This changing mindset augurs well for the future of Pakistan. The improved security situation brought the country’s most popular sport, cricket, back as Zimbabwe toured Pakistan. This was the first visit by an international sports team to Pakistan in six years, following an attack on Sri Lanka’s cricket team in 2009. The country also held the Pakistan Day Parade after a hiatus of seven years. More fundamentally, greater political stability as well as improved law and order could provide opportunities for economic development. But no significant improvement was seen. Though, Pakistan’s foreign reserves reached record heights, this was mostly due to extensive borrowings from the IMF and the World Bank. In fact, a crippling energy crisis, coupled with bad governance, nepotism and lack of clear government policies badly affected Pakistan’s economy. This led to decline both in exports and foreign investment. Even a sharp decline in international oil prices could not give a major boost to economy. The most significant development in 2015 was the establishment of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). During his visit to Pakistan in April 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping allocated US$46 billion for the construction of the CPEC , which analysts argue could be a ‘game-changer’, not only for Pakistan but the entire region. The two countries have already started a number of energy and infrastructure projects as part of the CPEC. Many of them are likely to be completed during 2016. Pakistan’s foreign relations remained on an even keel. The army’s indiscriminate operations against militants helped in restoring trust with the United States. Relations with Russia, which had been tense in the past, improved at an amazing pace. Moscow, a traditional ally of New Delhi, not only removed arms sanctions but also provided weapons to Islamabad. These ties are likely to further grow in the future, given the changing regional environment. Pakistan was able to abstain from participating in the Saudi–Yemen conflict, without hampering its ties with Saudi Arabia — a decision that prevented the country from going down a disastrous path. On the whole relations with the Muslim countries remained traditionally close. By the end of 2015, relations with Afghanistan and India also began to improve. Pakistan agreed to play its role in stalled Taliban–Afghanistan talks. While Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Pakistan in late December thawed the frosty relationship, leading to the resumption of dialogue. Improved relations with Afghanistan and India could have a long-term positive impact on the overall political and economic situation in the country. If Pakistan can reinforce these positive developments during 2016, it may could go a long way towards addressing its myriad crises.

Ext. Alt Cause to CPEC failureAlt Cause – Pakistani Political Opposition and safety.Markey and West, 5/12/2016 (Daniel S., Adjunct Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia @ CFR, and James, Research Associate, India, Pakistan, and South Asia @CFR, “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan” Council on Foreign Relations Accessed 7/5/16 http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/behind-chinas-gambit-pakistan/p37855 JJH)

The CPEC also faces domestic political opposition in Pakistan, with infighting between provinces and the central government over the allocation of investments. Opposition parties have leveled accusations of preferential treatment along the eastern route, claiming the government’s proposals for the distribution of services, industrial parks, and special economic zones denies some provinces access to investment opportunities and only benefits Punjab. The lack of transparency surrounding the negotiated deals has heightened concerns and skepticism that only a select few, if any in Pakistan, will benefit from the investments. Addressing these concerns will require more than additional troops to protect the projects. Unless Pakistan’s federal government works with provincial and local authorities to convince communities that these projects are in their best interest, the CPEC’s viability will remain in doubt. China’s own tolerance for attacks is difficult to anticipate, but because the CPEC is a flagship of the OBOR initiative China may be willing to weather more violence. Yet if Pakistan is unable to provide sufficient security or address the concerns of domestic opponents, projects will have trouble getting off the ground and will fail to prompt follow-on investments or deliver commercial success.

China investment alone not enough to solve CPEC – empirics, secrecyYounus 16 – Uzair Younus, graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and works as a consultant in the US, 2016, (“CPEC questions,” Dawn, January 3, Available online at http://www.dawn.com/news/1230347, Accessed 7-5-2016, SAA)

IF there was one achievement of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government this year, it was the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Counter-insurgency, relative macroeconomic stability, and the survival of the democratic set-up alongside a buoyant military establishment pale in comparison to CPEC. Upwards of $45 billion are going to be pumped into the economy, much of it in the underdeveloped regions of Balochistan and KP. Gwadar is set to become a port worthy of its geopolitical location. And over time, the Pakistani economy will forge a tighter bond with a possible successor to the global hegemon, the US. This is the strategy to propel Pakistan’s economy forward. Or so we are told. The problem with the CPEC agreement is that much of it is secret and undisclosed. The State Bank governor recently bemoaned this fact, arguing that it is important for the bank to know the structure of CPEC deals. That the man responsible for ensuring the long-term macroeconomic stability of the country is unaware of the details, and is forced to argue his case in the press, is evidence of how secret this deal is. This matters, not only because transparency of government deals is fundamental to a democratic republic, but also because the ultimate structure of the deal determines its short- and long-term benefits to Pakistani citizens. In recent years, Pakistan’s external debt has ballooned to over $65bn. Successive governments have been unable to increase revenue collection, and failed to deal with inefficiencies and corruption. Burgeoning deficits and lack of foreign exchange reserves have forced governments to plead for preferential trade status, soft loans, and IMF bailouts. The result has been high levels of inflation, stagnant real wages, and an overall decline in purchasing power for the working class. But well-heeled political and economic elites have witnessed an unprecedented increase in their income and wealth. Much of the CPEC agreement is undisclosed. While sufficient details about CPEC are not available, the experience of African and Latin American countries can inform policymakers of the advantages and pitfalls of increased Chinese

investment in the economy. In both regions, China has increased investment in large-scale infrastructure projects. The focus of trade, however, has been on extractives. This has exposed the economies in both regions to the slowdown in China, causing dramatic declines in investment and currency levels. The Brazilian real has declined almost 30pc this year, as the slowdown in China coupled with domestic political upheaval has caused economic stagnation. As part of increased Chinese investment, governments have also agreed to give preferential treatment to Chinese corporations and labour. This has limited growth opportunities for local companies and employment, thereby reducing the positive impact of the investment on the masses. Lax oversight has led to poor quality of work in some cases: in 2011, a 130-kilometre highway, constructed by a Chinese corporation in Zambia, was swept away by rainfall. To ensure that Pakistan does not suffer, the government must not only develop contingency plans, it must also be more transparent about the deal itself. Questions have already been raised about the proposed CPEC routes. Both Balochistan’s and KP’s political leadership have concerns about the proposed routes and their impact on their local economies. To ensure macroeconomic stability, economic policymakers, both at the State Bank and outside, should be provided details about the expected inflows and outflows of foreign currency, and the debt and equity components of the deal. The last time a secret deal was signed with a superpower, Pakistan was supporting another hegemon in its ultimate victory against the Soviet Union. The ideology and weapons brought chaos that continues to haunt Pakistan. As the country received billions of dollars to keep the economic wheels turning, a toxic ideology permeated society, dividing the nation and killing thousands of innocent people. The argument this time is that the deals being signed are purely economic in nature and will bring jobs, foreign capital, and economic growth to the country. That may be true, and if it is, why the secrecy? Why is it that a top policymaker, the man in charge of keeping the economic system in order, is not aware of the dynamics of this deal? Why is the equity and debt component of the corridor a secret? Why are details around potential preferential treatment for Chinese construction companies and employees not being made public? These are questions that Pakistanis must ask themselves and those running this country. Last time around, the country was ruled by a zealot who wanted to alter the course of Pakistani society at all costs. Today, Pakistan is a democracy, at least an imperfect one. Demanding an answer is not only a right, but a moral and ethical responsibility.

CPEC will fail in the squoThe New Indian Express 16 – 2016, (“Pakistan Senate Expresses Doubts Over China Pakistan Economic Corridor,” TNIE, March 30, Available online at http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/Pakistan-Senate-Expresses-Doubts-Over-China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor/2016/03/30/article3354196.ece, Accessed 7-7-2016, SAA)

ISLAMABAD: The Pakistan Senate has accused the Nawaz Sharif-led PML-N Government of concealing facts about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, and warned the latter that failure to satisfy Parliament on all aspects of this vital economic project is creating serious doubts not only in their minds, but also among the residents of three of the country’s five provinces – Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh. Taking the government and especially Federal Planning and Development Minister Ahsan Iqbal to task recently, the chairman of the Senate Standing Committee on Planning and Development, Senator Tahir Hussain Mashhadi, told the former, “You have failed to satisfy almost the entire committee because you too seem to be uncertain about many issues relating to the CPEC. Members of the committee are patriotic Pakistanis and they are concerned because, a huge investment is involved in the CPEC.” An unrelenting Senator Mashhadi further said the government’s strategy for the 46 billion dollar project, which also includes construction of eastern and western routes, railway links, and establishment of economic zones and power plants remains unconvincing and unclear “In fact, the government is concealing facts ...,” claimed Senator Mashhadi. Apart from Senator

Mashhadi, Senators Salim Mandviwala, Hasil Bizenjo, Sherry Rehman and Mohammad Mohsin Khan Leghari maintained that the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) inked between Pakistan and China with regard to the CPEC was unclear, and did not accept Minister Iqbal’s contention that the Chinese would be irked if critical questions were asked, and this could place the future of the entire project in jeopardy. Senator Usman Khan Kakar of the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party also criticised the government for giving the impression that work on the western route of the project has commenced, when actually the case was that even alignments of the said route were not in place. Referring specifically to the Lahore’s Orange Line train project, Minister Iqbal said that it was not part of the CPEC project. However, according to a media report, the architecture, construction and operation of the train project has been entrusted to Beijing and its estimated completion time is 27 months. Minister Iqbal said that the federal government has not allocated any funds for the train project and added that the government in Pakistan’s Punjab Province is executing the project from its own budget and resources. About investment in energy and transport infrastructure, the minister said Chinese private companies would set up energy projects in accordance with the government’s energy policy. Critics of the CPEC have also pointed out other lacunae such as commercial operations at the Gwadar Port remaining dormant for almost nine years because of differences between the G wadar P ort A uthority and the P ort S ingapore A uthority I nternational ; or the fact that details of the agreement related to the handing over of the Gwadar Port to Chinese not being revealed; or need for the P akistan P lanning C ommission to allocate major portions of the capital amount for CPEC power projects which have nothing to do with trade corridors. Questions have also been raised about trans-shipment operations not commencing at Gwadar as also the fact that the United States might consider reducing financial aid to Pakistan in the wake of China emerging as an alternative economic partner to Islamabad. The CPEC is considered to be an extension of China’s ambitious proposed 21st century Silk Road initiative, and is considered central to China–Pakistan relations. While economic opportunities and development will largely benefit Pakistan, the CPEC's importance to China's geopolitical and economic goals is reflected by the inclusion of the project as part of China's 13th five year development plan. Should all the planned projects be implemented, the value of those projects would be equal to all foreign direct investment in Pakistan since 1970, and would be equivalent to 17 percent of Pakistan's 2015 gross domestic product. Infrastructure projects under the aegis of CPEC will span the length and breadth of Pakistan, and will eventually link the Pakistani city of Gwadar in the southwest to China's north western Xinjiang Province via a vast network of highways and railways.

Ext. CPEC Doesn’t SolveCPEC doesn’t solve Pakistan economic stability- requires too many resources from Pakistan that mitigate the benefitSalman 15—Ali Salman is the Executive Director of PRIME Institute, an independent think tank based in Islamabad, (“Pakistan-China Economic Corridor: a cost-benefit analysis”, May 3rd, Accessed 7/13/16, Available online at http://tribune.com.pk/story/880259/pakistan-china-economic-corridor-a-cost-benefit-analysis/, JRR)

The Pakistan-China Economic Corridor (PCEC) has been rightly termed a game changer. A careful cost-benefit analysis is required to assess for whom it will be the game changer. The key parameters should be additional business and additional savings. Every day, China spends around $18 million on import of 6.3 million barrels of oil as shipment costs from the Middle East, accounting for 80% of its all oil needs, routing through the Strait of Malacca covering a distance of 9,912 miles. By cutting a corridor directly from Kashgar to Gwadar, it will bring these costs significantly down to one-third of the current levels as new distance will be 3,626 miles to Central China, whereas only 2,295 miles till West China. Even if China were to use PCEC only for 50% of its current level of oil supplies, it will save around $6 million every day, almost $2 billion every year. It is true that these savings are peanuts to the Chinese economy, however, the greater gain may lie in the strategic outreach via Gwadar as its Maritime Silk Route. There is another benefit that will accrue to China. As half of Chinese exports are destined on its Western side, it will also gain tremendously by saving on its containerised traffic costs. China is one of Pakistan’s largest trading partners; the two-way trade exceeded $16 billion last year, marking an annual growth of 12.57%. While our exports to the United States and European Union earn us trade surplus, our imports from Chinese contribute to enlarging the trade deficit. The Chinese president has promised $46 billion investment to Pakistan and the planning minister has stated that out of that amount, $11 billion has been set aside for infrastructure work on the corridor, while the remaining $35 billion will be directed towards energy projects. In all likelihood, the $11-billion amount for infrastructure purposes is a Chinese loan whereas the $35-billion investment for the power sector is yet to be converted into a concrete term sheet. Consider this example. According to the Ministry of Finance, the Executive Committee of National Economic Council, in 2014, approved Karachi-Multan-Lahore Motorway Project – construction of Sukkur-Multan section (387 kilometres) – with a rationalised cost of Rs259.353 billion or $2.59 billion. Ten per cent cost of the project will come from the Public Sector Development Programme and 90% of the cost as credit financing through the government of China. This will be part of PCEC. In the form of PCEC, Pakistan will acquire a new asset in terms of infrastructure. However, it has to first mobilise its own industry and trade sectors to make the best use of the corridor. Else, it will be a road and pipeline largely meant for Chinese business – on Pakistan’s taxpayers’ cost – and now protected by the Pakistan Army on our cost. The term-sheet for Chinese investment in the power sector does not seem very promising at the moment. The federal government’s sovereign guarantee has been called in several times by IPPs over the last few years. The Chinese may not give it its due value. The next alternative for them as a guarantee is a revolving letter of credit backed by the government. That is almost a non-starter for the government as it will imply special privileges to Chinese investors and no bank can offer revolving letter of credit for the life cycle of a power project, running over decades. The government should refuse such requests. What Pakistan needs to do? If Pakistan cannot overcome its power crisis, and prepare a trade-centric economic vision, we stand to benefit little from PCEC in terms of additional business opportunities apart from temporary jobs. One scenario for our planning and finance ministers is to consider imposing a toll tax on Chinese oil shipment and trade traffic. Another possibility is to negotiate infrastructure projects on the basis of build-own-operate-transfer instead of an outright loan. China needs

us. Pakistan should embrace this huge opportunity with a pragmatic, and business-like cost-benefit analysis instead of confounding this transaction with metaphors of oceans, mountains, honey and now iron. It’s about hard cash which the finance minister badly needs for the country. We should not leave too much cash on the Chinese Wall.

CPEC is not enough to solve econChaudhary, 3/10/2016 (Shamila, Senior South Asia Fellow, New America and Senior Advisor, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China and South Asia” Accessed 7/5/16 http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/CHAUDHARY_Remarks%20031016.pdf JJH)

Finally, no one donor or relationship can stabilize Pakistan. Even if CPEC was 100% successful, Pakistan’s internal security situation requires more than energy and infrastructure investment to stabilize it. It requires a new system of governance in the tribal areas. It requires the state to be strong enough to fight the growing influence of militancy that has roots in the country’s national security policies. It requires greater investments in the Pakistani people. Stabilizing Pakistan is a multifaceted approach that must be led by Pakistani institutions and leaders and aided by foreign partners. And while Washington’s ire with Pakistan may fluctuate from time to time, its focus on its political and economic stability should not. Playing the long game with Pakistan is important, as we are learning more and more from the Chinese.

CPEC won’t benefit the Pakistani EconomyAhmad 16- Staff writer for the Express Tribune- CPEC: Perils ahead for Pakistan, http://tribune.com.pk/story/1101574/cpec-perils-ahead-for-pakistan/ @yangtri 7/13/16

Government accused of not sharing details of CPEC projects Marred with inconsistent government policies, shortage of energy and trained manpower, Pakistani businessmen believe they will not be able to compete with Chinese products which are cheaper, better and come with lesser restriction to the consumer market . Furthermore,

economists see the top most importer with reduced or no taxes as a serious blow to a country which collects almost half of its total revenue through levies. Since emphasis on exports has never been a serious priority for Islamabad, rarely an FTA signed by the commerce ministry has yielded positive results for the economy. For that matter, one with China will have to be the hardest. Compared to Chinese imports worth around $500 billion, Pakistan’s share is a meagre $5.5 billion despite geographical proximity and the much clichéd taller-than-Himalayas-and-deeper-than-the-oceans friendship. For now, Nawaz government fantasises the China economic corridor more for its own political ambitions rather than national interest. The coordination between the office of Ahsan Iqbal, Pakistan’s point-man on China-

Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and commerce and finance ministries is nearly non-existent. Characteristically lacking in-depth homework, the government is working in isolation from think-tanks and universities. CPEC affiliated projects have little input from other stakeholders, including the political and business community and local people. The

nervous business leaders are not only scared of massive dumping of goods but also smuggling of goods from China at the same time. Chinese investment in special economic zones is another fantasy unless Islamabad accepts investment with lasting technological relevance and good profit margins besides other factors. Forgetting its pre-election rhetoric about eliminating load shedding within a year, the Nawaz government has revised the target by the end of its term in 2018. With power cuts lasting longer and political anarchy becoming more rampant, there remain no visible catalytic factors to boost the country’s economy, especially exports. So far,

lower oil prices have been a blessing in disguise for the tax-friendly regime. Given Pakistan is already putting all economic eggs in one basket, its stakes are high. Learning from mindless policies of Ziaul Haq on the Afghan front, Pakistan can avoid being trapped in an economic whirlpool for many decades

to come. If Beijing is spending billions of dollars on CPEC, it’s neither for Pakistan’s makeover nor for the PMLN’s success in 2018 elections. Alone Ahsan Iqbal can’t visualise the fate of Pakistan’s peasants, labourers, consumers and entrepreneurs with their respective advantage.

Failing to reform their energy sector makes economic instability inevitable-CPEC can’t solve thisRoberts and Sattar 15—Research Fellow For Economic Freedom and Growth at the Center for Trade and Economics (CTE) at the Heritage Foundation, Huma Sattar (“Pakistan’s Economic Disarray and How to Fix It”, July 30, 2015, Accessed 7/13/16, Available Online at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/06/pakistans-economic-disarray-and-how-to-fix-it, JRR)

Growth Impossible Without Deregulation of Energy Sector. At the heart of the power crisis is the government’s intransigence and insistence on retaining control of the sector. The regulatory framework permits the government to set tariffs at politically attractive but economically unsustainable low levels, thereby leading to payment defaults, circular debt, and electricity shortages. Energy-intensive companies, in turn, cannot meet production targets, and in recent years many have lost export contracts. In fact, power shortages have led many industries in Pakistan to rely on stand-by power generators, which produce electricity that is much more costly than it would be from the traditional grid source. Although in the short run it would cause higher electricity prices, deregulation would allow generation companies to construct dedicated transmission lines to these export-oriented companies, helping them to meet demand and, in the long run, create economies of scale. The current system of unsustainably low, fixed prices only fuels corruption within the system and helps neither industry nor the consumer. In May 2015, the IMF’s mission chief to Pakistan announced that the government and the IMF had reached an agreement to move gradually to full cost recovery in the power sector and eliminate circular debt by “increasing the allowance of losses in electricity tariff adjustments and privatization of power distribution companies.”[64] In the past the government has repeatedly promised to tackle price distortions, inadequate collections, burdening subsidies, governance inefficiencies, and most of all, deregulation of the sector; but most of these reforms, including the privatization of most DISCOs, remain pending. Aside from some ambiguous initiatives aimed at kick-starting locally mined coal, wind, and on-grid solar power projects, the feasibility of which is still uncertain, the only progress made to resolve the crisis has been the approval of grid-connected solar energy that could be fed back to the national grid, rooftop solar installations, and mortgage financing for home solar panels, which could potentially lower the burden for domestic energy consumers. The government also eliminated a 32.5 percent tax on imports of solar equipment by private companies, in an effort to bring down the cost of installing solar panels.[65] This development, however, will neither resolve the crisis itself nor provide electricity to energy-starved industries that are growth drivers for the economy. According to the Pakistan Economic Survey 2014, the solar panels imported by the private sector can provide only 64.5 MW of additional energy capacity,[66] or about 1 percent of the approximately 5,000 MW energy deficit in Pakistan. The Nawaz government had already pledged privatization of several distribution companies early on when starting his term as prime minister. Perhaps the pressure to meet targets set by the latest agreement with the IMF will push the government to take action now. Government: No Sustainable Actions to Implement Its Economic Reform Agenda. The Pew Research Center’s 2014 Global Attitudes & Trends survey[67] showed that national priorities in Pakistan considered most troubling to the people were rising prices, electricity shortages, lack of jobs, crime, the rich/poor income gap, and corrupt political leadership. Conflict with India and terrorism in the region were of lesser concern to the average Pakistani. Although terrorist attacks, such as the horrific December 2014 attack at the school in Peshawar, cause spikes in public concern about terrorism, it is the economic condition of the country that remains paramount to Pakistanis and has become almost an existential crisis for the country. South Asia expert Michael Kugelman of the Wilson Center asserts that Pakistan’s energy crisis is “more of a menace than militancy”[68] and says: “Pakistan’s energy insecurity is deeply destabilizing—and not just because militants prey on fragile infrastructure. Streets often swell with angry protestors railing against power outages. They have blocked

roads, and attacked the homes and offices of members of Pakistan’s major political parties.”[69] The same Pew survey indicates that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is very popular. According to the survey, 64 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of him[70] and are satisfied with the direction their country is taking under his leadership.[71] Nawaz may have bitten off more than he can chew, however, in making sunny promises to reform the economy in order to increase his popularity. In its party platform manifesto, the Pakistan Muslim League presented a comprehensive economic agenda focusing on economic revival, energy security, and social protection, with lofty claims of doubling GDP growth (from 3 percent to 6 percent), bringing down the fiscal deficit from 8 percent to 4 percent, increasing the tax-to-GDP ratio to 15 percent, massively bringing down inflation, reducing government borrowing, minimizing power shortages, cutting import taxes, and other reforms.[72] Nawaz has repeatedly touted his belief in limited, smaller government and a free-market economy. Yet, two years into his administration, little or no progress has been seen on most of his agenda. The political unrest, sectarian violence, and terrorism may have sidetracked the government’s attention, but do not explain its negligence in implementing reforms that are vital to reviving the economy. A joint project undertaken by a policy think tank in Islamabad, the Policy Research Institute of Market Economy, along with its international partner, the Center for International Private Enterprise, is tracking the government’s performance against its economic agenda every six months to determine where the administration stands.[73] The fourth tracking report, issued in the last quarter of 2014, calls the Pakistani government’s performance “too slow to make it.”[74] Even though the first tracking report, published in early 2014, scored the administration generously on attempting to implement some economic reforms, and indicated that the economy may be moving in the right direction, later reports continue to urge the government to take action sooner rather than later. As of December 2014, the government, according to the tracking report, stood below 50 percent of its target goals in terms of legislative and policy developments and institutional reforms.[75] The government contended that Chinese investments of $45.6 billion for its economic corridor into Pakistan[76] would substantially relieve the energy crisis and end crippling power shortages. The project—that will create 16,000 MW of new electricity-generation capacity—will not, however, solve the larger issues of power mismanagement, poor governance and corruption within the sector, electricity thefts, and transmission losses.[77] Coincidentally, electricity shortages increased in late 2014. Other government promises were similarly found unfulfilled: No meaningful tax reforms were implemented, tax evasion persisted, and the number of tax filers actually decreased by 15,000. In efforts to reduce fiscal deficit, the government reduced budgeted power subsidies by 24 percent for FY 2015 compared to the previous year, but they remain at about 1 percent of GDP.[78] The Economist reported in May 2015 that Pakistan was experiencing “a rare period of optimism about its economy,” citing as reasons IMF projections of 4.7 percent growth and the smallest increase in consumer prices (2.5 percent) in more than a decade.[79] Largely due to global oil price drops, Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves could experience a windfall since Pakistan’s oil imports are huge—5 percent of GDP in 2014. Such one-time gains, however, will not bolster the Pakistani economy in the long term. Deeper reforms are still essential for the economy to show sustainable signs of improvement. In an April 2015 evaluation of Pakistan’s creditworthiness, Moody’s awarded a rating of “M–” (moderate–) for Economic Strength owing to gradual improvements. It warned, however, that the structural disabilities within the country, especially weaknesses in the power sector, could hurt this rating. In fact, the report gives a rating of “VL+” (very low+) on institutional strength and an even lower score, the lowest on the scale, “VL–,” on fiscal strength.[80]

Ext. Econ Doesn’t SolveEconomic Development alone cannot solve for Pakistani Stability/Laundry List of Alt CausesAkram 15- Munir Akram, Served two terms as President of the UN Security Council, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations from 2002 to 2008, Started in Foreign Service of Pakistan in 1967, , 1995-2002 represented Pakistan as Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, and prior to that Munir Akram filled a number of important diplomatic positions, including Vice-Foreign Minister (1992-1995); Ambassador of Pakistan to the European Community, Belgium and Luxembourg (1988-1992); Director for UN Economic Cooperation and Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Geneva (1985-1988); and as Minister/Counselor in Pakistan’s Embassy to Japan in Tokyo (1982-1985), Former Pakistan ambassador to the UN, Writer for the Dawn, Special Adviser on "Sustainable Development" to Sha Zukang, UN Under Secretary General for Economic and Social Affairs and serves as Special Adviser to several other United Nations agencies, Pakistan’s Stability Agenda, November 15, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1219733. @yangtri 7/12/16

PAKISTAN today has achieved a measure of political, security and economic stability — due largely to the strategic clarity imposed by the ‘security establishment’ — and happenstance. Domestic and externally sponsored terrorism has been reduced though not eliminated. Pakistan has not succumbed to India’s belligerence and bullying. The spreading turmoil in Afghanistan has, so far, had a limited fallout on Pakistan. Relations with the US

appear to be on an even keel. The strategic relationship with China is being consolidated including under the rubric of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. New prospects of cooperation have been opened with Russia and Iran, although the ties with traditional friends in the Gulf have

deteriorated significantly. The economy has stabilised and shows promise of growth. There are no dark clouds on the domestic

political horizon. Yet, this stability is fragile and incomplete. With the ‘correlation of forces’ in perpetual motion, equilibriums cannot always

be preserved by inaction. There are present and impending threats to Pakistan’s stability which require a dynamic response. The most immediate threat continues to be posed by terrorism and extremist violence. The ubiquitous military

campaigns undertaken must be followed by comprehensive action — political, economic, social and cultural — to ensure sustained success. In this context, the vocal complaint from the military of civilian laxity in implementing the much heralded National Action Plan is

disturbing. Hopefully, all arms of the government will be energised in the wake of the army’s complaint. Our stability is dependent on achieving equitable economic development and evolving stable governance. Policy action is also essential to insulate Pakistan from the escalating chaos and conflict in Afghanistan. The collapse of the dysfunctional and frequently hostile Kabul government, the splintering of the Afghan Taliban, the emergence of terrorists of the self-styled Islamic State, and a Hobbesian civil war in Afghanistan, could erode Pakistan’s stability. It must, therefore, contribute to the thankless task of Afghan reconciliation. But, rather than hosting public dialogues between Kabul and the

Afghan Taliban, and making promises which it may not be able to fulfil, Pakistan should undertake quiet efforts to promote reconciliation and reduce the violence in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan’s own interests — to eliminate the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and its cross-border attacks — must remain central. The Afghan Taliban must be convinced to break all links with the TTP and Kabul (and its patrons) must also be

responsive to Pakistan’s concerns regarding the TTP and India’s military and intelligence activities in Afghanistan. India continues to pose the major threat to Pakistan’s security and stability. Normalisation will remain a chimera while Narendra Modi rules in New Delhi. Pakistan should adopt a policy of ‘dignified distance’ from the Bharatiya Janata Party government. Unfortunately, the BJP’s domestic decline — as manifested in the Delhi and Bihar elections — may lead Modi to embark on a chauvinist adventure against Pakistan to revive popular support. Thus, Pakistan must maintain ‘full-spectrum deterrence’ against an increasingly militarised India and reject discriminatory restraints. But Pakistan can offer reciprocal restraint to India to prevent the ‘nuclear nightmare’ which can result from a conflict between the two countries. On terrorism too, Pakistan should insist on reciprocity. Since the previous government agreed to outlaw the pro-Kashmiri Lashkar-e-Taiba, Islamabad has been obliged to swim against the tide of domestic opinion while acting against it. This is all the more

reason to expose and outlaw India’s state-sponsored terrorism against Pakistan which Indian officials have proudly admitted. Nor can Pakistan remain passive on Kashmir. Even if Pakistan does nothing, the Kashmiris will, sooner rather than later, rise in another revolt against India’s heavy-handed

occupation. Inevitably, Pakistan will be blamed for the resulting violence and ‘terrorism’. To avert another Pakistan-India crisis, if not to fulfil its political and moral obligation to the Kashmiris, Pakistan must promote an active diplomatic effort to halt India’s oppression and secure the inalienable rights of the Kashmiri people. Growing great power rivalry may also threaten Pakistan’s stability. Pakistan’s strategic relationship with China is pivotal to its security. The closer American alignment with India to contain China may produce further and more blatant attempts by Washington to extract unilateral strategic concessions from Pakistan. These must be boldly rejected. To do so, Pakistan needs to reduce its financial dependence on the West. However, promoting cooperation with the US wherever interests are convergent — counterterrorism, Afghanistan, investment, development — can also help to maintain a balanced relationship with the US. Islamabad has been wise to avoid involvement in the sectarian wars in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Delicate diplomacy will continue to be

required to balance relations between an unshackled Iran and an angry Saudi Arabia as they vie for regional influence. Pakistan’s priority must be to ensure that no

Pakistani groups become associated with the self-styled Islamic State or other extremist Sunni or Shia groups engaged in these conflicts. Ultimately, Pakistan’s stability is dependent on achieving equitable economic development and evolving a stable system of political governance . Pakistan’s present economic balance has been achieved mainly by exogenous and temporary factors — low oil prices, remittances, bond sales and IMF support. To sustain and accelerate growth, Pakistan needs to expand government revenues, restructure its energy policies, reform its loss-making state corporations and mobilise significant domestic and foreign investment. Without growing prosperity and jobs, socio-economic strife will not be averted for long within the country. A shaky ‘democracy’ has survived — but only just — for several years. It is an inconvenient fact that the country’s present relative stability would not have been possible without the firm guiding hand of the Pakistan military. Reforms in Pakistan’s political and governance structures — to enhance accountability, efficiency and honesty of elected representatives and the sprawling bureaucracy — are essential and overdue. The present interregnum of relative stability is a good time to embark on these reforms.

Security threats external to the ones the aff solves make economic stability impossibleRoberts and Sattar 15—Research Fellow For Economic Freedom and Growth at the Center for Trade and Economics (CTE) at the Heritage Foundation, Huma Sattar (“Pakistan’s Economic Disarray and How to Fix It”, July 30, 2015, Accessed 7/13/16, Available Online at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/06/pakistans-economic-disarray-and-how-to-fix-it, JRR)

Security Problems Undermine Economic Freedom. Political, sectarian, and religious violence, in addition to the widespread terrorist activities in the region, have played a large role in derailing the process of economic growth in Pakistan. Pakistan has witnessed countless terrorist attacks in its short history, the Peshawar attack being the most lethal. According to data compiled by the India-based Institute for Conflict Management, Pakistan has suffered over 57,000 fatalities since 2003 as a result of terrorist violence.[81] Poor security conditions also bear some—but not all—of the blame for deterring would-be domestic and foreign investors from starting new businesses as well as discouraging existing businesses from continuing or expanding in Pakistan. Lack of security within Pakistan, whether due to terrorist attacks or violence induced by sectarian or religious attacks, often brings major cities to a halt, shuts down small and large businesses and schools, and disrupts daily life. The Pakistani Ministry of Finance asserts that Pakistan has incurred economic costs amounting to $102 billion since 2001 due to terrorism.[82] While the Pakistani army is actively fighting the anti-government TTP militants, it is known to have a tactical approach to the terrorism ideology—fighting some while supporting others, such as the LeT or Jaish Mohammad, retaining them as strategic tools for the army’s foreign policy interests in Afghanistan and India. This has largely undermined the Pakistani state’s own efforts to eliminate terrorism in the country, bring stability, or create space for the country to grow economically.

Bureaucratic corruption damages trade and kills economic stability in PakistanRoberts and Sattar 15—Research Fellow For Economic Freedom and Growth at the Center for Trade and Economics (CTE) at the Heritage Foundation, Huma Sattar (“Pakistan’s Economic Disarray and How to Fix It”, July 30, 2015, Accessed 7/13/16, Available Online at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/06/pakistans-economic-disarray-and-how-to-fix-it, JRR)

Endemic corruption also plagues Pakistan at all levels of government bureaucracy. According to Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), scaled from 0 to 100, Pakistan is highly corrupt, with a score of 29, and ranks 126th most corrupt of 175 countries measured.[35] Although the scores have improved marginally since 2012, the CPI continues to place Pakistan in the “Highly Corrupt” category. The CPI’s chapter on Pakistan reports that Pakistan lost $94 billion due to corruption, tax evasion, and bad governance during the four years of Zardari’s Peoples Party government.[36] By comparison (and notwithstanding both nations’ legacy of Anglo-Saxon legal systems), next-door neighbor India ranks 85th on the CPI with a score of 38, up from 36 in 2012—corrupt but improving.[37] According to the World Bank, corruption in Pakistan is also a significant and growing deterrent to foreign

trade and investment.[38] More than half of all Pakistani firms (57 percent) consider corruption to be a severe constraint in doing business. This figure has increased from 40 percent in 2002 and is much higher than in the most competitive countries, with the exception of Brazil and Bangladesh.[39] More recently, Walt Disney cancelled nearly $200 million in textile orders from Pakistan and banned the country as a supplier, citing massive corruption, lack of accountability, and violence among the reasons for the ban.[40] A Canadian textile company also discontinued business with Pakistan, claiming that it had become increasingly difficult to do business with Pakistan due to poor infrastructure, unplanned delays, power shortages, corruption, and overall instability in the country. Given that more than half of Pakistan’s total exports consist of textile and textile products, these cancellations are devastating to the country’s economy. Anecdotal evidence gathered by the authors of this Special Report suggests that, in general, instability within the country and corrupt governance continue to affect the business environment and prospects for foreign investments. The Pakistani tax system is riddled with tax exemptions. According to the Pakistan Economic Survey 2014, tax exemptions enjoyed by many business elites and companies amounted to nearly $4.7 billion in FY 2014, almost 100 percent higher than the preceding year. The government has promised to phase out these exemptions in three years.[41] Tax evasion is also rampant in Pakistan, but no administration has managed to deal with it head-on. Only one in every 200 citizens in Pakistan files income tax returns. In 2014, the government published a list of tax defaulters in an effort to shame evaders to pay,[42] but such soft measures are not likely to bear substantial fruit. According to a report published by the Center for Investigative Reporting in Pakistan, only about a third of Pakistani lawmakers filed income tax returns in 2012; among the 67 percent of non-filers was then-Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani.[43] Many lawmakers, the report says, are not even registered taxpayers. Many of those who did file were found to have mis-declared their annual earnings.[44] In fact, the report cites astonishing figures: Less than 1 percent of Pakistanis filed tax returns in 2012,[45] while the country’s tax-to-GDP share was only 10 percent[46] (essentially due to a low tax base combined with high rates). The report explains why the IMF emphasized to Pakistan’s government the need to focus on tax evasion and tax compliance—one of the primary conditions of the 2013 IMF Extended Fund Facility of $6.6 billion.

Economic diversification is the most important issue for Pakistan’s economy- CPEC won’t solveQureshl 5/2/16— Nadeem M Qureshi is the Chairman and founder of the political party Mustaqbil Pakistan, Nadeem has a business background and has studied engineering at M.I.T. in Cambridge Mass. and business. He also went to Harvard Business School in Boston (“Is Pakistan ready to diversify its economy?”, Accessed 7/13/16, Available online at http://www.khaleejtimes.com/editorials-columns/is-pakistan-ready-to-diversify-its-economy, JRR)

The Gulf States have responded with unprecedented speed and daring to the possible impact of the oil crisis on their economies. Led by a new generation of leaders - especially in Saudi Arabia - they have crafted a sweeping new vision for the country as it seeks to wean itself away from its addiction to oil. The question we have to ask here in Pakistan is: Have we done anything? Many will say: Why should we? It's not our problem. If oil prices fall from $120 per barrel to $30, why should we worry? In fact, we benefit from the windfall savings in our oil import bill? True. But not the whole truth. Consider the following: The mainstay of Pakistan's economy is the remittances it gets from its overseas workers. A total of about $18 billion were sent home by our workers abroad. Of this some $11 billion was sent by workers in the Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia alone accounted for $5 billion in annual remittances. Let's be clear. It is these remittances that are propping up Pakistan's stumbling economy. Industries have shut down. Value creation is virtually non-existent. Unemployment and poverty are rampant. Yet our imports far exceed our

exports. Last year, according to the State Bank of Pakistan, we imported goods worth $41 billion, and exported goods worth $24 billion. The difference between the two numbers, our trade deficit of $17 billion, is made up entirely by the $18 billion in remittances from overseas workers. Take away these remittances and our economy would no longer be able to finance our trade balance. A wrenching downward adjustment would need to be made in a very short time. And what is happening in the Gulf today suggests that this day of reckoning may not be far away. The Gulf States are taking a range of measures to deal with the crisis. Non-essential projects are being cancelled. Efforts are being made to replace foreign labour with a local labour force. Taxes are being contemplated. These would be on remittances by foreigners and possibly on their incomes. The Consultative Assembly of Saudi Arabia known as the Shoura Council is taking up a proposal to tax expatriate remittances. Fees on residence permits and other licenses will rise. Subsidies on utilities are being axed. Fuel prices have already tripled in the Kingdom. All of these steps will have an impact on Pakistan. The most serious of these will result from job losses as marginal projects are cut. Already, last week, one of the largest construction companies in Saudi Arabia, the Bin Laden Group, culled 50,000 workers - the vast majority from Pakistan. And this is just the beginning. There are an estimated four million Pakistani workers in the Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia alone is host to some two million of them. In just one week, one company has decided to send three per cent of all Pakistani workers in the Kingdom home. As the new reforms take hold more and more of them will start to come home. If taxes are imposed on their remittances, many Pakistani workers will find it difficult to support their families at home and might well opt to return voluntarily. This applies especially to blue-collar workers who represent the vast majority - some 90 per cent - of Pakistanis in the Gulf. The upshot is that Pakistan will start to see a reverse exodus of workers returning from the Gulf. This will impact Pakistan's economy in two ways. First, remittances will take a hit. And, second, hundreds of thousands of able-bodied returning workers will add to the millions of the already unemployed in Pakistan. This is the classic double whammy that may deal the deathblow to our already floundering economy. So it is surprising that this issue is not even being discussed in government or political circles. Instead, the corridors of power seem infatuated with the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC ). It is seen as some kind of rejuvenating elixir for our dying economy - a 'game changer' as it is often called. This is a dangerous illusion . Yes, CPEC is useful. But let's not forget that it is a single project. And that too a Chinese project whose benefits will flow more to them than to us. A single project, however grand, can never be a substitute for an integrated and focused economic development plan and strategy for the country. And this is precisely what Pakistan lacks today. The government thrashes about randomly implementing mega projects - a rail transit scheme here, a metro bus there, a coal fired power plant elsewhere, and so on. All this without an overarching strategy or plan to pull Pakistan's people out of their misery and put them on the path of sustained economic development. We got away with this as long as the money flowed from the Gulf. But that tap is about to be turned off. And this reality, not CPEC, will be the 'gamechanger' that will matter.

Alt causes to Pakistan instability- Afghanistan War, terrorism and Baluchistan and they can’t even solve ethno-sectarian violence the root cause of Pakistan’s economic instabilityCordesman 11— Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS (“PAKISTAN: VIOLENCE VS. STABILITY”, June 7th , Accessed 7/14/16, Available Online at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110607_Stabilizing_Pakistan.pdf, JRR)

Pakistan faces the convergence of various localized conflicts that were once insulated from each other. A massive growth in militancy in the Pakistani-Afghan border area interacts with growing threats in the

heartland of the Punjabi, Sindhi and Baloch interior. Pakistan‟s growing instability does not have one cause or center of gravity, it has many The war in Afghanistan has moved al-Qaeda into Pakistan along with the Taliban, Haqqani network, and Hekmatyar‟s forces. At the same time, Pakistan faces a combination of separatist pressures in Baluchistan and the Sindh and foreign and domestic neo-Salafi threats that have growing ties to al-Qaeda. These threats include the continuing violence in the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA) and the neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Insurgent momentum shows few signs of having been decisively reversed despite increasingly robust Pakistani military (PAKMIL) operations. Improved counterinsurgency efforts have had some successes in certain tribal agencies, but gains are likely to be ephemeral, as many of the root causes of militancy remain unaddressed, including political, administrative and economic stagnation. A diverse array of militant actors including core command nodes of al-Qaeda, continue to operate inside the tribal areas. They maneuver in support of distinct organizational priorities, including the global jihad, regional jihads in Afghanistan and Kashmir, as well as domestic antistate and sectarian agendas. They often collaborate on operational, ideological and fundraising axes. Their combined activities have uprooted many of the traditional modes of tribal governance, complicating efforts to restore stability. Pakistani military operations have also compounded these problems. The selective counterinsurgency approach adopted by the military has attempted to delineate between groups actively hostile to Pakistani interests, and those – like the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban -- that may have future strategic utility in reestablishing Pakistan‟s sphere of influence and helping contain its external enemies. As senior US officials and officers have made all too clear – along with some Pakistani experts and their Afghan counterparts – some elements of the Pakistani government and security forces are supporting groups that are actively at war with the United States and Afghanistan. This strategy is causing a steady deterioration in Pakistani and US relations, and complicating the prospects for future US aid. It also is helping to strengthen extremists who ultimately may become an active threat to Pakistan. These conflicts have been augmented by violence and tensions inside the rest of Pakistan. In south Punjab, a historical hotbed of militancy, various groups once firmly tethered to state policy have begun to splinter and migrate to the tribal areas. These groups have considerable experience in combat and knowledge of the weapons and technologies needed for asymmetric warfare. They have joined tribal militant groups, and assisted them in bringing terrorist violence into the previously insulated urban centers of the Punjab and the Sindh. In Karachi, the economic engine of Pakistan, ethno-sectarian violence has risen to new levels with the real danger of a slide back into the communal violence of the early 1990s. Such a reversal would be catastrophic for national stability , exacerbating already chronic economic woes, whilst providing fodder for the sectarian and ethnic drivers of conflict in Pakistan. In Baluchistan, a fifth separatist insurgency has become more active since 2004, and is closely linked and influenced by regional geopolitics. The Baloch insurgency is distinct from other conflicts, primarily in that Sunni-Deobandi philosophies play little role, but it nonetheless benefits from many of the same drivers, including widespread impoverishment, chronic underdevelopment and alienation from mainstream Pakistan.

Multiple alt causes to Pakistan instability- corruption, poverty, and terrorismCordesman 14— Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS (“The Metrics of Terrorism and Instability in Pakistan”, December 18th, Accessed 7/14/16, Available Online at https://www.csis.org/analysis/metrics-terrorism-and-instability-pakistan, JRR)

The report shows that the school attacks are part of a sharply rising overall pattern of terrorism in Pakistan that killed and severely wounded over 7,000 people in Pakistan in 2013, and made Pakistan rank second in the world in total terrorist attacks. It also shows that the Pakistani Taliban or TTP is only one of a mix of violent terrorist groups – although many attacks cannot be attributed to a given group and the

Pakistani Taliban still ranked 5th in the world in violence in 2013. At the same time, the number of terrorist incidents has more than doubled each year for the last half decade, and the TTP has clearly been the key perpetrator for those cases, where responsibility was claimed or the source could be identified. The types of attack have become increasingly violent, and more and more targets have been civilians, although much of the killing has also been directed at the police, with explosives and firearms being the key weapon of choice. Other data from sources such as the World Bank indicate that part of this terrorism has been resulted as a response to poor governance, a lack of political stability, weak rule of law, and high rates of corruption. The UN shows that little recent progress has been made in human development, and poverty levels are very high. There are serious barriers to business investment, and corruption is rated high by Transparency International as well as the World Bank. It is clear from these numbers that Pakistani security forces need to steadily increase their focus on counterterrorism, and the level of prioritization and political effort necessary will only come about if Pakistan reduces its tensions with India and Afghanistan. It is equally clear that Pakistan needs to address some of the key causes of terror and instability, like poor governance, corruption, problems in its rule of law, and poverty, as well as counter the twisted religious and ideological message of groups like the LLT by asserting the real values of moderation and Islam.

Ext. Central Asia/Russia defenseThe aff authors misread Russia---even in Central Asia, they are non-interventionist---multiple warrantsMatveeva 13 – Anna Matveeva, member of the Russia and Eurasia Security Research Group, headed the Research Secretariat of the international Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, 2013, (“Russia's changing security role in Central Asia,” European Security, February 6, Available online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2013.775121, Accessed 7-14-2016, SAA)

The predominant academic and policy narrative on Russia/Central Asian relations (Jonson 1998, Nixey 2012) is of withering of Russian power and influence, its diminishing role, losing ground to other actors in economy, security or political and cultural attractiveness. Empirical realities are somewhat different: new infrastructure is being built with Russian money, its energy companies are visibly present throughout the region, branches of universities open in Central Asian capitals and goods from Russia traverse en route to Afghanistan. Moreover, the discourse failed to attach significance to the factors which became central, such as enormity of economic dependency on Russia through labour migration, a threat of drugs influx for Russian society, potential security vacuum in the region, Moscow unwilling to intervene beyond its borders and a Russo–Sino partnership in international affairs gaining momentum. This failure can be attributed to the tendency to view Russia's role predominantly from a realist perspective of power maximisation and expansionism, the school to which most of the experts working on Russia–Central Asian relations belong to (Jonson and Allison 2001, Lo 2008, Blank 2009). Regionalism in Central Asia is understood as a platform for Russia for a pursuit of power and security and projection of hegemony (Allison 2004). Still, it may have some mileage in studying Russia's policy from a defensive realist perspective which supports Robert Art's (1982, p. 14) observation that ‘most states most of the time’ enjoy a certain degree of security and seeking power by pursuing expansionist policies can be futile or self-defeating. A realist approach1 tends to assess Russia's policy as if it acts strategically in a pursuit of coherent interests and finds its way into political commentary along the New Great Game lines. Andrei Kazantsev (2010) more plausibly argues that Russia's policy combines strategic and non-strategic elements, and this non-strategic character has clear consequences. Certainly, as observed by Roland Dannreuther (2007, p. 31), ‘tension between the temptation of empire and the reality of an anti-imperialist age encapsulates some of the key challenges of contemporary international security.’ Russia's policy, occasionally, reflects these temptations, but it would be wrong to assume that they serve as a sole guide to action. Changing nature of threats, non-traditional challenges, unstable coalitions and absence of coherent international rivalries make application of realist theories of power and its balancing problematic. Other IR theory approaches include Emilian Kavalski's (2010) ‘project to de-Cold War the political experience of the region’ which takes contemporary Russia out of the equation in Central Asia. Christian Thorun (2009) combines realist and constructivist approaches, seeking to explain changes in Russian foreign policy. The paper looks at Russia as an actor pursuing its interests in power, security and identity while engaged in interactions with other actors within institutions and on bilateral basis. The interests are a combination of material and normative, while its interventions range from reproduction of inherent inequalities to multi-sum cooperation (Lake 2011, p. 473). It underscores the centrality of the North–South dimension to contemporary security, which influence Russia's priorities in Central Asia rather than the cold war East–West rivalry. The paper applies Fred Halliday's (1994) historical sociology approach, arguing for recognition of an interrelationship between the internal and international factors, as ‘it is not possible to explain the politics of individual states without reference to a range of international factors, historical and current. States operate simultaneously at the domestic and international level’ (p. 20). This study demonstrates the significance of this interrelationship for the discourse as to whether Russia is an

emerging power or a declining one: it may be emerging in those respects which matter domestically and declining in those which no longer form priorities. It is also a question of the extent to which Russia's policy vis-à-vis Central Asia is really ‘foreign’ and comparable to policy towards a more ‘foreign’ Afghanistan. This is a valid distinction in the light of the tendency to view policies towards the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in a radically different category. According to Geoffrey Stern (1995), foreign policy priorities lie in three dimensions: security, i.e. preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a community; prestige, i.e. the country's authority, esteem and status; and preserving a stake in the international system, i.e. the rights, privileges, assets and amenities it enjoys beyond its frontiers. They all manifest themselves in different ways in Russia's role in the region. The paper argues that Russia's role is changing but remains active and is shaped by aspects which have not been sufficiently acknowledged, but, nevertheless, are important: the domestic agenda, the emerging reluctance to intervene, at the same time a concern over a potential security vacuum and uneasy geopolitical equation shaping around the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. It asks whether we are witnessing the makings of a new ‘Russia First’ strategy of selective engagement, when only the issues in the CIS directly affecting the federation will be pro-actively addressed. Does Russia still regard itself as a security provider for Central Asia or does it lack serious enough stakes, as non-intervention in Kyrgyzstan demonstrated? What is the purpose of regional security structures, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)2 or Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),3 other than preserving Russia's stake in the international system? The paper first outlines the prevalence of danger discourse among Russian domestic constituency, then assesses Russian security presence in the region with a case study of the non-intervention in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 as a way of exploring Moscow's changing approach to security. It discusses the implications of withdrawal from Afghanistan for evolution of Russian security policy and concludes with reflection on regional organisations and international relations forming around the region. The issue of energy is not discussed as it is not considered directly relevant for Russia's security policy.

Kyrgyzstan proves – even conflicts involving Russia won’t provoke interventionMatveeva 13 – Anna Matveeva, member of the Russia and Eurasia Security Research Group, headed the Research Secretariat of the international Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, 2013, (“Russia's changing security role in Central Asia,” European Security, February 6, Available online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2013.775121, Accessed 7-14-2016, SAA)

Inter-ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 attracted little international spotlight. As the riots broke out, the central government was not prepared to deal with a crisis of such magnitude so early in the office, as it came to power only in April. The security sector was weakened by two power changes, split regional loyalties, low morale and widespread corruption. Military, police and border guards became easy targets for seizing weapons and equipment, and some started to flee. The government realised that the country did not have sufficient capacity to cope with a deepening crisis and needed external help. The same message was coming from the Uzbek community leaders, civil society and opposition politicians in Bishkek. Kyrgyz leaders in the South feared Uzbekistan's intervention which appeared imminent, as the latter moved forces to the border and considered that Russia would be more even-handed. On 12 June, chair of the provisional government (PG) Roza Otunbayeva addressed President Medvedev for a peacekeeping deployment. Moscow declined, guided by apprehension than by responsibility to protect (Matveeva 2011). The consequences involved a loss of life, destruction, displacement, and a breakdown in interethnic relations. Altogether 470 people were killed. Given Kyrgyzstan's history of turmoil – it is the only post-Soviet country which underwent two turbulent regime changes – it was to be expected that the country would be on Russia's crisis ‘watch list,’ but before the conflict, its operations were limited and focused on politicians in Bishkek. As violence unfolded, troops from Russia were already sent to the Kant

base, but then Moscow announced that their arrival was necessary to protect personnel there. Allison (2004, p. 472) argued that potential for Russia's peacekeeping operations was low on the grounds of opposition by the region's states to it, implying that Russia would seek to intervene given an opportunity. The opposite turned out to be the case. Moscow chose to concentrate on relief measures: provided emergency evacuation, sent humanitarian supplies and assisted with medical forensic examinations. Beyond that it remained non-committal, calling the crisis ‘an internal matter’. Instead of troops, Moscow gave advice to ‘restore order with maximum speed’.10 Russian officials criticised Bishkek's continuous failure, made fatalistic predictions about an ‘Afghan-type scenario’ in Kyrgyzstan, kept promising assistance with armed personnel carriers (APCs), helicopters and fuel that never materialised and remained unsympathetic to the government's pleas (International Crisis Group 2010). The Russian Embassy was receiving calls for help, intervention, evacuation or humanitarian supplies, but it merely documented the cases and issued appeals to the Kyrgyzstan's government to act. The most practical assistance from Russia's side was the willingness to receive those leaving in the aftermath of violence. The choice Moscow was faced with was to demonstrate that it is the power that can bring order to the region and is ready to take up moral obligations, or to preserve its military capabilities and political capital for the interests of its own people. Stern (1995) identifies domestic constraints on the use of force as moral, psycho-social, political, a presence of viable alternatives and a lack of capacity, opportunity and fear of consequences. He outlines international constraints as international law, international institutions, ‘rules of the game,’ regimes and international morality. The analysis below demonstrates how interplay of these factors made Russia arrive to its decision, as the constraints on intervention outweighed its potential advantages. Russia could have used the government's invitation as the legal basis, given its direct appeal and the Friendship Treaty of 27 July 2000, therefore, there were no obstacles in terms of international law. It is believed that Russian Embassy supported the dispatch of peacekeepers at the time.11 Mylonas and Radnitz (2010) attribute the reasons to low geopolitical significance. ‘The two powers [Russia and US – AM] perceive little at stake in Kyrgyzstan. The country is impoverished, possesses no oil or gas, it does not border Russia, and has no known al-Qaeda presence.’ There is some truth in this argument. Some Kyrgyz politicians, such as Omurbek Tekebayev, attributed Russia's inaction to a political cause – Moscow's alleged displeasure with the country turning into a semi-parliamentary republic. In this line of reasoning, were Kyrgyzstan to halt the constitutional referendum and dismiss Tekebayev, Russia would have sent the troops in. President Medvedev's statement of 27 June 2010, disfavouring the new constitution, served as an indirect confirmation of that. The paper argues that the reasons were different. Intricacies of power rivalries and political alliances in Kyrgyzstan were not what the Kremlin was concerned about, as it did not have a single horse to back in the country. Obstacles lay at the highest echelons of power in Moscow, which are influenced more by global factors than local developments. They were in the symbolic domain, as Russia had self-doubts about the recognition of international legitimacy of such operation and was uncertain of what the ‘rules of the game’ were. Our analysis focuses on how ideas and perceptions influence and structure international reality. The major factor deciding against the intervention seemed to be the fear of international consequences after the fall-out from the 2008 war in South Ossetia, for which Russia paid a dear political price in its relations with the West. In this context, potential negative repercussions of an involvement in Kyrgyzstan loomed large, but benefits were not obvious and moral reasons not compelling enough. Russian politicians feared that Cold Warrior discourse in the West would easily accuse them of projection of geopolitical influence. It would be assumed by the West that Russians intervened for the sake of ejecting the US military base at Manas. Fear of consequences in terms of adverse publicity was also a factor. In messy conditions of an interethnic conflict, peacekeepers would inevitably do something wrong and become vulnerable to criticism of their conduct. The troops may have to use lethal force, and Russians would be to blame for casualties. They would have to enforce order against the wishes of Kyrgyz community members who might feel that

foreigners tell them how to behave. By the way of comparison, the deployment of the Soviet paratroopers and prosecutors in the 1990, now remembered in Osh as helpful and fair, had been criticised at the time. An inquiry into their conduct was launched which failed to uncover proof of wrongdoing.12 Kyrgyzstan is an open country, where foreign media operates freely. Any pitfalls would be duly reported by what Moscow sees as unfriendly Western press. It is perceived that the ‘international community,’ – meaning the West, – in general, does not trust Russia and would not be convinced of Russia's neutrality and constructiveness even if it acted in good faith and with best intentions. Thus, the Kremlin feared that any robust action on the ground could easily turn into a public relations disaster, to which image-conscious Russians are particularly sensitive. In the opinion of a senior Russian officer, ‘we are not yet ready, as the Israelis, to produce a videotape in response to an allegation of unlawful use of firearms. We would grow sick and tired, proving that we are not camels’ (Telmanov 2010). Image is an important self-construction in the modern thinking of the military, and their immediate suspicion of hostility of the Western response is telling. Psycho-social factors played out in judging the mood of the domestic constituency. Normally, the state co-opts sections of domestic society for its international activities (Halliday 1994), but this turned out not to be the case. In an event of casualties among peacekeepers, Russian press would make an issue out of it, unleashing a debate on why Russia should pay with the blood of its soldiers for mismanagement of interethnic relations by the Kyrgyz authorities. A survey by the Ekho Moskvy radio station suggested that the majority of Russians wanted to keep their troops out of Kyrgyzstan.13 The military feared a long-term engagement. An apprehension of a ‘mission creep,’ as was the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, and lukewarm attitudes towards Otunbayeva's government, too fresh in power to develop strong links in Moscow, contributed to Kremlin's caution. There were also operational reasons, related to the doubts about Russia's military capacity to intervene into a civil conflict. The nature of the engagement was potentially contradictory. Were the troops invited for a short peace-enforcement mission to break street fighting and cut off the main arteries leading into theatres of action, with a view to hand over control to Kyrgyz armed forces in a few days, or was it a prelude to a peacekeeping operation modelled on 1990 scenario when the troops stayed for a year to maintain public order and to secure investigations and prosecutions? In the latter case, such troops would require long-term contingency planning, the appropriate training for becoming involved in civil strife with an inter-ethnic character and solid cooperation with the local law enforcement. Neither the Ministry of Interior nor Russian airborne forces would have easily contributed their elite troops, which are mostly engaged in the North Caucasus. Although Russian forces had participated in international peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and received training for that purpose, it was uncertain whether this experience was directly applicable to Kyrgyzstan. In reality, the Russian high command sensed that an intervention, which could have resulted in Russian and other civilian casualties, would have been the basis for an ineffective embroilment in the conflict in which Russia held no real stake. The lack of foresight and a deficit of the senior leadership's attention led to an absence of advanced contingency planning. The impending crisis was not dealt with at a sufficient level in Moscow decision-making circles. Neither Medvedev, nor Putin took a personal interest in the country, leaving it to the bureaucracy to maintain the relationship. Vladimir Rushailo, the presidential envoy to Kyrgyzstan, with his police background and no area expertise, underestimated the seriousness of the developments, although the Uzbek leaders from South Kyrgyzstan tried to bring the rising tensions to Moscow's attention. Subsequently, it had no plan of action when violence unfolded. The international institutions demonstrated that they were unable to engage Russia quickly in crisis. The UN appeared to be looking at Moscow, which for its part looked to the UN to give it a clear signal. Medvedev's position was that any decision to send peacekeepers would only be made after consultations with the UN.14 On 14 June, the Under-Secretary Lynn Pascoe called for ‘urgent action by the international community,’ which could only be an intervention by Russia or a coalition led by it. On 24 June, the Assistant Secretary-General Oscar Fernandez-Taranco reported to the UN Security Council on

continuing tensions. On neither occasion did the council take any action (International Crisis Group 2010). Events moved too fast to adopt a UN or, potentially, an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mandate, which could have been another option if Russia, the USA and the EU discussed such format in advance. The UN and OSCE were concerned with staff evacuation from the conflict zones and did not have the willingness or capacity for involvement in the crisis. The US which had military aircraft, assisted with emergency evacuation of its citizens and other personnel stranded on the ground, but was unable to supply practical help to the government, when requested, citing legal reasons.15 The international consensus on the ground was that Russian intervention was desirable and, in fact, the only feasible solution. The UN and OSCE did not have any strategy for non-Russian-based peacekeeping, capacities on the ground for crisis intervention or intentions to do so. Jos Boonstra noted that ‘the US, Russia and certainly the EU do not seem to be eager to intervene since consequences of duration, intensity and regional implications of the mission would be difficult to foresee.’16 Consequently, Russia did not receive sufficient international encouragement, and non-intervention did not cost the Kremlin much. Nobody apart from the Uzbek community in Kyrgyzstan condemned Russia for the failure to protect, and their voices were too weak to matter on the global scene. The international Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission attributed blame solely to the national authorities and did not discuss international responsibility in any measure. Non-intervention should have weakened the argument of the realist camp according to which Moscow would not have missed the opportunity for territorial expansion and control over sovereign states, but it passed unnoticed. This is telling because the realist discourse applied to Russia appears to function autonomously. The intensity of offensive realism did not diminish (Blank 2012): Russia has no real vision of the world. The only idea behind Russia's mantra of a multi-polar world is that Russia is to be one of the poles; insistence on its own importance is the main thing that Russia brings to the table. No one trusts Russia today or sees it fit as an ally or model worthy of emulation. Russians do not feel they are taken seriously enough. The idea that Russia is great and everyone else is inferior is deeply rooted.

Russia has little stake in Central Asia stability – the US is regional hegemonMatveeva 13 – Anna Matveeva, member of the Russia and Eurasia Security Research Group, headed the Research Secretariat of the international Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, 2013, (“Russia's changing security role in Central Asia,” European Security, February 6, Available online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2013.775121, Accessed 7-14-2016, SAA)

Afghanistan is a high-profile issue on the regional security agenda. In Russia's terms, Afghanistan does not present an extension of its policy in Central Asia: Moscow is not interested in Afghanistan per se and turns its attention to the country only reluctantly. Trenin and Malashenko (2010) describe Russia's interests in Afghanistan as: preventing an outright victory for the Taliban, essentially through the efforts of the US-led coalition; stemming the flow of drugs out of Afghanistan, especially into Russia; and restoring a pacified and neutral Afghanistan as a buffer state between Central Asia and the Greater Middle East. The first goal is largely out of Moscow's hands. Rather than seeking to fill themselves a strategic vacuum which would be created past 2014, Moscow prefers the USA to stay, but its ability to influence Washington on this decision is negligible. Lavrov criticised NATO's plan to withdraw, saying that coalition troops should remain in the country until government forces are capable of ensuring security (Guardian 2012). In the meantime, Moscow concentrates on the third goal of restoring a peaceful Afghanistan where development is taking place and the country does not project a threat to its neighbours. Efforts are made to involve Afghanistan in multilateral fora, where Russia has a key role, such as SCO, to contribute to building capacities of its armed forces and render development assistance. In this, Russia's efforts largely follow the coalition's blueprint. Yet Russia does not have a foreign policy

concept on Afghanistan. Different policy lines are articulated, ranging from pro- to anti-cooperation with the West, but no option so far prevails.18 Moscow suffers from a deficit of expertise and limitations in institutional and personnel resources. The overall relationship has little depth. People educated and trained by the USSR were discouraged from Hamid Karzai's government from the start, with the tacit approval of the Bush administration. Moscow, affected by the ‘Afghan syndrome,’ did not try to lobby for its former loyalists to be included in the new arrangements. Arguably, Russian policy planners did not have to be so apprehensive of the USSR legacy in Afghanistan, as perspectives in the country are not that necessarily negative: ‘shuravi 19 were bad, but everything which came after shuravi, was even worst. The Russians do not seem to be so terrible now as they used to.’20 Although some key figures in Kabul had been virulent Soviet opponents in the past, President Karzai cooperates with Moscow largely due to the same reasons that Tajikistan's President Rahmon cooperates with the West, i.e. to show to his Western allies that he has some freedom of manoeuvre, foreign policy options and other allies who can provide military assistance if need be. At the same time, the ruling elite are driven by short-term thinking in the light of 2014 pull-out. It is not certain to what extent Moscow perceives Taliban as a threat to Russia and as a force which it cannot accommodate. Taliban are certainly friends of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which is a sworn enemy of Central Asian secular states, but it does not necessarily make them the enemy of Russia. There are grounds to believe that Taliban, were it to come to power, may be open to the idea of banning foreign groups on its territory in exchange for non-interference into internal affairs (Semple et al. 2012). There had been direct links between Al-Qaeda – the IMU in Afghanistan – and Islamist militants in the North Caucasus, but the international intervention dealt them a deadly blow, and Al-Qaeda has largely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The Islamist threat may be of an ideational rather than of an operational nature. So far, Russian security officials in the North Caucasus only report nationals of Turkey and Arab states among detained or killed foreign militants. Halting influx of drugs from Afghanistan into Russia is indeed a vital interest, and it is a question whether international military presence facilitates or hinders it. Moscow officials criticised anti-drug measures as ineffective and not rigorously enforced by NATO troops, as they conflict with a larger goal of winning hearts and minds of the Afghan population. By contrast, Taliban when in power led an uncompromising campaign against drugs. On that count, a drug-fighting Taliban may quite suit Russia's interests, even if its ideological agenda is inadmissible. Moscow, being pessimistic over durability of Karzai's political survival after the withdrawal, would be willing to explore whether accommodation with Taliban can be reached and ground rules established, e.g. not to export ‘Islamic revolution’ beyond Afghanistan's borders. The most likely scenario threatening Central Asia is not a full-scale Taliban invasion, but hit-and-run attacks of criminal nature or crossings into Tajik territory by fighters to avoid a chase from a rival group; in other words, a spillover of local instability. The potential actions of the Russian troops in Tajikistan in such ‘grey’ case are uncertain: border security incidents do not equal an ‘external invasion’ in which case the CSTO mandate can be invoked. Anything which reminds a military engagement in Afghanistan is likely to be resisted in Russia internally, and the government is conscious of the strength of public opinion on the issue.

Cooperation through regional institution checks Russian action and escalationMatveeva 13 – Anna Matveeva, member of the Russia and Eurasia Security Research Group, headed the Research Secretariat of the international Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, 2013, (“Russia's changing

security role in Central Asia,” European Security, February 6, Available online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2013.775121, Accessed 7-14-2016, SAA)

The question is why Russia invests in regional organisations if they have not played an obvious role in real-life security. A possible explanation is that they are needed to maintain prestige and status and preserve a role in international relations over the region. Although little competition between Russia and the West over Central Asia takes place in reality – partly because the latter's stakes are fairly low, – the attitudes of geopolitical competition influence Russian–Western relations. Much of expert discourse follow this rhetoric: ‘Russia has tended to view the introduction of US troops there and US access to local military facilities since 2001 as a violation of its unwritten post-colonial rights’ (Bohr 2004, p. 489). In this school of thought, the US role is far-reaching: after 11 September, ‘virtually overnight America became the leading power in Central Asia, reinforced by a long-term troop presence’ (Lo 2008, p. 12). Trenin (2007) acknowledges that Russia aspires to dominance, but it comes in a soft form and does not require physical reintegration. In his view, Moscow wants to ensure favourable conditions for economic expansion and for a high degree of political influence which guarantees loyalty. There is an argument that Central Asian leaderships capitalise on the ‘Great Game’ and pursue multivector policies manoeuvring successfully between different poles and manipulate geopolitical rivalry to their advantage. Bohr (2004, p. 501) observes that ‘since the end of 2001 the Central Asian states have been attempting to use the renewed rivalry between Russia and the United States to maximize their strategic and economic benefits.’ However, only Kyrgyzstan and, partially, Kazakhstan played the game skilfully, attracting many benefits and suffering few liabilities, while Uzbekistan and Tajikistan ran into problems both with Russia and the West. Turkmenistan has been too cautious to engage in such manoeuvring. The constructivist framework in regionalism (Buzan and Ole 2003) does not suggest a clear answer whether Central Asia forms a regional security complex, or is a part of the one centred on Russia, while the evolving situation in Afghanistan might place it into an Afghan-centred regional complex. More promising way to analyse international relations around Central Asia is Ruth Deyermond's (2009) ‘matrioshka model of hegemony’ which outlines multilevel hegemonic encounter, in which external actors co-exist, cooperate and compete in their interactions in the region. Limiting the US military presence and discouragement of its expansion constitute a symbolic goal for Russia which fills the rhetoric. The December 2011 CSTO summit announced that the countries outside the bloc would only be able to establish bases on the territory of a member state with the consent of all members. Given that the USA and its allies are more concerned with how to get out of the wider region, such statements do not amount to anything but sloganeering. Apprehension of democracy promotion as a way of regime change continues. As Halliday (1994, p. 90) stressed, ‘there could be no clearer demonstration of the interlinking of internal and international politics than the ways in which revolutions can be stimulated by international factors…. The anxiety and counter-revolutionary response which revolutions..may provoke in hegemonic powers’ can be a powerful influence on states’ behaviour.’ The ‘Tulip’ revolution that occurred in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 had just that effect. Gleason (2011) notes that state-to-state interactions in Central Asia are: simply competitive in the sense that there are differences of interests among states, but these involve exchanges that lead to mutual benefit. In the circumstances, the contemporary globalized world, is just as important for theorists and analysts to dispense with outdated and divisive ‘cold war’ conceptualizing and attend to competitive and cooperative strategies. Pragmatic cooperation with NATO over Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to move supplies to Afghanistan did not suffer from geopolitics. In fact, Afghanistan is the only arena in which Russia cooperates with NATO in earnest: in addition to the two existing routes through Russia territory (NDN land route and use of Russia's air

space), Moscow opens a route through Ulyanovsk to facilitate the coalition withdrawal. Central Asia is one of the arenas where Russia interacts with China. Moscow has no single policy on China and is unsure of how to react to its advance. It toyed with the idea of forming a strategic alliance, but Beijing's consistent line has been not to enter close political and military alliances with any country but restrict cooperation to areas it can directly control. Ian Clark (2011) discusses China from a hegemonic succession theory perspective, where he regards hegemony as one possible institution of international society. Broad acceptance of a dominant state's preferred international order is itself a constituent of a hegemon's effective power. The policies of both Russia and China are centred on preservation of order, which so far worked in the interests of both. China accepts Russia-influenced regional order where the Central Asian states are discouraged from entering rival blocs and the USA is reminded of its limitations in military presence or democracy promotion. In order to preserve this order, Russia and China need to take the states of the region with them, which they do through subsidisation, i.e. provision of material and non-material goods. ‘However, subsidization can be problematic because it implies the provision of political and economic support, in other words, the deployment of resources’ (Fiammenghi 2011, p. 149). CSTO and SCO serve as the vehicles of subsidisation. The CSTO is funded primarily by Russia, while its other members are not sufficiently motivated. One of the key reasons why the states of the region participate in these structures derive from an aspiration that they will assist them in addressing issues with their neighbours which they are unable to resolve themselves on a bilateral basis because of adverse interstate relations, fundamental lack of mutual affection, ethnic differences and the events of modern history. Often, the regional organisations are the only fora where the heads of states can meet and engage with each other. Smaller Central Asian states feel threatened by the policies of the larger states, while the larger ones are affected by instability emanating from the smaller ones, e.g. Uzbekistan which had to host over 110,000 refugees from the conflict in Kyrgyzstan. The states expect the regional organisations to help them to resolve particular disputes over trade and tariffs, water and environment and voice their security concerns over each other's actions. Moreover, regional organisations are meant to act as guarantors that the rulings would be adhered to, although their practice has been varied. Efforts to address security concerns met with only limited success, such as in the case of Uzbek–Tajik relations which in 2012 deteriorated to the point of possible military confrontation. Escalation of hostilities would have been a worst-case scenario for Russia/CSTO as it would force it to produce a response of some kind. To prevent this, Russia reluctantly assumes a role of a power broker between the two, so far without a sustainable solution in sight. The SCO is still grappling with its role as a macro-regional organisation, balancing security, economic and geopolitical dimensions. Still, it appears to be useful as a forum for Central Asians to re-align themselves with Russia and China. The SCO's distinctive features have been its determination to combat terrorism in the region, speed up security cooperation in strategic areas and provide a platform to express a thinly veiled irritation with the role of the USA (Matveeva and Giustozzi 2008). SCO promotion of its voice in the international arena is aided by Russia and China being permanent members of the UN Security Council. Given that the other macro-regional organisation – OSCE, – does not include China, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, – SCO has a potential to evolve into a forum for multilateral cooperation based on common norms and values where regimes are weak or non-existent, on the condition that the Russo-Sino political partnership lasts. Despite little substantive role played so far, Moscow regards SCO as a successful undertaking. It is one of the few organisations where the USA has no role, directly or through proxies, which adds value to its members, and the one which generated a following among important Asian countries.21

Ext. No Pakistan TerrorEven if terrorists got their hands on Pakistani nukes, they wouldn’t be able to use them – too many hoops to jump throughKerr and Nikitin 16 —Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Kerr is an analyst in nonproliferation and Nikitin is a specialist in nonproliferation, 2016 (“Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons”, Congressional Research Service, June 14th, Accessed Online at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf, Accessed 07-13-2016, SP)

Pakistan’s command and control over its nuclear weapons is compartmentalized and includes strict operational security. Islamabad’s Strategic Command Organization has a three-tiered structure, consisting of the National Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the Strategic Forces Commands. General Kidwai asserted in 2015 that the NCA and SPD have “operational control” over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, explaining that “only day-today administrative control, some kind of technical control” has been delegated to the country’s armed services.107 The NCA, established in 2000 and codified in the National Command Authority Act, 2010, supervises the functions and administration of all of Pakistan’s organizations involved in nuclear weapons research, development, and employment, as well as the military services that operate the strategic forces. The prime minister, as head of government, is chairperson of the NCA.108 The NCA also includes the chair of the joint chiefs of staff; the ministers of defense, interior, foreign affairs, and finance; the director general of the SPD; and the commanders of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The final authority to launch a nuclear strike requires consensus within the NCA; the chairperson must cast the final vote. The NCA is comprised of two committees, the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (DCC), each of which includes a mix of civilian and military officials. The ECC’s functions include establishing a command and control system over the use of nuclear weapons. The DCC “exercises technical, financial and administrative control over all strategic organisations, including national laboratories and research and development organisations associated with the development and modernisation of nuclear weapons.”109 The NCA also has a “fully automated Strategic Command and Control Support System, which “enables robust Command and Control capability of all strategic assets with round the clock situational awareness in a digitized network centric environment to decision makers.”110 The SPD is headed by a director general from the Army and acts as the secretariat for the NCA. The SPD’s functions include formulating Islamabad’s nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine; developing the nuclear chain of command; and formulating operational plans at the service level for the movement, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. The Army, Air Force, and Navy each have their own strategic force command, but operational planning and control remains with the NCA. The SPD coordinates operational plans with the strategic forces commands. According to current and former Pakistani officials, Islamabad employs a system which requires that at least two, and perhaps three, people authenticate launch codes for nuclear weapons.111 The National Command Authority Act, 2010, addresses the problems of the proliferation of nuclear expertise and personnel reliability. It outlines punishable offenses related to breach of confidentiality or leakage of “secured information,” gives the SPD authority to investigate suspicious conduct, states that punishment for these offenses can be up to 25 years imprisonment, and applies to both serving and retired personnel, including military personnel, notwithstanding any other laws.

Terrorists wouldn’t get their hands on nukes even in the event of a coup – US safety measures checkKerr and Nikitin 16 —Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Kerr is an analyst in nonproliferation and Nikitin is a specialist in nonproliferation, 2016 (“Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons”, Congressional Research Service, June 14th, Accessed Online at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf, Accessed 07-13-2016, SP)

During former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s January 2005 confirmation hearing, then Senator John Kerry asked what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in the event of a radical Islamic coup in Islamabad, Secretary Rice answered, “[w]e have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it,” suggesting that the United States had plans to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons in case of a loss of control by the Pakistani government153 On November 12, 2007, responding to press reports about this contingency, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson said, “Pakistan possesses adequate retaliatory capacity to defend its strategic assets and sovereignty,” emphasizing that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons have been under “strong multilayered, institutionalized decision-making, organizational, administrative and command and control structures since 1998.”154 The issue of U.S. contingency plans to take over Pakistani strategic assets was raised again in the press following Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, and was met with similar assurances by Pakistan’s government.155 Responding to a report detailing alleged U.S.-Pakistani discussions regarding contingency plans for U.S. forces to help secure Islamabad’s nuclear weapons, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson stated on November 8, 2009, that Pakistan “does not require any foreign assistance in this regard.” Pakistan will never “allow any country to have direct or indirect access to its nuclear and strategic facilities,” the spokesperson said, adding that “no talks have ever taken place on the issue of the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal with U.S. officials.”156 Then Secretary of Defense Gates stated in January 2010 that the United States has “no intention or desire to take over any of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.”157 The United States reportedly offered nuclear security assistance to Pakistan soon after September 11, 2001.158 U.S. assistance to Islamabad, which must comply with nonproliferation guidelines, has reportedly included the sharing of best practices and technical measures to prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personnel reliability.159 As noted above, Islamabad employs a system requiring that at least two, and perhaps three, people authenticate launch codes for nuclear weapons.160 Security at nuclear sites in Islamabad is the responsibility of a 10,000-member security force, commanded by a two-star general. Former Pakistani military officials have said Pakistan has developed Permissive Action Links (PALs) for its warheads without U.S. assistance.161 PALs require a code to be entered before a weapon can be detonated. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage confirmed in a November 2007 interview that there has been U.S. assistance in securing Pakistani nuclear weapons, explaining that the United States was unlikely to intervene militarily in a crisis in Pakistan because “we have spent considerable time with the Pakistani military, talking with them and working with them on the security of their nuclear weapons. I think most observers would say that they are fairly secure. They have pretty sophisticated mechanisms to guard the security of those.”162 Rolf Mowatt Larssen, former Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy, pointed out in May 2009 that “there’s not a lot of transparency into” how Islamabad spends the U.S. funds, but he nevertheless characterized them as “money well spent.”163 A Pakistani official said in November 2009 that Pakistan reserves the right to “pick and choose” the nuclear security measures it will undertake, adding that Islamabad will only accept such measures that are “non-intrusive.”164

Ext. CCP Collapse WrongNo impactMichael D. Swaine et al, 2013 - senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, doctorate in government from Harvard University", CHINA’S MILITARY & THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE IN 2030", carnegieendowment.org/files/net_assessment_full.pdf

It is of course also possible that severe domestic problems could result in even more extreme scenarios, such as regime collapse and a prolonged period of internal disarray or, alternatively, the relatively rapid emergence of a more open and democratic political system. Both would pose significant implications for China’s foreign and defense policies. Although such scenarios cannot be ruled out,

they are both highly unlikely during the next fifteen to twenty years, given (1) the probable willingness of China’s leaders and ordinary citizens to contemplate virtually any measures necessary to avoid internal disorder; (2) the likely continued absence or scarcity of the structural conditions and belief systems that could precipitate the total collapse of the PRC regime and/or the emergence of a viable democratic system during this period;

and (3) the often-demonstrated capacity of the CCP leadership to adapt to rapid societal change.213 Moreover, as

discussed in the next section, China’s leadership succession and governing processes tend to imbue the PRC system with a significant degree of stability that makes it quite resilient against events that could prove catastrophic to CCP rule.

No collapseHeath, Senior Defense and International Analyst – RAND Corporation, 3/13/’15 (Timothy, “No, China’s Not About to Collapse”, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/no-chinas-not-about-to-collapse/)

The party’s advantages are less often discussed, but these bear reviewing if one is to evaluate the viability of CCP rule. One of the most overlooked, but important, assets is a lack of any credible alternative . The party’s repressive politics prevent the

formation of potential candidates, so the alternative to CCP rule for now is anarchy. For a country still traumatized by its historic experience with national breakdown, this grants the party no small advantage . To truly imperil its authority, the CCP would need to behave in so damaging a manner as to make the certainty of political chaos and economic collapse preferable to the continuation of CCP rule. A party that attempted to return to extreme

Mao-era policies such as the catastrophic Great Leap Forward could perhaps meet that threshold. But despite the numerous superficial

comparisons in Western media, little about the current administration policy agenda resembles classic Maoism. The second major political advantage lies in improvements to the party’s effectiveness in recent years. In a major paradigm shift, the CCP redefined itself as a “governing party” whose primary responsibility rests in addressing the myriad economic, political, cultural,

ecological, and social welfare demands of the people. It has carried out ideological and political reforms to improve its competence and effectiveness accordingly. The Xi administration has refined, but upheld, the focus on increasing the

nation’s standard of living and realizing national revitalization, objectives embodied in the vision of the “Chinese dream.” Although the

party has rightly come in for criticism for moving slowly and inadequately on these issues, the policy agenda nevertheless appears to resonate with the majority of Chinese citizens. Independent polls consistently show that the party has in recent

years enjoyed surprisingly strong public support . When weighing the party’s political liabilities against its assets, therefore, the evidence suggests that the CCP faces little danger of imminent collapse . Improvements to its cohesion, competence, and responsiveness, combined with a policy agenda that resonates with most Chinese and the lack of a compelling alternative outweigh the

persistent political liabilities. The party’s overall political stability throughout the 2000s , despite massive political unrest generated by breakneck economic growth, underscores this point. The Insecure CCP If the party does indeed a measure of political support and security, why does it behave in so insecure a manner? This is perhaps the most puzzling aspect of CCP

behavior today and a major driver of speculation about the possibilities of political exhaustion and collapse. There is no question that China is experiencing tumult of a degree unusual even for a country habituated to pervasive discontent. Amid the unrelenting anti-corruption drive, officials throughout the country appear to be operating in an atmosphere of pervasive fear and distrust. The intensifying political crackdown against critics, liberal thinkers, and supposedly pernicious, malignant Western influences evoke the paranoid witch-hunts of the Mao era. The oppressive atmosphere and political insecurity (not to mention choking pollution and problems such as toxic water and food) have

motivated an astonishing number of China’s elite to seek a way out of the country. While it is tempting to read such behavior as

symptomatic of a desperate regime fending off the inevitable, there are reasons to doubt such an interpretation .

For one, signs of systemic breakdown are hard to find . There is little evidence of the open political warfare that has typified previous periods of political weakness and disarray. For now, at least, the central leadership appears united behind Xi’s policy agenda. The economy continues to grow, with PRC officials anticipating an annual rate at a slowing, but

still healthy, 7 percent. Government policy and operations continue without the kinds of abnormal interruptions or

breakdowns that one would expect of a nation in serious crisis. A more plausible reading is that China’s leadership is determined to do whatever it takes to achieve national development and establish the conditions for long-term rule. The CCP aims to do this primarily by undertaking political reforms to improve the effectiveness and competence of government administration and

by overseeing the sustained growth that can enable a steady increase in the standard of living. These objectives are so important to the party’s long-term survival that the Xi administration has shown a willingness to crush whomever gets in the way, regardless of political party affiliation. The severity of the myriad challenges impeding the realization of these policy objectives deserves emphasis. The old export- and investment-driven model of growth that powered China’s rise for three decades has exhausted itself. Rebalancing the economy to accommodate a greater role for consumer-driven growth remains a politically contentious process that has historically proven extremely difficult and destabilizing for any country. China also continues to face persistent problems of pollution, injustice, corruption, adverse demographics, and other difficulties. Party leaders increasingly recognize that progress on any single issue depends on progress on all issues. A more stable model of economic growth depends on a greater reliance on markets, law-abiding government, and the spending power of educated consumers who will expect more of government. Improvements to the quality of government services, meanwhile, depend in part on access to resources that can only come from sustained growth. Nor can China’s leaders focus exclusively on domestic policy to address these issues. Deep integration with the global economy means domestic growth and stability depends in part on the safeguarding of distant developmental interests and a restructuring of

the Asia-Pacific region’s political economy. The centralization of power and focus on structural, top-down reforms that have defined the policy agenda of the Xi administration reflect a realistic recognition of the complexity and magnitude

of the problems confronting the nation. The Central Leading Group for the Deepening of Comprehensive Reform, National Security

Commission, and similar central leading groups design and oversee the systemic policies needed to maintain long-

term growth and improve the government’s operations. Many officials and powerful interests stand to lose from these reforms. The

anti-corruption campaign, political crackdown on potential critics, and destruction of the careers of thousands of party officials reflects a ruthlessly pragmatic calculation that the sacrifice many party members is a worthwhile price to pay for the greater gains of long term political stability that would come from successful reform. Perhaps it is not coincidental

that predictions of the party’s impending collapse have traditionally surged at major inflection points in the history of the PRC. The last major wave of pessimism occurred at the turn of the century, when China also faced economic

slowdown, political demoralization, widespread unrest, and bitter factional infighting. The symptoms may have been correctly

perceived, but the prognosis proved faulty . The party’s adaptation and resilience surprised observers and disproved the gloomy predictions. China has similarly reached a key inflection point, one in which the policy challenges possibly surpass those of the turn of the century.

A2: ISISISIS won’t get a stronghold Afghanistan and Pakistan – too much competitionRashid, Rubin, and Myers, 11/24/2015 (Ahmed, former Pakistani Militant and a journalist and best-selling foreign policy author of several books about Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia and Afghanistan Pakistan Security Analyst, Barnett, an expert on Afghanistan and South Asia, is the director of studies/senior fellow at the Center for International Cooperation at New York University, and Joanne, director of the Carnegie Council's Public Affairs Programs “Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Re-emergence of the Taliban and the Arrival of ISIS” Public Affairs Accessed 7/4/16 http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20151124/index.html)

JOANNE MYERS: But ISIS is claiming to take territory, to seduce recruits, and is growing. Do you think their claims are false, or how much of a problem are they?

AHMED RASHID: Again, I have an irregular view of ISIS in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The fact is that both these countries have been plagued by Islamic fundamentalism since the 1970s, and certainly since the Soviets occupied Afghanistan in the 1980s.

We have been facing up to this problem for the last 40 years. Afghanistan and Pakistan both have multiple extremist groups in their countries. I don't think any of these extremist groups are going to give space to ISIS to establish itself. First of all, the military in Pakistan is going after the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), which is sending a very negative signal to all the extremist groups, but particularly to ISIS. The fact is that the Punjabi groups which

are faced off against India, which are based in Pakistani Punjab, the Pakistani Taliban, or what is left of them, and the Afghan Taliban, are extremely well entrenched inside the country. Their leaders are not going to give way to a bunch of Arab leaders coming from a few thousand miles away. Even what little presence there has been of ISIS—and we have seen it only in about three provinces in Afghanistan—they have been turncoat Taliban—in other words, Taliban who have become disillusioned with their leadership and have said, "We have become ISIS," and they raised the black flag. Remember that there is a lot of competition to become ISIS. If you get nominated as the ISIS rep in wherever, presumably with that comes a lot of the money that ISIS has. So there is an element of greed here also, where some of these Afghans and some of these Pakistanis are looking at the money that ISIS may bring. If you compare Pakistan-Afghanistan, unfortunately, to the Arab world, remember, the Arab world was under complete dictatorship of one kind or another for 40 years, the same 40 years that Pakistan and Afghanistan have spent facing off against extremist groups. We have had Saddam Hussein. We have had Assad. We have had the kings and princes of the Gulf States. Fundamentalist movements have been basically crushed. Democratic movements have been crushed. So the Arab world is just experiencing this for the first time. They are experiencing extremism and fundamentalism of the kind that ISIS has brought about literally for the first time. We have been living it for the last two generations.

Sino-Pak Relations ResilientSino-Pakistan relations are resilient- history and strategic alliancesShukla et al. 13—Ashish Shukla is an ICSSR Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for South Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is the author of Deadly Connection: The Cost of Becoming a Frontline State, Prof. Mondira Dutta is Chairperson, Centre for Inner Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi. Dr. Michael Dillon was founding Director, Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of Durham, UK. Currently he is Consultant, Europe China Research and Advice Network (ECRAN), based at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. Late Dr. Ivanka D. Petkova was Deputy Dean, Technical University, Sofia, Bulgaria. Dr. Michael Fredholm who is associated with the Stockholm International Program for Central Asian Studies (SIPCAS), is an historian and defence analyst who has written extensively on the history, defence strategies, security policies, and energy sector developments of Eurasia. His recent books include The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Geopolitics (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2013). Arun Warikoo is a cyber security specialist based in the United States. His areas of research include cyber security and security metrics. Manuel Rocha-Pino is associated with Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain. Dr. K. Warikoo is Professor of Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Dr. B.R. Deepak is Professor of Chinese and China Studies and Chairperson, Centre of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He has been Asia and Nehru Fellow, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China. Dr. Baatr U. Kitinov is Associate Professor, Peoplesí Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, Russia. Dr. Amit Ranjan is Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. Deldan Kunzes Angmo Nyachu born in Leh, Ladakh is a doctoral research scholar in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Dr Rahul Mishra is a Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. Earlier he was associated with Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, New Delhi for four years. In 2012-13, Dr Mishra was a Visiting Fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore). In 2011, Dr Mishra was affiliated with National University of Singapore (Singapore) as a Visiting Fellow. Mohammad Mansoor Ehsan of Afghanistan is a doctoral research scholar in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Said Reza ëHuseinií is a research scholar at Department of History, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2013 (“PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS A CASE STUDY OF ALL-WEATHER FRIENDSHIP”, July-December 2013, Accessed 7/1/16, Available online at file:///C:/Users/ruben_000/Downloads/out%20(4).pdf, JRR)

Pakistan, a born insecure state, is a fit example that has worked tirelessly to forge an alliance, first with the United States,8 Muslim nations of the world,9 and later with the Peopleís Republic of China as well. The only logic behind such a strategy, given from 1947 till date, is the existential threat posed by a larger and stronger neighbor - India. Many in Pakistani establishment believe, even today, that India is not reconciled to the partition and wants to undo it. Former Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan, in his political autobiography categorically accused India of having a hegemonic design. In his own words: The Indian leaders made no secret of their designs. Mr. Acharya Kripalani, who was the President of the Indian National Congress in 1947, declared, ëNeither the Congress nor the nation has given up its claim of a united India.í Sardar V. B. Patel, the first Indian Home Minister and the ëstrong maní of the Congress Party,

announced at about the same time, ëSooner than later, we shall again be united in common allegiance to our country.í10 There is no evidence at all that India, despite being the much powerful state, made any attempt to swallow its smaller neighbour by applying force. The statements of Acharya Kripalani and Sardar Patel, as mentioned by Ayub Khan, can best be explained as occasional emotional outbursts unsubstantiated by Indiaís official policy and activities in the region. It is important to note that India and Pakistan have fought four PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF ALL-WEATHER FRIENDSHIP 208 Himalayan and Central Asian Studies Vol. 17, No. 3-4, July-December 2013 wars, including the Kargil in 1999, but all of them were imposed upon India by Pakistan itself. Prof. Ishtiaq Ahmed agrees that on at least three occasions, excluding 1971 war which resulted in the breakup of the two wings of Pakistan, it was Pakistan that initiated the war. He questions the very logic of ìIndia Threatî openly and argues that ìIf we say that India is a threat to Pakistanís existence. Normally one would expect India more often than Pakistan initiating hostilities. So there is a puzzle [and Pakistan doesnít

know] how to explain it.î11 In fact, after the partition of British India, Pakistan started its journey as an independent state

with a fundamentally false assumption that India is the enemy no. 1 and poses an existential threat to the very survival of the country. In order to deal with this largely perceived threat, Pakistan embarked on a mission to enlist foreign support and get economic and military aid. It was the time when entire Europe was struggling to rebuild its war-torn economies and Washington was supposed to be the only likely source of help12 for the newly established state in South Asia. Thus, it willingly became a part of US-led/sponsored military alliance system, but for a very different reason, and soon earned the distinction of being the ìmost allied ally of the United States.î It is worth mentioning that, contrary to the popular belief, there was no

convergence of interests between Pakistan and the United States.13 And thatís the reason Pakistan later found its expectations unfulfilled by her Western partner. Her initial efforts to forge a Muslim bloc did not produce the desired results either.14 However,

this has not been the case with its other important partner in Asia-The Peopleís Republic of China. It is worth mentioning that Pakistani leaders knew their country’s geo-strategic location , especially of western Pakistan (present day Pakistan),

very well and used this very strength from time to time to extract aid from one or other major power of the international system.15 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who is considered to be the architect of Pakistanís special relationship with China, in his

speech in National Assembly of Pakistan on 24 July 1963 very emphatically stated that: The fact is that the geo-political position of Pakistan is important to the world and to the global strategy of the great powers. We do not get aid and assistance because we beg for it. We get aid and assistance because Pakistan is a nation of a hundred million people with a geopolitical position of great importance. West Pakistan adjoins the Middle East, a region of vital concern to the world. East Pakistan is on the periphery of the sensitive areas of South East Asia. That being so, it is in the interest of certain powers to give aid to Pakistan. Pakistan having committed itself to defence alliances with those powers, they are giving it aid. Thus there is mutuality of interests and reciprocity between Pakistan and those who give it assistance.16 Bhuttoís assumption was quite right. Pakistanís geo-strategic location is her biggest strength. It is no secret that his reference to great powers, after US, included China too. Thus, Chinese policy of a good friendly relations with Pakistan can be analysed keeping latterís strategic location in mind. Both the countries have moved forward from the initial cold years to the present day commitment of a long term strategic partnership. The two most recent high profile visits highlight the very nature of the special relationship between both countries. In May 2013, on the occasion of the 62nd anniversary of Pakistan-China diplomatic relations, Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the Peopleís

Republic of China, visited Pakistan and addressed the Pakistani Senate. During hisspeech, the Chinese Premier said: China-Pakistan friendly exchanges are rooted in history . The ancient Silk Road connected us togetherÖThe formal establishment of China-

Pakistan diplomatic ties in 1951 ushered our friendly relations into a new era. In the 62 years since then , the all-weather friendship and all-round cooperation between China and Pakistan have stood the test of the changing global environment and set a fine example for the growth of state-to-state relations ...Over the past half century and

more, China-Pakistan friendly relations have grown in strength from one generation to another , regardless of any

change in the international environment or domestic politics. Ours is a brotherly friendship that has been tested by times of difficulty and forged by mutual trustÖAs an old Chinese saying goes, ìFriendship between chess playmates lasts less than a day. Friendship between diners lasts less than a month. Friendship based on power and influence lasts less than a year. Only friendship based on

shared values lasts a lifetime.î What we have between China and Pakistan is a friendship based on shared values . It will not only last a lifetime, but also endure from generation to generation and last forever .

However strong China may grow, we will always stand shoulder to shoulder with the Pakistani people as good neighbors, good friends, good partners and good brothers, come rain or shine. China will work with Pakistan to forge a stronger, deeper and more solid strategic partnership of cooperation .17

Sino-Pakistan relations are resilient- economic interdependence and geo-strategic agreements stop collapseShukla et al. 13—Ashish Shukla is an ICSSR Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for South Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is the author of Deadly Connection: The Cost of Becoming a Frontline State, Prof. Mondira Dutta is Chairperson, Centre for Inner Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi. Dr. Michael Dillon was founding Director, Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of Durham, UK. Currently he is Consultant, Europe China Research and Advice Network (ECRAN), based at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. Late Dr. Ivanka D. Petkova was Deputy Dean, Technical University, Sofia, Bulgaria. Dr. Michael Fredholm who is associated with the Stockholm International Program for Central Asian Studies (SIPCAS), is an historian and defence analyst who has written extensively on the history, defence strategies, security policies, and energy sector developments of Eurasia. His recent books include The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian

Geopolitics (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2013). Arun Warikoo is a cyber security specialist based in the United States. His areas of research include cyber security and security metrics. Manuel Rocha-Pino is associated with Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain. Dr. K. Warikoo is Professor of Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Dr. B.R. Deepak is Professor of Chinese and China Studies and Chairperson, Centre of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He has been Asia and Nehru Fellow, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China. Dr. Baatr U. Kitinov is Associate Professor, Peoplesí Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, Russia. Dr. Amit Ranjan is Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. Deldan Kunzes Angmo Nyachu born in Leh, Ladakh is a doctoral research scholar in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Dr Rahul Mishra is a Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. Earlier he was associated with Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, New Delhi for four years. In 2012-13, Dr Mishra was a Visiting Fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore). In 2011, Dr Mishra was affiliated with National University of Singapore (Singapore) as a Visiting Fellow. Mohammad Mansoor Ehsan of Afghanistan is a doctoral research scholar in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Said Reza ëHuseinií is a research scholar at Department of History, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2013 (“PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS A CASE STUDY OF ALL-WEATHER FRIENDSHIP”, July-December 2013, Accessed 7/1/16, Available online at file:///C:/Users/ruben_000/Downloads/out%20(4).pdf, JRR)

Sino-Pakistan relations defy the widely held perception that there are no permanent friends/enemies in international relations. Two factors are responsible for this near permanent friendship ; first, Pakistan’s geostrategic location and China’s economic interests in the region; and second, the shared enmity with India. With the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in early 1950s both the countries proceeded carefully. Initially, it was Pakistan that offered goodwill gestures first by recognising the communist state and then supporting it on various occasions at the United Nations. For Chinese, it was a great relief at that time. There were some tension during the Cold War period when Pakistan became the most allied ally of the United States but both the countries managed the situation in a pretty well manner and the breaking point never came. Islamabad repeatedly assured Beijing that her alliance with Washington was not against China but India and Chinese understood the constraints faced by Pakistan. During the period of SinoIndian tensions Pakistani leaders, especially then Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, correctly read the events and their possible

outcomes. Based on these strategic calculations, Pakistan moved forward to establish good friendly relations with China . It was a part of well thought out strategy under which Pakistan entered into a border agreement, during the Sino-Indian war, and ceded a part of illegally occupied territory of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir to China. Since then there was no going back and the relationship progressed on the classic formula of my enemy ís enemy is my friend. Karakoram Highway and Gwadar port can be described as the symbols of Sino-Pakistan friendship that on the one hand offer both the countriesí economic opportunities and on the other can be used for strategic purposes.

Relations

1nc Relations Adv.The US and China are cooperating on Afghanistan now.Wu, 2016 (Xinbo, Professor and Director Center for American Studies @ Fudan University and Executive Dean of Institute of International Studies @ Fudan University “Cooperation, competition and shaping the outlook: the United States and China’s neighbourhood diplomacy” International Affairs 92:4 Accessed 7/8/16 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12651/epdf JJH)

Cooperation between China and the United States has also been possible in respect of Afghanistan, where the two countries have overlapping interests.6 Both Beijing and Washington want to see a stable and secular Afghanistan that will no longer be a hotbed for terrorism . As the United States fought the Taliban with its NATO partners, China became a major investor in the country, trying to help develop its impoverished economy. This cooperative division of labour between China and America was well illustrated by a construction project in which Chinese workers built a road in a mountain valley while US soldiers protected them from attack by the Taliban. Starting in 2012, China and the United States jointly launched an annual training programme for Afghan diplomats, in which each year a group of young Afghan diplomats spent two weeks in China and another two weeks in the United States. China also helped to train officers and soldiers in the Afghan security forces. As the United States made plans to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, China felt concern at the prospect of Afghanistan falling back into chaos, with potentially damaging effects on stability in China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region. The United States, for its part, was concerned about the potential for the Taliban to regain control of the country, and wanted to see China play a more positive role there after the US withdrawal. Against this background, Beijing and Washington agreed to step up their coordination on Afghan affairs. During the fifth Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, held in July 2013 in Washington DC, the two sides decided to ‘expand coordination in advance of the 2014 drawdown in support of their shared interest in political stability and economic revitalization in Afghanistan’.7 They also agreed to continue the joint diplomatic training programme for Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials through 2013. The two governments also stated their intention to continue to work together in support of regional cooperation efforts such as the Istanbul Process, and the United States welcomed China’s decision to host its fourth ministerial meeting in 2014. As the deadline for US withdrawal approached, China notably strengthened its efforts on issues relating to Afghanistan. Sun Yuxi, appointed special envoy for Afghan affairs in July 2014, visited Afghanistan and Pakistan, telling Afghan President Hamid Karzai in their meeting that ‘China wants to enhance its role in Afghanistan’.8 In October, the fourth ministerial conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan was held in Beijing. When the newly elected Afghan President Ashraf Ghani visited Beijing in the same month, China pledged 2 billion renminbi (US$327 million) in aid to Afghanistan up to 2017, more than doubling the US $250 million China had already contributed to Afghanistan since 2001. In addition, China promised to provide training for 3,000 Afghan professionals as well as to help develop Afghan agriculture, hydroelectricity and infrastructure.9 Since late 2014, China has actively facilitated dialogue between the Taliban and the Afghan government, and between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced during his visit to Islamabad in February 2015 that ‘we will support the Afghan government in realizing reconciliation with various political factions including the Taliban’ and that ‘China is ready to play a constructive role and will provide necessary facilitation any time if it is required by various parties in Afghanistan’.10 A US State Department official welcomed China’s efforts, stating that ‘the US and China have agreed to work together to support Afghanistan’s government of national unity, security forces and economic development to ensure that Afghanistan can never again be used as a safe haven for terrorists’ . 11 In early July 2015, talks were held in Pakistan between the Taliban and the Afghan government with the

participation of Chinese and US representatives, signalling a joint effort by the latter to promote the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan.12 For the foreseeable future, China and the United States are likely to continue to cooperate and coordinate their policies in respect of North Korea and Afghanistan, motivated by their shared and overlapping interests. However, there are some geopolitical factors that may constrain such cooperation and coordination. On the North Korean issue, Beijing will insist on pursuing the goal of denuclearization without jeopardizing the stability of the North Korean state, in which China has important geopolitical interests, while Washington may be ready to see the current regime in Pyongyang collapse at any time. On the Afghanistan issue, the United States may want China to go so far as sending troops into the country under certain conditions to help stabilize the situation, which China is unlikely to be willing to do, considering the associated risks too great. Also, Washington may urge Beijing to put more pressure on Islamabad on the Afghan issue, which Beijing would be reluctant to do out of concern for Sino-Pakistani ties.

Cooperation over terror won’t have a big affect on US-Sino relations and even if it did that affect would be negativePant 12— Harsh V. Pant is Reader in International Relations at King’s College London in the Department of Defense Studies. He is also an Associate with the King’s Centre for Science and Security Studies and an Affiliate with the King’s India Institute, 2012 (“The Pakistan Thorn in China—India—U.S. Relations”, Winter 2012, Accessed 7/5/16, Available online at https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/19515/uploads, JRR)

Overall, it has been rightly observed that China’s policy toward Pakistan is ‘‘an object lesson in how to attain long-term national goals by calm calculation, forbearance, and diplomatic skill.’’35 Nevertheless, there are indeed limits to China—Pakistan ties. The relationship remains fundamentally asymmetrical: Pakistan wants more out of its ties with China than China is willing to offer. Today, while Pakistan’s domestic problems are gargantuan, China will be very cautious in involving itself even more. In September 2011, China Kingho Group, one of China’s largest private coal mining companies, pulled out of what was to be Pakistan’s largest foreign-investment pact, citing concerns for the Islamabad’s inability to curb extremism makes it difficult for China to trust Pakistan completely. security of its personnel.36 Moreover, the closer China gets to Pakistan, the faster India would move into the U.S. orbit . Amid worries about the potential destabilizing influence of Pakistani militants on China’s Muslim minority in Xinjiang, Beijing has also taken a harder line against Pakistan. The flow of arms and terrorists from across the border in Pakistan remains a major headache for Chinese authorities, and Islamabad’s inability and/or failure to curb extremism makes it difficult for the Chinese to trust Pakistan completely. If Pakistan wants to keep receiving support from China, then it needs to demonstrate progress on this issue. As tensions rose between China and Pakistan in the aftermath of violence in the border town of Kashgar in Xinjiang in August 2011, President Zardari went to talk directly with local leaders and businessmen in Xinjiang, recognizing that if he was not able to mend fences with local leadership, Sino-Pakistani ties might be in real jeopardy. China, at least publicly, has continued to emphasize that its relationship with Pakistan is far more important than isolated incidents of violence. To be clear, Chinese involvement in Pakistan is unlikely to match the U.S. profile in the country in the short to medium term , and it is not readily evident if China even wants to match the United States. But flirtation with Pakistan gives China crucial space for diplomatic maneuvering vis-a`-vis India and the United States, and it will continue to utilize the relationship in pursuit of its larger strategic objectives. Pakistan is not going to be a common interest that binds China with either India or the United States any time soon.

No Indian retaliation – terror attacks happen frequently and there are no military strategies in placeRajagopalan 13 – Rajesh Rajagopalan, Professor of International Politics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2013, (“Fearing nuclear escalation, India limits its response to Pakistan’s provocations,” The Economic Times, August 9, Available online at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/et-commentary/fearing-nuclear-escalation-india-limits-its-response-to-pakistans-provocations/articleshow/21716228.cms, Accessed 7-15-2016, SAA)

In the aftermath of yet another Pakistani transgression, we are back to the tired old arguments about whether or not India should be talking to Pakistan. Proponents argue that nothing has been gained whenever India stopped talking to Pakistan, as it did after every major provocation. Their opponents argue that dialogue has not stopped Pakistan's provocations. Both sides are right and therein lies the simple truth that New Delhi refuses to acknowledge: dialogue or the lack of it has little impact on Pakistan. The reason Pakistan continues to provoke is that India has eschewed any retaliation for fear of nuclear escalation. Because Pakistan does not fear Indian retaliation, India's deterrence is dead. To prevent Pakistani provocations, India needs to resurrect its deterrence and that requires considering using military force. Pakistan's nuclearisation has ended India's ability to deter Islamabad from provocations. Consequently, Pakistan has provided unprecedented levels of support to terrorist groups, which includes not only terrorist attacks in India but also against the Indian mission in Afghanistan. Fearing nuclear escalation, both the BJP and the UPA governments have limited their responses to diplomatic protests and calling off dialogue. These are ineffectual responses that only serve to illustrate Indian helplessness. Pakistan knows that India will eventually have to return to talks. Strategic Stupidity It is not as if Indian leadership has been unaware of the problem. After Kargil, then defence minister George Fernandes and army chief General VP Malik suggested that India could explore limited conventional war options that would punish Pakistan without risking escalation. Unfortunately that idea has not been pursued. After Operation Parakram, the Indian Army proposed a "cold start" doctrine. It was a plan for faster mobilisation because one lesson of Operation Parakram was that Indian military mobilisation took very long, which allowed international pressure and strategic secondguessing to undermine the Indian leadership's will to order a military retaliation. But Cold Start envisaged a much larger war and it might not be an appropriate response for anything but a catastrophic terrorist attack. Also, Pakistan's introduction of short-range tactical nuclear weapons has increased New Delhi's apprehensions. In any case, at least formally, the Indian Army has discarded Cold Start. Indian leaders have further undermined our deterrence by repeatedly proclaiming that they do not want war. This is the one point on which there is consensus in New Delhi but consensus is not wisdom. Even if war is not an option, taking it off the table is the height of strategic stupidity. As long as India is unable to threaten Pakistan with military retaliation, Pakistan has little incentive to stop supporting terrorist actions against India. Diplomacy provides few useful responses. Stopping the dialogue is a shortterm measure that will not deter Pakistan. Seeking international support is equally useless because even if the other powers support India diplomatically — which itself is a mighty big if considering Pakistan's talent for leveraging its strategic location — it will have little impact on Pakistan, as they have repeatedly demonstrated. Diplomacy can aid military power but it cannot replace it.

No Indo-Pak War—Empirics, US Intervention, Internal Affairs all checkSharma 13- Rajeev Sharma is a Strategic Affairs Analyst for the Diplomat & The First Post, He is also a New Delhi-based journalist-author who has been writing on international relations, foreign policy, strategic affairs, security and terrorism for over two decades. Writer for the Diplomat, The First Post,

Sakaal Times, Why India Can’t Go to with Pakistan, http://www.firstpost.com/breaking-views/why-india-cant-go-to-war-with-pakistan-590038.html @yangtri 7/15/16

Indian political leadership’s upping of ante on Tuesday vis a vis Pakistan is not unlike the famous single-liner of Hamlet, the Prince of Denmark: “Words, words, words.” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid used strong words against Pakistan and both said that it can’t be “business as usual” with Pakistan after the neighbour’s brutal act in the Medhar sector of the Line of Control (LoC) last

week. But they both stopped at that and declined to spell out what concrete steps they would be taking against the recalcitrant neighbour. Words, words, words! BJP leader and former External Affairs Minister went a step ahead and demanded “controlled military response” against Pakistan. Well, being in the opposition, Sinha can say that, though neither he nor any BJP leader can explain what concrete deliverables resulted from Operation Parakram when the then NDA government had mobilized troops along the Pakistan border in the wake of December 2001 terror attack on Indian

Parliament. Sinha also could not explain his idea of “controlled military response” further. Words, words, words! Let’s chuck the political grandstanding in the ongoing India-Pakistan theater of the absurd and focus on how India-Pakistan relations may play out in the coming weeks in the current geopolitical matrix. There are three issues. The most important question is whether Pakistan army personnel’s barbaric act of mutilating the bodies of two Indian jawans they killed on 6 January (which is nothing short of a war crime) needs to be given a

military response – controlled or full blast? War's that way: What can India do to retaliate? PTI The UPA government is clearly not thinking on these lines. The war drums are not beating; not yet. One may ask: if not now, then when? But then matters of statecraft are not that simple. More so, when the habitual offender neighbour happens to be a nuclear weapon power! But then does it mean that big power like India should allow itself to be bullied by a fast failing state just because it is a nuclear weapon state? Far from it! The beheading of the Indian soldier by the Pakistani regulars was a covert operation

and covert operations need not trigger an overt response. India has the option of beating Pakistan in its own game without even giving a semblance of mobilizing its war machinery. India can also put itself on a denial mode just as Pakistan has been for its sins of omission and commission in violating the ceasefire repeatedly over the past

ten days. In all probability this is what the chiefs of Indian Army and the Indian Air Force had in mind when they separately fired warning shots at Pakistan a few days ago. The LoC would unlikely remain a Line of Control in the coming weeks. It will be a live wire. The Indian Army will do well to deploy its best commandos in the vulnerable sectors of the LoC with a single-point brief: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. This is what Pakistan did on 6 January that has brought the Indo-Pak relations on the brink. The medieval age barbarism was perpetrated by Pakistan army’s Special Service Group (SSG) commandos. After the Pakistani provocation, the Indian army should have its tail up and give a “measured” and “proportionate” response, to borrow words from the Indian political leadership’s recent lexicon. The

likely scenario, therefore, would be that the Indian response to subsequent Pakistani provocations would be sector-specific and event-specific without enlarging the sweepstakes. This is possibly what the chiefs of Indian Army and Indian Air Force indicated and this is probably what BJP leaders like Yashwant Sinha and Sushma Swaraj meant when they made those hawkish statements. Pakistan Army would be mis-adventurous if they were to mistake India’s continued recourse to the laid down diplomatic means as cowardice and carry on with their business as

usual. Two, this is not the right time for an overt response from India given the chaotic situation in Pakistan .

Nobody knows who the boss in Pakistan is today . The government of President Asif Ali Zardari has become a rootless wonder. The Supreme Court has ordered the arrest of Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf on corruption charges. Army Chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani remains as indecisive and a passive onlooker as he has been for years. Gen Kayani’s perceived best bets, Imran Khan and Tahir-ul Qadri, are busily pursuing their own independent personal agendas, the former all to set to carry out a “tsunami march” while the latter a “million man march”. Pakistan’s slide to anarchy is being hastened with each passing

day. The Indian government would only be displaying knee-jerk reactions by beating the war drums. Why declare war with a state which is at war with itself? India won’t be wrong is playing the waiting game with a neighbour which has its fingers on the self-destruct button. Declaring war on Pakistan at this stage would be no less than a favour to Islamabad . Third, and perhaps the most important factor, is the United States. The Obama administration’s major foreign policy imperative at this moment is to get out of Afghanistan. At the same time, the Americans cannot afford to exit Afghanistan today only to re-enter tomorrow. The Americans’ exit policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan has to be executed in such a manner that they do not have to stage

a hasty come-back. Washington’s Afghanistan strategic imperatives won’t allow any escalation in India-Pakistan conflict. The Americans don’t want to get bogged down to South Asia as their priority has shifted to the South China Sea region . T he Americans won’t like to see even controlled aggression by India against Pakistan which may have the potential of getting out of hand.

Ext. Terror Not Key To Co-OpNoKo, SCS, naval power, Taiwan, and economic power are obstaclesRosemont 15 — Henry Rosemont, Rosemont Jr. is a distinguished professor of the liberal arts (emeritus) at St. Mary’s College of Maryland and a visiting scholar in the Religious Studies Depatment at Brown University, 2015 (“What Better U.S.-China Cooperation Might Look Like”, Foreign Policy in Focus, October 14th, Accessed Online at http://fpif.org/what-better-u-s-china-cooperation-might-look-like/, Accessed 07-15-2016, SP)

Assuming that appropriate regrets are expressed at the proper time, sufficient to alert the Chinese that the game has changed, let us briefly examine a few specific areas where Sino-U.S. relations might be transformed by thinking cooperatively rather than competitively. On the following five issues — North Korea, the South China Sea, naval competition, Taiwan, and the economy — the two countries could indeed deepen trust and lessen suspicion . Believing that only even stronger sanctions can bring North Korea to the negotiating table on nuclear disarmament, Secretary of State John Kerry is pressing China to join in imposing them. China, however, is reluctant to do so, even though it has become sorely peeved at its neighbor in recent years. One thing the U.S. could offer in return for Chinese cooperation would be a pledge not to station any American troops or nuclear weapons in North Korea when the two countries reunite, as sooner or later they must. Such a pledge would clearly restrict our future options, but it is almost certainly worth the effort. On the dispute in the South China Sea, the United States should first make clear to the Chinese that it understands and sympathizes with their legitimate security interests in the area just as Washington claims the same in the Caribbean. Second, rather than suggest a legalistic manner of hemming China in, the United States should show its deep commitment to the need for maritime law among all nations by signing the Law of the Sea, as 166 other nations (including China) did years ago. Then Washington should promise to end the provocative reconnaissance flights close to the Chinese mainland and invite all the disputants to settle the various conflicts in accordance with maritime law, with ourselves guaranteeing impartiality in the proceedings. On naval issues more generally, the United States should impress upon the Chinese that their single aircraft carrier — a retrofitted old Soviet model — is no match for 10 in the U.S. navy, and that it will be very expensive to build another nine to catch up. China wants to keep open the sea lanes in the Straits of Malacca as well as the South China Sea, through which it imports over 90 percent of its oil. It would be much better if a number of ships in the Chinese navy joined the United States and all other willing nations to form a “1000 ship navy,” as admiral Mike Mullen called his idea when he formulated it shortly before becoming chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Fleshed out, the idea is to have large, coordinated mini-fleets under general U.S. leadership patrolling the oceans as protection against piracy, smuggling, drug running, and terrorism, and capable of providing humanitarian aid in relatively short order to victims of typhoons, tsunamis, hurricanes, and other natural disasters. This would give China and all other maritime nations in the region the security they need and save them the cost of a huge navy buildup. It would be cheaper for the United States as well, and of great humanitarian benefit around the entire globe. The United States will continue to promise to protect Taiwan from outside aggression. But if China pledges never to attempt to take the island by force, Washington will pledge in return never to sell or give it any armaments in the future. On economic issues, China has begun to bring its finances into equilibrium even as it struggles with its “zombie factories.” Beijing has also asked the International Monetary Fund for special drawing rights, a complicated affair that in essence would allow the yuan into the club of elite currencies, enabling much greater foreign investment, and thereby hastening the necessary transition from an export-led focus on production to a consumer-driven import economy. Such a transition is necessary if China is going to make its state-owned factories productive again and regain its position of being the major engine of the

global economy, which is important for everyone. By not vetoing China’s request at the IMF meetings toward the end of the year, the United States runs a risk of the yuan replacing the dollar as the world’s currency in the near future. At the same time, approval of such a measure would be a huge boost to the Chinese economy, a significant boost to the U.S. economy, and therefore a good stimulus for other economies as well. So Washington should not veto Beijing’s bid.

Trade, Myanmar, ECS and SCS, and cyber security are all obstacles to co-opNoori et al 15 — Maral Noori, Noori holds a M.S. in Peace Operations from George Mason University, and a B.A. in International Relations from the College of William and Mary, a program specialist for the Middle East & North Africa programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Daniel Jasper, Jasper is the public education and advocacy coordinator for Asia at the AFSC, Jason Tower, Tower is the East Asia Quaker International Affairs representative at the AFSC, 2015 (“Overcoming Barriers to U.S.-China Cooperation”, United States Institute for Peace, August 24th, Accessed Online at http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/08/24/overcoming-barriers-us-china-cooperation, Accessed 07-15-2016, SP)

Lack of strategic trust between the United States and China prevents productive cooperation. Both sides have largely continued to act as if their relationship is a zero-sum game. These tensions have only intensified over recent security concerns in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Moreover, Washington has cited concerns about Beijing’s steady increase in military spending, from $10 billion in 1997 to $145 billion in 2015, and sees China as a direct threat to its allies and interests in the Asia-Pacific.2 Beijing sees the U.S. military presence in the region and across Asia as its greatest security threat. It is also keenly aware that Washington maintains the world’s highest military spending, up from $560 billion in 2015 to a requested $585 billion in 2016.3 Washington also routinely accuses Beijing of cyber attacks on government agencies—most recently in June 2015 when both the Office of Personnel Management’s systems and corporate computer systems were breached. Both sides lack strategic trust in trade, despite China being Washington’s second largest trade partner ($592 billion in 2014).4 A sense of competition is constant. As Washington pushes forward with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Beijing pursues the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Each framework tacitly excludes the other country, underscoring the mistrust. Further, the two nations continue to compete for influence in Myanmar, a nascent democracy still threatened by conflict. Points of tension should not prevent the United States and China from overcoming their challenges, enhancing cooperation, and fostering deeper mutual understanding and strategic trust. The private sectors and nongovernmental organizations on both sides could launch this process by enhancing their own cooperation. Ultimately, Washington and Beijing need to compartmentalize early on and hope that positivity on some ends—such as cooperation in Myanmar—will spill over to others—such as cyber security and the South China Sea. Both sides will need to commit to greater transparency so that in a moment of crisis, chances are minimal for misunderstanding to lead to a major conflict.

North Korea key to US-Sino co-opBBC News 16 — British Broadcasting Channel, 2016 (“North Korea nuclear tests: US and China to co-operate”, BBC, April 1st, Accessed Online at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35940067, Accessed 07-15-2016, SP)

China and the United States will work together to try to prevent further missile tests by North Korea, US President Barack Obama says. In recent weeks, North Korea has carried out a hydrogen bomb test and repeatedly test-fired missiles. Mr Obama met Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of a nuclear summit in Washington on Thursday. But hours later, South Korea's Yonhap news agency said the North

appeared to have test-fired another missile. The latest test saw what appeared to be a ballistic missile land off the east coast of the Korean peninsula, Yonhap reported. Mr Obama said he and Mr Xi were seeking to agree "how we can discourage action like nuclear missile tests that escalate tensions and violate international obligations". Mr Xi, quoted by China's state news agency Xinhua, said it was critical all parties "fully and strictly" implemented newly-agreed sanctions. China is North Korea's closest ally and largest trading partner. Zheng Zeguang, China's assistant foreign minister, said the presidents had a "candid and in-depth exchange of views on a variety of issues...and reached an important consensus". He called the meeting "positive, constructive and fruitful". North Korea's nuclear test on 6 January and a satellite launch on 7 February were violations of existing UN sanctions. Since then, the UN and Washington passed further sanctions on Pyongyang. The UN steps were drafted with support by China and reportedly came after two months of negotiations between Beijing and Washington. Previous UN sanctions imposed after North Korean tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013 did little to dispel its nuclear ambitions. Much of the burden of making sure the sanctions are implemented is falling on China. Under the new measures, any North Korean ships arriving in China must be inspected for contraband and imports halted if there is proof profits from those exchanges go towards the North's nuclear programme. Washington has long pushed for Beijing to put more pressure on North Korea. A White House statement in February said China's "unique influence over the North Korean regime" gave it the chance to do so. A map of previous North Korean nuclear tests China's foreign ministry last week said it was keen to push for wider talks on North Korea, involving a number of regional powers, during the meeting with Mr Obama. There was no confirmation whether new talks were agreed on Thursday. Mr Obama also vowed to closely work on the same issue with its allies South Korea and Japan after meeting their leaders on Thursday. "We are united in our efforts to deter and defend against North Korean provocations," he said.

Ext. Indo-Pak War

Even with high tensions, Escalation from conventional skirmishes won’t happenJadhav 14- Pranaav Jadhav, Journalist at USA Today Network, The Leaf Chronicle, The Reflector, Conventional war unlikely between Indo-Pak nations, http://www.reflector-online.com/opinion/article_bc0be81a-58b0-11e4-be30-001a4bcf6878.html @yangtri 7/15/16

India is not part of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty that prevents the spread of nuclear weapons, and there

is a good reason for it. For the last two weeks Pakistan has substantially escalated its cease-fire violations along the line of control (LOC) in the Northern Indian state of Jammu Kashmir. Pakistan’s continuous staking of claims on the Indian state of Kashmir has never ceased in Indo-Pak history. This would be as if Canada continually claimed a chunk of Illinois or Mexico claimed a slice of Texas. Maharajah Hari Singh, the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, signed the treaty, the Instrument of Accession, 1947, and acceded the state of Jammu and Kashmir to the Union of India. At present, there is a Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly in place with a duly-elected chief minister. Additionally, the United Nations Security Council has accepted India’s stand on the issue and has dismissed any talks of popular votes on the matter in the region. Why does Pakistan do what it does along the LOC? Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif faces

enormous pressure from within. There were huge protests for his resignation a few weeks ago. The Pakistani army is detached from any central authority and runs completely independently from the state. There is a section of these commanders that believes creating insurgency within Kashmir may help their cause and return the region back to the Pakistani civilians and make them believe the army is the actual protective shield they have from India. With this, the Army gains a motion of confidence among the people. Interestingly, this time what has

changed is India’s response to the cease-fire violations. India has a strong majority new government and a prime minister who believes in bulldozing India’s agenda on the world stage. India has had a very calm response toward Pakistan for the last decade even after numerous cease-fire violations, the 26/11 attack and the beheadings of Indian soldiers. For the last two weeks, India has begun a fierce retaliation along the line

of control with counter-firing field artillery, a move Pakistan has not seen in the last decade. India also said the duty of creating a positive environment for normalization of relations lies on Pakistan. After the kind of response Pakistan got, it quickly wrote a letter to the U.N. Secretary General calling for international attention in the region to which Pakistan was denied. The U.N. responded telling them to resolve the issue with India through dialogue. Among many others, PM Sharif will be a happy man to know his army, which is opposed to peace talks, has failed in its aggressive actions. How is the U.S. related to the issue? The Obama administration continues to provide close to $2 billion of funding to the Pakistani government. A report published in The Guardian in 2011 said Pakistan has historically been among the top recipients of U.S. aid. Since 1948, the U.S. has sent more than $50 billion in direct aid to the country. Nearly half of this has been for military assistance. This aid can reach the hands of the wrong people, those who promote direct attacks against India in the Kashmir valley. In an article I wrote earlier this year, I cited Obama’s comments on Pakistan. In an interview to the CBS program “60 Minutes,” President Obama said, “We think that there had to be some sort of support network for Bin Laden inside of Pakistan. But we don’t know who or what that support network was.” Additionally, with the financial aid we lend Pakistan, you should expect to at least have a better opinion of the U.S. in Pakistan among its civilians, but the numbers speak otherwise. According to a 2012 Pew Research poll, 74 percent of the Pakistanis polled believed the U.S. was an enemy. Finally, let us come to the nuclear and one-on-one debate between India and Pakistan. Pakistan has a history of surprising its opponents; it has fought three official wars against India, in 1965, 1971 and

1999, all considerably won by India. Pakistan could have an initial advantage if it surprises India like it did in Kargil, but India’s military may still substantially decimate Pakistan. How do the numbers stack up? India’s defense budget ranks 8th in world with approximately $50 billion, while Pakistan’s ranks 27th with a $5 billion budget. Approximately 1.25 billion people live in India, and over 180 million live in Pakistan. India’s field troops in 2013 were close to 2 million over Pakistan’s 600,000. India has close to 90 nuclear warheads, over Pakistan’s 30 to 50, and finally, India has 1.26 million square miles of land versus Pakistan’s 307,374 square miles. A rational guess you can safely make is there is no comparison between the two

countries. It will be unaffordable for Pakistan to kick-start a conventional war with India; an initial advantage cannot guarantee a victory. And therefore as most political scientists predict, a war is very unlikely between two nuclear powers in the Southeast Asian region. India is committed to never using nuclear weapons first, and Pakistan is unlikely to do so as well.

Rhetoric means nothingThomas Wright 13, a fellow at the Brookings Institution in the Managing Global Order project. Previously, he was executive director of studies at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a lecturer at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, and senior researcher for the Princeton Project on National Security, "Don’t Expect Worsening of India, Pakistan Ties," http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2013/01/16/dont-expect-worsening-of-india-pakistan-ties/, January 16

There’s no end for now to the hostile rhetoric between India and Pakistan. But that doesn’t necessarily presage anything more drastic. Pakistan claims another of its soldiers died Tuesday night in firing across the Line of Control in Kashmir, the divided Himalayan region claimed by both nations. Indian army chief, Gen. Bikram Singh, on Wednesday, said Pakistan had opened fire and India retaliated. “If any of their people have died, it would have been in retaliation to their firing,” Gen. Singh said. ”When they fire, we also fire.” It was the latest in tit-for-tat recriminations over deaths in Kashmir that began last week. Pakistan claimed one of its soldiers died on Jan. 6. Two days later, India said Pakistani forces killed two of its soldiers and mutilated the bodies. Tuesday night, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said the mutilations meant it could not be “business as usual” between the countries. That has worried some that peace talks, which have been in train for two years, could be about to break down. Mr. Singh’s comments built on a drumbeat of anger from India. Gen. Singh, Monday called the mutilations “unpardonable” and said India withheld the right to retaliate to Pakistan aggression when and where it chooses. Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, who is in the U.S., Tuesday termed the Indian army chief’s comments as “very hostile.” There are some other worrying signs. India said Tuesday it was delaying the start of a visa-on-arrival program meant to make it easier for some Indians and Pakistanis to visit each other’s countries. The visa program, like talks on opening up bilateral trade, is supposed to pave the way toward broader peace talks that would encompass thornier issues, like how to solve the Kashmir problem. Also Tuesday, nine Pakistani hockey players who had come to participate in a tournament in India were sent home due

to fears of protests and violence against them. Still, there’s little benefit for either side to escalate what is now still sporadic firing over the

Line of Control, the de facto border in Kashmir. Pakistan is embroiled in its own political meltdown sparked by the Supreme Court’s decision Tuesday to order the arrest of Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf on allegations of corruption. Tens of thousands of protesters Tuesday took to the streets in Islamabad, and remain there today, demanding

immediate elections and a greater role for the army and Supreme Court in politics. Pakistan’s military continues to play an important political role, dominating defense and foreign

policy. But it has so far shown little sign of mounting a full-blown coup despite persistent rumors of military intervention. Pakistan’s government must hold national elections by May, meaning the next few months are likely to be choppy ones in Pakistan politics. In such an environment, the military is unlikely to want to dial up tensions with India. On the Indian side, despite Mr. Singh’s unusually strident tone Tuesday, there also will be pause before taking matters to the next level. Mr. Singh has put immense personal political capital into trying to improve ties with Pakistan since he came to

power in 2004. Last year, he hosted Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari in New Delhi and promised a return visit. Such a trip is clearly off the table for now. But India still has put too much into peace talks to throw away the progress made so far on visas, trade and other issues. Even Gen. Singh, India’s army chief, Monday

said he did not believe the latest flare-up would lead to a broader escalation in violence and an official end to a 2003 ceasefire agreement in Kashmir. The clashes so far, he noted, have been limited to specific areas of the Line of Control.

Solvency

1nc Solvency

China won’t pressure and Pakistan can’t solve.Tanzeem, 6/2/2016 (Ayesha, “China Remains Afghanistan's Hope for a Secure Future” VOA News Accessed 7/1/2016 http://www.voanews.com/content/china-afghanistan-hope-security-pakistan/3359246.html JJH)

Diminished enthusiasm The initial U.S.-Afghan euphoria with Chinese involvement has slightly worn off. The QCG failed to lead to a decrease in violence in Afghanistan. Both Afghans and Americans realized that China would not pressure Pakistan beyond a certain point . With the killing of Taliban leader Mullah Mansoor and the election of new leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, chances of peace talks this year are grimmer than ever. "I don't believe that we will see peace talks anytime in the short term," said Brig. Gen. Charles Cleveland, deputy chief of staff for communications for Operation Resolute Support, the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Analyst Rizvi thinks the Chinese approach has been more measured because it recognizes the limits of Pakistan's capacity to influence the Afghan Taliban.

China Say NoZhou, 3/16/2016 (Andi, Program Assistant for the China, East Asia and United States Program, working out of the EastWest Institute’s New York Center. “Can China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Save the US in Afghanistan?” The Diplomat http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/can-chinas-one-belt-one-road-save-the-us-in-afghanistan/)

One major reason for this disconnect is that China’s interests in Afghanistan remain largely tied to a single issue: Uyghur separatist groups in China’s western frontier region of Xinjiang and their suspected ties to insurgent groups in Afghanistan. Some have pointed to the Uyghur connection as a potential hook to involve China more deeply in Afghanistan’s stabilization and reconstruction. But while it is true that the Uyghur issue has spurred China to act constructively in Afghanistan in some respects, including substantial investment commitments and mediation of peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, relying on the Uyghur connection alone to anchor China’s Afghanistan interest poses a number of problems . First, China’s policies toward its Uyghur population have long raised human rights concerns in Washington, and the U nited S tates’ refusal to label all Uyghur unrest as “terrorism” has frustrated China in bilateral discussions. The U.S. has also hesitated to expand counterterrorism cooperation with China for fear that China would use its newfound capabilities to persecute the broader Uyghur population. Second, China has been reluctant to act in Afghanistan on issues that lack direct implications for its concerns about Xinjiang . On top of a general predilection for non-interference, China views the U.S. nation-building misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan as a cautionary tale. With its hands full of problems both domestically and in its immediate neighborhood, China fears getting sucked into a quagmire in some far-flung land.

Ext. Pakistan Can’t SolveTaliban doesn’t need Pakistan bases any more they can’t solve.Reuters, 3/14/2016 (“In secret meetings, Taliban rejected Pakistan pressure on peace process” Accessed 7/1/2016 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-talibantalks-idUSKCN0WG2LM JJH)

Pakistan's influence over the insurgents is the lynchpin to the peace plan developed over last few months by Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and China to bring an end to the 15-year-old war in Afghanistan. A Pakistani official in Islamabad said the Taliban's recent success on the battlefield inside Afghanistan had changed the equation. "They no longer need their Pakistan bases in the same way, so if Pakistan threatens to expel them, it does not have the same effect," said the official, a retired military officer close to the talks. The insurgents have won new zones of influence - if not outright control - from Afghan security forces since the United States and its allies pulled most combat troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, Afghan and Western officials acknowledge. " Pakistan's trump card - safe havens on its soil - is in danger of being snatched away, " said Michael Kugelman of the Woodrow Wilson Institute, a Washington-based think tank. "The Taliban have little incentive to step off the battlefield now, given recent gains and those likely to come in the next few months. In effect, why quit while you're ahead?"

Taliban won’t listen to Afghanistan.Jamal, 3/12/2016 (Umair, “Pakistan May Have Jeopardized the Latest Afghan Peace Talks” The Diplomat Accessed 7/1/2016 http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/pakistan-may-have-jeopardized-the-latest-afghan-peace-talks/ JJH)

Strategically, the Afghan Taliban is under no pressure to join any peace process. Since the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan a year ago, the Taliban have had many victories on the military front : insurgent activities increased considerably in the last year, with at least 10,000 security and terrorist incidents recorded in 2015 alone. This latest refusal by the Taliban to join any dialogue has weakened Pakistan’s position. From here on, Pakistan’s credibility will further decline as it has not yet been able to deliver on the issue, despite making promises to do so at various forums. Aziz’s statement has led to more discontent in Kabul over the progress in the talks and particularly in Pakistan’s role in bringing the Taliban to the table. Many claim that Pakistan has not been exerting real pressure on the Taliban , except advising them to join the peace talks. Ahmad Rashid, a journalist and an expert on Afghanistan, recently said that “ if the Afghan civil war worsens, Pakistan’s allies , China and the United States, will lose faith in Islamabad’s intentions.” The Taliban have even promised to launch more attacks because of the growing number of foreign troops in the country. In the coming days and weeks, the security situation of Afghanistan is likely to deteriorate further, which will only put more pressure on Pakistan. Make no mistake: the stability of the region depends on the outcome of this peace process and Pakistan needs to take a clear position on it.

Pakistan has no controlFelbab-Brown and William 1/27/2016 (Vanda, senior fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, and Jennifer, Deputy Foreign Editor of Vox and former senior researcher at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, “"They are riding a tiger that they cannot control": Pakistan and the future of Afghanistan” Brookings Interview Accessed 7/1/2016 http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2016/01/27-pakistan-afghanistan-future-felbabbrown-williams JJH)

The relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan is hardly smooth and perfect . Many members of the Afghan Taliban deeply resent the level of Pakistani interference, even as the group has been supported by Pakistan. There is a lot of Afghan Pashtun nationalism also among the Taliban that deeply resents the influence and attempts at control by the Pakistani state. Part of the key issue in the relationship is that although Pakistan supports the Afghan Taliban, and although it has historically supported other extremist groups, it does not have perfect control . And arguably, its control is diminishing . And so they posture, they do their double game. They want to appear strong, and so they posture that they have much greater control than they have, but at the same time they deny that they have any nefarious role. In reality, they are playing both sides against the middle, and they often have much less capacity to control and rein in the extremist groups, including the Afghan Taliban, than many assume. The widespread criticism of Pakistan is one of its duplicity and its nefarious activity and its lack of willingness to act against the Afghan Taliban. Those are true , but they are also coupled with limits to their capacity . They are riding a tiger that they cannot control fully.

Pakistan can’t be trusted to solveCurtis, 1/5/2016 (Lisa, Senior Fellow @ CATO, “Afghanistan After America's War” The National Interest Accessed 7/7/16 http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2016/1/afghanistan-after-americas-war JJH)

The Heart of Asia ministerial meeting, held in Islamabad earlier this month, was designed to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan. The display of diplomatic bonhomie between Pakistani and Afghan leaders raised hopes that Pakistan will facilitate a resumption of Afghan-Taliban peace talks. Dialogue between the insurgents and Afghan authorities—launched in Murree, Pakistan last July—broke down a few weeks later, following revelations that Taliban leader Mullah Omar had died two years prior. But Pakistan’s diplomatic outreach and pledges to get the peace talks going again are incongruous with what is happening on the ground in Afghanistan. The Taliban have intensified their attacks in recent months, and according to a recently released report by the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War, the insurgents are making unprecedented territorial gains throughout the country and even threatening key provincial capitals. It is difficult to discern Pakistani intentions, and Afghan skepticism of its often-duplicitous neighbor is running high. The sudden resignation of the Afghan intelligence chief Rehmatullah Nabil during the Heart of Asia conference is indicative of the distrust most Afghans hold toward Pakistan.

Ext. Say NoEven with the threat of Pakistani terrorism, China will not cooperate with the USPant 12 – Harsh Pant, Professor of International Relations in Defense Studies Department and the India Institute at King’s College London, 2012 (“The Pakistan Thorn in China—India—U.S. Relations,” The Washington Quarterly, January 1, Available online at http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?sid=d7211962-62ee-4658-bb96-330e848b1f43%40sessionmgr105&vid=0&hid=118&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWlwLHVpZCZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmUmc2NvcGU9c2l0ZQ%3d%3d#AN=69732709&db=aph, Accessed 7-1-2012, SAA)

With India’s ascent in the global hierarchy and U.S. attempts to carve out a strong partnership with India, China’s need for Pakistan is only likely to grow. As tensions rose between India and Pakistan after the November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, Pakistan’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee went to China to seek that country’s support, which was readily given. The visit resulted in the signing of a new agreement on military cooperation between the two nations, with Beijing agreeing to expedite the delivery of F-22 frigates to Pakistan’s Navy. Beijing has justified its arms sales to Pakistan on the grounds that India was buying similar weapon systems from the United States (it also is buying military hardware from the Russians). China has consistently defended Pakistan’s desire for high capacity weapons systems as normal for an independent nation seeking to bolster its security.27 In the years preceding the attacks in Mumbai, China blocked UN sanctions against the dreaded Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), the organizations that planned and executed the attacks, despite a broad global consensus favoring such a move.28 Only when tensions surfaced between Beijing and Islamabad on the issue of Chinese Uighur separatists receiving sanctuaries and training on Pakistani territory did China agree to a ban on JuD. More recently, China has refused to reconsider its objection in the United Nations to proscribing the Jaish-e-Mohammed’s Maulana Masood Azhar and some prominent LeT operatives based in Pakistan, despite New Delhi’s presenting detailed information on them to Beijing.29 With the exception of China, other major global powers such as Britain, France, Germany, and Russia supported the U.S.—India nuclear deal as they were eager to sell nuclear fuel, reactors, and equipment to India. China, on its part, made its displeasure clear by asking India to sign the NPT and dismantle its nuclear weapons. The official Xinhua news agency of China commented that the U.S.—India nuclear agreement ‘‘will set a bad example for other countries.’’30 Since the U.S.—India deal is in many ways a recognition of India’s rising global profile, China was not very happy with the outcome and indicated that it would be willing to sell nuclear reactors to Pakistan.31 It was a not so subtle message to the United States that if Washington decides to play favorites, China retains the same right. Not surprisingly, China’s plans to supply two nuclear reactors to Pakistan in defiance of international rules have gathered momentum. Chinese authorities have confirmed that the China National Nuclear Cooperation has signed an agreement with Pakistan for two new nuclear reactors at the Chashma site Chashma III and Chashma IV in addition to the two that it is already working on in Pakistan. This will be in clear violation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines that forbid nuclear transfers to countries that are not signatories to the NPT or do not adhere to comprehensive international safeguards on their nuclear program. China has suggested that ‘‘there are compelling political reasons concerning the stability of South Asia to justify the exports,’’ echoing Pakistan’s oft-repeated compliant that the U.S.—India nuclear pact has upset stability in the region.32 The decision to supply reactors to Pakistan which has a record of dealing with North Korea, Iran, and Libya reflects China’s growing diplomatic confidence and underscores its view of Pakistan as a prized South Asian strategic power. Recent suggestions emanating from Beijing that China is likely to set up military bases overseas to counter U.S. influence and exert pressure on India have been interpreted in certain sections in New Delhi as a veiled reference to China’s

interest in having a permanent military presence in Pakistan . Even though it might not be politically possible for the Pakistani government to follow through on such threats and openly allow China to set up a military base, New Delhi fears that Islamabad might allow Beijing use of Pakistani military facilities without any public announcement.33 Indian concerns have also risen that China and Pakistan are coordinating their efforts in regard to border issues with India. The presence of the Chinese military in the Gilgit—Baltistan area of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, purportedly to repair and upgrade the Karakoram Highway, has enormous implications for Indian security.34 Overall, it has been rightly observed that China’s policy toward Pakistan is ‘‘an object lesson in how to attain long-term national goals by calm calculation, forbearance, and diplomatic skill.’’35 Nevertheless, there are indeed limits to China—Pakistan ties. The relationship remains fundamentally asymmetrical: Pakistan wants more out of its ties with China than China is willing to offer. Today, while Pakistan’s domestic problems are gargantuan, China will be very cautious in involving itself even more. In September 2011, China Kingho Group, one of China’s largest private coal mining companies, pulled out of what was to be Pakistan’s largest foreign-investment pact, citing concerns for the Is security of its personnel.36 Moreover, the closer China gets to Pakistan, the faster India would move into the U.S. orbit. Amid worries about the potential destabilizing influence of Pakistani militants on China’s Muslim minority in Xinjiang, Beijing has also taken a harder line against Pakistan. The flow of arms and terrorists from across the border in Pakistan remains a major headache for Chinese authorities, and Islamabad’s inability and/or failure to curb extremism makes it difficult for the Chinese to trust Pakistan completely. If Pakistan wants to keep receiving support from China, then it needs to demonstrate progress on this issue. As tensions rose between China and Pakistan in the aftermath of violence in the border town of Kashgar in Xinjiang in August 2011, President Zardari went to talk directly with local leaders and businessmen in Xinjiang, recognizing that if he was not able to mend fences with local leadership, Sino-Pakistani ties might be in real jeopardy. China, at least publicly, has continued to emphasize that its relationship with Pakistan is far more important than isolated incidents of violence. To be clear, Chinese involvement in Pakistan is unlikely to match the U.S. profile in the country in the short to medium term, and it is not readily evident if China even wants to match the United States. But flirtation with Pakistan gives China crucial space for diplomatic maneuvering vis-a`-vis India and the United States, and it will continue to utilize the relationship in pursuit of its larger strategic objectives. Pakistan is not going to be a common interest that binds China with either India or the United States any time soon .

Addon

2nc China Terror AddonChina has increased and reorganized counterterror efforts creating more effective counterterror efforts that can stop future attacks.Mattis 16—Peter Mattis is a Fellow in the Jamestown Foundation’s China Program and edited China Brief from 2011 to 2013. (“New Law Reshapes Chinese Counterterrorism Policy and Operations”, January 25, 2016, Accessed 7/15/16, Available Online at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45016&cHash=be8667ec32b79d60f8ffc4d04235f3ae#.V4ksT2grK00, JRR)

The new Counterterrorism Law outlines a broad set of authorities and practices for the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the Ministry of Public

Security (MPS), and other parts of the political-legal apparatus. Cooperation: Information technology and telecommunications firms are required to cooperate as requested by the appropriate authorities. This cooperation includes the possibility of providing encryption keys and data otherwise kept private within a company’s records. Expanded Police Authority: The police can restrain the activities of terrorist suspects, including preventing them from leaving a locality, meeting with others, and taking public transport. Use of Force: The police are allowed to use weapons against armed terrorists in the middle of an attack without prior authorization. This

strange provision seems to suggest either more police officers will be armed or that confusion about what police could do in the

middle of an attack had stalled the responses to attacks, like the attacks at the Kunming train station in March 2014. Overseas Operations: The People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police are authorized to execute counterterrorism operations overseas with the approval of the Central Military Commission. The Ministry of Public Security is similarly authorized with the approval of the host country and the State Council (Xinhua, December 27, 2015). As with the Counterespionage Law passed in late 2014, the new Counterterrorism Law contains provisions that provide a legal foundation for activities that are probably already occurring (China Brief, March 6, 2015). State media also pointed out that some of the practices formalized in the new law were drawn from studies of U.S. and European security legislation. Although this obvious propaganda point is intended to undermine Western criticism of some of the law’s features, many of the authorities are not unlike how Western security services operate (Xinhua, December 27, 2015; Legal Network, December 29, 2015). The primary difference is the latter receive judicial and legal oversight for their operations and often do not possess the authority to proceed without that oversight. The explicit discussion of Chinese armed forces and the security services operating abroad highlights Beijing’s growing willingness to use force outside China and engage in joint operations to protect Chinese overseas interests, even if such operations are not necessarily related to terrorism. An incident on October 5, 2011, in which 13 Chinese riverboat sailors were killed by drug smugglers, galvanized the government to take action (China Brief, November 11, 2011). After a flurry of negotiations, the MPS began coordinated river patrols on the Mekong River and deployed officers to Laos to provide operational support in the hunt for the drug lord, Naw Kham, responsible for the murders (Xinhua, September 19, 2012). The MPS has conducted joint operations in Angola to capture a Chinese criminal gang, and Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign led to MPS officers being deployed overseas to track fugitives and liaise with local authorities, as well as use Interpol channels to put pressure on those fugitives (Xinhua, August 25, 2012; SCMP, April 23, 2015; Xinhua, October 29, 2015). The PLA’s different service elements also appear to be seeking roles, as demonstrated by PLA Navy marines’ participation in a recent training exercise in Xinjiang (Xinhua, January 8). The need to protect Chinese citizens from kidnappings or worse (as Chinese deaths in the Boston Marathon bombings, the Islamic State execution, and the bombing in Bangkok amply demonstrate) and the inability of the Chinese government to do so probably generated momentum for the international aspects of the Counterterrorism Law (Bangkok Post, August 19, 2015; China Brief, February 3, 2012;

China Brief, May 11, 2012). Establishing a New Counterterrorism Structure The most important provisions relate to a new policy and operations system focused on creating and implementing counterterrorism policy . The system will bring together counterterrorism elements of the MSS, MPS, and possibly the People’s Armed Police under a quasi-autonomous structure, distinct from other policymaking bodies like the Political-Legal Commission. The law contains two provisions that outline the structure of the policy

system: National institution for counterterrorism work (国家反恐怖主义工作领导机构): This leading institution at the national

level will be present at every level of government at least down to the municipality. The organizations in this structure will be responsible for conducting counterterrorism operations; State Counterterrorism Intelligence Center (国家反恐怖主义情报中心): The State Counterterrorism Intelligence Center (SCIC) would serve as an interdepartmental and inter-regional clearinghouse for “counterterrorism intelligence information work” (反恐怖主义情报信息工作) and coordinating related resources. The MPS and MSS, as well as their provincial departments and sub-provincial bureaus, therefore, would submit counterterrorism information to the SCIC. The work of the SCIC also will be buttressed by sub-national counterterrorism intelligence centers; however, the law is ambiguous about what level of government is required to set up a local center. The SCIC also will provide analytic reports and warning of terrorist activities to local security forces (Xinhua, December 27, 2015). The law mentions each of the major political-legal institutions contributing to the new counterterrorism institutions—namely, the MSS, MPS, People’s Procuratorate, and the court system. The “relevant departments” (有关部门) could include the principal military intelligence departments within the PLA General Staff Department (or possibly the newly-established Strategic Support Force), the People’s Armed Police, and the United Front Work Department (UFWD). The relevance of the first two are obvious, but their role depends on whether the Central Military Commission authorizes their participation. The latter has responsibility for

manufacturing consent among the ethnic minority groups for Beijing’s rule, and some evidence suggests the United Front system has become more involved in managing unrest in Xinjiang (China Brief, July 26, 2013). The UFWD potentially adds capabilities, including intelligence,

indoctrination, and the authority to integrate outsiders, albeit in a controlled form, into the party’s political processes. According to the law’s text, the counterterrorism intelligence system will draw upon the full capabilities of the Chinese intelligence and security apparatus. The law authorizes MPS and MSS elements to recruit sources as well as develop a broad network of contacts (“rely on the masses” and “establish a grassroots work force”) to provide tip-offs. Technical reconnaissance means, such as computer network operations, can also be employed, provided the information collected is used solely for counterterrorism operations. The law’s text is explicit on this point, probably to assuage concerns that Western companies providing their encryptions keys would be vulnerable to economic espionage (Xinhua, December 27, 2015). Additionally, the MPS is singled out for its capability to collect information on and track an individual through their identification documents and biometrics, as well as real name registration for many telecommunications and Internet services. The law authorizes the MPS to gather this data, and employ it to restrict the movements of terrorist suspects. These capabilities have been under development for some time, and the wording of the law (and the specific omission of the MSS) suggests that, without the counterterrorism law, the MSS could not draw upon these resources for state security work (China Brief, June 3, 2011). Integrating these collection capabilities under the SCIC might make the counterterrorism policy system the closest to an all-source intelligence system in China, second only to the military intelligence system. The organizational details described in the Counterterrorism Law offer only a glimpse of what probably will be built up in the coming months, but this is not Beijing’s first effort at integrating policy and operations against a particular challenge. The closest parallel to the new counterterrorism system is the structure of the 610 Office under the Leading Small Group for the Defense and Management of Evil Cult Issues (中央防范和处理邪教问题领导小组), established to target the Falun Gong quasi-spiritual movement. Beneath the leading small group is an executive office, the 610 Office itself, which staffs the group and formulates policy. Beneath the central 610 Office, every province and down to the county or municipal level has a local 610 Office. The personnel at each level are drawn from their local MPS and MSS bureaus, and they work in the 610 Office independent of their home element. By seconding police and intelligence officers away from their home ministry, the 610 Office sharply reduces bureaucratic friction and competition. Because the MSS adopted the police rank system in the early 1990s, performance evaluations can be standardized and being assigned to the 610 Office does not obviously disrupt one’s career (Xinhua, September 16, 1992; December 23, 1992). The effectiveness of Beijing’s campaign against Falun Gong over the last 17 years suggests the 610 Office structure streamlines domestic security intelligence and operations. Comparing the available information on the counterterrorism system to the 610 Office structure raises a few questions about the new set of organizations and how they will function. First, this system will operate under the State Council, unlike the 610 Office, which operates under the Party’s umbrella. This could signal that the UFWD or related institutions would not be included in counterterrorism. Unless a counterterrorism leading small group is established inside the Party or the State Security Committee (中央国家安全委员会) to serve as the primary authority, the new system almost certainly will be focused narrowly on security operations rather than a comprehensive counterterrorism effort. An integrated approach would be signaled by making united front work as a constituent part of the system or placing senior counterterrorism officials in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress separate from their home ministries. Otherwise, placing a Party organization like the UFWD under or integrating with a State–Council-led effort seems unlikely, if not unthinkable. Second, the status of the counterterrorism personnel assigned to the new counterterrorism system probably will affect how well the system functions. In the 610 Office structure, police and intelligence officers are seconded over, removing them from their home agencies. For the operational elements of the counterterrorism system, mimicking the 610 Office may be the most beneficial option. The personnel work separately in an integrated office, but can later return to their home ministry. The SCIC and any sub-national elements, however, might be better served by a task force structure, more akin to the Olympic security intelligence organizations. The Chinese intelligence officers and information workers assigned would have direct connectivity back to their home offices with the ability to search for useful information and feed it into the SCIC rather than wait for the ministry to provide intelligence reporting as it determines relevance. The Olympics, however, were an exceptional political event, and Beijing may not be prepared to push such integration in a system where rivalries have been the historical norm. [1]

Conclusion The Counterterrorism Law, in large part because of the organizational changes, marks a significant change in Beijing’s intelligence and security operations against what it considers to be terrorist targets. Although counterterrorism probably will not be on par with similarly integrated systems (Taiwan, Falun Gong, and preserving stability) led by Politburo

Standing Committee members, the new authorities and institutional structure likely will be sufficient to integrate policy and operations both at home and abroad. Though the implementation remains to be seen, there is little reason to doubt

NPC Chairman Zhang Dejiang’s assertions that the new law, by establishing the basic principles of counterterrorism operations, “will improve [China’s] counterterrorism capability and level” (Xinhua, December 27, 2015). The new organizational structure for counterterrorism should smooth out some of the tensions between the MPS and MSS over which ministry has jurisdiction in

terrorism cases. In China, the definitions of public security and state security complicate the handling of terrorism when the individuals involved are Chinese citizens. Ostensibly, the MPS should have primacy, but, if there is an international dimension to why these people pose a threat, then the MSS should have primacy. The difference in political clout, however, is substantial. MPS officials frequently outrank their MSS counterparts at every level of the Political-Legal Committee structure, and the former has

started to encroach on the MSS’s national security prerogative (China Brief, April 12, 2013). In addition to streamlining operations, the counterterrorism system should improve the flow of information across the relevant ministries. The creation of a national-level intelligence center above the operational counterterrorism offices establishes a clear structure outside of the MPS and MSS for who should be handling what tasks. Instead of feeding a competing ministry, the agencies will be supporting a national policy system in which clearer directions and established overarching objectives ensure a basic level of cooperative effort as can be seen in operations against Taiwan (China Brief, December 5, 2014).

China can stop future terror attacks- controlling the boarder and XinjiangBusiness Standard 16 (“China claims sharp drop in terror attacks in Xinjiang”, March 9, 2016, Accessed 7/15/16, Available Online at http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/china-claims-sharp-drop-in-terror-attacks-in-xinjiang-116030900748_1.html, JRR)

China today claimed there had been a sharp drop in terrorist attacks last year in its volatile Xinjiang province, saying the security situation in the region was now "stable" following the success of a massive crackdown against Islamist Uyghur militants . The frequency of terrorist attacks in the province has dropped significantly, Zhang Chunxian, provincial head of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC), said on the sidelines of the annual session of the national legislature here. "The situation in Xinjiang is becoming ever more stable. Local authorities have strengthened their ability to prevent and fight terrorist activity ," he said. But at the same time Xinjiang which remained restive for several years due to Uyghur Muslim protests over Han settlements from other provinces, still faces a severe and complicated counter- terrorism situation that requires a continuous campaign against terrorists , Zhang said. Religious extremism has dramatically dropped in Xinjiang , while the current counter-terrorism campaign has been attracting extensive support among people of various ethnic groups in the autonomous region, Zhang was quoted as saying by official media here. China has blamed the al-Qaeda-backed East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) whose origins and its leadership were little known. Xinjiang and rest of China witnessed some of the deadliest attacks in the last two years in which dozens were killed and scores injured. Also several Uyghurs were reported to have entered Syria to join the dreaded Islamic State terror group. China also successfully stopped the migration of Uyghurs through southeast Asian countries. The last major attack was reported in September, 2015 when a local coal mine was attacked killing 11 people. "The number of terror cases dropped due to efforts to crack down on terrorist activities and to destroy the hotbed of terrorism," Li Wei, an anti-terrorism expert at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, told state-run Global Times adding that rising international terrorism contributed greatly to militancy in China. "Religious extremism created hatred among different ethnic groups under the guise of religion," Abudulrekep Tumniyaz, deputy director of the Xinjiang Islamic Association, said noting that Islam, as a religion of "peace, unity, tolerance and caring," as opposed to extremism. The counter-terrorist campaign has helped protect the rights and interests of the public, Nayim Yasen, director of the Standing Committee of the Xinjiang People's Congress, told the media at the conference. In counter-terrorism, human rights as well as freedom of religion and ethnic customs should be respected, he said.

Ext. China Stops TerrorChina’s new anti-terror legislation is effective in stopping terrorists in China and mitigating the effects of major attacksZhou 16—Dr. Zunyou Zhou is head of the China section at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law (“China’s Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Law”, January 23, 2016, Accessed 7/15/16, Available online at http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/chinas-comprehensive-counter-terrorism-law/, JRR)

A Comprehensive Law According to the legislature, the drafting of this law was guided by President Xi Jinping’s “overall national security outlook.” Judging by the multi-faceted and far-reaching measures it has adopted, the law may be called “comprehensive” in the true sense of the word. The law consists of 97 articles in 10 chapters. While the first and last chapters involve general and supplementary provisions, the other chapters deal with major issues on counter-terrorism such as terrorism designation (chapter 2), prevention (chapter 3), intelligence gathering (chapter 4), investigation (chapter 5), emergency response (chapter 6), international cooperation (chapter 7), safeguards (chapter 8), and legal liabilities (chapter 9). This article will highlight four specific aspects of the law: (1) China’s definition of terrorism; (2) obligating technology companies to provide technical support for counter-terrorism purposes; (3) placing restrictions on the reporting of terrorist attacks and government responses; and (4) implementing a “people’s war on terrorism.” Definition of Terrorism In the final law, the revised definition of terrorism reads as follows: “Any advocacy or activity that, by means of violence, sabotage, or threat, aims to create social panic, undermine public safety, infringe on personal and property rights, or coerce a state organ or an international organization, in order to achieve political, ideological, or other objectives.” The legislature’s removal of the term “thought” from the initial definition of terrorism (namely, “any thought, speech or activity that …”) is a welcome step, but the term “advocacy” (主张) in the current definition is vague enough to be interpreted either as “thought” or as “speech.” The legislature may have intended to punish the dissemination of terrorist thoughts or speech by including “advocacy”, but it appears to fail to understand that such an act of terrorist propaganda is part and parcel of terrorist “activity.” Although there is no globally recognized definition of terrorism, the international community has reached a high degree of consensus. Compared with definitions proposed by the UN in its Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and used by the EU in its Framework Decision of June 2, 2002 on Combating Terrorism, the current Chinese definition , albeit open to wide interpretation, has been brought quite close to international consensus. “Backdoor Provisions” Until today, most of the debate on the law has been focused on the so-called “backdoor provisions.” These portions of the draft law would have required telecommunications operators and Internet service providers to provide the Chinese government with “backdoor” access to their products , to handover encryption codes for review, and to store local user data on servers within China. In an interview with Reuters in March 2015, U.S. President Barack Obama sharply criticized the law, saying that such provisions would subject U.S. technology companies to Chinese snooping and that he had raised his concerns with President Xi Jinping. To the relief of many, the final law abandons the above-mentioned demands for encryption review and data localization but retains the original text on the requirement for providing the government with technical support, including backdoor access and decryption, for the prevention and investigation of terrorist activities. In defending the “backdoor provisions,” Chinese officials usually claim that such rules are in line with internationally recognized practices, partly because other countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, have been demanding the very same from technology companies. It is true that officials in both countries often use the rhetoric of counter-terrorism to call for legal norms that enable law enforcement access to encrypted data. In this sense, the Chinese accusation of the Western double standards on terrorism hits the

mark. However, since such attempts have not been successful, it is not correct to say that the Chinese rules in this regard conform to international standards. Reporting Restrictions China’s new law also places restrictions on the reporting of terrorist attacks and government responses. Pursuant to the new law, no one is allowed to disseminate details of terrorist incidents that may lead to copycat acts , nor may they spread cruel or inhuman images. Moreover, no one is allowed to publish identifying information on response personnel or hostages, nor on anti-terror responses, with the exception that the news media may do so with the permission of the counter-terrorism agencies exclusively responsible for releasing such information. While China is known for maintaining a powerful censorship apparatus to curtail the flow of information on many sensitive topics, its censorship of terrorism-related information is even more severe . The lawmakers may have wished to avoid political repercussions from terrorist attacks by censoring terrorism-related information, but such a policy has the potential to backfire in the long term. This is because public ignorance of the true state of terrorism affects people’s ability to cooperate with the government in its counter-terrorism efforts. Further, freedom of the press is not only a fundamental human right but also a major foundation of democracy. People’s War The “people’s war” strategy that highlights the participation of civilians has been recognized as a top principle of the counter-terrorism law (Article 5). Specifically, the law says that the authorities should establish joint coordination mechanisms to mobilize grassroots organizations (Article 8), set up formal forces or volunteer groups in the communities (Article 74), and encourage civilians to work as informants to promote intelligence gathering (Article 44). Meanwhile, the law stipulates that all organizations and individuals have the duty to assist and cooperate with the authorities (Article 9), and promises that honors and rewards should be given to those who have provided outstanding support in the prevention of terrorist activities (Article 10) and those who have been injured or killed for performing their anti-terror civil duties (Article 75). In fact, China has long implemented a “people’s war” strategy in its fight against terrorism. On August 1, 2014 alone, more than 30,000 local residents in Hotan Prefecture, Xinjiang were mobilized to join hands with the police in a successful manhunt for 10 suspected terrorists. Beijing has also started recruiting local residents to act as security volunteers. “Chaoyang Masses,” a group of such volunteers in the Chaoyang district of Beijing, was jokingly nicknamed one of the top-tier intelligence agencies in the world, on par with the United States’ CIA, the Soviet-era KGB, Israel’s Mossad, and the British MI6. Terrorists live among the people, terrorist attacks occur before the eyes of the people, and terrorism threatens the lives of the people. So the people have an unparalleled advantage compared with uniformed, specialized security forces.

Terrorism decreasing significantly in China because of effective counterterror effortsReuters 16 (Michael Martina, “'Violent terrorism' in China's Xinjiang has dropped: party official” March 8th, Accessed 7/15/16, Available online at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-xinjiang-idUSKCN0WA1CE, JRR)

Violent terrorism" in China's troubled western region of Xinjiang has fallen markedly over the last year , its Communist Party boss said on Tuesday, in the government's latest effort to show progress in its battle for stability there. Hundreds of people have been killed over the past few years in resource-rich Xinjiang, strategically located on the borders of central Asia, in violence between the Muslim Uighur people, who call the region home, and ethnic majority Han Chinese. Officials have blamed the unrest on Islamist militants, though rights groups and exiles say anger at Chinese controls on the religion and culture of the Uighurs is more to blame for the unrest. China denies any repression in Xinjiang. Religious management and ethnic unity had undergone "heartening changes" and the people and officials were in "good spirits ", Xinjiang party secretary Zhang Chunxian said at a briefing on the sidelines of China's annual parliament

meeting. "Violent terrorist incidents have dropped significantly," Zhang said, adding that the government's preventative abilities had increased. Zhang, however, said conditions for combating terrorism and maintaining stability in the region remained complex. "Wherever the terrorist mentality and extremist behavior exists, we will maintain (our policy) of striking hard," he said. China said in November that security forces had killed 28 members of a group that carried out a deadly attack at a coal mine in Xinjiang in September, though it is unclear why the government had not disclosed the attack earlier. Some previous attacks have also not been reported until days or even weeks after they happened, and rights groups say China has never presented convincing evidence of the existence of a cohesive militant group fighting the government. Senior Chinese officials have increasingly described the security challenges in Xinjiang as an important front in the global fight against terrorism. Zhang has previously said some people from the region have gone to fight with Islamic State.

Counterplans

US Pressure CP

1nc US Pressure CPThe United States federal government should

condition all military assistance to Pakistan on Pakistan taking meaningful steps to shutdown the Haqqani network and Taliban operations in Pakistan.

increase intelligence, logistics and air support to Afghanistan ease the rules of engagement for targeting the Taliban and ISIS.

Only sustained US pressure can solveKhalilzad and Dobbins, 1/11/2016 (Zalmay, former American ambassador to Afghanistan and U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, is a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies., and James veteran diplomat who most recently served as the State Department's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, is a senior fellow at RAND, “Pakistan Holds the Key to Peace in Afghanistan” The RAND Blog Access 7/1/16 http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/01/pakistan-holds-the-key-to-peace-in-afghanistan.html JJH)

Without Pakistani initiative, talks with the Taliban are unlikely to succeed . Perhaps with Pakistani consent and support the Taliban will continue to push their advantage on the ground. Alternatively, given ground realities, the Taliban might demand that the United States and Afghanistan cede provinces in the east and the south to them. Territorial demands in particular would prove unacceptable to Washington and Kabul, as they would create a new terrorist sanctuary and serve as a launching pad for insurgents to divide Afghanistan and seize Kabul. Continued U.S. pressure is needed to induce Pakistani cooperation in reducing the violence. Congress withheld nearly a third of the military assistance allocated to Pakistan for 2015 due to Islamabad's failure to take meaningful action against the Haqqani network . An even larger proportion of the assistance should be conditioned in the coming year on Islamabad closing down the Haqqani network and Taliban military in the country . Another step that would steer Pakistan in a more cooperative direction is for the United States to move urgently in addressing the gaps in Afghan capabilities identified during the last fighting season in areas such as intelligence, logistics and air support . Washington should not rule out deploying some additional forces and easing rules of engagement for targeting the Taliban and ISIS targets. At this juncture, sustained and intensified pressure on Pakistan offers the only viable path to advancing the reconciliation process in a way that does not turn Afghanistan into a launching pad for terrorism and extremism.

Pressure SolvesPressuring Pakistan is the only way to solve for Pakistani terrorism IANS 16 (Indo-Asian News Service, Arun Kumar, “Pressure Pakistan to end support for terrorist groups: US expert”, January 12, 2016, Accessed 7/11/16, Available Online at http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/pressure-pakistan-to-end-support-for-terrorist-groups-us-expert-116011200172_1.html, JRR)

As the US again voiced its expectation that Pakistan would thoroughly probe the terrorist attack on an Indian Air Force base, an expert asked Washington to unequivocally pressure Pakistan to end support for terrorist groups. The US was committed to peace between India and Pakistan and wanted them to continue talks to resolve issues between them bilaterally despite the attack on the Pathankot base, US State Department Spokesperson John Kirby told reporters Monday. "We're committed to that end (peace), to that goal, and we have been for a long time," he said. "These are tough issues, and these are some very complicated relationships." Secretary of State John Kerry had called Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Saturday, Kirby said. " They talked a lot about this issue of the pressing need to stay focused on terrorism not just in Pakistan but in the region." Kerry, he said, also "stressed that it's obviously United States' interest that India and Pakistan continue to look for ways to work better work better together on terrorism concerns but to reduce the tensions between the two countries." Asked if Kerry had told Sharif that scheduled foreign secretary level talks between India and Pakistan should continue despite the attack, Kirby said they had talked about it. "He certainly, as I said, encouraged India and Pakistan to work bilaterally to continue discussions and to try to work through these problems." "Yes, this was a topic of discussion," he said. "It's one we're having at multiple levels here, as you might imagine, at the State Department diplomatically, not just at the Secretary's level." Asked if Kerry had any feedback about the state of investigation by Pakistan, Kerry repeated that the US was "encouraged by the fact that the Pakistani Government condemned the attack and said that they would investigate." "Our expectation is that investigation will be thorough and complete and as transparent as possible," he said. "But in terms of its progress and where they are, you'd have to talk to Pakistani authorities on it. Meanwhile, Alyssa Ayres, a senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations said in a commentary the US does not play a role in India-Pakistan bilateral talks. "But Washington can certainly take steps to help prevent spoilers from once again disrupting a dialogue process that deserves every chance to succeed," she wrote. "The single most useful thing the United States can do is to unequivocally pressure Pakistan to end support for terrorist groups - not just some, but all - that destabilize India and the region ," Ayres wrote.

Aid Conditionality SolvencyUS coercing Pakistan by withdrawing military aid and enforcing sanctions will force them to fight against the Haqqani network- aid is actually counterproductive Markey 16—Daniel Markey is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of No Exit from Pakistan: America's Tortured Relationship with Islamabad, 2016 (“Stop Writing Pakistan Blank Checks”, February 18, 2016, Accessed 7/11/16, Available online at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/18/pakistan-corker-military-aid-blank-checks-corruption-terrorism/, JRR)

Mending U.S. assistance to Pakistan requires a more sophisticated and comprehensive approach for precisely the reasons that Corker notes: The countries continue to share both overlapping and diverging interests with this nuclear-armed nation of nearly 200 million people. Washington should keep the following points in mind as it reconsiders assistance to Pakistan. First, Washington should be careful not to overestimate the leverage generated by U.S. assistance. It has learned this lesson through its long experience in Pakistan. Despite tens of billions of dollars in aid since 9/11, Islamabad still does not see the world through the United States’ preferred strategic prism — whether in Afghanistan, India, or on the issue of nuclear proliferation. Then again, history also shows that U.S. sanctions on Pakistan throughout the 1990s failed to curtail Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, the political dominance of its military, or the state’s support to terrorist groups like the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba that have engulfed the region in violence. Aid is no panacea. Neither are sanctions. Second, U.S. assistance is never delivered in a vacuum; its political effects must be assessed in a broader context. For instance, U.S. lawmakers should not be surprised that billions of dollars in development assistance over the past decade failed to win Pakistani “hearts and minds,” when the arrival of that money coincided with a massive surge in violence at least partly caused by the U.S. war in neighboring Afghanistan. Similarly, Sen. Corker’s threat to hold up FMF until Pakistan turns against the Haqqani network is only the latest wrinkle in the long, complicated saga of the U.S. war in Afghanistan and its associated dealings with Pakistan. Unfortunately, that saga is full of mixed messages being sent from Washington to Islamabad. Right now, U .S. officials are not simply using assistance as coercive leverage to force Pakistan to fight the Haqqanis ; they are also asking for Pakistan’s help to facilitate a “reconciliation dialogue” with all factions of the Afghan insurgency (including the Haqqanis). These mixed messages come at a time of deep Pakistani doubts about the future of America’s commitment to Afghanistan’s struggling government and security forces. Under such circumstances, Pakistan’s decisions about how to manage relations with the Haqqanis will surely be influenced by many factors beyond U.S. aid. Third, Pakistan is a high-stakes game for the United States. Washington should steer clear of risky policy moves — including threats to curtail assistance and reimbursements — unless they hold the realistic promise of significant gains. Washington must appreciate that fixing today’s patently broken aid strategy is a tricky business, and that some “solutions” could make the problem even worse. This is not an unqualified argument against cutting Pakistan’s aid, but only for thinking carefully and acting with purpose. Many academics and pundits have correctly pointed out failings in U.S. assistance to Pakistan. Most damningly, they argue that U.S. aid is often worse than ineffective; it is positively counterproductive. These critics have a point: Too often, American money has propped up some of the most repressive, anti-reformist leaders and institutions in Pakistani society, including the military and feudal civilian elites.Too often, American money has propped up some of the most repressive, anti-reformist leaders and institutions in Pakistani society, including the military and feudal civilian elites. So it is not altogether farfetched to argue that comprehensive, well-timed sanctions (including cutting indirect aid through multilateral lending institutions) could coerce Pakistan’s military and civilian establishment into enacting policies that would

better serve U.S. interests. Indeed, the United States has successfully coerced Pakistan in the past — temporarily, at least. The George W. Bush administration’s post-9/11 “with us or against us” threat to then-President Pervez Musharraf forced Pakistan into an early, if fleeting and inadequate, alliance against al-Qaeda, one that netted several high-profile terrorists living in Pakistan like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

Aid Conditionality is key.Curtis, 12/15/2015 (Lisa, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, “Why Congress Must Question US Counterterrorism Policies in Pakistan” The Daily Signal Access 7/7/16 http://dailysignal.com/2015/12/15/why-congress-must-question-u-s-counterterrorism-policies-in-pakistan/ JJH)

The Pakistan military should be lauded for its operations against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which a year ago attacked a military school in Peshawar, killing over 130 children. But the Pakistani crackdown has not included other terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Haqqani network (both U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations). Indeed, in April of this year, Pakistan released from jail the LeT mastermind behind the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which killed 160, including six U.S. citizens. The U.S. must reduce its military aid to Pakistan until it demonstrates willingness to crack down on terrorist groups like the LeT and Haqqani network . The U.S. is beginning to move in this direction and is set to withhold $300 million in Coalition Support Funding (CSF) for Pakistan this year because of its failure to crack down on the Haqqani Network. This is a step in the right direction. Washington must continue this momentum by employing a combination of incentives and disincentives to convince Pakistan to take a comprehensive approach to fighting terrorism and to finally end its policy of selectively targeting only those groups that attack the Pakistani state. Not only will this improve regional stability, but it would diminish the chances of another San Bernardino type of attack in the U.S. homeland. For far too long, Pakistan’s dual policies toward terrorism have been putting the rest of the world at risk.

US not pressuring now, but if they cut off aid that would shape Pakistani terror policy- anything else fails because Pakistan is not willing to cooperatePande 15—Aparna Pande is a Research Fellow at Hudson Institute, 2015 (“U.S. Should Stop Reinforcing Pakistan’s Delusions”, September 1, 2015, Accessed 7/11/16, Available online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aparna-pande/us-should-stop-reinforcin_b_8072748.html, JRR)

Susan Rice, the U.S. national security advisor, apparently traveled to Pakistan on Sunday August 30 to tell Pakistani officials that operations of militant jihadi groups like the Haqqani network from Pakistani soil were “absolutely unacceptable” to Americans. She is not the first official to convey that message to Pakistan. American and Pakistani officials have discussed the elimination of terrorist safe havens in Pakistan for at least the last two decades. Why, then, has the United States failed to secure Pakistan’s acquiescence to its demands? Ms. Rice’s demand that Pakistan “do more” to curb terrorism from its soil will most likely have no more effect on Pakistan’s all powerful military than earlier similar entreaties. The United States has been reluctant to exert leverage and pressure on Pakistan that might actually work, like international isolation, targeted sanctions or cutting off aid. The periodic suspension and conditionality of aid that the U.S. resorts to are too familiar to Pakistanis to make a difference. In the end, it is all about how Pakistan’s power centers view their national interest and the extent they fear (or, actually, do not fear) the Americans. The Pakistani military views the Haqqani network and allied groups as assets to help achieve its desire for a pro-Pakistan regime in Afghanistan. U.S. officials, in their desire

to obtain Pakistan’s support for American global aims, do not understand Pakistan’s regional aspirations. Pakistan promises support to U.S. global aims, secures Washington’s support and then goes on with pursuing its regional aims without regard for American concerns about its methods in the region. The Pakistani assumption is that America protests but does not really care about its nuclear proliferation or support for terrorism as long as Pakistan’s target is India or Afghanistan. The Taliban, the Haqqani network and the assorted anti-India jihadi groups nurtured by Islamabad did not attract American attention until 9/11. Since 2001, Pakistan has balanced its support for regional Jihadis with some cooperation with the U.S. in going after Al-Qaeda. Instead of seeing through and confronting Pakistan, Americans are all too willing to encourage Pakistan in persisting with its policies by praising the one step forward (in fighting some terrorist groups) without focusing on the many steps back. Pakistan’s regional preoccupation has been seeking military parity with its much larger neighbor, India. It doesn’t matter that each one of the Pakistan’s four wars with India were initiated by Pakistan. An existential threat from India is at the heart of Pakistani nationalism, the defining characteristic of a nation only 67 years old that lacks both history and an established national identity. Pakistan has wooed the United States since its independence because Pakistani strategists and policy makers believed the U.S. was the ideal superpower ally who would build Pakistan’s economic and material resources in order to help it stand up to India. From the 1950s until 1990s, Pakistan for the United States was one of many allies helping fight international communism. American policy makers have consistently ignored, even when internal intelligence and staff memos said otherwise, the harsh reality of Pakistan never sharing American goals. When the Americans turned to Pakistan to fight international communism, Pakistan saw Hinduism as the threat. Now, despite being America’s nominal allies in the fight against international terrorism, Pakistan still sees ‘Hindu India’ as the principal threat. Jihadi groups, such as the Haqqani Network, are Pakistan’s instruments in its own war with India for influence over Afghanistan. While the United States’ focus has been global, Pakistan’s focus has been regional: the desire for parity — primarily military but also economic — with India. Economic and military aid from the US has been one part of the strategy for achieving parity, the other has been using non-state actors or jihadi groups to keep both its neighbors - India and Afghanistan - tied down. Fearful of one neighbor, India, Pakistan’s early leaders hoped that their western neighbor, ‘Muslim’ Afghanistan would accept the Pakistani viewpoint and avoid ties with ‘Hindu’ India. However, Kabul and New Delhi have had close ties right from the 1950s with the exception of the years of Taliban rule. To prevent a strategic encirclement by India and Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment has supported Islamist groups in Afghanistan in the hope of a pro-Pakistan anti-Indian Afghan government. This has led Pakistan to support not just the Afghan Taliban but also the Haqqani network and allied groups. Washington has known -and ignored — Pakistan’s security fears (and paranoia) about India and Afghanistan for decades. American policymakers and leaders have, however, always hoped that by giving more aid and arms to Pakistan they would reassur e Pakistan ’s leaders that there was no threat to their territorial integrity and this would lead Pakistan to change its worldview . Ironically, every American president in his first year (with the exception of Kennedy) tries to reach out to Pakistan and sees it as an American ally and in his last two years realizes the problem of divergent objectives. In his book ‘Magnificent Delusions -Pakistan, the United States and an Epic History of Misunderstanding,’ Husain Haqqani (former Pakistani ambassador to the U.S.) tells the fascinating story of how President Dwight Eisenhower (along with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles) initially saw Pakistan as America’s ‘Most Allied Ally in Asia,’ only to wonder in his second term whether military aid to Pakistan served any useful American purpose. President Lyndon Johnson asked the same question in 1965 and every American President, with the exception of Richard Nixon, has done so since then. Despite the $12 billion in aid that the US provided to Pakistan after 9/11, former President George W. Bush wrote in his memoirs that then Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf “would not or could not fulfill his promises. ” The Obama administration , too, has followed the

familiar pattern of assuming that aid will buy America leverage with Pakistan. The Kerry Lugar Berman Bill, authorized by Congress in 2009, promised $1.5 billion in aid annually for 5 years, in the hope that this would encourage Pakistan to abandon support for Jihadi groups. The aid has flown uninterrupted even though Taliban operating from Pakistan attacked American troops in Afghanistan. US intelligence found the Pakistan-backed Haqqani network responsible for an attack on the American Embassy in Kabul and suspected Pakistani intelligence officers of directing the attack. Ms. Rice’s visit to Pakistan is unlikely to change Pakistani policy any more than the several visits to Islamabad by her predecessor General Jim Jones. Former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, met the Pakistan army chief 26 times in three years, hoping to initiate a change in Pakistani behavior. Towards the end of his tenure, Mullen voiced his frustration that the Haqqani Network operated as ‘a veritable arm’ of Pakistan’s army. Apparently, frequent meetings with Pakistan’s top general was not guarantee that the general would redirect the effort of his ground troops. High-level visits by American officials to Pakistan do not help change Pakistan’s strategic mindset. They only reinforce the belief of Pakistani leaders in the centrality of their country to global order. The belief that Pakistan is indispensable to the United States and is the pivot of the world for other major powers has encouraged Pakistan’s irresponsible behavior. Instead of feeding Pakistan’s psychoses of self-importance and paranoia, the U.S. would do better by jolting its leaders into facing the realities of their domestic failures and the elusiveness of their dream of regional pre-eminence through terrorism.

US withholding aid is key to pressure Pakistan into cracking down on the Haqqani network and reducing state sponsored terrorNYT 5/12/16 (New York Times, “Time to Put the Squeeze on Pakistan”, Accessed 7/11/16, Available Online at /http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/12/opinion/time-to-put-the-squeeze-on-pakistan.html?_r=0, JRR)

Nearly 15 years after 9/11, the war in Afghanistan is raging and Pakistan deserves much of the blame. It remains a duplicitous and dangerous partner for the United States and Afghanistan, despite $33 billion in American aid and repeated attempts to reset relations on a more constructive course. In coming weeks, Gen. John Nicholson Jr., the new American commander in Afghanistan, will present his assessment of the war. It’s likely to be bleak and may question the wisdom of President Obama’s goal of cutting the American force of 10,000 troops to 5,500 by the end of the year. The truth is, regardless of troop levels, the only hope for long-term peace is negotiations with some factions of the Taliban. The key to that is Pakistan. Pakistan’s powerful army and intelligence services have for years given support to the Taliban and the Haqqani terrorist network and relied on them to protect Pakistani interests in Afghanistan and prevent India from increasing its influence there. Under American pressure, the Pakistan Army recently waged a military campaign against the Taliban in the ungoverned border region. But the Haqqanis still operate in relative safety in Pakistan. Some experts say the army has helped engineer the integration of the Haqqanis into the Taliban leadership. Pakistan’s double game has long frustrated American officials, and it has grown worse. There are now efforts in Washington to exert more pressure on the Pakistan Army. Senator Bob Corker, Republican of Tennessee, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has wisely barred the use of American aid to underwrite Pakistan’s purchase of eight F-16 jet fighters. Pakistan will still be allowed to purchase the planes, but at a cost of $700 million instead of about $380 million. Mr. Corker told The Times he would lift the hold on the aid if Pakistan cracks down on the Haqqani network, which he called the “No. 1 threat” to Afghanistan and American troops there. President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan is also getting tougher with Pakistan’s leaders. He courted Pakistan for more than a year in the hopes that the army would bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. But the surge in violence forced him to effectively end negotiations. Last month, he threatened to lodge a

complaint with the United Nations Security Council if Pakistan refuses to take military action against Taliban leaders on its soil.

Afghan Support SolvesIncreasing support to Afghanistan for fighting the Taliban solves Afghan stability and weakens the TalibanCurtis 15—Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation, 2015 (“U.S. Engagement Required: Afghanistan Must Avoid an Iraq-Style Breakdown”, July 23, 2015, Accessed 7/11/16, Available Online at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/07/us-engagement-required-afghanistan-must-avoid-an-iraq-style-breakdown, JRR)

The U.S. must maintain robust engagement in Afghanistan, including through support for the Afghan security forces and investments in economic projects that involve the private sector and encourage regional economic integration. Ghani’s attempts to foster reconciliation with the Taliban, while welcome, are unlikely to bear fruit in the near term since the Taliban likely calculates that a military solution could still go in its favor. The Taliban is counting on international funding and military support to dry up, weakening the Afghan Army and undermining political stability. If the U.S. continues its commitment to Afghanistan’s security and if the new Afghan government delivers on its promises of reform and economic growth, the Taliban could eventually become demoralized and start to fracture, leading some elements of the insurgency to consider reconciliation with the government . To hasten this outcome, the U.S. should: Maintain current U.S. force levels in the country so long as conditions on the ground merit it . President Obama’s decision to extend U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan by at least six months is welcome, but he should scrap all deadlines for withdrawal. Although U.S. and NATO combat operations have ended, it is necessary that the international coalition continue to backstop the Afghan forces. Maintaining the coalition presence has both psychological and practical purposes. It builds confidence among the Afghan forces, helps keep Taliban ambitions in check, and allows the U.S. a toe-hold in the country, in the event that fighting escalates and American forces need to re-engage in military operations. If the Taliban retakes territory in Afghanistan, core al-Qaeda would be able to revive itself and again find a facilitative environment from which to operate, just as it did before 9/11. This would be an unacceptable situation in terms of U.S. national security. It is arguable that had the U.S. maintained some level of force presence in Iraq beyond 2011, ISIS may have been prevented from taking over parts of the country as it has done over the last year. Continue to provide training, financing, and other military support to the Afghan security forces. The U.S. should continue to extend aviation and intelligence support, battlefield advice, financial resources, and training and capacity-building assistance to the Afghan security forces. Air support is particularly critical in order for the Afghan forces to maintain an edge over the Taliban. The U.S. confirmed during Strategic Dialogue talks in March that it would seek funding to support the Afghan forces at the level of 352,000 troops through at least 2017. The U.S. must follow through on this commitment. Maintain ability to conduct counterterrorism missions, including drone strikes. In addition to helping the Afghan forces keep the Taliban at bay, the U.S. needs to maintain the ability to conduct counterterrorism missions in the country. This includes maintaining bases from which to launch drone strikes in the Afghanistan–Pakistan border areas, which remain a hotbed for al-Qaeda and a host of other extremist groups intent on attacking the U.S. Articulate a long-term Afghan strategy and explain how it supports U.S. national security objectives. The White House has done a poor job of explaining its strategy in Afghanistan to the American public over the past six years. President Obama also erred in announcing a drawdown strategy for U.S. troops in 2009 before the surge troops had even deployed to the country. The White House must shift its focus from talking about a full troop withdrawal to explaining why long-term U.S. engagement in the country, including a residual force presence, is critical for protecting U.S. national security interests.

Other CP Ideas

Pakistan BIT CPBIT would solve.Runde, 8/3/2015 (Daniel, William Schreyer Chair and Direct the Project on US Leadership and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies., “Pakistan: The Next Colombia Success Story?” Forbes Accessed 7/5/16 http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielrunde/2015/08/03/pakistan-the-next-colombia-success-story/#537858a43b60 JJH)

As Pakistan gradually improves on a number of fronts, so should its relationship with the U nited S tates. Clearly, Pakistan wants more than just traditional foreign aid. During my visit, a prominent Pakistani intellectual and influencer told me that “if the United States isn’t going to build stuff, then it shouldn’t don’t bother.” Given the smaller budget envelope for U.S. infrastructure projects (the largest infrastructure project built by the United States in the last decade is the new U.S. embassy), assistance should be geared towards facilitating infrastructure investment particularly in the water and energy sectors. Specifically, the United States should encourage regulatory and policy reform and encourage greater US investment using specialized agencies including Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the U.S. Trade Development Agency and USAID’s Development Credit Authority. N egotiations for a U.S.- Pakistan Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) have stalled due to reservations on both sides, but a successfully concluded BIT would be a strong signal of certainty and stability for US based investors interested in deeper engagement in Pakistan. This might be a good topic for discussion when Prime Minister Sharif visits DC in October.

India DA

Top Shelf

India 1ncIndia perceives CPEC as an attempt at containmentRamachandran 15 — Sudha Ramachandran, independent researcher / journalist based in India. She writes on South Asian political and security issues. Her articles have appeared in Asia Times Online, The Diplomat, China Brief, etc., 2015 (“India and the CPEC project: to oppose or not to oppose?”, The Central Asia Caucus Analyst, September 10th, Accessed Online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13272-india-and-the-cpec-project-to-oppose-or-not-to-oppose?.html, Accessed 07-11-2016, SP)

IMPLICATIONS: Pakistan and China enjoy a warm relationship that goes back over five decades. Economic and defense co-operation is robust,

including in the nuclear field. Co-operation over CPEC is expected to further cement the Sino-Pakistan bond , triggering concern in India. India has raised objections to the corridor’s route, which runs through Gilgit-Baltistan, territory which India lays claim to. Part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (which, in turn, is

claimed by Pakistan), Gilgit Baltistan has been under Pakistani control since 1947. India has objected to Pakistan’s moves to assert ownership or consolidate control over what it considers Indian territory under its occupation. Thus it objected to Pakistan offering the Shaksgam Valley to China in 1963 and to China’s construction of Karakoram Highway and its investment in

“development” projects here. India also has strategic concerns. For over a decade now, analysts have been drawing attention to China’s “String of Pearls ,” a network of ports extending from its eastern coast to West Asia. They have argued that China’s funding and construction/upgrading of these ports aims at gaining access to naval facilities, perhaps even permission to set up bases here in the future. The strategy would give China permanent access to the Indian Ocean, through which vital shipping routes for China’s oil imports from the Persian Gulf run. India fears that China’s String of Pearls is aimed at encircling and containing India . It views the Maritime Silk Route

project as a benign reinvention of the String of Pearls strategy. Gwadar port is said to be the western-most “pearl” in this “string.” Its strategic location near the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz is of concern to India as 63 percent of India’s oil imports are transported via this waterway. A Pakistan-China presence here , especially with Beijing gaining management control of this port for 40 years has deepened India’s anxieties as it has the potential to undermine India’s energy and economic security. CPEC heightens the threat China poses to India’s defense. In the event of a military confrontation with India or if China decides to come to Islamabad’s aid in an India-Pakistan war , CPEC’s infrastructure will facilitate Chinese deployment of troops rapidly to India’s western front, as well.

Containing India causes conflict with China.Joshi, 2013 (Sachindra, Masters Thesis and Lt. Colonel in the Indian Army, “THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER: IS CONFLICT INEVITABLE?” Accessed 7/15/16 www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA599319 JJH)

The frequent intrusions inside Indian territory by PLA patrols that Chinese officials often blame on their local commanders as acting on their own discretion if followed with long term occupation of territory or casualties, could compel India to react with force leading to an escalation to major conflict . The inexperience of the Chinese and Indian lower-level local commanders and soldiers could spark a conflict . Likewise, the Sino-Pak entente, threatening India with encirclement in J&K and/or a proxy war by China supporting Pakistan to create a Kargil-like situation that could force India to react either directly, or indirectly by using its Tibet card could further aggravate the situation. In the maritime theatre, both China and India view the South China Sea and Indian Ocean as their respective areas of influence and dislike others navies in their domain. In attempts to encircle and counter encirclement, both navies seem to be moving towards a potential conflict in the naval domain . Any issue on the land domain and/or maritime

clash due to PLAN presence in the Indian Ocean and IN presence in the South China Sea could also escalate and engulf the naval domain. However, as of now, both PLAN and IN lack the capability to pose a real threat to each other. Any trigger for conflict would be a result of mistake and miscalculation from either side, however, the conditions and environment are set militarily for that trigger to escalate into a conflict.

Sino-Indian conflict goes nuclear – extinctionRory Medcalf 12, Director-International Security Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, with FIONA CUNNINGHAM, The Dangers of Denial: Nuclear Weapons in China-India Relations–http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Cunningham_and_Medcalf%2C_The_dangers_of_denial_web.pdfThe nuclear dynamic between China and India – the world’s two most populous states armed with the world’s most dangerous weapons – has long been a strangely cold issue in international affairs: underexplored and underestimated . It is often assumed they have a stable relationship involving mutual deterrence that would function in a crisis and that this benign situation will endure .1 But as their power and interests expand, such assumptions will need to be re-examined . It is striking that, despite their commonalities of restrained nuclear postures and disarmament rhetoric, China and India have failed to achieve reassurance and cooperation on nuclear issues . This is an unpropitious starting point for a relationship that is becoming more competitive . 2 The more troubling conceivable futures for Sino-Indian nuclear relations are marked by questions about the effectiveness of deterrence and a lack of preparation for crisis management . In any case, the implications of nuclear competition between China and India extend beyond the possibilities – remote but not to be dismissed – of military confrontation, the exchange of nuclear threats or nuclear use . This dynamic is creating new uncertainties in relations between the two powers, as well as their relations with the United States and Pakistan. It is also obstructing global arms control and disarmament efforts. In this Lowy Institute Analysis, we assess Sino- Indian nuclear dynamics including by examining the two countries' nuclear capabilities and postures, drivers of security tensions and potential flashpoints. We conclude by suggesting measures to restrain this nascent nuclear competition. Strategic

tensions Competition, coexistence and asymmetry Mistrust is an enduring feature of relations between India and China, and has worsened in the past five years. Certainly some substantial elements of cooperation have simultaneously grown and persisted, resulting in what might be termed competitive coexistence rather than full- blown rivalry.* China has become India's largest trading

partner, though economic competition could deepen as manufacturing expands in India. As huge developing nations, India and China have parallel interests in some global forums, such as on climate change, but this has not led to patterns of sustained cooperation, trust or mutual respect .

2nc/1nr Impact CalcChina/India conflict escalates into global great power conflictDarling 10 (Daniel, International Military Markets Analyst – Forecast International Inc., “Will the Indian Ocean Become the Next Arena of Great Power Conflict?”, The Faster Times, 5-4, http://thefastertimes.com/defensespen ding/2010/03/24/will-the-indian-ocean-become-the-next-arena-of-great-power-conflict/)

As the global balance of power continues to shift from west to east, so too do the intermingling pressures that brought about the savage conflicts of the last century. Economic expansion, shipping lanes, geography, territorial disputes and natural resources all intermingle to form a potentially toxic environment. Avoiding the missteps that led to such catastrophes as occurred in 20th Century Europe h as become something of a tightrope walk for the region’s two preeminent powers, China and India . Nestled together along the Himalayas and Kunlun mountain

ranges, these economically ascendant and burgeoning military powers warily eye each others moves , hoping to prevent the other from gaining some insurmountable strategic advantage. Ambitious rivals whose five-month border war in 1962 resulted in a Chinese military victory, a disputed Indian claim to a slice of territory known as Aksai Chin, a heavily militarized border (referred to as the “Line of Actual Control”) and a traumatized psyche in India where China is concerned. Ever mindful of Chinese moves, India has watched with growing anxiety as Beijing has invested in a highway linking it to Pakistan, India’s fiercest regional rival. This land route signals an attempt by Beijing to circumvent a crucial Chinese vulnerability, one that India might exploit in the even of another outbreak of hostilities between the two nations: China’s need for secure shipping lanes which ensure its vital energy supplies from the Middle East are not disrupted. With both countries proceeding to expand their military capabilities and both heavily dependent upon Middle East oil to fuel their economic growth, maneuvering for the upper hand in the Indian Ocean has intensified. The shipping lane which stretches from the Persian Gulf into the Arabian Sea and across the Indian Ocean represents the crucial transport lifeline for 80 percent of Chinese oil and 65 percent of India’s. Disadvantaged by fate of geography, Chinese energy trans-shipment must not only wind its way along this route, but then must traverse the heavily-pirated maritime choke-point, the Straits of Malacca, before then proceeding northward through the South China Sea and into home ports. The length and delicacy of such a journey makes protection of this vital shipping lifeline a fundamental security priority for China. That India, hoping to project its power throughout the Indian Ocean region, has embarked on a naval buildup only adds to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) sense of urgency regarding sovereignty over its sea lines of communication. As a result, China has launched an effort to protect its commercial interests by undertaking a series of port development and construction projects in Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Bangladesh (Chittagong), Myanmar (Kyaukphyu), Pakistan (Gwadar) and Yemen (Mukkala). The Chinese government has assiduously cultivated warm relations with Indian Ocean nations, signing friendship pacts and providing them with large amounts of aid in a bid to build up its political capital in the region. The PLAN, meanwhile, has constructed a hardened deep-water base at Sanya, on Hainan Island in the South China Sea. The base is capable of accommodating both attack and nuclear ballistic submarines, enabling these vessels to perform patrols in the northern Indian Ocean. There is also the possibility that the PLAN may begin stationing Su-30MKK fighter/attack aircraft at bases in Myanmar, providing China with an extended airborne strike range over the Bay of Bengal. China’s expansionary efforts in the Indian Ocean region have been dubbed by the Pentagon as the “string of pearls” strategy. But while the creation and development of logistical support bases represent a necessary component of this strategy, military muscle is what underwrites its execution. With an expansionary defense budget expected to reach close to $80 billion in 2010, China is the world’s second-largest military investor and has allocated more and more to naval capabilities in the past decade. Like India, the PLAN has undertaken its own blue-water naval development. This involves the continued expansion of its submarine, destroyer and oil tanker fleets, and possibly the construction of one or more aircraft carriers. India, which for the time being arguably has a naval edge on China, is pushing forward on a ten-year, $15 billion naval acquisition plan. India’s plan to grow its blue-water capabilities includes bringing three aircraft carriers into naval service by 2015. Among some of the crucial naval platforms in Indian development are six Scorpene submarines produced under license with French technologies (plus a follow-on order for six additional submarines), six improved Project 17A (improved Shivalik-class) frigates, a nuclear-powered missile submarine (the INS Arihant), and the domestically-built Project 15 (Delhi-class) destroyers. India has also introduced Russian MiG-29K jet fighters into its aircraft fleet, intending to deploy them on the carrier INS Vikramadity - formerly the Russian carrier Admiral Gorshkov - when it finally is introduced into Indian naval service. India is also taking steps to expand its air force bases in the Andaman and Nicobar island chains and plans to station Su-30MKI fighters, mid-air refuelling tankers and short- and medium-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on these island bases. This dual naval build-up has become worrisome for those with vested interests in the greater Indian Ocean. The U.S. Navy had long been entrusted with protecting shipping through the region. But with China’s rise as an economic power and status as budding rival to the U.S., Beijing is unlikely to view the American 5th Fleet as some metaphorical benevolent hand helping to protect its sea lines of communication. Indeed, American efforts to court India as

a foil against China’s expanding regional influence have only added to Chinese distrust regarding Washington’s intentions. Then there is Japan, which like China relies heavily

upon energy transshipment through the Indian Ocean. With a heightened PLAN presence across the same shipping lane Japan uses to ferry Middle East oil to its ports, Tokyo might opt to bolster its own naval component , thus upping the naval traffic in the region and increasing the possibility for friction. The potential for a military showdown is always strong when the interests and concerns of powerful nations intersect. But so too is the potential for partnership and pragmatism. Trade between China and India has grown exponentially since 2002; in 2008, China became India’s largest trading partner. This increased trade volume helps to weave the two countries’ economic interdependence. If the 21st Century is to become the Asian

Century that some predict, then China and India must carefully balance their needs and strategies against the security concerns of the other. Avoiding hazardous missteps in the Indian Ocean would be as good a place to start as any.

Nuclear warKanwal 00 (Gurmeet, Senior Fellow – Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, “Does India Need Tactical Nuclear Weapons?”, Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the ISDA, May, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_may00kag01.html) China is a status quo nuclear power with a long-standing territorial and boundary dispute with India. Despite the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA) of 1993 and the confidence building measures (CBMs) agreed upon in 1996, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) continues to remain ill-defined and ambiguous and its early 'clarification' still appears to be a distant goal as China is apparently in no hurry for further progress on these substantive issues. China's continuing nuclear and missile collusion and defence cooperation with Pakistan, its support to the military regime in Myanmar and increasing activities in the Bay of Bengal, its attempts to isolate India in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and its relentless efforts to increase its influence in Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, are all pointers to a carefully orchestrated plan aimed at the strategic encirclement of India. Apparently, China poses a long-term strategic challenge to India as a

competing regional power in Asia. A border war between these two Asian giants , though improbable, cannot be ruled out . Jasjit Singh has stated that, "The non-strategic category of weapons, which constitute 96 percent (if warheads on SLBMs are taken into account, the proportion drops to a little over 93 percent) of China's nuclear arsenal, even after 34 years, have relevance only for China's immediate neighbours." 26 Besides some ICBMs and IRBMs, China has deployed a large number of medium-and short-range nuclear-tipped missiles and nuclear capable aircraft in Tibet. 27 As China has already signed a de-targeting agreement with Russia and the US, it is not clear where these nuclear weapons are aimed or intended to be aimed. These deployed nuclear weapons constitute a 'threat-in-being' to India. Also, China has lately modified its original no-first-use doctrine. "China's

military strategists do not consider the use of nuclear weapons in their own territory as violating their NFU (no-first-use) doctrine." 28 Though China has never bothered to clarify the ambiguities inherent in this stand as it suits its purpose to play a guessing game, it can be deduced that since China clearly considers Taiwan as its own territory, the use of China's nuclear weapons during a

war over Taiwan would not violate its no-first-use doctrine. As a corollary, Indian analysts are justified in concluding that as China has not renounced its claim over

Arunachal Pradesh, or for that matter is still to recognise Sikkim, it may seriously consider the first use of tactical nuclear weapons during a border conflict with India in the future. China is continuing to modernise its nuclear and missile forces and tactical nuclear weapons, 29 including by acquiring Western technology through clandestine means. The US has claimed that China has acquired the technology for its W-88 nuclear warhead through illegal means.

Notwithstanding the US claim and China's vigorous denial, it is clear that China is continuing to place immense emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons. It naturally follows that China's concept of fighting a 'limited war under high-tech conditions' includes a nuclear warfighting strategy. Hence, India may expect to witness Chinese mushroom clouds over the high Himalayas during a future Sino-Indian border war , particularly if the Chinese Military Region commander is convinced that Indian forces are gaining advantage at the operational level. Due to India's affinity and long-standing cultural links with the Tibetan people, India would naturally like to ensure that collateral damage in Tibet is scrupulously avoided. In fact, even more worrisome would be the long-term contamination of the Himalayan water sources. Since most of the Tibetan rivers drain into the Indian plains, it is in India's interest to ensure that nuclear exchanges over the Himalayan watershed are not allowed to occur. It is also for this reason that India must ensure that ADMs are not employed by either side during a Himalayan conflict, contrary to the proposals

made by Bharat Karnad, 30 et al. How, then, is such a threat to be countered? Some Indian analysts argue that India must retaliate in kind on China's forward troops, firepower assets, headquarters, logistics support areas and communications choke points and that raising the ante and targeting Chinese cities would prove to be counter-productive as China has a much superior nuclear arsenal. In the unlikely event that China employs battlefield nuclear weapons against the Indian army on the grounds that it is justified in

using them on the territory that it claims in 'self-defence', India will really have no option but to retaliate massively against Chinese cities and economic centres on China's well developed eastern seaboard . Only such a declaratory policy and matching operational plans will make the first use cost for China prohibitive. It is a moot point whether the loss of a single Chinese city would be acceptable to the proponents of the first use of battlefield nuclear weapons within the Chinese Central Military Commission.

Goes globalEmmott 8 (Bill, Former Editor – Economist, “Tibet is one thing, but India and China tensions Spell Bigger Disaster”, Sunday Times, 3-30, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1993902/posts)

An array of disputes, historical bitternesses and regional flashpoints weigh down on all three countries. Conflict is not inevitable but nor is it inconceivable. If it were to occur – over Taiwan, say, or the Korean peninsula or Tibet or Pakistan – it would not simply be an intra-Asian affair. The outside world would be drawn in . Such a conflict could break out suddenly . This month’s unrest in Tibet has shown just how volatile China can be – and how easily one of those flashpoints could cause international tension . In 1962 China and India fought a border war that humiliated India and left an enduring legacy of bitterness and suspicion. Both countries are now increasing their military spending and trying to modernise their armed forces. The border dispute remains unresolved.

ExtinctionCaldicott 2 (Helen, Founder – Physicians for Social Responsibility, The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush’s Military-Industrial Complex, p. x)

The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction. Nuclear-armed India , an ancient enemy, could respond in kind. China , India's hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent. If any of either Russia or America's 2,250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth .

Link Extensions

Capabilities CPEC contains IndiaGeneral Knowledge Today 15 — India’s Daily E-Magazine of GK & Current Affairs, 2015 (“China Pakistan Economic Corridor”, GK Today, December 25th, Accessed Online at http://www.gktoday.in/blog/china-pakistan-economic-corridor/#Indias_concern_about_CPEC_project, Accessed 07-11-2016, SP)

India’s concern about CPEC project India’s main contention is about the corridor’s route through the PoK, which we consider as our territory and construction of CPEC would further strengthen the Pakistan’s claim over the region. There are several other concerns also. Firstly, China’s presence in the strategic location of PoK as a connecting point to South, West, Central and East Asia may limit the India’s outreach to the Eurasian region. Secondly,   Gwadar port further expands the China’s “String of Pearls”. String of Pearls refers to a network of ports which China is building from its eastern coast to the West Asia. China is investing in construction of ports, which in future can be converted into China’s naval bases. India is suspicious that China’s String of Pearls is aimed at encircling and containing India . Most of the Indian oil imports are transported through Strait of Hormuz. The Gwadar port of Pakistan is located near Strait of Hormuz. As part of CPEC project, China is developing the Gwadar port as a commercial port but in future it may be converted as a naval base. This would lead to maritime competition in the Indian Ocean and threatens India’s energy security. Fourthly, India suspects that the CPEC is aimed at countering the India’s ‘Act East’ policy and growing India-USA relations. Lastly, there is also a fear that the newly developed roadways near Indian border in PoK region will increase the infiltration of anti-India elements from Pakistan to India .

CPEC is a Chinese containment strategy against IndiaKhaniejo 16 — Roshan Khaniejo, Khaniejo's academic qualification includes BSc, MA and PhD. Her topic for the doctoral thesis was "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Developing Countries – A Critical Appraisal" She is the author of a book "Complexities and Challenges of Nuclear India" She was the member of the study team which did the Net Assessment on China and South Asia. She has been a panelist in Panel Discussions on nuclear issues. She presented a paper in the seminar organized by CIISS (China Institute for International and strategic Studies) in Beijing .She also took part in the discussions held by CICIR (China Institute of Contemporary International Relations) in Beijing. She has taken guest lectures for Jindal International University .Currently she is working as a Research Fellow at USI, 2016 (“CPEC: A $46 Billion Project To Develop Pakistan Or Contain India?”, The United Service Institution of India, April 25th, Accessed Online at http://usiblog.in/2016/04/cpec-a-46-billion-project-to-develop-pakistan-or-contain-india/, Accessed 07-11-2016, SP)

Certainly, Pakistan is not leaving any stone unturned to cooperate with China for the implementation of the numerous developmental projects under CPEC. Although the corridor is of great significance to the China-Pakistan nexus, India has shown its disapproval for this economic corridor . This was primarily due to the geographic location of the CPEC. The route of CPEC runs through Gilgit Baltistan. It is one of the Pakistan occupied Kashmir areas which has remained an area of tension since the last many years. The area often experiences firing across the borders. Even before the Indian Prime minister’s visit to Beijing last year, India has remained clear with its stance strictly against the CPEC project. China almost ignored India’s concern regarding the corridor, calling it an ‘economic project’ . CPEC forms a part of China’s thirteenth 5year plan. It will reduce its maritime distance with Africa and Middle East. Thus, it

appears on analyzing the magnificence of the $46 billion project, it is likely that both the nations will not consider India’s discontent on CPEC. On April 12, 2016, a statement given by the Pakistan Army Chief-Raheel Sharif at a conference indicated his unhappiness with India’s objection. He said, “I must highlight that India, our immediate neighbor, has openly challenged this development initiative (CPEC).” Estimating the massive infrastructure, trade and investment development that Pakistan will gain , it further confirmed that they will protect the $46 billion project from their Indian counterparts by all means. To

conclude, it could be said that both China and Pakistan are at a win- win situation. China takes

a leap forward to contain India in its own neighborhood and expand its strength while Pakistan will recover from being an almost failed state to a growing economic hub . This will act as a game changer in the Asian geopolitics which the rest of the world is awaiting to watch. Considering every dimension of the CPEC, I think China could have executed such a huge line of project without involving any such disputed area which would cause another third party’s concern to rise. It can be viewed as one of the deliberate attempts of China- Pak nexus to contain India . Hence, the solution in this respect for India is to closely observe the pace of progress of the CPEC and take necessary steps towards surveillance for preparing itself in case of any adversary. Finally, India must extensively engage in dynamic economic and strategic ties with nations in China’s neighborhood to expand its international relations.

EmpiricsCPEC is an attempt to contain India – history provesHiro 15 — Dilip Hiro, educated in India, Britain and America, where he received a master's degree at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. He then settled in London in the mid-1960s, and became a full-time writer, journalist and commentator. He has published 35 books (available in 88 editions at Amazon.com) and contributed to another 18. Three of his earlier books were re-issued by the publisher in 2013. He is the editor of Babur Nama: Journal of Emperor Babur, a world classic, preserved since 1530. He has also written scripts for theatre, television drama and cinema, 2015 (“China Muscles Way Into the Indian Ocean Through Its Silk Road Link With Pakistan”, The World Post (A Partnership of the Huffington Post and Beggruen Institute, July 31st, Accessed Online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dilip-hiro/china-silk-road-pakistan_b_7895716.html, Accessed 07-11-2016, SP)

After the 1962 Sino-India War, Chairman Mao Zedong decided to contain India’s regional clout by forging an alliance with its rival Pakistan, even though the latter was then firmly in the “imperialist” camp of the United States. This alliance is now being given a new varnish as part of the modern Silk Road network aimed at extending China’s economic-strategic influence to the Indian Ocean region . The enduring stability of Sino-Pakistan ties stems from mutual interest in containing India. Strained relations between the two South Asian neighbors date back to the founding of Pakistan on the eve of the independence and partition of British India in August 1947. Since then Pakistan, the smaller of the twins, has struggled to even up to its larger, more powerful sibling. In this quest, it has found China a pivotal ally. Whereas Washington has had wildly fluctuating relations with Islamabad, Beijing has proved to be its all-weather ally. In May 2011, when Pakistan protested that the United States had not given it the merest hint of the impending clandestine operation to kill Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, there was silence in capitals worldwide — except Beijing. China supported Islamabad’s stance, arguing that Pakistan had been foremost in combatting terrorism at home . This led Pakistan’s ambassador to China, Masood Khan, to laud the Sino-Pakistani friendship. “We say it is higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel, dearer than eyesight, sweeter than honey, and so on.” “Pakistan’s location on the edge of the Persian Gulf is key in its geopolitical alliance with China, and offers a bridging role.” Pakistan’s location has been a key factor in the geopolitical alliance. On the edge of the Persian Gulf, Pakistan offers a bridging role for China. Pakistan’s ports overlooking the busiest oil shipping lanes have been a key element in China’s implementation of its “string of pearls“ strategy linking the South China Sea, South Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean. Aiming initially at safeguarding the sea lanes used to ferry Middle East oil for its voracious industry and rising living standards of its people, China has come to view Pakistan as a critical element in containing India on a wider scale . According to China’s ambitious plan, the westernmost pearl in its string of pearls is Gwadar port, to be linked by rail and road to the Chinese city of Kashgar, end points of the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC . Gwadar is 386 kilometers from the Strait of Hormuz through which about 30 percent of world oil shipments pass daily. China aims to import Middle East petroleum through Gwadar, thus discontinuing reliance on the long, expensive sea route, exposed to potential blockade of the Malacca Straits by the U.S. Navy. The CPEC project — a network of roads, railway and pipelines — moved up from blueprints in April when Chinese President Xi Jinping and his senior officials signed 51 agreements with Pakistan, 31 related to CPEC to which China has committed an investment of $46 billion.

Perception Sino-Pakistan economic cooperation increases India and US fears and will increase regional tensionsReuters 16 (Anja Manuel, “What to read into a growing alliance between China and Pakistan”, April 27, 2016, Accessed 7/1/16, Available Online at http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/04/26/what-to-read-into-a-growing-alliance-between-china-and-pakistan/, JRR)

Pakistan is awash with a tidal wave of Chinese infrastructure projects. The small town of Gwadar, for example, was a forgotten end of the earth, filled with dust-colored cinder-block houses that lined trash-strewn streets and ringed by cliffs, desert and the Arabian Sea. Yet this sleepy fishing town has erupted with development over the past few years. A Chinese delegation inaugurated its sparkling new container port in early April, as

part of a deal by which China will build and have rights over the port. China has agreed to spend an extraordinary $46 billion in investment throughout Pakistan , far more than the annual U.S. aid budget for the entire world . This is now Beijing’s biggest commitment to any one countr y. Pakistan is also the largest recipient of Chinese weapons, and Beijing increasingly relies on it to help contain militants in China’s western provinces. Pakistan holds a unique position in Chinese diplomatic circles. The Chinese state media describes Pakistan as China’s only “all-weather strategic cooperation partner.” Though it is the largest beneficiary of Beijing’s investment, it is not a client state, as North Korea is. Rather, in a

neighborhood where many countries either distrust China, feel beholden to it or both, Pakistan is the closest thing to a real ally and friend that Beijing possesses. This means that China and Pakistan sometimes cooperate in ways that concern the United States and India . Washington and New Delhi worry that all this largesse will bring Pakistan firmly into China’s orbit. With subtle diplomacy, however, all four countries may be able to create a workable balance. The Gwadar port is just one example of China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative. This effort is by far the most spectacular example of Beijing’s strategic policy of combining aid, trade and foreign direct investment to build goodwill, expand its global political sway and secure the natural resources it needs to grow. Declaring that the Chinese-Pakistani friendship is “sweeter than honey,” and “stronger than steel,” Beijing announced last year that it would finance a 1,800-mile-long superhighway and a high-speed railway from the Arabian Sea over the Himalayas to

China’s Xinjiang province. In addition, it would fund an oil pipeline route to the inland Chinese city of Kashgar. This network of infrastructure, including the Gwadar port, would help Pakistan grow, while pushing back against the growing power of regional competitors like India. Helping Pakistan so dramatically also fits into China’s overall economic strategy. With a deep-sea port in the Arabian Sea and a land route to remote western China, some of Beijing’s Middle Eastern oil could travel the short route through Pakistan, instead of 6,000 miles through the Malacca Straits to Shanghai. That’s the route more than 80 percent of China’s oil

and natural resources now have to take. The infrastructure projects allow China to invest its large, if dwindling, foreign currency reserves, and also buy goodwill with its neighbors. Chinese state-owned companies get additional work, and the many energy projects that are part of the deal offer strong financial returns. The initiative even has the convenient side effect of annoying India, Pakistan’s archenemy and China’s potential strategic rival. Chinese engineers have already begun digging tunnels and building bridges to improve safety along the legendary Karakoram highway, one of the highest paved roads on earth, which links Pakistan to China. In addition, China is Pakistan’s largest trading partner and allows Pakistan special trade preferences through a free-trade agreement signed in 2006, though the volume of trade with Pakistan remains a drop in the bucket for Beijing. As another sign of the growing alliance, Pakistan and China are close partners militarily, and

their cooperation has increased in recent years. Pakistan accounts for more than a third of Chinese weapons sales . In just

the past seven months, Pakistan and China have conducted joint military exercises in Pakistan, China and, for the first

time, in the East China Sea. China also built six nuclear reactors in Pakistan over the past two decades and expects to help build at least two more. This is raising concerns with the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an institution that supervises the export of global civilian nuclear technology. In the 1980s and 1990s, China helped develop Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Some intelligence suggests that Beijing even helped with Pakistan’s new frightening miniature “battlefield” nuclear weapons, and with its first

weaponized drone. Many in India and the United States are alarmed about what they see as a China-Pakistan axis . They worry that China’s largesse means that Western nations will have little leverage to shape Pakistan’s actions on militants or nuclear weapons , or in supporting peace in Afghanistan . Another concern is that China would protect Pakistan when, for example, it refuses to cooperate with India and the West on handing over dangerous militants Washington should indeed monitor the China-Pakistan relationship closely, but the signs are not all bad. There is still much the world can do to prevent South Asia from splitting into two hostile China-Pakistan and India-U.S. camps, which is in no one’s interest. The West should cautiously welcome China’s lavish economic investment in Pakistan because more development helps stabilize the country, a positive result for everyone. Although China considers Pakistan an ally and a convenient access route

to western China, China has broader interests in the region that may cause it to moderate Pakistan’s more worrisome tendencies. China trades more with India than with Pakistan and shares with it a long, sometimes contested border. So despite sometimes touchy relations, China cannot afford to really antagonize New Delhi. More broadly, addressing Islamic militancy is a serious goal for Beijing because small groups of Uighur militants have launched violent attacks in China and at times allied with the Pakistani Taliban, Islamic State and others. This alliance means that China is likely prodding Pakistan to do more to crack down on militants there. It could also have a positive effect for Afghanistan, where China has become engaged in pushing for peace talks, and just announced a small security aid package.

Plan is viewed as containmentChaudhary, 3/10/2016 (Shamila, Senior South Asia Fellow, New America and Senior Advisor, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China and South Asia” Accessed 7/5/16 http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/CHAUDHARY_Remarks%20031016.pdf JJH)

China-Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation does not feign to focus on the militancy problem in Pakistan’s Punjab province, where anti-India militants, such as Lashkar-eTaiba, plan attacks on Indian targets and support Taliban fighters in Afghanistan . As long as Pakistan addresses Chinese security concerns on the Afghanistan border, it is likely that the Chinese will continue to accept Pakistani inaction in Punjab – where the Pakistani military is far more entrenched with jihadist networks than on the Afghan border and where the Sharif government also deals more intimately with such groups. Chinese expansion into Pakistan will be viewed by India as yet another attempt to contain it through economic and military ties with its neighbors . It may also have the added effect of tarnishing what little sentiment there is left in the Indian government for rapprochement with Pakistan. We should also pay attention to how this dynamic unfolds in Afghanistan, where India and China both maintain a significant economic and development presence.

RelationsSino-Pak relations cause containment fears.Smith 13 – Paul Smith, professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, 2013, (“The Tilting Triangle: Geopolitics of the China–India–Pakistan Relationship,” Comparative Strategy, September 5, Available online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01495933.2013.821850, Accessed 7-11-2016, SAA)

When the Cold War ended, there was much optimism in South Asia about the possibility of a new security order. Waning military competition and international talk of “peace dividends” seemed to presage an era in which major power rivalry would decline. One India-based analyst wrote: “Old and entrenched animosities between India, Pakistan, and China are being rapidly thawed as South and South-East Asian powers move to

match the superpowers in their drive to ease bilateral relations and international tensions.” 93 Indeed, Sino-Indian relations enjoyed a certain resurgence in the late 1980s and early 1990s . In December 1988, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China, the first such visit by an Indian leader since 1954. The visit bolstered narratives that the region—and indeed the world—was fundamentally changing. One diplomat stated that “the entire situation in South Asia has changed; you used to have the Soviet Union supporting India against China and Pakistan, and China supporting Pakistan against India…the situation today is much more fluid.” 94 Moreover, in 1989, India announced a reduction in military spending as a result of “improved relations with Pakistan and China.” 95 In 1991, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng visited India (the first such visit by a Chinese leader for more than three decades). During the visit, representatives from both countries railed against the United States and other countries that were seeking to create an “international oligarchy.” 96 The year 1996 marked a high point in New Delhi's relationship with Beijing. President Jiang Zemin made history by becoming the first Chinese head of state to visit independent India. During his four-day visit, both countries agreed to reduce tensions along their 2,500 mile border and both pledged that “neither side shall use its military capability against the other.” 97 Moreover, in speeches, leaders from both countries spoke glowingly about the other. President Jiang, for example, characterized India and China as “major powers in the world” that should “develop…as quickly as possible,” while Indian

President Shankar Dayal Sharma stated the two countries exhibited “broad-mindedness and wisdom.” 98 However, it was not long before the traditional tensions, which had defined the region for more than 40 years, appeared to reemerge . Only a few weeks

after President Jiang's visit, China's foreign ministry announced that China would continue its “cooperation” to help Pakistan develop nuclear energy, notwithstanding widespread concerns that Islamabad would divert technology or materials for nuclear weapons development. 99 A year later , India announced that it would resume development of its Agni long-range ballistic missile program, which would enable it to hit targets deep within China and Pakistan . 100 In 1998, India's Defense Minister George Fernandes would break diplomatic protocol by publicly announcing that China, not Pakistan, was India's “potential threat number 1.” 101 That same year, following India's nuclear test, an Indian official connected to the Prime Minister's office, speaking anonymously to an American newspaper reporter, provided the rationale

for India's nuclear weapons program: “Our problem is not Pakistan; Our problem is China…what we are seeking is a minimum deterrent.” 102 More than a decade later, India's concerns about China's rising military power have grown more acute. In November 2011, Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony told reporters that China was substantially “expanding its military capabilities” and increasing “infrastructure in the border area ” and that India has major concerns about this trend. 103 In 2012, India's National Defence College and the New Delhi–based Center for Policy Research jointly issued a report that noted: “China will, for the foreseeable future, remain a significant foreign policy and security challenge for India…As its economic and

military capabilities expand, its power differential with India is likely to widen.” 104 Not only is India concerned about Chinese military power, but also Beijing's willingness to deploy it in India's neighborhood. For China, the key driver of this trend is energy security and the country's growing dependence on energy shipping sea lines of communication (SLOCS) that traverse the Indian

Ocean, Malacca Strait, and South China Sea. Notwithstanding this economic motive, China's increasing advances in areas surrounding India have created anxiety in New Delhi. A more recent concern for India is China's apparent desire to establish a network of naval facilities in parts of the Indian Ocean. Following the announcement that China may build a supply facility in the Seychelles, Indian officials downplayed the significance, asserting that there was nothing “wrong” with China's plans to set up a military-related installation. 105 However, in other cases, Indian officials have been less sanguine about China's increasing presence in the region. For example, China's efforts to build a port or installation in the Maldives were interpreted by one Indian official as an effort by China to gain a “presence in these islands since they are closest to India and Sri Lanka.” 106 Some analysts believe that, at the very least, China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean will stimulate military competition. According to DNI James Clapper's assessment to the U.S. Congress in February 2012, the Indian military is “strengthening its forces” in response to a possible conflict with China along its disputed borders and is “working to balance Chinese power projection in the Indian Ocean.” 107 A related worry for New Delhi concerns China's increasingly intimate relationship with

Pakistan. China has consistently used its relationship with Pakistan as a way of containing or balancing against India's military and political power. 108 Even though Pakistan is a global source (and victim) of jihadi terrorism—some of which is linked to attacks against Chinese nationals working in Pakistan—this fact has not vitiated China's larger geopolitical objective in

South Asia. As a result , the Beijing–Islamabad nexus remains the most serious irritant in China–India relations , notwithstanding amicable diplomatic statements or initiatives from leaders of the two countries. The fact that China's relationship with Pakistan has a strong military character only confirms suspicions in New Delhi that it is intended to advance Beijing's anti-India containment agenda. During the period from 2007 to 2011, Pakistan received 64% of the total volume of Chinese military exports, including 50 JF-17 aircraft, 3 F-22P (Zulfiquar) frigates and 203 (MBT-2000) tanks. 109 The JF-17 project is particularly ambitious; Pakistan intends to replace its fleet of Mirage fighter aircraft with more than 100 JF-17 fighters, which have been jointly developed with China. 110 In the maritime realm, China has provided extensive naval assistance, including the transfer of naval vessels such as the aforementioned F-22P frigate. Media reports indicate that Pakistan is seeking a Chinese nuclear submarine to “maintain strategic balance in the subcontinent.” 111 Overall, China has emerged as Pakistan's largest arms supplier, “selling everything from aircraft to missiles to naval vessels.” 112 In addition, China and Pakistan have conducted four “friendship” joint military exercises since 2004; most of these exercises focus on counterterrorism objectives, but also involve conventional military maneuvers. 113 The report Nonalignment 2.0 (referenced earlier) described Pakistan as being a “subset of the larger strategic challenges posed by China.” 114 In other words, the 1947 system still persists, but it is being subsumed within the more robust 1962 system (particularly as China–Pakistan military relations become more integrated). This partially reflects Pakistan's economic and political decline, especially when contrasted with the “rise” of both China and India. Trade between Pakistan and India—the 1947 system—is insignificant when compared to trade between India and China (Pakistan's trade with India amounts to only 1 percent of the country's total global trade; for

India, trade with Pakistan only amounts to .93 percent of the country's total exports). 115 Only Pakistan's vast nuclear arsenal undergirds its relevance as a significant geopolitical actor in the South Asian region.

Impact Extension

2nc Incidents At SeaIndian containment increases the likelihood of incidents at seaRoy, 2013 (Dennis, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of POSCO Fellowship Program, and PhD in Political Science. Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security pg. 114)

The most prominent of the “pearls” is the port at Gwadar, Pakistan. Relatively deep, the port can accommodate the largest classes of ships. The Chinese helped build a commercial port at Gwadar that is now operated by a Singapore state-owned company. China also plans to build a pipeline with a terminal at Gwadar that will carry oil brought in by ships from Africa and the Middle East to China’s Xinjiang province, bypassing the sea lane through the Strait of Malacca. Many media reports up to 2011 said the Chinese were building a base at Gwadar for the Pakistani Navy. Some observers were prematurely describing it as a Chinese naval base and even a “Chinese Gibraltar” that would allow the PLA Navy to maintain a presence near the Persian Gulf. The most convincing assessments, however, anticipated Gwadar would be a primarily Pakistani base at which Chinese warships could dock and resupply. Development of the port at Gwadar is of great interest to the Pakistani government as an alternative to Karachi, which has processed up to 90 percent of the shipping trade into and out of Pakistan but is vulnerable to blockade because it is close to India. While Chinese intentions regarding Gwadar and the other “pearls” are debatable, most Indian observers fall into the group that believes Chinese activity along the Indian Ocean is largely in the service of Chinese military and strategic goals and directly impinges upon India’s security. China and India are simultaneously beefing up their respective capabilities to project naval power into the Indian Ocean. China does not recognize this sea as an Indian preserve . India does not accept China establishing a strong or permanent naval force there. The situation is ripe for incidents at sea and for each side to interpret the other’s actions as illegitimate and threatening. In January 2009, for example, a tense confrontation reportedly occurred when an Indian submarine shadowed two Chinese destroyers passing through the Indian Ocean en route to the waters off Somalia for antipiracy duty. During this incident, the Chinese dispatched a helicopter armed with antisubmarine torpedoes and forced the submarine to the surface. It was ironic and ominous that such an incident could result from a Chinese military operation that the international community saw as constructive. Regardless of the PLA’s ostensible mission, it may be difficult for the Indians to see Chinese warships in the Indian Ocean with anything but suspicion and hostility .

Incidents at sea risk Indo/Pak nuclear warIskander Rehman 15, nonresident fellow in the South Asia Program at the Atlantic Council, former research fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, former Stanton Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean,” March 9, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/09/murky-waters-naval-nuclear-dynamics-in-indian-ocean

India’s maritime strategy includes the following assessment of the 1999 deployment:¶ The Indian Navy short-listed three goals,

namely to ensure safety and security of our maritime interests against a surprise attack, to deter Pakistan from escalating the conflict into a full-scale war and to win the war convincingly at sea. The lesson that emerges for the Indian Navy is on two counts. Firstly, there will be space and scope to conduct conventional maritime operations below the nuclear threshold.

Secondly, a window of opportunity would exist to influence the land battle.72¶ From the Indian Navy’s point of view, such actions provided a means of projecting what some scholars have referred to as triadic deterrence—that is, using “threats and/or

punishments against another state to coerce it to prevent non-state actors from conducting attacks from its territory”—all while maintaining the conflict below the nuclear threshold.73 ¶ For Pakistani naval planners, however, both incidents were

sobering reminders of their coastal nation’s glaring vulnerability to blockade and strategies of commodity denial .74 Moeed Yusuf provides the following summary of how India’s naval actions were perceived in Pakistan: ¶ It would seem that the Kargil episode would have signaled to the Pakistani armed forces, army included, that if the advent of nuclear weapons had made the prospects of limited war more likely by allowing Pakistan to use the space below India’s nuclear threshold with impunity, it also meant that

India would counter Pakistan’s advantage at the lowest rung of the escalation ladder by exploit ing its naval superiority early on in the crisis . In essence, India was using the sea to neutralize Pakistan’s low-end strategic space under the nuclear umbrella.75¶ Islamabad appears particularly concerned over New Delhi’s ability to interfere with its crude oil imports , which accounted for 31 percent of Pakistan’s total energy supply in 2012.76 Energy shortages have frequently led to riots in Pakistan’s major cities, and for many Pakistani security managers,

any protracted disruption of sea-borne energy would automatically result in dangerous levels of unrest. ¶ Unable to sustain any remotely symmetrical form of naval competition , the Pakistan Navy sees nuclearization as the most effective means of countering Indian maritime power projection . Writing in 2004, five years before India unveiled the Arihant, Pakistani Lieutenant Commander Raja Rab Nawaz posited that¶ limited conventional war at sea between India and Pakistan is more[,] not less likely in a future conflict. Overwhelming conventional superiority of the Indian Navy poses serious challenges in case of such an eventuality. . . . Pakistan must acquire a sea-based second-strike capability to maintain strategic balance in the

region.77¶ Security managers in New Delhi are probably unaware of the extent to which their nation’s growing maritime strength is perceived as a threat in Pakistan. An illustration of this perceptual mismatch was provided in

the course of a crisis simulation exercise organized by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 2013. Held in Sri Lanka, the exercise

included both Indian and Pakistani participants, ranging from retired military officials to civilian academics. The simulation began with a

mass terrorist attack in an Indian cricket stadium, which appeared to have originated in Pakistan. The India n team immediately responded

by initiating a number of moves that they considered “limited” and “punitive” in nature, including the implementation of a maritime exclusion zone (MEZ) along Pakistan’s Makran coast. Whereas the India n participants deemed this action “restrained , justified, and short of war,” the “enforcement of the MEZ off the Makran coast were deemed by the Pakista n team as acts of war .”78 As the exercise continued to unfold, Pakistan began to heighten its nuclear readiness level and threatened first use . ¶ This form of coercive nuclear signaling is entirely in line with weaker states’ thinking with regard to the strategic utility of nuclear weapons .79 By threatening either directly or indirectly to employ low-yield nuclear weapons at sea or against an advancing Indian aircraft carrier strike force, Islamabad can hope to acquire escalation dominance and considerably dilute its larger neighbor’s coercive naval power.80

Containment Causes ConflictIndia perception of containment leads increases risks of conventional wars – interdependence and deterrence doesn’t check.Pant and Joshi 16 – Harsh V. Pant, Professor of International Relations in Defence Studies Department and the India Institute at King’s College London, and Yogesh Joshi, research scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2016, (“India’s China Challenge,” Palgrave Macmillan, Available online at http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-137-55772-8_4, Accessed 7-11-2016, SAA)

The debate within the Indian foreign policy and security community on managing China’s rise is vigorous. Largely, there are three schools of thought delineating India’s view on the China threat; they also offer unique policy prescriptions for how New Delhi should formulate its China policy. The first school refers to what Jairam Ramesh had articulated as the idea of “Chindia.” According to this school of thought, India and China are not “natural enemies” and “conflict and confrontation” is not inevitable. As Jin Huang, Kanti Bajpai and Kishore Mahbubani have argued, India and China could rise “peacefully together.”37 As world’s two emerging powers, India and China have much in common and cooperation is more likely given a number of reasons. Unlike the great powers of the past, military expansionism is not the way forward for the world’s newest entrants to the great power club. Second, both India and China have fully integrated into the international economic order making conflict a risky proposition. Third, there is a growing convergence between the two countries on global issues such as climate change and restructuring of world financial system. Lastly, global security architecture underpinned by US “hub and spoke” system of alliances cannot accommodate their “legitimate security interests commensurate with a growing role in world politics.” Essentially therefore, this school of thought vehemently opposes the characterization of India–China dyad as one of a “protracted contest”: some have even argued that India and China would never go to war.38 Normalization of relationships would occur if both continue to tread on the path of economic interdependence and avoid getting entangled in alliances, of one form or the other. of these conditions however hold true under the current transition of power in Asia. China’s land reclamation projects in South China Sea, largest ever of their kind in the world, are being carried under the shadow of its burgeoning military might. In international politics, relative gains matter more than absolute gains: China’s integration in liberal economic order have only helped her gain relatively more than other actors, fueling its military modernization. Third, cooperation in global forums does not

easily translate into agreement on bilateral issues. Even when India and China’s interests are converging globally, bilateral disputes have only aggravated in recent times.39 Lastly, American led liberal security order has benefited both India and China and more so the latter. As Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated during his lecture at the Central Party School in Beijing in May 2013: “India and China have been among the greatest beneficiaries of an open global economy; a rule-based and open international trade regime; and free flow of finance, information and technology.”40 This would not have been possible without the US backed liberal world order. However, even when China’s interests today stands in confrontation with that of Washington, India not only continues to benefit from the American-led liberal security order but New Delhi’s values and interests largely align with that of the US. As discussed in the previous chapter,

from freedom of the seas to the balance of power in Asia, Indian and American interests converge on a whole range of issues. The myth of economic interdependence as some kind of an invisible hand promoting peace in Asia has vanished ever since China’s assertion of territorial and maritime claims began from 2008 onwards. The regional states have become acutely aware of the fact that economic interdependence does enable China to gain relatively more and, in the process, helps her military consolidation. Interdependence has also failed to restrain Beijing’s assertive behavior. This was most evident in the 2010 standoff with Japan over the Senkaku Islands. If approximately $343 billion worth of economic interdependence between the two countries failed to elicit a more cautious approach from Beijing, it is difficult to make a case that relatively modest trade of around $80 billion between India and China would help to restrain the latter. In fact, China has used interdependence as a tool of economic punishment.41 Therefore, an elite consensus is evolving in India that China’s rise is posing problems for the country: as the report titled “Non-alignment 2.0” suggested, “China will, for the foreseeable future, remain a India’s China Challenge significant foreign policy and security challenge for India.”42 The highest echelons of India’s military planners and policymakers view China’s growing military power with increasing alacrity.43 For a long time now, Indian defense officials have been warning their government in rather blunt terms about the growing disparity between the two Asian powers. The ever expanding power differential between the two countries has made the situations more portentous. The naval chief had warned that India neither has “the capability nor the intention to match China force for force” in military terms, while the former air chief had suggested that China poses

more of a threat to India than does Pakistan. A growing number of Indians now see China as a competitor, if not a rival. A 2010 Pew poll suggested that only 34% of Indians held a favorable view of China, with four in ten viewing their neighbor as a “very serious threat .”44 The question for Indian decision makers is that if economic interdependence on one hand fuels China’s military power and on the other fails to restrain its increasing assertiveness, how can India best manage China’s meteoric rise and the challenges which it engenders. Balancing China both economically and militarily has become an imperative for India ; New Delhi’s dilemma lies in strategizing such a balance. Should India develop strong strategic partnerships with the United States and its allies in the region or should New Delhi aim for a mix of internal and regional balancing strategies? The latter position was most prominently articulated in the report titled “Non alignment 2.0.”45 Authored by scholars on Indian foreign and security policy in 2012, with some participation from the UPA government, the report identifies China as the most important strategic problem currently confronting India and acknowledges that

asymmetry in capabilities between the two countries, both economic and military, leaves India with little bargaining power vis-à-vis Beijing. However, the disputes and contentions—like the border problem—continue to fester with little possibility of resolution in the near future. The report rightly identifies that “due to unresolved boundary disputes and other potential political issues there is also threat of war that demands military preparations.”46 The possibility that China may resort to use of force and get involved in an exercise of “territorial grab” remains ever present.47 The way out of this conundrum of lingering disputes and relative asymmetry of power for India is to balance China internally: to develop its military power and especially air and maritime power. While internally balancing China, the report argues that India should avoid being a part of any “anti-China containment ring” as it may force Beijing in “adopting overtly hostile and negative policies towards India.”48 Internal balancing obviously is a sound strategy, as is avoiding entrapments in alliances. However, both these strategies place high expectations on India’s internal capacity to produce economic and military wherewithal necessary to deter China. Along with China, India is also considered as a major rising power in Asia. Such fanciful characterization does little justice to the gap in relative power between the two countries, which is also increasing by the day. At approximately $11.2 trillion, Chinese economy is around five times bigger than that of India and according to one

estimate, “Chinese GDP expands producing economic growth on the scale of a ‘new India’ every two years.”49 If economics is the latent power on which hard power is built, Chinese economic miracle has created a serious mismatch of military power with India. In 2014, China spent around $129 billion on its defense needs; if defense research and development is taken into account, the total defense budget rises to a towering $188 billion.50 China’s defense budgets have seen a secular increase over the last decade. Since 2008, China’s share in total defense spending in Asia has risen from 28 to 38 in 2014. New Delhi on the other hand spent around $45 billion on defense in 2014; between 2008 and 2014, its share in Asia’s defense spending has dropped from 15.4 to 13.1.51

Though insecurity vis-à-vis China has incentivized military build-up by New Delhi , it remains far from adequate. From artillery guns for the army to fighter planes for the air force and submarines for the navy, defense procurement has made halting progress mainly due to widespread corruption, inter-ministerial wrangling between the Defense and the Finance Ministries, and the lack of accountability on the part of indigenous defense manufacturers. Work on defense infrastructure along the frontier has gained pace in recent years,

but India’s border management remains disappointing, especially compared to what China has been able to accomplish in Tibet. With its Agni-V missile, India can now target Beijing, augmenting its deterrence potential. But in India–China dyad, given

New Delhi’s doctrine of “no first use,” strategic deterrence hardly obviates the threat of limited conventional wars . Additional factors also intervene in coherently responding to the Chinese threat through internal balancing. A focused internal effort toward balancing China would require a sense of conviction in Indian political class. However, Indian polity remains divided producing inefficient responses to both internal requirements as well as external threats. As Tellis has observed, these “realities suggest that successful ‘internal balancing’ required for realization of genuine strategic autonomy will likely fall on hard times in the foreseeable future.”52 Due to its smaller economy, the structural dysfunction prevalent in the polity and the ossified bureaucracy, India’s capability to balance China alone has always been doubtful. In fact, a former Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the Indian Armed Forces has gone on record suggesting that India is no match for China’s military power.53 Therefore, for managing China’s growing military capability and the threat it poses to its territorial integrity as well as its influence in the Asia-Pacific, external balancing may be the only resort available to New Delhi. Given the asymmetry in national power between India and China, India cannot rely only on internal balancing to cope with China’s rise; reaching out to the US and its Asian allies will have to be a part of any Indian strategy of external balancing. Since America is keen on developing a strategic partnership with India to counter-balance China’s rise, pivot represents an excellent opportunity for India and it does not necessarily entail formation of an institutionalized alliance. Indian foreign policy has been trying to come to terms with these changing strategic realities over the last two decades.

Causes WarContainment of India causes Sino-Indian war and that goes nuclearCaryl ’10 (CHRISTIAN CARYL “Nuclear arms race between China and India” JULY 13, 2010 http://www.defence.pk/forums/indian-defence/65480-nuclear-arms-race-between-china-india.html)

Europeans and Americans, who have dominated world affairs for so long, are understandably fascinated by the recent rise of China and India. It's obvious that the rapid economic resurgence of these two great Asian powers fundamentally alters the global rules of the game.¶ China and India have built up a $60-billion-per-year trading relationship, and for years they've insisted that they want to work more closely on a variety of fronts. Yet that expressed desire for collaboration co-exists uneasily with a long-running strategic rivalry. Parts of their mutual border remain in dispute. China has long supported Pakistan, India's main enemy, while the Indians have often befriended competitors of the Chinese (be it Moscow or Washington). Lately Beijing has been cultivating relationships among countries in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean -- including Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka -- to protect the flow of commerce and access to supplies of natural resources. That has the Indians fearing encirclement. ¶ Lately, though, a nother element is threatening to complicate the strategic calculus: the nuclear factor . In themselves, of course, nuclear weapons are nothing new to either country. China has been a nuclear power for decades, while India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 (though most outsiders tend to think of 1998, when New Delhi conducted a series of underground explosions designed to establish its bona fides as a genuine nuclear power). Although both countries have sworn off first use, both have built up formidable deterrents designed to retaliate against any attackers . ¶ So what's new? A lot. Concurrent with their rising economic might, China and India have set about modernizing their militaries to lend extra muscle to their growing strategic ambitions -- and given their complicated history, that can't help but spark worries. "China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world," noted one U.S. report. "China's ballistic missile force is expanding in both size and types of missiles." China's Dongfeng long-range missiles boast independently controlled multiple warheads, mobility, and solid fuel (meaning that they can be fired with little notice). That's just one of many areas in which the Chinese have demonstrated their advanced technological capabilities. In January China shot down one of its own satellites with a missile -- once again demonstrating, as it did with a previous test in 2007, that it's well down the path toward a ballistic missile defense system.¶That test unnerved the Indians, who saw the prospect of Chinese space weapons as a potential threat to the credibility of their own nuclear deterrent. The Indians, meanwhile, have been hard at work on a new generation of long-range missiles of their own . The Agni-5, which is set for a test flight by the end of this year, has a projected range of 5,000 to 6,000 kilometers -- meaning that it would be able to hit even the northernmost of China's cities. The Indians are also conducting sea trials of their first ballistic missile submarine, the Arihant, which could be ready for deployment within another year or two.¶ It is undoubtedly true that the two countries mainly have other potential enemies in mind. China is primarily concerned about deterring potential attacks by the world's leading nuclear power, the United States, while India's strategic calculations focus on the threat from Pakistan. Yet strategic logic is creating the potential for direct friction between Beijing and New Delhi on several fronts. The two countries are already engaged in a naval arms race as they jockey for influence in the waters around South Asia. Tensions have also been mounting over the two countries' border disputes -- especially the one involving the disputed area of Arunachal Pradesh (which is controlled by the Indians). The Indians complain of a rising number of Chinese incursions into the area; a remark by the Chinese ambassador to India a few years ago, when he claimed the territory as China's, stirred up public outrage. The Chinese, who regard Arunachal Pradesh as part of Tibet, worry in turn about a buildup of Indian troops in the region.¶ Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan of the Observer Research Foundation in New

Delhi notes one concern. Starting in 2007, the Chinese military began a major upgrade of its missile base near the city of Delingha in Qinghai province, next to Tibet. In addition to the intermediate-range missiles already stationed in the region, Rajagopalan says there are indications the Chinese may have beefed up the force with long-range DF-31s and DF-31As -- thus threatening not only northern India, including Delhi, but targets in the south as well . It's entirely possible, she acknowledges in a 2007 paper, that the Chinese move could be aimed primarily at countering Russian missiles stationed in Siberia, but warns that "what the Chinese may consider a routine exercise may send a wrong signal and have serious implications." For his part, former U.S. diplomat Charles Freeman says that he regards Indian fears of a Chinese nuclear buildup as exaggerated, but worries that a fateful mismatch of perceptions could already be spurring both countries toward a genuine nuclear arms race.¶The extent to which the two militaries are getting on each other's nerves became apparent in a bit of high-ranking trash-talking earlier this year . India's chief military science officer, V.K. Saraswat, declared that new advances in his country's ballistic missile technology meant that "as far as cities in China and Pakistan are concerned, there will be no target that we want to hit but can't hit." That prompted a retort from Rear Adm. Zhang Zhaozhong of China's National Defense University, who pointedly derided the "low level" of Indian technology. "In developing its military technology," Zhang said, "China has never taken India as a strategic rival, and none of its weapons were specifically designed to contain India." If that was meant to console anyone south of the border, it doesn't seem to have worked.¶The best time to talk about an arms race, of course, is before it really gathers steam . Krishnaswami Subrahmanyam, former chairman of India's National Security Advisory Board, says that China and India should take their nuclear concerns to the Conference on Disarmament, a multilateral negotiating forum at the United Nations. But that , of course, would require the Chinese to acknowledge that there's a problem , which they might not be willing to do. Rajagopalan notes that India and Pakistan have managed to set up some effective confidence-building measures on their common border, but that India and China have yet to do the same (aside from a few stillborn efforts in the early 1990s). Instituting mechanisms to warn each other of pending missile tests might be a start. "I think there's a great need for that," she says. "Otherwise these kinds of tensions can spiral out of control." You can say that again.

Aggressive India containment by China could escalate into conflictRajagopalan 16’ – Rajesh Rajagopalan is an international politics professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, India. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of New York. “As India’s power grows, China’s containment strategy will get frentic” June 12, 2016 http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/as-indias-power-grows-chinas-containment-strategy-will-get-frenetic/articleshow/52705951.cms

China's decision in Vienna to object to India entering the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should not come as too much of a surprise. China has been uncharacteristically open about opposing India's membership. This also

makes it unlikely that it will change its view in the next 10 days, before the NSG meets in plenary in Seoul on June 24. China's action has little to do with NSG, but is simply the latest indication of China's containment strategy against India . The NSG membership is important for India but not so much for any material gain. Its importance is mostly that it strengthens the legitimacy of India's nuclear programme and permits India to have some say in making the rules of the global nuclear order, all without joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Since the NSG, under American pressure, had in 2008 already permitted India to engage in nuclear commerce with other countries, what China's veto does mostly is hurt India's pride but not much more. China's objections have little to do with its fidelity to NSG rules. NSG has admitted members who were not NPT members.

Moreover, China's own actions after it joined the NSG demonstrate a completely dismissive attitude towards NSG rules. Against these rules, and its own solemn commitment, China agreed to supply additional nuclear power plants to Pakistan.

China's actions are not about the NSG as much as an attempt to balance and contain India within South Asia. This is why it might not object if India and Pakistan join together, thus ensuring both their hyphenation and having someone inside to

use as its cat's paw against India. But this is not likely to happen for a while because Pakistan's terrible proliferation record makes other NSG

members wary of letting it join. The policymakers in New Delhi need to recognise China's containment strategy against India and respond accordingly. China's behaviour is a reflection of three factors. The first is the balance of power in Asia. It was clear since the 1950s that India and China would be the most powerful countries in Asia. This led China to form an axis with Pakistan that is based on nothing but their common desire to balance India. India has never fully acknowledged or responded to

this axis. The second is China's rise, which has led to greater aggressiveness with all of its neighbours and with the US. Though China initially attempted to portray its rise as "peaceful" and different from previous great powers, these are now distant memories.

China's behaviour has become increasingly unyielding and pugnacious, as when the Chinese foreign minister told his Singaporean counterpart in 2010, in effect, that small countries should know their place. It is important to remember this because in the coming days there will be arguments that China's actions are the consequence of India getting closer to the US. That would be wrong. There is a certain uniformity in Chinese behaviour that applies to all of its neighbours, not just India. These are, moreover, neighbours with which China has close economic ties, countries that tried hard to engage with China in order to integrate it into the regional order in the hope that this would tame any temptations of power. They have all reluctantly concluded that China's power can only be balanced, not tamed, and are seeking closer security ties with the US because it is the only country that can effectively provide such balance. The US too tried hard to integrate China into the existing international order, seeking to partner with it rather than contain it. For almost a decade, the US was also diverted by its entanglements in the Middle East, giving China plenty of space to grow. US President Barack Obama's initial instinct, as befits his liberal view of international politics, was also to frame the relationship as a partnership, the G-2. None of this has helped keep China's rise peaceful. As China's power grew, its ambitions have also expanded. China, it turns out, is just another great

power and its change in behaviour tracks well with its growing power. Finally, China also has a paranoid strategic culture that automatically sees the world in conflictual terms, which is sometimes short-sighted. Indian leaders should be intimately familiar with this. It is this short-sightedness that unnecessarily antagonised a very pro-China Jawaharlal Nehru, helped cement the Indo-Soviet alliance, forced India to restart its nuclear programme by helping Pakistan's nuclear weapons quest and is driving an instinctively anti-American

Indian strategic elite into reluctantly considering an alliance with the US. That Beijing's behaviour is so self-defeatingly short-sighted should provide no comfort to New Delhi because it has led to a policy that has consistently sought to balance and contain India. China's decision to object to India's entry into the NSG is no different. China is reacting not so much to India's behaviour as much as to India's power. As India's power grows, India should prepare for China's containment

strategy to become even more frenetic. In New Delhi, there is almost a wilful blindness to this. The dangers of such strategic blindness cannot be overstated. If there is one positive outcome of the NSG issue, it is that it provides a further demonstration of

China's containment strategy. If India's strategic community and decision-makers continue to sleep on, they will have no one to blame but themselves.

China India War = NuclearWar goes global and nuclearKahn 09 (Jeremy, Newsweek, “Why India Fears China”, 10-19, 154:16, L/N)

On June 21, two Chinese military helicopters swooped low over Demchok, a tiny Indian hamlet high in the Hima-layas along the northwestern border with China. The helicopters dropped canned food over a barren expanse and then returned to bases in China. India's military scrambled helicopters to the scene but did not seem unduly alarmed. This sort of Cold War cat-and-mouse game has played out on the 4,057-kilometer

India-China border for decades. But the incident fed a media frenzy about "the Chinese dragon." Beginning in August, stories about new Chinese incursions into India have dominated the 24-hour TV news networks and the newspaper headlines. China claims some 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory. And most of those claims are tangled up with Tibet. Large swaths of India's northern mountains were once part of Tibet. Other stretches belonged to semi-independent kingdoms that paid fealty to Lhasa.

Because Beijing now claims Tibet as part of China, it has by extension sought to claim parts of India that it sees as historically Tibetan, a claim that has become increasingly flammable in recent months. Ever since the anti-Chinese unrest in Tibet last year, progress toward settling the border dispute has stalled, and the situation has taken a dangerous turn. The emergence of videos showing Tibetans beating up Han Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities created immense domestic pressure on Beijing to crack down. The Communist Party leadership worries that agitation by Tibetans will only encourage unrest by the country's other ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs in Xinjiang or ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, threatening China's integrity as a nation. Susan Shirk, a former Clinton-administration official and expert on China, says that "in the past, Taiwan was the 'core issue of sovereignty,' as they call it, and Tibet was not very salient to the public." Now, says Shirk, Tibet is considered a "core issue of national sovereignty" on par with Taiwan. The

implications for India's security--and the world's--are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved . The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice-- a conflict involving India and China could result in a nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in--either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.

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Russia China DAPlan violates Russia’s historical SOI, hurts cooperation.Kennedy and Parker 4/3/2015 (Scott, Deputy Director, Freeman Chair in China Studies and Director, Project on Chinese Business and Political Economy, and David A., Associate Fellow, William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy, “Building China’s “One Belt, One Road” Accessed 7/5/16 https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-china%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cone-belt-one-road%E2%80%9D JJH)

Another risk is that many countries in Asia and abroad (including the United States) are concerned about the geopolitical impact of the Belt and Road. Although Beijing has sought to allay these concerns in its latest plan, stressing the “win-win” potential of the initiative, its efforts will have important foreign policy implications for a number of key regional players, including Japan, India, and Russia. Moscow is particularly concerned about the initiative translating into increased Chinese influence in Central Asia , an area it has long viewed as within its sphere of influence and where Sino-Russia competition has been noticeably intensifying of late. Meanwhile, India has been especially alarmed by Chinese investments in Sri Lanka, which New Delhi likewise views as part of its backyard. Hence, there is a clear risk that Beijing’s efforts—well-intentioned or not—will heighten geopolitical tensions in an already tense region . There are also direct security implications of the project. The Maritime Silk Road in particular will likely expand China’s capacity to project its growing naval power abroad, while increased Chinese involvement in building regional information technology infrastructure could create new channels for Beijing to exert its influence in the region.

Terror DACPEC facilitates terrorism in China New Delhi Times, 6/13/2016 (“China Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Chinese Nightmare” Accessed 7/4/16 http://www.newdelhitimes.com/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-a-chinese-nightmare123/ JJH)

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a $46 billion mega-project which aims to connect Gwadar Port in South-western Pakistan to China’s North-western autonomous region of Xinjiang, via a network of highways, railways, oil & gas pipelines, and an optical fiber link. The CPEC’s main locus lies in Kashagar, Xinjiang, and the western Autonomous Region that is home to China’s Muslim Uighur minority. According to experts, China will not benefit with this corridor rather it will act as a ground for increasing problems in China as Uighur militant groups , like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) have pursued sanctuary in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas, where they have established contacts with al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. China identifies the ETIM as a persistent threat , committed to targeting China and attacking Chinese interests inside Pakistan. It may be mentioned here that in April 2013 Islami Awazi, the ETIM propaganda wing, released a training video showing 13 Uighur children being trained in the use of weapons . Local militants say that dozens of Central Asian militants live in North Waziristan and it was very difficult to differentiate between the Uzbeks and Uighur militants because of their similar appearances. The problem China will face with the opening of this corridor is that there is a possibility that Uighur and Taliban (TTP) militants may join forces to threaten CPEC as it will facilitate the moving of terrorists . Such security concerns are not unfounded as in 2014, Mufti Abu Zar al-Burmi, in a video message entitled “Let’s disturb China”, directed all Taliban groups to target Chinese interests in the region. In the same year, Uighur leader Abdullah Mansour in an interview to a leading news agency, vowed to carry out more attacks on Chinese interests.

Opening is a CPEC is facilitates the movements of terrorists and exacerbates ethnic tensions in China.New Delhi Times, 6/13/2016 (“China Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Chinese Nightmare” Accessed 7/4/16 http://www.newdelhitimes.com/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-a-chinese-nightmare123/ JJH)

The ETIM has been made further resourceful and deadly by training from ISIS where instances of Uighur militants being inducted in training camps have been seen. According to a leading security analyst, Siegfried O. Wolf, until the last decade or so, Pakistan establishment pursued a lenient approach to the Uighur presence in its north-western tribal areas and remained largely indifferent to their separatist cause in China. This policy framework was changed in order to appease China, which felt uncomfortable about the fact that Pakistan’s lawless tribal region bordering Afghanistan had developed into a sanctuary for Uighur extremists. However, despite the change in Pakistan’s policy, China will not be able to relax until the project is completed, as for China it can become a liability more than an asset, given Pakistan’s unpredictable nature . As China gears up to take up large projects related to CPEC, they may set up their units in Xinjiang province, which could further escalate the ethnic tension.

Increasing the capabilities of CPEC increases the likelihood of Uyghur terrorismAsia Times 5/11/16 (Peter Lee, “SCS for South China Sea aren’t the scariest letters in the world … they’re CPEC”, Accessed 7/5/16, Available Online at http://atimes.com/2016/05/csc-for-south-china-sea-arent-the-scariest-letters-in-the-world-theyre-cpec/, JRR)

Uyghur activism is a bigger wild card for PRC than Tibet, thanks to the demographic distribution of Uyghurs across the border in Kazakhstan, the burbling problem of recruitment of Uyghurs into ISIS and other Islamist military outfits, and the fact that one of those outfits, the Pakistan Taliban, bears a deep and abiding hatred for the PRC for its role in the storming of the Lal Masjid Mosque in 2007. It seems that India, despite Prime Minister Modhi’s shortcomings in Muslim outreach exemplified by the Gujarat pogrom, thinks the Uyghur wild card might be worth playing, especially given the fact that the CPEC terminates in the Uyghur heartland of Kashgar. The geostrategic value of the Uyghur invite received an endorsement from another ex-National Security Advisor, Shivshankar Menon: “I see it as necessary, possibly useful, but also setting us on a new course with China …We must play with the levers and cards we are dealt by fate and the Chinese.” PRC objections provoked the cancellation of the visa of Dolkun Ilsa, chairman of the World Uyghur Congress’s executive committee. However, several other Uyghur activists attended, and India is seen as a potential resource in the struggle. The PRC was also undoubtedly unhappy to learn that the conference was also attended by Katrina Lantos Swett, daughter of the late human rights champion Senator Tom Lantos and, in her own right one of the nine commissioners of the entirely US federal government funded bipartisan United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. US strategic interest in undercutting the PRC and Pakistan by exploiting their ethnic vulnerabilities long predates the announcement of the CPEC. This interest is probably growing stronger as US resentment against Pakistan — exemplified by the recent Congressional resolution to deny Pakistan funding for its purchase of F-16 fighters — plays out and the Pentagon’s over-the-top wooing of India as an anti-PRC security partner continues. So there you have it. On one hand you have the PRC and Pakistan trying to sell a win-win story with the CPEC , despite its rather boondoggley economic elements. On the other hand, you have diehard separatists in Balochistan, PoK, Xinjiang, and Tibet eager to make it fail . You’ve got a pool of resentful Islamist extremists near the route of the CPEC in Pakistan, Xinjiang, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan . You have China hawks in India and the United States who would be happy to see the CPEC turn into quagmire for the PRC. And you have leaders in both countries who are cautiously willing to give the China hawks some rein, in order to create some much needed leverage against the PRC. And to deal with these myriad challenges, the PRC has to lean on Pakistan. As the dismal precedent of the US experience illustrates, bad things happen when a great power relies on the Pakistan military/ISI for restrained, intelligent, responsible, and effective execution of a complicated security and political program. As I see it, the CPEC has only a narrow, winding path to success. If it works, it will be a miracle of disciplined diplomacy overcoming massive institutional, popular, and external resistance. There are a thousand roads to failure, failure that might come by design, or by accident as uncontrollable forces are released. Don’t make the mistake of regarding the CPEC as another South China Sea, an opportunity for a budget-fattening play date for the US and PRC and other regional militaries, one carefully constrained and choreographed between several high-capacity partners within a relatively stable political and security matrix… … think of Pakistan as another Syria, a nation with its national polity sliding into dysfunction and insurrection, immersed in a hostile environment of strategic enemies and failing states, a potential regional black hole of violence and chaos … … except it has 180 million people, has nuclear weapons, and shares borders with two anxious world powers. As I said at the outset, the biggest global threat doesn’t come from “SCS”…

Kritik

Cap LinkCPEC represents the endless drive for profit that undergirds the AFF’s desire to exploit resources– this flawed lens reifies a bankrupt system of capitalism- Turns the AFFZafar 16- Ali Zafar, DAAD Scholar of Development Economics at University of Applied Sciences, Berlin, Germany, Staff Writer for Pakistan Today, Failing CPEC, Feb. 25, 2016, http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/02/25/comment/failing-cpec/ @yangtri 7/13/16

It’s not the project rather the institution that will fail it China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has in recent days received more than required criticism on whether the project itself is an efficient one or not; some have objected on the mere route that the roads will

take from China to Gwadar and the injustice that is being done to the smaller provinces yet again, while others have been engaged in the futile discussion of it being an investment or a loan but what most of them have overlooked is the major aspect of this project : does Pakistan even have the institutional capacity to implement this project or not? The project might have its merits and demerits and no one can be entirely sure about it until the project is implemented but one thing that everyone in Pakistan can

attest to is the weak institutions that the country homes. Be it law enforcement or education , one of the most fundamental

problems is that of institutions. This article will, through the six variables (educational match, technology, absorption of skills/talent, system of law, equitable working environment and innovation), used by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in their research on institutions, evaluate the institution directly involved with CPEC i.e., Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform and pass a verdict whether this institution has the girth to

successfully implement the project or not. Most of the institutions of Pakistan have the same fundamentals that the British left us; the bureaucracy follows the same practices, the institutions follow the same norms and even the recruitment processes haven’t changed since 1947. Hence the institutions still remain the extractive kind as they used to be when the main objective of our white masters was to extract resources from the colonies and direct them to Great Britain. Over all these years only masters have changed, now the local bureaucrats extract these resources by using whatsoever power they have to make their lives better. This path dependence has brought with it the inefficiency that the system of bureaucracy reeks of and its inability to promote economic growth and development in the country due to plagued institutions . The extent of this path dependence can be gauged from the fact that even today there are separate toilets for the “Officers” and the “Staff”, as if the former gushes forth rainbows and rose petals while doing their business.

Security KTheir conception of india-china conflict is steeped in ahistorical, hypermasculine and inaccurate models of power that push out more accurate and peaceful understandings of the relationships between peoples of the countries they describe—reject their discourseBanerjee and Ling 2006 Payal, (PhD, Syracuse University, Sociology) is an Assistant Professor in Sociology @ Syracuse AND L. H. M., Associate Professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs (GPIA) at The New School in New York City “Hypermasculine War Games: Triangulating US-India-China” http://www.gpia.info/files/u1/wp/2006-12.pdf

This paper examines the current US security discourse on “triangulating” relations with India and China . Drawn from its Cold War precedent involving the US, the Soviet Union, and China, this strategy casts the US in a position of “playing” the “China card” against India, or the “India card” against China, as a means of obtaining crucial concessions from each. Contrary to most treatments of the subject, however, this paper does not decipher the specifics of US-India-China geopolitics: its goals, strategies, outcomes. Nor does it seek to survey this relationship from the perspective

of each state. Such analyses have been undertaken – indeed, they comprise the majority of the literature on the subject – yet they produce little new insight that is productive for considering future relations between the US, India, and China. They

tend, instead, to rehash the same old concepts and dynamics, freezing this relationship and our understanding of it in a realist time warp as if the Cold War never ended, India and China have not really globalized, and national elites think the same wherever and whoever they are. 2We offer

another approach to US-India-China relations. We examine the social relations behind “triangulating” these three states, particularly from the perspective of US defense intellectuals.3 We do so to evaluate the merits of participating in such

a discourse in the first place. In this sense, discourse is practice (cf. Weldes 1999; Milliken1999). We ask: Which identities and roles are assigned by whom to whom in this security discourse, and how are its benefits and penalties distributed systematically? Put differently, why would those who benefit least and suffer most from this discourse put up with it? Even for those who seem to benefit most from this discourse, what are its costs and consequences? And what alternatives could we consider instead? Here, we focus on the

security discourse that emanates from the US . As the world’s sole superpower, its constructions of world politics invariably precipitate(re)actions from others . Of course, India and China have their own security discourses is-à-vis the US as well as each other and we will touch upon them here. Indeed, a similar, relational analysis should be

conducted for each – but in due time. In this paper, we begin with the US. John Garver’s article, “The China-India-US Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold War Era” (NBR Analysis 2002) aptly illustrates “triangulation” as a national security strategy. Not only does Garver present the strategy as eminently objective, rational, and historically accurate, but also the article’s site of publication, NBR Analysis, comes from a well-respected, well-established source of research and intelligence on Asia. The National

Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) self-identifies as “nonprofit, nonpartisan” and “devoted to bridging the policy, academic,

and business communities with advanced policy-relevant research on Asia” (http://www.nbr.org). A closer examination of NBR’s Board of Directors reveals a very partisan membership composed of mega-corporations (e.g., Unocal, Coca Cola, Corning, Microsoft, Boeing, Ford) and their elite associates in the military (e.g., former US joint chiefs of staff chairman General John M. Shalikashvili), industry (e.g., Virginia Mason Medical Center), and academia(e.g., American Enterprise Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center). Furthermore, NBR makes its reports and publications easily available on-line to

ensure a wide readership. Our singular focus on Garver’s article, then, is more than compensated by its representativeness, not just in terms of its views but also the interests and social infrastructure behind them. We argue that the US security discourse of “triangulation” perpetuates hypermasculine war games . By hyper masculinity, we draw on Ashis Nandy’s (1988)identification of an exaggeration or distortion of those traits traditionally-assigned as masculine, like aggression and competition, at the expense of so-called feminine ones , like intellection and concern for social welfare, to justify colonial power

relations . Hypermasculinity affects colonizer and colonized alike such that each becomes a co-victim of colonialism and imperialism. For both, hypermasculinity leads to an “undeveloped heart” that sanctions sexism, racism, false cultural homogeneity, and most insidiously, banal violence. In the case of

US-India-China triangulation, this discourse allows former colonizers to retain their role as globe-spanning arbiters of the “rules of the game .” The formerly colonized, meanwhile, are relegated to a condition of postcolonial mimicry externally regardless of their elevated status internally. They must demonstrate forever their “manhood” or other forms of “legitimacy” according to the white man’s terms. Given this context

of colonialized, radicalized nationalism for ruling elites, hypermasculine war games set up a globalized hierarchy of gender, class, and culture for the rest of us. The proliferation of “desire industries” (Agathangelou and Ling

2003) all over the world, despite governmental condemnation and policing, offers one such indication. Whether women or femininity or even feminist analysis should intervene in this exclusive (neo)colonial club is beside the point. We, all of us, need to not just change “the rules” but displace “the game” altogether . One

way is to recognize the social relations that already exist in contrast to those imputed by conventional security. The latter fixates narrowly on questions of states-and-borders, law-and-order, who’s-on-top competitiveness whereas a broader appreciation of the binding engagements and contestations that make up everyday life asks: How do we want to live? For India and China, we can draw from a millennia-old archive of encounters, exchanges, and flows. We conclude with implications of this history for security in contemporary world politics.