Walker Body of Persuasion

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The Body of Persuasion: A Theory of the EnthymemeAuthor(s): Jeffrey WalkerSource: College English, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), pp. 46-65Published by: National Council of Teachers of EnglishStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/378216

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2/21

46

THE

BODY

OF

PERSUASION: A

THEORY

OF THE

ENTHYMEME

Jeffrey

Walker

hegenerally revailingoncept ftheenthymeme,r theonemost requent

in the world of

rhetoric and

composition

studies,

tends to

define

it

either as

a

kind

of

elliptical,

informal

syllogism

based

on

probable

rather

than certain

premises

and

on

tacit

assumptions

shared

by

audience and

rhetor,

or

as a kind

of

Toulmin

argument,

or as a

general

mode of

intuitive

reasoning representable

in

syllogistic

or Toulminian

terms, or,

most

simply,

as

the

juxtaposition

of

any

idea

with another

that

is

offered

as

a reason for

believing

it.

All

such

thinking

starts

from

Aristotle's

famous

dicta

that the

enthymeme

is

a

kind of

syllogism

or

rhetorical

syllogism,

and that

rhetoric is

a

counterpart

of dialectic

(Rhetoric

1.1 [1355a]; 1.2 [1356b]; 1.1 [1354a]).' This prevailing definition, however, has

recently

been

put

in

question

(see

in

particular

Conley, Enthymeme ; Gage,

Theory ).

And,

as

we

will

see,

it is

inadequate.

In

what

follows,

we

will

first reexamine the

primary

(and

not

exclusively

Aristotelian)

ancient sources

from

which a more

adequate

concept

of the en-

thymeme

can be derived.

Then,

we will

consider the

relevance

of that

concept

to

the

analysis

of modern

discourse-specifically,

to the

analysis

of Roland Barthes'

The

World

of

Wrestling

and

Martin

Luther

King,

Jr.'s

Letter

from

Birming-

ham

Jail,

both

of which

appear

in

popular anthologies

used in

composition

courses,

and both

of which

provide good examples

of modern-but

unrecog-

nized-enthymeming.

The

prevailing

definition

has,

of

course,

some

very

real

advantages.

Chief

among

them

is

its

tendency

to

emphasize

the

dialogic

relation

between writer

and

audience

by requiring

the writer to include

the

audience's

thinking

in

the inven-

Jeffrey

Walker has

just

returned

from a

Fulbright

Lectureship

in

Athens,

Greece,

where

this

article

was

completed.

He is Associate

Professor of

English

and Director of

Composition

at Penn State

University.

His

publications

include two

previous

articles in

CollegeEnglish,

and

a

book,

BardicEthos

and the American

Epic

Poem:

Whitman,

Pound,

Crane, Williams,

and

Olson

(LSU

Press,

1989).

He is

coauthor,

with Glen

McClish,

of the

anthology

Investigating

Arguments:Readingsor College

Writing

(Houghton Mifflin, 1991).

COLLEGE

ENGLISH,

VOLUME

56,

NUMBER

1,

JANUARY

1994


3/21

A

THEORY

OF THE ENTHYMEME

47

tion

process,

rather than

merely

adapting

the

discourse to an audience consid-

ered

after the

fact,

or considered

only

as an external other to be

manipulated

or accommodated

by

the writer's

unilateral,

monologic

action

(Gage,

Epistemol-

ogy

162-165).

Such an

approach

to

enthymematic

rhetoric

emphasizes

both

the

ethics

and the

techniques

of

persuasion,

as well as the

epistemological

and ideo-

logical

nature

of

rhetoric

by

requiring

the writer to examine

carefully

the

system

of

presuppositions

underlying

any given

line of

reasoning.

And since it is

the

epistemology/ideology

of an audience

that is in

question,

and not

merely

that of

a

romantically

isolated

individual,

this

approach

then leads to some form

of

cultural

criticism or

to

something

like the ancient

sophists'

skeptical

mode

of

inquiry

into conventional

belief.

It is also the

case,

however,

that the

currently prevailing

notion of the

enthymeme

as a rhetorical

syllogism

is

problematic

in

several

ways, especially

as we

find it too often

oversimplified

in

English

handbooks

currently

in

use

in

composition

classes.

First,

it all too

easily

permits

an

appropriation

of the

concept

that takes

inadequate

account

of what

syllogism might

mean

in

a rhetorical

context

or what it means

in

ancient Greek

apart

from

(or

before)

the

technical,

specialized significance

developed

in

Aristotle's

treatises

on

logic

and dialectic.

Plato,

for

example, appears

to

have

used

the

term

syllogismos

to

mean,

simply,

add

up

the results

(Quandahl 133).

Similarly,

we find

the

great sophist

Isocrates

using the word syllogisamenoin reference to the way an ordinary person intui-

tively

derives an inference or

judgment

from

a bundle of observations

(Against

the

Sophists

7-8).

This

intuitive

syllogizing,

moreover,

is

set

in

opposition

to

what

Isocrates

calls

eristics,

the

logic-chopping

verbal combat of

professional

dialec-

ticians who

claim to have

precise

or exact

knowledge.

Even

Aristotle,

at the

beginning

of the

Topics,

dopts

a

casual,

informal

definition

of the

syllogism

as

a

logos,

a

reasoning

or

discourse

in

which certain

things having

been laid

down,

other

things

necessarily

derive from them

(1.1

[100a]).

At

this

point

he is

probably drawing

on a

commonly

received

conception,

one that

would

be

familiar

for the audience of an introductory lecture. In the same place, dialectical syllo-

gizing

is

defined as

reasoning

from

doxa,

generally

accepted opinions,

or

more

specifically

as

reasoning

from doxa

granted

or

accepted by

one's

interlocutor(s),

one's

audience

(1.1 [100b]).

My

point

is

that

the

nontechnical

meaning

of

syllogism

in

ancient

Greek

seems

to

be

nothing

more than

ordinary,

informal

reasoning

and

inference,

and

that,

in

the context of

discussion and

debate,

this

meaning

includes informal

(as

well as

formal)

reasoning/inference

from

probable

assumptions

granted by

one's

audience.

If, then,

syllogism

can be

used

in

such a sense with reference to

everyday thought and discourse, why use enthymeme to name the same thing?

By carelessly invoking

enthymeme

as the rhetorical

syllogism,

we

may

be

making

a

distinction without a difference.


4/21


5/21

A THEORY OF THE ENTHYMEME

49

motive,

of the sometimes

uncontrollable

forces

of

desire

and wish

that

drive

human

intentionality. Thymos s, moreover,

often linked to both the

production

and

the

reception

of

passional thought

and

eloquent, persuasive

discourse.

Pin-

dar,

for

example,

tells

how

the

crafty

Hippolyta

strove

with all

her

heart

(thymos)

o

seduce

the

ever-virtuous

Peleus

with

beguiling

words and

falsely

inventing

wove

a

tale

to

persuade

her husband that Peleus had tried

to

seduce

her

(Nemean

5,

lines

26-31);

Hesiod in the

prologue

of Works nd

Days

(line

27)

tells

his

addressee, Perses,

to

lay

up

these

things

in

your

heart

(thymos).

The word

enthymema

and its relatives

clearly

are

grounded

in

such a field

of

meanings.

As Miller

and Bee have

noted,

for

example,

the

verb

enthymeomai

as

a semantic

range

that includes such

meanings

as

lay

to

heart,

consider

well,

reflect

on,

think

deeply

about,

be hurt or

angry

at,

form

a

plan,

infer,

conclude

202).

En-

thymeming,

then,

would

appear

to

include

both

the

inference-making

of

the

heart and the

strategic intentionality

of

forming plans.

In the

case of

rhetoric,

moreover,

this

strategic intentionality

includes what I

will

call kairotic

nventive-

ness -that

is,

an

inventiveness

responsive

to

what ancient

rhetoricians called

kairos,

the

opportune

at

any

given

moment in a

particular

rhetorical

situation.

For

a

pre-

or

non-Aristotelian

notion

of

the

enthymeme

in

rhetoric,

our

best

sources are

probably

Isocrates and the

otherwise

unknown

writer

of the

Rhetoric to

Alexander,

Anaximenes of

Lampsacus.

For

Isocrates,

enthymeme-

making is not only a matter of kairotic inventiveness, but is also linked to matters

of

style.

In

the

Panegyricus,

or

example,

he tells us

that

to

suit the kairos

of a

discourse with

fitting

enthymemes

and

with words

well

arranged

s

the

special

gift

of

those

of

good

intelligence

(9-10).

In

Against

the

Sophists,

ikewise,

he

portrays

the

ability

to see

what

kairos

demands,

and

speak

a discourse

wholly

wrought

with

fitting

enthymemes

and words both

rhythmic

and musical

as

the

essence of

rhetorical

skill

(16-17).

These statements

are

fairly

typical

(see,

for

example,

Evagoras

10-11

and Antidosis

46-47,

319).

In

Isocrates,

a

mention of

the

enthymeme

is seldom

without,

and

seldom far

from,

a

reference to

stylistic

matters; and indeed they often occur together in the same sentence.

Isocrates'

notion of

the

enthymeme,

then,

appears

to

include,

or to

be

linked

to,

passional

thought,

kairotic

inventiveness,

and

style-and

it

clearly occupies

a

central

place

in

his

conception

of

rhetorical skill.

But

Isocrates

will

not

give

us

the

satisfaction

of

a

rigidly

precise

or

systematic

account

of the

enthymeme,

since

in

general

he

denies the

possibility

or

usefulness of

exact

knowledge

and

does

not

consider rhetoric

reducible to

techne

for

a

discussion of this

denial,

see

Cahn).

For

more

explicit

codification,

we

must

turn

to

Anaximenes'

Rhetoric o

Alexander,

a

sophistic

techne

written

probably

in

the

generation

after

Aristotle (and for

many

centuries incorrectly attributed to Aristotle). What Anaximenes offers is the

fullest

surviving presentation

of a

sophistic

notion of

enthymeme

that

is

gener-

ally

taken both to

precede

and to

follow

Aristotle's

Rhetoric,

and that with a

long


6/21

50

COLLEGE ENGLISH

survival

in

Hellenistic, Roman,

and

Byzantine

treatises

appears

to be the

domi-

nant

tradition

in

antiquity (see Grimaldi,

Studies

67-82; Conley, Enthymeme ).

According

to

Anaximenes,

enthymemes

are

oppositions

or

contradictions

not

only

in

words or

in

actions..,

.but

also

in

anything

else.

Enthymemes,

he

says,

are

to

be invented

by inspecting

an

opponent's

discourse

or

an action for

anything

that is

contradictory

either with

itself or

with

the

principles

of

justice,

law,

expediency,

honor,

feasibility, facility

or

probability,

or

with the character

of the

speaker

or

the usual course

of

events. The

speaker

is then

to

make his

own

case

by

showing

that his words

or

actions are

exactly contrary

to

those that are

unjust,

unlawful

and

inexpedient,

and to

the usual conduct of bad

men,

in

brief

to whatever

is

deemed

evil,

phrasing

his

enthymemes

or

oppositions

as

briefly

and

economically

as

possible

(10

[1430a]).

Anaximenes

expands

this account

by

noting

that one invents and

deploys

enthymemes

by

following

the

methods

of what

he calls exetastic

discourse,

meaning

what

we

might

call

inquiry,

investigation,

or

critique.

Exetasis,

for

Anaximenes,

is an exhibition

of

inconsistencies

in

someone's

intentions, deeds,

or

words

(5

[1427b]),

and is

not

a

separate

genre

but a

general

method that is used

in

every

kind

of

public

discourse

(37

[1445a]).

The

actual

deployment

of exetasis

is

to

go

as

follows:

first,

one introduces

plausible pretexts

for

proceeding

to an

examination;

then,

one examines

the

actions, words,

or

intentions

in

question,

exposing

the contradictions into which they fall. Finally, Anaximenes advises the

speaker,

when

you

have

carefully

examined

everything

and have

amplified

your

points,

conclude

by giving

a concise

repetition, recalling

what

you

have

said to

your

hearer's

memory

(37 [1445a-b]).

For

Anaximenes,

then,

it

would

appear

that

an

enthymeme

is,

or

is

like,

the

argumentational

cap

that finishes

an

exetastic

movement: a

concise,

emphatic

statement

of an

emotionally

charged

opposition,

one that serves

not

only

to draw

conclusions

but also

to

foreground

stance

or

attitude

toward the

subject

under

discussion

and

to motivate

the audience

to

strongly

identify

with that stance

(this

is identification as Kenneth Burke uses it [Rhetoric17-29, 55-59]). The audi-

ence

is to feel

not

simply

that

the

speaker's

claims

are true or

probable,

but

that

both

speaker

and

claims are

good

and

admirable,

and the

very

opposite

of what is

false, bad,

and detestable.

Like

Isocrates,

Anaximenes

appears

to

link

stylistic

with

enthymematic

con-

cerns.

Only

seven

of

the

thirty-eight

chapters

in the Rhetoric

to Alexander

are

directly

concerned

with

style,

or

with

what Anaximenes

calls

the sources

of

urbanity,

but,

significantly,

he

begins

with

reference

to the

enthymeme:

Ur-

banity

is

achieved

in

this

way--you

state

half an

enthymeme,

so that the audience

may understand the other half for themselves (22 [1434a]). Moreover, of the ten

sources of

urbanity

Anaximenes

discusses,

seven seem

highly

relevant

to the

concise and

emphatic

statement

of

emotionally charged

oppositions:

brevity,


7/21

A

THEORY

OF THE

ENTHYMEME

51

adapting

the ethos

of the words to that of the

audience,

methods of

framing

twofold

statements,

clarity,

antithesis,

and

parallelisms

of structure and

of

sound.

Moreover,

while the other three sources

of

urbanity

do not seem

clearly

related

to

the statement

of

brief,

emphatic

enthymemes-these

are

lengthening

(by

creating

and

multiplying

divisions

within a

topic

and

dwelling

on

each),

speaking

at moderate

length,

and

composition

(the

choice and

arrangement

of

words)-they

do seem relevant to the

build-up

of

an exetastic movement and

may

perhaps

also

be

seen as variant

strategies

for the statement of elaborated

enthy-

memes.

Anaximenes's discussion of

style,

in

sum,

seems

mainly

(though certainly

not

exclusively)

concerned

with the

methods

of

effectively

stating

enthymemes-

that

is,

with the methods

of

enhancing

an

enthymeme's

prominence

and

memorability

or what Perelman would call its

presence

in its audience's mind

(New

Rhetoric

115-120,

144-148).

There

are, however,

important

differences

between

Anaximenes and

Isocrates,

and a failure to note them will commit us to

an

excessively

narrow

concept

of the

enthymeme.

Anaximenes,

after

all,

is the

kind

of

sophist

Isocrates

most

despises:

one who

considers rhetoric reducible

to

techne

and

has therefore

written

a

manual),

and

who, moreover,

focuses his

teachings

chiefly

on

the

methods

of

winning

lawsuits

(for

Isocrates'

disapproval

of

such

rhetoricians,

see

Against

the

Sophists

19-20

and Antidosis

47-50).

This

emphasis

is what

explains

the

rather prosecutorial, inquisitorial nature that Anaximenes gives to both the en-

thymeme

and the exetastic: he

sounds

very

much like

the eristical or

combative

kind

of

sophist,

always

on the watch for

contradictions,

whom

Isocrates takes

to

task. For

Isocrates,

enthymemes

are used not

only

in

the rhetorical

combats of

courts and

assemblies,

and not

only

in

eristics,

but

also

in

poetry

and

what he

calls

the

philosophical

and

panegyric

kinds

of

discourse that he

himself

practices

and

teaches;

and indeed the

enthymemes

in

these latter

genres

he

considers

most

lofty

and

original

(Evagoras

10-11;

Antidosis

46-47, 319).

It

is difficult

to see how

one could

generate

enthymemes

in

such

genres

exclusively by

indicting

the

flaws

and inconsistencies of an opponent. In a famous passage of the Panegyricus,one

can see

Isocrates

exploiting

oppositions

in

a

noninquisitorial

way

to

motivate

identification,

or

what

Perelman

calls

adherence

(New

Rhetoric

1-44,

49-54,

104-110),

with his

vision

of

Pan-Hellenism:

Athens...

has honored

eloquence,

which

all

desire in

the

wisely

skilled;

or she

realized hat

by

this

alone we

are

unique

among

all

creatures,

nd that

because

of

this

advantage

we

have

surpassed

hem

altogether;

and she

saw that

in

other

pursuits

ortune s

so

capricious

hat

often

the

wise

fail

and

the

foolish

succeed,

whereaswords

possessing

both

beauty

and art arenot the

fool's but are

truly

the

work

of an

intelligent

soul,

and

in

this

respect

the wise and the

ignorant

most

completelydifferfrom eachother;andshe knew, urthermore,hatwhethermen

havebeen

liberally

ducated

romthestart s shown

not

in

their

courage

or

wealth

or such

advantages,

ut is

most

certainly

made

manifest n

speech,

which

is

of

all


8/21

52

COLLEGE

ENGLISH

such

signs

the

surest

proof

of

culture

n

everyone,

and

that those

who use

discourse

well are

not

only

influential

among

their

friends

but

also are

truly

held

in

high

esteembyothers.Andso farhasourcityoutpacedallothers n thoughtandspeech

that her students

havebecomethe

teachers

of

the

rest,

so that the

word

Hellenes

suggests

no

longer

a race but a

way

of

thought,

and the title Hellenes

pplies

o

those

who share our culture

rather than to

those

who share a common blood.

(48-50)

In this

enthymeme

of

great

persuasive

force

and

enormous cultural

power,

Isocrates establishes

the

vision

that

defined the Hellenistic ideal of

paideia

for

centuries to

come.

Its

power

derives not

only

from

a

syllogistic

marshaling

of

evidence

to

justify

a conclusion

(the

claim that Athens has

become

the

school

of

all Hellas because it has most honored

eloquence

is, in truth,

weakly supported

here,

though

earlier

passages

do

give

it some

evidential

ground).

Rather,

this

enthymeme's power

lies in its use

of

emotively significant

oppositions

(hu-

man/animal,

wise/foolish,

cultured/ignorant,

achievement/luck,

etc.),

defining

eloquence

as the

distinguishing

feature

of

human-ness

and the distinctive

sign

of

an

accomplished

and wise

intelligence,

to motivate

the audience's

admiration

and

desire-the

wish

that Athens

should

indeed be

the

school

of

Hellas-a desire

that

drives

(or

simply

is)

adherence

with

Isocrates' vision

of a

cosmopolitan

cultural

identity

defined

by thought

(the

distinctly

human,

the

discursively

constructed)

rather than by blood (the animal and accidental).

In

considering

the

differences

between

Anaximenes and

Isocrates,

moreover,

we

should

recall

Isocrates'

emphasis

on

the

kairotic

aspect

of

enthymemes,

in

particular

his notion

that the best

enthymemes

will be

what he

calls

apotomos,

abrupt

(Evagoras

10-11).

Abruptness may

signify,

from

one

point

of

view,

simply

the

concise,

emphatic

quality

that

Anaximenes

attributes

to the

en-

thymeme,

or the

idea

that

in

public

speaking

enthymemes

should

be

plain-spoken

and

to

the

point.

But

the

adjective

apotomos

nd the verb

apotemno

rom

which

it

derives

have

other

kinds

of

significance

also,

including

cut off or

sever,

and

in the adjective a sense of precipitousness, or metaphorically of surprise, as in the

feeling

of

coming

suddenly upon

the

edge

of a cliff. What this

suggests

is

that,

as

opposed

to

Anaximenes'

somewhat

mechanistic

picture

of

an exetastic

movement

grinding

out

an

inquisitorial

investigation,

which

is then

pithily

summed

up

by

an

enthymeme,

for

Isocrates

the best and

most

effective

enthymemes

will in

some

sense come

as

a

surprise

and stand

apart

from

or

go

beyond

what

precedes

them.

They

will seize

the

kairos

of the

moment

to

move

the

audience

to

a decisive

recognition

that

is

or seems

lofty

and

original,

while

at

the same time

cutting

off

or

shifting

into the

background

other

possible

recognitions

that

may

be

latent

in the buildup.

This

is what

we

see,

again,

in the

passage

from Isocrates'

Panegyricus.

The

culminating

vision

or stance of

that

passage,

while motivated

and made

persuasive


9/21

A

THEORY OF THE ENTHYMEME

53

by

the

preceding

exetasis,

does not

inevitably

follow

from it and

certainly

does

not

summarize

it. Isocrates

might,

for

example,

turn to

blaming

Athens'

disas-

trous failure

in

the

recently

ended

Peloponnesian

War on failure to

honor

eloquence

and a

consequent

descent to

politics

determined

by

wealth,

blood-

loyalties,

and brutal force. Such

a turn

would

not serve his

purpose

in the

Panegyricus,

but it

is

latent

in his

exetasis;

and

it is

pushed

into

the

background by

what he

foregrounds.

(In

the

following passage,

he

explicitly

confronts

this

point

by declaring

that he

does not

want

to

seem

to be

praising

Athens'

cultural

achievement because

I

lack

grounds

for

praising

her conduct

in

war

[51].)

Isocrates'

enthymeme,

in

sum,

arrives

(for

its

audience)

as

a

brilliant,

inspirational

stroke of

insight,

a

decisive turn

that

brings suddenly

into focus and

gives

memo-

rable

presence

to a

particular

turn of

thought

the kairosof its moment has made

possible;

it is

indeed

apotomos.

Between Anaximenes and

Isocrates, then,

we

might

derive

a

reasonably

full

picture

of

a

sophistic,

non-Aristotelian notion of

the

enthymeme

that is

pervasive

in

the Hellenistic

rhetorical tradition: the

enthymeme

is a

strategic,

kairotic,

argumentational

turn

that

exploits

a

cluster

of

emotively

charged,

value-laden

oppositions

made available

(usually) by

an

exetastic

buildup,

in

order to

generate

in

its audience a

passional

identification

with

or

adherence

to

a

particular

stance,

and that

(ideally)

will

strike

the audience as an

abrupt

and

decisive flash of

insight. To be most effective, this enthymematic turn will exploit a range of

stylistic

schemes

(antithesis,

parallelism,

and

compactness

in

particular)

to

inten-

sify

its

impact

and enhance its

presence

and

memorability

in

the

audience's

psyche.

As

such,

the

enthymematic

turn

is

the

rhetorical move

par

excellence or

guiding

an

audience's

inference-making

and

attitude-formation in a

particular

direction.

From

this

perspective,

we can

understand

why

the

ability

to

see what

kairos

demands,

and

speak

a

discourse

wholly

wrought

with

fitting

enthymemes

figures

so

prominently

in

Isocrates'

account

of

discursive

skill,

and

why,

after

Isocrates,

the enthymeme would figure so prominently in Aristotle's account of rhetoric.

For

if

the

function of

rhetoric is

to

guide

an

audience

toward a

particular

recognition

or

stance

or

a

choice

of

actions,

then the

setting-up

and

deployment

of

impressive

enthymemes

is

indeed the

essence and

sum of

what an

effective

rhetor does. All

else

is,

as

Aristotle

says,

accessory

o

enthymeming

(Rhetoric

1.1

[1354a]).

Aristotle's

appropriation

of

the term

enthymema

must,

I

think,

be

considered

to

presuppose

all

that

we have

reviewed

thus far. It

is

significant,

for

example,

that

the

so-called common

material

topics

for

enthymematic

invention in Rhetoric

2.19-the possible and the impossible, past fact and future fact, and largeness and

smallness

(of

goods

and

evils)-are

largely

matters of

opposition

or

contrast. It

is

significant,

too,

that

the famous

catalogue

of

twenty-eight

formal

topics

in

2.23


10/21

54 COLLEGE ENGLISH

begins

with

opposites,

and

that,

though

not

all of

the

remaining twenty-seven

are

clearly

matters of

opposition

or

contrast,

most

of

them are

(seventeen, by my

count).

Even

those that

are not

obviously

matters

of

exploiting

oppositions

tend

to be illustrated

with

examples

that do

just

that,

as

in

topic

#5,

looking

at the

time

(from

Iphicrates' speech

against

Harmodius):

If,

before

accomplishing

anything,

I

asked

to be honored with

a

statue

if I

succeeded,

you

would

have

granted

it. Will

you

not

grant

it now when

I

have succeeded? Do

not

then make

a

promise

in

anticipation

but

refuse it in

realization

(1397b).

All

this

is

consistent

with the

picture

we

get

from

Anaximenes and

Isocrates.

The same

is true

for Aristotle's statements that the normal

language

of

enthy-

memes

is

compact,

antithetical utterance

(2.24 [1401a])

and that

opposites

stand

out more

clearly

when

juxtaposed

(3.27

[1418b]);

or his discussion of the advan-

tages

of

periodic

style, rhythm,

antithesis,

metaphors,

and

bringing-before-the-

eyes

for

enthymemes

(3.9-10);

or his advice that the

proof

section

of a

speech

should

not consist

of a continuous

string

of

enthymemes,

but rather

that the

enthymemes

should

be mixed

in

(3.17 [1418a]).

As Thomas

Conley

has ob-

served,

these

kinds

of remarks

suggest

that Aristotle is

thinking

of

enthymemes

as

nicely

turned sentences

or

[elenctic, rhetorical]

questions

raised at climactic

points

( Enthymeme

171).

Further,

Aristotle's inclusion

of

pathos

and

ethos

among

the

enthymematic

sources of

persuasion

in

2.2-17

suggests

that,

like

Anaximenes and Isocrates, he considers enthymemes to be something more than

an act

of... reason

(Grimaldi,

Studies

82)

and

to

carry

affective

force-although

he

also

says

that

enthymemes

should

not

be

used when

one is

trying

to arouse

pathos

or

project

ethos,

in

which

he seems to differ

from his

sophistic

colleagues.

One

might,

however,

resolve

the

seeming

contradiction

by

noting

that it is

mainly

the

exetastic

buildup

that will

generate

the affective

charge

and ethical

posture

that

an

enthymeme

will then

exploit;

and

one

might

note,

as

Kennedy

does

in his

translation

of the Rhetoric

[123],

that

Aristotle does

give

examples

of

emotional

appeals

that

take the

form

of

enthymemes.

(For

discussion

of this

issue,

see

Grimaldi, Studies 147-151 and Commentary349-356; Fortenbaugh 11-18; Con-

ley,

Pathe

and

Pisteis ;

Wisse

20-29;

Walker,

Enthymemes

of

Anger. )

Aristotle's

contribution

to

the notion

of

enthymeme

is,

of

course,

his

insistence

on its

underlying

rationality-his

crucial

and

enormously productive

recognition

that,

like the

dialectical

syllogism,

the

enthymeme

relies

on a

basic,

intuitive

capacity

for

deriving

inferences

and

forming judgments

from relation-

ships

between

ideas-so

that

condensed,

antithetical

expression

alone does

not

make an

enthymeme

(Rhetoric

1.1

[1355a],

2.24

[1401a]).

Aristotle's

dialectical

syllogism

is,

in

effect,

a kind

of

explanatory

metaphor,

a

simplified

one,

for

the

kind of inferential process on which enthymemes depend for their effects. But, as

Aristotle is careful

to

note

(1.1 [1355a]),

the

enthymeme

and

syllogism

arenot the

same,

and

the differences

are

more than matters

of

probability

vs. truth

or

explicit


11/21


55

vs.

implicit premises

or

reasoning

from shared

presuppositions,

all

of which

are

characteristic

of

both

rhetoric and dialectic

and are for the most

part

confined

to

the realm

of

propositional

reasoning.

We

must,

I

think,

consider

Aristotle's

account of the

dialogic rationality

of

enthymemes

as an addition to and

emenda-

tion of a

sophistic

notion of

enthymeme

that he has inherited

from

his

prede-

cessors.

The

enthymeme,

in

sum,

shares with the dialectical

syllogism

an

underlying

rationality

grounded

in

the

psychology

of

inference-making

and

of

reasoning

in

a

conversational

exchange;

but it is

also,

and

distinctively,

what

Anaximenes and Isocrates describe.

EXAMPLES OF MODERN ENTHYMEMING

We

can

argue

that the ancient

concept

of

enthymeme

has a direct

bearing

on

contemporary

discourse.

One

might,

for

example,

point

to

John

E

Kennedy's

famous ask not

what

your country

can

do for

you;

ask what

you

can do for

your

country

as an

enthymematic

turn of

Isocratean

elegance;

or one

might point

to

Lloyd

Bentsen's

memorable

gutting

of

Dan

Quayle

in

the

1988

Vice

Presidential

debate- I

knew

Jack

Kennedy;

Jack

Kennedy

was a

friend

of

mine;

and

believe

me, Senator,

you're

no

Jack

Kennedy -as

an

enthymematic

zinger

worthy

of

Anaximenes. But

probably

some reservations and

qualifications

need to be

kept

in mind. The most obvious is the fact that very few modern writers (or speakers)

have had a

training

in

argumentation

centered

on,

or

even

including,

an

explicit

theory

of

the

enthymeme,

and thus are

unlikely

to

be

self-consciously

turning

enthymemes,

though they may

in

fact

be

turning

them.

We should not

then

expect contemporary

enthymeming

to

take the

conventional

stylistic

form

of

ancient

enthymeming.

But as

Aristotle

points

out,

it

is

ultimately

not

any particu-

lar

stylistic

form

that

makes

an

enthymeme

an

enthymeme.

What

remains

characteristic

of

the

enthymeme

today,

I

think,

is

that it

is

a

stylistically

intensified

argumentative

turn

that

serves not

only

to draw

conclu-

sions but also, and decisively, to foreground stance and motivate identification

with

that stance.

And,

further,

its

motivating

force

will

derive

not

simply

from

a

propositional

logic

(the

kind

that can be

analyzed

with

syllogistic

or

Toulminian

diagrams),

but from what

Perelman

has called a

web or

network of

emotively

significant

ideas and

liaisons

that

may

or

may

not

appear

as a

structure

of

value-

laden

oppositions.

A

good example

of

modern

enthymeming-without-knowing-it

is

Roland

Barthes'

sophistical

performance

in

the lead-off

essay

of

Mythologies,

The World

of

Wrestling

(reprinted

in

Waysof

Reading

[ed.

David Barholomae

and

Anthony

Petrosky] and in InvestigatingArguments[ed. Jeffrey Walker and Glen McClish]).

Barthes,

is,

of

course,

aware of

the classical

rhetorical

tradition,

or

a certain

neoclassical

interpretation

of

it,

and of

the

enthymeme

as

well. In

S/Z he

calls it


12/21

56

COLLEGE ENGLISH

the foundation

of all

proof'

(201,

LXXXI/5

10).

But

for

Barthes the

enthymeme

is

only

an

imperfect syllogism

or

deduction,

being

fallacious,

incomplete,

or

merely

probable,

and founded

on a

current

opinion,

an

endoxa,

ather than a

scientific

verity.

He

consistently presents it-along

with that other

old

rhetori-

cal

deity, example/ induction -as

a

lure

by

which Balzac's

Sarrasine

deludes

himself,

a

lure

made

of

social discourse that

ultimately

constitutes his blind-

ness

and

conducts

...

the

subject

to

the

final

castration

(S/Z

153-154, LXIII;

see also

172-173,

LXXII).

As

Barthes

portrays

it,

the

enthymeme

is

a

tool

or form

of false

consciousness,

an

instrument

of

ideological

domination.

It seems

unlikely,

then,

that

Barthes conceives

himself as one who

argues

enthymematically.

But

in The World of

Wrestling,

Barthes

does

exactly that-although

the

enthymeme

as he

actually

uses it is not what he thinks it

is; indeed,

it is more like

what

Anaximenes and

Isocrates describe.

Here,

for

example,

is

the

enthymeme

with

which Barthes ends

his

essay

(it

is,

in

fact,

his

final

sentence):

In

the

ring,

and

even

in

the

depths

of their

nvoluntarygnominy,

wrestlers emain

gods

because

hey

are,

for

a

few

moments,

the

key

which

opens

Nature,

the

pure

gesture

which

separates

Good

from

Evil and

unveilsthe

figure

of

a

Justice

at last

intelligible.

21)

This flourish

of

enthymematic

eloquence clearly

functions

in

its context

as a

stylistically

intensified

argumentative

turn that

is meant to

stand forth

as an

abrupt

and

culminating

flash of

insight,

and

clearly

serves also to

project

a

stance-opposing

the

wrestler's

actual

(if

momentary) glory

to

his

apparent

igno-

miny-a

stance

with which the

reader

is asked to

identify.

Whatever

power

this

enthymeme

has

to

motivate

adherence

derives

not

only

and indeed not

primarily

from its

quasi-syllogistic

structure

of

claim-because-premise,

which taken

in isola-

tion seems

more

than

a

little

unpersuasive,

but

chiefly

from its

exploitation

of

a

network

of

oppositions

and

what Perelman would

call

liaisons,

which are estab-

lished

in the

preceding

discourse.

The chief

(though

not

only)

constituents

of this

network

are

a

linkage

of

wrestling

to the

associative

cluster

of

spectacle/thea-

ter/Greek

theater/religious

ritual,

and an

opposition

of the

supposed

ignobility

of

professional

wrestling

as fake

sport

to

the

nobility

of

theater as

sacred

spectacle.

(There

is also

an

opposition

of

the

greater

nobility

of theater

to the

lesser

nobility

of

athletic

contests.)

These

liaisons

and

oppositions

are

themselves

set

up,

early

on,

by

a

number

of

minor

enthymemes

such

as

in

the

first

paragraph,

Even

...

in the

most

squalid

Parisian

halls,

wrestling partakes

of

the nature of the

great

solar

spectacles,

Greek

drama,

and

bullfights:

in

both,

a

light

without

shadow

generates

an

emotion

without

reserve,

or

in

the

second

paragraph,

There are

people

who

think

that wrestling is an ignoble sport; it is a spectacle, and it is no more ignoble to

attend a wrestled

performance

of

Suffering

than

a

performance

of the

sorrows

of


13/21

A

THEORY OF THE

ENTHYMEME

57

Arnolphe

or

Andromaque

(15).

These

two

enthymemes

themselves are

oppor-

tunistic

turnings

of

comparisons

and

linkages

set

up

in

preceding

sentences

such

as

Here

we find a

grandiloquence

which

must have been that of ancient

theatres

(15).

Insofar as the

reader

is

willing

at least to

entertain

Barthes'

opening

en-

thymemes, they

form the kernel of the entire suasive

procedure

that

follows.

This

procedure

consists,

for

the

most

part,

of

an

extended

amplification

and

elaboration

of

the

wrestling/spectacle/theater/ritual

nexus,

chiefly by way

of

an

exetasis

in

which

the

wrestling

match and

the wrestlers themselves are

examined

as a

system

of

signs

representing

the

grand mythologies

of

Suffering,

Defeat,

and

Justice

(19)

for its

lower-class

public.

This

exetasis,

which takes

up virtually

all

but the last two

paragraphs

of the

essay,

is itself

punctuated by

a number of

minor

enthymemes

that serve to establish and

foreground

its

major points.

Most

appear

as

pseudo-syllogistic

inferences,

announced

usually

with

a

therefore,

that

in-

voke

an

insight

(or

what is

meant

to

be seen

as

one)

arising

from

the

paragraph

or

paragraphs preceding

them,

and that are

given

what

might

be

called

syntactic

prominence

by being

placed

at the

beginning

(or

sometimes the

end)

of

their own

paragraphs.

What then

follows

usually

takes the

enthymeme

as

its

point

of

departure,

amplifying

or

extending

the idea and

leading

to

the next

enthymematic

turn.

Much

of

what

Barthes

presents

through

this

procedure

is

quite

simply

enter-

taining and cajoles the reader into granting the notion of wrestling as theater

while

giving

Barthes

himself the

sympathetic

ethos

of an

interested,

witty

ob-

server

who is not a

culture-snob. But the

major

function

of

this web of

enthy-

memes and

amplifications

is

to

foreground

and

give

presence

to the

nobler

implications

of

the

wrestling-theater

nexus,

as

in

this

enthymeme:

But what

wrestling

is

above all

meant to

portray

is

a

purely

moral

concept:

that of

justice.

The idea of

'paying'

is

essential to

wrestling,

and

the crowd's

'Give it to

him'

above all

else means

'Make him

pay '

(21).

At

the same

time,

the

persistent,

varied

amplification

of such

ideas

also

serves

to

keep

well

out of

sight

opposite

argu-

ments that could plausibly be drawn from the same topological nexus-for exam-

ple,

the

argument

that

considering wrestling

as theater

reveals

what

shabby

theater it is.

By

means

of

this

exetasis

interspersed

with

fitting

enthymemes,

Barthes

gives

himself

the

opportunity

to

declare,

with

another

enthymematic

flourish

in

his

penultimate

paragraph,

This

grandiloquence

s

nothing

but the

popular

and

age-old

image

of the

perfect

intelligibility

of

reality.

What

is

portrayed

by

wrestling

is

therefore an ideal

understanding

f

things;

it is

the

euphoria

of men

raisedfor

a

while

above

the

constitutive

ambiguity

of

everyday

ituationsand

placed

before the

panoramic

view of a univocalNature, in which

signs

at last

correspond

o causes,without

obstacle,

without

evasion,

without

contradiction.

25)


14/21

58

COLLEGE

ENGLISH

Barthes is here

drawing

on

Aristotelian notions of

catharsis

and

the

philosophic

function of dramatic

mimesis

(representation

of

experiential universals),

notions

that are

linked,

at least for the educated reader

his

essay

presupposes

and

requires,

to the theater/Greek

theater/ritual nexus. From the

position

established

in this

enthymeme

Barthes

can

move,

in

his

final

paragraph

and

closing enthymeme,

to

the

transmuting

of wrestlers-who

have now

become

the

figures

of

a

transcen-

dent rite-into

momentary gods.

Barthes'

penultimate

and

final

enthymemes,

then,

are

kairotic,

opportunistic

exploitations

of

argumentative potentials

avail-

able from

a

cluster

of

value-charged, emotively significant

ideas

already

made

present

to the reader's

thought

by

the

strategic

deployment

of

oppositions

and

liaisons,

amplifications,

and

paragraph-level

minor

enthymemes

in

the

preceding

discourse. And from this

cluster,

a virtual chord of

adherence-motivating

notions,

Barthes'

culminating

enthymemes

derive whatever suasive

force

they

have.

What we find

in

Barthes

we

see

more

clearly

still

in

Martin

Luther

King,

Jr.'s

Letter

from

Birmingham

Jail.

Unlike

Barthes,

of

course,

King

is a

modern

writer

who

quite

explicitly

conceives

himself as a rhetor. Some of his

enthymemes

clearly

manifest

the ancient

paradigm,

as in:

Just

as

Socrates

elt

that it was

necessary

o create a tension

in

the

mind so that

individuals

ould rise

from the

bondage

of

myths

and

half-truths o

the unfettered

realm of

creative

analysis

and

objective

appraisal,

o must we see the

need for

nonviolentgadflies o create he kind of tensions n societythatwillhelpmen rise

from the

dark

depths

of

prejudice

and

racism

to the

majestic

heights

of

under-

standing

and

brotherhood.

(?110)

One

can,

of

course,

see this

enthymeme

as a Toulminian datum-so-claim

kind

of

movement;

which,

again,

is

Aristotle's

point.

But

clearly

it is more than that.

Its

real

adherence-motivating

power

lies

in

its

exploitation

of

a

web

of

oppositions-

bondage/freedom,

myth/creative

analysis,

half-truth/objective

appraisal,

dark

depths/majestic heights,

racism/brotherhood-and

the

relation

of this web

to

ideas

and

liaisons established

in

the

immediately

preceding

passages,

such

as

King's alignment of himself with the Apostle Paul, the implicit opposition of

Paul/Socrates

and their

persecutors,

and

King's

narration

of the

frustrations

and

injustices

that

have

impeded

his

campaign

(and

behind

all

this,

perhaps,

the

grand

mythic

narratives these

oppositions

organize).

This web

is

what

lends

salience

and

significance

to the

enthymeme's

controlling

opposition

of Socrates

to

society,

the

alignment

of

as Socrates felt..

.

so

must we

see,

and the

varied

repetition

of

individuals

could

rise..

.

help

men

rise. The

elaborately

schematized

and

fig-

ured

style,

moreover,

makes the

enthymeme

stand out

from what

precedes

it as

a

moment

of

high-spoken,

impressive,

and even

aesthetically

suasive

eloquence.

This enthymeme, in short, exploits the kairosof its moment to present a stance

with

which the reader

is

given

a

complex

chord of rational and

passional

reasons

to

identify.


15/21

A THEORY OF THE

ENTHYMEME

59

Not

all of

King's

enthymemes,

however,

are so

clearly

classical-as in

the

garment

of

destiny passage:

I

cannot

sit

idly by

in Atlanta and not be

concerned

about

what

happens

in

Birmingham.

njusticeanywhere

s

a

threatto

justice everywhere.

We are

caught

in an

inescapable

network of

mutuality,

tied

in

a

single garment

of

destiny.

Whatever

affectsone

directly,

affectsall

indirectly.

Never

again

can we

afford

o

live with the

narrow,

provincial

outside

agitator

dea.

(?4)

or, likewise,

the

enthymeme consisting

mainly

of

King's one-page litany

of

when

you

have

seen,

which

I

can

quote

here

only

in

abbreviated

form:

Perhaps

it is

easy

for those who have never

felt the

stinging

darts of

segrega-

tion to

say,

Wait.

But

when

you

have seen vicious mobs

lynchyour

mothers

and

fathersat

will and

drown

your

sisters

and

brothers

at

whim;

when

you

have

seen... then

you

will

understand

why

we

find

it difficult o wait. There comes

a

time when the

cup

of

endurance

uns

over,

and men are no

longer willing

to be

plunged

nto the

abyss

of

despair.

hope,

sirs,

you

can

understand ur

legitimate

and

unavoidable

mpatience.

?14)

I do not

propose

to offer a

detailed

analysis

of

these familiar

(to

many) passages,

but

only

to note that

what makes them

enthymematic

is,

once

again,

a

grounds-

claim

kind

of

movement,

in

which the claim s not

simply

a

proposition

but an

inferential and

attitudinal

complex-a

stance-and

the

grounds

consist not

simply of a quasi-syllogistic premise but, more fully, of a cluster of

emotively

significant

ideas

(or

images)

that work to motivate a

passional

identification

with

that

speaker's

stance. Both

enthymemes,

moreover,

arise

from

and

respond

to an

exetasis

in

the

paragraphs

preceding

them

and

are

given

prominence

and

memorability

by

means of

striking figuration-the

metaphors

and

parallelisms

in

the

first,

and the

insistent

anaphoras

of

the when

you

have seen

passage

in

the

second.

What

makes

these

passages

seem

less

obviously

enthymematic

is the

absence of an

explicitly

invoked set of

oppositions.

(A

careful

look,

however,

would

make evident

what kinds of

oppositions

are

implicit,

such

as

Providence,

destiny, and God's elect vs. provinciality, the damned, and what one cannot

afford. )

Moreover,

both

enthymemes

are,

aside from

their

key

middle

parts,

somewhat

loosely

structured: the

second,

for

example,

finishes off

with

what

Aristotle would call a

maxim and an

epilogue

(Rhetoric

2.21

[1394b]).

King's argumentation

can

be

seen,

like that of

Barthes,

as

a

process

of

setting

up

and

turning enthymemes.

This is

especially

evident

in

the first

part

of

the

Letter

(?11-22),

as

King responds

point-by-point

to

the

criticisms that

have

been

lodged against

him. Each

segment

is,

in

effect,

an

Anaximenean

exetasis

leading

to an

enthymeme.

Significantly,

King's

enthymematic

turns,

like the two

I have quoted above, include what are for most readers the most potent and

memorable moments in

the text.

Further,

they

include not

only

those

passages

conventionally

taught

as

examples

of

logical appeal,

such as

the

enthymemes

in


16/21

60

COLLEGE ENGLISH

the

segment

on

just

and

unjust

laws

(?115-22),

but also

those

taught

as

examples

of emotional

appeal.

A

fuller

concept

of

enthymeme

makes evident that such

distinctions are to

a

large degree meaningless:

the three traditional

sources of

persuasion-ethos,

logos,

pathos-are

not

separate

kinds of

proof'

but

simultane-

ous

dimensions of the

enthymeme.

As

Aristotle,

modern

philosophical

psychol-

ogy,

and

Chaim Perelman

all

affirm,

reason and

affect

are

inseparably

interwoven

(Aristotle,

Rhetoric

2.1-11; Perelman,

New Rhetoric

140, 149-150;

the

rationality

of

emotion

is

discussed at

length

in

Fortenbaugh,

Solomon,

de

Sousa,

Rorty,

and

Searle).

Finally,

King's argumentation

well

exemplifies

the kairotic

aspect

of

the

enthymeme,

its

ability

to

seize the

possibilities

available at

any

given

moment

and

to

give

those

possibilities

a

particular

realization and salience. We see this

clearly

in

the two

major

enthymemes

that conclude the Letter.

The

first is the culmi-

nating

moment of

a

lengthy

exetasis

(?12 3-44)

in

which

King

has

been

criticizing

the failure of

white moderates and the white church to

actively

support

his

cause:

If

the

inexpressible

ruelties

of

slavery

could

not

stop

us,

the

opposition

we now

face

will

surely

fail. We

will win

our

freedombecause he sacred

heritage

of our

nation

and the

eternal

will of

God are embodied

n

our

echoing

demands.

144)

This is

immediately

followed

by

the

major

segment

of

King's

peroration

(1?45-47), an additional exetasis in which he chides his white critics for com-

mending

the

restraint of the

Birmingham

police

in

dealing

with the demonstra-

tors,

and then

turns the second

of his

concluding

enthymemes:

One

day

the South

will know

that

when

these disinherited

childrenof God sat

down

at lunch

counters,

they

were

in

reality

standing

up

for

what is best

in

the

American

dream

and for

the

most sacredvalues

n

our

Judeo-Christian

eritage,

thereby bringing

our nation

back

to those

great

wells

of

democracy

which

were

dug

deep

by

the

founding

athers

n

their

formulation f the Constitution

and the

Declaration

of

Independence.

$47)

Clearly, and as every careful reader of the Letter recognizes, both of these

culminating enthymemes

are

capitalizing

on

the

many

liaisons

and

oppositions

that

the

argumentation

of

the

Letter has accumulated

and made

present

to the

reader-and

giving

that

reader a

powerful

chord of motives

for

identifying

with

King's position.

My point,

however,

is

that each

of these

concluding enthymemes

turns

the

argument

differently,

the

first

foregrounding

the

inevitability

of

victory,

the second

foregrounding

the

ethico-political

nobility

of

the

demonstrators.

Each,

in

short,

exploits

a

different

kairotic

possibility

inherent

in

the

structure

of

ideas

that

King

has

built,

bringing

the force of the adherences/identifications

established earlier to bear in different ways. Neither enthymeme is a summing up

or a

restatement

of

the whole

argument

of Letter

from

Birmingham

Jail,

nor,

like Barthes'

concluding enthymemes

(or Isocrates'),

is either

fully predictable

or


17/21

A

THEORY OF THE

ENTHYMEME

61

made inevitable

by

what

precedes.

King,

for

example, might

have ended

with

denunciations

of

his

detractors;

and

indeed

such a

denunciation

is

implicit,

but

left

tacit,

as

part

of the immediate

background

(or

the

flipside)

of the

enthymemes

he turns.

King's culminating enthymemes

are,

as

Isocrates would

say,

apotomos,

abrupt,

decisive and

fitting

exploitations

of the kairos

of their

particular

discur-

sive moments.

CONCLUSION

For

both

King

and

Barthes,

argumentative

or

suasory

procedure

is

very

much

what it was for

Anaximenes and

Isocrates,

that

is,

a

matter of

setting up

and

turning

enthymemes-or,

in a

large

and

complex

argument,

a

progression

from

enthymeme

to

enthymeme

to

enthymeme, building up

an

accumulated

fund of

value-laden,

emotively significant

ideas

(oppositions,

liaisons,

etc.)

that are vari-

ously brought

to

bear,

forcefully

and

memorably,

in

the rhetor's

final

enthyme-

matic turns.

The

enthymeme

remains,

in

sum,

a

vital

principle

in

modern

discourse,

even when an

adequate

conception

of

the

enthymeme

is

unavailable.

And

indeed,

as Aristotle

says,

it could

hardly

be

otherwise

(Rhetoric

1.1

[1354a],

1.2

[1356b]).

Enthymeming

is

simply

what

people

do,

whether

they

think

of

themselves

as

doing

so or

not,

whenever

they attempt

to

persuade

by

means

of

discourse.

Can

we then

say,

with

Aristotle and

(perhaps)

with

Isocrates,

that

enthyme-

matic skill is

the

essential

or

crucial

skill

in

rhetoric,

or at

least

in

argumentation?

If,

as

rhetoricians,

we

are

to

conceive

virtually

all

discourse

as

rhetorical and

therefore

suasory-and

thus as

either

explicitly

or

implicitly argumentational-

then I think

we

can.

But with

some

qualifications.

One is that

enthymemes

or

enthymematic

procedure

may

be

different in

different

kinds

of

discourse such

as,

for

example,

fiction

or

poetry,

or the

belletristic

essay,

or the

various

kinds of

scholarly,

scientific,

technical,

and

administrative

prose.

We

need to

consider

what enthymemes are like, and how they work, in these discursive realms and at

different

points

in

history.

Another

important

qualification

is

to

say

that,

while

enthymematic

skill

may

be the

crucial skill in

rhetoric

(or

argumentation),

Aristotle's

notion

that

all

the

other

skills of

rhetoric

are

supplementary

or

accessory

to

enthymeming

may

be

looking

at the

matter

backwards.

Can we

not

say

as

well that

enthymematic

skill

depends

on all

the

other skills?

For all the

means

of

persuasion

available

to

rhetoric

are

brought

together

by,

and

contribute

to,

the

enthymematic

turn. As

Isocrates

says,

to

speak

(or write)

a

discourse

wholly

woven

with

fitting

enthy-

memes, one must be able to choose from the elements of discourse those things

that

should

be used

for the case in

hand,

and

the

tropes

for

joining

and

arranging

them,

be able

to see

what

kairos

demands,

and be

able as well

to

speak

(or


18/21

62

COLLEGE

ENGLISH

write)

in

words

rhythmically

and

musically arranged

(Against

the

Sophists

16-

17).

In more

contemporary

terms,

one must

must know

well

enough

the

topoi

of

a discursive

field

(such

as

those that

Aristotle

lists

for

political,

juridical,

and

epideictic

argument

in

Rhetoric

1.3-14)

to select

what should be

used for

the

particular

case

in

hand;

one must know

the various

discourse-level

gambits,

schemes,

and

strategies

by

which a

discourse

using

and

combining

those

topoi

can

be

plotted

as an

argumentative

progression

(as

opposed

to

merely arranged

according

to some static

outline);

one must be

able to

analyze

one's

rhetorical

situation

as well as

recognize

the

shifting

demands and

possibilities

of the

imme-

diate discursive moment

(arguments

arise

in

response

to

preceding

arguments,

or

in

anticipation

of

arguments

to come or

audience

responses);

and one

must have

a fluent command of the

stylistic

resources of the

language

in which one writes

or

speaks.

All

this,

Isocrates

suggests,

is

needed for

genuine mastery

of the

strategic,

kairotic

skill

of

setting up

and

turning

eloquent,

powerful

enthymemes.

No

wonder

he thinks such

mastery

requires

study,

and

is

the work of a

vigorous

and

thoughtful

mind

(Against

the

Sophists

17).

This is

not to

say

that

enthymeming

is an advanced skill that

cannot be

learned before

other,

more basic

ones,

for as Isocrates and

Aristotle

recognize,

everyone

turns

enthymemes.

But

it

is

to

say

that

a

trained excellence

in

en-

thymeming requires

what Isocrates would call an

extensive discourse education

that cultivates not only advanced literacy but alsophronesis judgment and intelli-

gence)

and

sophia

wisdom, skill)

through

critical,

argumentative engagement

with

the

argumentation

of

others

in

many

discursive

genres

and in

many

fields of

thought.

This is the

sophistic

kind of discourse education we see

represented

in

Plato's

Protagoras,

both

in

the

symposiastic

debate

on

issues

of

ethical

and

political

philosophy

and

in

the

critique

of an

argument

in a

poem

by

Simonides. A

genuine

understanding

of

enthymematic

art cannot be

acquired

from

simplified, prescrip-

tive

recipes

and formalistic

models,

but

only

from

analytical

and critical

study

of

actual

argumentation

and from one's own

accumulated

experience

as a

producer

of argumentation (in symposiastic debate, in declamation exercises, etc.) over an

extended

period

of time.

There

is,

in

sum,

a

great

deal more to skillful

enthymem-

ing,

or

to

argumentation,

than

knowing

something

about Toulmin

logic,

Venn

diagrams,

or the

basic forms of the

syllogism-though

such models

might

be

presented

(with

the

reminder that

they

are

ultimately

inadequate)

as

simplified,

approximate analogies

for the kind

of

inferential

process

that underlies

the en-

thymeme

and

gives

it

its

persuasive

force.

Such reductions

may

be

helpful

for the

novice,

but

they eventually

must be discarded.

The view of

enthymemes

that

we have taken in this

essay

is

not,

in

fact,

incompatible with what has been the conventional view. Effective argumentation

that is

ethically

and

intellectually

responsible

is indeed

a matter of

dialogic

reasoning

that seeks to

incorporate

the audience's

knowledge

and beliefs

as

well


19/21


63

as the

rhetor's,

and an

enthymeme

is still

a

figure-any

figure-

that connects

an

idea

with reasons for

believing

it and that relies on its

audience's

inferential

powers.

But that is not all

it

is and does. The

enthymeme

is

also,

and

distinctively,

a

stylistically striking, kairotically

opportunistic, argumentative

turn that not

only

presents

a claim

but

also

foregrounds

an

inferential

and

attitudinal

complex,

a

stance;

that invokes

not

only

a

premise

(or

warrant)

as

justification

but a

chord

of

value-charged, emotively

significant

ideas to motivate

a

passional

adherence

or

identification with its

stance;

and that

is

not

only

a form of

passional

reasoning

but

also an architectonic

principle

for both the

invention and

structuring

of

suasive discourse

(for

a similar

view,

see

Gage, Theory ).

This

way

of

looking

at the

enthymeme

seems

richer,

more

complex,

and

more flexible than the conventional

view,

more consistent with modern theories

of

persuasion

and

argument-particularly

those

of

Kenneth Burke and

Chaim

Perelman-and more

descriptive

of

actual

argumentational practice.

We

have,

in

sum,

a double view of

enthymemes:

enthymeme

as a

complex

structure of

intuitive inference and

affect that constitutes

the substance

of

an

argument;

and

enthymeme

as a

structural/stylistic

turn

that

caps

an

exetasis,

gives

the inferen-

tial/affective substance a

particular

realization with a

particular

salience

for

a

particular

discursive

moment,

and

by doing

so

constructs or

shapes

its

audience's

perception

of

just

what the

argument

is.

The latter is

what

Anaximenes and

Isocrates describe; the former is what Aristotle tries to analyze. The enthymeme

is

both,

and

is

in

both

senses

truly

the

body

of

persuasion.

NOTE

1.

For recent

discussion

of the

enthymeme,

see Michael

Hood's

bibliography.

The

most

relevant sources for

the

present

study

are:

Lloyd

Bitzer,

Aristotle's

Enthymeme

Revisited ;

George

P.

Boss,

The

Stereotype

and Its

Correspondence

in

Discourse to the

Enthymeme ;

Thomas

Conley,

The

Enthymeme

in

Perspective ;

Jesse

G.

Delia,

The

Logic Fallacy ;

John

T.

Gage,

A

General

Theory

of the

Enthymeme

and

The

Shape

of

Reason;

Lawrence

Green,

Enthymemic

Invention ;

William M. A.

Grimaldi,

Studies in the

Philosophyof Aristotle's

Rhetoric

53-82; andJames Raymond,

Enthymemes,

Examples,

and Rhetorical

Method. The

arguments

of

Conley

and

Gage

are

the

closest to

the

position

that

I

take

here.

WORKS CITED

Anaximenes of

Lampsacus.

Rhetoricaad

Alexandrum.

Trans. H.

Rackham. Cam-

bridge:

Harvard

UP,

1957.

Aristotle.

Rhetoric.

3

translations:]

Freese,

J.

H.

Cambridge:

Harvard

UP,

1926.

Kennedy,

George.

New

York: Oxford

UP,

1991.

Roberts,

W.

R.,

and I.

Bywater.

New

York:

Modern

Library,

1954.


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