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UNDERSTANDING RECENT ELECTION RESULTS IN VENEZUELA FRANCISCO J. MONALDI HARVARD UNIVERSITY | IESA Wilson Center, January 2014

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THE CONTEXT A DYING PRESIDENT, A BOOM, AND AN ECONOMIC CRISIS

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THE LARGEST WINDFALL IN HISTORY Source: IMF

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IN 2012 GROWTH INCREASED AND INFLATION FELL, IN 2013 THE TENDENCIES REVERSED

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An electoral budget cycle on steroids...

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The public sector deficit in the year to the 2012 election at historical high of close to 17% of GDP, with total public expenditures also at a historical high of around 50% of GDP. This when the price of oil is also at a historical peak. Source: BCV and Barclays

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THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OCTOBER 7TH

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Record-high turnout 15,010,584 votes 80.67% voter participation 2012 Presidential Election Source: CNE (99% of ballots counted)

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Hugo Chvez Total votes8,136,964 Share of valid votes55.25% Capriles Radonski Total votes6,499,575 Share of valid votes44.3% Victory margin between HCR and HCF 10.90 percentage points Source: CNE (99% ballots counted) CHVEZ EASILY WINS THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

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Increasingly competitive elections It can be seen that elections have become more competitive since 2007. There were four elections between 2007 and 2010 and the opposition attained a majority of the popular vote in two of them, while the vote margin was close in all of them. In contrast, before 2007, the government won all elections with a wide margin. Fuente: CNE The last five electoral cycles have become much more competitive between the government and the opposition

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Fuente: CNE clculos propios. Henrique Capriles Hugo Chvez 3 minutes (mandated by CNE) 10 minutes (mandated by Ley Resorte) 38 minutes (cadenas) 3 minutes (CNE) MEDIA ACCESS WAS HIGHLY UNEQUAL Capriles Radonski had access to three minutes of advertising mandate by Venezuelas electoral authority (CNE). As a candidate, Hugo Chavez also had access to those three minutes. However, as President, the Ley Resorte (Venezuelas law regulating mass media which is enforced by the national government) allows him (the government) 10 minutes of general broadcast per day and 38 minutes of cadena per day publicizing government works. In sum, Capriles messages were broadcasted through all national media airwaves for three minutes a day, while Chavezs messages were broadcasted through all national media for 51 minutes a day.

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THE 2013 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION APRIL 13TH

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Very high turnout, although lower than 2012 14,854,477 votes 79.68% voter participation 2013 Presidential Election Source: CNE (98,9% of ballots counted)

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Nicols Maduro Total votes7,545,338 Share of valid votes50.58% Capriles Radonski Total votes7,270,383 Share of valid votes48.74% Victory margin between NM and HCR 1.84 percentage points Source: CNE (98,9% ballots counted) MADURO NARROWLY WINS THE HIGHLY CONTESTED 2013 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

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Fuente: CNE UNFAIR MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE 2013 ELECTIONS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ABUSE OF POWER IN THE HISTORY OF VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS SIGNIFICANT INRREGULARITIES ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTIONS The two main channels in the country (Venevisin and Televen) had a balanced coverage of both candidates in the news. While the opposition-leaning channel showed preference for Capriles, only surpassed by the bias showcased by the official state channel for Maduro.

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WITH CHAVEZ AS INCUMBENT ELECTIONS WERE NOT COMPETITIVE, BUT HE WON BY LESS THAN THE AVERAGE FOR INCUMBENTS IN THE REGION (27%) MADURO WAS NOT AN INCUMBENT AND THE ECONOMY DID NOT FARE WELL

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2013 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS DECEMBER 16TH 2013 2,792 public office positions were elected: 335 mayors. 2,435 municipal council members 686 chosen through PR 1,680 chosen by plurality

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Average turnout for local/regional elections 10,798,589 suffrages 58.92% voter participation 2013 Municipal Election Source: CNE (98,9% of ballots counted)

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Victory margin between Gov and Opp 7.92 percentage points Source: CNE (98,9% ballots counted) CHAVISMO BEATS THE OPPOSITION BY A MARGIN SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Government Total votes5,265,930 Share of valid votes48.76% Municipalities242 Opposition Total votes4,410,238 Share of valid votes40.84% Municipalities75 Other Total votes1,122,421 Share of valid votes10.39% Municipalities18 The victory margin rises to 10.62 percentage points if we account for government-and-opposition-affiliated parties in the comparison.

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OPPOSITION WON SIX OF THE TEN LARGEST MUNICIPALITIES IN THE COUNTRY StateMunicipalityGovernmentOpposition Distrito Metropolitano47,22%51,28% DTTO CAPITALLIBERTADOR54,55%43,34% ZULIAMARACAIBO46,64%51,74% LARAIRIBARREN46,04%52,41% CARABOBOVALENCIA44,28%54,24% BOLIVARCARONI51,21%43,52% MIRANDASUCRE44,51%52,79% ARAGUAGIRARDOT51,55%43,64% MONAGASMATURIN37,26%38,63% ZULIASAN FRANCISCO59,48%39,32% ANZOATEGUIBOLIVAR52,65%44,78% * Ranking designed by N of voters

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THE MUNICIPAL BALANCE OF POWER SHIFTED SLIGHTLY IN FAVOR OF THE OPPOSITION Chavismo lost 23 mayorships, passing from 265 mayorships to 242. They managed to maintain the Capital District (Libertador); as well as some large cities like Maracay, Pto. Ordaz, Barcelona and Pto. La Cruz. The government also held comfortable victory margins in mid-sized cities like San Francisco, Los Teques, La Victoria, Puerto Cabello, San Carlos, Coro and San Felipe. The opposition obtained 76 mayors (from 54 it previously held). They maintained the Caracas Metropolitan Mayor under their control, as well as four out of the five municipalities of Caracas. They also gained flagship municipalities like Barinas (capital of Chvez home state), Valera, Valle de la Pascua and Maturn, all of these traditionally chavista strongholds.

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HISTORICAL ELECTORAL RESULTS 2004-2013: THE OPPOSITION FARED WORSE IN VOTES THAN IN 2008 BUT WON MORE POSITIONS BECAUSE IT RAN UNITED

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Field dates: Nov 12-26 (post Dakas organized looting). Polling firm: Datanalisis. 2013 WAS A YEAR OF MOSTLY NEGATIVE VIEWS ON THE COUNTRYS SITUATION WITH A SLIGHT RECOVERY TOWARDS THE END DAKA effect

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THE DAKA EFFECT: ORGANIZED LOOTING? Economic situation is bad Annualized Inflation surpasses 55% and Scarcity is around 20% of basic-need products Chavismo manages to blame the retailers President Maduro announces that retailers should reduce prices by more tan 60% and calls for the people to re- claim these products Controlled looting begins The public goes first to Daka, and later to other retailers demanding the discounts Blow to private sector in the country Retailers are left without stock and ask their suppliers to redirect container to other ports Unclear perception of looting episode In the aftermath of the looting, society was polarized by those appalled by the events and those renergized by the sense of justice and decisiveness of their leader.

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DAKA Field dates: Nov 12-26 (post Dakas organized looting). Polling firm: Datanalisis. Chavismo candidates experienced a boost the month of Dakas looting

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DAKA Field dates: Nov 12-26 (post Dakas organized looting). Polling firm: Datanalisis. Government evaluation became a good proxy for the Municipal Election Results

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FINAL COMMENTS In October 2012 Chavez won by a smaller margin than he should have. In April 2014 Maduro barely won (if he did). The economy and the fact that he was not the incumbent led him to lose 9 pp of the margin, despite all the blatant abuse of power and electoral irregularities. The municipal elections of December 2013 were a significant victory for Maduro, given the terrible economic situation. The opposition did significantly better than in 2008 largely as a result of running unified. Next elections: at the end of 2015 for all seats in the National Assembly