The North Korean Nuclear/Missile Crisis

Dr. Clay MoltzCenter for Nonproliferation Studies

Monterey Institute of International StudiesJune 2005

2

Current Crisis

• October 2002—U.S. accuses DPRK of cheating

• U.S. cuts off fuel oil• DPRK withdraws from NPT

and kicks out IAEA inspectors

• DPRK restarts plutonium producing reactor

• Multiple rounds of talks fail to yield progress

• How did we get here?

3

Overview

• DPRK nuclear crisis and its roots– Division of Korea (1945)

– Cold War developments

– Anachronistic, totalitarian state seeking to survive

• Complex alliance and security questions for U.S.

• Vexing questions for future nuclear controls

4

DPRK Leadership• Japanese occupation (1911)• Rise of Kim Il Sung as

guerilla leader; selected as head of DPRK (1948)

• Allies with USSR and China• Struggle for power vs.

authoritarian South during Cold War

• Succession to his son, Kim Jong Il (1994)

Kim Il Sung

Kim Jong Il

5

History of the North Korean Nuclear Program

• Soviet assistance in civilian nuclear field

• Post-Korean War agreement on nuclear training (1956)

• Soviet provision of a 2 MWt research reactor

• Yongbyon reactor installed in 1965

• Possible planning for weapons capability

6

Strategic Environment

• South Korean nuclear power program aided by Western countries

• U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea

• South Korea begins nuclear weapons program in 1970s (French reprocessing deal)

• U.S. halts ROK weapons program (but begins “Team Spirit” exercises)

7

DPRK Decision-Making: 1970s

• Fear of ROK cheating

• Increasing political isolation from China and Soviet Union

• Beginning to lose economic race with South

• Drive to develop independent nuclear capability (for power, weapons, or both)

8

Nuclear Expansion in 1980s• Weapons research, uranium

mining/milling, and fuel fabrication facilities opened

• 20 MWt (5 MWe) research reactor in Yongbyon

• Construction of two power plants begun (gas-graphite reactors)

• Power reactor deal with Soviets; DPRK forced to join NPT (1985)

Outside of Yongbyon-1 reactor

Yongbyon 20 MWt (5 MWe) reactor

9

Fuel rod fabrication plant in Yongbyon

10

Uncompleted Yongbyon-2 , 50 MWt power reactor

11

Unfinished 200 MWt power reactor in Tae’chon

12

DPRK Missile Program

• Attempts to produce Chinese missiles

• Scuds from Egypt reverse-engineered

• Development of independent production capability

• Cooperation with states in Middle East; exports to Iran (War of the Cities)

• Development of Nodong missile

13

International Nuclear Issues: Early 1990s

• U.S. withdraws tactical nuclear weapons from ROK

• Bilateral denuclearization agreement with South (1991)

• IAEA safeguards agreement (1991) and DPRK facilities declaration (1992)

• IAEA inspections reveal discrepancies

14

Agreed Framework and KEDO• IAEA calls for special inspection

(February 1993)• DPRK initiates withdrawal from NPT

(March 1993)• Jimmy Carter visits Pyongyang (July

1994)• Agreed Framework (October 1994)• Korean Peninsula Energy

Development Organization (KEDO) (1995)

15

Map of DPRK Nuclear Sites

16

Missile Concerns

• Beyond the Nodong• Rumsfeld Commission

Report (July 1998)• Taepodong I test over

Japan (August 1998)• DPRK export goals

17

18

19

Other North Korean WMD Programs

• Biological Weapons– Evidence of past foreign assistance (GDR)– Some capabilities, but weaponization not clear

• Chemical Weapons– More solid evidence – Stockpile estimated at 2,500-5,000 tons – Artillery warheads and threat to U.S./ROK

forces

20

DPRK Chemical Weapons Facilities

21

Progress and Problems (pre-2002)

• Delays in Agreed Framework

• Missile test/moratorium for food aid

• Normalization of relations (Italy, Australia, UK)

• Economic engagement (South Korea)

• But apparent DPRK nuclear cheating

22

U.S.-DPRK Relations Today

• Pres. Bush’s distrust of Agreed Framework and Kim Jong Il

• DPRK’s nuclear threats• Recent ROK nuclear admissions• Demise of Agreed Framework (good or bad?)

– No more fears of nuclear transfer (or rewards)

– But no inspection mechanism

23

Simulator Building at Kumho site

24

Ship Terminal at Kumho Site

25

Status of Light-Water Reactors at Kumho Site

26

International Efforts

• Bilateral Talks (2002)—DPRK, U.S.• Three-Party Talks (2003)—DPRK,

U.S., China• Six-Party Talks (2003-2005)—

DPRK, U.S., China, ROK, Japan, and Russia

• Specific options?

27

How Far is the DPRK from a Bomb?

• Pu on hand (2003): 12-20 kg.

• Pu in spent fuel rods that could be reprocessed: 25 kg.

• Pu production of 5 kg./year at Yongbyon

• Future uranium enrichment and other Pu reactors?

28

How Far is the DPRK from an ICBM?

• Limitations (payloads, CEPs, numbers)

• Multiple stages and range extension

• Taepodong II and CONUS: terror weapon

• Japan?• Is a deal possible?

29

Current U.S.-DPRKPolicy Dilemmas

• U.S. Dilemmas– DPRK aim: WMD or regime survival?– How to verify compliance with a deal?

• DPRK Dilemmas– U.S. aim: regime change or denuclearization?– How to ensure economic aid, if nuclear

dismantlement comes first?

30

Conclusion

• DPRK nuclear/missile threat increasing over time

• Three basic options: dismantlement, management, or defense

• Narrow vs. broad approaches to regional security

• U.S./DPRK hold keys to change (but other four can help)