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The Middle Eastern Proxy War

The Middle East has gained a globally notorious reputation for the decades of conflict that have plagued the region. Currently, the region has four failed states, three of which are currently battling civil wars. Furthermore, countless terrorist organizations and armed militias are seizing power in the vacuum left by ineffective and powerless governments. To the naked eye, it seems as if the region will always be bound for violence, insurgency, and conflagration. However, a closer look at the many conflicts that have arisen as far back as the early 20th Century will display a common theme. At the heart of every conflict, stands two omnipresent adversaries: Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Contributors

Sahil BablaniEhsan MeratiSpencer Hall

Eva Li

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Source: red24 Security

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What is a Proxy Conflict? A proxy conflict occurs when a country of significant political power has an active role in influencing another nation to go to conflict on behalf of its own strategic, political and economic objectives. In traditional wars, nations attack or defend themselves from foreign armed forces. Additionally, standard wartime alliances are comprised of nations working towards a common goal using military prowess. Proxy wars differ from the aforementioned scenarios in that a nation does not battle in the conflict itself with their own troops, but rather funds the war indirectly from a distance. As an example, the United States (US) and Afghanistan are jointly combating the remnants of Al-Qaida and the Taliban. In this war against terrorism, the United States actively deploys troops, uniformed officers, and members of the US government to the region with the intent of engaging in conflict in Afghanistan. Iran is also currently working with the Houthi Rebel movement that is at war against the government in Yemen, but unlike the partnership of the United States and Afghanistan, Iran does not deploy any troops to Syria, and does not take any part in the fighting. Instead, it supplies weapons, training and funding to the rebel movement from a distance.

Why Engage in a Proxy Conflict?

For major resourceful nations like the United States, the primary reasoning behind engaging in proxy wars is cost: US troops avoid danger, while foreign agents fight on behalf of their objectives. Proxy armies are also often more able to navigate local communities, and better collect necessary intelligence. In addition, the lost lives of American troops often creates domestic political backlash,

which is easily avoided by putting the bloody task of war to foreign agents. For states like Iran and Saudi Arabia however, the reasoning differs. These regional powers see proxy conflicts as an opportunity to spread their broader political agenda. In nearly all centers of battle in the Middle East, proxy armies double as political parties, yearning to spread revolutionary propaganda. Arab governments often backed Yasser Arafat or other Palestinian leaders, many of whom they loathed, in order to burnish their Arab-nationalist credibility among domestic populations that saw the Palestinian cause as the beating heart of Arab identity.

Historical Context of Saudi-Iranian Proxy Conflict The Saudi-Iranian relationship began in 1929, following the signing of a Saudi-Iranian Friendship Treaty. However, relations were not active until the 1960s, mostly due to differences in religious practices and Iran's recognition of Israel. In 1966, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia visited Iran with the aim of further strengthening relationships between both countries. The Shah of Iran, Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, reciprocated by paying an official visit to Saudi Arabia. The Shah supported King Faisal's efforts regarding Islamic solidarity and actively contributed to the establishment of multinational Islamic institutions, including the Organization of the Islamic World Congress, the Muslim World League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

Saudi-Iranian relations deteriorated sharply after 1979, when the Iranian Revolution brought to power a regime dominated by Shiite clerics hostile to the West and to Islamic regimes seen as “corrupt". The Iran-Iraq War, in which Saudi Arabia and its smaller Arab Gulf neighbours

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supported Iraq, put further strains on the relationship, as did attempts by Iranian pilgrims to mount political demonstrations during the hajj and to smuggle drugs into Saudi Arabia. Those relations continued to worsen throughout the 1980s, especially during the 1987-88 "tanker war”, when Iranian air and naval forces attacked shipments bound for Saudi and Kuwaiti ports in the Gulf and, in Mecca, Iranian pilgrims clashed with Saudi security forces, leaving hundreds killed.

Geo-Political Ramifications Saudi Arabia and Iran’s competition for influence in the Middle East has manipulated the region’s geo-political landscape for decades. Saudi-Iranian relations are generally guided by three factors: i) sectarian divisions between the Sunnis in Saudi Arabia and the Shi’ites of Iran, ii) economic factors regarding oil and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and; iii) aspirations for Gulf power and esteem. These layers of opposition form the arena within which this rivalry is most often observed. Present hostilities permeate the region’s geo-political

circumstance through increasingly fractious rhetoric, and more tangibly, proxy war. Prominently, these proxy conflicts are observed in Yemen, Iran and Pakistan’s borders, and Syria. Amidst this, Pakistan and Turkey are attempting to play off these actors to maximize their own benefit.

Armed Proxy Conflict The most direct conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran is observed along the Pakistani-Iran border where Wahhabis fanatics launch attacks on Iranian Baluchistan. This month, 14 Iranian Revolutionary guards were abducted from their border post. While Pakistan and Iran have enjoyed closer relations of late, their inability to stem these terror cells and potential liaising with Saudi Arabia to accommodate them consistently angers Tehran. This hypocrisy in stance is due to the divide in strategic objectives between the central Pakistani government and their security arm, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

The most alarming of conflicts observed between these two gulf powers is the war in Yemen. The Iran-backed Houthi’s overthrew the Saudi-backed Hadi government in 2014. Fighting over the past three years has created the worst humanitarian crisis in the world today. The Saudi-led coalition has devastated the civilian populace through airstrikes and cutting off their access to health care and clean water. With UN-mitigated peace talks breaking down and the coalition’s recent offensive on port city Hodeidah, an end to this conflict eludes the foreseeable future. Should Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia escalate to large-scale damage and mass casualties, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran would heighten dramatically.

Source: The Maghreb and Orient Courier

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Shifting Regional Alliances Pakistan and Turkey both seek to leverage the current situation for their own benefit. For starters, Turkey has declared it will buy oil from Iran regardless of sanctions. They have a strong relationship with Pakistan and are eager to get involved in the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), of which Pakistan and Iran are crucial members. Pakistan will begin trading in yuan and have praised developing this economic corridor with China. More pressing to Imran Khan is their depleted foreign reserves and desperate need for oil. Saudi Arabia, who enjoys sworn protection from Pakistan and have a hand in their politics, leapt into action by providing Pakistan with a USD 6 billion aid package inclusive deferred payment on USS 3 billion worth of crude oil. A more permanent solution to their energy woes lies in the Iran-Pakistan oil pipeline for which the Iran side is already complete. Further, Russia and Iran penned an agreement in Islamabad to build a pipeline connecting Iran and India through Pakistan. In response, Saudi Arabia pledged investment to finish the Turkmenistan portion of the directly competitive Turkmenistan-Pakistan-Afghanistan-India (TAPI) pipeline. How Imran Khan will position himself amidst this myriad of forces could tip the balance of power in the Middle East.

Historical Context of Western Perspective

Since anti-Western regimes rose to power in Iraq in 1958 and the British relinquished its century-old security role in the Gulf in 1968, US foreign-policy planners looked first to Iran and Saudi Arabia to preserve Western interests in the Gulf region. However, the Nixon Administration's "two pillars" policy of relying on Iran and, secondarily, on Saudi

Arabia to maintain regional security against Soviet and radical Arab inroads collapsed in 1979 with the fall of the Shah. Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait brought an end to any hopes in Washington and Riyadh that Saddam Hussein might become an acceptable partner in countering revolutionary Iran's efforts to export its anti-US, and anti-monarchial ideology across the Gulf. The two-pillars policy therefore was succeeded in the 1990s by the Clinton administration's strategy of "dual containment" of both Iraq and Iran, an approach that has, at best, limited success in achieving US goals for peace and security in the Gulf.

Current Western Outlook Today, Saudi Arabia and the United States are so intertwined economically, that the Trump Administration is hesitant to distance itself politically from the Royal Saudi Family. The recent death of Jamal Khashoggi, and the unsubstantial reaction by the US government, is evidence of this reality. The prominent reason for the economic ties between the US and Saudi Arabia is oil. Even though the United States has doubled its oil production over the last decade, and is now considered the world’s largest oil producer, it still turns to Saudi Arabia for 10% of its oil usage. The Saudi Royal Family can also indirectly control global oil prices, as the sole producer of oil in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Aramco, is centrally managed by the government. With this power, the Kingdom has the ability to control the firm's oil output, which affects the global supply of oil, and moreover its price. Saudi financiers have developed good relationships in Silicon Valley as well, in an attempt to diversify from oil with the Saudi Public Investment Fund. Recent examples include an investment of USD 3.5 billion into Uber, a 5% stake in Tesla, and a USD

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45 billion fund technology fund co-run with Japanese giant, Softbank. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has been the largest funder of tech start ups in the United States. Close relationships with Wall Street have also been developed, wherein they have recently become a core member of a USD 20 billion infrastructure fund with Blackstone, and are currently in talks with BlackRock, the worlds largest asset manager. In addition, the US defense industry is so entrenched in Saudi Arabia, that in 2017, arms contracts of up to USD 110 billion were announced. President Trump has announced that he must maintain these arms contracts, otherwise Saudi Arabia will turn to other nations to buy weapons and military equipment.

In addition to economic ties, the US views Saudi Arabia as an important ally in deterring the expansion of Iranian influence in the region, with Israel being the other major US ally in the region. In the current political climate, the US has tightly sided with Saudi Arabia in this proxy conflict against Iran.

Future Outlook The close relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia starkly contrasts the relationship between Iran and strategic foes of the US. Iran has developed close relationships with Russia, China, North Korea, and Venezuela, all countries with competing political interests to the United States and its allies. The scene eerily resembles the landscape underlying the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the world should take cautious steps to avoid exacerbating this conflict. With global powers being economically and politically tied to the outcome of proxy conflicts between Iran and Saudi Arabia, all eyes should be on the Middle Eastern political theatre as the destabilizing conflicts continue to unfold.

Source: The White House

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