UACES 47th Annual Conference

Krakow, 4-6 September 2017

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should not be cited without the author's permission. The views and opinions expressed in this

paper are those of the author(s).

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The Impact of Economic Factors and the Shape of Migrant Image in EU

Galina Klimova

Paper prepared for UACES 47th Annual Conference, Krakow, 4-6 September 2017

Work is in progress. Please, do not quote without permission of the author.

Introduction

The phenomenon of migration is one of the key questions of the global

agenda. According to the World Bank the number of migrants around the world has

increased from 71.9 million to 243.2 million for the past 55 years.1 This means that

the total number has grown more than threefold. The dynamics in a percentage of

the population of the Earth is not so impressive (from 2.6% in 1960 to 3.3% in

2015),2 but still indicative. The migration processes in the late XX - early XXI

centuries are usually regarded as more intense than in previous periods, as an

inevitable and routine fact. Due to the technological development, the relocation is

really much more accessible than before. However, some researchers express doubts

about the inevitability of the unlimited global migration as a matter of fact in a post-

industrial world (Collier, 2013) and give comparable data of migration in previous

historical periods (Goldin and Cameron, 2012; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002).

Whatever position you share, the phenomenon of migration and the elaboration of

the migration policy deserve scholars’ attention.

Migration is obviously a complex phenomenon and it is not less multifarious

when looking at it from a European perspective. Guest workers and post-colonial

recruitment policies, refugee flows and socio-economic impact of immigration,

Assistant Professor, Department of International Policy and Foreign Regional Studies, School of Public Policy, The

Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, klimova-gs@ranepa.ru

1 International migrant stock. World Bank data. Available from

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL?end=2015&start=1960&view=chart&year=1997 2 International Migrants by Country of Destination, 1960-2015. Migration Policy Institute. Available from

http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/international-migrants-country-destination-1960-

2015?width=1000&height=850&iframe=true

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cultural adaptation and diversity, political participation and migrant rights – all of

these and other aspects are important to understand the phenomenon of migration.

Any research of it or its’ aspects requires the scholar to take into account a wide

range of political, economic, sociological, cultural and historic categories. I suppose

there are two fundamental positions that are useful in studying migration within

European borders. Firstly, we should remember that migration influences both sides:

the country of immigration and the country of emigration. According to that, study

should contribute the policy of positive sum. Secondly, it is not only political or

economic question, but the moral one. Analysing migration means studying real

people in different situations. From this perspective, scientific contribution to the

balanced and detailed migration policy can’t be limited by the issues of incoming

people, but embrace those who are already here, working up the aspects of

interaction, integration and reaping the benefit both for the EU and the global world.

In this context, this paper focuses on the issue of the perception of migrants

in host societies, the mechanism of its shaping and the factors that impact the image

of the migrant. The working hypothesis is that the economic factors (such as

economic activity, unemployment and level of education) are the key factors and

triggers of the migrant image’s forming in the EU. The perception of migrants in

host societies can be viewed not simply as a topical issue, connected, for example,

with the migration crisis in the EU, but as one of the key social problems. The

migration situation in the European Union also actualizes and fuels long-held

discussions about the role, image, perception and prospects of foreigners’ integration

into the host societies.

The paper proceeds by a short methodological comment that defines author’s

position. Then it observes the image of a migrant and the way of its construction.

Relying on the idea that the shaping of image is effected by the social patterns of the

host society, the paper continues looking at the role of political and mass media

discourse in this process. It then focuses on the EU citizens’ attitude to migrants,

using social survey data. From the perspective of the existing external and internal

types of migrants it clarifies that a “migrant” has mainly negative perception and is

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generally associated with non-EU asylum seekers. It also focuses very precisely on

the comparative analysis of the data of EU citizens and the types of migrants. The

correlation analysis of it shows that low level of education and economic activity as

well as unemployment increase risk of the migrant image as «the stranger» not «the

other».

Methodological commentary

Before proceeding to the main part, I would like to note several aspects that

outline the methodological field of the research. To begin with, migration is usually

studied through two paradigms: “methodological nationalism” and

“transnationalism”. The assumption of methodological nationalism is that the

national state is regarded as the only possible and natural form of the division of the

world, and also as the only possible and self-evident unit of analysis (Wimmer and

Glick Schiller, 2002; 2003). Transnationalism is an attempt to overcome the

centrality of the research view of national states (Faist, 2000; Portes and DeWind,

2007; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 2017; Vertovec, 2004). The paradigm of

transnationalism appeared to be on the top of agenda last decades. Today the

physical movement from one country to another is not followed by the consequences

with which it was associated even in the middle of the XX century. Nowadays, due

to the technological development, migrants live in a special transnational space,

building networks over the national borders. The methodological nationalism first

and foremost faces the challenge of the convention of the defining political borders

on a national basis (Malahov, 2015). The national state is a relatively new historical

phenomenon, and before its uprise (as, by the way, today) people had crossed

confessional or ethnic frontiers, not the national ones. Thus, this essay is written in

the perspective of the transnationalism.

Other notes are connected with the applied terms. The concept image is

polysemantic and is used in different contexts. In this paper this term is used in the

semiotic aspect of its meaning (Lotman, 1992). In other words, image – is the

construct of consciousness, used by an individual as a way of communication. Image

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is functioning in the sphere of social practice and feeling. By the means of image

social norms can be framed and evaluated, consequently the image shapes the

expectations and behaviour of people. (Belousova, 2017). The image of a migrant is

a clear example of that function.

Although there is a language gap between emigrant and immigrant, in

everyday practice we usually call all of people crossing the borders the migrants.3

This economy of ordinary language allows me to use the term migrant as a

generalizing synonym in this paper. But the other reason to do so is the data source

of the research. Public perception of migrants is studied by means of open

sociological data and it is clear that we cannot be sure that there is clear

understanding of the differences between “migrants”, “immigrants”, “asylum

seekers” or “refugees” by the respondents of the used surveys.

However, one primitive typology of the migrants is applied in this paper.

Studying phenomenon of migration within EU borders has some features. Political

and geographical structure of the European Union frame different types of migration

flows. Not taking into account migration within national borders, we see variety of

international migration. Crossing EU borders with countries which are not members

of the Union can be called external migration, while moving from one member-state

to the other – internal. Understanding the importance of demographical, gender,

economic and other criteria of migration, I will distinguish only EU (internal) and

non-EU (external) migrants. This position is also connected with the structure of

surveys and EU citizens answers.

The Image of a Migrant: aspects of shaping

“Who is the migrant?” – the answer to this question is obvious only at first

sight. Firstly, the borderline between migrants and autochthonous inhabitants is not

that clear. Many of those who are classified as indigenous residents of a particular

country are not autochthons. Either they themselves, or their closest ancestors once

3 UN defines a migrant as any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she was not

born, and has acquired some significant social ties to this country.

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immigrated here.4 Secondly, there are a lot of people whom no one will ever regard

as immigrants, although they should be attributed to this category on a formal basis.5

Thus, there is legal basis to determine status of a migrant, but this juridical rank will

not necessarily guarantee that a person will or will not be perceived as a migrant.

The image has different foundations.

The image of a migrant is one of the key aspects of the integration mechanism.

In other words, the process of its formation and functioning in the public

consciousness and social discourse to a great extend determines the prospects for the

resolving the problem of inclusion in the host society. In fact, with the foundation

of the concept of G. H. Mead, it can be said that the social process in case of the

migration influences the behavior of appropriate individuals. According to Mead the

mechanism of such an impact is a generalized other, “The attitude of the generalized

other is the attitude of the whole community” (Mead, 2009, P. 155). This means that

each particular person attributes an induvial as a migrant and perceives one using

stereotypes and patterns functioning in the host society.

The mentioned generalized other within the migration issue can be formed on

macro and micro levels. The micro level is the history and modern situation of the

particular community (town, village, etc.). The cultural traditions, previous

experience of migration and precise features of current migrants (demographic,

economic and etc.), level of development and effectiveness of social networks and

government – all of these has its impact on the attitude towards migrants and their

perception. And this level of analysis seems to be perspective for comparative

research. On macro level the generalized other as well is under the influence of the

variety of factors, but in my submission, governmental and media discourses are the

key ones. If we follow M. Foucault’s idea of “governmentality”, we can see that

Foucault proposed much broader understanding of government policy than just

decisions made by institutions and officials. He meant, above all, effort aimed at the

4 In 1988 Gerard Noiriel proved fifth French citizen who considers himself an indigenous Frenchman has at least one

relative in the third generation who was born outside of France. (Noiriel, 1988). 5 For example, the ex-president Nicolas Sarkozy’s father Pál Sarközy de Nagy-Bocsa immigrated to France from

Hungary in 1944, and became a French citizen only in the early 1970s, when the future French political leader was

already a teenager. But Sarkozy, born Nicolas Paul Stéphane Sarközy de Nagy-Bocsa is not considered as a migrant.

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formation of the image of the thoughts and actions of those on whom it is carried

out. (Gordon, 1991). The EU establishment is interested in appropriate attitude

towards migrants. The EU political space is not homogeneous, but the official

position of Brussels is transparent. The fundamental principles, claimed to be the

basis of the European integration and the European identity, include human rights,

humanism, respect to diversity and democracy. This, as well as Schengen acquis,

does not work in harmony with negative migration rhetoric. The ethic aspects

connected with refugee flow also contribute toward “softening” the official position.

The discussions and actions devoted to the overcoming of the crisis are usually

accompanied by statements similar to J.-C. Juncker’s position “Migration is both an

opportunity and a challenge for the EU”.6 In 2011 J.M. Barroso was very accurate,

saying “We know that it is now fashionable in some quarters to be extremist or

populist or even to wave sometimes the flags of xenophobia. This is not what we are

going to do. We will resist all these kinds of pressure. But to succeed in this, we

need to give citizens the confidence that we stand firm on two things: first, on

correcting the shortcomings of the existing system, so that effective relief can be

brought to situations of pressure and crisis; second, on ensuring, on this basis, the

full respect of human rights and humanitarian principles on which our Union is

founded. The people are ready to exercise solidarity, internally and externally, if

they are confident that their security concerns are addressed, decisively and

comprehensively”.7 Insisting on people’s readiness to internal and external solidarity

he acted as Foucauldian governmentality. He does not only put down to the EU

citizens appropriate way of thinking, but attempted to obtrude it. It is worth noting

that the deliberated and balanced discussion about migration is almost taboo. Both

positive or negative discourse about migration is mainly populism. One side is

accused of racism and xenophobia, the other of naivety. This taboo over the

migration discourse causes the policy of panic (Collier, 2013) and fear of unknown.

6 See J.-P. Juncker’s Speech. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration_en 7 See Barroso, J.M. Migration flows and asylum and their impact on Schengen. Available from

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-322_en.htm

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Consequently, not being gone through in detail issue of migration triggers the

negative image of a migrant.

The mass media is an important factor as it can frame debates and provide the

information that influences the perception of the citizens. We can refer the results of

recent research of European press prepared for the United Nations High Commission

for Refugees in 2015.8 This work has found that refugees and migrants have tended

to be framed negatively, described as a problem, rather than a benefit to host

societies. However, mass media can have a positive impact on the image of a

migrant. There were wide variations in how the press in different countries report on

asylum and immigration. Sweden was the country whose press system was the most

positive towards refugees and migrants. In contrast, coverage in the United Kingdom

was the most negative. Interesting that in some countries (Spain, Italy and Sweden)

the press, whether left or right, reported on asylum and immigration in broadly

similar ways, whilst in other countries reporting was highly varied. As we see the

position doesn’t depend on economic development or quantity of migrants. Even

more important that The European Union response to the crisis was widely seen as

inadequate, yet it was still defined as the key institution responsible for solving the

crisis. (Berry et al., 2015). The negative framing of the migration and consequently

migrants themselves we also noted by other researchers (Dekker and Scholten, 2017;

Jacomella, 2010).

Governmentality and mass media are not the only factors that affect the

construction of social patterns and public perception, but they can be seen as a key

one on EU level. And as we see they contribute, sometimes not deliberately, to the

negative attitude to migrants, causing public anxiety and not distinguishing types of

migrants.

8 The research embraced press in Sweden, Germany, Italy, Britain and Spain. It was focused on publications about

migration crisis in EU.

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Public attitude towards migrants9

Migration problems were always on the top of the agenda of the European

policy, but it should be noted that until 2015 the significance of this direction was

not considered either by the EU institutions or by its citizens as the sphere that

constitutes the main challenge for the Union. As we see, in Fig. 1 over the past 7

years, the population's interest in this issue has increased dramatically. The growing

attention to the problem of immigration in 2010-2011 is primarily connected with

the economic situation in the EU. The growth of unemployment and negative

macroeconomic dynamics, obviously, escalated the attitude towards migrants, as

potential competitors in the labor market and dependents. But until Spring 2015, the

immigration situation never took the first place in the European agenda, according

to Europeans’ opinion. Indeed, the immigration flow increased significantly during

this period. The most revealing is the number of people applying for asylum.

According to Eurostat data, from 2006 to 2012 the number of such requests grew

gradually, whereas after 2012 the intensity increases dramatically: 431 thousand

applications in 2013, 627 thousand in 2014 and about 1.3 million in 2015 and 2016.10

Thus, the change in the position of EU citizens is due to an objective external factor.

Notable that as the personally most important issue immigration was in top three

answers only in Germany (Denmark, Malta and Austria citizens regarded migration

as personal problem Spring 2016; Autumn 2016 – only Denmark).11 More

Europeans estimate migrations as a challenge, but not the personal one. It is possible

that social discourse and mass media effected public opinion more than individual

experience.

9 Taking into account the complexity of working with the public opinion, in this paper I will look at it through the

prism of open quantitative data of sociological surveys. 10 Asylum statistics. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics 11 Data of Eurobarometer - SB S2016, SB A2016, SB A2017.

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Fig. 1. Immigration as a key issue of the EU.12

The very structure of Eurobarometer publications shows that until recently

migration was not among the most acute issues, since it was not included in a

separate block of the survey. But, since the Autumn of 2014, the Eurobarometer

regularly polls citizens about their attitude towards the EU migration policy and

migrants. In general, the overwhelming majority of the EU citizens support the EU

policy, although these indicators were falling in Autumn 2015 – Spring 2016 and

this Spring. (See Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. EU citizens’ attitude towards common EU migration policy.13

12 The graphic is done according to the data of Standard Eurobarometer 81-87 for 2014-2017. 13 The histogram is done according to the data of Standard Eurobarometer 81-87 for 2014-2017.

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20

9 9 810

1621

24

38

58

4845

38

71 73 68 67 69 68

20 20 24 26 25 25

9 7 8 7 6 7

AUT UM N

2 0 1 4

S P R I N G

2 0 1 5

AUT UM N

2 0 1 5

S P R I N G

2 0 1 6

AUT UM N

2 0 1 6

S P R I N G

2 0 1 7

For Against Don't know

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It is worth noting that, in the framework of a special Eurobarometer survey

“The Future of Europe”, held in Autumn 2016, EU citizens have shown some

reduction in migration concerns. The problem of unemployment took the first place

among the main challenges for the EU (45%), as it was in 2014. But migration, as

well as social inequality, worries 36% of respondents (and the issue of

unemployment is, of course, connected with it). The inhabitants of Malta (62%),

Hungary (56%), Estonia and the Czech Republic (53%), Bulgaria (45%) and Great

Britain (42%) are the most concerned with migration. While the least of all this

problem worries citizens of Portugal (14%), Finland (15%) and Spain (16%).14 Such

a distribution cannot be explained only by the number of migrants in these

countries.15 It can be assumed that this is due both to the socio-economic situation

in the country and to the particular qualities of cultural traditions, the principles of a

collective identity formation and generalized other. In the same survey, only 11% of

respondents in the Czech Republic (this is the minimum indicator for the EU) and

14% in Bulgaria believe that the European community should pay more attention to

cultural diversity and openness, 28% of respondents in the Czech Republic (which

is the maximum result for the EU) and 27% in Hungary indicated that traditions are

a priority in addressing the challenges of globalization. Only 7% of respondents in

Spain, 8% in Finland and 12% in Portugal expressed support for the traditions as the

main direction of social efforts (the minimum figure is 5% in Sweden). The

development of openness is supported by 28% of respondents in Finland, 20% in

Portugal, 17% in Spain (the highest in Sweden and the Netherlands - 34%).16

Nevertheless, we cannot find a stable correlation between the attitude to the

migration crisis and the level of support for cultural diversity in the EU member

states. These data are an evidence that the attitude towards migrants and their image

in the public opinion are formed under the influence of up to date factors, as

14 Special Eurobarometer 451 “Future of Europe”. 2016. Available from

http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/yea

rFrom/1974/yearTo/2016/surveyKy/2131 15 See: International Organization for Migration. Available from https://www.iom.int/countries/; Asylum statistics.

Available from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics 16 Ibid. Special Eurobarometer 451.

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economic development and culturally entrenched, as social practice and effect of

generalized other.

Europeans differently perceive migrants from EU countries and non-EU

countries. The attitude towards migrants from non-European countries has not

changed fundamentally in the period of Autumn 2014 - Autumn 2016, including the

migration crisis (2015). Most EU citizens have negative feelings for them (see Fig.

3). Only a slight increase can be noted in the negative attitude in Autumn 2015 (up

to 59%) and some decline on the background of the maximum of positive feelings

(up to 37%) in Autumn 2016.

Fig. 3. EU citizens attitude to non-EU migrants.17

At the same time the positive attitude towards EU migrants during this period

is steadily growing (from 52 to 61%) with a decrease in negative one (see Fig. 4).

This dynamic of opinion can be explained by deeper cultural differences between

EU citizens and visitors from other regions of the world, rather than between

residents of European countries. But this social interaction and attitude can also have

economic background. I will come back to this hypothesis in next part of the paper.

At the same time, openness and the ideas of cultural diversity play an important role

in the European identity, although it is much easier to demonstrate it to less obvious

differences. In everyday social practices, ethnocentrism often manifests itself more

17 The histogram is done according to the data of Standard Eurobarometer 81-86 for 2014-2016.

35

34

34

34 3

7

57

56 5

9

58

56

8

10

7 8 7

A U T U M N 2 0 1 4 S P R I N G 2 0 1 5 A U T U M N 2 0 1 5 S P R I N G 2 0 1 6 A U T U M N 2 0 1 6

Positively Negatively Don't know

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often than cultural relativism, especially in those circumstances when “the Other”

views the world exclusively in ethnocentric categories. The differences in attitudes

towards migrants of different origins have both objective and subjective reasons, but

objective ones are more often material than cultural.

Fig. 4 EU citizens attitude to EU migrants.18

In general migrants of the same race or ethnic group are more attractive to

Europeans and migrants from poor non-European countries are the least desirable.

There was no global change according to the European Social Survey on the types

of migrants in the EU from 2002 to 2014. However, the existing shifts are

symptomatic and confirm the Eurobarometer data. The study demonstrated some

small positive dynamics in respect to migrants of the same ethnic group. Migrants

from poor European countries are seen as less desirable, but their overall evaluation

has not changed significantly in 21st century. The attitude towards migrants from

non-European poor countries has changed the most significantly: 11% of

respondents showed a sharply negative attitude towards them in 2002, while in 2014

they were already 20%. At the same time, the number of people who believed that

such migrants needed to be allowed into the EU increased by 1%. (Heath, Richards,

2016). The ethic, the everyday routine and the Foucauldian governmentality played

their roles in this dynamic.

18 The histogram is done according to the data of Standard Eurobarometer 81-86 for 2014-2016.

52

51 5

3

58 6

1

41

40

38

35

33

7

9

7 7 6

A U T U M N 2 0 1 4 S P R I N G 2 0 1 5 A U T U M N 2 0 1 5 S P R I N G 2 0 1 6 A U T U M N 2 0 1 6

Positively Negatively Don't know

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Significant differences with respect to undesirable migrants from non-

European countries exist between Europeans with different levels of education and

income. 60% of Europeans with high education approve the admission of migrants

from poor non-European countries. While among people with secondary education

this position is supported only by 38%. A slightly smaller but noticeable gap in

attitude to migrants from non-European countries is between the people with the

highest (57%) and the lowest (42%) income. These data are anticipated. Migrants,

and primo non-EU migrants, are the competitors for the working places. In the

situation when unemployment is always one of the key issues of EU agenda, fears

of autochthonous inhabitants are clear. The most vulnerable are the poorest (and

usually the least educated) members of the host society. Migration decreases their

wages and limits access to the social welfare. However, as recent researches show

the reasonable migration is not abstractly beneficial for the host society. C.

Dustmann and his colleagues studied the effect of immigration on wages in the UK

and they have found that while the lowest sector of wages is coming down due to

migration, the other part is growing (Dustmann et al., 2013). F. Docquier, C. Ozden

and G. Peri have also proved that migration encouraged growth of earnings of

autochthonous workers by general increase in labour productivity (Docquier et al.,

2010).

As we see quantitative data of sociological surveys give complex picture of

EU public opinion and image of a migrant. On one hand, EU citizens express support

to common EU migration policy. This is both the aspiration to share the challenge

and the intention to share the important idea of diversity and openness of European

identity. On the other hand, negative attitude and perception of migrants, first of all

external non-EU ones, are not hypocrisy or neglect to the ethic aspects (of course,

sometimes it is), but the anxiety about the social capital and functional social system

that attracts migrants to EU. That is true that part of the world migration is the

attempt to escape from the poverty and danger of dysfunctional social systems

(Acemoglu et al., 2012), but migrants are inclined to bring them to the host societies

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(Collier, 2013). Along with the economic fears that is the basement of the negative

attitude and image of a migrant.

Who are migrants/immigrants in public opinion

Studying public attitude towards migrants on the basement of social survey,

it is crucial to remember that respondents may mean something that doesn’t

correspond this the initial intention of the research. That is why we should consider

who do people have in mind when thinking and answering questions about migrants.

Most social surveys do not offer definition for the terms they use and respondents

may mean an asylum seeker or a refugee using the word “migrant” or “immigrant”.

It is usual for opinion polls and surveys to assume a level of knowledge about the

terms they used (Crawley, 2009). But this level of knowledge does not really exist.

To clarify the considered data let us turn to several important researches.

The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford initiated a survey in

the UK in 2011. One of the questions was “who do you have in mind when thinking

and answering questions about immigrants and migrants?”. They got rather sobering

results. The respondents were mostly like to think of asylum seekers (62%) and least

likely to think of students (29%), when they were asked about migrants. They tended

to think of migrants as those who come to the country permanently (62%) rather

than those who stay temporarily (less than 30%). People most commonly think about

foreigners (62% about non-EU citizens and 51% about EU citizens) answering

questions about migrants. Repatriates (7%) and UK-born children of migrants (12%)

were mentioned by few people (Blinder et al., 2011).

In the ISSP 2003 questionnaire on “National Identity”19 four items of migrants

were asked and only one was specified by the probe “Which type of immigrants

were you thinking of when you answered the question?”. The probe answer showed

that from one-fifth to one-third of the respondents in EU countries assumed to have

19 See International Social Survey Programme Research Group. Available from

https://www.gesis.org/issp/modules/issp-modules-by-topic/national-identity/

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thought about immigrants in general, but the rest associated migrants with non-EU

citizens and reflect the migration situation in the country.

Consequently, thinking of a migrant EU citizens would rather have an image

of an asylum seeker or a refugee from not European country, than a professor or a

top manager. EU-migrants (internal) are less associated with this category, even if

they arrive for permanent stay. The image of a migrant (mainly negative) is

stereotyped. Waves in statistic data clearly demonstrate that migration, is mainly

presented and then perceived as a basically crisis-driven issue (Beutin et al., 2006).

Perception of a migrant and migration itself is effected by many factors, including

functioning generalized other.

The economic factors of a migrant’s image.

There is variety of factors influencing public attitude and image of a migrant.

14 years ago, the European Monitor Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)

did a broad research on European public attitude to migrants. It was the analysis of

European cross-national data of Standard Eurobarometer (1997, 2000, 2003) and

European Social Survey (2001, 2003).20 EUMC has distinguished geography, social

categories and education, individual perception and unemployment as main factors

that impact public opinion about migrants (Coenders et al., 2003). The authors of

this research have found significant cross-national variety in attitude towards

migrants. A common logic that culture, economic development and migrant policy

influence the perception was proved. The impact of education and unemployment

shown in EUMC research has already been looked through in this paper. The role of

individual perception is closely connected to demography (age, sex, race and etc.),

religion, actual and perceived social norms, lifestyle, psychological type, political

believes (left-wing/right-wing ideologies) (Crawley, 2009). These data correspond

both to the results of other important researches and a common sense.

Nevertheless, since the initial attitude underlying this report is that another, it

can be supposed that the degree of migrants’ integration in the host society, their

20 The data of these surveys was also used in this paper.

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acceptance of existing social norms, contributes to the improvement of the image in

the eyes of autochthonous inhabitants. I assume that the level of integration to the

host society is caused by the economic factors.

The European Union uses special indicators to measure the integration of

migrants. The indicators were developed following the meeting of EU ministers on

the integration of migrants in the Spanish city of Zaragoza (the Zaragoza

Declaration)21 and approved by the Council for Justice and Home Affairs in June

2010. Coordinated indicators are used to measure the integration of migrants,

monitor their socio-economic status and the results of the respective policies of the

EU countries, assessing the integration of migrants in four areas: employment,

education, social inclusion and active citizenship. Variable survey data of labor force

(EU-LFS), statistics on income and living condition of the EU (EU-SILC), migration

statistics of Eurostat, data of the OECD International Program for the Evaluation of

Education Achievement of Students (PISA) are used for the calculation of these

indicators.

The active citizenship is mainly depended on over spheres and is the aim of a

following research. In this paper only indicators of employment, social inclusion and

education will be studied. To understand how effectively are migrants integrated

into the EU society I will evaluate the figures of indicators of EU citizens, internal

migrants (mobile EU citizens) and external migrants (citizens of non-EU countries).

The level of economic activity can be examined through: unemployment rate, long-

term unemployment, employment rate, youth employment rate, self-employment

rate, temporal employment and part-time employment. While social inclusion can

be measured by risk of poverty and median net income. The education can be rated

by highest educational attainment (share of population with tertiary, secondary and

21 Zaragoza declaration. 2010. Available from https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/declaration-of-the-

european-ministerial-conference-on-integration-zaragoza-15-16-april-2010

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primary or less than primary education) and etc. The effectiveness of this approach

was shown by series of EU reports.22

On 1 January 2016, the number of people residing in an EU Member State

with citizenship of a non-member country on 1 January 2016 was 20.7 million,

representing 4.1 % of the EU-28 population. In addition, there were 16 million

persons living in one of the EU Member States on 1 January 2016 with the

citizenship of another EU Member State (3.2 %). The number of people acquiring

the citizenship of an EU Member State in 2015 was 841.2 thousand, corresponding

to a 5 % decrease with respect to 2014.23 As we see the total quantity of migrants is

7.3 % of EU population, with a slight superiority of EU migrants.

The median net of the activity rate24 of EU citizens is 71% (73.1 % for 2016).

The internal migrants are the most active and rated in average – 76.98% (78.9%).

While the external migrants are the less economically active, but the gap with the

EU citizens is practically insignificant – 70.4% (71.2%). The data of the employment

rate (see Fig. 5) demonstrate almost the same situation. The more employed are

internal migrants and the less external ones. It is rather predictable. EU citizens are

usually crossing borders of member-states having rather high possibility of a job

there (higher income, career promotion and etc.). Due to the language ability and

social patterns, the EU citizens of the host country have some logical advantages.

The highest percentage (21.8%) of temporary employed is among the external

migrants (EU citizens – 13.3%, EU migrants – 17.49%). These data cannot be

evaluated negatively, as it can be connected with the fact of temporary migration.

The rate of part-time employment does not show significant difference between

types of migrants and gives comparable data – 22.4% external migrants, 22.3%

22 See Indicators of Immigrant Integration - A Pilot Study (2011). Available from

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-statistical-working-papers/-/KS-RA-11-009; Migrants in Europe - A

statistical portrait of the first and second generation. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-

statistical-books/-/KS-31-10-539; Migrants in Europe - A statistical portrait of the first and second generation (2011).

Available from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-statistical-books/-/KS-31-10-539; Indicators of Immigrant

Integration 2015. Settling In. Available from http://www.oecd.org/migration/indicators-of-immigrant-integration-

2015-settling-in-9789264234024-en.htm 23 Migration and migrant population statistics. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-

explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics 24 All data (2002-2015) are given in module, without sex differences, age 15-64, as the most active economic

involvement (except youth employment rate).

18

internal migrants. In average 17.9% of the EU citizens are partly occupied. These

figures can be connected with variety of positive and negative factors, including

education or lack of permanent contracts.

Fig. 5. The employment rate (2002-2016).25

The negative trend exists in the rate of the youth employment. If the EU youth,

as well as young EU migrant, in average is 74% employed, the external migrant

youth is involved in labour market only for 63%. Of course, it is comparable to the

general figures, but the youth integration is crucial for the development of the EU

society and it is important in case of the perception of the migrants from non-EU

countries (as they are mainly young male).

The median net of the self-employment rate is the lowest among internal

migrants (0.4%), only 0.7% non-EU migrants are self-employed, which means that

the minority of migrants organises workplaces for the locals or other migrants. In

comparison with 13% of self-employed EU citizens these figures are really minute.

The unemployment rate demonstrates more controversial situation (See Fig.

6). The data reveals permanent tendency, that the non-EU migrants suffered from

unemployment almost double more often than the EU citizens, and 30% more than

EU migrants. Even in the period of economic crises locals (who are usually more

25 The graphic is done according to the data of Eurostat.

65.6 65.763.8 63.7 64.5 65.5 65.9 64.8 64.4 64.5 64.5 64.5 65.2 66 67.168.6 69.6 69.6

67.8 67.6 68 67.8 68.2 69.2 70.5 71.7

57.8 57.8 57.859.5

61.4 62.4 62.959.9 59.8 59.8 59 58.8 59.8 60.7 61.4

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

EU citizens, % Internal migrants, % External migrants, %

19

expensive labour force) are more ensured from unemployment than any category of

the migrants.

Fig. 6. The unemployment rate (2002-2016).26

We can submit that autochthonous social capital is working in favour of the natives.

The long-term unemployment rate proves this tendency, although the gap in figures

is not that big (See Fig. 7).

Fig. 7. The long-term unemployment rate (2002-2016).27

26 The graphic is done according to the data of Eurostat. 27 The graphic is done according to the data of Eurostat.

7.3 7.79 8.6

7.86.8 6.6

8.39 9.1

9.9 10.39.7

8.98.1

9.28.2 8.4

11.3 11.7 11.512.2 12.3

11.7

10.39.1

12.814.1 14.3 14.1

13.1

11.0912.1

16.2 16.6 16.717.7 18

16.415.1

13.7

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

EU citizens, % Internal migrants, % External migrants, %

38.940.6

44.846.6 46.5

43.5

37.9

33.9

40.3

43.244.8

47.749.9 48.9

47.3

41.8

35

28.5 28.4

33.9

37.3 37.939.1

42 41.138.8

37.6

40.839.6

41 41.8

37.3

31.329.6

37.8

41.242.5

45.246.9 46.2

44

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

EU citizens, % Internal migrants, % External migrants, %

20

The indicators of integration in the employment sphere (first of all the

unemployment rate) clearly declare that migrants from non-EU countries are less

integrated into the host society, while the EU migrants benefit Schengen acquis.

The external migrants are also the most sensitive to the risk of poverty (See

Fig. 8). And it is almost twice higher than the risk of the locals and 30% higher than

for the EU migrants. It corresponds with the rate of unemployment and proves the

negative trend in integration among external migrants.

Fig. 8. The poverty risk rate (2002-2015).28

The data of median income is likewise meaningful (See Fig. 9). The median income

of internal migrants is the highest (> 17000 euros per year) and it can be the evidence

for the fact that EU migrants in general are specialists of higher quality than external

migrants, whose median income is about 14000 euros per year. That also confirms

the data of unemployment and risk of poverty.

28 The histogram is done according to the data of Eurostat. There are no figures for internal migrants in 2007, 2008.

23.5

22.3

21.8

22 22.7

23.2

22.9

22.7

22

27 28 2

9.6

27.8

29 3

0.2

29.9

34.2 3

7.2

37.8

38.8 41

38.1 40.3

40.5

39.8

2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5

EU citizens, % Internal migrants, % External migrants, %

21

Fig. 9. The median income (2010-2015).29

As well as the figures of the poorest residents. Only 6.5 % of the internal migrants

faces with severe material deprivation, while it affects 8.3% of the locals and 12.7%

of the external migrants (See Fig. 10). Lack of social networks and unemployment

can explain that. But education rate reveals more precise explanation.

Fig. 10. The severe material deprivation rate (2010-2015).30

The education rate in correlation with the previous data show the reasons of

the negative economic trends. The EU migrants are notable for higher level of

education. The number of people with tertiary education is 10% larger among the

EU migrants than among autochthonous inhabitants and non-EU migrants. It is

29 The histogram is done according to the data of Eurostat. 30 The histogram is done according to the data of Eurostat.

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

18000

20000

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Median net

EU citizens, Euro Internal migrants, Euro External migrants, Euro

7.8 8

.3

9.2

8.9

8.2

7.4

8.3

5.1

6.6

6.6

7.5

7.1

6.5 6.5

66666667

12.1

11.9 12.4

14.6

13.2

12.2 12.7

3333333

2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 M E D I AN

N E T

EU citizens, % Internal migrants, % External migrants, %

22

noteworthy that quantity of people with this level of education is approximately the

same among the EU citizens and the external migrants (See Fig. 11). And if in

tertiary education we can see positive dynamic in all categories of people, upper-

secondary level demonstrates rather different trend. If the quantity of the locals with

Fig. 11. The tertiary education rate (2007-2016).31

upper-secondary education seems not to change greatly, the amount of internal and

external migrants is decreasing (See Fig. 12). This data is ambivalent. On one hand,

we see the positive trend, that is proved by the decrease of number of low educated

people and early leavers of education in all categories, on the other hand, it is

obvious that external migrants are the least educated.

Fig. 12. The upper-secondary education rate.32

31 The graphic is done according to the data of Eurostat. 32 The graphic is done according to the data of Eurostat.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

EU citizens, % Internal migrants, % External migrants, %

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

EU citizens, % Internal migrants, % External migrants, %

23

And if we do correlation analysis of these data, we will see obvious, but

important bonds. The significant correlation coefficient (r) is between the tertiary

education level and economic activity rate (0.7). This means that the higher is the

level of education, the more economically active is a person. However, there is no

meaningful correlation (r=0.47) between tertiary education and employment rate. It

means that people with that level of education are less effected by the economic

risks, they do not have any special guarantee for job, but, due to their features and

ability to action, they are more likely to be involved in economic process and to be

integrated. And we know that the highest percentage of such people is among EU

migrants. Though the EU citizens and the external migrants could be the main

competitors, as they demonstrate almost the same level of education. As we know

such competition leads to the increase of the wages in this sector, but it is not clear

that all the locals understand that.

Likewise, there is strong ties between upper-secondary education level and

unemployment rate (r=-0.89) and risk of poverty (r=-0.99). It indicates the fact that

the lower level of education has the person, the bigger is his risk of unemployment

and, consequently, poverty. As far as there is also no correlation with the level of

economic activity, we can suggest that this category of people is under the strongest

economic pressure. And we remember that the external migrants demonstrate the

lowest percentage in quantity of people with upper-secondary eduction, so they are

likely to face the poverty and be less integrated. Besides, they are the competitors of

the locals, but this competition leads to the decrease in wages. Thus, we see the

economic basement of the negative image of a migrant.

Of course, it is important to understand that correlation and causality are not

the same thing. The fact that some characteristics are correlated with particular

position of a migrant and a particular image of a migrant does not necessarily mean

that these features are the primary cause. As everything in human society, the factors

influencing attitude towards migrants and the image of a migrant in EU are complex.

But the considered data let us state that economic factors play key role in the process

of migrants’ integration and as a result effect the shape of a migrant’s image. They

24

are not less important than cultural ones and can promote the benefit of cultural

differences and maintain it on effective level.

Conclusion

There is no typical migrant, but there is a typical image of a migrant. And this

image in the EU is mainly negative. The EU citizens associate refugees or asylum

seekers with the term “migrant”. The citizens of other EU countries are rarely

identified as migrants. Thus, in perception of the EU autochthonous inhabitants a

typical migrant is a person from non-EU country, escaping from the war or poverty

in his native country (even though the reality is much more complicated). The

indicators of integration, which have economic background, demonstrate that such

attitude towards non-EU migrants has some reasons. The external migrants are more

affected by risk of poverty and unemployment and less integrated in general.

This economically based integration could be called structural and it is closely

connected with social integration. The more person is involved in economic

networks, the more efficient is the process of his perceptions of host social patterns.

This also contribute to the improvement of the image of a migrant. Thus, one of the

ways to build up better connection between host society and migrants of all types is

to promote their excess to the economical and then political institutes. On 7 June

2016 the European Commission adopted an Action Plan on integration of third-

country nationals which included actions across education and labour market, but

they should be more precise and broad.

What is even more important is the balanced, open and non-taboo discussion

about migration to be initiated on all levels of the EU construction. It is important to

define the way how the host society receives the migrants - as a trouble or as a

potential? The question “Is a migrant “the Stranger” or “the Other”?” itself is not

less important as the answer to it both for the migration, and the European identity.

To what extent integration policy is open to social diversity? To what extent and in

what way the right to be different coordinates with the necessity of the appropriate

level of social harmony? The more aware people are about the issues of migration,

25

the more effective is the process of interaction and integration, which corresponds

to the better image of a migrant. The image of a migrant and the effective level of

the diversity in the EU are the different sides of one medal.

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