Post on 16-Jan-2017
An analysis concerning the strengths and limitations of structural international relations theory in an empirical context.
A Study of the U.S-China rapprochement under Richard Nixon.
Daniel Bassilios
I.D: 150091220
POL8099: Dissertation (2015-2016)
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in International Political Economy.
School of Geography, Politics and Sociology. Newcastle University.
August 2016
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to blend empirical analysis with relevant theoretical material to uncover
the strengths and weaknesses of International Relations theory. Through examining the Nixon
administration’s rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China, I aim to uncover some of the
most comprehensive perplexities and limitations that exist when theorising phenomena in
international relations. In utilising and scrutinising the works of Robert Keohane and Kenneth Waltz,
the primary proponents of neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-realism in the context of IR, and
applying their principles to the activity of the US in relation to China during the period of
reconciliation with the communist state, it will be possible to give a clear indication as to how and
why the US thought this was a necessary undertaking in the context of the Cold War and the other
dynamics, both domestic and international that shaped the course of world politics.
This is not however without its caveats; theory is effective and enables us to make sense out of the
convoluted and multi-dimensional facets within international relations. But it is also grounded and
often reductionist. The two doctrines form part of the core genesis of IR theoretical framework and
have since been scrutinised comprehensively; to the extent that an analysis involving the same case
study could produce a radically alternative narrative given the use of different theoretical blueprints.
Waltz and Keohane’s doctrines share their similarities and differences, the differences are most
pronounced in the methodological practices which are played out in the international arena.
Amongst the similarities is the composition and essentiality of this international arena. The
structuralist disposition of both theories makes their ontological assumptions regarding the
behaviour and aims of states grounded by a rational, objective mantra which is unconstrained by
anything less than the grand structure of the international systemic particularities and variables.
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Four variables related to the case study will be used to showcase both the strengths and weaknesses
of theory. I will embed theory within the facets of this case study and analyse the variables on these
theoretical grounds while also stressing the plausible inadequacy which can be concluded if theory is
to be taken without restriction or further consideration. I will then conclude on the extent to which
IR theory has given broad and comprehensive scope for analysis but also the capacity to which we
can be lead into further assessments sourced from a relatively restrictive analysis.
Word Count as of 23/08/2016 – 13,015
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Contents
Abstract – i
Introduction: US-China relational dynamics and theoretical blueprints - 2
Reviewing Essential Literature - 5
Methodological Underpinnings - 14
[Chapters 1-4]The Sino-Soviet Split - 18
Power and Hegemony - 21
Domestic Political Pressures - 24
Pragmatism - 27
Variables analysis and summery - 31
Conclusions - 37
Bibliography - 39
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Introduction: US-China relational dynamics and theoretical blueprints
Within a year, Sino-American diplomacy had moved from irreconcilable conflict to a visit
to Beijing by a presidential emissary to prepare a visit by the president himself. It did so by
sidestepping the rhetoric of two decades and staying focussed on the fundamental
strategic objective of a geopolitical dialogue leading to a recasting of the Cold War
international order. (Kissinger 2011, 234)
Henry Kissinger signals the rapid and radical birth of an interstate dialogue between a Marxist-
Leninist revolutionary militant turned statesman, and a stern anti-communist executive at the helm
of world’s foremost economic and military power. This new relationship was forged in the context
where before there had been isolation and containment; the latter being executed by the scale of
foreign intervention in the Vietnam conflict; US foreign policy towards the former French colony was
instigated by the Eisenhower administration within which Nixon was Vice President and expressively
anti-communist. Similar static and outwardly hostile sentiments of the political class had translated
across the country and encapsulated the ideological position of the citizenry (Lassiter 2006). This
conformity had been eroded by the time Nixon made his presence felt as commander-in-chief of the
US forces in Vietnam. Portions of American society had undergone a paradigm shift, projecting
rhetoric of revulsion and hatred towards war as well as the deep rooted inequalities in their own
society (Jeffreys-Jones 1999). The Nixon administration faced the external pressures of economic
paradigm shifts too, with the weakening of US manufacturing and industrial output relative to
overseas markets in conjunction with internal strife in the form of rising public debt accelerated by
the conflict in Vietnam. The end of the dollar-gold standard association altered US management of
the international monetary system and the international financial consensuses constructed at
Bretton Woods had arguably become annulled (Gill 1990). Bretton Woods epitomised the primary
motor for post-war global economics, and had been the engine for the liberal, open market
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philosophy which relied on expedient and widespread trade and investment without unilateral
political interference or protectionist policies.
‘The Sino-US rapprochement started as a tactical aspect of the Cold War; it evolved to where it
became central to the evolution of the new global order. Neither of us had any illusion of changing
the basic convictions of the other’ (Kissinger 2011, 243). Two seemingly conflicting ideologies
dominated in China and the United States, yet the binary had a third dimension in the form of the
Soviet Union. China had developed an increasingly scornful dialogue with the Soviet Union during
the 1960s and the hostility had ruptured the integrity of the Communist bloc (Luthi 2008). Now
isolated within the Communist sphere and without a formidable ally elsewhere; the hitherto
unrelenting and self-assured Marxist-Leninist state allowed itself to become accessible to US
diplomats, irrespective of the staunch opposition towards them being played out in Vietnam and on
ideological grounds in the meta-narrative of the state which Kissinger understood as a radical,
qualitative variant from the self-image that characterises the United States. China all the while
maintained its antipathy towards the US’s imperialist agenda and through the Cultural Revolution,
transmitted the Maoist doctrine and philosophy to its citizenry through brute force (Kissinger 2011,
181-201). In spite of this dialogue within China and Nixon’s own anti-communist tone, the
reconciliation materialised relatively quickly, even without the rudimentary bilateral institutions;
diplomatic missions or embassies (Kissinger 2011, 248).
The shallow points made thus far have only scratched the surface of the context which stimulated a
cautious move towards rapprochement. The domestic political pressures brought on largely by the
conflict in Vietnam, ailing command of the international economy and the increasingly destabilising
forces developing between the Soviet Union and China weighed heavily on Nixon administration in
its first term (Nixon 1978). They are discussed in the forthcoming analysis chiefly because the
administration claims to have done likewise or along similar lines with respect to its own motives as
explained in writing. However, a one dimensional approach such as this holds little clout in the prism
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of international political scrutiny and one must delve beyond the first hand narrative and the biases
that come with it. One bias I must acknowledge is the limitations that exist in focussing on the
manoeuvrings of the United States without a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese perspective. My
methodology is such that the use of structural international relations theory would produce an
effective discourse because the theory is predisposed to situate states as largely self-centred and
focussed on ascertaining greater power and security (Baldwin 1993). Therefore these universalist
blueprints could be applied to China with outcomes and variables which would be fundamentally
similar. The structural dominance found in neo-realism and neo-liberalism also suggests that a
dialogue with China was instigated largely because systemic pressures had bought the two
advisories together despite the hostility that permeated continuously since 1949 and that consistent
and calculated cost-benefit analyses enabled both the US and China to seek a path towards greater,
long term cooperation (Waltz 1979) (Keohane 1984). Both these theories are assembled primarily by
US academics and are focussed on Cold War international relations; furthermore they are
formulated shortly after Nixon’s presidential career.
As will be revealed, the theory greatly enhances the analysis and allows it to justifiably deviate from
the narratives which the key actors in the administration have produced. By positioning a specific,
universal framework which identifies states in a system as inclined to certain behaviours and
practices, it gives another dimension to a state of affairs which follows more than just one linear
account as given by the official reports on the proceedings and general texts detailing world history.
Yet theory and first-hand accounts are still limited, even when combined and scrutinized together.
Stripping away systemic level influences and authorized politicised discourse leads us to pragmatism,
a core methodological instinct which potentially manifests the preeminent drive human activity
(Rorty 1982). Its relevance is pronounced due to the instinctive personas of Nixon and Kissinger who
characterised a political partnership unmitigated by grounded philosophy, rigid bureaucratic
protocols or even pressures within the international system (Litwak 1994). Pragmatism represents
the extent of the complexity in producing concrete analyses and definitive conclusions and by no
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means can one be drawn from this study. However, by expanding the horizons beyond simple
theoretical application to a case study and scrutinising both the Nixon doctrine and the structural
theory, I aim to make this multi-faceted account constructive and informative in relation to the
current and future discourses in international relations.
Reviewing Essential Literature
The setting for which the theoretical applications are based are aptly characterised in this thesis as
perplexing, multi-dimensional and without a definitive theoretical mandate. The structural political
theories put forth by the United States’ academic class during the twentieth century to be
scrutinized, applied and discussed are neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism. Understanding
how and why these modes of thought came into fruition involves understanding the paradigm of
international politics which witnessed the development of these theories, (Burchill and Linklater
2009) but also taking note of the philosophical and literary traditions which translated into
formidable political theory for the context in question. As societies have become less fractured,
communities have solidified their relationships and the state system of political order has extended
and become the recognised norm in practical politics, analysis concerning the substance of this
normalised political behaviour emerges and seeks to position phenomenon in certain perspectives
and assign problem solving mechanisms to address the challenges which arise (Cox 1981). A variety
of different and conflicting reports concerning the behaviour of political actors is now readily
available for the student of international politics and the multi-disciplinary nature of the subject has
drawn in theories from the likes of philosophy, sociology and economics. Irrespective of the
academic source of the theory, its validity can be confirmed on the basis of to what extent it can
simplify what was hitherto complicated and this extent is not without contestation (Waltz 1979, 1-
13). One such example is game theory; which is largely methodological, yet sourced from the liberal
philosophical tradition concerning reciprocity and is characterised as a rational model for producing
outcomes in situations where there is conflicting interest (Axlerod 1970, 5-12). This like other
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methods will be discussed further as the following section will deal primarily with the key works that
form a large part of this thesis’ blueprints. However we must start with the ontological assumptions
of structural theory first.
Hans Morgenthau’s first principle of realism in ‘politics among nations’ perhaps establishes the root
of subsequent analyses in structural theory, ‘political realism...is governed by objective laws...the
operation of these laws being impervious to our preference’ (Morganthau 1985, 4). Human nature is
fundamentally orientated towards rationale, thus the declaration of war is as much the consequence
of human nature as is the making of peace. Both are subject to the demands and needs of the actors
and less so to one’s moral compass (Waltz 2001, 26-39). Part of the focus of this paper will be on the
writings of neo-realist Kenneth Waltz, who begins in man, the state and war starts with a mantra of
classical realists; ‘our miseries are ineluctably the product of our natures. The root of all evil is man’
(Waltz 2001, 3). This is a qualitatively similar analysis to the Hobbesian view of human nature and its
implications are of despotism and suffering. This forms part of the ontology of the neo-realist theory
and is the first of a few crucial points where there is a certain degree of concord with neo-liberalism.
They can both be considered rational choice theories in their ontological starting point however a
point of divergence emerges when action in accordance with rational choice is undertaken. Neo-
liberalists view the severity of human nature to be less pronounced insofar as it less likely to
precipitate into outright hostility between opposing factions, it is in fact centred more on the
traditional liberal philosophy of toleration, reciprocity and mutual respect for one another’s
autonomy, property and life choices (Wendt 2006). This evolves into logical, yet cunning
manoeuvring and strategising for absolute gains through co-operation and if necessary, defection.
(Axelrod 2006) It is nevertheless still grounded in realistic, static rationality because states approach
one other without a predetermined sentimentality and focus on utility maximisation in the political-
economic exchanges. Actors in markets in strictly economic realms interact in a similar fashion.
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When the image concerning human nature is translated at the international level, the concept of
anarchy is the derivative from the view that human nature is both objective and morally dislocated.
Anarchy is consistent dynamic which constitutes international politics in the realist application and
forms a sizeable portion of the ontology surrounding the international political sphere of social
sciences. In conjunction with the writings of Hobbes and the doctrine of Realpolitik (Waltz 1979,
116-117), anarchy and self-help are understood by Kenneth Waltz to be prevalent in the
international system because there are no hierarchy principles in operation between states as there
is within them (Waltz 1979, 88-89). Domestic realms have rigid legislative and judicial structures that
keep subjects loyal and obedient to the state’s unique parameters. These parameters are non-
existent beyond any state’s bounded territory. In such an environment, states seek survival in a
system that cannot lawfully prosecute or punish others and this is a prerequisite to all forthcoming
international relations (Waltz 1979, 91-93). Warfare is therefore the most salient response where
there is no world government but since this is more often than not undesirable and unviable; it is
likely that states form coalitions or protective spheres of influence with each other to a) make the
cost of war for prospective advisories less bearable and b) to maintain their position in relation to
others within the international system (Waltz 1979, 124-126). This position is understood in
materialistic terms and as such, a state’s power in relation to others is subject largely to its economic
and military capabilities and their behavioural pattern works in corresponds with the maxim of
Thucydides; ‘the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must’ (Thucydides 1910,
5.89.1). Framing the state’s security and prosperity in relative terms ensures that there will often be
inter-state conflict, the means to which security is often either enhanced or diminished. The
international climate being consistently hostile will therefore perpetuate the funding and
preparation of extreme security measures associated with military and arms build ups.
For the neo-realists, the balance of power is what constrains the effects of anarchy in the
international sphere where there is no concrete authority and control as is the case at the domestic
level. It is limited in its effectiveness but it’s upheld universally because the inclination to survive
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makes objective and logical sense where there are voids in security and defence (Waltz 1979, 118-
122). Survival is best ensured for the most powerful states when they maximise their relative
strengths economically and militarily; eventually the extent of their strengths and that of the lesser
powerful in the international system signifies the power dynamics that prevail in international
politics (Waltz 1979, 129-131). Finally for Waltz, anarchy is alleviated in an international system
where the risks of pursuing hegemony outweigh the cost and states will consequentially settle for
the status quo in a balanced equilibrium. The Cold War state of affairs is one Waltz identifies as the
most peaceful in the three centuries following the Treaty of Westphalia. (Waltz 1979, 161-163) The
stance illustrated by Waltz reduces states to objective, rational and morally restricted actors, the
same behavioural dynamics he observes in humans (Waltz 2001, 3). It also signals uniformity in the
pitfalls and promises that characterise the state’s activity in the form of the security dilemma. This
uniformity is a constraint among states that would accordingly rather ‘seek such other goals as
tranquillity, profit and power’ (Waltz 1979, 126). Power being understood in relative terms however
ensures the continuity of anarchy; one state’s gain is another state’s loss and its vulnerability
becomes apparent.
Anarchy is regarded by neo-liberal institutionalist theory as a concurrent norm also yet as with the
viewpoints on human nature; responses to anarchy are less austere or cataclysmic in this
framework. Although undeniably present at the international level, and with responses to anarchy
remaining rational and objective; the result for the neo-liberal modality reveals a drive towards
strategic cooperation, mutually beneficial compromises and less hostile links between states whose
animosity is alleviated through the absolute benefits attained through political-economic
cooperation (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). Arriving at different conclusions to Kenneth Waltz,
Keohane’s argument concerns the alternative methodology utilised by states and institutions when
faced with an anarchic realm within which they live and coexist. Realism’s methodology of relative
gains leaves it inflexible and narrow when explaining change on an international level. His
observations point out that cooperation is no less a common feature in the international system
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than is war (Keohane 1984, 7). The methodology is expanded upon by Robert Axelrod who suggests
that strategising through the use of the game theory payoff matrix will in turn lead states to arrive at
the Nash equilibrium. States enter deliberations with exogenously determined variables, or interests
determined externally to the political debate with respective rivals (Donnelly 2009), all the while
understanding that the best plausible outcome may only be achieved if the other party’s best
outcomes are taken into account and accepted as the tactic they will employ. Consequentially both
states, having predetermined the rational choice of one another other, will abandon their preferred
and most lucrative gains pursuit and settle on a compromise and in most cases, this evolves into
increasingly reliable and choreographed cooperation (Axelrod 2006, 3-24) (Axelrod 1970, 3-18).
All too aware of the conflict of interests that characterise international relations, Robert Keohane
deviates from liberal philosophical traditions which are underpinned by democratic peace, mutually
respectful and restrained rights and responsibility, and unimpeachable judicial structures (Burchill,
Liberalism 2009). ‘Cooperation must be distinguished from harmony. Harmony refers to a situation
in which actors policies automatically facilitate the attainment of other’s goals...intergovernmental
cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its
partners as facilitating realisation of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy
coordination’ (Keohane 1984, 51-52). States remain self-interested and egocentric in this approach
and aim to maximise only their own security and prosperity; cooperation maybe a necessity to which
states pursue this but the gains of others are of little relevance. Despite the seeming animosity that
remains in-spite of cooperation; absolute gains frequently become the unintended consequences of
this cooperation even though states have no intention of facilitating the attainment of other’s goals.
Keohane however does indicate that the disharmony is the facet to which states understand their
relations to one another and that discord and in some cases conflict are common because
governments will not build cohesive relations with those they cooperate with or reconcile with their
greatest foes (Keohane 1984, 53-54). This is the maintenance of impartiality and objectivity in the
international system as well as the maintenance of anarchy. It is also the maintenance of exogenous
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political-economic terms and conditions or intransigent manoeuvring which predetermines state’s
goals from within their own political sphere (Keohane 1994). Consequentially, the dialogue they may
have with other states will not precipitate into endogenous compromise or a deviation from their
original objectives. However, the extent to which mediatory institutions alleviate this and
reconfigure the dynamics between structure and agency is contestable and challenges the structural
disposition of neo-liberal theory (Keohane and Martin 1999).
A structural body characterises the core component of both theories. Mentioned previously on
several occasions thus far is the international system. This system is the structure which comprises
of multiple actors or agents establishing their aims and objectives through cooperation and conflict
and everything in between (Donnelly 2009, 45-47). The conduit of international relations is in the
dynamics of the system comprised of nation states who act in this realm in order to safeguard their
interests and security in the anarchic, finite space of the global political environment (Baldwin 1993).
Waltz approaches the need for a systemic analysis in light of the limitations of analytical
dissemination. ‘A system’s approach will be needed, if outcomes are affected not only by the
properties and interconnections of variables but also by the way in which they are organised’ (Waltz
1979, 39). Systemic theories maybe reductionist, however they help explain widespread and
complex phenomenon on a scale as large as the world itself (in international relations terms) (Waltz
1979, 18-37). The approaches of the structural theorists centre on the question of how order is
structured out of anarchy in a system of multiple parties, which are superficially equal as sovereign
states but with conflicting interests. In the structural realist paradigm, order is very much the norm
and consistently present within the confines of the sovereign state (Waltz 1979, 102-104). Where
this orderly status is recognised internationally, states collectively recognise each other’s sovereignty
and a realm’s control of the population. The institutions contained within a state precipitate the
necessary function of keeping the population obedient and loyal to the domestic authoritative
bodies. E.g. judicial apparatus’ and the central bank. Unit level analysis is however of little relevance
to the international systemic structures which drive international relations. While human nature is
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relevant in uncovering the root cause of anarchy and disharmony between states, in methodological
practices, it features very infrequently in the dialogue and actions between states. This is a key facet
of Waltz’s reductionism insofar as his thesis attempts only to explain the happenings in international
politics as if they were detached from domestic or individual variables. Although Waltz
acknowledges his limitations, this translates into the formulation of a perspective which cannot
thoroughly be applied universally in space and time. Upon reading, one will likely find that it
grapples mostly with militaristic and security issues in a political economic context (Levine 2012).
Likewise for the neo-liberal school, the extent of anarchy is both enforced and curtailed by the
structure of the international system. Where there is deviation from the realist modus operandi is in
their analysis of structural dynamics and the influences that drive change within it. Realising that
states have to co-exist with one another opens up perspectives for interdependence and at times
calculated cooperation that is mutually beneficial, as the extremity of conflict may throw states and
the international order into turmoil (Axelrod 2006) (Keohane and Nye 2012, 19-21). For Keohane,
the international order is supplemented by an additional dimension; institutions and regimes of
cooperation (Keohane 1984, 245). ‘Institutions that facilitate cooperation do not mandate what
governments do; rather they help governments pursue their own interests through cooperation’
(Keohane 1984, 246). Playing up the importance of these intermediary bodies projects an alternative
methodology on the management of international affairs. They help to quell the tensions and
hostility that originate organically out of anarchy and egoism and can facilitate a quasi-lawful code of
conduct which states seek to uphold for the sake of their reputation in the international community.
This shift is not undertaken coercively by a hegemonic power or a rogue world policing body; it is
largely manifested voluntarily and with widespread consent (Keohane 1984, 246-251). The power
structure which breeds hegemony is not rigid and altercations will arise without the voluntary
participation of the majority of states in the system seeking to reduce the propensity to engage in
conflict and increase the propensity for achieving higher levels of economic prosperity worldwide
(Keohane 1984, 252-259). The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation
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for Economic Security and Development and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Now the
World Trade Organisation) are the physical incarnations of institutions which shape the cooperative
dimensions of international relations and global political economy.
Both theories are justified and validated by their pseudo-scientific clout and their limited proficiency
in reducing human interaction to calculated discourse. The dialogue evolves differently when their
methodology is played out (Grieco 1993). For neo-realists, the scopes under which political actions
are made are subject to the prospective material outcomes whereas the neo-liberalists focus more
on the actions and reactions of the units or states involved. Their time horizons differ as the neo-
realists are more inclined to pursue the most gainful opportunities for maximising power as soon as
they arise; whereas the neo-liberals underscore the importance of future interactions, behaviours
and consequences of cooperation and defection in the present situation. Events may transpire in this
neo-liberal framework, however its proponents do not necessarily discredit neo-realism’s
methodologies, rather they present a clear variation in how the methodologies of both structural
theories may diverge when institutions which encourage and facilitate cooperation are added to the
equation or the structure of international system (Keohane 1984, 65-67) (Rana 2015). Both contend
that with the premise that international relations are fundamentally governed by activity above and
beyond the control of any one state or institution. The implied lack of universal authority brings
about the persistence of anarchy. This state of affairs has negative connotations but is not
understood as profoundly negative; the problem is not as the name suggests despotism or chaos,
but simply a lack of collective authority which immediately assumes that states require this
Leviathan to maintain continual order and wellbeing in the international arena (Waltz 1979, 102-
104) (Keohane 1994). International order has manifested and been maintained despite the
perceived presence of anarchy according to structuralist theories. Waltz argues that the horizontal
relationship between states develops a systemic balance of power where strong and weak states
coexist understanding their place relative to one another. War is produced when states of similar
economic and military capabilities vie for a greater allocation of power in their favour (Waltz 1979,
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111-114). Anarchy is positioned as an oxymoron for neo-liberals as the principle through which
states are inclined to carefully coordinate their relations through by means of cooperation (Keohane
1994).
Waltz and Keohane both articulate the justifications and limitations of their theoretical
underpinnings. Waltz picks up on theory as the mantra of explaining phenomenon. Raw data and
statistics alone are empty jargon which lack depth and understanding if there is no theory to guide
academics towards an explicit series of associations and patterns. Empirical knowledge is
supplemented by theory to make sense of the findings and offer some degree of rationalization to
the (thus far) shallow information one has gathered (Waltz 1979, 4-5). Keohane argues that the
breadth and complexity of phenomena in the international relations discipline is very much what
requires it to be disciplined, in part by theory, as it can offer an element of consistency when
analyses are made (Keohane 2004). Theory is seldom multidimensional and precise in assessing how
and why human beings behave in a certain manner, hence why they are challenged and
reconfigured as the compound analysis continues to reveal patterns of correlation and varying
degrees of causation. The forthcoming analysis will attempt to blend the two alternative structural
theories of international relations in the interpretations of the empirical study, not by defining and
exemplifying a more general structural theory through this integration but by interpreting the
manoeuvres of the actors involved as subject to a narrative which constitutes both neo-realism and
neo-liberalism. Furthermore, the positioning of such theoretical frameworks is not definitive and this
thesis will deviate from the rigidity of the structural models and examine the case study more
broadly; theory’s applicability will also be scrutinised.
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Methodological Underpinnings
The underlying reason for choosing to blend the Nixon administration’s rapprochement with China
with structural realism and liberalism is predicated on investigating the magnitude to which the
theories of international politics can explain the occurrences which fundamentally realigned
American foreign policy directives in the early 1970s. The weight of these theories is amplified due
to them manifesting clearly in more of less the same time and place to the case study. This context is
important due to the clear position of structural causes and effects in both theories. Since they both
utilise a clear comprehension of structural impact, it bodes well to examine an episode in 1970s
international relations with the academic tools of the period and the region. Indeed Kenneth Waltz’s
comprehension of the human condition is grappled with in ‘man, the state and war’. Through a
realignment of philosophy and psychology orchestrated by the intellectual elites of a society can
there be a general consensus in support of preventative politics (Waltz 2001, 42-46). In a similar
fashion, a liberal, secular meta-narrative manifested itself in Western tradition during the
enlightenment and Waltz sees progress in international politics as being determined by a similar
transition in the modes of thought (Waltz 2001, 72-79). The maintenance of peace in this
methodological narrative becomes subject to a great deal of domestic and unit level input, yet it has
its direct implications on the political climate of the international system.
In the neo-liberal format, the methodology is largely the basis of objective scientific behavioural
reasoning insofar as international relations are played out (Axelrod 1970). However the
acknowledgement on the part of Keohane holds that the theory is a blueprint to how actors SHOULD
behave, and this is not always translated when actor’s methods are played out (Keohane 1984, 72-
78). Rational choice is the methodological means which ought to create a narrative which all can
understand but the reality which will be dissected in relation to the US rapprochement with China
wields various other dynamics. Surrounding rational choice are the problems of security and
cooperation in a generally lawless international space; the core basis upon which structural theory is
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constructed. It should however be understood without further delay that the theoretical blueprints
offer nothing more than a vague direction for this analysis and that forces at play which do not
necessarily conform to either structural realism or liberalism offer a robust and solid argument in
discord with theory and in revealing its weaknesses. Consequentially I will be measuring to what
extent the theoretical tools of a particular place and time can illuminate certain facets of an event in
corresponding context, notwithstanding those dynamics which the theory struggles to explain.
Kenneth Waltz and Robert Keohane are two key proponents of the neo-realism and neo-liberalism
respectively and their primary works will largely constitute the theoretical elements of this paper.
An alternative scenario to the theoretically dense motif is pragmatism, a largely American inspired
doctrine which is anything but a formidable guideline of rule book to dissecting human behavioural
patterns. It is aligned to practicality and effectiveness in the philosophical conundrums regarding
truth and knowledge (Stuhr 2009). In empirical terms, that which is acted upon with practical
consequences holds more truth than intangible or abstract theories and ideas;
‘A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to
professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions,
from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins.
He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action, and towards power.
That means the empiricist temper regnant, and the rationalist temper sincerely given up. It means
the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality and the pretence of finality in
truth’ (James 1907, 51).
Pragmatism is a methodology in its own right, and solely a method without a theoretical blueprint in
the form of ontology (James 1907). It is worthy of mention here because of its origins in modern US
philosophy but more so because all political action is laden with a form of pragmatism insofar as
every action undertaken by an individual or a state is a method with a reified truth, in accordance
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with a pragmatic notion of the construct of truth. While this deviates somewhat from the synopsis
which attaches theoretical formulae to an empirical event; I justify this partial inclusion of
pragmatism because of the radical alternative it presents, it’s seemingly universal validity and the
case made in chapter four depends on nothing except method through action and action alone.
Although even this concept is manifested in various different formats, its central methodological use
will concentrate on what extent there has been a ‘pragmaticisation’ of theory and philosophy (Rorty
1982).
The numerous different challenges presented by the breadth and interpretations of these readings
will inevitably render this thesis with occasional limitations; especially as some of the abstract
material renders many analyses reductionist and at times, improbable (Clandinin and Caine 2013).
Aided but not dependant on supporting materials from the case in question (autobiographic,
archived and respected academic works), I will attempt to carefully blend the theory with the
empirical date through the use of a qualitative and interpretive-hermeneutic analysis. This method
calls for what is generally considered a contestable, subjective interpretation of a modality which is,
rather ironically, not saturated with clear cut objective reasoning but it commands more of an
individualised reading of a narrative which has its own contexts and traditions (Ricoeur 1974),
ultimately meaning that in this framework, the theoretical principles are inherently subjective
despite their assurance that they are in fact the opposite. In such a situation, it becomes intrinsically
difficult to make a clear sense of the theory’s proponents as this method immediately challenges its
core objective component. It raises issues concerning the ordering structure of the thesis, whether
the theory should instigate the empirical research or if the research can be used to decipher and
refine the existing theory (Berg 2009), in an altogether more practical or even pragmatic approach.
With this in consideration, the main essence will remain to assess the extent to which broad
structural theory in its self-professed format as an objective and rational doctrine will coherently
explain a foreign policy doctrine of the same time and place.
xviii
From the onset, a series of issues have come to fruition in this section; we must realise what
formulates a coherent or incoherent ‘extent’ and ‘explanation’. There is no definitive justification for
making a case on a spectrum of coherence, however what will come to light is the systematised
questioning of a theory’s core principles in relation to the case material or a ‘symptomatic reading’.
This interpretive practice aims to reveal the relational dispute between the objective disposition of
the theory and the subliminal governing principles which problematize the means of constructing a
validated form of objectivity (Resch 1992). With readings which are based on quasi-scientific
principles, one immediately comes to realise how the analytical pitfalls can materialise both within
the analysts’ own mental frame of mind but also the frameworks saturated within the texts;
Scientific observation is always polemical; it either confirms or denies a prior thesis, a pre-existing
model, an observational protocol. It shows as it demonstrates; it establishes a hierarchy of
appearances; it transcends the immediate; it reconstructs first its own models and then reality. And
once the step is taken from the observation to experimentation, the polemical character of
knowledge stands out even more sharply’ (Bachelard 1984, 13).
Through the use of divergent analyses (structural theories and pragmatic approaches) as well as the
acknowledgement of cautious and conscientious readings, the works of Waltz, Keohane and
additional academic personnel can be more thoroughly scrutinised and thus a more dynamic and
multi-faceted image of a chapter in 1970s US foreign policy can be presented. Furthermore there will
be a comprehensive yet limited reliance on excessive explanatory case material which is readily
available in media formats (academic or non-academic), and ill-defined holistic links between
phenomena. All the while, I will aspire to keep from any commentary which could produce an
unwarranted distortion of reality.
xix
The Sino-Soviet Relationship
In the tense, competitive and polarised political climate of much of the twentieth century, states of
various economic and military might can project even greater strengths and influences if they
identify as allies and keep many of their foreign policy aims and objectives in alignment (Waltz 1979,
125-128). In a state of bipolarity, two forces maintain the equilibrium in the international system and
their influence is seldom diminished by one ally’s choice to disassociate from the block, according to
the Waltz. ‘Thus two losses of China in the post war world- first by the United States and then by the
Soviet Union-were accommodated without disastrously distorting, or even much affecting, the
balance between America and Russia’ (Waltz 1979, 169). Disregarded as a minor setback for the
Soviet Union in the early 1970s by Waltz with respect to global security, the neo-liberal perspective
brings to light the economic connotations on power and hegemony; in a case such as this the
dynamics in a bipolar system become much less clear as the ‘hegemonic equilibrium has been
broken and a spiral of action and counter action may set in’ (Keohane and Nye 2012, 39). This first
chapter will examine the manner in which China and the Soviet Union constituted a less harmonious
relationship in the decade preceding the US rapprochement and the subsequent US responses with
application of neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist theories.
In a series of exchanges between delegates of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the kinship forged in the wake of the Communist
Party’s ascension in China was formally unravelled. The majority of the tensions raised concerned
ideological differences and the general direction of the global Marxist-Leninist doctrine which
ostensibly universalised the political-economic aims and objectives of all Communist parties (Foreign
Language Press - Beijing 1964). Additionally, deliberations between Beijing and Moscow frequently
cited the growing unease of the CPC with Soviet interference in Chinese affairs and the unequal
treatment of China by Soviet personnel engaged in the Chinese economy and military (Ellison 1993).
Personal animosity between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong continuously fuelled the
xx
breakdown of relations over a period of several years of Khrushchev’s leadership of the Soviet
Union, and the greater encroachment of the United States into the foreign policy objectives of
Moscow and then Beijing ensured that the Sino-Soviet relationship was increasingly coming under
pressure both internally and externally (Luthi 2008, 1-17). By the time of Nixon’s ascent to the
presidency, China had formidably re-orientated away from behind the veil of Soviet dominance of
the communist world and concerns had damaged relations had increased the propensity of conflict
between the two countries (Luthi 2008, 341-344). In a bipolar order and a structural realist set up,
these escalation fears would have little impact on the overall level of global stability and security, yet
with both states possessing nuclear weapons and the questionable status of China as merely a
supersized satellite state subservient to the schemes of the Soviet Union, potential conflict arguably
had less localised and more devastating effects. Nuclear weapons implore states to think in
cataclysmic terms and render alliances obsolete (Waltz 1979, 182-185), in this context the US had
minimal leverage over the Soviet Union and even less amongst politicians in China.
Security concerns supersede all others in the context of realism, and maintenance of a stable
international system often rests with strongest states (Waltz 1979, 199-204). At equilibrium there
are tensions under the guise of anarchy but the balance of power is maintained by the prospect of
heavier losses than gains, particularly so in the nuclear age. Where neo-liberalism brings forward the
discussion is in the assessment regarding the resurgence of anarchy if the equilibrium is unravelled
and bi-polarity mutates into multi-polarity (Keohane and Nye 2012, 39). This largely centres on the
question of whether or not China was an aspiring hegemonic power which sought to disassociate
with its former ally that was undermining its own potential. However it is categorically unlikely that
the US sought to curry favour with China over the Soviet Union due to the enhanced dialogue with
the Russians which eventually lead to the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty and expanded trade and
commercial activity (Goh 2005) (Ellison 1993, 93-121). However it is implied by Kissinger that both
parties, not least China under the authority of the ageing revolutionary Mao Zedong was ready for a
dialogue which would aggravate the Soviet Union (Kissinger 2011, 202-203). All the while both the
xxi
US and China had constructed the meta-narrative of hostility and staunch ideological opposition and
therefore approached with caution, indirectly pledging not to give China a friendlier dialogue than
had been given to the Soviets (Kissinger 2011, 204-205). This approach is categorised by realism as
an archetypal diplomatic protocol which is neither at the mercy of ideological or domestic political
factors and is purely a strategic alliance. Structural constraints and liberties ultimately determine
how states engage with one another (Keohane 1986, 93-94).
As enmity between Communist China and the USSR grew, it became apparent that China’s enemy’s
enemy could become its friend, albeit on a strategic basis akin to the alliances forged during the
Second World War between ideologically dissimilar countries. As such, the administration headed by
Nixon and Kissinger rejected an ideologically grounded US foreign policy objective and instigated its
will out of concern for global peace and stability; Kissinger identified this method as America’s
utilisation of realpolitik, the mantra of the realist in all their shapes and forms (Kissinger 1994, 723-
725) (Landau 1972).The US government at the time noted the changing fashion of the Eastern bloc’s
international relations and the implications on security within the international system. ‘The Stalinist
bloc has fragmented into competing centres of doctrine and power. One of the deepest conflicts in
the world today is between communist China and the Soviet Union’ (United States Government
Printing Office 1999, 220). As an acknowledged superpower, the US can instigate a shift towards
cooperation which can translate well in both economic and security terms (Keohane 1984, 31-39).
Nixon stated, with reference to belief in his country’s hegemony, that the Chinese can now be
‘drawn into a constructive relationship with the world community’ (United States Government
Printing Office. 1999, 276). There are conflicting accounts regarding the maintenance of peace
between neo-realists and neo-liberals, the former arguing in favour of the balance of power whereas
the latter see greater stability instilled by cooperative dialogue series of mediating institutions. The
overall stability of the international system was not thoroughly or immediately altered by the Sino-
Soviet split, despite concerns that the US had while developing a dialogue with China. It
correspondingly improved the dialogue with the Soviet Union.
xxii
Power and Hegemony
Against the backdrop of Soviet influence on much of Eastern Europe and Asia, the United States
stood as the foremost world power in the West. The Cold War is generally understood by Kenneth
Waltz to be constitutive of a bipolar international order. Moreover this configuration is ever more
divisive than had been previously because the US maybe hegemonic in its own sphere of influence
but the breadth of power has spread worldwide since, for example the European centric era of
British hegemony, to include the Soviet Union and its allies in Asia and Europe (Waltz 1968, 5-8).
With the greater dispersion of power across vastly dissimilar political-economic modalities, it
becomes questionable to state whether the system is unipolar or bipolar, nevertheless Waltz is clear
that on a global scale, the US maybe able to exert a disproportionately high level of influence but
that the Soviet Union has the ability to counter this if and when the US encroaches on its territory or
that of its closest neighbours; as was demonstrated by the proxy conflict in Vietnam (Waltz 1979,
204-210). The neo-liberal writings of Robert Keohane concern themselves with the post-hegemomic
order of global affairs, he contends with an implied pessimism that only in the immediate aftermath
of a great conflict is a hegemomic power established, only for its power to gradually erode in the
years ahead (Keohane 1984, 8-11). Order and stability in the post-hegemonic era is the subject of his
thesis and argues that this can prevail beyond hegemony if international institutions are strong and
can provide a concrete platform for cooperation (Keohane 1984, 11-17). This chapter examines the
dynamics of US hegemony in the early 1970s context of rapprochement with China and what course
of action authority makers undertook in correspondence with the structuralist principles.
What constitutes power? Largely it is considered by neo-realists that economic and military
capabilities are the ‘currency in international politics’ (Mearsheimer 2006, 72). Their rank may also
depend on ‘size of population and territory, resource endowment, political stability and
competence’ (Waltz 1979, 131). Kissinger realised power was spread out in a similar manner during
the Cold War and that it manifested itself in a manner closely in line with Waltz’s framework. Waltz’s
xxiii
take on the US movement towards China falls heavily in line with the understanding that Nixon and
Kissinger both shared; China possesses all the necessary attributes of a potential superpower and
must therefore be treated as one (Waltz 1979, 130). It must firstly be treated as a state and no
longer a pariah; the established hierarchy of power placed the US and USSR higher than all others,
however Nixon and Kissinger where convinced from early on in their mandate that greater potential
lay with China since the Soviet Union’s might was largely characterised by its military apparatus
(Litwak 1984, 89-94) (Nixon 1967). Although co-operation is undertaken to produce mutual gains, it
can also be employed shrewdly and tactically to subliminally exploit the increasing good will of a
political/economic partner (Gill 1990, 16-20). However the allure of the market’s ability to produce
substantial, consistent and mutual gains gives policymakers with long time horizons the impetus to
maintain cooperative relations with one another irrespective of where power is situated. Hierarchy
is diminished when states pursue a quasi-lawful and respectful free market agenda based on
reciprocity and open, honest dialogue which overtime constructs one’s reputation (Axelrod 2006).
Overtime cooperation also renders hegemony less paramount than otherwise it would be under the
guise of arms build ups and the belief in the finite quantity of power (Gill 1990, 20-25).
During the 1950s and 1960s, the US was able to dominate economic policy making and was
instrumental in the establishment of the international institutions and regimes which helped enforce
the US’s economic will on much of the world’s industrialised nations and many of the subsequent
former colonies of European powers (Keohane and Nye 2012, 35-40). The disintegration of the post-
war Bretton Woods international financial directives was precipitated largely by the US’s decision to
unhinge its currency from the gold-exchange standard in 1971. The move to fiat currency was
understood by the US treasury at the time to be vital in maintaining the US’s international
competitiveness in open markets with a currency increasingly under downward pressure from
speculation regarding the artificially inflated value of the dollar in relation to the volume of gold in
US vaults (US Department of State 2016). Nixon insisted that the move was made to safe guard
American living standards, job and industrial output (United States Government Printing Office
xxiv
1999). Yet American manufacturing and heavy industry were losing out to foreign ventures by this
stage and this action provoked subsequent instability in foreign exchange markets. Robert Keohane
argues this move to fiat currency and the safeguarding of uncompetitive US industries connotes the
fracturing of US hegemony because the world’s reserve currency had no concrete metallic backing.
Additionally the heavy debt levels incurred by the US in the previous decade had reduced the US to a
net debtor, reversing its position of two decades earlier when the Bretton Woods system was
established, largely to stabilise the war torn global economy which the US (the chief creditor nation)
sough to rejuvenate with its financial aid (Keohane 1984, 206-210).
Hegemony is largely characterised not just by a strong economy, but by a clear ability of a state to
drive forward progress, stability and prosperity in the international economy through its
engagements with the rest of the world (Keohane and Nye 2012, 35-40). China represented a blank
canvass for the US as Nixon and Kissinger saw its potential to supersede to Soviet Union and
effectively sought to engage while still seeming to dictate the direction of the global political
economy, to the dismay of its ally Japan, whose economic prowess was gradually undermining that
of the US (Litwak 1984, 133-137). Arguably, this manoeuvring by the US demonstrates there is lack
of harmony or friendship amongst allies, only strategic interests. Whether it materialises due to a
split between former Marxist-Leninist comrades or the US’s needs within the global economy,
Kissinger foresaw the importance of making the US presence felt wherever there was scope for US
power and influence to be enhanced, even at the expense of its allies within its own sphere of
influence (The National Security Archive 1999, 4-7) Additionally, it suits an established superpower
to undermine the hegemonic aspirations of its allies as well as its advisories, as the US was willing to
manipulate the international economy to suppress potent competition from Europe or the Pacific.
Managing the affair with China had the potentially intended consequence of undermining Soviet
hegemonic control as well as managing and nurturing the potential which China exemplified (Gill
1990, 63-88). This perceived manoeuvring by the US indicates a reconfigured self-identification in
terms of power and hegemony in relation to those of a similar status, and a long time horizon and a
xxv
staunch determination to maintain power and control strongly indicates the US had embedded the
philosophies of neo-realism and neo-liberalism respectively.
Domestic Political Pressures
Following his 1968 election success, Nixon called on the support of the ‘silent majority’ as the war in
Vietnam continued (Woolley 1969). These white-collar middle class suburban families rallied around
the rhetoric of meritocratic individualism and entrusted strong politicians with the well-being of the
nation in both a domestic and international context. Their ‘silence’ exacerbated by the fiery mantra
of civil rights demonstrators, anti-war protestors and a sub cultural cohort which expressed hatred
towards its political class and occasionally advocated grassroots, bottom up revolution (Lassiter
2006). Nixon generally discredited what was conveyed by those louder and often misunderstood
voices, as did many of his less publically present entourage amongst his inner circle (Nixon 1978,
403-410). In public he stated his respect for ‘their idealism and concern for peace’ and immediately
went on to praise the institution of democracy which permitted freedom of speech and freedom of
expression (Woolley 1969). Aware of the democratic mandate which could be revoked as easily as it
was bestowed, Nixon understood that the context in which he governed was an evolving quagmire
of person to person relations, where rising political violence and changing social attitudes began to
gradually irritate and influence political leaders (Nixon 1978, 411-413). This chapter looks at the
extent to which the US administration’s approach to China was influenced by the changing attitudes
of the US citizenry and the dynamics of these changes and prospective impacts with regards to
structural political theory.
The Vietnam War helped surface a grievance and mistrust felt by many in society towards US foreign
policy and a perceived militaristic and imperialist agenda of the elites of the world’s foremost
military power. Social cohesion was transformed from its hitherto disposition of the era in which
Nixon held the office of vice president; ostensibly saturated with a conformist populace with fewer
xxvi
protest movements opposing American foreign policy (Kissinger 1994, 675-676). Kissinger believed
these counter cultural movements were sapping and exposing the fragility of America’s hierarchy
vis-à-vis its citizens and that the moral and ethical crusade into foreign lands could no longer be
perceived as such (Kissinger 1994, 675-676). Kissinger also states that his administrative chief, Nixon
instigated a new strategy aimed at extricating the US from the stalemate against the Vietcong
without the prize of ultimate victory over the communist regime, but to do so in a manner which
seemed honourable (Kissinger 1994, 677-682). Showing restraint and deviating from the course of
action of the previous administrations enhanced the prospective for approaching the Chinese who
backed the Vietcong; furthermore it gave American hegemony a new course of action in the pre-
eminent superpower’s pursuit of maintaining global stability and its own strategic position in
relation to both its allies and its rivals (Goh 2005, 140-142). Within the US diplomatic circle, the US
president insisted that ‘anything we have done or are doing with respect to China is in no sense
designed to embarrass the Soviet Union’ (Nixon 1978, 406), the opposing power with which Nixon
was likewise attempting to re-orientate foreign policy towards. As containment transformed into
Detente, the position towards the entire communist bloc became less stubborn than had been
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. How and why the domestic agenda in the US and a dilapidated
foreign policy mission in Vietnam gradually translated into an open dialogue with a formerly isolated
communist power can be framed with the theoretical insights of both structural realism and
structural liberalism.
Kenneth Waltz stipulates that international relations are qualitatively different from domestic
politics. Because of hierarchy, functionality and the orderly distribution of each unit’s capability
(individuals and groups of all sorts in a hierarchical order), this structure is rigid and stable (Waltz
1979, 81-82). Because the opposite is true with the anarchic structure of the international system,
the behaviour of states is determined by a paradoxical blend of selfish aspirations and intangible and
organic structural constraints. This works irrespective of the internal domestic level variables, much
like the market economic structure mediates the behaviour of individuals and firms competing for
xxvii
prosperity, and in this case, survival (Waltz 1979, 88-93). As such, a paradigm shift of any magnitude
in US social culture would have little relevance to inter-state interaction because it is domestically
contained within the confines of a hierarchical structure and the state’s survival instincts and its
pursuit of relative power gains forces politicians to act against the public will, even if it diminishes
their popularity. They consider themselves free to act boldly and decisively if it’s in the interest of
national security (Waltz 1968, 286-297). Nevertheless, Nixon’s administration became increasingly
strained by these breadth and vigour of protest movements, the mounting US casualties and
escalating economic costs. What Kissinger negotiated on Nixon’s behalf with Chinese leaders was
the mutual de-escalation of US and Chinese involvement in arming their respective factions; the war
would therefore cease to be a proxy conflict (The National Security Archive 1999, 102-103). The
realist viewpoint of power being contingent on a strong economic and military apparatus may
therefore suggest that the US’s ability to direct effective foreign policy towards peace and security
worldwide is likely diminished by its lapsing hegemony (Litwak 1984, 39-47). The challenges US
politicians may face in their perpetual bid to carry a legitimate and democratic mantle would
produce minor alternatives in the US’s domestic makeup, but the direction of the state in
international affairs would more likely be influenced by their relative economic and military
strengths.
Keohane suggests that the rapprochement with China was largely a selfish ploy which Nixon
instigated personally (Keohane 1984, 251). Yet that the cooperative dynamics between states can be
enhanced and loyalties with international institutions are maintained between democratic structures
(Keohane 2002) (Keohane and Nye 2012, 248-250). The structural discourse would have held
precedence theoretically owing China’s one party state system; nevertheless the American approach
suggested the need to appease a growing mass of the electorate. The neo-liberal analysis cites
structure as a dominating but not all encompassing proponent influencing international politics; that
the distinction exemplified by Waltz is far less clear and that there are progressive, evolutionary
forces which can alter the disposition of international politics depending on the context. (Keohane
xxviii
1986, 187-200) The need for Chinese cooperation on Vietnam was consistently present in Nixon’s
discussions with his ministers in government from the onset of his administration (Nixon 1978, 386-
403), and after the initial dialogue had been established, an avenue of cooperation was opened
which enabled the US to gradually but actively withdraw its military presence in Vietnam. Resolving
what was previously a gross conflict of interest which had escalated to potent use of economic and
military force by the US and China suggests that there was also an escalating impasse and a
withering away of zeal and determination from both sides (Kissinger 2011, 340-345).
Consequentially, during the intense deliberations that followed, the two states effectively chose to
mutually compromise (Axelrod 1970). Although the neo-liberal methodology leads states to
compromise, their motives remain selfish and their own power and security must come before
others. Although ostensibly a voluntary action by state officials, its selfish motive was dormant
whether it manifests itself in the will of Nixon or that of the US itself (Keohane 1984, 70-75). A
landslide victory in 1972 suggests that the war which had sapped the credibility of Lyndon Johnson’s
regime had in fact enhanced Nixon’s democratic mandate and alleviated the pressures faced by the
US political class during the 1960s. This publicity revealed a cooperative tone replacing the outward
stubbornness and vanity that the US previously projected towards communism.
Pragmatism
‘I had never expected that the China initiative would come to fruition in the form of a ping pong
team’ (Nixon 1978, 548). When one examines the international systemic dynamics concerning
bilateral power relations, hegemonic status and military directives orchestrated from across the
Pacific Ocean, finer and more subtle details in the narrative can be missed. The rigidity of
international relations theory means an episode in ping pong diplomacy would not concern a neo-
realist or a neo-liberalist. The relationship between sports and politics is its own theses and debates,
yet there was a thawing of relations which surrounds a hitherto mistrustful relationship (Nixon 1972)
(Kissinger 2011, 231-233). This section won’t concern itself with an answer to this, but will instead
xxix
focus on the omissions that structural theory makes concerning the truth and knowledge believed in
and acted upon by the Nixon administration. Nixon carried a reputation in the US media and political
observers as a unique, active, cautious and formidable character in the political system (Ambrose
1989, 70-76). On his own accord, he saw himself as a pragmatist, particularly in his approach to
communism. ‘As the facts change...any intelligent man does change his approaches to the problems.
It does not mean that he is an opportunist. It means only that he is a pragmatist’ (Ambrose 1989,
171). Nixon’s adhesion to achieving dialogue with China also presented various risks from the onset,
not least in the stability of relations in the region with Japan and Taiwan (Brown 1976). His
entourage and allies had concerns for the speed and exuberance of the president, yet he was not
abandoned and often, at times, encouraged (Ambrose 1989, 252-256). A pragmatist’s view on a
character such as Nixon would play down any indication by biographers or commentators that he
may be out of step with the mainstream in US politics at the time; mainstream is what works, not
what is philosophically or morally embedded. The pragmatist incarnated in Nixon is unique but by no
means vacant in other leaders (James 1948).
Although set in his ways regarding the direction of foreign policy, Nixon had his limitations as an
individual manoeuvring an entire administration towards his objectives. A clear and present ally
presented itself in the form of Henry Kissinger who was appointed largely due to his academic
credentials and less for his affiliation with the Republican Party (Landau 1972, 88-91). Kissinger too
had an adhesion to reconfigure a status quo which simplistically positioned China as an advisory
communist power with which the United States has to contain due to the revolutionary advocacies
of the Marxist-Leninists. A catalogue of events during the 1960s; the most impactful having been
discussed in previous chapters in this section, gave Kissinger a shrewd impetus to make contact with
Mao and his inner circle, integrate with Chinese diplomats and even learn to work with the culturally
grounded manner of Chinese diplomacy (Kissinger 2011, 203-217). Nixon’s consent to a raft of US
diplomatic personnel’s autonomy in these affairs broke with the approaches of the past, so to was
his own and his entourage’s ability to remain strong willed while compromising (Kissinger 2011, 213-
xxx
215). His compromising was predicated on the conviction that China would also consent to
compromise (Ambrose 1989, 114-117). The preliminary secretive meetings managed by Kissinger
provided the Chinese delegates with a diplomacy expert who could alter the paradigm without a
brash or condescending tone, yet also outmanoeuvre the other party owing to its isolated state and
the hostility it faced (The National Security Archive 1999, 10-15). In essentials, Kissinger acted
according to his own beliefs and intellect in the right place at the right time. This activity in the US
administration was also upheld by the partnership Nixon had with Kissinger amongst all others,
which arguably contributed to the substantial deviation from the norm of US foreign affairs.
Kissinger notes that a special relationship was forged with Nixon which allowed for the pace and
succession of events in the realms of foreign policy to transpire. Citing the uniqueness of this
partnership, he said to a journalist, ‘I....am not sure I could have done with him with another
president. Such a special relationship...always depends on the style of both men. I don’t know many
leaders who would have the courage to send their aid to Peking without telling anyone’ (Litwak
1984, 50).
A pragmatist believes in one’s own course of action, irrespective of the philosophical outlook that
they may be exposed to or predisposed to take as their own. ‘For the pragmatist, true sentences are
not true because they correspond to reality, and so there is no need to worry about what sort of
reality’ (Rorty 1982, xvi). The various institutions that Nixon, Kissinger and others found themselves
in (educational, political) could impact the manner in which they construct truth and knowledge, but
their pragmatic behaviour is manifested in their conviction in achieving practical solutions to the
foreign policy challenges they faced. The secrecy which surrounded the early stages of the
rapprochement with China, and the close personal and official relationship between Nixon and
Kissinger created a metaphorical tremor in the stable foundations of the US political system. These
personal details also altered the personified image of the US as it gradually turned towards building
relations across the pacific and with states that had previously been institutionally recognised
pariahs (Gill 1990, 134-137). Easing enmity anywhere with states of any status shifted the Nixon’s
xxxi
administration away from the policy of containment and consequentially the highly publicised visit
to Beijing was packaged and presented in a positive dimension to the world as soon as the
foundations of the bilateral relationship had been established in private and uninterrupted talks.
By the early 1970s, with post-War European order firmly established and their market rejuvenated,
Nixon felt it appropriate to branch out of the region where an allegiance was secure and give the US
a presence somewhere he believed had to become more assimilated into the international
community (Nixon 1978, 280-282) (Nixon 1967). In pragmatic terms, it offers some validity to
Keohane’s claim that Nixon was selfish in his pursuit of a relationship with China and built his
administrative team around his foreign policy goals. His selfishness is nevertheless his pragmatism,
his believe in the path he is taking as a leader despite the uncertain outcome which he faced, the
high stakes associated with this diplomatic venture and the unclear knowledge regarding the precise
policy and timeframe which this episode would take (Kissinger 1994, 729-730). The Nixon doctrine
involved the calculated use of personality politics and imaginative, even radical tactics which could
have had a wide variety of implications that were directly dependent on the outcomes. The
institutionalist norms and the philosophy have their frameworks underpinned by greater certainty,
contrasting an elaborate, cunning, fast-paced practicality based approach.
xxxii
Variables Analysis and Summary
All four of the previous factors considered alone help to illuminate how and why the rapprochement
with China was instigated. What this forthcoming chapter will attempt to do is to make just criticism
of the theoretical blueprints which, I have thus far argued, have impacted the United States in its
foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, I intend to question some of the variables themselves, since
they have also thus far been written about as essentially factual. Though many of the sources used
have their respective seal of approval, they are not to be taken without scrutiny, especially as many
are sourced from US government personnel. Their official lines can be expressed to suit the narrative
they endeavour to build. Structural theory, amongst others, reduces the individual agents into
obscurity, helping to render the substance fabricated by Nixon and Kissinger as the work of forces
beyond their control. Theory too however comes with the caveat of being grounded in elements of
subjectivity and with limited scope to portray every dimension (Foucault 1972). The first of the now
numerous theoretical instruments were being developed during the 1970s, attempting to generate
and assign a concrete set of rules to an international relations environment with a shifting political-
economic equilibrium and set of parameters. The US and China relationship’s had manifested out of
the changes taking place in international political economy, which in structural terms created the
right conditions for the rapprochement which American diplomats undertook (Kahler 1997).
America’s strategies in light of the Sino-Soviet split have clear connotations with structural theory
and an easing of tensions with both states simultaneously. The prospect of antagonising the Soviet
Union by reconciling with China weighed heavily on Henry Kissinger, yet the tactic of trilateral
diplomacy involving Beijing as a presumptive partner of the US, had the desired effect of weakening
the Soviet Union’s influence within its neighbourhood (The National Security Archive 1999). To what
extent was the US balancing the relative power between itself and others or manoeuvring effectively
between two advisory states in an effort to preserve international systemic stability? The
environment and philosophical tradition which positions a state’s own power and survival above all
xxxiii
other needs and wants would have prompted the US to cautiously but unhesitatingly intervene,
despite not being in a conflict limbo with either state; but the scale of Soviet and Chinese military
capital could have made the fallout from armed conflict globally devastating and as such the US was
prompted to pacify the communist rivals. The US arguably maintained hegemony within the
international system but the system’s gradual evolution away from hegemony can suggest that the
neo-liberal methodology based on calculated cooperation was gradually materialising (Keohane
1984). Waltz too argues that lapses in the systemic balance can enable states to cooperate and ease
tensions from time to time and that hierarchy in the international system may translate into
international systemic level discipline, but it’s persistence is subject to changes in this system and
the resulting equilibrium is more cyclical and transient, as opposed to the neo-liberal post
hegemonic order which is more permanent (Waltz 1979, 115-116) (Keohane 1984, 11-17). States’
precondition to be concerned with survival first and foremost is an assumed observation from
structural theory which may not be persistently true in certain contexts. The US and China, both
yielding independent nuclear arsenals had survival as a key concern especially given the context of
hostility that permeated cold war international relations, yet it had become increasingly clear three
decades after the prospect of mutually assured destruction had first encapsulated the international
community, that the security dilemma had been gradually mitigated. The Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks also helped ease the unchecked militarism of the US and USSR. In spite of prevailing realism
during the 1970s (Kahler 1997), the Sino-Soviet split and the US response demonstrates a move
away from ethos based on egocentrism and militarism as far as the Nixon administration acted.
Closely relatable with the changing power dynamics amongst its advisories, the US too arguably
faced growing insecurities relating to its economic capacity and its ability to project its weight upon
the directions of its allies and that of weaker states destabilising the US sanctioned order and peace.
But towards China, the post-hegemonic order the US found itself in could have become increasingly
hostile. Richard Nixon was compelled by Communist China’s admission to the UN to cease the
hostility between the two states, lest the US found itself on a Security Council with an additional
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faction working against it; China now had permanent membership and veto powers. In this context,
Nixon’s approach grew increasingly desperate, ‘we hope for, but will not be deterred by a lack of
reciprocity’ (Nixon 1978, 548). Reciprocity is what stimulates long term and effective cooperation
where mutual compromise can be found to be neither one sided or implausible for either party; it is
the ultimate principle upon which neo-liberal political-economic theory can produce an impressive
response to anarchy which brings states and institutions into constructive and beneficial activity
(Keohane 1986). Nixon downplayed American hegemony at the same time as he magnified the UN’s
strengths, creating a new scope for political-economic discourse which the neo-liberal school now
has as part of its inherent blueprints. Declining hegemony and institutional power does not
necessarily reflect a transient period in theoretical discourse simply from neo-realism to neo-
liberalism. As discussed previously, the competitive decline of the US economically and the
structural adjustments made by the uncoupling of the dollar from gold and the increasing
protectionist measures Nixon had implemented to suppress the influx of foreign capital and
investment had signalled a lapse in Keynesian, liberal, globalist economic approaches. Realist
sentiments continue to permeate the US administration with respect to the economic undertakings
but the distinctions between international economic and political risks to global security are
ambiguous and overlapping. US management of China ascent within the UN and the economic
management protocols reveal the complexity of American power in the early 1970s, to some extent
there was clear and present deterioration, yet this was not without attempts to halt or decline the
country’s economic pre-eminence (Keohane and Nye 2012). Although neo-liberal international
relations theory differs from liberal economics, they are similar with respect to methodology.
Keohane’s analysis is very economics-centric as the growing concern in a post-hegemonic order is
the maintenance of cooperation and the prevention of hostile anarchy and war; economic relations
are the key variable (Keohane 1984). We therefore clearly see a growing presence of neo-liberalism
developing in an economic order where American hegemony is no longer the status-quo.
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In moments of crisis and especially in crisis of war, attempts to achieve a nearly unanimous backing
for foreign policy are most likely to be successful. Nixon was able to command a unanimous backing
for his initiatives in China and in easing US involvement in the Vietnam War. The American public
however did not speak on the latter with voice in close correspondence with their government or
with a consensus. At the domestic level within the US, the war in Vietnam gave voice to numerous
movements’ intent on undermining US foreign policy directives through means which were often
confrontational or violent. These changing social attitudes maybe disregarded as irrelevant to the
structural integrity of the international system, however a generation of US citizens during the 1960s
managed to captivate both the Johnson and Nixon administration with their chants and slogans
(Chomsky 2003). These galvanised peace activists were addressed by Nixon and labelled as ‘idealists’
(Woolley 1969), a demographic Nixon had little affection for insofar as he believed them to be
misinformed rabble rousers who could not comprehend the complexity of what was unravelling
(Nixon 1978). In spite of the anguish this cohort presented, Nixon was an elected representative who
required the consent to govern and therefore had to contain any escalation in what was widespread
civil discontent.
The US contains and utilises numerous elements of representative democracy where as those it vied
with for hegemony and influences operated more or less as authoritarian regimes. A government
accountable to its citizens will have to be mindful of the decisions it takes, in foreign policy and
beyond to ensure it remains legitimately endowed with the political instruments of power. However,
the extent to which the US driven to acquiesce to China in an effort to uncouple its military
personnel from Vietnam because of the democratic structure is either large or small depending on
the framework through which it is argued. Waltz suggests that democracy is irrelevant, especially in
matters concerning international relations, where the stakes are so high, democracy is subservient
to the will and expertise of the security and defence personnel (Waltz 1979, 84-88). Keohane
emphasises interdependence and transnationalism is greatly enhanced where there are democratic
governments in place. But between democracies, relations may take on a different form than
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between a democracy and an autocracy. Institutional norms may give a state a superficial form of a
democracy but enshrined democratic values give it greater cultural significance (Keohane 2002). The
US saw protest movements responded to the increasing alienation felt by the electorate in relation
to the elites which governed. To many, their reputation as public servants had become tarnished, as
had the democratic institutions (Chomsky 2003). In traditional liberal philosophy, If Nixon wants the
power to drive the US towards war or peace, cooperation or defection; he would have to appease
the voices within of the electorate to make good on his commitment to the country’s foreign policy
direction. In spite of this, a realist undertaking suggests that the path to power and control is often
laden with ruthless manipulation. Nixon in particular carried with him a shrewd and sometimes
alienating personality which politicians found difficult to comprehend and work with initially, yet he
was convinced that he understood his place in the order of the structural sphere around him
(Ambrose 1989).
Nixon operated in a somewhat paradoxical manner with respect to the structure/agency paradigm.
In a speech to students on the topic of Vietnam, he recalled the events in British politics which
proved Chamberlain’s appeasement of the Nazis was a gross error of judgement and events had
transpired in favour of Churchill, the man Nixon had considered a ‘madman’ (Ambrose 1989, 355).
The structural pressures in this example had pushed Chamberlain onto the wrong side of history and
propelled Churchill to the throne of power. Nixon at the helm of American politics was self-
professed portent of his destiny. A unique time and place where an individual can change and shape
the course of history exacerbated Nixon’s stubborn persona and sense of mission in life yet as his
resignation following the scandal at Watergate suggested, Nixon was by no means able to
manipulate the state without consequence. The notion of individual pragmatism or prowess creating
such a marked and long term impact on the state of international relations as could be argued was
the case regarding the US-Chinese rapprochement seems to completely contradict the notion that
structure dictates behaviour at all other levels of analysis. This stark separation of structure from
agent can however be over simplified and it is more plausible to suggest that the distinction
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between them is blurred (Marks 2011). Nixon’s adhesion to structural limits was evident in his
efforts to end involvement in Vietnam without dishonour, carnage or clear signs of American
weakness as well as his comprehension of China’s geopolitical significance superseded any negative
sentiments towards communism or the strategies of previous US politicians.
Realism encapsulates the mantra of Nixon and Kissinger more than any other political theory in
action. Their thinking on foreign policy matters had been conceived and strategized in a similar
fashion to that of Otto Von Bismarck; an individual which Kissinger had stylized as ‘the white
revolutionary’ in an academic thesis centred on the cunning exploits of a man whose brash wisdom
worked in tandem with the structural pitfalls and promises; effectively creating the pre-World War I
European balance or power (Kissinger 1968). Nixon and Kissinger too set out altering the paradigm
by making contact and ingratiating the US with China, using the Bismarckian tactics meant carefully
utilising the tools while being mindful of the context to achieve a bilateral relationship. These tactics
largely involved making use of all the variables that have been thus far dissected in addition to other,
more subtle details, such as changing the US meta-narratives towards communism and China (Litwak
1994). With no stone unturned, the strategy’s ideological disposition could not be deciphered
effectively; the aim was to achieve a success by most means afforded to Nixon and Kissinger. The
methodology of pragmatism is to make use of what works. Realism is what worked for Nixon and the
US in the early 1970s; effectively the distinction between theoretical blueprints and pragmatic
methodological practice also becomes blurred if realism can be considered a doctrinised form of
pragmatism. Its ontology is however saturated with assumptions about power and security that
coherently compel states to behave in a specific manner. When structural constraints are factored in
as with neo-realism and to a lesser extent, neo-liberalism, the ability for individuals and states to
behave as though they can act independently on their own convictions and truths is markedly
diminished , especially since this arbitrary structure is free-flowing, fluid and indiscriminate (Waltz
1979).
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Conclusions
Not without its shortcomings, a firm case has been made for the validity of International relations
theory which has highlighted many of the more discreet actions and reactions which the US had
taken in its approach to China under the leadership of Richard Nixon. By no means the standard
framework for which states solely operate, the structural dimensions have their clout in explaining
variables with international, systemic level causes and effects, such as that detailing the implications
of the Sino-Soviet split and the developments in US hegemonic control of the international economy.
The theory becomes less potent in assessing variables which are sourced at the domestic level or
even the personal or individual level of analysis. We see that the intended function of the structural
theory is to provide a framework for which explanations can be made through observing IR
phenomenon at the structural or systemic level. Theory is by no means universally applicable and
consistently reductionist, by Kenneth Waltz’s admission (Waltz 1979). Similarly Keohane also
contends that theory naturally makes assumptions and deductions which marginalise certain
elements of an argument, but it also helps ‘retain focus on systemic constraints’ (Keohane 1984, 29).
In this assessment, we have seen the logic of Waltz and Keohane’s arguments shape the US
responses to its relations with China; the internationalised nature of this empirical study made it
useful to apply a relevant theoretical blueprint. But this produces a casual denial of other, potentially
essential variables which have been cited by the actors involved as crucial, influential elements.
The political practices of the first Nixon administration exemplify some of the key themes of this
thesis. The most significant of which is the paradoxical approach that was taken in diplomacy and
foreign policy; its methods were orthodox, insofar and Nixon and Kissinger were realists with a keen
sense and understanding of the order they had to produce out of the systemic chaos that
perpetuates (Litwak 1994). It also came with its own also distinctive, unique flare that was
disassociated with the stagnant, introspective views of the past and staunchly active and pragmatic
enough to alter the meta-narratives (Kissinger 1994). The variables considered have all shaped the
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founding of the US and China’s bilateral relationship but this relationship’s birth is by no means
limited to the variables discussed. These offer an insight into the extent to which the structural
narratives is useful in explaining the course of events from the point of view of the United States.
The elements and methods which do not conform to the theory’s ontology, in addition to
showcasing the limits of theory and expanding the scope to which a case study can be dissected, also
gives the incomplete theory a portion of its characteristics, a series of elements through which the
theory can disregard as extraneous or inappropriate, such as the suggestion that Nixon’s foreign was
influenced by protest movements at the domestic level. Furthermore, it can also blur the reasoning
which theory assigns to its agents and structures. Pragmatism may reflect realism in a doctrinated
format, problematizing the language and connotations which produce what could also be
interpreted as two radically different practices.
This chapter, amongst others, has compellingly illuminated the complex and multi-dimensional
character of diplomacy in the sphere of contemporary international relations. This period represents
a pivot in the direction of international politics, as new relations and approaches were forged in the
discipline of diplomacy, but also in the character of the global economic structure, where a
distinctive global liberal order was gradually challenged prominently by the United States (Cox and
Skidmore-Hess 1999, 129-132). The effects of the rapprochement with China have shaped
subsequent episodes in international relations beyond the twentieth century and beyond the
borders of America and China. Approaching solely with the prism of structural theory would severely
limit our comprehension of the dynamics which develop international relations; a discipline which
encompasses a spectrum of numerous humanities and social sciences accords.
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