tuesday general cybercrime dittrich 63.17 · 2015-02-02 · T.’Werner.’P2P’Botnet...

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BEYOND THE RANGE OF THE MOMENT:ETHICAL RESPONSE TO CYBERCRIME David Di9rich Katherine Carpenter 1 Copyright (C) 2010, 2015, David Di9rich, Katherine Carpenter. All rights reserved. NANOG 63 | San Antonio, TX | 3 Feb 2015

Transcript of tuesday general cybercrime dittrich 63.17 · 2015-02-02 · T.’Werner.’P2P’Botnet...

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BEYOND  THE  RANGE  OF  THE  MOMENT:  ETHICAL  RESPONSE  TO  

CYBERCRIME  

David  Di9rich   Katherine  Carpenter  

1  Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.  

NANOG  63    |    San  Antonio,  TX    |    3  Feb  2015  

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This  material  includes  research  sponsored  by  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  (DHS)  Science  and  Technology  Directorate,  Homeland  Security  Advanced  Research  Projects  Agency,  Cyber  Security  Division  (DHS  S&T/

HSARPA/CSD),  BAA  11-­‐01  and  Air  Force  Research  Laboratory,  InformaXon  Directorate  under  agreement  number  FA8750-­‐12-­‐2-­‐0329.  The  U.S.  Government  is  authorized  to  reproduce  and  distribute  reprints  for  

Governmental  purposes  notwithstanding  any  copyright  notaXon  thereon.      

The  views  and  conclusions  contained  herein  are  those  of  the  authors  and  should  not  be  interpreted  as  necessarily  represenXng  the  official  policies  or  endorsements,  either  expressed  or  implied,  of  Department  of  Homeland  

Security,  Air  Force  Research  Laboratory  or  the  U.S.  Government.  

 Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  

Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.   2  

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ObjecXves  

•  Enlist  the  community  in  defining  the  parameters  for  effecXve  and  safe  counter-­‐criminal  acXons  

•  Produce  a  healthy  and  open  debate  of  all  aspects  of  previous  botnet  takedown  acXons  

•  Elicit  comments  from  NANOG  members  about  interacXng  with  an  advisory  body  helping  guide  risky  network  operaXons  before  &  aeer  acXon  

Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.   3  

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ACTING  ON  THE  RANGE  OF  THE  MOMENT  

 “a  lot  of  people  …  are  frustrated  and  angry  and  they  want  to  kick  some  bad-­‐guy  ass.  that  in  itself  is  great,  unless  it  leads  us  to  range-­‐of-­‐the-­‐moment  thought  and  acXon,  such  as  taking  down  botnets.  can  we  uplevel  this  discussion  -­‐-­‐  talk  about  strategic  teamwork  that  would  have  a  lasXng  impact  on  bad-­‐guy  profits?”      Paul  Vixie  

4  Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.  

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FRUSTRATION  AND  LOATHING  

•  “Law  enforcement  is  not  doing  their  job.”  •  “I  found  a  cache  of  stolen  documents  and  reported  it  to  LE.  It’s  

been  months  and  nothing  has  happened  and  they  haven’t  told  me  anything.”  

•  “What’s  the  result  of  most  botnet  takedowns?  The  botnets  are  mostly  sXll  up  and  running  and  not  a  single  person  is  in  jail.”  

 

"We  will  conAnue  to  fight  the  threat  of  botnets  and  the  criminals  behind  them,"  says  Davis.  "We'll  start  by  dismantling  their  infrastructure  and  won't  stop  unAl  they're  standing  in  front  of  a  judge.”  Chris  Davis,  CEO  for  Defence  Intelligence  (re:  Mariposa  Botnet)  h9p://security.ulitzer.com/node/1305941    

5  Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.  

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DomesXc  JusXce  Systems  

•  Civil  and/or  Criminal  Process  •  Codified  Law  vs.  Common  Law  •  JusXce  is  a  “deliberaXve”  process  

– ConsXtuXonal  protecXons  – The  Grand  Jury      – MLAT  system  for  trans-­‐naXonal  criminal  invesXgaXons  

6  Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.  

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DiscriminaXon,  collateral  harm  

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Level   Actor’s  Posture   Characteris3c  Ac3ons  

4   Non-­‐cooperaXve  

Intelligence  collecXon,  tracebacks,  cease  &  desist,  takedown/takeover,  retaliatory  counterstrike  

3   CooperaXve   Joint  traceback,  collaboraXon,  sharing  

2   InteracXve   Modify  own  systems  in  response  to  a9ack  

1   Involved   Uses  AV,  simple  firewalls,  basic  encrypXon  

0   Unaware   None  (expect  others  to  protect  them)  

ACTIVE  RESPONSE  CONTINUUM  First  Agora  workshop  (June  8,  2001)  

3  more,  funded  by  Cisco,  through  2004   h9p://www.flickr.com/photos/69839732@N08/8010796716/  

8  Copyright  (C)  2013,  2015  David  Di9rich.  All  rights  reserved.  

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LEVEL  4  OF  THE  ACTIVE  RESPONSE  CONTINUUM  

•  Non-­‐cooperaXve  ‘intelligence’  collecXon  –  External  services  –  Back  doors/remote  exploit  to  access  internal  services  

•  Non-­‐cooperaXve  ‘cease  &  desist’  –  “InterdicXon”  ala  Berman-­‐Coble  bill  –  Disabling  malware  

•  RetribuXon  or  counter-­‐strike  •  PreempXve  defense  (a.k.a.  “offense”)  

Involves  things  outside  your  sphere  of  authority,  without  coopera1on  of  their  owners/operators  

9  Copyright  (C)  2013,  2015  David  Di9rich.  All  rights  reserved.  

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Levels  of  AcXon  

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ETHICS  AND  THE  PRIVATE  SECTOR  

11  Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.  

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EXHIBITING  INTEGRITY  

•  “Integrity,  as  I  define  it…”*  1.  Able  to  discern  right  from  wrong  2.  AcAng  on  what  you  have  discerned,  

even  at  personal  cost  3.  Saying  openly  that  you  are  acAng  on  your  

understanding  of  right  from  wrong        *  Stephen  L.  Carter.  Integrity.  BasicBooks  –  A  division  of  Harper  Collins  Publishers,  1996.  ISBN  0-­‐465-­‐03466-­‐7  h9p://www.stephencarterbooks.com/books/nonficXon/integrity    

12  Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.  

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Ethical  Frameworks  

•  Deontology  (normaXve)  –  Rules  

 Torture  is  always  wrong  •  ConsequenXalism  

–  Focus  on  outcomes  –  “The  end  jusXfies  the  means”  

 If  it  saves  $LIVES,  torture  is  acceptable  •  Virtue  Ethics  

–  Focus  on  the  actor,  their  history  of  acXng  in  a  virtuous  manner  

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Virtuous  Choice  •  The  Right  Agent  •  Done  to  the  right  person  

•  At  the  right  Xme  and  place  

•  To  the  right  degree  •  In  the  right  way,  and  •  For  the  right  reason  

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“Right  acAon  is  that  which  a  person  with  pracAcal  wisdom,  that  is,  the  ability  to  reason  well,  would  choose  in  the  circumstances.”    D.  Chan,  Beyond  Just  War:  A  Virtue  Ethics  Approach,  ISBN  978-­‐1-­‐137-­‐26340-­‐7.  Palgrave  Macmillan,  2012.  

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Reflect  Ethics  •  What  is  [your]  intent  in  [your  proposed  acXon]?  •  Who  is  the  stakeholder  being  served?  •  How  would  this  stakeholder  view  my  acXons  and  interpret  my  intent?  

•  Would  they  feel  grateful,  neutral  or  resenyul?  

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"When  engaged  [in]  `world-­‐fixing,'  one  needs  to  `[derive  their  methods]  through  constant,  criXcal  reflecXon  on  the  goals  of  research  and  the  research  quesXons,'  understanding  not  only  the  problems  to  be  solved,  but  the  potenXal  effects  on  all  parXes  involved.”  -­‐    Anne9e  Markham  

A.  Markham.  Method  as  Ethic,  Ethic  as  Method:  A  Case  for  Reflexivity  in  QualitaXve  ICT  Research.  Journal  of  InformaXon  Ethics,  15(2):37–55,  2006.  

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DHS S&T AND THE MENLO REPORT

Belmont  Principle   Menlo  Applica3on  

Respect  for  Persons   Ø IdenXfy  stakeholders  Ø Informed  consent  

Beneficence   Ø IdenXfy  potenXal  benefits  and  harms  Ø Balance  risks  and  benefits  Ø MiXgate  realized  harms  

JusXce   Ø Fairness  and  equity  AddiXonal  Menlo  Principle:  Respect  for  the  Law  and  Public  Interest  

Ø Compliance  Ø Transparency  and  accountability  

16  

•  DHS  Working  Group  on  Ethics  in  ICTR  –  Inaugural  mtg  -­‐  May  26th-­‐27th,  2009,  Washington,  DC  –  Lawyers,  Computer  ScienXsts,  IRB  Members,  Ethicists  

•  Report  published  in  Federal  Register,  Dec.  2011  –  Revision  based  on  comments  delivered  May  2012  –  “Companion  to  the  Menlo  Report”  published  in  2012  

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STAKEHOLDER  ANALYSIS  •  Primary  Stakeholders  

“Those  ulXmately  affected  [either  posiXvely  or  negaXvely]”  

•  Secondary  Stakeholders  “Intermediaries  in  delivery  [of  the  benefits  or  harms]”  

•  Key  Stakeholders  “Those  who  can  significantly  influence,  or  are  important  to  the  success  [or  failure]  of  the  project”    

17  Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.  

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RelaXonships  and  “Distance”  

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CASE  STUDY:  HYPERVM/KLOXO  (2009)  

19  Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.  

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Timeline of events

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Stakeholders

Entity Activity Type Risk/Benefit

Researcher Discovered vulnerabilities Key Reputation, altruism, personal safety

Programmers Write and maintain software Key Jobs

Vendor Control programmers’ activities

Key Reputation, lost revenue

Svc. Providers Customers of vendor; provide service to clients

Secondary Lost revenue

Clients Create/run virtual storefronts Primary Lost revenue

Customers Buy from online stores Primary DoS, fraud

Criminals and attackers

Exploit services Key Booty, LOLZ, Arrest

Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.  

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CASE  STUDY:  KELIHOS    TAKEDOWN  (2012)  

22  Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.  

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Raise  the  Costs  of  the  A9acker  

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Achieving  the  Desired  Outcome  

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Back  of  the  Envelope  

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Hours   Rate   Cost  

37   $300/hr   $11,000  

73   $150/hr   $11,000  

110   $100/hr   $11,000  

Bots   Rate   Cost  

110,000   $200/10K   $2,200  

110,000   $400/10K   $4,400  

110,000   $1K/10K   $11,000  

Cost  to  replace  Kelihos  in  24  hours  

ComparaXve  cost  to  iniAate  sinkhole  

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ROLES  &  RELATIONSHIPS  

26  Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.  

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ELEMENTS  OF  A  VIABLE  FRAMEWORK  FOR  ARC  

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A9ributes  of  a  Viable  (Ethical)  Framework  

•  Should  handle  deconflicXon  (in  more  than  the  military  sense)  

•  Should  provide  before-­‐  and  aeer-­‐acXon  review  •  Should  favor  government  over  private  sector  acXon  at  the  extreme  end  of  the  ARC  

•  Should  favor  civil/criminal  process  over  extrajudicial  private  sector  acXon  

•  Should  follow  virtue  ethics  (Integrity  +  “Right  AcXon”  jusXficaXon)  

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How  do  NANOG  members  fit  in?  

•  How  should  your  organizaXon  be  involved?    – AcXve,  or  secondary?  

•  What  influence  does  your  organizaXon  have  in  terms  of  botnet  miXgaXon  operaXons?  

•  What  limits  your  organizaXon’s  ability  to  be  acXvely  involved?  

•  How  should  your  organizaXon  express  its  concerns  in  botnet  miXgaXon  operaXons?  

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CONTACT  

•  Dave  Di9rich  University  of  Washington  di9rich  @  uw.edu  h9ps://staff.washington.edu/di9rich/    

•  Katherine  Carpenter  carpenter.katherinej  @  gmail.com  

30  Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.  

QuesXons?    Discussion…  

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References  •  AcXve  Response  ConXnuum  

David  Di9rich  and  Kenneth  E.  Himma.  AcXve  Response  to  Computer  Intrusions.  Chapter  182  in  Vol.  III,  Handbook  of  InformaXon  Security,  2005.  h9p://ssrn.com/abstract=790585    

•  Levels  of  AcXon  Adapted  from:  David  Di9rich  and  Kenneth  E.  Himma.  AcXve  Response  to  Computer  Intrusions.  Chapter  182  in  Vol.  III,  Handbook  of  InformaXon  Security,  2005.  h9p://ssrn.com/abstract=790585    

•  DHS  “Menlo  Report”  D.  Di9rich  and  E.  Kenneally  (editors).  The  Menlo  Report:  Ethical  Principles  Guiding  InformaXon  and  CommunicaXon  Technology  Research,  December  2012.  h9p://www.cyber.st.dhs.gov/wp-­‐content/uploads/2012/09/MenloPrinciplesCORE-­‐20120803.pdf    

•  Achieving  the  desire  outcome  C.  Rossow,  D.  Andriesse,  T.  Werner,  B.  Stone-­‐Gross,  D.  Plohmann,  C.  J.  Dietrich,  and  H.  Bos.  SoK:  P2PWNED  —  Modeling  and  EvaluaXng  the  Resilience  of  Peer-­‐to-­‐Peer  Botnets.  In  Proceedings  of  the  IEEE  Symposium  on  Security  and  Privacy,  May  2013.  T.  Werner.  P2P  Botnet  Kelihos.B  with  100.000  Nodes  Sinkholed,  March  2012.  h9p://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/p2p-­‐botnet-­‐kelihosb-­‐100000-­‐nodes-­‐sinkholed/index.html    

•  RelaXonships  and  “Distance”  Adapted  from:  Katherine  Carpenter  and  David  Di9rich.  Bridging  the  Distance:  Removing  the  Technology  Buffer  and  Seeking  Consistent  Ethical  Analysis  in  Computer  Security  Research.  In  1st  InternaXonal  Digital  Ethics  Symposium.  Loyola  University  Chicago  Center  for  Digital  Ethics  and  Policy,  October  2011.  h9p://staff.washington.edu/di9rich/papers/loyola-­‐2011/    

•  Stakeholder  analysis  D.  Di9rich.  FAQ  on  Kelihos.B/Hlux.B  sinkholing,  March  2012.    h9p://www.honeynet.org/node/836    Di9rich,  Leder,  and  Werner.  A  Case  Study  in  Ethical  Decision  Making  Regarding  Remote  MiXgaXon  of  Botnets.  In  Proceedings  of  the  14th  InternaXonal  Conference  on  Financial  Cryptograpy  and  Data  Security,  FC’10,  pages  216–230,  Berlin,  Heidelberg,  2010.  Springer-­‐Verlag.  Di9rich,  Bailey,  and  Dietrich.  Towards  Community  Standards  for  Ethical  Behavior  in  Computer  Security  Research.  Stevens  CS  Technical  Report  2009-­‐1,  20  April  2009  Di9rich,  Bailey,  and  Dietrich.  Have  we  Crossed  the  Line?  The  Growing  Ethical  Debate  in  Modern  Computer  Security  Research.  In  (Poster  at)  Proceedings  of  the  16th  ACM  Conference  on  Computer  and  CommunicaXon  Security  (CCS  '09),  Chicago,  Illinois  USA,  November  2009  

Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.   31  

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KELIHOS  SINKHOLE  FAQ  

32  Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.  

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KELIHOS  SINKHOLE  FAQ  

33  Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.  

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Kelihos  

34  Copyright  (C)  2010,  2015,  David  Di9rich,  Katherine  Carpenter.  All  rights  reserved.  


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