An analysis concerning the strengths and limitations of structural international relations theory in an empirical context.

A Study of the U.S-China rapprochement under Richard Nixon.

Daniel Bassilios

I.D: 150091220

POL8099: Dissertation (2015-2016)

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in International Political Economy.

School of Geography, Politics and Sociology. Newcastle University.

August 2016

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to blend empirical analysis with relevant theoretical material to uncover

the strengths and weaknesses of International Relations theory. Through examining the Nixon

administration’s rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China, I aim to uncover some of the

most comprehensive perplexities and limitations that exist when theorising phenomena in

international relations. In utilising and scrutinising the works of Robert Keohane and Kenneth Waltz,

the primary proponents of neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-realism in the context of IR, and

applying their principles to the activity of the US in relation to China during the period of

reconciliation with the communist state, it will be possible to give a clear indication as to how and

why the US thought this was a necessary undertaking in the context of the Cold War and the other

dynamics, both domestic and international that shaped the course of world politics.

This is not however without its caveats; theory is effective and enables us to make sense out of the

convoluted and multi-dimensional facets within international relations. But it is also grounded and

often reductionist. The two doctrines form part of the core genesis of IR theoretical framework and

have since been scrutinised comprehensively; to the extent that an analysis involving the same case

study could produce a radically alternative narrative given the use of different theoretical blueprints.

Waltz and Keohane’s doctrines share their similarities and differences, the differences are most

pronounced in the methodological practices which are played out in the international arena.

Amongst the similarities is the composition and essentiality of this international arena. The

structuralist disposition of both theories makes their ontological assumptions regarding the

behaviour and aims of states grounded by a rational, objective mantra which is unconstrained by

anything less than the grand structure of the international systemic particularities and variables.

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Four variables related to the case study will be used to showcase both the strengths and weaknesses

of theory. I will embed theory within the facets of this case study and analyse the variables on these

theoretical grounds while also stressing the plausible inadequacy which can be concluded if theory is

to be taken without restriction or further consideration. I will then conclude on the extent to which

IR theory has given broad and comprehensive scope for analysis but also the capacity to which we

can be lead into further assessments sourced from a relatively restrictive analysis.

Word Count as of 23/08/2016 – 13,015

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Contents

Abstract – i

Introduction: US-China relational dynamics and theoretical blueprints - 2

Reviewing Essential Literature - 5

Methodological Underpinnings - 14

[Chapters 1-4]The Sino-Soviet Split - 18

Power and Hegemony - 21

Domestic Political Pressures - 24

Pragmatism - 27

Variables analysis and summery - 31

Conclusions - 37

Bibliography - 39

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Introduction: US-China relational dynamics and theoretical blueprints

Within a year, Sino-American diplomacy had moved from irreconcilable conflict to a visit

to Beijing by a presidential emissary to prepare a visit by the president himself. It did so by

sidestepping the rhetoric of two decades and staying focussed on the fundamental

strategic objective of a geopolitical dialogue leading to a recasting of the Cold War

international order. (Kissinger 2011, 234)

Henry Kissinger signals the rapid and radical birth of an interstate dialogue between a Marxist-

Leninist revolutionary militant turned statesman, and a stern anti-communist executive at the helm

of world’s foremost economic and military power. This new relationship was forged in the context

where before there had been isolation and containment; the latter being executed by the scale of

foreign intervention in the Vietnam conflict; US foreign policy towards the former French colony was

instigated by the Eisenhower administration within which Nixon was Vice President and expressively

anti-communist. Similar static and outwardly hostile sentiments of the political class had translated

across the country and encapsulated the ideological position of the citizenry (Lassiter 2006). This

conformity had been eroded by the time Nixon made his presence felt as commander-in-chief of the

US forces in Vietnam. Portions of American society had undergone a paradigm shift, projecting

rhetoric of revulsion and hatred towards war as well as the deep rooted inequalities in their own

society (Jeffreys-Jones 1999). The Nixon administration faced the external pressures of economic

paradigm shifts too, with the weakening of US manufacturing and industrial output relative to

overseas markets in conjunction with internal strife in the form of rising public debt accelerated by

the conflict in Vietnam. The end of the dollar-gold standard association altered US management of

the international monetary system and the international financial consensuses constructed at

Bretton Woods had arguably become annulled (Gill 1990). Bretton Woods epitomised the primary

motor for post-war global economics, and had been the engine for the liberal, open market

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philosophy which relied on expedient and widespread trade and investment without unilateral

political interference or protectionist policies.

‘The Sino-US rapprochement started as a tactical aspect of the Cold War; it evolved to where it

became central to the evolution of the new global order. Neither of us had any illusion of changing

the basic convictions of the other’ (Kissinger 2011, 243). Two seemingly conflicting ideologies

dominated in China and the United States, yet the binary had a third dimension in the form of the

Soviet Union. China had developed an increasingly scornful dialogue with the Soviet Union during

the 1960s and the hostility had ruptured the integrity of the Communist bloc (Luthi 2008). Now

isolated within the Communist sphere and without a formidable ally elsewhere; the hitherto

unrelenting and self-assured Marxist-Leninist state allowed itself to become accessible to US

diplomats, irrespective of the staunch opposition towards them being played out in Vietnam and on

ideological grounds in the meta-narrative of the state which Kissinger understood as a radical,

qualitative variant from the self-image that characterises the United States. China all the while

maintained its antipathy towards the US’s imperialist agenda and through the Cultural Revolution,

transmitted the Maoist doctrine and philosophy to its citizenry through brute force (Kissinger 2011,

181-201). In spite of this dialogue within China and Nixon’s own anti-communist tone, the

reconciliation materialised relatively quickly, even without the rudimentary bilateral institutions;

diplomatic missions or embassies (Kissinger 2011, 248).

The shallow points made thus far have only scratched the surface of the context which stimulated a

cautious move towards rapprochement. The domestic political pressures brought on largely by the

conflict in Vietnam, ailing command of the international economy and the increasingly destabilising

forces developing between the Soviet Union and China weighed heavily on Nixon administration in

its first term (Nixon 1978). They are discussed in the forthcoming analysis chiefly because the

administration claims to have done likewise or along similar lines with respect to its own motives as

explained in writing. However, a one dimensional approach such as this holds little clout in the prism

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of international political scrutiny and one must delve beyond the first hand narrative and the biases

that come with it. One bias I must acknowledge is the limitations that exist in focussing on the

manoeuvrings of the United States without a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese perspective. My

methodology is such that the use of structural international relations theory would produce an

effective discourse because the theory is predisposed to situate states as largely self-centred and

focussed on ascertaining greater power and security (Baldwin 1993). Therefore these universalist

blueprints could be applied to China with outcomes and variables which would be fundamentally

similar. The structural dominance found in neo-realism and neo-liberalism also suggests that a

dialogue with China was instigated largely because systemic pressures had bought the two

advisories together despite the hostility that permeated continuously since 1949 and that consistent

and calculated cost-benefit analyses enabled both the US and China to seek a path towards greater,

long term cooperation (Waltz 1979) (Keohane 1984). Both these theories are assembled primarily by

US academics and are focussed on Cold War international relations; furthermore they are

formulated shortly after Nixon’s presidential career.

As will be revealed, the theory greatly enhances the analysis and allows it to justifiably deviate from

the narratives which the key actors in the administration have produced. By positioning a specific,

universal framework which identifies states in a system as inclined to certain behaviours and

practices, it gives another dimension to a state of affairs which follows more than just one linear

account as given by the official reports on the proceedings and general texts detailing world history.

Yet theory and first-hand accounts are still limited, even when combined and scrutinized together.

Stripping away systemic level influences and authorized politicised discourse leads us to pragmatism,

a core methodological instinct which potentially manifests the preeminent drive human activity

(Rorty 1982). Its relevance is pronounced due to the instinctive personas of Nixon and Kissinger who

characterised a political partnership unmitigated by grounded philosophy, rigid bureaucratic

protocols or even pressures within the international system (Litwak 1994). Pragmatism represents

the extent of the complexity in producing concrete analyses and definitive conclusions and by no

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means can one be drawn from this study. However, by expanding the horizons beyond simple

theoretical application to a case study and scrutinising both the Nixon doctrine and the structural

theory, I aim to make this multi-faceted account constructive and informative in relation to the

current and future discourses in international relations.

Reviewing Essential Literature

The setting for which the theoretical applications are based are aptly characterised in this thesis as

perplexing, multi-dimensional and without a definitive theoretical mandate. The structural political

theories put forth by the United States’ academic class during the twentieth century to be

scrutinized, applied and discussed are neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism. Understanding

how and why these modes of thought came into fruition involves understanding the paradigm of

international politics which witnessed the development of these theories, (Burchill and Linklater

2009) but also taking note of the philosophical and literary traditions which translated into

formidable political theory for the context in question. As societies have become less fractured,

communities have solidified their relationships and the state system of political order has extended

and become the recognised norm in practical politics, analysis concerning the substance of this

normalised political behaviour emerges and seeks to position phenomenon in certain perspectives

and assign problem solving mechanisms to address the challenges which arise (Cox 1981). A variety

of different and conflicting reports concerning the behaviour of political actors is now readily

available for the student of international politics and the multi-disciplinary nature of the subject has

drawn in theories from the likes of philosophy, sociology and economics. Irrespective of the

academic source of the theory, its validity can be confirmed on the basis of to what extent it can

simplify what was hitherto complicated and this extent is not without contestation (Waltz 1979, 1-

13). One such example is game theory; which is largely methodological, yet sourced from the liberal

philosophical tradition concerning reciprocity and is characterised as a rational model for producing

outcomes in situations where there is conflicting interest (Axlerod 1970, 5-12). This like other

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methods will be discussed further as the following section will deal primarily with the key works that

form a large part of this thesis’ blueprints. However we must start with the ontological assumptions

of structural theory first.

Hans Morgenthau’s first principle of realism in ‘politics among nations’ perhaps establishes the root

of subsequent analyses in structural theory, ‘political realism...is governed by objective laws...the

operation of these laws being impervious to our preference’ (Morganthau 1985, 4). Human nature is

fundamentally orientated towards rationale, thus the declaration of war is as much the consequence

of human nature as is the making of peace. Both are subject to the demands and needs of the actors

and less so to one’s moral compass (Waltz 2001, 26-39). Part of the focus of this paper will be on the

writings of neo-realist Kenneth Waltz, who begins in man, the state and war starts with a mantra of

classical realists; ‘our miseries are ineluctably the product of our natures. The root of all evil is man’

(Waltz 2001, 3). This is a qualitatively similar analysis to the Hobbesian view of human nature and its

implications are of despotism and suffering. This forms part of the ontology of the neo-realist theory

and is the first of a few crucial points where there is a certain degree of concord with neo-liberalism.

They can both be considered rational choice theories in their ontological starting point however a

point of divergence emerges when action in accordance with rational choice is undertaken. Neo-

liberalists view the severity of human nature to be less pronounced insofar as it less likely to

precipitate into outright hostility between opposing factions, it is in fact centred more on the

traditional liberal philosophy of toleration, reciprocity and mutual respect for one another’s

autonomy, property and life choices (Wendt 2006). This evolves into logical, yet cunning

manoeuvring and strategising for absolute gains through co-operation and if necessary, defection.

(Axelrod 2006) It is nevertheless still grounded in realistic, static rationality because states approach

one other without a predetermined sentimentality and focus on utility maximisation in the political-

economic exchanges. Actors in markets in strictly economic realms interact in a similar fashion.

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When the image concerning human nature is translated at the international level, the concept of

anarchy is the derivative from the view that human nature is both objective and morally dislocated.

Anarchy is consistent dynamic which constitutes international politics in the realist application and

forms a sizeable portion of the ontology surrounding the international political sphere of social

sciences. In conjunction with the writings of Hobbes and the doctrine of Realpolitik (Waltz 1979,

116-117), anarchy and self-help are understood by Kenneth Waltz to be prevalent in the

international system because there are no hierarchy principles in operation between states as there

is within them (Waltz 1979, 88-89). Domestic realms have rigid legislative and judicial structures that

keep subjects loyal and obedient to the state’s unique parameters. These parameters are non-

existent beyond any state’s bounded territory. In such an environment, states seek survival in a

system that cannot lawfully prosecute or punish others and this is a prerequisite to all forthcoming

international relations (Waltz 1979, 91-93). Warfare is therefore the most salient response where

there is no world government but since this is more often than not undesirable and unviable; it is

likely that states form coalitions or protective spheres of influence with each other to a) make the

cost of war for prospective advisories less bearable and b) to maintain their position in relation to

others within the international system (Waltz 1979, 124-126). This position is understood in

materialistic terms and as such, a state’s power in relation to others is subject largely to its economic

and military capabilities and their behavioural pattern works in corresponds with the maxim of

Thucydides; ‘the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must’ (Thucydides 1910,

5.89.1). Framing the state’s security and prosperity in relative terms ensures that there will often be

inter-state conflict, the means to which security is often either enhanced or diminished. The

international climate being consistently hostile will therefore perpetuate the funding and

preparation of extreme security measures associated with military and arms build ups.

For the neo-realists, the balance of power is what constrains the effects of anarchy in the

international sphere where there is no concrete authority and control as is the case at the domestic

level. It is limited in its effectiveness but it’s upheld universally because the inclination to survive

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makes objective and logical sense where there are voids in security and defence (Waltz 1979, 118-

122). Survival is best ensured for the most powerful states when they maximise their relative

strengths economically and militarily; eventually the extent of their strengths and that of the lesser

powerful in the international system signifies the power dynamics that prevail in international

politics (Waltz 1979, 129-131). Finally for Waltz, anarchy is alleviated in an international system

where the risks of pursuing hegemony outweigh the cost and states will consequentially settle for

the status quo in a balanced equilibrium. The Cold War state of affairs is one Waltz identifies as the

most peaceful in the three centuries following the Treaty of Westphalia. (Waltz 1979, 161-163) The

stance illustrated by Waltz reduces states to objective, rational and morally restricted actors, the

same behavioural dynamics he observes in humans (Waltz 2001, 3). It also signals uniformity in the

pitfalls and promises that characterise the state’s activity in the form of the security dilemma. This

uniformity is a constraint among states that would accordingly rather ‘seek such other goals as

tranquillity, profit and power’ (Waltz 1979, 126). Power being understood in relative terms however

ensures the continuity of anarchy; one state’s gain is another state’s loss and its vulnerability

becomes apparent.

Anarchy is regarded by neo-liberal institutionalist theory as a concurrent norm also yet as with the

viewpoints on human nature; responses to anarchy are less austere or cataclysmic in this

framework. Although undeniably present at the international level, and with responses to anarchy

remaining rational and objective; the result for the neo-liberal modality reveals a drive towards

strategic cooperation, mutually beneficial compromises and less hostile links between states whose

animosity is alleviated through the absolute benefits attained through political-economic

cooperation (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). Arriving at different conclusions to Kenneth Waltz,

Keohane’s argument concerns the alternative methodology utilised by states and institutions when

faced with an anarchic realm within which they live and coexist. Realism’s methodology of relative

gains leaves it inflexible and narrow when explaining change on an international level. His

observations point out that cooperation is no less a common feature in the international system

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than is war (Keohane 1984, 7). The methodology is expanded upon by Robert Axelrod who suggests

that strategising through the use of the game theory payoff matrix will in turn lead states to arrive at

the Nash equilibrium. States enter deliberations with exogenously determined variables, or interests

determined externally to the political debate with respective rivals (Donnelly 2009), all the while

understanding that the best plausible outcome may only be achieved if the other party’s best

outcomes are taken into account and accepted as the tactic they will employ. Consequentially both

states, having predetermined the rational choice of one another other, will abandon their preferred

and most lucrative gains pursuit and settle on a compromise and in most cases, this evolves into

increasingly reliable and choreographed cooperation (Axelrod 2006, 3-24) (Axelrod 1970, 3-18).

All too aware of the conflict of interests that characterise international relations, Robert Keohane

deviates from liberal philosophical traditions which are underpinned by democratic peace, mutually

respectful and restrained rights and responsibility, and unimpeachable judicial structures (Burchill,

Liberalism 2009). ‘Cooperation must be distinguished from harmony. Harmony refers to a situation

in which actors policies automatically facilitate the attainment of other’s goals...intergovernmental

cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its

partners as facilitating realisation of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy

coordination’ (Keohane 1984, 51-52). States remain self-interested and egocentric in this approach

and aim to maximise only their own security and prosperity; cooperation maybe a necessity to which

states pursue this but the gains of others are of little relevance. Despite the seeming animosity that

remains in-spite of cooperation; absolute gains frequently become the unintended consequences of

this cooperation even though states have no intention of facilitating the attainment of other’s goals.

Keohane however does indicate that the disharmony is the facet to which states understand their

relations to one another and that discord and in some cases conflict are common because

governments will not build cohesive relations with those they cooperate with or reconcile with their

greatest foes (Keohane 1984, 53-54). This is the maintenance of impartiality and objectivity in the

international system as well as the maintenance of anarchy. It is also the maintenance of exogenous

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political-economic terms and conditions or intransigent manoeuvring which predetermines state’s

goals from within their own political sphere (Keohane 1994). Consequentially, the dialogue they may

have with other states will not precipitate into endogenous compromise or a deviation from their

original objectives. However, the extent to which mediatory institutions alleviate this and

reconfigure the dynamics between structure and agency is contestable and challenges the structural

disposition of neo-liberal theory (Keohane and Martin 1999).

A structural body characterises the core component of both theories. Mentioned previously on

several occasions thus far is the international system. This system is the structure which comprises

of multiple actors or agents establishing their aims and objectives through cooperation and conflict

and everything in between (Donnelly 2009, 45-47). The conduit of international relations is in the

dynamics of the system comprised of nation states who act in this realm in order to safeguard their

interests and security in the anarchic, finite space of the global political environment (Baldwin 1993).

Waltz approaches the need for a systemic analysis in light of the limitations of analytical

dissemination. ‘A system’s approach will be needed, if outcomes are affected not only by the

properties and interconnections of variables but also by the way in which they are organised’ (Waltz

1979, 39). Systemic theories maybe reductionist, however they help explain widespread and

complex phenomenon on a scale as large as the world itself (in international relations terms) (Waltz

1979, 18-37). The approaches of the structural theorists centre on the question of how order is

structured out of anarchy in a system of multiple parties, which are superficially equal as sovereign

states but with conflicting interests. In the structural realist paradigm, order is very much the norm

and consistently present within the confines of the sovereign state (Waltz 1979, 102-104). Where

this orderly status is recognised internationally, states collectively recognise each other’s sovereignty

and a realm’s control of the population. The institutions contained within a state precipitate the

necessary function of keeping the population obedient and loyal to the domestic authoritative

bodies. E.g. judicial apparatus’ and the central bank. Unit level analysis is however of little relevance

to the international systemic structures which drive international relations. While human nature is

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relevant in uncovering the root cause of anarchy and disharmony between states, in methodological

practices, it features very infrequently in the dialogue and actions between states. This is a key facet

of Waltz’s reductionism insofar as his thesis attempts only to explain the happenings in international

politics as if they were detached from domestic or individual variables. Although Waltz

acknowledges his limitations, this translates into the formulation of a perspective which cannot

thoroughly be applied universally in space and time. Upon reading, one will likely find that it

grapples mostly with militaristic and security issues in a political economic context (Levine 2012).

Likewise for the neo-liberal school, the extent of anarchy is both enforced and curtailed by the

structure of the international system. Where there is deviation from the realist modus operandi is in

their analysis of structural dynamics and the influences that drive change within it. Realising that

states have to co-exist with one another opens up perspectives for interdependence and at times

calculated cooperation that is mutually beneficial, as the extremity of conflict may throw states and

the international order into turmoil (Axelrod 2006) (Keohane and Nye 2012, 19-21). For Keohane,

the international order is supplemented by an additional dimension; institutions and regimes of

cooperation (Keohane 1984, 245). ‘Institutions that facilitate cooperation do not mandate what

governments do; rather they help governments pursue their own interests through cooperation’

(Keohane 1984, 246). Playing up the importance of these intermediary bodies projects an alternative

methodology on the management of international affairs. They help to quell the tensions and

hostility that originate organically out of anarchy and egoism and can facilitate a quasi-lawful code of

conduct which states seek to uphold for the sake of their reputation in the international community.

This shift is not undertaken coercively by a hegemonic power or a rogue world policing body; it is

largely manifested voluntarily and with widespread consent (Keohane 1984, 246-251). The power

structure which breeds hegemony is not rigid and altercations will arise without the voluntary

participation of the majority of states in the system seeking to reduce the propensity to engage in

conflict and increase the propensity for achieving higher levels of economic prosperity worldwide

(Keohane 1984, 252-259). The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation

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for Economic Security and Development and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Now the

World Trade Organisation) are the physical incarnations of institutions which shape the cooperative

dimensions of international relations and global political economy.

Both theories are justified and validated by their pseudo-scientific clout and their limited proficiency

in reducing human interaction to calculated discourse. The dialogue evolves differently when their

methodology is played out (Grieco 1993). For neo-realists, the scopes under which political actions

are made are subject to the prospective material outcomes whereas the neo-liberalists focus more

on the actions and reactions of the units or states involved. Their time horizons differ as the neo-

realists are more inclined to pursue the most gainful opportunities for maximising power as soon as

they arise; whereas the neo-liberals underscore the importance of future interactions, behaviours

and consequences of cooperation and defection in the present situation. Events may transpire in this

neo-liberal framework, however its proponents do not necessarily discredit neo-realism’s

methodologies, rather they present a clear variation in how the methodologies of both structural

theories may diverge when institutions which encourage and facilitate cooperation are added to the

equation or the structure of international system (Keohane 1984, 65-67) (Rana 2015). Both contend

that with the premise that international relations are fundamentally governed by activity above and

beyond the control of any one state or institution. The implied lack of universal authority brings

about the persistence of anarchy. This state of affairs has negative connotations but is not

understood as profoundly negative; the problem is not as the name suggests despotism or chaos,

but simply a lack of collective authority which immediately assumes that states require this

Leviathan to maintain continual order and wellbeing in the international arena (Waltz 1979, 102-

104) (Keohane 1994). International order has manifested and been maintained despite the

perceived presence of anarchy according to structuralist theories. Waltz argues that the horizontal

relationship between states develops a systemic balance of power where strong and weak states

coexist understanding their place relative to one another. War is produced when states of similar

economic and military capabilities vie for a greater allocation of power in their favour (Waltz 1979,

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111-114). Anarchy is positioned as an oxymoron for neo-liberals as the principle through which

states are inclined to carefully coordinate their relations through by means of cooperation (Keohane

1994).

Waltz and Keohane both articulate the justifications and limitations of their theoretical

underpinnings. Waltz picks up on theory as the mantra of explaining phenomenon. Raw data and

statistics alone are empty jargon which lack depth and understanding if there is no theory to guide

academics towards an explicit series of associations and patterns. Empirical knowledge is

supplemented by theory to make sense of the findings and offer some degree of rationalization to

the (thus far) shallow information one has gathered (Waltz 1979, 4-5). Keohane argues that the

breadth and complexity of phenomena in the international relations discipline is very much what

requires it to be disciplined, in part by theory, as it can offer an element of consistency when

analyses are made (Keohane 2004). Theory is seldom multidimensional and precise in assessing how

and why human beings behave in a certain manner, hence why they are challenged and

reconfigured as the compound analysis continues to reveal patterns of correlation and varying

degrees of causation. The forthcoming analysis will attempt to blend the two alternative structural

theories of international relations in the interpretations of the empirical study, not by defining and

exemplifying a more general structural theory through this integration but by interpreting the

manoeuvres of the actors involved as subject to a narrative which constitutes both neo-realism and

neo-liberalism. Furthermore, the positioning of such theoretical frameworks is not definitive and this

thesis will deviate from the rigidity of the structural models and examine the case study more

broadly; theory’s applicability will also be scrutinised.

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Methodological Underpinnings

The underlying reason for choosing to blend the Nixon administration’s rapprochement with China

with structural realism and liberalism is predicated on investigating the magnitude to which the

theories of international politics can explain the occurrences which fundamentally realigned

American foreign policy directives in the early 1970s. The weight of these theories is amplified due

to them manifesting clearly in more of less the same time and place to the case study. This context is

important due to the clear position of structural causes and effects in both theories. Since they both

utilise a clear comprehension of structural impact, it bodes well to examine an episode in 1970s

international relations with the academic tools of the period and the region. Indeed Kenneth Waltz’s

comprehension of the human condition is grappled with in ‘man, the state and war’. Through a

realignment of philosophy and psychology orchestrated by the intellectual elites of a society can

there be a general consensus in support of preventative politics (Waltz 2001, 42-46). In a similar

fashion, a liberal, secular meta-narrative manifested itself in Western tradition during the

enlightenment and Waltz sees progress in international politics as being determined by a similar

transition in the modes of thought (Waltz 2001, 72-79). The maintenance of peace in this

methodological narrative becomes subject to a great deal of domestic and unit level input, yet it has

its direct implications on the political climate of the international system.

In the neo-liberal format, the methodology is largely the basis of objective scientific behavioural

reasoning insofar as international relations are played out (Axelrod 1970). However the

acknowledgement on the part of Keohane holds that the theory is a blueprint to how actors SHOULD

behave, and this is not always translated when actor’s methods are played out (Keohane 1984, 72-

78). Rational choice is the methodological means which ought to create a narrative which all can

understand but the reality which will be dissected in relation to the US rapprochement with China

wields various other dynamics. Surrounding rational choice are the problems of security and

cooperation in a generally lawless international space; the core basis upon which structural theory is

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constructed. It should however be understood without further delay that the theoretical blueprints

offer nothing more than a vague direction for this analysis and that forces at play which do not

necessarily conform to either structural realism or liberalism offer a robust and solid argument in

discord with theory and in revealing its weaknesses. Consequentially I will be measuring to what

extent the theoretical tools of a particular place and time can illuminate certain facets of an event in

corresponding context, notwithstanding those dynamics which the theory struggles to explain.

Kenneth Waltz and Robert Keohane are two key proponents of the neo-realism and neo-liberalism

respectively and their primary works will largely constitute the theoretical elements of this paper.

An alternative scenario to the theoretically dense motif is pragmatism, a largely American inspired

doctrine which is anything but a formidable guideline of rule book to dissecting human behavioural

patterns. It is aligned to practicality and effectiveness in the philosophical conundrums regarding

truth and knowledge (Stuhr 2009). In empirical terms, that which is acted upon with practical

consequences holds more truth than intangible or abstract theories and ideas;

‘A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to

professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions,

from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins.

He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action, and towards power.

That means the empiricist temper regnant, and the rationalist temper sincerely given up. It means

the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality and the pretence of finality in

truth’ (James 1907, 51).

Pragmatism is a methodology in its own right, and solely a method without a theoretical blueprint in

the form of ontology (James 1907). It is worthy of mention here because of its origins in modern US

philosophy but more so because all political action is laden with a form of pragmatism insofar as

every action undertaken by an individual or a state is a method with a reified truth, in accordance

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with a pragmatic notion of the construct of truth. While this deviates somewhat from the synopsis

which attaches theoretical formulae to an empirical event; I justify this partial inclusion of

pragmatism because of the radical alternative it presents, it’s seemingly universal validity and the

case made in chapter four depends on nothing except method through action and action alone.

Although even this concept is manifested in various different formats, its central methodological use

will concentrate on what extent there has been a ‘pragmaticisation’ of theory and philosophy (Rorty

1982).

The numerous different challenges presented by the breadth and interpretations of these readings

will inevitably render this thesis with occasional limitations; especially as some of the abstract

material renders many analyses reductionist and at times, improbable (Clandinin and Caine 2013).

Aided but not dependant on supporting materials from the case in question (autobiographic,

archived and respected academic works), I will attempt to carefully blend the theory with the

empirical date through the use of a qualitative and interpretive-hermeneutic analysis. This method

calls for what is generally considered a contestable, subjective interpretation of a modality which is,

rather ironically, not saturated with clear cut objective reasoning but it commands more of an

individualised reading of a narrative which has its own contexts and traditions (Ricoeur 1974),

ultimately meaning that in this framework, the theoretical principles are inherently subjective

despite their assurance that they are in fact the opposite. In such a situation, it becomes intrinsically

difficult to make a clear sense of the theory’s proponents as this method immediately challenges its

core objective component. It raises issues concerning the ordering structure of the thesis, whether

the theory should instigate the empirical research or if the research can be used to decipher and

refine the existing theory (Berg 2009), in an altogether more practical or even pragmatic approach.

With this in consideration, the main essence will remain to assess the extent to which broad

structural theory in its self-professed format as an objective and rational doctrine will coherently

explain a foreign policy doctrine of the same time and place.

xviii

From the onset, a series of issues have come to fruition in this section; we must realise what

formulates a coherent or incoherent ‘extent’ and ‘explanation’. There is no definitive justification for

making a case on a spectrum of coherence, however what will come to light is the systematised

questioning of a theory’s core principles in relation to the case material or a ‘symptomatic reading’.

This interpretive practice aims to reveal the relational dispute between the objective disposition of

the theory and the subliminal governing principles which problematize the means of constructing a

validated form of objectivity (Resch 1992). With readings which are based on quasi-scientific

principles, one immediately comes to realise how the analytical pitfalls can materialise both within

the analysts’ own mental frame of mind but also the frameworks saturated within the texts;

Scientific observation is always polemical; it either confirms or denies a prior thesis, a pre-existing

model, an observational protocol. It shows as it demonstrates; it establishes a hierarchy of

appearances; it transcends the immediate; it reconstructs first its own models and then reality. And

once the step is taken from the observation to experimentation, the polemical character of

knowledge stands out even more sharply’ (Bachelard 1984, 13).

Through the use of divergent analyses (structural theories and pragmatic approaches) as well as the

acknowledgement of cautious and conscientious readings, the works of Waltz, Keohane and

additional academic personnel can be more thoroughly scrutinised and thus a more dynamic and

multi-faceted image of a chapter in 1970s US foreign policy can be presented. Furthermore there will

be a comprehensive yet limited reliance on excessive explanatory case material which is readily

available in media formats (academic or non-academic), and ill-defined holistic links between

phenomena. All the while, I will aspire to keep from any commentary which could produce an

unwarranted distortion of reality.

xix

The Sino-Soviet Relationship

In the tense, competitive and polarised political climate of much of the twentieth century, states of

various economic and military might can project even greater strengths and influences if they

identify as allies and keep many of their foreign policy aims and objectives in alignment (Waltz 1979,

125-128). In a state of bipolarity, two forces maintain the equilibrium in the international system and

their influence is seldom diminished by one ally’s choice to disassociate from the block, according to

the Waltz. ‘Thus two losses of China in the post war world- first by the United States and then by the

Soviet Union-were accommodated without disastrously distorting, or even much affecting, the

balance between America and Russia’ (Waltz 1979, 169). Disregarded as a minor setback for the

Soviet Union in the early 1970s by Waltz with respect to global security, the neo-liberal perspective

brings to light the economic connotations on power and hegemony; in a case such as this the

dynamics in a bipolar system become much less clear as the ‘hegemonic equilibrium has been

broken and a spiral of action and counter action may set in’ (Keohane and Nye 2012, 39). This first

chapter will examine the manner in which China and the Soviet Union constituted a less harmonious

relationship in the decade preceding the US rapprochement and the subsequent US responses with

application of neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist theories.

In a series of exchanges between delegates of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the kinship forged in the wake of the Communist

Party’s ascension in China was formally unravelled. The majority of the tensions raised concerned

ideological differences and the general direction of the global Marxist-Leninist doctrine which

ostensibly universalised the political-economic aims and objectives of all Communist parties (Foreign

Language Press - Beijing 1964). Additionally, deliberations between Beijing and Moscow frequently

cited the growing unease of the CPC with Soviet interference in Chinese affairs and the unequal

treatment of China by Soviet personnel engaged in the Chinese economy and military (Ellison 1993).

Personal animosity between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong continuously fuelled the

xx

breakdown of relations over a period of several years of Khrushchev’s leadership of the Soviet

Union, and the greater encroachment of the United States into the foreign policy objectives of

Moscow and then Beijing ensured that the Sino-Soviet relationship was increasingly coming under

pressure both internally and externally (Luthi 2008, 1-17). By the time of Nixon’s ascent to the

presidency, China had formidably re-orientated away from behind the veil of Soviet dominance of

the communist world and concerns had damaged relations had increased the propensity of conflict

between the two countries (Luthi 2008, 341-344). In a bipolar order and a structural realist set up,

these escalation fears would have little impact on the overall level of global stability and security, yet

with both states possessing nuclear weapons and the questionable status of China as merely a

supersized satellite state subservient to the schemes of the Soviet Union, potential conflict arguably

had less localised and more devastating effects. Nuclear weapons implore states to think in

cataclysmic terms and render alliances obsolete (Waltz 1979, 182-185), in this context the US had

minimal leverage over the Soviet Union and even less amongst politicians in China.

Security concerns supersede all others in the context of realism, and maintenance of a stable

international system often rests with strongest states (Waltz 1979, 199-204). At equilibrium there

are tensions under the guise of anarchy but the balance of power is maintained by the prospect of

heavier losses than gains, particularly so in the nuclear age. Where neo-liberalism brings forward the

discussion is in the assessment regarding the resurgence of anarchy if the equilibrium is unravelled

and bi-polarity mutates into multi-polarity (Keohane and Nye 2012, 39). This largely centres on the

question of whether or not China was an aspiring hegemonic power which sought to disassociate

with its former ally that was undermining its own potential. However it is categorically unlikely that

the US sought to curry favour with China over the Soviet Union due to the enhanced dialogue with

the Russians which eventually lead to the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty and expanded trade and

commercial activity (Goh 2005) (Ellison 1993, 93-121). However it is implied by Kissinger that both

parties, not least China under the authority of the ageing revolutionary Mao Zedong was ready for a

dialogue which would aggravate the Soviet Union (Kissinger 2011, 202-203). All the while both the

xxi

US and China had constructed the meta-narrative of hostility and staunch ideological opposition and

therefore approached with caution, indirectly pledging not to give China a friendlier dialogue than

had been given to the Soviets (Kissinger 2011, 204-205). This approach is categorised by realism as

an archetypal diplomatic protocol which is neither at the mercy of ideological or domestic political

factors and is purely a strategic alliance. Structural constraints and liberties ultimately determine

how states engage with one another (Keohane 1986, 93-94).

As enmity between Communist China and the USSR grew, it became apparent that China’s enemy’s

enemy could become its friend, albeit on a strategic basis akin to the alliances forged during the

Second World War between ideologically dissimilar countries. As such, the administration headed by

Nixon and Kissinger rejected an ideologically grounded US foreign policy objective and instigated its

will out of concern for global peace and stability; Kissinger identified this method as America’s

utilisation of realpolitik, the mantra of the realist in all their shapes and forms (Kissinger 1994, 723-

725) (Landau 1972).The US government at the time noted the changing fashion of the Eastern bloc’s

international relations and the implications on security within the international system. ‘The Stalinist

bloc has fragmented into competing centres of doctrine and power. One of the deepest conflicts in

the world today is between communist China and the Soviet Union’ (United States Government

Printing Office 1999, 220). As an acknowledged superpower, the US can instigate a shift towards

cooperation which can translate well in both economic and security terms (Keohane 1984, 31-39).

Nixon stated, with reference to belief in his country’s hegemony, that the Chinese can now be

‘drawn into a constructive relationship with the world community’ (United States Government

Printing Office. 1999, 276). There are conflicting accounts regarding the maintenance of peace

between neo-realists and neo-liberals, the former arguing in favour of the balance of power whereas

the latter see greater stability instilled by cooperative dialogue series of mediating institutions. The

overall stability of the international system was not thoroughly or immediately altered by the Sino-

Soviet split, despite concerns that the US had while developing a dialogue with China. It

correspondingly improved the dialogue with the Soviet Union.

xxii

Power and Hegemony

Against the backdrop of Soviet influence on much of Eastern Europe and Asia, the United States

stood as the foremost world power in the West. The Cold War is generally understood by Kenneth

Waltz to be constitutive of a bipolar international order. Moreover this configuration is ever more

divisive than had been previously because the US maybe hegemonic in its own sphere of influence

but the breadth of power has spread worldwide since, for example the European centric era of

British hegemony, to include the Soviet Union and its allies in Asia and Europe (Waltz 1968, 5-8).

With the greater dispersion of power across vastly dissimilar political-economic modalities, it

becomes questionable to state whether the system is unipolar or bipolar, nevertheless Waltz is clear

that on a global scale, the US maybe able to exert a disproportionately high level of influence but

that the Soviet Union has the ability to counter this if and when the US encroaches on its territory or

that of its closest neighbours; as was demonstrated by the proxy conflict in Vietnam (Waltz 1979,

204-210). The neo-liberal writings of Robert Keohane concern themselves with the post-hegemomic

order of global affairs, he contends with an implied pessimism that only in the immediate aftermath

of a great conflict is a hegemomic power established, only for its power to gradually erode in the

years ahead (Keohane 1984, 8-11). Order and stability in the post-hegemonic era is the subject of his

thesis and argues that this can prevail beyond hegemony if international institutions are strong and

can provide a concrete platform for cooperation (Keohane 1984, 11-17). This chapter examines the

dynamics of US hegemony in the early 1970s context of rapprochement with China and what course

of action authority makers undertook in correspondence with the structuralist principles.

What constitutes power? Largely it is considered by neo-realists that economic and military

capabilities are the ‘currency in international politics’ (Mearsheimer 2006, 72). Their rank may also

depend on ‘size of population and territory, resource endowment, political stability and

competence’ (Waltz 1979, 131). Kissinger realised power was spread out in a similar manner during

the Cold War and that it manifested itself in a manner closely in line with Waltz’s framework. Waltz’s

xxiii

take on the US movement towards China falls heavily in line with the understanding that Nixon and

Kissinger both shared; China possesses all the necessary attributes of a potential superpower and

must therefore be treated as one (Waltz 1979, 130). It must firstly be treated as a state and no

longer a pariah; the established hierarchy of power placed the US and USSR higher than all others,

however Nixon and Kissinger where convinced from early on in their mandate that greater potential

lay with China since the Soviet Union’s might was largely characterised by its military apparatus

(Litwak 1984, 89-94) (Nixon 1967). Although co-operation is undertaken to produce mutual gains, it

can also be employed shrewdly and tactically to subliminally exploit the increasing good will of a

political/economic partner (Gill 1990, 16-20). However the allure of the market’s ability to produce

substantial, consistent and mutual gains gives policymakers with long time horizons the impetus to

maintain cooperative relations with one another irrespective of where power is situated. Hierarchy

is diminished when states pursue a quasi-lawful and respectful free market agenda based on

reciprocity and open, honest dialogue which overtime constructs one’s reputation (Axelrod 2006).

Overtime cooperation also renders hegemony less paramount than otherwise it would be under the

guise of arms build ups and the belief in the finite quantity of power (Gill 1990, 20-25).

During the 1950s and 1960s, the US was able to dominate economic policy making and was

instrumental in the establishment of the international institutions and regimes which helped enforce

the US’s economic will on much of the world’s industrialised nations and many of the subsequent

former colonies of European powers (Keohane and Nye 2012, 35-40). The disintegration of the post-

war Bretton Woods international financial directives was precipitated largely by the US’s decision to

unhinge its currency from the gold-exchange standard in 1971. The move to fiat currency was

understood by the US treasury at the time to be vital in maintaining the US’s international

competitiveness in open markets with a currency increasingly under downward pressure from

speculation regarding the artificially inflated value of the dollar in relation to the volume of gold in

US vaults (US Department of State 2016). Nixon insisted that the move was made to safe guard

American living standards, job and industrial output (United States Government Printing Office

xxiv

1999). Yet American manufacturing and heavy industry were losing out to foreign ventures by this

stage and this action provoked subsequent instability in foreign exchange markets. Robert Keohane

argues this move to fiat currency and the safeguarding of uncompetitive US industries connotes the

fracturing of US hegemony because the world’s reserve currency had no concrete metallic backing.

Additionally the heavy debt levels incurred by the US in the previous decade had reduced the US to a

net debtor, reversing its position of two decades earlier when the Bretton Woods system was

established, largely to stabilise the war torn global economy which the US (the chief creditor nation)

sough to rejuvenate with its financial aid (Keohane 1984, 206-210).

Hegemony is largely characterised not just by a strong economy, but by a clear ability of a state to

drive forward progress, stability and prosperity in the international economy through its

engagements with the rest of the world (Keohane and Nye 2012, 35-40). China represented a blank

canvass for the US as Nixon and Kissinger saw its potential to supersede to Soviet Union and

effectively sought to engage while still seeming to dictate the direction of the global political

economy, to the dismay of its ally Japan, whose economic prowess was gradually undermining that

of the US (Litwak 1984, 133-137). Arguably, this manoeuvring by the US demonstrates there is lack

of harmony or friendship amongst allies, only strategic interests. Whether it materialises due to a

split between former Marxist-Leninist comrades or the US’s needs within the global economy,

Kissinger foresaw the importance of making the US presence felt wherever there was scope for US

power and influence to be enhanced, even at the expense of its allies within its own sphere of

influence (The National Security Archive 1999, 4-7) Additionally, it suits an established superpower

to undermine the hegemonic aspirations of its allies as well as its advisories, as the US was willing to

manipulate the international economy to suppress potent competition from Europe or the Pacific.

Managing the affair with China had the potentially intended consequence of undermining Soviet

hegemonic control as well as managing and nurturing the potential which China exemplified (Gill

1990, 63-88). This perceived manoeuvring by the US indicates a reconfigured self-identification in

terms of power and hegemony in relation to those of a similar status, and a long time horizon and a

xxv

staunch determination to maintain power and control strongly indicates the US had embedded the

philosophies of neo-realism and neo-liberalism respectively.

Domestic Political Pressures

Following his 1968 election success, Nixon called on the support of the ‘silent majority’ as the war in

Vietnam continued (Woolley 1969). These white-collar middle class suburban families rallied around

the rhetoric of meritocratic individualism and entrusted strong politicians with the well-being of the

nation in both a domestic and international context. Their ‘silence’ exacerbated by the fiery mantra

of civil rights demonstrators, anti-war protestors and a sub cultural cohort which expressed hatred

towards its political class and occasionally advocated grassroots, bottom up revolution (Lassiter

2006). Nixon generally discredited what was conveyed by those louder and often misunderstood

voices, as did many of his less publically present entourage amongst his inner circle (Nixon 1978,

403-410). In public he stated his respect for ‘their idealism and concern for peace’ and immediately

went on to praise the institution of democracy which permitted freedom of speech and freedom of

expression (Woolley 1969). Aware of the democratic mandate which could be revoked as easily as it

was bestowed, Nixon understood that the context in which he governed was an evolving quagmire

of person to person relations, where rising political violence and changing social attitudes began to

gradually irritate and influence political leaders (Nixon 1978, 411-413). This chapter looks at the

extent to which the US administration’s approach to China was influenced by the changing attitudes

of the US citizenry and the dynamics of these changes and prospective impacts with regards to

structural political theory.

The Vietnam War helped surface a grievance and mistrust felt by many in society towards US foreign

policy and a perceived militaristic and imperialist agenda of the elites of the world’s foremost

military power. Social cohesion was transformed from its hitherto disposition of the era in which

Nixon held the office of vice president; ostensibly saturated with a conformist populace with fewer

xxvi

protest movements opposing American foreign policy (Kissinger 1994, 675-676). Kissinger believed

these counter cultural movements were sapping and exposing the fragility of America’s hierarchy

vis-à-vis its citizens and that the moral and ethical crusade into foreign lands could no longer be

perceived as such (Kissinger 1994, 675-676). Kissinger also states that his administrative chief, Nixon

instigated a new strategy aimed at extricating the US from the stalemate against the Vietcong

without the prize of ultimate victory over the communist regime, but to do so in a manner which

seemed honourable (Kissinger 1994, 677-682). Showing restraint and deviating from the course of

action of the previous administrations enhanced the prospective for approaching the Chinese who

backed the Vietcong; furthermore it gave American hegemony a new course of action in the pre-

eminent superpower’s pursuit of maintaining global stability and its own strategic position in

relation to both its allies and its rivals (Goh 2005, 140-142). Within the US diplomatic circle, the US

president insisted that ‘anything we have done or are doing with respect to China is in no sense

designed to embarrass the Soviet Union’ (Nixon 1978, 406), the opposing power with which Nixon

was likewise attempting to re-orientate foreign policy towards. As containment transformed into

Detente, the position towards the entire communist bloc became less stubborn than had been

throughout the 1950s and 1960s. How and why the domestic agenda in the US and a dilapidated

foreign policy mission in Vietnam gradually translated into an open dialogue with a formerly isolated

communist power can be framed with the theoretical insights of both structural realism and

structural liberalism.

Kenneth Waltz stipulates that international relations are qualitatively different from domestic

politics. Because of hierarchy, functionality and the orderly distribution of each unit’s capability

(individuals and groups of all sorts in a hierarchical order), this structure is rigid and stable (Waltz

1979, 81-82). Because the opposite is true with the anarchic structure of the international system,

the behaviour of states is determined by a paradoxical blend of selfish aspirations and intangible and

organic structural constraints. This works irrespective of the internal domestic level variables, much

like the market economic structure mediates the behaviour of individuals and firms competing for

xxvii

prosperity, and in this case, survival (Waltz 1979, 88-93). As such, a paradigm shift of any magnitude

in US social culture would have little relevance to inter-state interaction because it is domestically

contained within the confines of a hierarchical structure and the state’s survival instincts and its

pursuit of relative power gains forces politicians to act against the public will, even if it diminishes

their popularity. They consider themselves free to act boldly and decisively if it’s in the interest of

national security (Waltz 1968, 286-297). Nevertheless, Nixon’s administration became increasingly

strained by these breadth and vigour of protest movements, the mounting US casualties and

escalating economic costs. What Kissinger negotiated on Nixon’s behalf with Chinese leaders was

the mutual de-escalation of US and Chinese involvement in arming their respective factions; the war

would therefore cease to be a proxy conflict (The National Security Archive 1999, 102-103). The

realist viewpoint of power being contingent on a strong economic and military apparatus may

therefore suggest that the US’s ability to direct effective foreign policy towards peace and security

worldwide is likely diminished by its lapsing hegemony (Litwak 1984, 39-47). The challenges US

politicians may face in their perpetual bid to carry a legitimate and democratic mantle would

produce minor alternatives in the US’s domestic makeup, but the direction of the state in

international affairs would more likely be influenced by their relative economic and military

strengths.

Keohane suggests that the rapprochement with China was largely a selfish ploy which Nixon

instigated personally (Keohane 1984, 251). Yet that the cooperative dynamics between states can be

enhanced and loyalties with international institutions are maintained between democratic structures

(Keohane 2002) (Keohane and Nye 2012, 248-250). The structural discourse would have held

precedence theoretically owing China’s one party state system; nevertheless the American approach

suggested the need to appease a growing mass of the electorate. The neo-liberal analysis cites

structure as a dominating but not all encompassing proponent influencing international politics; that

the distinction exemplified by Waltz is far less clear and that there are progressive, evolutionary

forces which can alter the disposition of international politics depending on the context. (Keohane

xxviii

1986, 187-200) The need for Chinese cooperation on Vietnam was consistently present in Nixon’s

discussions with his ministers in government from the onset of his administration (Nixon 1978, 386-

403), and after the initial dialogue had been established, an avenue of cooperation was opened

which enabled the US to gradually but actively withdraw its military presence in Vietnam. Resolving

what was previously a gross conflict of interest which had escalated to potent use of economic and

military force by the US and China suggests that there was also an escalating impasse and a

withering away of zeal and determination from both sides (Kissinger 2011, 340-345).

Consequentially, during the intense deliberations that followed, the two states effectively chose to

mutually compromise (Axelrod 1970). Although the neo-liberal methodology leads states to

compromise, their motives remain selfish and their own power and security must come before

others. Although ostensibly a voluntary action by state officials, its selfish motive was dormant

whether it manifests itself in the will of Nixon or that of the US itself (Keohane 1984, 70-75). A

landslide victory in 1972 suggests that the war which had sapped the credibility of Lyndon Johnson’s

regime had in fact enhanced Nixon’s democratic mandate and alleviated the pressures faced by the

US political class during the 1960s. This publicity revealed a cooperative tone replacing the outward

stubbornness and vanity that the US previously projected towards communism.

Pragmatism

‘I had never expected that the China initiative would come to fruition in the form of a ping pong

team’ (Nixon 1978, 548). When one examines the international systemic dynamics concerning

bilateral power relations, hegemonic status and military directives orchestrated from across the

Pacific Ocean, finer and more subtle details in the narrative can be missed. The rigidity of

international relations theory means an episode in ping pong diplomacy would not concern a neo-

realist or a neo-liberalist. The relationship between sports and politics is its own theses and debates,

yet there was a thawing of relations which surrounds a hitherto mistrustful relationship (Nixon 1972)

(Kissinger 2011, 231-233). This section won’t concern itself with an answer to this, but will instead

xxix

focus on the omissions that structural theory makes concerning the truth and knowledge believed in

and acted upon by the Nixon administration. Nixon carried a reputation in the US media and political

observers as a unique, active, cautious and formidable character in the political system (Ambrose

1989, 70-76). On his own accord, he saw himself as a pragmatist, particularly in his approach to

communism. ‘As the facts change...any intelligent man does change his approaches to the problems.

It does not mean that he is an opportunist. It means only that he is a pragmatist’ (Ambrose 1989,

171). Nixon’s adhesion to achieving dialogue with China also presented various risks from the onset,

not least in the stability of relations in the region with Japan and Taiwan (Brown 1976). His

entourage and allies had concerns for the speed and exuberance of the president, yet he was not

abandoned and often, at times, encouraged (Ambrose 1989, 252-256). A pragmatist’s view on a

character such as Nixon would play down any indication by biographers or commentators that he

may be out of step with the mainstream in US politics at the time; mainstream is what works, not

what is philosophically or morally embedded. The pragmatist incarnated in Nixon is unique but by no

means vacant in other leaders (James 1948).

Although set in his ways regarding the direction of foreign policy, Nixon had his limitations as an

individual manoeuvring an entire administration towards his objectives. A clear and present ally

presented itself in the form of Henry Kissinger who was appointed largely due to his academic

credentials and less for his affiliation with the Republican Party (Landau 1972, 88-91). Kissinger too

had an adhesion to reconfigure a status quo which simplistically positioned China as an advisory

communist power with which the United States has to contain due to the revolutionary advocacies

of the Marxist-Leninists. A catalogue of events during the 1960s; the most impactful having been

discussed in previous chapters in this section, gave Kissinger a shrewd impetus to make contact with

Mao and his inner circle, integrate with Chinese diplomats and even learn to work with the culturally

grounded manner of Chinese diplomacy (Kissinger 2011, 203-217). Nixon’s consent to a raft of US

diplomatic personnel’s autonomy in these affairs broke with the approaches of the past, so to was

his own and his entourage’s ability to remain strong willed while compromising (Kissinger 2011, 213-

xxx

215). His compromising was predicated on the conviction that China would also consent to

compromise (Ambrose 1989, 114-117). The preliminary secretive meetings managed by Kissinger

provided the Chinese delegates with a diplomacy expert who could alter the paradigm without a

brash or condescending tone, yet also outmanoeuvre the other party owing to its isolated state and

the hostility it faced (The National Security Archive 1999, 10-15). In essentials, Kissinger acted

according to his own beliefs and intellect in the right place at the right time. This activity in the US

administration was also upheld by the partnership Nixon had with Kissinger amongst all others,

which arguably contributed to the substantial deviation from the norm of US foreign affairs.

Kissinger notes that a special relationship was forged with Nixon which allowed for the pace and

succession of events in the realms of foreign policy to transpire. Citing the uniqueness of this

partnership, he said to a journalist, ‘I....am not sure I could have done with him with another

president. Such a special relationship...always depends on the style of both men. I don’t know many

leaders who would have the courage to send their aid to Peking without telling anyone’ (Litwak

1984, 50).

A pragmatist believes in one’s own course of action, irrespective of the philosophical outlook that

they may be exposed to or predisposed to take as their own. ‘For the pragmatist, true sentences are

not true because they correspond to reality, and so there is no need to worry about what sort of

reality’ (Rorty 1982, xvi). The various institutions that Nixon, Kissinger and others found themselves

in (educational, political) could impact the manner in which they construct truth and knowledge, but

their pragmatic behaviour is manifested in their conviction in achieving practical solutions to the

foreign policy challenges they faced. The secrecy which surrounded the early stages of the

rapprochement with China, and the close personal and official relationship between Nixon and

Kissinger created a metaphorical tremor in the stable foundations of the US political system. These

personal details also altered the personified image of the US as it gradually turned towards building

relations across the pacific and with states that had previously been institutionally recognised

pariahs (Gill 1990, 134-137). Easing enmity anywhere with states of any status shifted the Nixon’s

xxxi

administration away from the policy of containment and consequentially the highly publicised visit

to Beijing was packaged and presented in a positive dimension to the world as soon as the

foundations of the bilateral relationship had been established in private and uninterrupted talks.

By the early 1970s, with post-War European order firmly established and their market rejuvenated,

Nixon felt it appropriate to branch out of the region where an allegiance was secure and give the US

a presence somewhere he believed had to become more assimilated into the international

community (Nixon 1978, 280-282) (Nixon 1967). In pragmatic terms, it offers some validity to

Keohane’s claim that Nixon was selfish in his pursuit of a relationship with China and built his

administrative team around his foreign policy goals. His selfishness is nevertheless his pragmatism,

his believe in the path he is taking as a leader despite the uncertain outcome which he faced, the

high stakes associated with this diplomatic venture and the unclear knowledge regarding the precise

policy and timeframe which this episode would take (Kissinger 1994, 729-730). The Nixon doctrine

involved the calculated use of personality politics and imaginative, even radical tactics which could

have had a wide variety of implications that were directly dependent on the outcomes. The

institutionalist norms and the philosophy have their frameworks underpinned by greater certainty,

contrasting an elaborate, cunning, fast-paced practicality based approach.

xxxii

Variables Analysis and Summary

All four of the previous factors considered alone help to illuminate how and why the rapprochement

with China was instigated. What this forthcoming chapter will attempt to do is to make just criticism

of the theoretical blueprints which, I have thus far argued, have impacted the United States in its

foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, I intend to question some of the variables themselves, since

they have also thus far been written about as essentially factual. Though many of the sources used

have their respective seal of approval, they are not to be taken without scrutiny, especially as many

are sourced from US government personnel. Their official lines can be expressed to suit the narrative

they endeavour to build. Structural theory, amongst others, reduces the individual agents into

obscurity, helping to render the substance fabricated by Nixon and Kissinger as the work of forces

beyond their control. Theory too however comes with the caveat of being grounded in elements of

subjectivity and with limited scope to portray every dimension (Foucault 1972). The first of the now

numerous theoretical instruments were being developed during the 1970s, attempting to generate

and assign a concrete set of rules to an international relations environment with a shifting political-

economic equilibrium and set of parameters. The US and China relationship’s had manifested out of

the changes taking place in international political economy, which in structural terms created the

right conditions for the rapprochement which American diplomats undertook (Kahler 1997).

America’s strategies in light of the Sino-Soviet split have clear connotations with structural theory

and an easing of tensions with both states simultaneously. The prospect of antagonising the Soviet

Union by reconciling with China weighed heavily on Henry Kissinger, yet the tactic of trilateral

diplomacy involving Beijing as a presumptive partner of the US, had the desired effect of weakening

the Soviet Union’s influence within its neighbourhood (The National Security Archive 1999). To what

extent was the US balancing the relative power between itself and others or manoeuvring effectively

between two advisory states in an effort to preserve international systemic stability? The

environment and philosophical tradition which positions a state’s own power and survival above all

xxxiii

other needs and wants would have prompted the US to cautiously but unhesitatingly intervene,

despite not being in a conflict limbo with either state; but the scale of Soviet and Chinese military

capital could have made the fallout from armed conflict globally devastating and as such the US was

prompted to pacify the communist rivals. The US arguably maintained hegemony within the

international system but the system’s gradual evolution away from hegemony can suggest that the

neo-liberal methodology based on calculated cooperation was gradually materialising (Keohane

1984). Waltz too argues that lapses in the systemic balance can enable states to cooperate and ease

tensions from time to time and that hierarchy in the international system may translate into

international systemic level discipline, but it’s persistence is subject to changes in this system and

the resulting equilibrium is more cyclical and transient, as opposed to the neo-liberal post

hegemonic order which is more permanent (Waltz 1979, 115-116) (Keohane 1984, 11-17). States’

precondition to be concerned with survival first and foremost is an assumed observation from

structural theory which may not be persistently true in certain contexts. The US and China, both

yielding independent nuclear arsenals had survival as a key concern especially given the context of

hostility that permeated cold war international relations, yet it had become increasingly clear three

decades after the prospect of mutually assured destruction had first encapsulated the international

community, that the security dilemma had been gradually mitigated. The Strategic Arms Limitation

Talks also helped ease the unchecked militarism of the US and USSR. In spite of prevailing realism

during the 1970s (Kahler 1997), the Sino-Soviet split and the US response demonstrates a move

away from ethos based on egocentrism and militarism as far as the Nixon administration acted.

Closely relatable with the changing power dynamics amongst its advisories, the US too arguably

faced growing insecurities relating to its economic capacity and its ability to project its weight upon

the directions of its allies and that of weaker states destabilising the US sanctioned order and peace.

But towards China, the post-hegemonic order the US found itself in could have become increasingly

hostile. Richard Nixon was compelled by Communist China’s admission to the UN to cease the

hostility between the two states, lest the US found itself on a Security Council with an additional

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faction working against it; China now had permanent membership and veto powers. In this context,

Nixon’s approach grew increasingly desperate, ‘we hope for, but will not be deterred by a lack of

reciprocity’ (Nixon 1978, 548). Reciprocity is what stimulates long term and effective cooperation

where mutual compromise can be found to be neither one sided or implausible for either party; it is

the ultimate principle upon which neo-liberal political-economic theory can produce an impressive

response to anarchy which brings states and institutions into constructive and beneficial activity

(Keohane 1986). Nixon downplayed American hegemony at the same time as he magnified the UN’s

strengths, creating a new scope for political-economic discourse which the neo-liberal school now

has as part of its inherent blueprints. Declining hegemony and institutional power does not

necessarily reflect a transient period in theoretical discourse simply from neo-realism to neo-

liberalism. As discussed previously, the competitive decline of the US economically and the

structural adjustments made by the uncoupling of the dollar from gold and the increasing

protectionist measures Nixon had implemented to suppress the influx of foreign capital and

investment had signalled a lapse in Keynesian, liberal, globalist economic approaches. Realist

sentiments continue to permeate the US administration with respect to the economic undertakings

but the distinctions between international economic and political risks to global security are

ambiguous and overlapping. US management of China ascent within the UN and the economic

management protocols reveal the complexity of American power in the early 1970s, to some extent

there was clear and present deterioration, yet this was not without attempts to halt or decline the

country’s economic pre-eminence (Keohane and Nye 2012). Although neo-liberal international

relations theory differs from liberal economics, they are similar with respect to methodology.

Keohane’s analysis is very economics-centric as the growing concern in a post-hegemonic order is

the maintenance of cooperation and the prevention of hostile anarchy and war; economic relations

are the key variable (Keohane 1984). We therefore clearly see a growing presence of neo-liberalism

developing in an economic order where American hegemony is no longer the status-quo.

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In moments of crisis and especially in crisis of war, attempts to achieve a nearly unanimous backing

for foreign policy are most likely to be successful. Nixon was able to command a unanimous backing

for his initiatives in China and in easing US involvement in the Vietnam War. The American public

however did not speak on the latter with voice in close correspondence with their government or

with a consensus. At the domestic level within the US, the war in Vietnam gave voice to numerous

movements’ intent on undermining US foreign policy directives through means which were often

confrontational or violent. These changing social attitudes maybe disregarded as irrelevant to the

structural integrity of the international system, however a generation of US citizens during the 1960s

managed to captivate both the Johnson and Nixon administration with their chants and slogans

(Chomsky 2003). These galvanised peace activists were addressed by Nixon and labelled as ‘idealists’

(Woolley 1969), a demographic Nixon had little affection for insofar as he believed them to be

misinformed rabble rousers who could not comprehend the complexity of what was unravelling

(Nixon 1978). In spite of the anguish this cohort presented, Nixon was an elected representative who

required the consent to govern and therefore had to contain any escalation in what was widespread

civil discontent.

The US contains and utilises numerous elements of representative democracy where as those it vied

with for hegemony and influences operated more or less as authoritarian regimes. A government

accountable to its citizens will have to be mindful of the decisions it takes, in foreign policy and

beyond to ensure it remains legitimately endowed with the political instruments of power. However,

the extent to which the US driven to acquiesce to China in an effort to uncouple its military

personnel from Vietnam because of the democratic structure is either large or small depending on

the framework through which it is argued. Waltz suggests that democracy is irrelevant, especially in

matters concerning international relations, where the stakes are so high, democracy is subservient

to the will and expertise of the security and defence personnel (Waltz 1979, 84-88). Keohane

emphasises interdependence and transnationalism is greatly enhanced where there are democratic

governments in place. But between democracies, relations may take on a different form than

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between a democracy and an autocracy. Institutional norms may give a state a superficial form of a

democracy but enshrined democratic values give it greater cultural significance (Keohane 2002). The

US saw protest movements responded to the increasing alienation felt by the electorate in relation

to the elites which governed. To many, their reputation as public servants had become tarnished, as

had the democratic institutions (Chomsky 2003). In traditional liberal philosophy, If Nixon wants the

power to drive the US towards war or peace, cooperation or defection; he would have to appease

the voices within of the electorate to make good on his commitment to the country’s foreign policy

direction. In spite of this, a realist undertaking suggests that the path to power and control is often

laden with ruthless manipulation. Nixon in particular carried with him a shrewd and sometimes

alienating personality which politicians found difficult to comprehend and work with initially, yet he

was convinced that he understood his place in the order of the structural sphere around him

(Ambrose 1989).

Nixon operated in a somewhat paradoxical manner with respect to the structure/agency paradigm.

In a speech to students on the topic of Vietnam, he recalled the events in British politics which

proved Chamberlain’s appeasement of the Nazis was a gross error of judgement and events had

transpired in favour of Churchill, the man Nixon had considered a ‘madman’ (Ambrose 1989, 355).

The structural pressures in this example had pushed Chamberlain onto the wrong side of history and

propelled Churchill to the throne of power. Nixon at the helm of American politics was self-

professed portent of his destiny. A unique time and place where an individual can change and shape

the course of history exacerbated Nixon’s stubborn persona and sense of mission in life yet as his

resignation following the scandal at Watergate suggested, Nixon was by no means able to

manipulate the state without consequence. The notion of individual pragmatism or prowess creating

such a marked and long term impact on the state of international relations as could be argued was

the case regarding the US-Chinese rapprochement seems to completely contradict the notion that

structure dictates behaviour at all other levels of analysis. This stark separation of structure from

agent can however be over simplified and it is more plausible to suggest that the distinction

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between them is blurred (Marks 2011). Nixon’s adhesion to structural limits was evident in his

efforts to end involvement in Vietnam without dishonour, carnage or clear signs of American

weakness as well as his comprehension of China’s geopolitical significance superseded any negative

sentiments towards communism or the strategies of previous US politicians.

Realism encapsulates the mantra of Nixon and Kissinger more than any other political theory in

action. Their thinking on foreign policy matters had been conceived and strategized in a similar

fashion to that of Otto Von Bismarck; an individual which Kissinger had stylized as ‘the white

revolutionary’ in an academic thesis centred on the cunning exploits of a man whose brash wisdom

worked in tandem with the structural pitfalls and promises; effectively creating the pre-World War I

European balance or power (Kissinger 1968). Nixon and Kissinger too set out altering the paradigm

by making contact and ingratiating the US with China, using the Bismarckian tactics meant carefully

utilising the tools while being mindful of the context to achieve a bilateral relationship. These tactics

largely involved making use of all the variables that have been thus far dissected in addition to other,

more subtle details, such as changing the US meta-narratives towards communism and China (Litwak

1994). With no stone unturned, the strategy’s ideological disposition could not be deciphered

effectively; the aim was to achieve a success by most means afforded to Nixon and Kissinger. The

methodology of pragmatism is to make use of what works. Realism is what worked for Nixon and the

US in the early 1970s; effectively the distinction between theoretical blueprints and pragmatic

methodological practice also becomes blurred if realism can be considered a doctrinised form of

pragmatism. Its ontology is however saturated with assumptions about power and security that

coherently compel states to behave in a specific manner. When structural constraints are factored in

as with neo-realism and to a lesser extent, neo-liberalism, the ability for individuals and states to

behave as though they can act independently on their own convictions and truths is markedly

diminished , especially since this arbitrary structure is free-flowing, fluid and indiscriminate (Waltz

1979).

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Conclusions

Not without its shortcomings, a firm case has been made for the validity of International relations

theory which has highlighted many of the more discreet actions and reactions which the US had

taken in its approach to China under the leadership of Richard Nixon. By no means the standard

framework for which states solely operate, the structural dimensions have their clout in explaining

variables with international, systemic level causes and effects, such as that detailing the implications

of the Sino-Soviet split and the developments in US hegemonic control of the international economy.

The theory becomes less potent in assessing variables which are sourced at the domestic level or

even the personal or individual level of analysis. We see that the intended function of the structural

theory is to provide a framework for which explanations can be made through observing IR

phenomenon at the structural or systemic level. Theory is by no means universally applicable and

consistently reductionist, by Kenneth Waltz’s admission (Waltz 1979). Similarly Keohane also

contends that theory naturally makes assumptions and deductions which marginalise certain

elements of an argument, but it also helps ‘retain focus on systemic constraints’ (Keohane 1984, 29).

In this assessment, we have seen the logic of Waltz and Keohane’s arguments shape the US

responses to its relations with China; the internationalised nature of this empirical study made it

useful to apply a relevant theoretical blueprint. But this produces a casual denial of other, potentially

essential variables which have been cited by the actors involved as crucial, influential elements.

The political practices of the first Nixon administration exemplify some of the key themes of this

thesis. The most significant of which is the paradoxical approach that was taken in diplomacy and

foreign policy; its methods were orthodox, insofar and Nixon and Kissinger were realists with a keen

sense and understanding of the order they had to produce out of the systemic chaos that

perpetuates (Litwak 1994). It also came with its own also distinctive, unique flare that was

disassociated with the stagnant, introspective views of the past and staunchly active and pragmatic

enough to alter the meta-narratives (Kissinger 1994). The variables considered have all shaped the

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founding of the US and China’s bilateral relationship but this relationship’s birth is by no means

limited to the variables discussed. These offer an insight into the extent to which the structural

narratives is useful in explaining the course of events from the point of view of the United States.

The elements and methods which do not conform to the theory’s ontology, in addition to

showcasing the limits of theory and expanding the scope to which a case study can be dissected, also

gives the incomplete theory a portion of its characteristics, a series of elements through which the

theory can disregard as extraneous or inappropriate, such as the suggestion that Nixon’s foreign was

influenced by protest movements at the domestic level. Furthermore, it can also blur the reasoning

which theory assigns to its agents and structures. Pragmatism may reflect realism in a doctrinated

format, problematizing the language and connotations which produce what could also be

interpreted as two radically different practices.

This chapter, amongst others, has compellingly illuminated the complex and multi-dimensional

character of diplomacy in the sphere of contemporary international relations. This period represents

a pivot in the direction of international politics, as new relations and approaches were forged in the

discipline of diplomacy, but also in the character of the global economic structure, where a

distinctive global liberal order was gradually challenged prominently by the United States (Cox and

Skidmore-Hess 1999, 129-132). The effects of the rapprochement with China have shaped

subsequent episodes in international relations beyond the twentieth century and beyond the

borders of America and China. Approaching solely with the prism of structural theory would severely

limit our comprehension of the dynamics which develop international relations; a discipline which

encompasses a spectrum of numerous humanities and social sciences accords.

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